

# alert 2013!

Report on conflicts,  
human rights  
and peacebuilding



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This book is printed on chlorine-free recycled paper.

Report completed in January 2013.

Edited by: Icaria Editorial / Escola de Cultura de Pau, UAB

Printed by: Publicisa

Design: Lucas Wainer Mattosso

ISBN: 978-84-9888-510-1

This report was written by: Vicenç Fisas Armengol (peace processes), Josep Maria Royo Aspa (armed conflicts and socio-political crises), Jordi Urgell García (armed conflicts and socio-political crises), Pamela Urrutia Arestizábal (armed conflicts and socio-political crises), Ana Vilellas Ariño (armed conflicts and socio-political crises) and María Vilellas Ariño (gender, armed conflicts and socio-political crises).

The Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace) is particularly grateful for the support received from the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF).

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Citation:

Escola de Cultura de Pau. *Alert 2013! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2013.

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# Foreword

## Civil society and regional organizations strengthening human security

How to prevent violence, transform conflict and create a more durable peace? It remains a key challenge for every reasonable individual embracing the values of humanity. *Alert 2013! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding* gives a comprehensive overview of a number of cases where there is some hope for peace, supported by analysis of several thematic issues cutting across these cases. At the heart of our common discourse is the question how to ensure that the human security needs of people and communities at a local level are incorporated into policy making processes that lead to decision-making that ultimately impacts on peoples' lives?

The international system lacks consistent mechanisms for linking local realities to global, regional and national policy processes. This becomes critical in particular in fragile and repressive states, where citizens have no or limited voice via their government or within the structures of international institutions. How to connect local, national and regional perspectives with international policy- and decision making remains an essential problem in the governance of peace and security issues. In the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), we argue that strengthening the role of Regional International Governmental Organizations (RIGOs) in collaboration with civil society is among the most promising ways forward in the design of an effective global peacebuilding architecture, and the delivery of human security as a global public good.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are well placed to bridge the crucial gap between different levels of governance by bringing in people-centered human security perspectives to conflict analysis and transformation. At the same time, Regional International Governmental Organizations are among the actors that are increasingly playing, and expected to play, a more significant role in ensuring peace and stability in their respective regions. There are important benefits in strengthening the match between the two.

Since the 1990s an array of regional mechanisms to enhance security and prevent armed conflict has been established or expanded. The African Union (AU), for instance, established a set of mechanisms for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding. The Africa Panel of the Wise has played an important role in mediation and constraining violence on a number of occasions. It was the entry point for Kofi Annan's successful intervention that constrained the post-election violence in Kenya early 2008. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has developed several innovative mechanisms and practices toward preventing conflict in Europe and Central Asia. The silent diplomacy approach of the OSCE on resolving issues around minorities have been among the most successful preventive efforts. The Organization of American States

(OAS) has also established different regional instruments for preventive diplomacy and crisis management. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is working towards a more active role in preventive diplomacy, and a new ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) is being created. Developments in the Middle East have also initiated a 'fast forward' development of the League of Arab States (LAS), which used to have a relatively low profile but appeared to provide a much needed framework in international efforts to act upon the crisis in Libya and Syria. Let's not forget that the current High Level mediation in Syria, albeit with its own challenges, is happening on behalf of the United Nations and the League of Arab States.

Looking at higher-risk conflict areas in the world today, the reverse argument can also be made; where there is no effective regional organization or at least an established regional framework of interaction between states, conflicts or potential violent conflict become more difficult to handle. The Chinese-Japanese dispute over the Sengagku-Diaoyu islands is a good example where there is no regional framework available, making the conflict bare in international relations and more difficult to approach. Who or what is in the neighborhood to help China and Japan in confidence building, provide a space to talk, mediate or think along constructively? The daunting reality of Afghanistan post-2014 is another example, where neighboring countries in Central- and South Asia are already wondering what will happen with their legitimate interest in peace and stability in Afghanistan if there is no mechanism to perceive these interests in a regional scope?

At the same time, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been playing a significant role in areas such as conflict early warning, track II diplomacy and advocacy to galvanize domestic and foreign public opinion in support of preventive measures. For instance, recent events in the Middle East and North Africa have dramatically highlighted how civil society can play a crucial role in the advancement of nonviolent means of social change. Local civil society actors are at the forefront of conflict situations, and their knowledge and expertise are crucial to understanding the drivers of conflict that sustain violence and obstruct peaceful solutions. The engagement of civil society with key institutions, processes and actors relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding is an essential element in collaborative solutions to the transformation of conflicts.

The voices of local actors can be amplified by connecting them to the regional and international organizations that facilitate policy dialogue and decision making. At present, linkages between local CSOs and international institutions are often fragmented and ineffective, and gaps exist between citizen and governmental perspectives on the conditions

that give rise to conflict and how to address them. Bridging these gaps and building more effective constituencies for peace are priorities that a better relationship between civil society and regional organizations could help to address. In different parts of the world we already see important progress in the engagement of civil society with regional organizations. In West Africa, the relationship between ECOWAS and the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) provides an example of structured cooperation between a sub-regional organization and civil society in the field of early warning and early response.

Early warning became a concern of ECOWAS in the context of a new generation of internal conflicts in the 1990's (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire, etc.) which had devastating consequences in terms of small arms and light weapons proliferation, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), trafficking in people, drugs and money, competition for high value resources, and ultimately poverty.

In each case, the ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG) was deployed, but on an unplanned ad hoc basis. The consequences of conflict, combined with the sometimes negative consequences of ECOMOG interventions highlighted the need to develop prevention capacity and to address the root causes of conflicts including political instability, weak institutions, human rights abuses, etc. The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) was created as an observation and monitoring tool for conflict prevention and decision-making. Partnership with civil society is integral to the Protocol which provides legitimacy and guidance for structured cooperation.

Engagement with the regional CSO network, WANEP, is grounded in a 2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). ECOWARN informs the interventions of ECOWAS and others by providing regular and verifiable situational reports that chart the risk in each country. A daily regional synopsis highlights significant developments and hot spots. Data collection and analysis feed into policy briefs submitted to the Early Warning Department.

What the West African example shows is that CSOs have developed significant expertise in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field in one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world. This has not yet made the whole of West Africa peaceful, but it has contributed to progress in several countries and addressing such difficult situations as the post-election crisis in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010.

The capacities of CSOs are not always known or used within RIGOs in the design and implementation of their peace and security strategies. The same can be said of CSOs, which are not always aware of the mandates, capacities and roles of RIGOs.

The need to enhance multi-actor cooperation for peace and security was highlighted by the United Nations Secretary General in his report on Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results (26 August 2011). The report points at the unique contribution that regional and sub-regional organizations can make in preventive diplomacy efforts but it also acknowledges the need to create greater synergies and improve coordination. The report identifies the need to develop joint strategies and establish a division of labor with civil society organizations that specialize in supporting Track II and "people-to-people" Track III, diplomacy. The UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283 on Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution, similarly stresses 'the importance of partnerships and cooperation of international, regional and sub-regional organizations with the UN, with each other and with civil society, and of developing mechanisms to improve information –sharing, cooperation and coordination in order to ensure the coherence and complementarity of efforts and actors involved in a specific mediation context, (28 July 2011).

With the objective of examining and further defining the roles that Regional Intergovernmental Organizations in collaboration with civil society can play to contribute to a sustainable peace and human security, GPPAC has been working with the Organization of American States (OAS) to organize the First International Conference on Strengthening Global Peace and Security for Development. This event took place in November 2011 in Madrid, Spain, and brought together participants from 13 different regional and sub-regional organizations, civil society from these regions, the UN and various other stakeholders including the private sector.

The collaboration between the OAS and GPPAC is continuing, moving forward, and expanding. We are motivated by the realization that the development of a space to better channel and connect the capacities, expertise and comparative advantages of RIGOs and civil society to respond to drivers of violent conflict and transnational challenges will constitute a significant contribution to the necessary strengthening of the global peace and security architecture. An increased role for RIGOs in collaboration with civil society in addressing conflict will create greater possibilities to absorb tensions, prevent violence and provide human security. Hopefully, it will make next volumes of the Alert reflect lesser problems and more successes in avoiding violence in the public domain.

Peter van Tuijl,  
Executive Director of the Global Partnership for  
the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)

# Executive Summary

**Alert 2013! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding** is a yearbook that analyses the state of the world in terms of conflict and peacebuilding on the basis of four pillars: armed conflicts, socio-political crises, peace processes and the gender dimension in peacebuilding. The analysis of the most important events in 2012 and of the nature, causes, dynamics, actors and consequences of the main armed conflicts and socio-political crises that currently exist in the world makes it possible to provide a comparative regional overview and to identify global trends, as well as risk and early warning elements for the future. The report also identifies opportunities for peacebuilding or for the reduction, prevention or resolution of conflicts. In both cases, one of the main objectives of the present report is to place the information, analysis and identification of alert factors and opportunities for peace at the service of actors responsible for political decision-making, for intervening in the peaceful resolution of conflicts or for raising the political, media or academic profile of the many situations of political and social violence that exist throughout the world.

