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to be demobilised, and it therefore requested that UNTAC be allocated a budget of between 9 and 14 million dollars just for the demobilisation of these fighters. This was impossible to achieve at that time due to a lack of cooperation from certain groups.

DDR STRUCTURE

Background to the DDR process:

The demobilisation of some of the 155,000 combatants began following the Paris Agreements of 1991, and the programme was completed in May 1993 with the demobilisation of 36,000 fighters. However, a number of groups continued to recruit soldiers, making it necessary to propose a further demobilisation programme in 1999, in the midst of a dispute over the total number of fighters who had been integrated into the country's armed forces (150,000 or 101,000). A pilot programme for the demobilisation of 1,500 soldiers was introduced between May and July 2000, financed by the World Bank to the tune of 2.25 million dollars from six donors. This pilot programme offered payments of 360\$ per demobilised combatant. The average cost per person was 1,500\$.

In 2001, the World Bank awarded Cambodia a loan of 18.4 million dollars to begin a new DDR Programme that would involve 30,000 soldiers. During the first stage, which ran from October to December 2001, some 15,000 combatants benefited from the programme (1,359 of whom (9%) were women), though they did not receive any financial help from the World Bank until July 2002. Funds for their reintegration did not arrive until the beginning of 2003.

The second phase, which involved the demobilisation of a further 15,000 fighters, began in March 2002 and should have ended in June of the same year. However, the reintegration phase was delayed for two years beyond the planned timetable due to an investigation by the World Bank into the use to which its funds were being put.

Type of DDR:

Security sector reform.

Enforcing bodies:

The programme has been planned by the World Bank but is coordinated by the Council for the Demobilisation of Armed Forces (CDAF), which has set up 13 technical teams to take charge of the demobilisation process. Several ministries are represented on the CDAF, and a team of 300 people has been set up to work with other organisations involved in the process (the Red Cross, the WFP, the ILO, NGOs, etc.).

Basic principles:

Armed Forces reduction and, consequently, the military expenditure.

Strategic aims of the programme:

The programme will be carried out in two stages, each of which will benefit 15,000 combatants. Demobilised troops will be free to choose the place in which they are to resettle. 10 information centres have been set up in 10 different provinces.

Groups to be demobilised:

30,000 soldiers from the country's armed forces.

Vulnerable groups:

In 2001, the government and UNICEF introduced a joint programme to provide education to child soldiers. However, in 2002 UNICEF announced the relative failure of the programme to demobilise child soldiers due to a lack of funds.

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Budget:

The total cost is 42 million dollars, the main donors are the World Bank, Japan, the Cambodian government, Sweden, the Netherlands and the WFP. There have also been smaller donations from the USA, Canada and Australia, which form the Donor Working Group on Demobilization. Mention should be made of a donor meeting held in Paris in 2000, which focused on long-term reintegration. The main **contributions** break down as follows:

Source	Millions of \$	(%)
World Bank	18.4	43.8
Japan	10.0	23.8
Cambodia	7.2	17.1
Sweden	2.4	5.7
Netherlands	2.0	4.7
WFP	2.0	4.7
TOTAL	42.0	100

The **components** to which this budget has been allocated break down as follows:

Phase	Unit cost (dollars)	Total cost (M\$)	(%)
Demobilisation	460	13.8	32.9
Reintegration	800	24.0	57.1
Implementation and studies	133	4.0	9.5
Processing data	7	0.2	0.5
Total (estimate)	1,400	42.0	100

The pilot test carried out in 2000 for the demobilisation of 1,500 soldiers received the following donations, which came to a total of 2.5 million dollars: Canada (325,000), Germany (280,000), Cambodian government (360,000), Netherlands (310,000), Japan (400,000), Sweden (400,000) and the WFP (130,000). During 2003, the government had to repay part of the loan awarded by the World Bank due to the misappropriation of some of the funds. The World Bank also insisted on an external audit to examine the way the funds handed over had been used.

In May 2006, Finland contributed with 429,000 dollars on clearing mines activities.

Timetable:

From October 2001 to December 2004 (39 months). It was previewed to be done in two stages, benefiting 15,000 combatants on each one of those. However, the process has been inactive from 2003 to 2005 due to the lack of delivery of funds from the WB.

Other issues:

- Justice:** In May 2003, the UN Assembly General agreed a draft proposal for the establishment of a Special Court to try those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide during the time of the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979).
- Security sector reform:** This DDR process only affects people who have already been integrated into the armed forces, and is aimed at leaving troop numbers at between 70,000 and 80,000. Reform of the armed forces has been delayed by mistakes committed during the DDR process and by a lack of sufficient funding. The reforms that remain to be implemented will have to deal with the demobilisation of a number of inactive troops and a larger number of officers. The World Bank calculated in 1991 that DDR would lead to a saving of 10.3 million dollars a year in military spending. However, in October 2006, Government approved the compulsory military service, against the Armed Forces reduction plans, justified by the high unemployment level of young people in the country.

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DDR STAGES

Disarmament:

The program doesn't specify any disarmament stage. However, in January 2006 UNDP started a clearing mines project in the country, whose ending is previewed by 2010. The goal of this program is clearing mines around 472 square Km., thank to the funds of Australia and Canada, the same UNDP and local authorities.

Demobilisation:

The government pays each demobilised soldier a total of \$240 (a total of 7.2 million dollars) , paid by the Cambodian government) at the time of processing. The first phase began on 15 October 2001 and ended on 26 December of the same year. The demobilisation process involves the soldier handing in his or her weapons and being provided with information on reintegration, a cash payment, a medical check, a civilian identity and transportation back to his or her community.

Reinsertion and Reintegration:

This includes the provision of social and financial services to assist both families and communities, along with the provision of farming equipment, livestock, tools etc. and advice and awareness services for communities.

EVOLUTION OF THE DDR PROCESS

Of the 15,000 combatants demobilised during the first stage (2001), 32% chose to work in the agricultural sector. Funding for reintegration did not become available until the beginning of 2003, and items supplied included motorcycles, sewing machines and generators. In the middle of 2002, food was distributed to all veterans demobilised during the first stage.

The evaluation on the role of the UNTAC has been negative due to the huge quantity of arms remaining in the country. The Government collected 112,562 arms in 22 provinces, 79,411 of them were destroyed in 16 public ceremonies around the country. Small Arms Survey estimates that there still are between 22,000 and 85,000 arms in the country.

ASPECTS TO BE EXAMINED

Planning:

- Disputes over the real number of existing military troops.
- Existence of "idle or phantom troops" assigned to non-military service duties.
- Poor definition of plans to reform the armed forces.
- Lack of clarity regarding the distribution of land.

Financing:

- Lack of control over the World Bank loan.
- Corruption in connection with an important contract for the purchase of motorcycles.
- Delay in payments to demobilised troops.

Other issues:

- Lack of monitoring during the different demobilisation and reintegration phases.
- Lack of civilian and popular participation in the process.
- Low level of success in the arms collection programmes.

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