

Countries engaged in armed conflicts (indicator no. 1)

Ending of armed conflict during 2009

1. Armed Conflicts

- In 2009 31 armed conflicts were reported, but a decrease in hostilities in Sri Lanka (northeast) and India (Nagaland) meant that at the end of the year 29 conflicts were active. The only addition to the list of conflicts with respect to 2008 is Sudan (southern).
- The large majority of armed conflicts took place in Asia (14) and Africa (10), while the rest occurred in Europe (three) the Middle East (three) and America (one).
- Approximately two thirds of the armed conflicts in 2009 were linked to identity issues and demands for greater self-government.
- The highest intensity armed conflicts took place in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, DR Congo (east), Pakistan (northeast), Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan (south) and Uganda (north).
- Violence increased in Yemen as part of the conflict between the Government and the followers of al-Houthi, in the north of the country, having a dramatic impact on the civilian population.
- Violence in Afghanistan became worse and in northeast Pakistan, with thousands of deaths, due to the expansion of the Taliban militia and an increase in terrorist attacks and clashes between insurgent groups and security forces.
- In Africa, the LRA area of operations moved from the north of Uganda to the border region between DR Congo, Sudan and the Central African Republic, while Somalia was witness to the worst escalation of violence in the last 20 years.

This chapter analyzes the armed conflicts that took place during 2009 (indicator 1). The chapter has two main sections, apart from the definition that follows and the map at the beginning which shows the active conflicts in 2009. The first section contains an analysis of the global trends in armed conflicts in 2009 and the second describes the evolution and most notable events of each armed conflict during the year.

1.1. Armed conflicts: definition

An **armed conflict** is any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible and where the continuous and organized use of violence: a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or has a serious impact on the territory (e.g. destruction of infrastructures or natural resources) and the human security (e.g. injury or displacement of civilians, sexual violence, food insecurity, effect on mental health and the social fabric or interruption of basic services); b) pursues goals that can be differentiated from common crime and are normally linked to:
- demands for self-determination and self government, or identity issues;
- opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State or the internal or international policies of the government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power;
- or to control the resources or the territory.

Figure 1.1. **Conflict dynamics**



Table 1.1. **Summary of armed conflicts 2009**

Conflict[1] -start date-	Type[2]	Main parties [3]	Intensity[4] / Trend[5]
Africa			
Algeria -1992-	Internationalized internal	Government, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) / al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	2
	System		=
Chad -2006-	Internationalized internal	Government, new UFR coalition of armed groups (UFDD, UFDD-Fundamental, RFC, CNT, FSR, UFCD, UDC, FPRN), MDJT, FPIR, Janjaweed militias, Toro Boro militia, Sudan, France	2
	Government		↓
Ethiopia (Ogaden) -2007-	Internal	Government, ONLF, OLF, pro-government militias	2
	Self-government, Identity		=
Nigeria (Niger Delta) -2001-	Internal	Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, militias from the Ijaw, Itsekeri, Urhobo and Ogoni communities, private security groups	2
	Resources, Identity		↓
Central African Rep. -2006-	Internationalized internal	Government, APRD, UFRD, armed groups split from UFDR (FURCA, MJLC), FDPC, France, MICOPAX, EUFOR RCA/TCHAD and highway bandits (Zaraguinas)	1
	Government		=
DR Congo (East) -1998-	Internationalized internal	Government, Mai-Mai militias, FDLR, FDLR-RUD, CNDP, FRF, PARECO, APCLS, armed Ituri groups, Burundian FNL armed opposition group, Ugandan ADF-NALU and LRA armed opposition group, Rwanda, MONUC	3
	Identity, Government, Resources		=
Somalia -1988-	Internationalized internal	New Transitional Federal Government (TFG) – including the moderate faction of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), and supported by Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a, warlords, Ethiopia, US, AMISOM–, radical faction of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) –including part of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Hizbul Islam, al-Shabab– and supported by Eritrea.	3
	Government		=
Sudan (South) -2009-	Internal	Ethnic communities militias, National Unity Government and the Government of South Sudan	3
	Territory, Resources, Self-government		↑
Sudan (Darfur) -2003-	Internationalized internal	Government, pro-government Janjaweed militias, JEM, several factions of the SLA and other armed groups	2
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		↓
Uganda (North) -1986-	Internationalized internal	Armed Forces of Uganda, Central African Republic, DR Congo and from South Sudan, pro-government militias from DR Congo and from South Sudan, LRA	3
	Self-government, Identity		↑
America			
Colombia -1964-	Internationalized internal	Government, FARC, ELN, paramilitary groups	3
	System		=
Asia			
Afghanistan -2001-	Internationalized internal	Government, international coalition (led by the US), ISAF (NATO), Taliban militia, warlords	3
	System		↑
Philippines (NPA) -1969-	Internal	Government, NPA	1
	System		=
Philippines (Mindanao-MILF) -1978-	Internal	Government, MILF	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf) -1991-	Internationalized internal	Government, Abu Sayyaf	1
	Self-government, Identity, System		↑
India (Assam) -1983-	Internationalized internal	Government, ULFA, DHD, Black Widow, NDFB	2
	Self-government, Identity		=

Conflict -start date-	Type	Main parties	Intensity / Trend
Asia			
India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989-	Internationalized internal	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
India (Manipur) -1982-	Internal	Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KNF, KNA, KYNL	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
India (Nagaland) -1955-	Internal	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM	1
	Self-government, Identity		End
India (CPI-M) -1967-	Internal	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)	2
	System		↑
Myanmar -1948-	Internal	Government, armed groups (KNU, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNU/KNLA, KNPLAC, SSNPLO)	1
	Self-government, Identity		↑
Pakistan (Baluchistan) -2005-	Internal	Government, BLA, BRA and BLF	2
	Self-government, Resources		=
Pakistan (northwest) -2001-	Internationalized internal	Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias, US	3
	System		↑
Sri Lanka (northeast) -1983-	Internal	Government, LTTE	3
	Self-government, Identity		End
Thailand (South) -2004-	Internal	Government, secessionist armed opposition groups	2
	Self-government, Identity		=
Europe			
Russia (Chechnya) -1999-	Internal	Russian Federal Government, Government of Chechnya, armed opposition groups	1
	Self-government, Identity, System		↑
Russia (Ingushetia) -2008-	Internal	Russian Federal Government, Government of Ingushetia, armed opposition groups (Jamaat Ingush)	1
	System		↑
Turkey (Southeast) -1984-	Internationalized internal	Government, PKK, TAK	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Middle East			
Iraq -2003-	Internationalized internal	International coalition led by the USA/United Kingdom, internal and external armed opposition groups	3
	System, Government, Resources		=
Israel-Palestine -2000-	International	Israeli government, settlers' militias, PNA, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committees	2
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		↓
Yemen -2004-	Internationalized internal	Government, followers of the cleric al-Houthi (al-Shabab al-Mumen)	2
	System		↑

1: Low intensity; 2: Medium intensity; 3: High intensity;
↑: Escalation of violence; ↓: Decrease of violence; = : Unchanged; End: No longer considered an armed conflict

1. This column includes those States where armed conflict is taking place and indicates in parenthesis the region within the State where the conflict is confined or the name of the armed group involved in the conflict. This last option is used in those cases where there is more than one armed conflict in the same State or in the same territory within the State, with the purpose of differentiating them.
2. The report classifies and analyses armed conflicts using a dual typology which addresses, on the one hand, the causes or incompatibility of interests and, on the other hand, the convergence of the scenario of the conflict and the parties involved. With regard to the main causes the following can be distinguished: demands for self-determination and self-government (Self-government) or identity issues (Identity); opposition

1.2. Armed conflicts: global trends in 2009

In 2009, 31 armed conflicts were reported, although at the end of the year only 29 remained active. During the year the military victory of the Sri Lankan Army over the LTTE and a decline in hostilities in the Indian state of Nagaland meant that both contexts were no longer considered armed conflicts. Compared to 2008, the total number of armed conflicts remains unchanged (31 conflicts during the year, 30 active at the end of the year) and the only variation is the inclusion of Sudan (south), which experienced a serious increase in violence. The large majority of armed conflicts took place in Asia (14) and Africa (10), followed by Europe (3), the Middle East (3) and America (1). In all of the cases analyzed in this section, the State was one of the contending parties. Nevertheless, in numerous conflicts there were frequent clashes between non-state armed actors, while in other contexts, such as Sudan (south), inter-communal violence explained a considerable part of the high mortality rates. All of the conflicts, except the dispute between Israel and Palestine,[6] were internal (14) or internationalized internal (16). The average duration of armed conflicts in 2009 was nearly 18 years, although this figure is questionable due to the difficulty of setting an exact start date for a conflict and due to the high number of current armed conflicts that have been through previous cycles of violence.

Although armed conflicts have multiple causes, it should be noted that **almost two out of three conflicts (19 of 31) refer mainly to identity issues or demands for greater self-government**. On the other hand, there are 14 cases where the main divergence is rooted in opposition to a specific Government or to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State. Of these, there were five cases –Iraq, Chad, Central African Republic, DR Congo (east) and Somalia– where several armed groups were struggling to take power or undermine the central Government. In those cases where the main reason for the conflict is opposition to the State system, we can identify two categories. In the first, which includes Colombia, Philippines (NPA) and India (CPI-M), the insurgency advocates the establishment of a socialist style political and economic system. In the second category,

Graph 1.1. **Regional distribution of the number of armed conflicts**



to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State (System) or the internal or international policies of a government (Government), which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or control over the resources (Resources) or the territory (Territory). In connection with the second typology, armed conflicts can be internal, internationalised internal or international. Internal armed conflict is any confrontation involving armed parties from the same State that operate exclusively within its territory. Second, an internationalized internal armed conflict is when some of the adversaries are foreign, and/or when the confrontation extends into a neighbouring country. To consider an armed conflict as internationalized internal, it is also taken into account the fact that the armed groups have their military bases in neighbouring countries, with the connivance of those States, and launch their attacks from them. Finally, international conflict is taken to be those where state or non-state actors from two or more countries are in conflict. In addition, it must be considered that most of the current armed conflicts have an important regional and international dimension and influence due to factors such as the flow of refugees, arms trade, economic or political interests (such as the legal or illegal exploitation of resources) that neighbouring countries have in the conflict, the participation of foreign combatants or logistic and military support provided by other States.

3. The main players that intervene in the conflicts are made up of a mixture of regular or irregular armed actors. The conflicts usually involve the Government, or its Armed Forces, against one or several armed opposition groups, but can also include other irregular groups such as clans, guerrillas, warlords, armed groups confronting each other or militias from ethnic or religious communities. Although they most frequently use conventional weapons, and more specifically small arms (which cause most of the deaths in the conflicts), in many cases other methods such as suicide attacks, bombings and sexual violence are used; even hunger is employed as a weapon of war.
4. The intensity of an armed conflict (high, medium or low) and its trend (escalation of violence, decrease of violence, unchanged) are evaluated mostly based on how deadly it is (number of fatalities) and other consequences on the population and the territory. In addition, there are other aspects to be considered, such as the systematization and frequency of the violence or the complexity of the military struggle (the complexity is normally related to the number of parties involved and how fragmented they are, the level of institutionalization and the capabilities of the State and the degree of internationalization of the conflict, as well as the flexibility of the objectives and the political willingness of the parties to reach an agreement). As a consequence, high intensity armed conflicts are usually those that cause over 1,000 annual battle-related deaths and also affect significant parts of the territory and population and include numerous actors (that establish relationships of alliances, confrontation or tactical coexistence among themselves). Medium and low intensity conflicts, with over 100 annual battle-related deaths, have the aforementioned characteristics but with a more limited presence and scope. An armed conflict is considered to be ended when a significant and sustained decrease in armed hostilities occurs because of a military victory, agreement between the actors in conflict, demobilization by one of the parties or because one of the parties abandons the armed struggle or limits it considerably as a strategy to achieve specific objectives. None of these options necessarily imply that the root causes of the armed conflict have been overcome or exclude the possibility of new outbreaks of violence. A temporary halt in hostilities, formal or tacit, does not necessarily entail the end of an armed conflict
5. In this column the evolution of events in the current year (2009) is compared with the previous year (2008). The escalation of violence symbol (↑) is shown if the general situation of the conflict during 2009 is worse than the previous year, the reduction of violence symbol (↓) if things have improved and the unchanged sign (=) if no significant change has taken place.
6. Although Palestine (whose Palestine National Authority is a political entity linked to a specific population and territory) is not an internationally recognized State, the conflict between Israel and Palestine is considered "international" and not "internal" since it is a territory which has been illegally occupied and it is not recognized as being part of Israel under International Law or by a United Nations resolution.

some of the contending parties have stated their intention to create an Islamic State or include essential elements of Islamic law in the institutions and laws of the State, such as the cases of Algeria, Afghanistan, Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf), Iraq, Pakistan (northeast), Russia (Chechnya), Russia (Ingushetia), Somalia and Yemen. It should be noted that some of the armed opposition groups that operate in those countries have been accused of having ties to the al-Qaeda network. Apart from the cases where the cause of the conflict is linked to identity and self-government or to the type of government or system, there are several countries where **control of resources and the territory** are essential to understanding the origin and the dynamics of the military conflict. This was especially clear in the cases of **Iraq, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Pakistan (Baluchistan), DR Congo (east), Sudan (Darfur) and Sudan (south), although in many other cases the control of, or access to, resources fuelled and aggravated the dispute**.

With regard to intensity, **in nine cases –Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, DR Congo (east), Pakistan (northwest), Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan (south) and Uganda (north)– very high levels of violence caused the death of nearly 1,000 people**, although in some of these cases, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan (northwest), Iraq, Sri Lanka, Somalia or Sudan (south), the number of deaths was much higher. Two countries joined the list of high intensity conflicts compared to the previous year: Uganda (mainly because of the spread of the LRA's armed activities to countries such as Sudan, Central African Republic or DR Congo) and southern Sudan (mostly due to increase in inter-communal violence). In contrast, conflict intensity decreased appreciably in some of the most virulent struggles of 2008, such as Chad, Israel-Palestine and Sudan (Darfur). Similar to last year, most of the armed conflicts were medium intensity (15 conflicts) and the remaining seven cases –India (Nagaland), Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf), Philippines (NPA), Myanmar, Central African Republic, Russia (Chechnya) and Russia (Ingushetia)- were low intensity. If we compare the situation to the previous year, **in 10 of the 29 active conflicts at the end of the year there was an increase in hostilities**, in eleven cases the situation did not change considerably and in eight cases a decrease in violence was reported: Chad, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Sudan (Darfur), Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), India (Jammu and Kashmir), India (Manipur), Turkey (southeast) and Israel-Palestine.

Graph 1.2. **Intensity of the armed conflicts**



a) Regional trends

By region, it should be noted that **most of the conflicts in Africa are linked to the struggle to take or erode current power due to opposition to the internal or international polices of the Government**. However, the number of conflicts where demands of self-government of a territory or group are the key to the conflict is much lower than the worldwide average. In fact, although in the cases of DR Congo (east), Nigeria (Niger Delta) and Uganda (north), identity grievances have been used to justify the struggle or mobilize certain sectors of the population, the cases of Ethiopia (Ogaden) and Sudan (south) are the only ones where the issue of self-government plays an important role. The second main feature of the conflicts in Africa is the regional dimension, due to the important role that Governments from neighbouring countries play on many occasions and also because numerous armed groups have their bases in adjacent countries. In this regard, of note is the clear link between the conflicts that are taking place in the Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan (Darfur), the incursions by the Ethiopian Armed Forces in Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government, the activity by armed groups from Rwanda in eastern DR Congo or the internationalization of the conflict in northern Uganda caused by the expansion of LRA activities to the southeast of the Central African Republic, northeast DR Congo and southeast Sudan. Except for the cases of Ethiopia (Ogaden), Sudan (south) and Nigeria (Niger Delta), all of the African conflicts were classified as internationalized internal. Another feature of armed conflicts in Africa is the high number of armed actors. Thus, in the cases of DR Congo (east), Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), and Nigeria (Niger Delta) the number of armed actors actively involved in the hostilities is greater than 10, and in another seven cases there are a minimum of four armed actors.

