

AFGHANISTAN



BASIC INFORMATION

Population:	26.5 million inhabitants (2005)
GDP:	7,168 million dollars (2005)
GNI per capita:	217 dollars (2005)

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

Fighting between Afghan government forces and US troops on one side and various Taliban militias on the other. Struggle for democratic power in a context of political fragility and ethnic divisions after the 9/11 attacks in New York.

The professional Afghan army disintegrated in 1992, leaving power in the hands of a large number of militias. Following the fall of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001, many of these militias formed a **new military body, the Afghan Military Forces (AMF)**, controlled by the Ministry of Defence. It should eventually become the new **Afghan National Army (ANA)** in a process that will include DDR.

During 2005 and 2006, there was a significant rise in violence and attacks by Taliban militias, as well as the operations against these by the Armed Forces and US troops.

PEACE AGREEMENTS / PROCESS

The **Bonn Agreements** were signed in December **2001** under a great deal of pressure from the USA. These agreements, rather an arrangement among victorious parties, set out a transitional political structure for the country and established the formation of an **Afghan Interim Authority (AIA)**. As part of the Bonn Agreements, the Security Council called for the creation of an international security force that would provide security in the capital and other urban areas. The *Loya Jirga* met in June 2002 to elect a transitional authority, and this was endorsed during the elections held in October 2004.

The **Petersberg Decree**, signed by the President H. Karzai in December 2002, specified the reduction of the ANA to 70,000 effectives through a DDR program.

INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

On 28 March 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1401 establishing the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)**, with the aim of providing support for the country's reconstruction and assisting the DDR programme. The budget allocated for UNAMA during the period from April to December 2003 was 37.9 million dollars.

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The UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Afghanistan (SGSR) has two deputies, one of whom is responsible for the electoral process and DDR. The SGSR also has a special adviser who is responsible, among other things, for issues relating to the military and demilitarization.

In August 2003, NATO took charge of the command and coordination of the **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)**, comprising some 8,000 troops, whose aim is to help the Afghan government maintaining the security and to assist in the training of the future Afghan security forces. The EU took over the running of the ISAF in 2004 with the deployment of its Eurocorps mission and during 2005 it was expanded to the west of the country. During 2006 the expansion, aiming to cover all the country, was to the south and east, with a total number of 12,000 soldiers.

DDR STRUCTURE

Background to the DDR process:

In May 2002, the IOM presented its proposal for a DDR programme in conjunction with UNAMA, the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF and the transitional government, estimating that it could benefit around 175,000 former combatants (preliminary estimates indicate that the number of former combatants could be as high as 750,000). This first programme was refined during 2003 and was entrusted to the UNDP and a new Afghan body known as the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP), sponsored by the Japanese government with contributions from Canada, the USA, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland.

Type of DDR:

This is a multiple programme that includes the reform of the security sector, given that the disarmament and demobilisation of militia members is to a great extent connected with the setting up of the Government's own armed forces during the period of transition and political reform. It should be pointed out that it is taking place against a background of wide-ranging reconstruction of the country, and that the programme covers a wide variety of different actors and a large number of child soldiers.

Basic principles:

Demobilising the largest possible number of the 100,000 militia members still estimated to be active in the country. The programme includes the collection of small arms and heavy artillery and the restructuring of the security sector.

Enforcing bodies:

UNDP, through its regional office. The programme was administered by the **Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP)**, a body created in October 2003 by the Afghan government and the United Nations and allocated an initial operational budget of 41 million dollars. The ANBP was supported by the Disarmament Commission and the Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, as agreed in the Petersberg Decree, and it also coordinated the actions of the Defence Ministry. The ANBP had a central office in Kabul along with eight regional offices and was operational until June 2006, as planned.

The ANBP had one Mobile Disarmament Unit (MDU) at each of its eight regional offices. It also engaged Afghan and international NGOs as Implementation Partners (IP) with funds from the UNDP to assist in the recruitment to the programme.

Body	Ministry of Defence Operational Groups	→	Regional Verification Committees (RVCs)	→	8 Mobil Disarmament Units (MDUs)	→	Regional Offices
	Selection of individuals and units in each region		Verification		Disarmament		Demobilisation Reintegration

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Groups to be demobilised:

Initially, the programme was intended to cover the demobilisation of 100,000 combatants from the various militias, many of whom had already joined the Afghan Military Forces (AMF), though this figure has now been reduced to a maximum of 63,000.