As regards methodology, the report is largely produced on the basis of the qualitative analysis of reports and news items provided by numerous sources (the United Nations, international bodies, research centres, media outlets or NGOs, among others), as well as from the experience drawn from research on the ground.

Some of the most important conclusions and facts contained in the report are as follows:

- 38 armed conflicts and 91 socio-political crises were identified in 2012, in line with the figures for 2011.
- At the end of 2012, 35 armed conflicts remained active, following the signing of a peace agreement and the lack of significant clashes between the Philippine government and the MILF; the reduction of violence by the Kurdish armed group PJAK in Iran; and the reduction in hostilities in Yemen in the context of the transition under way following the 2011 agreement.
- The vast majority of armed conflicts and socio-political crises were concentrated in Africa and Asia, followed by Europe, the Middle East and America.
- Almost all of the armed conflicts were related to the opposition to a certain government or to the system of a state, and to self-government and identity-related demands, although the struggle for the control of resources or land was a factor that fuelled and exacerbated most of the conflicts.
- The most intense conflicts were those in DR Congo (east), Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Pakistan (Balochistan), Iraq, Syria and Yemen (AQAP).
- The armed impacts had a serious impact on the civilian population, including grave violations of human rights and of IHL. They also exacerbated the existing humanitarian crises. In addition to fatalities, other typical impacts of conflicts were also present, such as forced displacement, food insecurity, the recruitment of child soldiers, sexual violence, extrajudicial executions, illegal detentions, torture and other practices. The lethal impact of the armed hostilities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria was especially grave in 2012.
- 33 arms embargoes were in place in 2012, affecting a total of 19 states and non-state armed groups, one fewer than in 2011.
- In 29 of the armed conflicts that remained active in 2012, neither the UN Security Council nor the EU proposed imposing an arms embargo as a sanction measure.
- In 2012 there were 83 international missions, 31 of which were deployed in Africa. Furthermore, there was an increase in the number of missions in Africa and the Middle East related to the outbreak of new conflicts or the deterioration of existing ones.
- The UN peacekeeping missions were composed of 117,465 personnel, continuing the downward trend that began in September 2010, when there were 124,000 personnel. From June 1999, which saw the lowest number of peacekeeping personnel since the Cold War (13,000), to the present day, the increase in the number of peacekeeping personnel had been constant.
- In 2012, 91 socio-political crises were registered around the world, a very similar figure to that of 2011 (90). The cases were mainly concentrated in Africa (35) and Asia (23), while the remaining socio-political crises occurred in Europe (15), the Middle East (14) and America (four).
- The highest percentage of serious socio-political crises in 2012 was concentrated in the Middle East, partly due to the repercussions in the region of the armed conflict in Syria.
- In 2012, 46.3% of the negotiations in the 54 analysed contexts went well or concluded satisfactorily. 27.8% of the negotiations had to overcome serious difficulties, while 13% went very badly.
- In 13 of the 38 current armed conflicts (34%), open or exploratory talks are under way. Over the course of the year, 13 groups in four countries laid down their weapons after reaching peace agreements with their respective governments.
- 77 countries suffered serious gender inequalities, 48 of which stood out in particular, mainly concentrated in Africa and Asia.
- 81% of the armed conflicts for which data was



available on gender equality took place in contexts with serious gender inequalities.

- In 2012, the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war in situations of armed conflict and socio-political crises was registered in countries including DR Congo, Somalia, Mali, Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Colombia or Sri Lanka.
- The UN Secretary-General presented the first report on sexual violence in armed conflicts, which includes a list of the armed, government and opposition actors responsible for crimes of sexual violence.
- Women's organisations in Mali, Somalia, Colombia, Myanmar and Afghanistan demanded to play a greater role in the peace processes currently under way in these countries.
- Seven opportunities for peace were identified in 2013: a possible improvement in relations between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia following the results of the Georgian parliamentary elections; the progress made in negotiations between the Indian government and the NSCN-IM, which may lead to a peace agreement; the signing of a peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF; the talks under way between the Senegalese government and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), which offers encouraging signs of a peaceful outcome to the conflict; the negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC; the second attempt to negotiate the approval of an arms trade treaty; and the role that can be played by young people as an engine of change and dialogue in contexts of conflict.
- Several alert scenarios have been identified with a view to 2013: the deterioration of the situation in the Russian region of Dagestan due to the growing militarisation of the regime and human rights violations; the uncertainty surrounding the political transition process in Myanmar; pending challenges 15 years after the signing of a peace agreement on Tajikistan; the possible resumption of the armed conflict between the government and the MNLF in the south of the Philippines; the self-immolations in Tibet as a symptom of the desperation felt by the Tibetan community; the challenges posed by unmanned aerial vehicles in the scenarios of conflict where they are deployed; problems related to the closure of the US mission in Guantánamo; the period of growing instability in which Kenya will

*In 2012, 38 armed conflicts were registered, a slightly lower figure than in previous years*

be mired in 2013; the role played by Rwanda and the FDLR in the instability of the Great Lakes region; the crisis of the forced displacement of the Syrian population as a result of the violence; and the security challenges posed in the Sahel.

## Structure

The report is composed of six chapters. The first two chapters provide a global analysis of conflicts (causes, type, dynamics, trend, actors in armed conflicts or socio-political crises) and identify elements of risk or early warning signs. The third chapter addresses peace processes, while the fourth analyses the gender dimension in peacebuilding (the specific impacts of armed violence and peacebuilding from a gender perspective). The fifth chapter focuses on opportunities for peace, identifying scenarios in which the circumstances are favourable for the resolution of conflicts or for the progress or consolidation of peace initiatives over the course of the coming year. The final chapter analyses some scenarios that present risks for the future. In addition to the six chapters and their respective annexes, the report also includes a fold-out map on which armed conflicts, socio-political crises and negotiation processes scenarios are identified, as well as the main international missions, the arms embargoes imposed by the main international bodies, and the number and location of internally displaced persons and refugees.

## Armed conflicts

In the first chapter (**Armed conflicts**)<sup>1</sup> the trend, type, causes and dynamics of the armed conflicts that remained active during the year are described. It also provides an analysis of the global trends of armed conflicts in 2012 and discusses the arms embargoes in force and the international missions deployed.

**In 2012, 38 armed conflicts were registered, a slightly lower figure than in 2011**, when 40 disputes were registered. This slightly lower figure is due to the fact that in 2012, the situations in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and the Niger Delta region were no longer considered armed conflicts due to the significant reduction of violence in these cases. On the other hand, the instability in Mali led to a new armed conflict in 2012, in which Tuareg and Islamist armed groups attempted to wrest control

1. In this report, an armed conflict is understood as any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible, in which the continuous and organised use of violence: a) causes a minimum of 100 fatalities in a year and/or has a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. injured or displaced persons, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric, or disruption of basic services); and b) aims to achieve objectives different from those of common crime and normally related to:  
- demands for self-determination and self-government or identity aspirations;  
- opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of a government, which in both triggers a struggle to seize or undermine power;  
- the control of resources or land.

## Armed conflicts in 2012\*

AFRICA	ASIA	MIDDLE EAST
Algeria (AQIM) -1992- Burundi -2011- Central Africa (LRA) -1986- Central African Republic -2006- DR Congo (east) -1998- Ethiopia (Ogaden) -2007- Libya -2011- Mali (north) -2012- Nigeria (Boko Haram) - 2011- Somalia -1988- South Sudan -2009- Sudan (Darfur) -2003- Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) -2011-	Afghanistan -2001- India (Assam) -1983- India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989- India (Manipur) -1982- India (CPI-M) -1967- Myanmar -1948- Pakistan -2001- Pakistan (Balochistan) -2005- Thailand (south) -2004- The Philippines (NPA) -1969- The Philippines (Mindanao-MILF) -1978- The Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf) -1991-	Iran (northwest) -2011- Iraq -2003- Israel – Palestine -2000- Syria -2011- Yemen -2011- Yemen (Houthis) -2004- Yemen (AQAP) -2011-
		EUROPA
		Russia (Chechnya) -1999- Russia (Dagestan) -2010- Russia (Ingushetia) -2008- Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria) -2011- Turkey (southeast) -1984-
		AMERICA
		Colombia -1964-

\*The start date of the armed conflict is included between hyphens.

of the north of the country from a weakened central state that was also affected by a coup d'état. At the end of 2012, 35 of the 38 armed conflicts remained active, following the signing of a peace agreement and the lack of significant clashes between the Philippine government and the MILF; the reduction of violence by the Kurdish armed group PJAK in Iran; and the reduction in hostilities in Yemen in the context of the transition under way following the 2011 agreement, which encompassed the withdrawal of the armed actors. **Most of the armed conflicts occurred in Africa and Asia (13 and 12, respectively), followed by the Middle East (seven), Europe (five) and America (one).**

Most of the conflicts that are currently active are characterised by a significant regional and international dimension due to several factors (population displacement, trafficking of arms and resources, participation of mercenaries or other foreign combatants, support from neighbouring countries, among others). In 2012, some of these factors took on special relevance due to their impact on other crises. As such, the return to Mali of Tuareg fighters who had fought in 2011 along with then Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and the proliferation of weapons linked to the Libyan crisis, had an impact on developments in northern Mali and increased instability throughout the Sahel region. Furthermore, **in 2012 there were once again discussions in the international community on the advisability and the nature of potential international interventions in some crises, such as those in Syria and northern Mali.** Although no agreement was reached on Syria, due in part to the clashing interests of international and regional powers, in respect of Mali, in December the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of an ECOWAS military mission, as requested by the Malian government. At the end of the year the mission

had not yet been put together and before it could be deployed France carried out a military intervention in early January 2013, which had also been requested by Mali. Debates were triggered on the extent of the interference, interests and neocolonialism involved in this intervention.