Currently, the average duration of armed conflicts in Africa (approximately nine years) is significantly below the world average (18 years) and the average for the rest of the continents. Thus, only three of the nine conflicts –Algeria, Somalia and Uganda (north)– have been going on for over 15 years, and seven of them began after 2000. However, the intensity of the conflicts in Africa is higher than in other regions, which is probably linked to the fact that **the continent is home to almost half of the highest intensity conflicts in the world: DR Congo (east), Somalia, Sudan (south) and Uganda (north).** With re-

Graph 1.3. **Intensity of the conflicts by region**



gard to the evolution of the wars in Africa in 2009, we should note the increase in violence in southern Sudan (mainly due to communal fighting) and Somalia (where some analysts have denounced the greatest escalation in violence of the last two decades) or the expansion of the LRA armed group into the Central African Republic, Sudan and DR Congo. On a positive note, we should highlight the decrease of violence in conflicts such as those in Chad, Nigeria (Niger Delta) or Sudan (Darfur).

In **Asia, contrary to what happens in Africa, over 70% of the armed conflicts are linked to demands for self-government or identity issues** and the majority (64%) is highly internal. However, there are also situations with a clear international dimension, such as the cases of Afghanistan, India (Jammu and Kashmir) and Pakistan (northeast). The average duration of the conflicts in Asia surpasses 26 years and is clearly the highest in the world. In this sense, it should be noted that two of the oldest insurgencies on the planet (the Karen in Myanmar and the Naga in northeast India) can trace their origins back to the 1950s, while the two main communist insurgencies on the continent (the NPA in Philippines and the CPI-M in India) began their activities in the 1960s. In addition, there are five other conflicts –Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), India (Assam), India (Manipur), India (Jammu and Kashmir) or Sri Lanka (northeast)– that have been active for over two decades. Some of the factors that may explain the long duration of the armed conflicts in Asia is the limited presence of international actors in facilitation and mediation tasks (especially by the United Nations), the large number of conflicts linked to the foundation of the State or the difficulty in resolving disputes linked to identity and self-determination, which are frequent in Asia. As far as intensity is concerned, we should point out that three of the nine conflicts that have the highest mortality rates on the planet are taking place in Southern Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan (northeast) and Sri Lanka, in spite of the fact that this conflict ended in May.

In regard to the actors, there is a mixture of conflicts on the Asian continent with some armed groups having significant war capability and control of territory –the CPI-M in India, the NPA and the MILF in Philippines or the LTTE in Sri Lanka before their defeat in the first months of 2009– and other conflicts which are characterized by the fragmentation of the insurgent groups –Afghanistan, Pakistan (northeast), India (Assam), India (Nagaland), Myanmar or Thailand (south). Beyond the fact that practically all Governments use the term terrorist when referring to their respective armed opposition groups, of note are some cases such as Afghanistan, Pakistan (northeast), India (Jammu and Kashmir) or Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf) where the Governments have closely tied their counterinsurgency strategies to the so-called global war on terrorism which provides them with political legitimacy and in some cases with economic and military support. In the last cases listed the armed groups have made religious demands linked to Islam. **Another characteristic of the disputes in Asia is that there are some States, such as India, the Philippines or Pakistan, that are home to several armed conflicts, with different causes, war dynamics and locations**. On the topic of the evolution of the conflicts in 2009, of note is the escalation of violence in Afghanistan and in northeast Pakistan –both with a growing involvement by the US Government– and the increase in counterinsurgency offensives by the Myanmar Government in the east of the country and the Philippine Government in Mindanao against the Abu Sayyaf group. Furthermore, it should also be noted the decline in hostilities in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir and Manipur. In another region in India, Nagaland, a significant decrease in the number of deaths led this report to consider this the end of the armed conflict. Also, the military victory by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces over the LTTE led to a drastic reduction in clashes and, thus, northeast Sri Lanka was no longer considered an armed conflict. However, in the final stages of the Army offensive, some of the most violent episodes of the war took place since its beginning in the 1980s.

Finally, there are some issues to consider with respect to the armed conflicts in the rest of the continents. In **America**, the conflict in Colombia continued to be one of the longest lasting and most lethal in the world, with a huge impact on the civilian population in terms of deaths and forced displacement. During 2009 violence increased in the southwestern regions of the country and the impact of the violence on the indigenous peoples was clear. In addition, the degree of internationalization of the conflict grew. In **Europe, the centre of disputes was again the area between the Black and Caspian seas**. In this region armed hostilities rose in the neighbouring Russian republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia due to the porous borders and a certain link between the insurgencies and the counterinsurgency policies. Nevertheless, in relative terms, the intensity of the conflict in both scenarios continued to be low. In Turkey, the different initiatives by the parties to resolve the conflict caused a decrease in the levels of violence, although armed clashes continued to be reported throughout the year and the Army continued to conduct bombing raids on the PKK in northern Iraq, where the group has its bases. Finally, in the **Middle East**, violence mounted in Iraq –mainly because of the proximity of the 2010 elections and the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi cities– and especially in Yemen, where there is a risk of internationalization of the conflict due to the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran and greater attention by the West to al-Qaeda's activities in the country. Furthermore, the intensity of the conflict between Israel and Palestine diminished, especially because of the end to the Israeli military offensive in Gaza in the month of January. In the cases of Israel-Palestine and Yemen, the intensity of the conflict was medium, while the conflict in Iraq continued to be one of the most virulent on the planet.

b) International missions

One of the questions in terms of global conflict during 2009 that deserves mention is related to international missions. In December 2009 around the world there were 15 UN peacekeeping operations, two political missions run and supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (BINUB and UNAMA) and another 10 UN political and peacekeeping operations supported by the UN Department of Political Affairs. From a regional perspective, of the 27 UN missions in the world, approximately half (13) were in the African con-

tinent, five in the Middle East, five in Asia, three in Europe and one in America. In addition, alongside the United Nations, many other regional organizations participate in military, political and peacebuilding tasks such as the OSCE (with 19 missions in the European and Central Asian sphere), the EU (15 missions in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East) and NATO (six missions in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East), the CIS (three missions in Europe), the AU (two missions in Africa), the OAS (two missions in America), the ECCAS (one mission in Africa) and seven multilateral operations under the auspices of countries or groups of countries. Changes that took place this year included not renewing the UN peacekeeping mission in Georgia, UNOMIG, as well as the two missions by the CIS in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU mission EUFOR TCHAD/RCA successfully transferred its functions to the MINURCAT in March. Additionally, a joint sea operation by NATO (Operation Ocean Shield), the EU NAVFOR and Combined Task Force 151 (led by the United States 5th Fleet), together with other ships, was launched to patrol Somali territorial waters and the Gulf of Aden in the northwest Indian Ocean to stop attacks on ships that fish or pass through the area.

The UN peacekeeping missions were made up of around 120,000 troops[7] and 3,781 more were on political and peacebuilding missions which are above the numbers for 2008. This clearly shows the continuous increase of missions and forces that has taken place in the last decade. Since June 1999, when the number reached its lowest point since the end of the Cold War (13,000 Blue Helmets), to the present day, growth has been constant and need are still dire in many contexts. To this number we should also add the NATO forces (more than 83,000 troops), from the EU (over 6,000 troops including police and soldiers in six contexts, although the end of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA reduces this number to less than half), from the CIS (more than 4,200 troops

Table 1.2. **Main international missions in 2009**

Name	Start-End	Name	Start-End
UN		**NATO**	
West Africa (UNOWA)	2001	Afghanistan (ISAF)	2001
Burundi (BINUB)	2007	Iraq (NTIM-I)	2004
DR Congo (MONUC)	1999	Kosovo (KFOR)	1999
Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI)	2004	Operation Active Endeavour (Mediterranean Sea)	2001
Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)	2000	Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden (Operation Ocean Shield)	2009
Liberia (UNMIL)	2003	**EU**	
Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991	DR Congo (EUSEC DR Congo)	2005
Central African Rep. (BONUCA)	2000	Central African Rep. and Chad (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)	2007-2009
Central African Rep. / Chad (MINURCAT)	2007	Palestine Territories (EU BAM Rafah)	2005
Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)	2008	Palestine Territories (EUPOL COPPS)	2006
Somalia (UNPOS)	1995	Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)	2002
Sudan (UNMIS)	2005	Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)	2003
Sudan (Darfur) (UNAMID)	2007	Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA)	2004
Haiti (MINUSTAH)	2004	**CIS**	
Afghanistan (UNAMA)	2002	Georgia (South Ossetia)	1992-2009
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1949	Georgia (Abkhazia)	1994-2009
Nepal (UNMIN)	2007	Moldova (Transdniestria)	1992
Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	2006	**ECCAS**	
Central Asia (UNRCCA)	2007	Central African Rep. (MICOPAX)	2008
Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1964	**AU**	
Georgia (Abkhazia) (UNOMIG)	1993-2009	Somalia (AMISOM)	2007
Kosovo (UNMIK)	1999	Comoros (MAES)	2007
Iraq (UNAMI)	2003	**Other missions**	
Golan Heights (UNDOF)	1974	DPR Korea and Rep. of Korea (NSC)	1953
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978/2006	Solomon Islands (RAMSI)	2003
Lebanon (USCOL)	2007	Hebron, Palestine (TPIH 2)	1997
Middle East (UNTSO)	1948	Egypt and Israel	1982
		Iraq (US and UK)	2003
		Côte d'Ivoire (Operation Licorne, France)	2003
		Timor-Leste (ISF, Australia)	2006

in three contexts, although the two missions in Georgia have concluded), ECCAS and the AU (almost 4,000 troops in three contexts), and another six operations from different countries (close to 6,000 police officers and soldiers). In general terms the total number of peacekeeping troops deployed across the world easily surpassed 210,000 soldiers and police officers. Moreover, if troops planned for in the design of the missions or their extensions were actually deployed (nearly 7,000 Blue Helmets in the UNAMID in Darfur, close to 2,000 in the MONUC, 5,000 in the AMISOM are still pending) the total would be 14,000 troops more. To this number it could also be added 7,000 soldiers proposed by the European countries and another 30,000 from the US for the ISAF in Afghanistan that will be deployed between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. This would raise the number to over **260,000 soldiers deployed across the world in international missions.** Finally, it must be added the joint sea operation in the Indian Ocean made up of the EU NAVFOR, NATO and the CTF 151 plus ships from other States such as Japan, China, India and Saudi Arabia, although the military figures for this operation are unknown.

The growing use of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to design the mandate of the United Nations missions has led to a greater participation in violent scenarios. These multidimensional missions are being established in situations that are more and more violent and with mandates that are more and more complex, as can be seen by the number of deaths among UN troops, which have tripled since the end of the Cold War, rising from 800 in 1991 to 2,659 in December 2009. At the same time, the number of military operations designed using Chapter VII as a framework have increased in recent years with the consent of the UN Security Council. An example of this is NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan, which is called a "coalition of goodwill". This is not a United Nations force *per se*, although it does have a mandate under the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and is conducting offensive operations independently, with US troops and to support the Afghan Government.

c) Arms embargoes

Furthermore, under the auspices of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may adopt coercive measures to maintain or re-establish international peace and security. These include economic or other kinds of sanctions, without the use of military force, or even international military intervention.[8] The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to apply pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force.[9] The sanctions can be economic or commercial in a broad sense, or more selective measures can be used such as arms embargoes, travel restrictions, financial or diplomatic restrictions, or both selective and general measures can be applied at the same time. The EU also imposes binding arms embargoes for its Member States. In some cases they respond to the need to implement arms embargoes that the United Nations imposes and in other cases they are initiatives of the EU itself.

In 2009, 28 arms embargoes were in force for a total of 17 States and non-state armed groups. Of these, 12 embargoes were imposed by the United Nations and 16 by the EU.[10] The UN Security Council passed resolution 1907 on December 23 which established a new arms embargo on Eritrea for violating the existing embargo on Somalia by providing political, financial and logistical aid, as well as training and arms to Somali Islamic armed groups opposed to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The EU, in turn, imposed a new embargo on Guinea on October 27, due to the evolution of the situation in the country over the last year (10 days previously, ECOWAS had decided to impose a voluntary arms embargo for the Member States of the organization). The EU lifted the embargo on Uzbekistan on October 31 having considered that the human rights situation had improved in the country since the Andijan events, in spite of alerts from international organizations that there was a lack of any real advances. It is worth mentioning that 11 of the 16 embargoes established by the EU were to implement the UN Security Council embargoes.[11] The remaining five correspond to initiatives by the EU: China, Myanmar, Guinea, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.

Of the 17 States and non-state armed groups indicated by both organizations, six refer to currently active armed conflicts (Myanmar, Sudan [Darfur] and armed groups in Iraq, Somalia, DR Congo and Afghanistan). Of the other 11, eight refer to scenarios of socio-political crises of varying intensity (China, Eritrea, Iran, Guinea, Lebanon, DPR Korea, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe) and the remaining three have recently overcome armed conflicts and are in post-war peacebuilding stages (Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone) with different degrees of internal tension. Beyond the criticism which can be levelled at embargoes and their effectiveness, there are another 24

7. Of the 120,000 troops in UN peacekeeping missions, 98,114 are military and police personnel. 3% of this number (3,027 soldiers and police officers) are women. Data available on December 8, 2009.
8. For more information on the UN Security Council Sanctions Committees please see <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/>.
9. The sanction mechanisms, and specifically arms embargoes, have been used inconsistently since the founding of the United Nations. Between 1945 and 1989 they were only used in two contexts tied to the decolonization process: in the former Southern Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe) between 1968 and 1979 (due to internal instability); and in South Africa between 1977 and 1994 (because of South African intervention in neighbouring countries, internal violence and instability, and the system of racial discrimination or Apartheid). Forsaking the use of these mechanisms during the Cold War, as with other United Nations instruments, was part of the politics of competition between the two Blocs, and the end to the Cold War resulted in a growing activism by the organization in this area, and others, and paved the way to the imposition of arms embargoes. Its use also strengthened the role of the United Nations as a cornerstone of international peace and security. In addition, arms embargoes came to be seen as a more effective sanction than economic sanctions since they focused on the State elite and the non-state armed groups, thus limiting their humanitarian impact.
10. There are two voluntary arms embargoes, one imposed by the OSCE on Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1992, and another imposed by ECOWAS on Guinea in 2009.
11. In the case of Sudan, the EU imposed it for the entire country in 1994 and the UN Security Council for the Darfur region in 2004; in the case of Iran they include different types of arms.

Table 1.3. **Arms embargoes currently in force declared by the United Nations, the EU and the OSCE**

Embargoes declared by the United Nations		Embargoes declared by the EU	
Country*	**Effective date**	**Country**	**Effective date**
Taliban militias and al-Qaeda**	2002	**Taliban militias and al-Qaeda***	2002
Côte d'Ivoire	2004	China	1989
Congo, DR (except the Government)	2003	Côte d'Ivoire	2004
Eritrea	2009	**Congo, DR (except the Government)**	2003
Iran	2006	Iran	2007
Iraq (except the Government)	2003	**Iraq (except the Government)**	2003
Lebanon (except the Government)	2006	Guinea	2009
Liberia (except the Government)	1992	Lebanon (except the Government)	2006
DPR Korea	2006	Liberia (except the Government)	2001
Sierra Leone (RUF)	1997	**Myanmar**	1991
Somalia (except the Government)	1992	DPR Korea	2006
Sudan (Darfur) (except the Government)	2004	Sierra Leone (RUF)	1998
Embargoes declared by the OSCE		**Somalia (except the Government)**	2002
Armenia - Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1992	**Sudan**	1994
Embargoes declared by ECOWAS		Uzbekistan	2005-2009
Guinea	2009	Zimbabwe	2002

* In bold, country or group in armed conflict.
** Embargo that is not linked to a specific country or territory.
Source: SIPRI. Arms Embargoes Database. 2009.

armed conflicts where neither the UN Security Council nor the EU have proposed the establishment of an arms embargo as a form of sanction. Furthermore, there are another 60 situations of socio-political crisis of varying intensity that have not been subject to embargoes and, in many of these cases, the preventive nature of arms embargoes could mean a decrease in the hostilities.

d) Military expenditure and armed conflict

Finally, an analysis of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP of the countries in armed conflict can help us draw some conclusions. It should be noted that this study is hampered by a lack of official data, which is frequent for many of the activities in the military sphere. Due to the situation in some of these countries, data are nonexistent, lower than actual figures and/or has been manipulated, since part of the expenditures related to State security activities are included in other areas of the budget. However, in most of the cases the percentage of government military expenditure as a percentage of GDP does not surpass 3%, with the exception of Algeria, Colombia, Pakistan, Russia, Israel and Yemen, six of the 20 countries with available data (no data exist for Somalia, Sudan and Palestine). Furthermore, according to SIPRI, it is estimated that worldwide military expenditure in 2007 reached 1339 billion USD which represents 25% of GDP in 2007.[12] Thus, the first conclusion is that only in nine of the 20 countries in armed conflict military expenditure in 2007 was equal or above the anticipated world average for the year (India, Sri Lanka and Iraq are included with the six countries mentioned previously). In the other 11 cases military expenditure was lower than the world average.