Vulnerable groups:

UNICEF estimates that there may be around 8,000 child soldiers. Between February and December 2004, UNICEF demobilised some 4,000 children, most of them aged between 14 and 17. This was accomplished in two stages. The first was a local demobilisation phase implemented by reintegration committees run by community representatives and NGOs with support from UNICEF. Each child received a basic pack (registration, photo, ID card, medical and psychological support, advice on avoiding drugs and HIV/AIDS, health education and choices for reintegration). The beneficiaries of this phase were both former combatants and other children in vulnerable circumstances, and by the middle of November 2005 around 3,000 of them had benefited from the programme. The second phase involves deciding whether these children should enter the school system or begin training for jobs.

The central focus of the programme is to engage with children from the same community in order to engender mutual assistance in the reintegration process. The programme has been allocated a budget of 5.3 million dollars.

By mid April 2006, Internal Affairs Ministry and UNDP signed an agreement in order to capacitate women relative to former combatants as teachers, in order to facilitate her civil life reintegration. These courses would last 5 months and will capacitate 560 women.

Budget:

Reform of the security sector has been financed by dividing up the different duties. Japan is taking care of DDR, the USA and Germany are in charge of police training, the United Kingdom is dealing with the drugs problem, Italy with judicial reform and the USA with reform of the armed forces. During 2004, the USA assigned 287 million dollars to this project, and in 2005 it allocated 400 million to the police training and anti-narcotics programmes.

The first budget allocated to the DDR programme totalled 167 million dollars. When the number of combatants to be demobilised subsequently fell, the final budget was also reduced. A report issued by the Afghan government and dated April 2004 estimated spending would reach 117 million dollars for the three year period between 2005 and 2007 and that a further 100 million dollars would be required for the following three years.

By the end of August 2005, the ANBP had spent 74,5 million dollars on the DDR programme. At the end of the same year, UNDP disbursed two additional million dollars for the reintegration support of the former combatants support in the East and Southeastern regions, by distributing agricultural tools and vocational training.

USAID planned to contribute 30 million dollars to the programme through the UNDP during the course of the 2004 financial year. UNICEF has also received 5.3 million dollars for the DDR of child soldiers, with contributions from the USA (Department of Employment), Sweden (SIDA), Germany, the *Japan Ogata Initiative* and UNICEF itself.

The programme includes a specific strategy for the commanders of the many militias, aimed at encouraging their participation. As a result, they receive special payments and are included in additional programmes of a social, economic and political nature.

During May 2006, la FAO apported US 2.6 millions on the rural families support, including Excombatents in Kandahar, Balkh and Nangharhar. By the end of June 2006, the UNDP announced the ending of the DDR program with a final budget of 141 million dollars and an average of 2,238 dollars for combatant.

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Donor	Disbursed (millions \$)	(%)
Japan	91	64.5
United Kingdom	19	13.4
Canada	16	11.2
US	9	6.4
The Netherlands	4	2.8
Norway	0.8	0.56
Switzerland	0.5	0.35
European Commission	0.1	0.07
TOTAL	140.9	

Timetable:

This is a three-year programme which is divided up as follows: one year for the pilot programme, a further year for the central phase (disarmament and demobilisation) and a third year for the reintegration phase. It began on 24 October 2003.

Other issues:

- **Justice:** Although it is not mentioned in the Bonn Agreements, Chapter V indicates that all the Mujahideen, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country must submit to the command and control of the Interim Authority and reorganise themselves in accordance with the requirements for the new Afghan armed and security forces. Annex III (point 4) of the Agreements also states that the various participants “urge the United Nations and the international community, in recognition of the heroic role played by the Mujahideen in protecting the independence of Afghanistan and the dignity of its people, to take the necessary measures, in coordination with the Interim Authority, to assist in the reintegration of the Mujahideen into the new Afghan security and armed forces”.

In May 2005, the Head of the Peace and Reconciliation Commission offered an amnesty to all armed opposition groups, including the most wanted Taliban leaders like Mullah M. Omar and the warlord G. Hekmatyar, though this offer did not subsequently lead to anything.