In respect of the underlying causes, most of the armed conflicts featured several causes, with several simultaneous elements constituting the underlying causes of the disputes. One of the main causes of two thirds of the conflicts (24 cases) was opposition to a certain government or to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state. Of the 24 cases that remained active in 2012, in 17 disputes there were armed opposition groups fighting for a change of system, whether aspiring to a socialist political and economic system –Colombia (FARC and ELN), the Philippines (NPA) and India (CPI-M)– or with the aim of creating an Islamic political structure, or of introducing or strengthening elements of Islamic law in the institutions and form of state –Algeria (AQIM), Mali (north), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Somalia, Afghanistan, the Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf), Pakistan, Russia (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria), Iraq, Yemen (Houthis and AQAP). Of the 14 cases that encompassed aspirations for the creation of Islamic structures, most involved armed groups who operated beyond the administrative borders of the territory in which they were fighting, mainly due to their cross-border modus operandi, their membership of regional insurgent movements or because their dynamics and local objectives were linked, at least rhetorically, to a more global discourse of international Jihad. In this respect, the spotlight was on the African region of the Sahel in 2012 due to the proliferation of armed groups with an extreme Islamist ideology. Meanwhile, in 10 cases there were armed groups whose goal was

not the transformation of the system but rather the overthrow of the government and the seizure of power. If their military capability was insufficient to achieve such an overthrow, they concentrated on expressing their opposition to the government and to undermining it through violence. This dimension of opposition to the government included the cases of Burundi, Libya, the Central African Republic, DR Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen (both in relation to the conflict that led to the fall from power of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011 and to the specific dispute between Houthis militia from the north and the government). In some of these conflicts, the insurgent movements opposed to the government coexisted with other armed actors who pursued a change of system, such as in the cases of Somalia or Iraq.

**One of the main causes of almost three quarters of the conflicts was opposition to a certain government or to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state**

Meanwhile, self-government and identity-related demands continued to carry significant weight as one of the main underlying causes, present in almost two thirds of the disputes (32 cases). Conflicts of this kind were mostly seen in Asia and Europe, although they were also significant in Africa and the Middle East. The demands for identity and self-government were manifested in different ways, ranging from claims for cultural rights to pro-independence positions. Some of the most long-standing armed conflicts linked to the issue of identity and self-government –Philippines (Mindanao-MILF, active since 1978), Myanmar (numerous insurgencies, such as the KNU, active since 1948) and Turkey (PKK, since 1984)– saw significant steps made towards peace: the signing of a partial peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF, after decades of peace processes; the achievement of agreements between the government and several ethnic insurgent groups in Myanmar; and the resumption of talks between Turkey and the PKK. Furthermore, in several cases the struggle for the control of resources or land was another key element driving disputes –Central Africa (LRA), DR Congo (east), Sudan (Darfur and South Kordofan and the Blue Nile), South Sudan, Pakistan (Baluchistan)– in line with the trend of previous years. In any case, this is a factor that fuels and exacerbates virtually all of today’s armed conflicts.

### Intensity of the armed conflicts by region



As regards intensity, almost one quarter of the armed conflicts (nine cases) witnessed very high levels of violence, with one thousand fatalities per year or more –DR Congo (east), Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Pakistan (Baluchistan), Iraq, Syria and Yemen (AQAP). In some cases this level of violence was surpassed by several thousand fatalities, such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria. In another 11 cases (29%) the levels of violence were of moderate intensity, while in 18 contexts (47%) they were low. However, the figures on the level of violence should be viewed with some caution, given the restrictions on the media coverage of some of the disputes, and the difficulty of obtaining independent figures. As regards the trend of these contexts, 37% of the disputes saw an increase in violence (14 cases), 29% saw no significant changes (11 cases), and the remaining 34% saw a reduction in violence (13 cases).

The report also analyses two of the main instruments available to the international community in order to deal with threats to peace and security: arms embargoes and international missions. In respect of arms embargoes, one of the main coercive measures listed in chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 33 arms embargoes were registered in 2012, imposed on 19 states and non-state armed groups in total, one fewer than in 2011, due to the fact that in 2011 ECOWAS lifted the voluntary arms embargo imposed on Guinea. No new arms embargoes were imposed by the UN Security Council or by the EU in 2012. Of the 19 states and non-state armed groups listed by the two organisations, nine refer to armed conflicts that are currently active (Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Sudan [Darfur] and South Sudan and the armed groups in Iraq, Somalia, DR Congo and Afghanistan). Of the other 10, nine refer to scenarios featuring tensions of varying intensity (Côte d'Ivoire, Belarus, China, Eritrea, Iran, Guinea, Lebanon, DPR Korea and Zimbabwe). As such, 29 armed conflicts took place in 2012 in which neither the UN Security Council nor the EU proposed imposing an arms embargo as a sanction measure. Furthermore, there are 80 scenarios featuring tensions of varying intensity in which no arms embargoes have been imposed, despite the fact that in many cases the preventive nature of arms embargoes might lead to a reduction of conflict.

As regards international missions, the greatest number of active operations in 2012 were concentrated in Africa (31), followed by Europe (21), Asia (14), the Middle East (13) and America (four). As such, there were 83 international missions in total in 2012. Of the total number of missions, three ended during 2012: the mission of the Arab League in Syria, which began its mandate in November 2011 and was forced to withdraw at the end of January 2012, due to the escalation of clashes; the United Nations mission in

## Arms embargoes by the United Nations, EU, OSCE and the Arab League in 2012

Country*	Coming into effect	Country	Coming into effect
<b>Embargoes declared by the United Nations</b>		<b>Embargoes declared by the European Union</b>	
<b>Afghanistan/Pakistan (Taliban militias and al-Qaeda**)</b>	2002	<b>Afghanistan/Pakistan (Taliban militias and al-Qaeda **)</b>	2002
Côte d'Ivoire	2004	Belarus	2011
DPR Korea	2006	China	1989
<b>DR Congo (except the Government)</b>	2003	Côte d'Ivoire	2004
Eritrea	2009	<b>DR Congo (except the Government)</b>	2003
Iran	2006	DPR Korea	2006
<b>Iraq (except the Government)</b>	2003	Eritrea	2010
Lebanon (except the Government)	2006	Guinea	2009
Liberia (except the Government)	1992	Iran	2007
<b>Libya</b>	2011	<b>Iraq (except the Government)</b>	2003
<b>Somalia (except the Government)</b>	1992	Lebanon (except the Government)	2006
<b>Sudan (Darfur) (except the Government)</b>	2004	Liberia (except the Government)	2001
		<b>Libya</b>	2011
<b>Embargoes declared by the Arab League</b>		<b>Myanmar</b>	1991
<b>Syria</b>	2011	<b>Somalia (except the Government)</b>	2002
<b>Embargoes declared by the OSCE</b>		<b>South Sudan</b>	2011
Armenia - Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1992	<b>Sudan</b>	1994
		<b>Syria</b>	2011
		Zimbabwe	2002

\* In bold, country or group in armed conflict subject to embargo.

\*\* Embargo not linked to a specific country or territory.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2012 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). European Commission, Website, [http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm).

Syria (UNSMIS), which was deployed between April and August 2012, and which was also forced to leave the country due to the impossibility of fulfilling its mandate (monitoring the ceasefire) as a consequence of the high levels of violence; and the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), which completed its mandate in June 2012. Furthermore, there was an increase in the number of missions in Africa and the Middle East due to the outbreak of new conflicts or the exacerbation of existing ones.

Forced displacement was one of the most visible effects of the armed conflicts. With respect to internal displacement, the latest global figures, which refer to the situation at the end of 2011, estimated that 26.4 million people had been displaced around the world as a result of armed conflicts, widespread violence and/or human rights violations, which represented a reduction in respect of the 27.5 million people registered in 2010, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Even

***In 29 of the armed conflicts that remained active in 2012, neither the UN Security Council nor the EU proposed imposing an arms embargo as a sanction measure***

so, notwithstanding reductions registered in occasional years, there has been an upward global trend in internal displacement since 1997. The number of new internally displaced persons in 2011 was 3.5 million, a 20% increase in respect of 2010. This rise was closely related to new large-scale displacement in the Middle East and North Africa (Yemen, Libya, Syria), as well as in sub-Saharan Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, South Sudan, DR Congo, Sudan and Somalia). Meanwhile, the annual UNHCR reported that there were 800,000 new refugees, bringing the total number of refugees up to 15.2 million. Nevertheless, the accumulated total number of refugees in 2011 was lower than in 2010 (15.4 million).