However, this initial conclusion must be qualified by other factors. A factor that is not usually considered, but would necessarily increase the war machine figures in each context, is the resources managed by the political-military movements and their military wings.[13] Only some approximate figures are available. The same may be said for international organizations or other countries that can be considered actors that are directly involved in the armed conflict due to their participation in the hostilities. In the case of armed groups, these figures can be a few thousand dollars a year, as in the case of some of the Mai Mai militias in DR Congo, or budgets of political-military movements whose organizational structure is much more complex. Examples of this last case include the FDLR in DR Congo, which

12. The estimated figure for 2008 is 1464 billion USD, which represents 2.4% of GDP in 2008. This figure is a 4% increase in real terms compared to 2007 and a 45% rise since 1999. See SIPRI. *SIPRI Yearbook 2009. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
13. It must be noted that the total budget of armed groups is not dedicated to the war effort. They also include sections that are dedicated to maintaining their support networks and social policies, that is, resources that are not related to military aspects.

Table 1.4. **Military expenditure in countries that are the scene of armed conflict, 2007** [14]

Country	Military expenditure (percentage of GDP)	Country	Military expenditure (percentage of GDP)
Algeria	3,515 (3%)	India	23,535 (2.5%)
Chad	64.2 (0.96%)	Myanmar	--
Ethiopia	285 (1.7%)	Pakistan	4,468 (3.1%)
Nigeria	816 (0.6%)	Sri Lanka	795 (2.8%)
Central African Rep.	16.1 (1.1%)	Thailand	2,569 (1.3%)
DR Congo	169 (2%)	Russia	34,800 (3.5%)
Somalia	--	Turkey	11,155 (2.1%)
Sudan	--	Iraq	828 (2.5%)
Uganda	237 (2.2%)	Israel	12,513 (8.6%)
Colombia	5,579 (4%)	Palestine	--
Afghanistan	178 (2.2%)	Yemen	821 (5.1%)
Philippines	1,034 (0.9%)		

Source: SIPRI. *SIPRI Yearbook* 2009.

manages several millions of US dollars per year;[15] Hamas, with an approximate budget of between 30 and 90 million dollars per year; Hezbollah, with a budget of between 100 and 200 million dollars per year,[16] or the recently dismantled LTTE, with estimates of between 200 and 300 million dollars per year.[17]

There are also Governments and international organizations that use military force, normally to support the Governments of the countries affected by armed conflict, as part of a peace agreement or to verify compliance with the ceasefire agreement. This intervention may be unilateral with no legal basis, or under a United Nations mandate, which gives it a legal basis and international legitimacy. Nevertheless, in some cases the coverage afforded by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which allows the use of force,[18] converts the members of the international operations in parties of the armed conflict itself, although they have the legitimacy granted by the United Nations. An example of this are the two United Nations missions that are currently the most expensive and with the largest military component, the MONUC in the DR Congo, and the UNAMID[19] in the Sudanese region of Darfur. In the case of the MONUC, which has participated in combat operations on several occasions on its own or to support the Congolese Armed Forces, its annual budget, 1.35 billion dollars,[20] is 10 times the amount of resources the Congolese Government dedicates to the war effort, although the entire 1.35 billion does not correspond to the military component of the mission. In the case of UNAMID, this figure reached 1.598 billion dollars for the same period, making the UNAMID the largest and most costly mission at present. Although the UNAMID had not entered combat with the different armed groups in Darfur or with the pro-government militias, its mandate to protect the civilian population may place the mission in a situation where they must use force to avoid human rights violations. In the case of NATO in Afghanistan, the ISAF's mandate is backed by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and its main function is to aid the Afghan Government to guarantee security in the country. Nevertheless, to implement that mandate it takes part in direct combat actions against different Taliban militias and other armed actors in the country and is therefore directly involved in the conflict. In this regard, the US budget for Afghanistan and in other countries (as part of Operation Enduring Freedom) has amounted to 159.8 billion dollars for the 2001-2008 period, with 34 billion corresponding to 2008. Finally, in the case of Iraq, the US budget was 603 billion dollars for the 2001-2008 period (153 billion for 2008, the highest figure since the operation was launched in 2003).[21]

1.3. Armed conflicts: annual evolution by region

Africa

a) Western Africa

Nigeria (Niger Delta)	
Start:	2001
Type:	Resources, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, militias from the Ijaw, Itsekeri, Urhobo and Ogoni communities, private security groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The conflict in the Niger Delta is the result of unsatisfied demands for control of the profits from oil resources located in that region. Several armed groups, MEND (Ijaw) is the most noteworthy, demand compensation for the impact the extraction industries have on their territory and a more equitable share of the profits obtained from the installations and a greater decentralization of the Nigerian State. Attacks on oil instal-

14. In millions of US dollars. The percentage refers to the 2007 budget.
15. United Nations Security Council. *Final report of the Group of Experts on the DR Congo*. Letter dated 23 November 2009 addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the DR Congo. November 23, 2009, in <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.htm>.
16. Wallace, Bret. "Banks Are Not Mere Bystanders". The Terror Finance Blog, July 1, 2009, [consulted on 21.12.09], in <http://www.terrorfinance.org/Banks%20Are%20Not%20Mere%20Bystanders_Wallace.pdf>.
17. According to reports from Jane's Intelligence research centre cited in the Sri Lanka News, this figure is an estimation of the LTTE yearly budget. Jane's Intelligence stated that of that figure only nine million USD were needed for running their military activities. Sri Lanka News. "What if LTTE were Hamas & the GOSL were Israel with powerful friends?". January 10, 2009, in <http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2009/1/37519_space.html>.
18. Article 42 of the Charter states that the UN Security Council may take such action as necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
19. African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur.
20. For the approved period between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010.
21. SIPRI, 2009, op. cit.

lations and military posts, as well as kidnappings of workers, are the methods normally used by the insurgency. In addition, this situation has led to fighting for control of the land and resources by the different communities that live in the region.

During the year important advances took place which could have led to the resolution of the conflict in the Delta.[22] However, at the beginning of 2009 the outlook was not especially good since the MEND called off the ceasefire that had been declared in September 2008 and they threatened to launch a large scale offensive. Dozens of deaths and kidnappings occurred at the beginning of the year. The gas and oil supply was interrupted and there were attacks on oil platforms and Police stations. The situation got worse on May 15 with the offensive mounted by the governmental military unit **Joint Task Force (JTF)**. The JTF is responsible for security in the Delta. This offensive was the most serious in recent years, lasted three weeks and caused **hundreds of deaths and the displacement of thousands of people**. This provoked a response by the MEND with new kidnappings and attacks on the oil industry. After this operation, on June 25 the president declared **a ceasefire, an amnesty for members of the groups that abandoned armed combat in 60 days time and he freed one of the MEND leaders, Henry Okah.** As a result, **the MEND announced a temporary ceasefire** –for 60 days starting July 15– to facilitate the beginning of talks. This ceasefire was later extended for a month and then, in October, was made indefinite. Nevertheless, divisions in the MEND regarding the acceptance of the amnesty, and the existence of sectors that did not obey the orders from the leaders to demobilize, threatened to jeopardize the process. Moreover, mistrust by the MEND continued and on several occasions they threatened to renew fighting if advances were not achieved in the negotiation process, and due to some sporadic episodes with the JTF, and delays in the beginning of the rehabilitation program. At the end of the year 15,000 insurgents were included in the disarmament process, according to the Government.

The United Nations denounced that all of the parties in the conflict were committing acts of torture and deliberate attacks on civilians, which could be classified as war crimes

b) Horn of Africa

Ethiopia (Ogaden)	
Start:	2007
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, ONLF, OLF, pro-government militias
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:

Ethiopia has experienced secessionist movements or resistance to central power since the 1970s. The ONLF was founded in 1984 and operates in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, in the southeast of the country, and demands a greater degree of autonomy for the Somali community that lives in the region. On several occasions the ONLF has conducted insurgent activities beyond the Ogaden region in collaboration with the OLF which demands from the Government greater autonomy for the region of Oromia since 1973. The Somali Government has backed the ONLF against Ethiopia, who it went to war with for control of the region in 1977 and 1978. In this war Ethiopia defeated Somalia. The end to the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000 led to an increase in government operations to bring to an end the insurgency in Ogaden, and after the 2005 elections, fighting between the Armed Forces and the ONLF have been on the rise.

During the year there were **attacks and ambushes by the ONLF on the security forces and its garrisons, as well as military operations by the Army and the pro-government militias**, although this information could not be confirmed due to the restrictive information policy of the Government and limited access to the Ethiopian region of Ogaden. Even United Nations requests to access to the area were rejected. In mid-November, the ONLF announced the death of 626 Ethiopian soldiers and that it had captured seven towns, and military material and vehicles in different attacks conducted by the groups in the areas near the Somali border. The Government, which had previously announced in October that the ONLF was no longer a security threat, again denied the claims. According to the Government, the army offensive conducted in 2007 had dismantled the military capability of the ONLF. Simultaneously, the Malay multinational company Petronas, together with other foreign companies participating in the extraction of hydrocarbons in the region, was warned by the ONLF on several occasions of the consequences of collaborating with the Government since it is considered an accomplice of the serious situation of violence that troubles the area. Meanwhile, the Government continued in its attempt to convince this company and others that the ONLF no longer had the capability to attack oil exploration and production in the region. There was an upsurge of local denouncements of abuses and attacks by the Army and its militias against the civilian population, and Addis Ababa confirmed the execution of one of the ONLF leaders, Serad Dolal. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that 300,000 people continued to be displaced during 2009 as a consequence of the different inter-community conflicts and border disputes that affected the country.

Somalia	
Start:	1988
Type:	Government Internationalized internal
Main parties:	New Transitional Federal Government (TFG) –which was joined by the moderate faction of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), and supported by Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a, warlords, Ethiopia, US, AMISOM-, Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia radical faction (ARS) –which includes partly the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Hizbul Islam, al-Shabab- and is supported by Eritrea

22. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

The armed conflict and the lack of effective central authority in the country began in 1988 when a coalition of opposition groups rebelled against the dictatorial power of Siad Barre, and three years later they were able to depose him. This led to a new fight within the coalition to fill the vacuum of power which has caused the destruction of the country and the death of 300,000 people since 1991, in spite of the failed international intervention at the beginning of the 1990s. Various peace processes set up to create a central authority have run into numerous difficulties, including grievances between different clans and subclans which make up the Somali social structure, interference by Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the power of different warlords. The most recent peace initiative created in 2004 the TFG, which has been backed by Ethiopia in an attempt to regain control of the country which is partially in the hands of the UIC. The moderate faction of the UIC has joined the TFG and together they fight against the militias of the radical faction of the UIC which control part of the southern region of the country.

Despite the remodelling of the Transitional Federal Government in January which includes sectors linked to the ARS, among them Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed –the new president who replaces Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed–, fighting continued throughout the year in different areas in the centre and south between the **TFG –backed by the moderate militia Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a and by the AMISOM– against the insurgency made up of al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam.** In September **fighting between al-Shabab and allied factions of Hizbul Islam** took place for several reasons, among which was the control and management of the lucrative port of Kismayo, in the south, and the fact that some representative figures from Hizbul Islam joined the TFG. The presence of Ethiopian Armed Forces in Somalia was reported at different times during the year to give support to the TFG and pursue the insurgency. This was denied by Ethiopia. The US also carried out unilateral actions –bombardments– as part of the persecution of alleged members of al-Qaeda in the country that would have links to al-Shabab. At the beginning of Ramadan, the worst escalation of violence in the past 20 years broke out according to the local Elman Peace and Human Rights Organisation. Several sources have reported that **17,000 people have died since the beginning of 2007**. Al-Shabab threatened to extend the war to the Horn of Africa region. According to the TFG, thousands of foreigners entered the country to join al-Shabab with the goal of overthrowing it. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights denounced that all of the parties in the conflict were committing acts of torture and deliberate attacks on civilians, which could be classified as war crimes. The United Nations warned that the country was going through its worst humanitarian crisis since 1991.[23] The TFG, unable to deal with the internal situation and piracy,[24] requested the strengthening of the AMISOM o its substitution by a more robust United Nations mission.

Sudan (Darfur)

Start:	2003
Type:	Self-government, Resources, Identity Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, pro-government Janjaweed militias, JEM, several factions of the SLA and other armed groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The conflict in Darfur began in 2003 related to demands of greater decentralisation and development of the region by several insurgent groups, mainly the SLA and the JEM. The Government responded to this uprising by using its own Armed Forces and the Arab Janjaweed militias. The magnitude of the violence committed by all contending parties against the civilian population has led some to consider the possibility that genocide has taken place in the region. 300,000 people have died since the beginning of hostilities according to the United Nations. After a peace agreement (DPA) was signed between the government and one faction of the SLA in May 2006, levels of violence grew and brought about the fragmentation of the opposition groups and a serious regional impact due to the displacement of the population caused by the Sudanese implication in the Chadian conflict and the Chadian implication in the Sudanese conflict. An observation mission by the AU (AMIS), created in 2004, was included in 2007 in a joint UN and AU mission, the UNAMID. This mission has been attacked multiple times. In 2008 it did not reach even half of the planned 26,000 troops and therefore is unable to comply with its mission to protect the civilian population and humanitarian personnel.

The situation in Darfur was marked by the **arrest order, announced in March, by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the Sudanese president accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity** in the region. The Government reacted by expelling the international humanitarian organizations from the country which gave rise to international condemnation and concern that the humanitarian situation would deteriorate. It also generated an important controversy between those in favour and those against the ICC decision. Afterwards, the order to expel the NGOs was partially revoked. During the year, the United Nations was able to see a gradual decline of fighting, although it underlined the volatility of the situation.[25] Even the general of the UNAMID Martin Agwai stated that the war had ended. His statement was strongly criticized. The Panel of Experts on

23. See Chapter 5 (Humanitarian crises).
24. Given the persistence of piracy in the waters of the Gulf of Aden, with more than 140 attacks and fifty kidnappings of ships that were navigating within and outside the security zone patrolled by the international community, the special representative of UN secretary-general Somalia noted that the fight against piracy cannot be limited to the deployment of international naval forces, and added that the only sustainable solution is the establishment of an effective government and security institutions and provide alternative sources of income to the population. The lack of a central Government in the country, the general atmosphere of impunity and the very high economic benefits that kidnappings provide facilitate that several militias in the region of Puntland are increasingly getting involved in this activity, given the regional authorities' inability to control the situation, when they are not involved.
25. UN Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*. S/2009/352, 13 July 2009, in <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2009/352>.

the arms embargo stated in November that actions of war had continued.[26] They denounced the **systematic failure to comply with the embargo by all of the parties involved in the conflict, violations of human rights and abuses of the civilian population, especially against women, as well as the disproportionate use of force** by the Sudanese Army and paramilitary groups. Finally, the Panel evaluated the violation of the embargo in the context of four issues that continued to affect Darfur: competition for land and resources; the rape of women and impunity in Darfur; the war between the armed groups and the Governments of Sudan and Chad, with the Sudanese JEM and Chadian groups being the main actors; and finally, the cross-border attacks carried out by the Sudanese and Chadian Armies. Moreover, over two years after its creation, the UNAMID did not complete its deployment and suffered an increase in the number of attacks. 2.6 million people continued to be displaced and another 4.7 million relied on humanitarian aid.[27]

In southern Sudan there was an increase in inter-communal violence that easily surpassed 2,500 deaths since the beginning of 2009

Sudan (South)	
Start:	2009
Type:	Territory, Resources, Self-government Internal
Main parties:	Militias of ethnic groups, National Unity Government, the semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan, political parties of the south
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:

After signing in 2005 the peace agreement between the SPLA armed group from the south and the Government of Sudan, which ended an armed conflict that set the north against the south for 20 years, inter-communal rivalry in the south reappeared at the scene of violence. The communities, which were fighting for control of resources and pastureland, initially limited their actions to stealing each others livestock. Since the end of 2008, however, there was a change in the pattern of violence with direct attacks on towns, deaths of members of the civilian population and kidnapping of children. The Government of South Sudan accused the NCP, the party of Sudan's president, of being behind the violence. Several analysts, however, suggested the possibility that different political groups from the south might also be interested in demonstrating the infeasibility of the political project of the SPLM, political wing of the former armed group, in light of the referendum planned for 2011 which will decide whether the south splits away from the north.