- **Security sector reform:** The programme includes the dismantling of the militias that have come together in the AMF (45,000 troops), and replacing them with the new Afghan National Army (ANA) created in December 2002, with support from the USA, the United Kingdom and France. This army will have a maximum of between 60,000 and 70,000 troops and must contain an equal ethnic mix. By February 2005, the ANA already had 21,000 troops, financed mainly by the USA (364 million dollars in 2004), with salaries (between 50 and 70 dollars a month) well above the level of other public sector employees. The National Police will also be restructured (employing some 62,000 people) and the Ministry of Defence is to undergo reforms.

DDR STAGES

The DDR process is organised at two different levels: one for regular troops and one for commanding officers. The former are provided with a total reintegration package valued at 700\$. The latter, particularly a group of 470 generals and 70 colonels, are offered 1,200\$. There is a special programme worth 20 million dollars for the highest ranking commanders. In spite of this, many have preferred not to relinquish their illegal activities, which bring them huge benefits.

Disarmament:

This officially started on 24 October 2003, with a pilot program targeted for 1.000 combatants from the northern region of Konduz, and ended on 30 June 2005. More than 63,000 former

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combatants had been disarmed since the beginning of the programme. The process was divided into four phases:

Phase	Dates	Forces
Pilot	October 2003 – May 2004	6,271
Central phase I	June – August 2004	8,551
Central phase II	September – October 2004	7,169
Central phase III	November 2004 – March 2005	22,440
Central phase IV	April – July 2005	18,949
TOTAL		63,380

36,751 small and medium-sized weapons were collected, along with 12,248 heavy weapons (including tanks and artillery), more than 2.5 million rounds of heavy artillery (weighting 3,000 tons) were also collected, along with 73 million rounds of assorted ammunition. Heavy weaponry is stored in Kabul under Canadian troop's responsibility. Of those collected, 14,754 pieces have been handed over for the rearmament of the Afghan defence forces. Since this stage ended, no-one is officially allowed to use or carry arms except for security organisations with authorisation from the Ministry of Interior.

Mention should be made of an initiative linked with the disarmament process. Known as APMASD (Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction), this provides the government with assistance in collecting and destroying any remaining mines and unexploded munitions, thus ensuring the country's compliance as a party to the Ottawa Treaty on Anti-Personnel Mines. The budget for this initiative is 16 million dollars, which has been donated by Canada. At the end of January there were 879,936 boxed arms and 2,473,116 unboxed.

Demobilisation:

This begins on the day after disarmament and lasts for one day, during which the different Regional Offices offer information and advice on the reintegration stage. Each former combatant is given a package containing clothing, shoes and food, along with a diploma and a medal in recognition of services rendered. This stage officially ended at the beginning of July 2005 with the disarmament and demobilisation of 62,276 former combatants.

Reintegration:

This phase begins three weeks after demobilisation and lasts between two and four months. Participants are given a voucher which is redeemed at the end of three months. The ANBP takes charge of various duties such as professional training, home-building, courses to obtain qualifications, jobs, business training and the grant of micro-credits. At the end of January 2006 there were 60,646 demobilisations in reintegration phase, of which 50% had chosen to do agricultural work, 26% professional training, 15.5% start up small businesses, and 3% to join the armed forces (ANA). The ANBP announced in June the end of the reintegration process, and therefore of all the DDR programme, in the envisaged time and without additional costs. Despite everything, the ANBP and the UNDP committed themselves, with the agreement of the Afghan government, to remaining until December 2007 in order to carry out the monitoring of the Reintegration Support Projects. In addition, the Government announced its intention of recruiting members of the communities to make up the police force and armed forces, although they denied that it was the creation of new paramilitary forces.

Initially, each demobilised combatant received 200 dollars in two instalments, but after several cases of extortion by some of the militia commanders came to light, the ANBP stopped these payments and replaced them with daily payments of 3 or 4 dollars for the reintegration period (between 180 and 480 dollars per person). This amount was added to the salary of those who joined the new armed forces (ANA). Between the supportive NGO there is ANCTED, in charge of the agricol kits distribution to the southeast and east of the country.