## Socio-political crises

The second chapter (**Socio-political crises**)<sup>2</sup> offers an analysis of the nature and most significant developments

2. A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by a range of actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach

## International missions of 2012\*

UN (29)	EU (17)	OSCE (16)
Afghanistan (UNAMA) -2002-	Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) -2002-	Albania (OSCE Presence in Albania) -1997-
Burundi (BNUB) -2011-	Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA) -2004-	Armenia (OSCE Office in Yerevan) -2000-
Central Africa (UNOCA) -2011-	<i>Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) 2003-2012</i>	Azerbaijan (OSCE Office in Baku) -2000-
Central African Republic (BINUCA) -2009-	DR Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) -2007-	Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (Personal Representative for the Minsk Conference) -1995-
Central Asia (UNRCCA) -2007-	DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) -2005-	Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina) -1995-
Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) -2004-	Georgia – Russia (EUMM Georgia) -2008-	Kazakhstan (OSCE Centre in Astana) -1998-
Cyprus (UNFICYP) -1964-	Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR) -2012-	Kosovo (OMIK, OSCE Mission in Kosovo) -1996-
DR Congo (MONUSCO)-1999/2010-	Iraq (EUJUST Lex Iraq) -2005-	Kyrgyzstan (OSCE Centre in Bishkek) -1999-
East Timor (UNMIT) -2006-	Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) -2008-	Macedonia, FYR (OSCE Mission to Skopje) -1992-
Golan Heights (UNDOF) -1974-	Mali (EUTM Mali) -2013-	Moldova (OSCE Mission to Moldova) -1993-
Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) -2010-	Moldova – Ukraine (EUBAM) -2005-	Montenegro (OSCE Mission to Montenegro) -2006-
Haiti (MINUSTAH) -2004-	Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger) -2012-	Serbia (OSCE Mission to Serbia) -2006-
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) -1949-	Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah) -2005-	Tajikistan (OSCE Office in Tajikistan) -1994-
Iraq (UNAMI) -2003-	Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) -2006-	Turkmenistan (OSCE Centre in Ashgabat) -1999-
Israel – Palestine (UNSCO) -1994-	Somalia (EUNAVFOR Somalia) -2008-	Ukraine (OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine) -1999-
Kosovo (UNMIK) -1999-	Somalia (EUTM Somalia) -2010-	Uzbekistan (OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan) -2006-
Lebanon (UNIFIL) -1978/2006-	South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan) -2012-	ARAB LEAGUE (1)
Lebanon (USCOL) -2007-	NATO (5)	<i>Syria (Arab League Observer Mission in Syria) 2011-2012</i>
Liberia (UNMIL) -2003-	Afghanistan (ISAF) -2001-	CIS (1)
Libya (UNSMIL) -2011-	Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden (Operation Ocean Shield) -2009-	Moldova (Transnistria) -1992-
Middle East (UNTSO) -1948-	Kosovo (KFOR) -1999-	ECCAS (1)
Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) -2008-	Somalia (NATO assistance to the AMISOM) -2007-	Central African Republic (MICOPAX) -2008-
Somalia (UNPOS) -1995-	The Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour) -2001-	OAS (3)
South Sudan (UNMISS) -2009-	AU (2)	Belize – Guatemala (OAS/AZ Office) -2003-
Sudan – South Sudan (UNISFA) -2011-	Central Africa (LRA) (Regional Co-operation Initiative against the LRA, ICR/LRA) -2012-	Colombia (MAPP OEA) -2004-
Sudan (Darfur) (UNAMID) -2007-	Somalia (AMISOM) -2007-	Colombia (MIB OEA) -2008-
<i>Syria (UNSMIS) -2012-</i>	ECOWAS (2)	Other missions (6)
West Africa (UNOWA) -2001-	Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) -2012-	Côte d'Ivoire (Operation Licorne, France) -2003-
Western Sahara (MINURSO) -1991-	Mali (AFISMA) -2013-	Egypt and Israel -1982-
		Hebron, Palestine (TPIH 2) -1997-
		The Solomon Islands (RAMSI) -2003-
		DPR Korea and Rep. Korea (NSC) -1953-
		East Timor (ISF, Australia) -2006-

\* The start year of the mission is included. In italics, missions finished during 2012.


regarding socio-political crises in 2012, as well as providing a comparison of global and regional trends. In

2012, 91 socio-political crises were registered around the world, in line with the trend shown in 2011, when

that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may lead to an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity aspirations; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or undermine power; or c) control of resources or territory.



## Number of internally displaced persons in 2011



90 cases were registered. As in 2011, most of the socio-political crises in 2012 were concentrated in Africa and Asia, with 35 and 23 cases, respectively. The remaining crises occurred in Europe (15), the Middle East (14) and America (six). In the case of Africa, the figure was similar to that of 2011, although the scenarios were not the same. Over the course of 2012, some cases classified as active socio-political crises in 2011 ceased to be classified as such (Chad-Sudan, Djibouti-Eritrea and Niger), while others were added to the list of active crises in 2012, one example being Sudan, due to the various incidents of instability that affected the government. The cases of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and the Niger Delta region were no longer classified as armed conflicts in 2012 due to a reduction in the level of violence. However, the continued occurrence of security incidents meant that they were classified as socio-political crises. In Asia the number of socio-political crises rose slightly in respect of 2011. The increase was due to the inclusion in 2012 of the China-Japan crisis following the escalation in tension due to the dispute over the islands known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and as the Diaoyu Islands in China.


The socio-political crises in 2012 were linked to a wide variety of situations: scenarios in which armed conflict is on the horizon due to the failure to resolve the

underlying problems and in which instability continued (such as in Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Nigeria - Niger Delta); military coups d'état (Mali or Guinea-Bissau); the intensification of political polarisation and/or of the repression of dissidents in the context of electoral processes (Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Guinea or Iran); difficulties involving constitutional processes (Nepal or Egypt); bilateral tension involving cross-border incidents (between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey and Syria, or Armenia and Azerbaijan in respect of the dispute over Nagorno Karabakh, for example); the repression of popular protests, clashes between demonstrators and the police or human rights violations (Bahrain, Kazakhstan or Uganda); or clashes linked to disputes between government forces and a variety of armed groups whose level of intensity falls below that of an armed conflict (such as the cases of the Shining Path armed group in Peru or of militants in the north-east of India or in the North Caucasus); among others.

While taking into account that most of the socio-political crises are due to a variety of causes, generally speaking it is possible to conclude that in the majority of cases there was an element of opposition to the internal or international policies of the government that triggered a struggle to gain or undermine power. This was one of the causes of tension in 58.2% of

***The number of new internally displaced persons as a result of armed conflicts, widespread violence or human rights violations increased by 20% in 2011***

## Intensity of socio-political crises by region



the cases registered in 2012. Meanwhile, opposition to the political, social or ideological system of a state was present in 17.5% of the cases. The identity aspirations of a variety of collectives were one of the main causes of 38.4% of the socio-political crises, while demands for self-determination or self-government were a key element in 32.9% of the cases registered in this period. Other underlying causes of the socio-political crises registered in 2012 were disputes over the control of resources (in 15.3% of cases) and over the control of the territory (in 13% of the contexts).

As in previous years, on a global level most of the socio-political crises were of low intensity (47 cases, equivalent to 51.6%) or medium intensity (28 cases or 30.7%). 17.5% of the contexts (16 cases) were considered high-intensity crises. Unlike in 2011 and other years, in which the largest number of serious cases were in Africa and Asia, in 2012 the greatest number of high-intensity crises were to be found in the Middle East (six), which can be explained in part by the regional repercussions of the armed conflict in Syria and by the Arab uprisings in this part of the world. As regards the remaining high-intensity crises, five occurred in Africa, four in Asia and one in Europe. The most serious cases in 2012 were Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland), Sudan – South Sudan, India (Nagaland), Indonesia (Western Papua), Pakistan, Tajikistan, Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh), Bahrain, Egypt, Israel – Syria – Lebanon, Lebanon, Syria – Turkey and Yemen (south).

Last of all, and following the trend of previous years, it should be pointed out that many of the cases (51 out of the 91, or 56%) were of an internal nature. In other words, the socio-political crisis involves actors from the state itself who operate exclusively

**128 armed conflicts or socio-political crises are analysed, most of them in Africa and Asia**

**In 13 of the 38 current armed conflicts (34%), open or exploratory talks are under way.**

within its territory. In another 25 cases (27.4%), the significant presence of an international actor in the crisis, the spread of the dispute to other countries, the intervention of foreign troops or regional organisations, or the role played by armed groups operating from foreign bases, among other factors, led them to be classified as internationalised internal socio-political crises. Finally, there were 15 international socio-political crises, equivalent to 16.4% of the total.

A joint analysis of the contents of the first two chapters of the yearbook provides a more comprehensive view of conflicts around the world. As such, as can be observed in the table below, 129 armed conflicts or socio-political crises are analysed. More than one third of these scenarios are concentrated in Africa (48), followed by Asia (35). Europe and the Middle East had a similar number of cases (20 and 21, respectively), while America was the continent with the fewest number of armed conflicts or socio-political crises (five).