During the year there was a sharp rise in inter-communal fighting, mainly in the state of Jonglei, but also in Lakes, Unity and Central Equatoria. Most of the clashes were between militias of the Murle, Lou-Nuer, Dinka, Mundari y Shilluk communities and **the number of deaths since the beginning of 2009 has easily surpassed 2,500 victims**. More than 350,000 people have abandoned their homes in southern Sudan due to the violence in the region. Several analysts pointed to a change in the pattern of inter-communal violence which had gone from clashes between farmers to direct attacks on villages and the kidnapping of children. The proximity of the general elections (February 2010) and the referendum (2011) –which will determine the possible secession of the south– could be behind the instability. In some cases the target seemed to be the SPLA security forces, which contradicted the government position which stated that the origin of the violence was competition for livestock. The analyses also mentioned internal factors as the cause for the disputes and the existence of local rivalries –even within the SPLA itself– regarding the elections. The SPLA accused the Army and the NCP, president Omar al-Bashir's party, of providing arms and munitions to the militias of the southern states in an attempt to hinder the SPLA's efforts to disarm the civilian population. Khartoum, meanwhile, criticized the lack of action by the Government of the south. In this sense, the United Nations described the situation in the south of the country as a security vacuum, where the different communities depended on their own militias of armed young men to defend themselves from attacks and livestock theft.

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

DR Congo (East)	
Start:	1998
Type:	Government, Identity, Resources Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, Mai-Mai militias, FDLR, FDLR-RUD, CNDP, FRF, PARECO, APCLS, armed Ituri groups, Burundian FNL armed opposition group, Ugandan ADF-NALU and LRA armed opposition group, Rwanda, MONUC
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

The current conflict originated with the coup d'état carried out by Laurent Desiré Kabila in 1996 against Mobutu Sese Seko, which eventually led him to relinquish power in 1997. In 1998, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, together with various armed groups, attempted to overthrow Kabila, who in turn received support from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, in a war that has left around four million dead. Control and exploitation of the country's natural resources have contributed to the perpetuation of the conflict and the presence of foreign Armed Forces. The signing of a ceasefire agreement in 1999 and various peace agreements in 2002 and 2003 led to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the creation of a transitional government and subsequently an elected government in 2006. This has not meant an end to violence in the east of the country, given Rwanda's involvement and the presence of factions that have not yet been demobilised, as well as the FDLR, which was responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

26. UN Security Council. *Report by The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning Sudan*. S/2009/562, 29 October 2009, in <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2009/562>.
27. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).

At the beginning of 2009, a series of events took place that shaped the rest of the year: tensions in the CNDP armed group resulted in an internal coup d'état. The military leader of the group, Bosco Ntaganda, replaced the leader Laurent Nkunda, and subsequently ended the hostilities against the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and then integrated the armed group into them, with the consent of Rwanda. In an agreement on March 23, the CNDP certified its transformation into a political party in exchange for amnesty and the liberation of those under arrest. Nevertheless, the CNDP also maintained its structure and political control in North Kivu, in spite of the fact that it merged with the FARDC. Rwanda and DR Congo had been negotiating a rapprochement which resulted in the dismantling of this group. Additionally, in January and February the joint operation in Congolese territory between the Armed Forces from both countries against the Rwandese FDLR apparently resulted in a weakening of the armed group. However, at a later time the operation was considered a failure since **the FDLR regained the positions it had abandoned during the offensive, and a group of UN experts stated that the group's command structure was still intact** in spite of the operation, and maintained the same illegal funding mechanisms. Several analysts also stated that **the DDR process for the 25 or more Mai Mai militias and the reform of the security sector had been a failure due to corruption and poor management of the resources.** In March the FARDC operation, Kimia II, was launched with logistic support from the MONUC in an attempt to neutralize the FDLR. Systematic violations of human rights and sexual violence were perpetrated,[28] which raised contradictions in the MONUC. In November, Germany arrested the FDLR leader, Ignace Murwanashyaka, and his vice commander, Straton Musoni, who are accused of crimes of war and crimes against humanity.

Central African Republic

Start:	2006
Type:	Government Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, APRD, UFRD, armed groups split from UFDR (FURCA, MJLC), FDPC, CPJP, France, FOMUC, MINURCAT and Zaraguinas (highway bandits)
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=

Summary:

In 2006, the situation in the country deteriorated considerably as a result of increased activities by a number of insurgent groups who dispute the legitimacy of the François Bozizé government, which took power following a coup d'état against President Ange Félix Patassé during 2002 and 2003. The Bozizé Government has been accused of mismanaging public funds and dividing the nation. The insurgency fights on two fronts: first, in the densely populated central and north-western parts of the country, the APRD, led by Jean-Jacques Demafouth, has challenged the Bozizé government and demanded a new sharing of power. Secondly, there has been an increase in insurgency operations in the northeast of the country by groups belonging to the UFDR coalition. To this instability was added the emergence in the north-west of numerous bands of highway bandits, the Zaraguinas.

Instability persisted and the implementation of the peace agreements was slow. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the year the armed groups APRD and UFDR were included in the Government. In July, the leader of the FDPC armed group, Abdoulaye Miskine, signed a peace agreement that had been pending since 2008. **Several international organizations alerted to the gradual escalation of violence and insecurity due to actions by criminal groups, State security forces and armed groups which mainly affected the civilian population.** In October, Miskine torpedoed the peace process by stating that the Government had failed to implement the peace agreements of 2007 and 2009, and declared them invalid. Shortly after, his group, the FDPC, launched attacks against the Central African Army. The CPJP, the only armed group that had not joined the peace process to date, conducted various small military operations throughout the year and demanded that negotiations begin. At the end of the year, MINURCAT only had 2,750 of the planned 5,200 soldiers, 53% of the forces needed to guarantee the fulfilment of its mandate. The Government presented its DDR program in August. It is anticipated that between 6,000 and 10,000 insurgents will participate. Of note were some advances which took place in the political sphere. In October, the **Government enacted the election law, accepted by the opposition** that had threatened to withdraw from the process, and **days later the election commission was set up.** However, preparations for the presidential elections in March 2010 were delayed for numerous reasons. Former president Ange Félix Patassé returned from exile at the end of October to participate in the elections. Furthermore, the Ugandan LRA armed group stepped up its activities in the southeast of the country with kidnappings that forced the displacement of over 4,500 people.[29]

Chad

Start:	2006
Type:	Government Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, new UFR coalition of armed groups (UFDD, UFDD-Fundamental, RFC, CNT, FSR, UFCD, UDC, FPRN), MDJT, FPIR, Janjaweed militias, Toro Boro militia, Sudan, France
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The frustrated *coup d'état* of 2004 and the reform of the Constitution in 2005, boycotted by the opposition, sparked the insurgency that intensified its activity during 2006, with the aim of overthrowing the authoritarian government of Idriss Déby. This opposition is made up of several groups and soldiers hostile to the regime. In addition there is the antagonism that exists between Arab tribes and black populations in the border region between Sudan and Chad which is linked to

28. See Chapter 6 (Gender).
29. See Uganda (north).

local grievances, competition for resources and the extension of the war to the neighbouring Sudanese region of Darfur as a result of cross-border operations by Sudanese armed groups and Sudanese pro-government Arab *Janjaweed* militias. These groups have attacked towns and Darfur refugee camps in eastern Chad, which has contributed to an escalation of tension between Sudan and Chad, which accuse each other of supporting the other's respective insurgencies.

Of note is the establishment between November 2008 and January 2009 of a new armed coalition, the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR), made up of eight armed groups including the main factions: the RFC of Timane Erdimi (chosen as leader of the coalition) and Mahamat Nouri's UFDD. Previous coalitions had failed because of divisions and rivalries regarding issues of leadership. This coalition launched in May an important offensive from Sudan and the Chadian Army responded by pursuing the rebel groups in Sudanese territory. The fighting caused 250 deaths (the majority from the rebel forces) and hundreds of wounded, according to the Chadian Government. Chad's incursion in Sudanese territory unleashed a new diplomatic crisis between both countries.[30] Nevertheless, in July a new coalition of three groups, the National Movement, **signed a peace agreement with the Chadian Government in Sirte (Libya) with the intermediation of Muammar Gaddafi.** It included a halt to hostilities, a general amnesty, and the possibility for the armed groups to participate in political activities and join the Armed Forces.[31] The UFR coalition of Timane Erdimi rejected this agreement and called for the establishment of an inclusive negotiating table. At the end of the year, MINURCAT only had 2,750 of the planned 5,200 soldiers, 53% of the forces needed to guarantee the fulfilment of its mandate. As an example, almost 200 attacks on humanitarian personnel took place in 2009. In the political sphere, the Government and the opposition made advances in the implementation of the agreement of August 2007 and agreed to create an election commission. However, the political environment continued to be affected by the lack of a solution to the conflict, as pointed out by the UN Secretary General.[32]

Uganda (North)	
Start:	1986
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Ugandan Armed Forces, Central African, Congolese and from South Sudan, pro-government militias from DR Congo and from South Sudan, LRA
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:

Since 1986, northern Uganda has been suffering from a conflict in which the LRA armed opposition group, moved by the religious messianism of its leader, Joseph Kony, has been trying to overthrow the government of Yoweri Museveni, to establish a regime based on the Ten Commandments of the Bible and to bring the northern region of the country out of its marginalisation. The violence and insecurity caused by the LRA's attacks against the civilian population, the kidnapping of children to swell their ranks (around 25,000 since the beginning of the conflict) and the confrontations between the armed group and the Armed Forces (together with the pro-governmental militias) have caused the death of around 200,000 people and the forced displacement of nearly two million people at the height of the conflict. The LRA has expanded its activities in neighbouring countries where it set up bases, due to the inability in DR Congo and the Central African Republic to stop them, and with the complicity of Sudan. Between 2006 and 2008, a peace process had been ongoing and had managed to stop hostilities, although it failed and in December 2008, the Ugandan, Congolese and South Sudan (SPLA) Armies carried out an offensive against the LRA. This caused the group to split up and move to the north of DR Congo, the southeast of the Central African Republic and the south-west of Sudan where the offensive continued.

During the year a constant trickle of attacks by the LRA took place in the region made up of the provinces of Haut-Uélé and Bas Uélé (north and northeast of DR Congo), Haut Mbomou (southeast of the Central African Republic), and in towns of the neighbouring states in southern Sudan, Western Equatoria and Western Bahr al-Ghazal, near the Congolese and Central African border. The humanitarian agencies that work in the region denounced the death of 2,000 civilians since December 2008. Additionally, there were reports of plundering and the kidnapping of hundreds of people. This highlighted the fact that the LRA was made up of many small groups with certain freedom of action, according to different analysts. The military operations to dismantle the LRA had pushed the group (or some of its units, mainly the one led by Joseph Kony, who was allegedly in the Central African Republic) farther and farther to the north. This fragmented the group and its makeup became more international. Dozens of LRA members surrendered during the year reducing its numbers to several hundred combatants, the majority children, although the group did not lose its lethal capacity. Attacks by the LRA forced the displacement of 70,000 Sudanese, and some 5,000 Congolese sought refuge in the Sudanese state of Western Equatoria. Given the magnitude of the problem, the UN Security Council called for its peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic (MINURCAT), DR Congo (MONUC) and southern Sudan (UNMIS) to coordinate its strategies to protect the civilian population from LRA attacks.

d) Maghreb and North Africa

Algeria	
Start:	1992
Type:	System Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) / al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Intensity:	2

30. See Chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).
31. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).
32. UN Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad*. S/2009/535, 14 October 2009, in <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2009/535>.

Trend: =

Summary:
This conflict began with the banning of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1992 after it had won the municipal (1990) and legislative (1991) elections, defeating the party that had historically led the country to independence, the National Liberation Front. The victory of the FIS took place in the context of a growing Islamic movement in the 1970s in response to popular unrest which was further exacerbated in the 1980s by the economic crisis and the lack of opportunity for political participation. After the military chiefs of staff banned the FIS and dismissed the government, a period of armed struggle began between a number of groups (the EIS, the GIA and the GSPC, which split off from the GIA and became AQIM in 2007) and the army, backed by self-defence militias. The conflict left 150,000 dead during the 1990s, the majority of them civilians, amid accusations of army and Islamist groups' involvement in massacres. In spite of the reconciliation processes promoted by the government, the conflict is ongoing and has claimed thousands of lives since 2000.

Episodes of violence continued in the context of the conflict between the Government and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and **caused more than 300 deaths in incidents throughout the country and in border regions** during 2009. The former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) celebrated its third year as a branch of al-Qaeda in the region and continued with attacks on the military, police and security guards, although it also caused civilian casualties. As part of its counterinsurgency campaign, the Government reported throughout the year the number of rebels captured and those who surrendered. In November AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, was sentenced to death in absentia along with fifty of his followers for an attack in 2007 that caused 11 deaths in Algiers. Together with the military campaign, the Algerian Government also launched a media offensive to question the Islamic cause of AQIM. In this context, some former GSPC leaders made a public statement calling for AQIM to abandon violence and accept the amnesty offered by the Government. In the political sphere, it should be noted that **insurgent activity redoubled at the time of the controversial April elections in which president Abdelaziz Bouteflika was re-elected to a third term** with over 90% of the vote. In parallel to the armed offensive, AQIM continued with its campaign of kidnappings. Often the victims were people from the West captured in neighbouring countries such as Mali or Niger. In November and December alone AQIM captured three Spaniards and two Italians in Mauritania and a French national in Mali. **In response to the expansion of the group's actions into the Sahel region, during 2009 regional cooperation initiatives were set in motion** to battle AQIM. This included forces from Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania.

Box 1.1. **Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Origins, tactics and new areas of action**

Efforts by several countries in North Africa to coordinate their anti-terrorism strategies in 2009 could be attributed to a growing concern regarding the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) beyond the borders of Algeria, the country were it arose in January 2007. Although this may seem recent, the truth is that this franchise of Osama bin Laden's network is the continuation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which played an important role in the Islamic struggle against the Algerian Government at the end of the 1990s. Despite the name change, the group's actions have always been seen as part of a strictly domestic insurgency. Nevertheless, in recent years AQIM's operations have raised concern in the region and in European countries which have posed questions regarding their objectives, tactics and sphere of action.

In this context, one should analyze the origin of AQIM and its evolution after the Algerian GSPC. The latter had its roots in the internecine struggle set off in the country at the beginning of the 1990s when the Military regime decided to cancel the second round of elections when a victory by the Islamic movement seemed evident. The bloody internal war was witness to the emergence of several groups in protest against the Government. Among them was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) who was accused of being responsible for multiple actions against the Algerian security forces and massacres and abuses of the civilian population. In 1998, the GSPC was born when the group split off from the GIA allegedly due to differences regarding the tactics used by the latter group that affected the civilian population. The members of the new GSPC considered these tactics counterproductive to achieve the goal of building an Islamic State. The GSPC, which had some veteran Algerian Mujahideen members from the war in Afghanistan against the soviets (1979 – 1989), rejected an offer of peace from the Government –which other organizations did accept– as well as the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, and became the most active Islamic armed organization in Algeria.