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Lastly, the reintegration programme in the country has taken on a complex character due to the host of agencies intervening (some 30), among them international agencies, national and international NGOs, as well as private companies. Under a mechanism focused on aiding a specific group, the activities have been: packages for agriculture, vocational training, education, mine-clearing corps, training for incorporation in the armed forces or police forces, and work for public infrastructures. Finally, the percentages of reintegration projects are as follows:

Project	Combatants	%
Agriculture	23,940	42.90
Vocational training	11,736	21.03
Small enterprises	14,251	25.54
Demining	843	1.51
ANA	713	1.28
ANP	98	0.18
Recruitment teams	1,027	1.18
Other	63	0.10
Education	374	0.67
Not taking part	2,759	4.94
TOTAL	55,804	

EVOLUTION OF THE DDR PROCESS

Though progress was slow during the first year, due to the lack of trust and internal conflicts between militias from different ethnic backgrounds, a total of 63,380 former combatants had joined the programme by the beginning of July 2005, of which 62,276 were disarmed and 55,804 had entered the reintegration stage. The majority formed part of the AMF. The average age was 27 and 11% were officers (with an average age of 37).

Once the DDR programme had been officially completed it became the DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups). The aim of this new initiative, which is supported by the ISAF, is to dismantle the 1,800 identified armed groups that include some 120,000 individuals and are causing serious security problems in many parts of the country. This programme will include the creation of a Code of Conduct on the possession of weapons. It should be mentioned that, to date, near 29,000 arms (both small arms and heavy armour) have been collected under this programme, along with more than 24,000 boxed and 250,000 unboxed pieces of ammunition. This program is for two years to June at US\$16 million, were some of the donors are:

DDR donors	Amount paid (millions \$)
Canada	5.1
United Kingdom	3
The Netherlands	2.6
European Commission	1.8
Ministry of Finance	0.5
UNDP	0.5
Norway	0.3

Some of these armed groups are linked with drug-trafficking, while others obtain financing through imposing illegal taxes in the areas they control. The government is implementing two pilot negotiating projects with the local leaders of these groups. For this it has the support of UNAMA and the international military force, as well as the ISAF's Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which identify local needs and requirements. The UNDP finances these projects with funds from the United Kingdom and Canada, with a budget of 8.5 million dollars.

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At the beginning of 2006, ANBP, UNAMA and local police, continued with the **armed groups armament collection (DIAG)** that had reached 20,000 arms since June, as well as 150,000 rounds of ammunition, and the support of several warlords.

Level	Success criteria	Evaluation
Political / Strategically	Exhaustive politic and development frameworks.	Partial
	National empowerment of the program.	Complete
	Program planning through empirical data.	Partial
Operational	Flexible and sufficient financial mechanisms.	Complete
	Effective coordination.	Complete
	Realistic goals and objectives on the programs implementation.	None
Tactical	Holistic and indivisible approximation on the program implementation.	Complete
	Effective public information.	None
	Detailed and transparent program eligibility criteria.	Complete
	Community participation.	Partial

At the end of October 2006, the United Nations pressed for an improvement in the national disarmament programme. Local analysts have pointed out that the DIAG has not been successful in disarming many warlords, even in the capital itself. For their part, officials of the ANBP have admitted the challenges that have to be surmounted in complying with this process, although they attribute the responsibility to the Afghan Executive. The latest figures indicate that at the beginning of October, some 26,000 weapons and more than 750,000 rounds of ammunition had been collected.

ASPECTS TO BE EXAMINED

Planning:

- Refusal by many militia commanders to submit to the process. It is estimated that some 850 groups, totalling 65,000 militia forces, have not participated in the process.
- Evidence that several "warlords" who participated in the DDR process have retained weapons for their own purposes and continue to control the drugs trade, in spite of the preferential treatment they have received.
- Exaggeration of the number of troops declared by the militia leaders, in order to obtain more financial resources.
- Extortion by several leaders from combatants under their command.
- A considerable number of former combatants appear to have been forced to participate in these programmes.
- Little emphasis on the collection of small arms. Handover of very old weapons and collective rather than individual armaments.

Financing:

- Delay in making payments.
- Failure to collect the funds promised.
- Presence of drug-trafficking.
- Difficulties in reintegration due to the country's almost non-existence economic growth. Furthermore, it has been found that in some places too many people are being trained for the same jobs, meaning that many of the combatants who have signed up to the programme are having to migrate in order to have a greater chance of finding work.

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Other aspects:

- The new police force is more interested in protecting the state than the civilian population.
- The dividing-up of duties in the reform of the security system has led to a certain lack of coordination.
- Disagreement between the USA and UNAMA regarding the former's low level of involvement in the DDR process.
- Impunity of the so-called "warlords" and assistance for combatants linked with illegal activities.
- Insufficient attention paid to women.
- Use of combatants by private security companies.

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