## Peace processes

In the third chapter (**Peace processes**)<sup>3</sup> 54 contexts are analysed. In 13 of the 38 current armed conflicts (34%), open or exploratory talks are under way. Over the course of the year, 13 groups in four countries laid down their weapons on reaching peace agreements with their respective governments. In general terms, in 2012, 55% of the analysed peace negotiations went well or concluded satisfactorily. 24% of the negotiations had to overcome serious difficulties, while 7% went very badly.

Some of the **most important developments of the year** with respect to peace processes were the following:

- 13 armed groups laid down their weapons over the course of the year. Ten of them are based in India.
- Exploratory talks began in Senegal (Casamance) between the government and the MFDC, with the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio.
- The Philippine government and the MILF reached an agreement in principle to create the Bangsamoro entity on the island of Mindanao. The final peace agreement will be signed in early 2013.
  - The Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla organisation began talks in Cuba, with a pre-agreed and limited agenda. The talks are mediated by Norway and Cuba.
- The Kurdish guerrilla organisation PKK began talks with the Turkish government.

<sup>3</sup> Negotiation is understood as the process through which two or more parties involved in a dispute (whether countries or internal actors within a country) agree to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to seek a satisfactory solution to their demands. This negotiation may be direct or with the mediation of third parties. Formal negotiations tend to have a prior or exploratory stage that enables the framework of the future negotiations to be defined (format, place, conditions, guarantees, etc.). Peace process is understood as the consolidation of a negotiation process, once the agenda points, procedures to be followed, timeline and facilitators have been defined. As such, negotiation constitutes one of the stages of a peace process.

## Conflict overview 2012

Continent	Armed conflicts			Socio-political crises			TOTAL
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low	
Africa	<i>DR Congo (East)</i> <i>Somalia</i> South Sudan	Libia Mali (north) Nigeria (Boko Haram) <i>Sudan (Darfur)</i> <i>Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile)</i>	Algeria (AQIM) Burundi Central Africa (LRA) <i>Central African Republic</i> <i>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</i>	Côte d'Ivoire Kenya <i>Mali</i> Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland) <i>Sudan – South Sudan</i>	DR Congo DR Congo – Rwanda – Uganda Eritrea Eritrea – Ethiopia Guinea-Bissau Nigeria Nigeria (Niger Delta) <i>Senegal (Casamance)</i> Tunisia	Angola (Cabinda) Algeria Burkina Faso Chad Comoros Congo Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Ethiopia (Oromia) Guinea Madagascar Malawi Morocco <i>Morocco – Western Sahara</i> Mauritania Rwanda Sudan Swazilandia Uganda Zimbabwe	
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>48</b>
America		<i>Colombia</i>			Bolivia Haiti Peru	Paraguay	
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>1</b>				<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>
Asia and Pacific	<i>Afghanistan</i> Pakistan Pakistan (Balochistan)	India (CPI-M) <i>Myanmar</i> Thailand (south)	<i>India (Assam)</i> India (Jammu and Kashmir) India (Manipur) <i>Philippines (NPA)</i> <i>Philippines (Mindanao – Abu Sayyaf)</i> <i>Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)*</i>	<i>India (Nagaland)</i> Indonesia (West Papua) Pakistan Tajikistan	China (Tibet) China (East Turquestan) Kazakhstan Korea, DPR – USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea <i>India – Pakistan</i> Indonesia (Aceh) <i>Myanmar</i> Nepal Thailand <i>Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)</i>	China – Japan India (Tripura) Kyrgyzstan Lao, PDR <i>Nepal (Terai)</i> Sri Lanka (north-east) Thailand – Cambodia Uzbekistan	
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>35</b>
Europe		Russia (Dagestan) <i>Turkey (south-east)</i>	Russia (Chechnya) Russia (Ingushetia) Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	<i>Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)</i>	<i>Serbia-Kosovo</i>	Azerbaijan Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina <i>Cyprus</i> <i>Georgia (Abkhazia)</i> <i>Georgia (South Ossetia)</i> Macedonia <i>Moldova, Rep. of (Transnistria)</i> Russia Russia (Karachay-Cherkessia) Russia (North Ossetia) Spain (Basque Country) United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>20</b>
Middle East	Iraq <i>Syria</i> Yemen (AQAP)	Yemen (Houthis)	Iran (north-west)* <i>Israel – Palestine</i> Yemen*	Bahrein Egypt Lebanon – Israel – Syria Lebanon Syria – Turkey Yemen (south)	Egypt – Israel Iran – USA, Israel Iraq (Kurdistan) Saudi Arabia	Iran Iran (Sistan Balochistan) Jordan Palestine	
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>129</b>

Armed conflicts and socio-political crises with ongoing peace negotiations, whether exploratory or formal, are identified in italics. With asterisk, armed conflicts ended during 2012.



## Status of the negotiations at the end of 2012

Good (12)	In difficulties (15)	Bad (7)	At an exploratory stage (7)	Resolved (13)
India (NDFB(P)) India (NCSN-IM) Myanmar (KNU, ABSDF, NMSF, ALP, CNF, RCSS-SSA, KNPP) Philippines (MILF) Senegal (MFDC) Sudan (JEM)	Colombia (FARC) Cyprus DR Congo (M23) Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) India (ULFA) India (NSCN-K) India-Pakistan Moldavia (Transnistria) Philippines (MNLF) Philippines (NPA) Serbia-Kosovo Somalia Sudan (JEM-MC) Sudan-South Sudan	Afghanistan Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh) Ethiopia (ONLF) Israel-Palestine Mali Morocco-Western Sahara Syria	CAR (CPJP faction) Colombia (ELN) India (NDFB) India (NDFB(R) faction) Myanmar (ABSDF) Sudan (SPLM-N) Turkey (PKK)	CAR (CPJP) India (APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, UKDA, KRA, DHD) Myanmar (SSAS) Nepal (SKTMMM)

## The gender dimension in peacebuilding

In the fourth chapter (**The gender dimension in peacebuilding**) an analysis is provided of the various initiatives being implemented in peacebuilding processes from a gender perspective by the United Nations and by other local and international organisations and movements.<sup>4</sup> An analysis through this perspective makes it possible to highlight the specific impacts of armed conflict on men and women, as well as the extent to which and the way in which each gender participates in peacebuilding, in particular the contributions being made by women in this respect. The chapter provides an assessment of the global gender inequality situation through an analysis of the gender dimension in the impact of armed conflicts and socio-political crises, followed by an assessment of various peacebuilding initiatives from a gender perspective.

As regards the situation concerning gender equality, according to the GII, **the situation of women was serious in 77 countries, being especially serious in 48 cases, mainly concentrated in Africa and Asia.** This means that 26 of the 38 armed conflicts that took place over the course of 2012 occurred in countries in which there were serious gender inequalities and that six of these conflicts occurred in countries for which there is no available data in this respect. 81% of the armed conflicts for which data was available on gender

equality took place in contexts with serious gender inequalities. Furthermore, in 39 of the countries with serious inequalities there were one or more socio-political crises. This means that 47 of the 91 socio-political crises that remained active in 2012 took place in countries in which there were serious gender inequalities, which represents 52% of the socio-political crises on which data was available.

As regards the impact of violence and armed conflicts from a gender perspective, in 2012, as in previous years, there was once again evidence of the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war by the armed actors in several conflicts. The UN Secretary-General

*The UN Secretary-General presented the first report on sexual violence in armed conflicts, which includes a list of the armed, government and opposition actors responsible for crimes of sexual violence*


presented its report on sexual violence in armed conflicts, the first report in which detailed information has been compiled on the carrying out of acts of violence in various contexts of armed conflict, post-war scenarios and socio-political crises. The report also includes a list of government and opposition armed actors that are responsible for crimes of sexual violence in these contexts. The report addresses the sexual violence carried out and documented in the period from December 2010 to November 2011. Meanwhile, there were repeated reports in 2012 of the use of sexual violence

in different contexts of armed conflict and in socio-political crises. Some of the places where reports of sexual violence were constant were Somalia, DR Congo and Myanmar, among others.

In the section on peacebuilding from a gender perspective, important formal peace processes took

<sup>4</sup> As an analytical category, gender makes it clear that inequalities between men and women are the product of social norms rather than a result of nature, and sets out to underline this social and cultural construction to distinguish it from the biological differences of the sexes. The gender perspective aims to highlight the social construction of sexual difference and the sexual division of work and power. It also attempts to show that the differences between men and women are a social construction resulting from unequal power relations that have been historically established in the patriarchal system. The goal of gender as an analytical category is to demonstrate the historical and situated nature of sexual differences.

## Countries with serious gender inequalities



place in 2012 in countries such as Somalia, Myanmar, the Philippines or Colombia, among others. In all of these processes, women's organisations pressed for greater involvement in negotiations and for their demands to be considered over the course of the talks between the parties in conflict. Meanwhile, various women's organisations from civil society were involved in initiatives to promote dialogue and peacebuilding in countries such as Colombia, Pakistan, Serbia or Syria, highlighting the important role that can be played by these organisations in peacebuilding processes.

## Opportunities for peace in 2013


The fifth chapter of the report (**Opportunities for peace in 2013**) provides an analysis of seven areas in which positive steps have been taken in terms of peacebuilding in 2013. The opportunities identified in 2012 refer to different regions and issues.