A key date for the GSPC was 2003, the year it chose a leadership in favour of maintaining the Jihad against the Algerian Government and open to joining the al-Qaeda cause. Factors such as the designation of the GSPC as a terrorist group by Washington after the attacks in 2001, religious motivations, the beginning of the war in Iraq –which boosted the recruitment of new members–, the decision to revitalize the movement and the possibility to extend its contacts with other militant groups, are some of the elements that would have favoured contacts with the network of Osama bin Laden, which was channelled through the al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Some investigations indicate that the ties were from much earlier on and that bin Laden himself had allocated funds for the creation of the GSPC at the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, at least publically, it was not until September 11, 2006 when al-Qaeda admitted the tie to the GSPC. Four months later it was renamed AQIM.[33] Even though the group's main objective is linked to overthrowing the Algerian regime and the creation of an Islamic caliphate –some analysts feel that this is the genuine agenda and doubt that AQIM is a regional organization

33. For more information, see Mekhennet, Souad. "Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from al-Qaeda", *The New York Times*, July 1 2008, in <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01algeria.html#> and Hansen, Andrew. *Backgrounder: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb*. Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, July 21 2009, in <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12717>.

that acts coherently–,[34] in public statements the group has broadened its objectives to include attacks on European and US interests, and asserts that it has expanded its activities and recruiting to neighbouring countries in the Maghreb and the Sahel. In videos and communiqués on the web, AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel –an explosives expert who goes by the name of Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud in recognition of al-Zarqawi– usually focuses on the situation in Algeria, but also expresses opinions on events in Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.[35]

The tactics used by the group have also gone through some changes. Although AQIM has mainly used actions which are typical of the traditional guerrillas, including ambushes and attacks with mortars and rockets, since 2007 the group has begun using suicide attacks. In April of that year, a terrorist attack against a governmental building caused the death of 30 people. Months later, a double suicide attack caused 41 deaths including 17 United Nations workers. The group also sets off explosives when Algerian military forces drive by, a technique that analysts liken to the one used by the Taliban in Afghanistan. AQIM has claimed responsibility for other attacks against the military and Israeli and French interests in Mauritania. It has called for the Jihad against the military Government that took power in the country after the coup d'état in 2008. Furthermore, one of AQIM's tactics is the kidnapping of Westerners. This usually occurs in the Sahel, in the border region between Algeria and countries such as Mali, Niger and Mauritania. Kidnapping Westerners has two purposes: apply pressure to free the prisoners of Islamic movements, and obtain resources through the payment of ransom. Information on other sources of funding for the group is varied and include donations by followers, trafficking in arms, drugs, vehicles and tobacco through the Sahara Desert, which is a region of porous borders and difficult for authorities to control. This kind of activities has led some analysts to argue that AQIM looks more like a band that seeks economic benefit than a radical Jihadist group. However, these statements are countered by other specialists that believe the ideological bent of AQIM is visible in some of the group's most recent actions, for example, the execution of a British hostage when London refused to free a Jordanian cleric, last May, or the demand for the withdrawal of Italian troops from Afghanistan and Iraq in exchange of the liberation of two other hostages at the end of 2009.

US Intelligence sources believe that AQIM currently has between 300 and 400 combatants in a mountainous area east of Algiers and another 200 have a support role in the rest of the country. There are also speculations that the base of operations is in southern Algeria and northern Mali, and that some of the most recent actions attempted to demonstrate their capability to act in the entire Islamic Maghreb. Some analysts, nevertheless, indicate that the group moved its bases and sphere of action in response to the strategy rolled out by the Algerian Government: on the one hand, a military offensive whose goal is to hound the group –with the belief that if they are busy surviving then they will not have time to prepare terrorist attacks– and, on the other, a campaign to question the legitimacy of AQIM's Islamic cause.[36] Algiers has made it easy for former GPSC leaders to publicly request that their former colleagues abandon the armed struggle and is fostering Sufism, a branch of Islam associated with contemplation and not combat.[37] In the current scenario, some analysts have also warned of the possibility that AQIM is trying to activate cells in Europe, especially after suspects of collaborating with the group have been arrested in several countries in the European Union. In this context, therefore, questions about the future of the group are also linked to the current and future initiatives of the EU and the US in the region and the effectiveness of the regional cooperation programs in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger in their struggle against AQIM.

America

Colombia	
Start:	1964
Type:	System Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, FARC, ELN, new paramilitary groups
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

In 1964, in the context of a pact for alternating power between the liberal and conservative parties (National Front), which excluded any political alternatives, two armed opposition movements emerged: the ELN (inspired by Che Guevara and with support from the working classes and academics) and the FARC (which had a peasants base and was influenced by Communist ideals). During the 1970s, several other groups emerged (M-19, EPL, etc.), which ended up negotiating with the government and supporting a new Constitution (1991) which established the bases for a Social State of Law. The end of the 1980s saw the emergence of a number of paramilitary self-defence groups instigated by sectors of the Armed Forces, business people and politicians in defence of the status quo and the maintenance of illegal businesses who promoted a strategy of terror. Drug money is currently the main element that keeps the war alive.

The unilateral liberation of political and military hostages that the FARC have been carrying out little by little, came to a stop when the Colombian Chief of Staff demanded the rebels liberate all of the hostages in exchange for nothing. Before the end of the year, however, the Government withdrew the request and authorized Senator Piedad Córdoba, the ICRC and the Catholic Church to continue efforts to achieve the freedom of another group of hostages. **In the southwestern region of the country the armed conflict intensified and the number of civilian and combatant victims rose dramatically, especially among the indigenous people,** which

34. See Joffe, George. "A convenient untruth", *The Guardian*, April 12 2007, in <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/apr/12/aconvenientuntruth>.
35. See Europol. *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*. The Hague: Europol, 2009, in <http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2009.pdf>.
36. See Tawill, Camille. "New Strategies in al-Qaeda's Battle for Algeria". *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume VII, 22, (July 27 2009), in <http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_007_63.pdf>.
37. See Chikhi, Lamine. "Algeria sponsors Sufism to Fight Extremism". *Reuters*, July 8 2009, in <http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINL721135820090708>.

has been the main object of violence by members of the guerrillas, the paramilitary forces and state agents. The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions in Colombia estimates that in the last three years nearly 2,000 people have been killed by members of the Armed Forces and presented as "guerrillas who have died in combat". This practice, known as "false positives", led to the dismissal, capture and trial of over one thousand troops. The **"cross-borderization" of the conflict caused a serious diplomatic incident between the Government of Colombia and those of Ecuador and Venezuela.** The situation deteriorated after the agreement between Colombian leader Álvaro Uribe with the Washington Government that allows US soldiers to use seven military bases (three air force, two naval and two army) on Colombian soil in operations against the guerrillas and drug trafficking. Other countries in the region, such as Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia, expressed their concern in the UNASUR summit for the growing interference of the US in South America with the pretext of supplying technical, logistical and intelligence support to the Colombian Government in their fight against the rebels.

Asia and Pacific

a) Southern Asia

Afghanistan	
Start:	2001
Type:	System Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, International Coalition (led by United States), ISAF (NATO), Taliban militia, warlords
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:
The country has lived in almost constant armed conflict since the invasion by Soviet troops in 1979, beginning a civil war between the Armed Forces (with Soviet support) and anti-Communist, Islamist guerrillas (Mujahideen). The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 and the rise of the Mujahideen to power in 1992, in a context of chaos and internal fighting between the different anti-Communist factions, led to the emergence of the Taliban movement, which, at the end of the 1990s, controlled almost the entire Afghan territory. In November 2001, after the Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, the US invaded the country and defeated the Taliban regime. After signing the Bonn agreements, an interim government was established led by Hamid Karzai and subsequently ratified at the polls. Since 2006, there has been an escalation of violence in the country caused by the revival of the Taliban militias.

The year was marked by an increase of violence, controversy regarding the elections and the US announcement at the end of last year of a massive deployment of troops. In the first eight months of the year 1,500 civilians died. Most of these deaths were attributed to the insurgency and a good number to international operations. The total death toll –combatants and civilians– at the end of the year reached several thousand. It was the most deadly year for the international troops, with 498 deaths, compared to 295 in 2008. **Combat became more intense in the south, especially in the province of Helmand**, where there was a wave of insurgent attacks, especially during mid-year, in response to the international operations. Insurgent violence became evident during the election campaign with at least thirty dead on voting day. Especially serious were several international air raids that caused numerous civilian deaths, such as the US strike in Farah (southeast), with 97 civilians dead according to the Afghan Government, or the one launched by NATO in September in Kunduz, with 70 dead. For their part, the insurgency carried out attacks in the capital, including a multiple attack in February against several government organisms, leaving twenty dead; an attack in October against a building where UN workers lived, with 11 dead, five of them UN workers; or an attack against the Indian embassy, with 17 dead. Additionally, the United Nations and international NGOs alerted to the deteriorating situation of women.[38] In this context of violence, at the end of the year, the US president announced a new strategy which included the deployment of 30,000 additional troops and a calendar for withdrawal which will begin in 2011. In this sense, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar rejected a negotiation with the Afghan Government as long as foreign troops were present.[39] In the political sphere, the re-election of Hamid Karzai in the first round was annulled after hundreds of thousands of fraudulent votes were cancelled which favoured him. His rival, **Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew from the second round and denounced the lack of guarantees. Karzai was declared the winner without having to go a second round** which had an impact on the legitimacy of the process.

India (Assam)	
Start:	1983
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, ULFA, DHD, Black Widow, NDFB
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Sintesis:
The ULFA armed opposition group emerged in 1979 with the aim of freeing the state of Assam from Indian colonisation and establishing a sovereign State. The demographic transformations the state underwent after the partition of the Indian subcontinent, with the arrival of two million people from Bangladesh, are at the centre of the ethnic Assamese population's demands for recognition of their cultural and civil rights and the establishment of an independent State. During the 1980s and 1990s several escalations of violence occurred as well as attempts at negotiation which failed. A peace process began in 2005 that resulted in a decrease in violence, but was interrupted in 2006, giving rise to a new escalation of the conflict. Additionally, during the 1980s armed groups of Bodo origin emerged, such as the NDFB, and demanded recognition of their identity as opposed to the majority Assamese population

38. See Chapter 6 (Gender).
39. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

Overall, violence remained at a level comparable to previous years, with at least 380 deaths in the state of Assam between January and mid-December, although **the conflict with the Dimasa armed group "Black Widow" was escalated, which forced the group to surrender**. After months of insurgent violence and military operations against Black Widow in the North Cachar Hills district, a government ultimatum in September with the threat of a large scale offensive brought about the surrender of the group. Nearly 400 members were transferred to cantonment sites. In the first nine months of the year, at least one hundred people died due to violence in the district which caused the displacement of thousands of people and mainly affected the Dimasa and Zeme Naga populations. After their surrender, some media organizations reported that other irregular groups were committing acts of violence due to the insurgent power vacuum created. Moreover, with regard to the **ULFA** conflict, the group **continued to be active during the year** and the Police held them responsible for several attacks, including several explosions in January in Guwahati that caused fifty deaths and 60 wounded; various multiple explosions in April, also in Guwahati, with a dozen dead and 80 wounded; and two explosions in Nalbarri in November with nearly a dozen deaths and over 50 wounded. The group denied responsibility for the attacks **and in November agreed to the possibility of beginning peace talks with the Government** which coincided with civilian calls for dialogue.[40] In connection with the NDFB Bodo conflict, the Administration extended the ceasefire agreement and began peace talks with the group in Delhi, but maintained military operations against the faction led by Ranjan Daimary.[41]

India (Jammu and Kashmir)	
Start:	1989
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizbul Mujahideen
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The armed conflict in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir has its origin in the dispute over the region of Kashmir which has set India and Pakistan against each other since their independence and partition. On three occasions (1947-1948; 1965; 1971) the two countries have clashed in armed conflict, both claiming sovereignty over the region, which is split between India, Pakistan and China. The armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1947 gave rise to the current division and creation of a *de facto* border between the two countries. Since 1989, the armed conflict has moved to the interior of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where a multitude of insurgent groups, in favour of full independence for the state or unconditional adhesion to Pakistan, confront the Indian security forces. Since the beginning of the peace process between India and Pakistan in 2004, violence has declined considerably, although the armed groups remain active.

Around 365 people died in 2009, which was slightly below the figure for previous years. In this sense, **the Government stated on several occasions that the conflict was in a sustained period of decrease in violence** and announced that it intended to withdraw thousands of troops from Jammu and Kashmir to redeploy them in areas where the CPI-M armed Maoist group operates. Nevertheless, in December the Government had only withdrawn 15.000 troops and had not announced the number of soldiers involved or a calendar for withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Government declared that only 110 of the 3,429 missing people in the region between 1990 and 2009 had disappeared after being arrested by the State security forces. However, **human rights organizations demanded a truth commission be set up since they considered that the number of missing persons could be as high as 8,000, the majority after being arrested by the State security forces.** Apart from the fighting that took place near the Line of Control, which caused the majority of the deaths, there were massive protests at different times of the year against the presence and the *modus operandi* of the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. During the protests, led by pro-independence organizations such as Hurriyat Conference or United Jihad Council, hundreds of people were wounded and a similar number arrested. Political and social tension climbed significantly at certain times during the year, such as during the legislative elections in April and May (boycotted by some organizations) or the commemoration of India's independence in the month of August. In addition, in the second and third quarters massive protests were held for the rape and murder of two women, allegedly by the State security forces.

India (Manipur)	
Start:	1982
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KNF, KNA, KYKL
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The armed conflict that confronts the government with various armed groups operating in the state, as well as some who are fighting against each other, began with demands for independence by several of these groups, and with the tensions that exist between the different ethnic groups that coexist in the state. In the 1960s and 1970s various armed groups emerged, some inspired by Communism and others of ethnic origin. These groups have remained active throughout the subsequent decades. In addition, the regional context of a state which shares borders with Nagaland, Assam and Myanmar also marked the development of conflict in Manipur, and tensions between Manipuri ethnic groups and the Naga population are constant. The economic impoverishment of the state and its isolation from the rest of the country have decisively contributed to reinforcing a feeling of injustice among the Manipuri population.

40. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).
41. Figure provided by the SATP think tank. The mortality data for the different conflicts in India and Pakistan are from the same source, in <http://www.satp.org/default.asp>.

Fighting continued between the security forces and the different armed groups, with some 380 deaths, one hundred less than the previous year. In the second half of the year armed violence decreased while social and political tension were on the rise. The insurgency was especially active in the Thoubal and Imphal districts. In Imphal, the murder of several civil servants in February, allegedly by the NSCN-IM (from the neighbouring state of Nagaland), brought on the imposition of a curfew which continued until the end of March. Moreover, in the Bishnupur district, the Police and Assam Rifles security force launched a special counterinsurgency operation in April which caused dozens of casualties in the armed groups of the area, mainly in the PREPAK. Beginning in July, violence in the state declined although social tension was on the rise with massive demonstrations which combined strikes and protests organized by the major Naga organizations and numerous civil society groups, as well as protests by the political opposition. They all **demanded the resignation of the state prime minister, Okram Singh, for the over 210 murders allegedly committed by the security forces and disguised as combat casualties**. The protests were sparked by the death, in July, of a young activist who was in favour of independence –according to some sectors he was killed in police custody–, and because of the denouncement of an increase in the number of murders that allegedly were being covered up. During the year there were also civilian protests against the intimidation and threats from armed groups. In addition, the agreement was again renewed for another year to suspend hostilities between the central Government, the Government of Manipur and two Kuki armed groups, the Kuki National Organisation and the United People's Front.

India (Nagaland)	
Start:	1955
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM
Intensity:	1
Trend:	Fin

Summary:

El The conflict that affects the state of Nagaland began after the British decolonization process in India (1947) when a Naga movement emerged demanding recognition for the collective rights of the population, mostly Christian, as opposed to the majority which are Indian Hindu. The founding of the NCC Naga organization in 1946 marks the beginning of political demands for independence for the Naga people. These demands evolved over the following decades both in content (Nagaland independence or the creation of the Great Nagaland including territories from neighbouring states inhabited by Nagas) and in the methods of opposition, with the beginning of the armed struggle in 1955. In 1980 the NSCN armed opposition group was created as a result of disagreements with more moderate political groups, and eight years later split into two factions, Isaac Muivah and Khaplang. Since 1997 the NSCN-IM has maintained a ceasefire agreement and talks with the Indian Government, but in recent years the number of clashes between the two groups has multiplied.

Violence in the state declined significantly during the year, compared to the increase in fighting and number of victims during the 2007 and 2008 conflict, and was therefore no longer considered an armed conflict beginning in the first quarter.[42] Even so, some incidents during the first quarter were reported. On the one hand, there were clashes between the State security forces and the NSCN-IM, which warned the Government that it would not tolerate the presence of security forces in the area around the camps where its members are stationed. On the other hand, fighting took place between the NSCN-IM and rival NSCN-K in the area of Bhandari, in the Wokha district. Additionally, in February in the neighbouring state of Manipur, the murder of three Government employees by members of the **NSCN-IM** created tension between the parties in the conflict, although the armed group considered the attack the responsibility of individuals and requested that it not be used to hamper the peace process.[43] Moreover, **the group's leader, Isaac Chisi Swu, reasserted his commitment to a peaceful solution to the conflict**.

India (CPI-M)	
Start:	1967
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The armed conflict in which confronts the Indian government with the CPI-M Maoist armed group (known as the Naxalites, in honour of the town where the movement was created) affects numerous Indian states. The CPI-M surfaced in West Bengal at the end of the 1960s with demands related to the eradication of the land ownership system, as well as strong criticism of the system of parliamentary democracy, which was considered as a colonial legacy. Since then, armed activity has been constant and has been accompanied by the establishment of parallel systems of government in the areas under its control, which are mainly rural. Military operations against this group, considered by the Indian government as a terrorist organization, have been constant. In 2004, a negotiation process began which ended in failure.

Violence climbed, reaching 960 deaths during the year. The most significant increase was in the states of Chhattishgarh, West Bengal and Jharkhand where the most violent clashes were reported, as opposed to Orissa where there was a decline. During the year there were Naxalite attacks which caused a high number of deaths, the one in Chhattishgarh in June being the most notable with 39 police casualties and 15 wounded. This was the largest number of victims in one single day since the beginning of the conflict. Moreover, the insurgency used a large number of combatants in some of the attacks, such as the one against the Police in Maharashtra with 200 insurgents and 17 police dead; or another offensive against the Police in the state of Bihar with 200 insurgents that caused the death of 10 police officers. In addition, **the**

42. See Chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).
43. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

state West Bengal was, for the first time, the scene for high levels of violence. In this state there were over one hundred deaths during the year, compared to 20 in 2008, in fighting set off by the deployment of 1,800 soldiers in the area in June and after the death of 10 members of the government party, the CPI-M (this party has the same name as the armed group, but is opposed to it). In recent months, tension had mounted in the area of Lalgarh, which is mostly under Naxalite control since the end of 2008 when the Police were expelled and part of the State administration was dismantled. The violence in West Bengal caused the displacement of thousands of civilians. In the third quarter the authorities regained political and military control. Given the existing violence in the country, **seven states supported the initiative of the Interior Minister to coordinate the counterinsurgency campaign in the border regions.** Furthermore, in October a new strategy was announced, headed by the Police in the different states and which included the deployment of 70,000 members of the security forces, elite commandos and special forces, and the use of the Air Force. This plan was heavily criticized by the civil society. This operation was launched in December, known as Green Hunt, with the transfer of 3,000 police agents from Jammu and Kashmir to Chhattisgarh. The launch coincided with a leak that the insurgency was approaching the Indian capital.

The conflict in northwest Pakistan between the Taliban militia and the Army became worse, with over 2,800 deaths and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons

Pakistan (Baluchistan)	
Start:	2005
Type:	Self-government, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Government, BLA, BRA and BLF
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:

Since the creation of the State of Pakistan in 1947, Baluchistan, the richest province in natural resources but with some of the highest poverty rates in the country, has experienced four periods of armed violence (1948, 1958, 1963-69 and 1973-77) in which the insurgents have spelled out their objective of achieving greater autonomy or even independence. In 2005, the armed insurgency reappeared on the scene, mainly attacking gas extraction infrastructures . The BLA armed opposition group became the main force opposing the presence of the central Government, which it accused of taking advantage of the wealth of the province without any of this benefiting the local population. As a consequence of the resurgence of the armed opposition, a military operation was launched in the province in 2005, causing the displacement of the civilian population and armed confrontations.

Conflict related violence in the region of Baluchistan was similar to levels in 2008. **The year began with the announcement by the BLA, BRA and BLF opposition armed groups that they were suspending the ceasefire that they had unilaterally declared at the end of 2008.** The argument used was the need to respond to the Armed Forces offensive which they accused of killing 50 people during the ceasefire. During this period the insurgency had continued their attacks and, therefore, the decision to renew the armed struggle was just the continuation of a situation of violence that, in practice, had been maintained in the region. Following the pattern established since violence was renewed in 2005, the opposition groups' actions concentrated on infrastructures, rail networks and gas pipelines, as well as bombings against the security forces. In addition, kidnappings were carried out which resulted in the death of dozens of hostages. In parallel, **throughout the year nationalist Baluchi leaders were murdered, which was attributed to the security forces.** On several occasions these deaths sparked massive protests and strikes that, in turn, caused more fatalities and dozens of wounded. In September, the Government announced a general amnesty for Baluchi political prisoners and reported that the accusations of disappearances and torture of activists in the province were being investigated by the Pakistani Human Rights Commission. In December, according to official estimates, one thousand people were missing. At the end of the year, the Government presented a plan in the Parliament to increase the autonomy of Baluchistan, but the proposal was considered insufficient and rejected. On the regional level, Islamabad accused Afghanistan and India of providing support for the insurgency in Baluchistan, which is the poorest province in Pakistan in spite of its abundant natural resources. Both Governments rejected these accusations.

Pakistan (northwest)	
Start:	2001
Type:	System Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias, US
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The armed conflict in the northwest region of the country began as part of the armed conflict in Afghanistan after the US bombings in 2001. The area is made up of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which had been inaccessible to the Pakistani Government until 2002, when the first military operations began in the area – and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, members of the Taliban militias with alleged connections to al-Qaeda, took refuge in this area, giving rise to large-scale military operations by the Pakistani Armed Forces (nearly 50,000 soldiers have been deployed) with US support. The local population, largely from the Pashtun ethnic group, have been accused of supporting the combatants from Afghanistan. Since the first operations in 2002, violence has been on the rise.

The atmosphere of violence in the northwest got worse, with at least 2,800 deaths during the year and had a greater effect on the NWFP during the first half of the year and on the FATA in the final months. In February in the NWFP, the central Government accepted an agreement between the provincial Government and the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah Mohammadi organization,

which included the application of Islamic law in some areas of the province, disarmament of the militias and the end to military operations. This was followed by a ceasefire in Swat. Nevertheless, violence returned shortly after, with the **Taliban expansion in the former Malakand division** (Swat, Dir, Malakand and Buner districts, among others), and reached Buer and Dir, **only one hundred kilometers from Islamabad.** Counter-offensive operations by the Army in April forced the Taliban to retreat and put an end to the talks. According to UNHCR, since the beginning of operations in the NWFP, 2.3 million people have been displaced because of the violence.[44] More than one thousand people died in these actions and the Pakistani prime minister declared the area a disaster zone. The Government announced in July that it had regained control, although throughout the rest of the year the NWFP continued to be the scene of clashes and suicide attacks which caused hundreds of deaths. This included **an attack on a market in Peshawar with 96 fatalities, the deadliest in Pakistan in the last two years**, and which coincided with a visit by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Furthermore, the situation in the FATA deteriorated considerably after the peace agreement between the insurgency and the authorities failed in June. This led to more violence with large scale military offensives and a rise in insurgent attacks in areas such as Khyber in September, which caused tens of thousands of displaced people and over one hundred victims, and South Waziristan since October, with over 600 dead and hundreds of thousands of displaced people. In addition, **attacks by unmanned US drones caused dozens of deaths.** The death of Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the TTP, in an attack by the US was reported in August.

Sri Lanka (northeast)	
Start:	1983
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, LTTE
Intensity:	3
Trend:	Fin

Summary:

In 1983, the Tamil pro-independence armed opposition group, the LTTE, began the armed conflict that has ravaged Sri Lanka for the past three decades. After the decolonisation of the island in 1948, the growing marginalisation of the Tamil population by the Government, which is mostly made up of the Sinhalese elite, led the group to fight for the establishment of an independent Tamil State. Since 1983, each of the three phases of the conflict has ended with a failed peace process. In 2002, peace negotiations began once again with Norwegian mediation, following the signing of a ceasefire agreement. The failure of the talks sparked a violent renewal of the armed conflict in 2006. In May 2009, the Armed Forces inflicted a military defeat on the LTTE and regained control over the entire country after killing the armed group's leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

In May, **President Mahinda Rajapakse declared that the armed conflict**, which had lasted 26 years and caused 86,000 deaths, **had ended**. Since then, the levels of violence have dropped drastically and this context is now no longer considered an armed conflict. [45] The Armed Forces' final offensive on the remaining LTTE strongholds began in January with the capture of Kilinochchi, where the group's headquarters had been located in recent years, and the Jaffna peninsula. Soon after, in February, the Army took the city of Mullaitivu and the Chalai naval base which significantly weakened the group's military capabilities and cornered them into a small area of the territory. According to Government sources, in the previous 34 months of the armed conflict nearly 22,000 insurgents and died and 6,200 soldiers. Conversely, the **United Nations stated that about 7,000 civilians had died and another 14,000 had been wounded between the months of January and May 2009**. In this sense, **the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, denounced that both sides could have committed war crimes** in the final stages of the armed conflict: the Government for bombing areas designated to protect civilians and for using cluster bombs, and the LTTE for using civilians as human shields and for blocking the evacuation of the civilian population in areas under its control. The land, air and sea battles in the final weeks of the Army's offensive forced the displacement of approximately 300,000 people with the majority being trapped in the combat areas. Finally, the Government officially declared an end to the armed conflict the day after the death of the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was confirmed.

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Philippines (NPA)	
Start:	1969
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Government, NPA
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=

Summary:

The NPA, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, began its armed struggle in 1969 and reached its peak in the 1980s, during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. Although the group was seriously weakened at the beginning of the 1990s –because of internal purges, the democratisation of the Philippines during the second half of the 1980s and an offering of an amnesty–, it is currently estimated that the NPA operates in most of the country's provinces. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NPA was included in the US and EU terrorist organization lists, which greatly undermined the trust between both parties and to a large extent caused the peace talks with Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's Government to be broken off. The political arm of the NPA, whose main aim is to take power and transform the political and socio-economic system, are the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front (NDF), which brings together various Communist-inspired organisations.

44. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).
45. See Chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

Box 1.2. **The reasons behind the military defeat of the LTTE**

On May 19, 2009, the president of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapakse, announced the military defeat of the Tamil armed opposition group LTTE after having killed its leader, Vellupillai Prabakharan. The defeat of one of the most powerful insurgencies in the world –approximately 15,000 combatants,[46] army, air force, navy and important financial resources– and for 26 years able to corner the Armed Forces, raised many questions regarding the key to an unforeseen victory. Although the ultimate reasons for the defeat are still not clear, a multi-causal approach seems necessary to attempt to explain how the Government was able to regain control of the entire island of Sri Lanka and dismantle the LTTE.

First, it is necessary to mention the split by Coronel Karuna and the impact it had on the group, which meant losing control of the east of the island and the desertion of an important number of LTTE combatants. Around 6,000 combatants left the ranks of the LTTE to join Karuna. The support provided by this faction to the Armed Forces in 2006 and 2007 was the beginning of the armed group's decline, which at that time was mainly grouped in the north of the island. Second, the LTTE defeat can also be included in the context of the global war against terrorism. In fact, the armed group was included in the terrorist organizations list of the EU and Canada in 2006.[47] The inclusion of the LTTE in the list not only hampered the negotiation process between the Sri Lankan Government and the armed organization because it forbade its leaders from travelling to UE countries, but also was a setback in logistic and financial terms since it made it more difficult to gain access to the economic resources provided by the diaspora.

Furthermore, contributions by the diaspora –vital for the armed group's maintenance–[48] had dwindled in recent years. Among the reasons analysts give for the growing distance between the diaspora and the armed group are certain practices (recruitment of child soldiers, utilization of the civilian population) and the fact that the group was self-proclaimed as the only legitimate representative of the Tamil people, which excluded other Tamil voices that were critical of the armed group's methods. Finally, the Government's determination to achieve a military victory no matter what the cost should be mentioned. This led them to give priority to military goals over other issues such as protecting the civilian population and respecting International Humanitarian Law. The end result was that the victory was accompanied by grave human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions or bombings in areas set aside for the civilian population.

Despite continuing contacts between the Government and the NDF to renew the peace process,[49] fighting took place in many provinces throughout the year. Moreover, the Government insisted on its plan to defeat the NPA by 2010, as the President had repeated on several occasions. In this sense, **the Government substantially increased the number of military units dedicated to fight the NPA and reinforced the demobilization and reintegration program for combatants**. Manila reported that since the program began in 2001, over 12,000 insurgents, especially from the NPA, had accepted to participate in it and 3,700 members of the NPA had surrendered since 2004. Violence rose three times during the year. First, in the month of April, coinciding with the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the armed group and with the joint military exercises that the Philippine and US troops conduct each year. At different times of the year the NPA also carried out several attacks on US troops that were realizing counter-terrorism tasks in Mindanao. Second, violence rose again in September, shortly after an attempt to renew the peace process failed. Finally, in November and December, over 40 people died in different clashes which were especially intense in Mindanao. The Government accused the NPA of setting off more and more bombs by remote control and of increasing their attacks on the civilian population. In this sense, the Government reported that between May 2008 and May 2009 the NPA had murdered over 120 people accused of providing information to the Government or not paying the revolutionary tax. The NPA denied this information and accused the Army of militarizing the civilian population with the creation of self-defence groups to fight against the NPA.

Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)	
Start:	1978
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, MILF
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The armed conflict in Mindanao dates back to the end of the 1960s, when Nur Misuari founded the MNLF to fight for the self-determination of the Moro people –a number of Islamized ethnolinguistic groups that are politically organised into independent sultanates since the 15th century–. The MILF, for strategic, ideological and leadership reasons, broke away from the MNLF at the end of the 1970s and continued with the armed struggle while the MNLF signed a peace agreement in 1996 which included a certain degree of autonomy for the areas of Mindanao that are mostly Muslim (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). Despite the fact that both parties signed

46. There is no agreement on the exact number of combatants. After the end of the conflict, the Government has stated that approximately 10,000 people remain under arrest accused of having links to the armed group. Moreover, the Government affirmed that the number of insurgents killed in the 34 month period prior to the defeat of the armed group was 22,000 (BBC. "Colombo to rehabilitate rebels", BBC, 27 May 2009, in <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8069469.stm>.
47. The United Kingdom considered the LTTE a terrorist group since 2000 and the US named it Specially Designated Global Terrorist since November 2001.
48. It is estimated that before 2000 the Diaspora provided approximately 50 million dollars yearly. Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan. *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001.
49. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

a ceasefire in 2003 (monitored by an international mission) and that in recent years several rounds of negotiations have been held with the Government –with help from Malaysia and focusing on the ancestral territories of the Moro people– the MILF continues to be active in several regions of Mindanao and it is estimated to have around 11,000 members.

Although the intensity of the conflict declined compared to the last quarter of 2008, fighting continued throughout the year. The Government declared that one hundred members of the MILF had died during the fighting in January, in which the Army had conducted air strikes and had about 50 casualties in its own ranks. These clashes, especially those that took place in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao, caused the displacement of thousands of people. **Manila indicated that in the month of February over 120 people had died due to the precarious conditions in the displacement centres**. In subsequent months the Army stepped up its campaign to arrest those allegedly responsible for the outbreak of violence that took place in Mindanao in the final third of 2008, such as the commander Ameril Umbra Kato. The exact number of people that died during this offensive is unknown, although the Armed Forces announced that one hundred insurgents had died in the month of June alone, and a minimum of 200 combatants had surrendered. Conversely, **the MILF declared that over 500 soldiers had died between August 2008 and July 2009.** The Government accused the MILF of continuing to attack the civilian population and of participating in dozens of attacks with explosive devices. The MILF accused the Government of conducting air strikes and systematically destroying the populations' homes. According to official sources, in the first months of the year alone over 2,000 homes had been burned in the province of Maguindanao. Fighting decreased significantly during the second half of the year due to the signing of several agreements between the parties,[50] although isolated incidents continued to take place (such as the alleged participation of MILF members in the kidnapping of an Irish priest in October or the attack on a prison in Basilan in December), insurgent leaders were arrested and sporadic violations of the ceasefire agreement occurred.

Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf)	
Start:	1991
Type:	Self-government, Identity, System Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, Abu Sayyaf
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The Abu Sayyaf group has been fighting since the 1990s to establish an independent Islamic state in the Sulu archipelago and the western regions of Mindanao (south). It initially recruited disaffected members from other armed groups, such as the MILF or the MNLF. However, it subsequently distanced itself ideologically from both organisations and became more systematically involved in kidnappings, extortion, decapitation and bomb attacks, thus being included in the US and EU lists of terrorist organisations. The Government considers that its counterinsurgency strategy in recent years has significantly weakened the leadership and military capability of the group. It also warns, however, that Abu Sayyaf continues to be a threat to the State because of the significant resources that it obtains through kidnapping and through alleged alliances with organisations considered as terrorists, such as Al-Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah.