- **Georgia (Abkhazia / South Ossetia):** The arrival in power of a new government in Georgia that is interested in improving relations with neighbouring Russia and in altering its strategy towards the independence-seeking regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, promoting community links and viewing the regions as actors in the conflict in their own right rather than mere puppets of Moscow, may lead to a reduction of tension in the area.
- **India (NSCN-IM):** Over the course of 2012 positive

progress has been made at various times, which seems to indicate that the negotiations between the government and the NSCN-IM (ongoing since the signing of the ceasefire in 1997 but unsuccessful to date in terms of specific positive developments) may be close to producing an agreement.

- **Philippines (Mindanao-MILF):** The Philippine government and the MILF signed the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro. This preliminary peace agreement safeguards the territorial integrity of the Philippines and encompasses broad self-government powers for the Bangsamoro region, opening the door to the consolidation of peace in Mindanao after 15 years of negotiations and 40 years of armed conflict.
- **Senegal (Casamance):** The Senegalese government and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) entered a new round of negotiations that has raised expectations of a possible peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict, almost exactly three decades after the start of the conflict.
- **Colombia:** Following several failed attempts to carry out peace negotiations, the Colombian government and the FARC made progress towards finding a negotiated political outcome to the conflict. However, it was not until Juan Manuel Santos took office as president in 2010 that a new opportunity for reaching an agreement appeared.
- **Arms Trade Treaty:** There is a new opportunity in 2013 for states to approve an Arms Trade Treaty that

## Opportunities for peace in 2013




- mitigates the lethal consequences of this trade.
- **Youth and Conflict:** Despite their frequent victimisation or stigmatisation, young people participate in and constitute the driving force of several peace initiatives, including the promotion of inter-community dialogue, making them an engine of positive transformation in many contexts.

## Risk scenarios for 2013

The sixth chapter of the report (**Risk scenarios for 2013**) offers an analysis of 12 armed conflicts and socio-political crises that due to their particular conditions may deteriorate and turn into scenarios of greater instability and violence in 2013.

*The report analyses 12 armed conflicts and socio-political crises that due to their particular conditions may deteriorate in 2013*

- **Russian Federation (Dagestan):** The rise in insurgent and counter-insurgent violence seen in recent years and the general climate of impunity and human rights violations, together with the intense militarisation that took place in 2012, may lead to the escalation of the crisis affecting this area in the north of the Caucasus.
- **Myanmar:** There is considerable uncertainty concerning the political transition process in Myanmar that might harm progress in the process of democratic reforms under way in Myanmar.
- **Tajikistan:** The struggles between the central government and alternative power options, including former opposition commanders from the civil war who are enjoying growing influence in the peripheral areas of the country, may lead to new violent clashes in 2013 and to the use of excessive force by the state in order to consolidate its power in the territory, with the risk of the population becoming disaffected.
- **Philippines:** The signing of a peace agreement between the government and the MILF, which might hinder the full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement between the government and the MNLF, triggered warnings from the MNLF regarding the possible resumption of the armed conflict.
- **China (Tibet):** The self-immolation of dozens of people in 2012 to protest against the repression carried out by the Chinese government, along with international calls for Beijing to enter talks with the Tibetan authorities to overcome the current situation, point towards a hardening of the Chinese government's stance.
- **Haiti:** Many doubts persist concerning how a government that has been so politically weakened by the economic and humanitarian situation of the country and placed under so much pressure by the frequent and numerous protests that have been staged in 2012 can handle the demands for the reconstitution of the army made by groups of former soldiers, who have staged several shows of strength.
- **Unmanned aerial vehicles:** The growing number of attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) in recent years, especially by the USA, has fuelled the




debate on the legality and legitimacy of this practice and its grave impact in terms of civilian victims. Nevertheless, the number of international actors with access to this technology is growing, increasing the challenges of “remote-controlled warfare”.

- **USA - Guantánamo:** In 2008, the recently elected US president, Barack Obama, announced his intention to close down Guantánamo prison. However, five years on, Guantánamo is no longer on the political agenda and no longer features in the media. Moreover, very little information on the real situation of this detention centre enters the public domain.
- **Kenya:** The country is mired in instability due to the upcoming elections in 2013. However, there are other factors that contribute to the worsening of the situation, such as the growing pressure exerted by the government on the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) secessionist movement and, above all, the intervention of the Kenyan armed forces in Somalia, which has led al-Shabaab to step up its violent actions, as well as fuelling growing anti-Somalian feelings in Kenya.
- **DR Congo (east):** Unresolved local dynamics and the breach of peace agreements, the destabilising role played by Rwanda in the Great Lakes and the laissez faire attitude of the international community have brought a new period of instability to the east of the DR Congo. Even if it is resolved through dialogue between the Congolese government and the M23, the instability will continue because the roots of this complex situation will remain unresolved.

- **Syria:** One of the most serious consequences of the armed conflict in Syria is the forced displacement of the population, both inside and outside the country, since for many people, leaving their homes has become the only way to escape the violence. The figures for refugees and internally displaced persons (which at the end of 2012 were 600,000 and 2.5 million, respectively) surpassed all forecasts and completely overwhelmed the neighbouring countries in terms of their capacity for welcoming refugees.
- **Mali (north):** The armed conflict in the north of Mali highlighted the security challenges in the Sahel and the consequences of the Libyan war on the area. The widespread availability of weapons, the increase in criminal activities, the proliferation and widening of the operations area of radical Islamist groups and the uncertain consequences of the military intervention led by France in Mali have raised alarms about the possibility of the area becoming a “new Afghanistan” right at Europe’s door.

Map 1.1. Armed conflicts





# 1. Armed Conflicts

- In 2012 38 armed conflicts were reported, the majority in Africa (13) and Asia (12), followed by the Middle East (seven), Europe (five) and Latin America (one).
- The situation of violence in northern Mali came to be classified as a new armed conflict in 2012, while of the total of 38 disputes, three were deactivated during the year: the Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), Iran (northwest) and Yemen, leaving active 35 at the end of 2012.
- The highest intensity conflicts were those in DR Congo (east), Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Pakistan (Balochistan), Iraq, Syria and Yemen (AQAP).
- Most of the conflicts were driven by opposition to a particular government or state system, or related to identity and self-government demands.
- In the east of DR Congo there was a serious escalation of violence as a result of the M23 rebellion supported by Rwanda, which forced peace negotiations in December.
- A new rebellion in the Central African Republic arising from the breaking off of ancient groups threatened to overthrow the government, and resulted in the holding of peace talks in Gabon.
- The political crisis in Mali favoured the advance of rebel forces in the north of the country, where Tuareg nationalists were increasingly displaced by radical Islamist groups.
- The escalation of the conflict between Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces had a major impact on the civilian population, with serious allegations of human rights abuses against both parties.
- Relations between Afghanistan and the USA deteriorated as the result, among other factors, of various acts of violence perpetrated by US soldiers, such as the killing of civilians and the burning of Korans.
- Sectarian violence against the Shiite population in the Pakistani province of Balochistan flared up, causing dozens of deaths.
- The conflict between Turkey and the Kurdish group the PKK led to the most serious escalation in violence in recent years, though at the end of December the government announced the existence of talks with the group.
- The recognition of Palestine as a non-member state in the UN was preceded by an escalation of violence in the context of an Israeli military operation in Gaza.
- The intensification of violence in Syria raised the death toll to over 60,000 since the start of the armed conflict in 2011, while also triggering a severe crisis of forced displacement.

This chapter analyses the armed conflicts that took place over the course of 2012. It is structured in four parts. The first section outlines the definition of armed conflict and its characteristics. The second examines trends in conflict during 2012, including global and regional trends and other issues related to international conflicts, such as arms embargoes and international missions. The third section describes the evolution of situations and the most important events of the year in their different contexts. Finally, risk scenarios in all the armed conflicts of 2012 are identified with a view to issuing early warnings regarding them. Also included is a map at the beginning of the chapter identifying the active conflicts in 2012.

## 1.1. Armed conflicts: definition

An **armed conflict** is any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible in which the continuous and organised use of violence a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. wounded or displaced population, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services) and b) aims to achieve objectives that are different than those of common delinquency and are normally linked to

- demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues;
- the opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of the government, which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power;
- control over the resources or the territory.