Fighting rose appreciably compared to last year and has caused the death of close to 200 people. The first part of the year was marked by an Armed Forces operation to free the hostages in Abu Sayyaf's hands, especially the three workers from the International Committee of the Red Cross (two of them foreigners) who had been kidnapped in January. Fighting was especially intense in July and caused the death of over 50 people and the displacement of some 10,000 people on Jolo Island. A few days after the last Red Cross worker was set free, the Armed Forces increased their military pressure against the group and deployed thousands of additional soldiers in the Sulu Archipelago. Thus, **in mid-August, 54 people, 23 of them soldiers, died on Basilan Island in one of the fiercest clashes in recent years.** A few weeks later, at the beginning of September, 34 members of Abu Sayyaf and eight soldiers died during the taking of one of the group's main camps on Jolo Island in which the Army used air strikes. The Armed Forces declared that both the military offensive during the last year and several internal purges had enormously weakened the armed capability of Abu Sayyaf, although they recognized that the group was trying to rebuild its links with organizations in the Middle East and, also, that each year it obtained large amounts of income from the kidnappings. In this sense, **Manila indicated that Abu Sayyaf had captured over 200 people since 2003**. Furthermore, the Government said the group was responsible for most of the 140 attacks with explosive devices during the year which killed over 50 people and wounded almost 300. Finally, the Government warned again of the presence of foreign organizations considered terrorists that operate in the south of the country and maintain close ties to Abu Sayyaf.

Myanmar	
Start:	1948
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, armed groups (KNU/ KNLA, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNPLAC, SSNPLO)
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑

Summary:

Since 1948, dozens of armed insurgent groups of ethnic origin have confronted the government of Myanmar to demand recognition of their distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics and call for reforms in the territorial structure of the State or independence. Since the beginning of the military dictatorship in 1962, the Armed Forces have been combating armed groups in the ethnic states. These groups combine demands

50. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

for self-determination for minorities and calls for democratisation, a goal they share with the political opposition. In 1988, the Government launched a ceasefire process with part of the insurgent groups which allowed them to continue with their economic activity (mainly, trafficking in drugs and precious stones). Nevertheless, military operations have been constant for decades and have been especially aimed at the civilian population to force the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people with the intention of eliminating the armed groups' bases.

The two main scenes of violence were the states of Karen and Shan, although attacks with explosive devices were also reported in Rangoon and Mon State. In Karen state, the Armed Forces and the Karen armed group DKBA (split off from the KNU) conducted the most important military offensive of the decade which forced 4,000 people to flee to Thailand. Some voices indicated that the motivation for the offensive was an attempt by the DKBA to militarily eradicate the KNU bases, control the region's natural resources and maintain greater commercial ties with neighbouring Thailand. In addition, **the DKBA began a forcible recruitment campaign among the civilian population in Karen state** to increase its forces from 6,000 to 9,000 and thus meet Government requirements for joining the border patrol, which is under the Armed Forces. The number of people that died during the fighting is unknown, although the KNU declared that some 250 soldiers could have died during the first half of the year. In turn, Thailand increased pressure on the KNU to restrict its armed activity in Thai territory. In Shan state, sporadic clashes took place between the Army and the armed groups SSA-S, KNPP and PNLO. **In July and August, over 30,000 people were forced to cross the border with China due to the fighting between the Armed Forces and the MNDAA, which was aided by the UWSA.** Since mid-2008, tension in this state has increased notably between the Government and several armed groups –like the KIA, the NDAA or the SSA-N– that signed ceasefire agreements with the Government but refuse to join the border patrol. In this sense, several sources warned about growing military tension between the Government and the UWSA (the most powerful armed group) and of the possible renewal of a high intensity conflict in Shan or Kachin states, where the KIO has also warned that it may renew armed activity if the Government obliges them to join the border patrol.

The Myanmar Armed Forces conducted one of the fiercest counterinsurgency offensives in recent years in Karen state

Thailand (South)	
Start:	2004
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, secessionist armed opposition groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:

The conflict in southern Thailand dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, when the then Kingdom of Siam and the British colonial government in the Malay peninsula decided to divide up the Sultanate of Patani, leaving some territories under the sovereign control of current day Malaysia and others (the southern provinces of Songkhla, Yala, Patani and Narathiwat) under Thai control. During the 20th century groups have existed that fought to resist political cultural and religious homogenization driven by Bangkok or to demand the independence of these provinces with a Malay-Muslim majority. The conflict reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s and tapered off thanks to the democratization of the country. Nevertheless, the arrival to power of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 resulted in a drastic change of direction in the counterinsurgency policies and preceded the armed conflict which affects the region since 2004. The civilian population, both Buddhist and Muslim, is the main victim of the violence. Normally, no groups take responsibility for the actions.

The Government declared that violence was falling in the first months of 2009, but a study by the Thai research centre Deep South Watch presented in mid-September revealed that although levels of violence had gradually decreased since 2007 they had been on the rise again in 2009 and had reached 100 armed incidents per month (the highest number since 2007). The centre pointed out that from 2004 to August 2009 over 9,000 armed incidents had taken place, 3,600 people had died and over 6,000 had been wounded. Some media outlets, however, consider that the number of fatalities has surpassed 4,000 since 2004. As in previous years, the violence mainly affected the civilian population (Buddhist and Muslim) with a considerable impact on the educational domain, with dozens of attacks on schools and teachers. Intelligence sources estimate that the insurgency, led mainly by the BRN-C group, currently has between 4,000 and 9,000 active members which operate in small independent cells and have considerable autonomy to act. Although the Government declared that the key to resolving the armed conflict was to drive development projects, strengthen cooperation with Malaysia, increase local participation and carry out educational and cultural measures, **Bangkok increased its military presence in the south of the country (where almost half of the Army is already deployed) and extended the state of emergency in the three southern provinces.** In this sense, while Amnesty International accused the Armed Forces of systematically practicing torture, several organizations meanwhile criticized the Government for promoting the creation of civilian self-defence groups.

Europe

Russia (Chechnya)	
Start:	1999
Type:	Self-government, Identity, System Internal
Main parties:	Russian Federal Government, Government of Chechnya, armed opposition groups
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑

Summary:

After the so-called first Chechen war (1994-1996) which confronted the Russian Federation with the Republic of Chechnya,

mainly over the issue of the latter's independence (which was unilaterally proclaimed during the break-up of the USSR), and which ended in a peace treaty that failed to resolve Chechnya's status, the conflict resumed in 1999 in what became known as the second Chechen war and was set off triggered by incursions into Dagestan by Chechen rebels and attacks on Russian cities. Prior to elections and using anti-terrorist rhetoric, the Russian military once again entered Chechnya to combat the moderate pro-independence regime that had emerged following the first war and that had itself been victim of internal disputes and growing criminality. Russia announced the end of the war in 2001, without having achieved any agreement or a definitive victory, and promoted a statute of autonomy and a pro-Russian Chechen administration. However, fighting continued accompanied by a growing Islamization of the Chechen rebel troops and the regionalization of the armed struggle.

There was a clear contrast between the official rhetoric of stability and a deteriorating security situation, especially for the civilian population. In mid-April, the Kremlin announced the **end to the anti-terrorism operation in Chechnya** in reference to the military campaign began in 1999 which gave rise to the second Chechen war. The decision implies the end to special measures and the withdrawal of temporary federal troops. In spite of the announcement, **violence rose during the year with an increase of actions by the irregular units, including suicide attacks.** Over one hundred people died in 2009 due to insurgent and counterinsurgent violence. According to the Chechen Interior Ministry, between the end of April and November, 118 combatants died. Of the incidents, we should highlight one operation by the Chechen security forces in mid-November, with an official count of 20 rebels killed. In parallel, the North Caucasus insurgency claimed responsibility for an attack on a luxury train 320 kilometers from Moscow in November, which caused 26 deaths and close to one hundred wounded, although several analysts had doubts about their participation. In addition, the counterinsurgency cooperation between Chechnya and Ingushetia increased. Meanwhile, **grave human rights violations continued**, including kidnappings and disappearances. Local and international organizations urged Russia to end the atmosphere of abuses against civilians. During the year several people with links to the fields of human rights, journalism and humanitarian work were killed, including the activist from the NGO Memorial Natalia Estemirova.[51] In addition, in March the former Vostok battalion commander and main rival of the Chechen president, Sulim Yamadayev, was killed in Dubai.

Russia (Ingushetia)	
Start:	2008
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Russian Federal Government, Government of Ingushetia, armed opposition groups (Jamaat Ingush)
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑

51. See Chapter 5 (Human Rights and Transitional Justice).

Summary:
The low-level violence experienced in Ingushetia since the beginning of the 21st century confronts the local and federal security forces with a network of armed Islamist cells known as the Jamaat Ingush and is part of the Caucasus Front (movement that brings together the different insurgent groups in the northern Caucasus). With origins that date back to the participation of Ingush fighters in the first Chechen War (1994-1996), since 2002 the Ingush insurgency has been restructured along territorial lines and has promoted a campaign of local violence. Without the nationalist drive of Chechnya, it pursues the establishment of an Islamic state in the Caucasus. The beginning of violence in Ingushetia occurred during the presidency in the Republic of Murat Zyazikov, whose term (2002-2008) is said to have been responsible for human rights violations, corruption, poverty, social and political tension and an atmosphere of misgovernment. The Ingush insurgents periodically attack military and civilian personnel belonging to the Russian and local state machinery. 2008 marked an increase in violence and tension.

The security situation in the Republic continued to deteriorate, in spite of a change in the Presidency at the end of 2008 and the announcement by the new leader, Yunus-bek Yevkurov, of his willingness to dialogue with the Islamic insurgency. During the year over one hundred people died, including insurgents, members of the security forces and civilians. The BBC estimated the number at 200 at the end of October and the NGO Médecins Sans Frontières had reported 140 during the first six months of the year. Additionally, suicide attacks and selective attacks by the insurgency against high level officials increased. In of the most notable incidents, **25 people died and 140 were wounded, including children, in a suicide attack with a truck bomb** against a police complex in the city of Nazran in August. This was the most deadly attack in the North Caucasus in recent years. The **Ingush president was also the victim of an attack, in which he was wounded**. In different attacks during the year high level officials died, such as the Minister of Construction and the deputy head of the Supreme Court. In response, Ingushetia and Chechnya increased their counterinsurgency cooperation. Meanwhile, the atmosphere of violence and abuses against the civilian population continued. The NGO Memorial warned that the war against terrorism in the North Caucasus had turned into a state of terror due to **extrajudicial executions, torture, disappearances and impunity**, also present in Ingushetia. The Ingush political opponent, Maksharip Aushev, was killed in the neighbouring republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. In October, **the president dismissed the entire Government** and criticized them for not having suitable strategies to resolve the Republic's socio-economic problems. Furthermore, he began contacts with local clans to create a council of *teips* (clans) to address Ingushetia's problems.

Turkey (Southeast)	
Start:	1984
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, PKK, TAK
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The PKK, founded in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist political party led by Abdullah Öcalan, announced an armed offensive in 1984 against the Government and launched a military insurgency campaign to demand Kurdistan's independence. This prompted a strong response from the Government in defence of territorial integrity. The resulting war between the PKK and the Government particularly affected the Kurdish civilian population in south-eastern Turkey, trapped in the crossfire and victim of persecutions and forcible evacuation campaigns carried out by the Government. The conflict took a new turn in 1999, with the arrest of Öcalan and the subsequent announcement by the PKK that it was abandoning the armed struggle and transforming its goals. It would cease in its demands for independence to focus on fighting for the recognition of the Kurdish identity within Turkey. With Turkey's anti-terrorist discourse and the PKK claiming a policy of self-defence, the conflict remained alive as a socio-political crisis in subsequent years and escalated in 2007.

An opportunity for peace was created with trust building measures by the PKK and the Government, although in December violence was on the rise and the DTP Kurdish party was banned

An opportunity for peace during the year, as a result of the trust building measures by the Government and the PKK, was jeopardized at the end of the year with the banning of the pro-Kurdish party DTP and an upturn in violence. Until November fighting had declined considerably, although there were several clashes and cross-border operations by the Army against the PKK, with dozens of deaths. According to the group, 128 soldiers and 94 combatants died during 2009. The PKK, which had formally maintained a non-offensive position since the end of 2008 until the local elections in March 2009, announced **a new ceasefire in April. The PKK subsequently renewed it** and simultaneously made calls for dialogue and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan[52] requested the creation of a road map. **The Government, in an about-face regarding its earlier position, announced in July the preparation of reforms to resolve the Kurdish question** which it presented to the Parliament in November. The plan was rejected by the opposition and supported by the Army, who was determined to finish off the PKK. In this sense, the Parliament renewed for another year the Army's permission to attack the group in Iraq. This decision was considered by the PKK to be a declaration of war. Moreover, the armed group considered the Government's reform plan ambiguous. Even so, the PKK sent, at the initiative of Öcalan and as a peace gesture, a group of 34 people –eight combatants and 24 civilian refugees– from Iraq to Turkey in October. However, the mass reception they were offered in Diyarbakir was harshly criticized by the Turkish political class. Furthermore, the tension between the State and Kurdish social and political sectors was visible throughout the year. There were massive arrests of activists and DTP members were accused of having links with the PKK after the March elections, in which the DTP won by a wide margin in the southeast. Protests were launched in response to the arrests and caused the death of at least one police officer and dozens of wounded. Tension increased significantly in December for two reasons: an attack by a PKK cell in the province of Tokat (centre) without orders from above which caused the death of seven soldiers and had a considerable political and social impact; and because of a judicial order to ban the DTP, accused of cooperating with the PKK. **The latter considered the position of the Government and the State an attempt to wipe out the group and its bases**; criticized the new conditions of Öcalan's arrest; and threatened with a process of no return in reference to a renewal of violence. Subsequent Kurdish demonstrations in numerous cities resulted in three civilians dead and several wounded. Massive arrests at the end of the year against Kurdish circles, including mayors from the DTP, resulted in 300 accused.

Middle East

Iraq	
Start:	2003
Type:	System, Government, Resources Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Transitional Government, international coalition led by the USA/United Kingdom, internal and external armed opposition groups
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

The invasion by the US-led coalition in March 2003, based on the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction as a justification and with the purpose of overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime on the grounds of supposed links to the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York, gave rise to the beginning of an armed conflict that has gradually involved an increasing number of actors: international troops, Iraqi Armed Forces, militias and insurgent groups and al-Qaeda, among others. The new power-sharing arrangement between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds within the constitutional framework introduced following Hussein's overthrow has aroused discontent in many sectors. Violence has been on the rise and armed opposition to the international presence in the country has given way to an internal power struggle with a strong sectarian bent since February 2006, mainly between Shiites and Sunnis.

The country continued to undergo high levels of violence which intensified in the second quarter with the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi cities in June and with the approach of the elections planned for the beginning of 2010 (the second general election since Saddam Hussein was ousted). The continuous attacks, suicide

52. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

attacks and episodes of sectarian violence ended the lives of thousands of people throughout the year. According to a study by the organization Iraq Body Count, a total of 4,500 civilians died in 2009, half the number of the previous year and the lowest number of civilian victims since the invasion of the country in 2003. Nevertheless, in 2009 the number of victims in large scale attacks increased. In October, the deadliest attack since 2007 killed 150 people in the centre of Baghdad, in theory one of the most heavily guarded places in the country, and which had been the scene of another attack two months earlier resulting in over one hundred dead. Towards the end of the year the situation of insecurity and the difficulties in passing the election law which should govern the general elections raised doubts about whether the US would be able to fulfil the **calendar of troop withdrawals announced in February by US president Barack Obama. He had anticipated the departure of combat troops in August 2010 with 50,000 troops remaining for limited missions until the end of 2011**. Finally, just before the deadline and under pressure from the US, the Iraqi Parliament passed the voting law and the elections were scheduled for March 7. A day later the country saw one of its bloodiest days, with a series of attacks in Baghdad that caused over one hundred deaths. Political tension and violence also marked the local elections in 14 of the 18 provinces in the country at the beginning of the year and in the elections in the Iraqi Kurdistan in July. Conflict in the province of Nineveh and its capital, Mosul, as well as an uncertain political situation in the Northern oil-rich city of Kirkuk, marked by ethnic divisions, made these areas the main spotlight of attention due to their potential instability.

Box 1.3. **Increased conflict in the "disputed territories" in Northern Iraq**

The "disputed territories" refer to a strip of land which extends from Syria to Iran along the southern edge of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region (Iraq). Once the stage for the Arabization policy of Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by the expulsion of the Kurdish population, the situation in these areas constitutes the principle axis of growing tension between the Kurdish government and the central powers in Baghdad. While the Kurdish authorities insist that the status of these zones be defined within the framework of the 2005 Constitution, a number of factors have made this impossible up till now, without any prospect of it taking place.[53]

According to the KRG, these areas include territories under the administration of Kirkuk, Nineveh (Mosul), Diyala and Wasit (Kut) and they are considered "disputed" because their internal frontiers, administrative bodies, resources and population were subjected to changes under the Arabization programs adopted decades ago by the central government. According to the KRG, these changes led to a decrease in the Kurdish population of each region, created new entities and transferred Kurdish and Turkoman land to Arab colonists. For this reason the KRG insists on looking at these policies again to define the status of these territories and, to this end, in 2003 the Kurdish authorities initiated a campaign to settle the question. On the other hand, central government is reticent about Kurdish claims and says the areas are only described as "disputed" because the Kurds claim them.

Matters have evolved on two levels. In the legislative sphere, various articles relating to the "disputed territories" have been approved. Among the most notable is Article 58 of the 2004 Transitional Administration Law, which was later absorbed into Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution approved in 2005, which lays out, with some ambiguity, three phases in order to arrive at a definitive status for these zones: "normalization", carrying out a census and holding a referendum. On the ground, various experts say that the area has progressively come under the control of the KRG, although it remains de jure under the central government. In practice, and among other measures, what this means is that there are peshmergas, Kurdish regional forces, present. As for the proposed phases, although the cut-off date for a referendum set out in the Constitution (31 December 2007) has passed, parts of the other phases have been carried out. According to the Kurdish government, the normalization phase is complete and logistically everything is ready to carry out the census. However, the lack of agreements between the sides has blocked advances towards the holding of a referendum.

Two principal factors, each given different weight, depending on the point of view, stand out among the causes of the dispute. On the one hand, the difficult area of the "disputed territories" is presented as a question of dignity and historical justice, rooting the problem in the policy adopted for decades by the Baghdad government. On the other hand, others see the existence of oil as the main factor in the dispute. According to the first point of view, there must be reparations for the damage suffered in the past, and to this end they see the application of Article 140 as the only and perfect solution. According the second analysis, oil is the fundamental factor in the dispute, linked to the perceived aspirations towards independence and the centrifugal forces around of Erbil. In parallel to an increase in political tension, an increase in direct violence in the "disputed territories" has been identified: violence has taken place in various ways, with continuous bomb attacks that have left dozens of deaths, and also killings and numerous incidents. The two main troubled areas are located in the areas of Mosul and Kirkuk. Near the latter, a large-scale attack in mid-June left a death toll of more than 70 and wounded nearly 200 people.

It should be borne in mind that the violence in the "disputed territories", which manifests itself in many ways and is in itself complex and multidimensional, sometimes becomes extremely diffused. According to some analysts, there is a perception that "everyone and no one" is behind the violence. Even so, various factors that contribute to violence in the "disputed territories"

53. Tomàs, Núria, Villellas, Ana. *The Autonomous Kurdistan Region: Risks and Challenges for Peace*. Quadern de Construcció de Pau nº. 8, Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace), July 2009. http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/qcp/kurdistan_risks_peace.pdf

can be identified, although the origin of the violence is the subject of diametrically opposed points of view. For some – among them Kurdish government sources – the al-Qaeda network is the main source of the violence or, at least, them along with Baathist insurgents backed by Syria. Those who attribute the violence to outside forces also highlight the presence of violent Saudi and Yemeni elements as a key factor. Others blame neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, for supporting opposition groups.

Others, however, highlight the violence's internal origin. In this respect, analysts interviewed lay some of the responsibility at the door of the KRG, For example, the massive presence of heavily armed peshmergas in such small areas (such as the city of Kirkuk) alongside other militias (Sunni Arabs and Turkomans) – although on a much smaller scale – has inflamed the situation. To this must be added the aggressive statements made by all sides. Some sources consulted also consider that maintaining a level of violence in the area is in Kurdish leaders' interest, adding that there is a developing power struggle between the PUK and the KDP. Central government has also made aggressive moves, such as the sending of tanks to Khanaqin in 2008. At the same time, the tight control maintained by the Iraqi National Police in Mosul significantly inflames the situation.

There is evidently a risk of escalating conflict. To avoid it, it would help if the recent rhetoric were toned down, consensus was found and confidence-building and peacebuilding policies were initiated urgently.

Israel – Palestine	
Start:	2000
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Territory Internacional[54]
Main parties:	Israeli government, colonist militias, PNA, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committees
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The conflict between Israel and the different Palestinian actors is renewed in 2000 with the outbreak of the second Intifada caused by the failure of the peace process initiated at the beginning of the 1990s (Oslo Process, 1993-1994). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates back to 1947 when UN Security Council Resolution 181 divided the territory of Palestine, then under British mandate, into two states. Shortly afterwards the State of Israel was proclaimed (1948). A Palestinian state has yet to materialise. In 1948, Israel annexed West Jerusalem, while Egypt and Jordan occupied Gaza and the West Bank respectively. In 1967, Israel invaded East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza after winning the Six-Day War against the Arab countries. Autonomy for the Palestinian territories was not formally recognised until the Oslo agreements, though its implementation would be prevented by military occupation and the territorial controls imposed by Israel.

The year began with high levels of violence due to the Israeli offensive on Gaza which lasted from December 27, 2008 to January 19, 2009. The so-called Operation "Cast Lead" concluded with 1,400 Palestinians dead –half of them civilians– and 13 Israeli victims –three of them civilians–. Although the air and land campaigns ended, during the whole year Israel maintained their blockade of Palestinian territory, which worsened the humanitarian crisis caused by the lack of access of the population to basic goods, services and materials to rebuild what had been destroyed during the Israeli operation in December and January.[55] In September, an extensive report commissioned by the UN and led by the South African judge Richard Goldstone denounced the **commission of crimes of war during the Gaza conflict**. It accused Israel of using disproportionate force and indiscriminate attacks against civilians; and Hamas of launching missiles against Israeli territory. The text, which was passed by the UN Human Rights Commission and sparked a heated controversy, recommends sending the case to the International Criminal Court if the parties do not adequately investigate the allegations of abuses.[56] In the political sphere, the February elections in Israel brought to power the Likud in coalition with the extreme right parties. Expectations regarding the new US administration's plan to advance the peace process tailed off during the year in the face of **Washington's difficulty in getting a commitment from Benjamin Netanyahu's Government to halt the construction of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem**, a condition that the Palestinians consider indispensable.[57] In December, the Israeli Government showed its willingness to suspend for ten months the construction of colonies in the West Bank, but it maintained its policy of demolishing Palestinian homes and announced the construction of another 700 homes in East Jerusalem. At the end of the year, the death of an Israeli and six Palestinians during incidents in the West Bank and Gaza provoked fears about a new increase of violence.

Yemen	
Start:	2004
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Government, followers of the cleric al-Houthi (al-Shabab al-Mumen)
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑

54. Although "Palestine" (whose Palestine National Authority is a political entity linked to a specific population and territory) is not an internationally recognized State, the conflict between Israel and Palestine is considered "international" and not "internal" since it is a territory which has been illegally occupied and it is not recognized as being part of Israel under International Law or by a United Nations resolution.
55. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).
56. See Chapter 5 (Human Rights and Transitional Justice).
57. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

Summary:
This conflict began in 2004, when followers of the cleric al-Houthi, who belonged to the Shiite minority, began an uprising in the north of Yemen with the aim of reinstating a theocratic regime similar to the one that disappeared in 1962. The rebels have always accused the government of corruption and of failing to pay attention to the northern mountainous regions of the country, while objecting to its alliance with the US in the fight against terrorism. The conflict has caused the death of thousands of people and the displacement of thousands more. Violence increased at the beginning of 2007 until a peace agreement was reached in June of that year. However, sporadic fighting and accusations of breaking the agreement continued.

Violence increased significantly in Yemen as part of the conflict between the Government and the followers of al-Houthi, in the north of the country, having a dramatic impact on the civilian population. In the first quarter, mutual accusations were repeated of non-compliance with the ceasefire agreed to in 2008. Beginning in August, fighting increased after the **Government launched a widespread offensive, called Operation Scorched Earth, against the Shiite insurgents**. The clashes forced the displacement of 75,000 people which makes a total of 175,000 since hostilities began in 2004. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs point to the grave situation of the civilian population which is often trapped in combat zones.[58] In September, it was reported the death of 87 people in a refugee camp, allegedly caused by the security forces. Restricted access to the area of conflict made humanitarian aid and independent verification of the number of victims difficult. According to estimates there could be as many as one hundred victims including civilians and combatants. In the last quarter the conflict threatened to escalate into a regional problem due to the growing involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran. At the same time, Yemen faced two other sources of conflict. The first was located in the south of the country, where recurring demonstration were taking place to denounce governmental discrimination towards the region and clashes between pro-independence groups and security forces which resulted in twenty deaths. The second source of conflict had to do with al-Qaeda since the Yemeni and Saudi branches announced their integration in January. During the year clashes between the Yemeni security forces and alleged members of al-Qaeda caused the death of at least fifty people and another six were sentenced to death for collaborating with the network. At the end of 2009, international attention was focused on Yemen because of a failed attack on an airplane in route to the US. The young Nigerian attacker had been trained in Yemeni territory. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the action and claimed it was a retaliation for the offensive by the Yemeni forces with support from the US that caused the death of at least 60 of its members.

Box 1.4. **Destabilization factors in Yemen**

On May 22, 2010 Yemen will celebrate its 20th anniversary as a State after unification in 1990 of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), in the north, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), in the south. The 20th anniversary of the sole Republic in the Arabian Peninsula will be celebrated in an extremely unstable context, amidst growing conflicts in the northern area of the country, with the forced displacement of thousands of people, and warnings from analysts regarding the possibility that Yemen may end up on the list of failed states. In its most recent ranking on this issue, Foreign Policy magazine placed it in a situation of high "danger" –number 18 on the list after North Korea– and warned of the possibility that it could become the next Afghanistan.[59] In December 2009, after the failed attempt by a young Nigerian trained in Yemen to commit a terrorist attack on an airplane flying to Detroit, all international attention was focused on the risks the country posed as a potential haven for al-Qaeda bases. US President Barack Obama himself had warned about this possibility a few months earlier. What factors contribute to the instability of this country? What are the key elements needed to understand the conflicts that affect Yemen? Without pretending to be exhaustive, we cite below the main sources of tension and some economic, political and demographic features and trends that affect the current situation.

First, it should be pointed out that episodes of violence in the country have revolved around three areas. The main centre of conflict –practically ignored by the international community in recent years, although much more visible in 2009–, is in the north of the country where the government forces and insurgents known as al-Houthists –followers of al-Houthi–, are fighting in the context of the hostilities that began in 2004. The Sanaa administration accuses the rebels of attempting to restore an imamate like the one that ruled in the area for one thousand years until the victory of the Republican revolution in 1962. That is, a clerical regime following the principles of Zaidism –a minority branch of Shiism in Yemen, but which holds the majority in the north of the country–. The al-Houthists, therefore, accuse the Government of corruption and marginalizing the north of the country. They have condemned Sanaa's alliance with the US in its campaign against terrorism. The conflict has taken place against a background of sectarian identities, regional underdevelopment and a perception of historical injustice. It has caused hundreds of deaths between the civilian population and combatants as well as a severe humanitarian crisis in the area due to the forced displacement of 175,000 people. Restricted access to the region has made it impossible to conduct an external evaluation of the conflict and of reports that cite the use of unconventional weapons and the recruitment of children and Ethiopians and Somalis for combat. At the end of 2009 international concern focused on the possibility that the conflict could intensify due to the intervention of neighbouring countries and even trigger a regional escalation. Saudi Arabia inter-

58. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).
59. See Foreign Policy. *The Failed States Index 2009*. Washington DC: Foreign Policy, 2009, in <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings>.

vened directly against the al-Houthists in the border region beginning in November and, together with Yemen –in both countries the majority is Sunni–, have insinuated that Iran –with its Shiite majority– is backing the insurgents. Tehran denied the support and criticized the Saudi intervention. In this context, some analysts feel that if Iran was not yet giving support to the rebels they may begin considering this option due to the growing participation by Riyadh in the conflict.

In parallel, the central Yemeni Government is facing a growing secessionist movement in the south of the country, in the region which corresponds to the former PDRY which went through a period of Socialism in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the unification, the balance of power has leaned toward the north and, in fact, President Ali Abdullah Saleh (leader in the former YAR since 1978) has governed continuously since then. The fragile political balance set up when the new State was created only lasted a few years and resulted in the outbreak of a civil war in 1994 with the forces in the north eventually claiming the victory. Tension continues and during this last year there have been many demonstrations to denounce discrimination of the south, especially regarding the control of resources, and there have also been clashes with the security forces that have caused dozens of deaths. In this scenario, Human Rights Watch has warned of the climate caused by the repression of the separatist movement by the Government and of the violence that could break out in the region.[60]

The third source of conflict in the country—and the one which is garnering the most international attention– is linked to actions by al-Qaeda which announced the integration of its Yemeni and Saudi branches in January. Yemen, Osama bin Laden's father's homeland, is located in a highly strategic area –where the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa meet– with porous borders and areas of their territory that escape government control. These factors make the territory an ideal base for al-Qaeda activity; even more so given that the Yemeni security forces have focused their attention on the conflicts that affect the north and south of the country and that Yemen seems to be a more viable refuge because pursuit of its members has increased in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. What is now called al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is currently led by the former private secretary of bin Laden, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, has been operating in the country for years, especially against Western interests (17 marines died in 2000 in a terrorist attack against the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole and another 19 people died in an attack against the US embassy in Sanaa in 2008). According to some analysts, the group could strengthen its positions in Yemen by establishing relations with local tribes and exploiting the conflicts that affect the country, for example, by expressing support for the secessionist struggle in the south as it did in mid-2009.[61] Even before the failed terrorist attack in Detroit, the US had intensified its collaboration with Yemeni forces in its battle against al-Qaeda, considering that the group had shown signs that it was looking for higher profile targets in its attacks. It was also believed that this branch could attempt to get stronger considering the pressure the bin Laden network was under in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[62]

Along with these three sources of conflict, Yemen faces another series of challenges that also threaten its political future. These include social, economic and demographic problems that could heighten the climate of destabilization. In the economic sphere, we should note that it is the poorest country in the Arab world and has high rates of unemployment and inflation, as well as significant levels of corruption. In addition, most of the State's resources –around 75%– come from oil revenues and the reserves are rapidly being depleted. Some estimations state that these resources will not last more than five years while other more optimistic forecasts place the limit in 2017. These reserves are not the only ones that are in jeopardy in Yemen. Alarms have been raised regarding the dramatic decrease in the country's water supplies, placing it among the nations with the greatest water shortages in the world, according to the United Nations. The situation looks even more complex if we consider that these economic factors must be understood in the framework of a rising demographic trend: the Yemeni population is expected to double to 40 million people in the next twenty years. Currently, over two thirds of the population is below age 24, and the predictions are that in coming years a growing and impoverished population could increase its pressure on the Government that traditionally has had problems exercising central power. In Yemen tribal dynamics continue to play an important role and the population is heavily armed despite efforts by the Government to control the extensive use of light arms in most of the cities in the country.

Given the situation, specialized analysts have alerted to the need for both local actors and the international community to act quickly to avoid a worsening of violence in Yemen and they remind us that although the country has overcome several crises and situations of instability in the past, it has never had to face a combination of challenges so complex to resolve.[63]

60. See Human Rights Watch. *In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government's Brutal Response to Southern Movement Protests*. Washington DC, HRW, 15 December 2009, in <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/12/15/name-unity-0>
61. See Phillips, Sarah and Shanahan, Rodger. *Al Qaida, Tribes and Instability in Yemen*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, November 2009, in <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/LOWY_AlQaida_Tribes_Instability_Yemen.pdf> and Bakier, Abdul Hamed. "Al-Qaeda in Yemen Supports Southern Secession". *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. VII, 16, (June 12, 2009), in <http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_007_32.pdf>.
62. In August, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched an unsuccessful terrorist attack against the Saudi prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who is responsible for Saudi anti-terrorist activities, with the same kind of explosive used by the young Nigerian in the failed attack on a flight between Amsterdam and Detroit.
63. For more information, see Bouceck, Christopher. *Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2009, in http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf. International Crisis Group. *Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb*. Middle East Report N°86, Brussels: ICG, May 27, 2009, in <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6113&l=1>.