**Table 1.1. Summary of armed conflicts in 2012**

Conflict <sup>1</sup> -beginning-	Type <sup>2</sup>	Main parties <sup>3</sup>	Intensity <sup>4</sup>
			Trend <sup>5</sup>
<b>Africa</b>			
Algeria (AQIM) -1992-	Internationalised internal	Government, AQIM (ex GSPC), MUJAO, governments of Mauritania, Mali and Niger	1
	System		=
Burundi -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, FNL armed group	1
	Government		=
Central Africa (LRA) -1986-	International	Ugandan, Central African, Congolese and South Sudanese armed forces, self defence militias from DR Congo and from South Sudan, LRA	1
	Resources		↓
Central African Republic -2006-	Internationalised internal	Government, APRD, UFDR, divisions of the UFDR (FURCA, MJLC), FDPC, CPJP, Séléka (made up of factions of the aforementioned groups), France, MICOPAX, Ugandan armed group LRA, Chad armed group FPR, Zaraguinas (criminal gangs)	1
	Government		↑
DR Congo (east) -1998-	Internationalised internal	Government, Mai-Mai militias, M23 (ex CNDP), FDLR, FRF, PARECO, APCLS, armed Ituri groups, Burundian opposition armed group FNL, Ugandan opposition armed groups ADF-NALU and LRA, Rwanda, MONUSCO	3
	Government, Identity, Resources		↑
Ethiopia (Ogaden) -2007-	Internationalised internal	Government, ONLF, OLF, pro-governmental militias, UWSLF	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Libya -2011-	Internal	Government, anti-Gaddafi militias, pro-Gaddafi armed groups, tribal militias	2
	Government		↓
Mali (north) -2012-	Internationalised internal	Government, MNLA, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM	2
	System, Self-government, Identity		↑

- 1 This column shows the states in which armed conflicts are taking place, specifying the region in this state to which the conflict is limited in brackets and the name of the armed group involved in the conflict. The latter is given in the case that there is more than one armed conflict in the same state or in the same territory within a state, in order to differentiate them.
- 2 This report classifies and analyses the armed conflicts from a dual aspect, which deals, on the one hand with the causes or incompatibility of interests and, on the other hand, the convergence between the scenario of the conflict and the actors. With regard to the main causes, the following can be distinguished: the demand for self-determination and self-government (self-government), or identity aspirations (Identity); opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state (System) or the internal or international policy of a government (Government), which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power; or fight to control the resources (Resources) or the territory (Territory). As far as the second aspect is concerned, the armed conflicts may be internal, internationalised internal or international. An internal armed conflict is any confrontation involving armed parties from the same state that operate exclusively in and from within the territory. Secondly, internationalised internal armed conflict is one in which one or more of the adversaries are foreign and/or when the confrontation spreads to neighbouring countries. To consider an armed conflict to be internationalised internal, the fact that the armed groups have their military bases in neighbouring countries, in connivance with those states and launch their attacks from them should be taken into account. Finally, an international conflict is one in which state and non-state parties from two or more countries confront each other. It should also be taken into account that most current armed conflicts have a significant regional or international dimension and influence due, among other things, to the flows of refugees, the arms trade, economic or political interests (such as illegal or illegal exploitation of resources) that the neighbouring countries have in the conflict, the participation of foreign combatants or the logistical and military support provided by other states.
- 3 This column shows the actors that intervene directly in the hostilities. The main actors that directly participate in the conflicts are made up of a mixture of regular or irregular armed parties. The conflicts usually involve the government, or its armed forces, against one or several armed opposition groups, but can also include other irregular groups such as clans, the guerrillas, warlords, armed groups confronting each other or militias from ethnic or religious communities. Although they most frequently use conventional weapons, and more specifically small arms (which cause most of the deaths in the conflicts), in many cases other methods such as suicide attacks, bombings and sexual violence are used; even hunger is employed as a weapon of war. There are also other actors who do not directly participate in the armed activities, but who do have a significant influence on the conflict.
- 4 The intensity of an armed conflict (high, medium or low) and its trend (escalation of violence, decrease of violence, unchanged) are evaluated mostly based on how deadly it is (number of fatalities) and other consequences on the population and the territory. In addition, there are other aspects to be considered, such as the systematisation and frequency of the violence or the complexity of the military struggle (the complexity is normally related to the number of parties involved and how fragmented they are, the level of institutionalisation and the capabilities of the state and the degree of internationalisation of the conflict, as well as the flexibility of the objectives and the political willingness of the parties to reach an agreement). Thus, high intensity armed conflicts are usually those that cause over 1,000 battle-related deaths a year and also affect significant parts of the territory and population and include numerous actors (that establish relations of alliances, confrontation or tactical coexistence among themselves). Medium and low intensity conflicts, with over 100 battle-related deaths a year, have the aforementioned characteristics but with a more limited presence and scope. An armed conflict is considered to be ended when a significant and sustained decrease in armed hostilities occurs because of a military victory, agreement between the actors in conflict, demobilisation by one of the parties or because one of the parties abandons the armed struggle or limits it considerably as a strategy to achieve specific objectives. None of these options necessarily imply that the root causes of the armed conflict have been overcome or exclude the possibility of new outbreaks of violence. A temporary halt in hostilities, whether formal or tacit, does not necessarily mean the end of an armed conflict.
- 5 In this column, the development of the events of the year 2012 are compared with those of 2011, with the symbol of escalation of violence appearing (↑) if the general situation of the conflict during 2012 is more serious than during the previous year, the decrease of violence (↓) if it is better and that of no changes (=) if no significant changes have been experienced.

Conflict -beginning-	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
<b>Africa</b>			
Nigeria (Boko Haram) -2011-	Internal	Government, Boko Haram radical Islamist group (BH)	2
	System		↑
Somalia -1988-	Internationalised internal	New Federal Transitional Government (FTG) —to which the moderate faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) has adhered, and supported by Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ), warlords, Ethiopia, Kenya, USA, France, AMISOM, EU-Navfor, Operation Ocean Shield—, the radical faction of the ARS —made up by part of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Hizbul Islam, al-Shabaab— and supported by Eritrea	3
	Government, System		↑
South Sudan -2009-	Internationalised internal	Government, Army (SPLA), South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A), community militias, Sudan	3
	Government, Resources, Identity		↓
Sudan (Darfur) -2003-	Internationalised internal	Government, janjaweed pro-governmental militias, JEM, LJM coalition, diverse factions of the SLA and other armed groups	2
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		↓
Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, SPLM-N armed group, Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF) armed coalition, pro-governmental PDF militias, South Sudan	2
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		=
<b>America</b>			
Colombia -1964-	Internationalised internal	Government, FARC, ELN, paramilitary groups	2
	System		↓
<b>Asia</b>			
Afghanistan -2001-	Internationalised internal	Government, international coalition (led by the USA), ISAF (NATO), Taliban militias, warlords	3
	System		=
India (Assam) -1983-	Internationalised internal	Government, ULFA, DHD, Black Widow, NDFB, UPDS, KLNLF, KPLT, MULTA, HUM	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
India (CPI-M) -1967-	Internal	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)	2
	System		↓
India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989-	Internationalised internal	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
India (Manipur) -1982-	Internal	Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, PREPAK (Pro), KNF, KNA, KYKL, RPF, UPPK, PCP	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Myanmar -1948-	Internal	Government, armed groups (KNU, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNU/KNLA, SSNPLO, KIO)	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Pakistan -2001-	Internationalised internal	Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias, USA	3
	System		=
Pakistan (Balochistan) -2005-	Internal	Government, BLA, BRA, BLF and BLT	3
	Self-government, Identity Resources		↑
Philippines (NPA) -1969-	Internal	Government, NPA	1
	System		=
Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf) -1991-	Internationalised internal	Government, Abu Sayyaf	1
	Self-government, Identity, System		↑
Philippines (Mindanao-MILF) -1978-	Internal	Government, MILF	1
	Self-government, Identity		End
Thailand (south) -2004-	Internal	Government, secessionist opposition armed groups	2
	Self-government, Identity		=



Conflict -beginning-	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
<b>Europe</b>			
Russia (Chechnya) -1999-	Internal	Russian federal government, Chechen republic government, opposition armed groups	1
	System, Identity, Self-government		=
Russia (Dagestan) -2010-	Internal	Russian federal government, Dagestan republic government, opposition armed groups	2
	System, Identity, Self-government		=
Russia (Ingushetia) -2008-	Internal	Russian federal government, Ingushetian republic government, opposition armed groups (Ingush Jamaat)	1
	System, Identity, Self-government		↑
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria) -2011-	Internal	Russian federal government, Kabardino-Balkaria republic government, opposition armed groups	1
	System, Identity, Self-government		↓
Turkey (south-east) -1984-	Internationalised internal	Government, PKK, TAK	2
	Self-government, Identity		↑
<b>Middle East</b>			
Iran (north-west) -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, PJAK, Autonomous Government of Kurdistan (Iraq), Iraq	1
	Self-government, Identity		End
Iraq -2003-	Internationalised internal	Government, opposition armed groups (Islamic State of Iraq, including al-Qaeda in Iraq/Mesopotamia), militias, USA	3
	System, Government, Identity		↑
Israel-Palestine -2000-	International	Israeli government, settlers militias, PA, Fatah (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committees	1
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		↑
Syria -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, pro-government militias (Shabbiha), army deserters, Free Syrian Army (FSA), al-Nusra Front, Salafist armed groups	3
	Government		↑
Yemen -2011-	Internal	Government, pro-government militias, army deserters, armed tribal groups	1
	Government		End
Yemen (AQAP) -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, AQAP/Ansar Sharia, tribal militias (popular resistance committees) USA, Saudi Arabia	3
	System		↑
Yemen (Houthis) -2004-	Internationalised internal	Government, followers of al-Houthi religious leader (al-Shabab al-Mumen), pro-governmental tribes, Salafist militias, Saudi Arabia	1
	System, Government, Identity		=

1: low intensity; 2: medium intensity; 3: high intensity

↑: escalation of violence; ↓: decrease of violence; = : no changes; End: no longer considered armed conflict

## 1.2. Armed conflicts: analysis of trends in 2012

This section offers an analysis of the global and regional trends of armed conflicts in 2012 and of other issues related to international disputes, such as arms embargoes and international missions.

### a) Global trends


In 2012 38 armed conflicts were recorded, a figure slightly down from the previous year, in which there were 40. The slight decrease was due to the fact that in 2012 the cases of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and the state of the Niger Delta in Nigeria were no longer classified as armed conflicts. In 2012 instability in Mali resulted

in a new armed conflict, in which Tuareg and Islamist groups sought to take over control in the north of the country, fighting against a weakened central state which also had to grapple with a military coup. At the end of 2012 only 35 of 38 armed conflicts remained active following the signing of a preliminary peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the MILF armed group, and the absence of significant clashes; the reduction in violence by the PJAK Kurdish armed group in Iran, a decline linked in part to a ceasefire, allegedly motivated by the strategy of the PKK –a Kurdish group from Turkey with ties to the PJAK– to focus pressure on Turkey; as well as a significant decrease in hostilities in Yemen within the framework of the transition process opened up after the 2011 agreement calling for the withdrawal of the armed actors involved. Of these three scenarios which ceased to be considered conflicts at the end of the year, in all

three some kind of agreement was reached in 2012 or in the previous year (partial peace agreement in the Philippines, truce in Iran and the Yemen transition agreement), which facilitated the sustained reduction of violence.

**Most armed conflicts occurred in Africa and Asia (13 and 12, respectively), followed by the Middle East (seven), Europe (five) and Latin America (one).** Of the total number of conflicts, 58% (22 cases) were internationalised internal, while another 37% (14 cases) were internal conflicts. The remaining two cases –the conflict between Israel and Palestine and that between various central African governments and the Ugandan armed group the LRA– were international. Key among the factors leading to their internationalisation was the military involvement of third actors, whether states –Ethiopia, Kenya, the USA and France in Somalia; the USA in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen, among others– missions or international forces –NATO in Afghanistan, MONUSCO in DR Congo, AMISOM in Somalia, among others– or regional or foreign armed groups –the Islamist groups MUJAO and AQIM in Mali (north) and various groups in DR Congo. Other factors included the spread of violence beyond the borders of several states affected by conflicts, both by the conduct of governmental actors and that of opposition groups –armed activity by Uganda’s LRA group in various neighbouring countries, and Turkey’s bombings against the Kurdish group the PKK in northern Iraq. In any case, the majority of today’s conflicts are characterized by significant regional and international influences, due to various factors: population displacement, trafficking in weapons and resources, participation by mercenaries and other foreign fighters, and support by neighbouring countries, among others. In 2012 some of these factors took on special relevance due to their impact on other crises. Thus, the return to Mali of Tuareg fighters who had fought in 2011 along with Libya’s then leader Muammar Gaddafi, and the proliferation of weapons linked to the Libyan crisis, had an impact on developments in northern Mali and aggravated instability throughout the Sahel region. **For yet another year there were debates on the international scene regarding the advisability and the form of potential international interventions in some crises, like that in Syria and northern Mali.** While there was no agreement on Syria, partly due to the disparate interests of the international and regional powers, in the case of Mali in December the UN Security Council authorised an ECOWAS military mission, requested by the government of Mali, which at the year’s end had still not been formed. Before this mission was constituted France launched a military intervention in early January 2013, also requested by Mali, which prompted discussions regarding the degree of interference, interests and neocolonialism involved in the action. In 2011 the military actions of the UNOCI and France in Côte d’Ivoire, NATO’s military campaign in Libya, as well as also the crisis in Syria, were those which had sparked discussions about military interventionism and the principle of the responsibility to protect.


Graph 1.1. Regional distribution of the number of armed conflicts




The average duration of armed conflicts in 2012 was 15.8 years. However, this is a statistic which must be viewed with some caution due to the difficulty of assigning an exact date to the beginning of armed conflicts, and due to the large number of current armed conflicts that have featured prior cycles of violence, as in the cases of Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Thailand (south), Afghanistan and Russia (Chechnya).

In relation to root causes, the majority of armed conflicts were characterized by multi-causality, with multiple and concurrent causes at their roots. **Among these conflicts two thirds (24 cases) had among their main causes opposition to a particular government or to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state.** Among these 24 cases active in 2012, in 17 disputes there existed armed opposition groups fighting for a change of the system, whether aspiring to a socialist political and economic system –Colombia (FARC and ELN), Philippines (NPA) and India (CPI-M)– or with the aim of creating an Islamic political structure, or to introduce or strengthen elements of Islamic law in the institutions and in the shaping of the state –Algeria (AQIM), Mali (north), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Somalia, Afghanistan, Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf), Pakistan, Russia (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria), Iraq, Yemen (Houthis and the AQAP). **In the 14 cases in which there were aspirations for an Islamic framework, most involved armed groups whose idiosyncrasies transcended the administrative borders of the territory in which they fought, largely employing cross-border modus operandi and affiliations with regional insurgencies, or by tying, at least rhetorically, their dynamics and local objectives to a more global discourse of international jihad.** In this area the African Sahel region gained prominence in 2012 due to the proliferation of armed jihadist groups. In 10 cases there were armed groups whose objective was not so much focused on the transformation of the system as it was on overthrowing the government and accessing power, or, when suffering from inadequate military capacity, expressing opposition to the government by eroding it through the use of violence. This dimension of opposition to the government included the cases of Burundi, Libya, the Central African Republic, DR Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen (both in relation to the conflict that led to the fall from power of Ali Abdullah Saleh in

Graph 1.2. Intensity of the armed conflicts



Graph 1.3. Intensity of the armed conflicts by region



2011 and to the specific dispute between Houthis militia from the north and the government). In some of these conflicts the insurgencies opposing the government coexisted with other armed actors seeking a change of the system, such as in Somalia.

At the same time, **demands for self-government and identity continued to play a very important role as a leading root cause, present in almost two thirds of the disputes** (23 cases). Such conflicts

accounted for a majority in Asia and Europe, although they were also significant in Africa and the Middle East. Demands for identity and self-government yield different manifestations, from claims for cultural rights to pro-independence positions. Some of the most longstanding armed conflicts linked to the issue of identity and self-government –Philippines (Mindanao-MILF, active since 1978), Myanmar (numerous insurgencies, such as the KNU, active since 1948) and Turkey (the PKK, since 1984)– saw significant steps made towards peace: the signing of a partial peace between the Philippine government and the MILF after decades of peace processes; the signing of agreements between the Government and multiple insurgencies of an ethnic character in Myanmar; and the reopening of talks between Turkey and the PKK. Also, in several cases the struggle for the control of resources or territory was another key element driving disputes –Central Africa (LRA), DR Congo (east), Sudan (Darfur and South Kordofan and the Blue Nile), South Sudan, Pakistan (Balochistan)– in line with the trend from previous years. In any case, it is a factor which fuels and exacerbates virtually all of today’s armed conflicts.

In terms of intensity, **nearly one quarter of the armed conflicts (nine cases) featured very high levels of violence**, surpassing or approaching 1,000 fatalities annually –DR Congo (east), Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Pakistan (Balochistan), Iraq, Syria and Yemen (AQAP). In some of these cases this mark was shattered, with several thousand violent deaths, as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria. In another 11 cases (29%) the levels of violence were of

medium intensity, while in 18 contexts (47%) they were low. In any case, restrictions on the media coverage of some of the disputes, and the difficulty of obtaining independent assessments of them, require us to view the lethality levels with some caution. In terms of the evolution of these contexts, 37% of the disputes featured an increase in violence (14 cases), 29% saw no relevant changes (11 cases), and violence was down in the remaining 34% (13 cases). Cases where there was

a clear deterioration included Mali (north), Nigeria (Boko Haram), the Central African Republic and RD Congo in Africa; Pakistan (Balochistan) in Asia; Turkey (southeast) in Europe; and Syria and Yemen (AQAP) in the Middle East.


**Armed conflicts had a major impact on the civilian population**, with serious violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law (IHL), while generating or aggravating humanitarian crises. In addition to the deaths linked to the disputes there were also other forms of impact typical

of such conflicts, such as forced displacements, food insecurity, the recruitment of children, sexual violence, extrajudicial executions, illegal arrests, torture and other practices. In its report in May 2012 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General noted that, despite some progress, the reality continued to be marked by failures on the part of the actors in conflicts to meet their obligations under International Humanitarian Law, as well as other relevant obligations in the field of human rights, which he attributed to lack of political will.

**Forced displacement was one of the most visible effects of armed conflict**, both in terms of population displacement within victims’ national borders (internal displacement) and outside them (refugees). In 2012 of special note due to their severity were the forced displacements generated by the conflicts in Mali (north), DR Congo, Sudan (South Kordofan and the Blue Nile), Pakistan, India (Assam), Yemen (AQAP) and Syria. Thus, the latter country alone at the beginning of 2013 had 612,000 refugees in neighbouring countries and 2.5 million internally displaced persons.

**Internal forced displacement was one of the most evident effects of armed conflicts in 2012, with particularly serious situations such as in Syria, where 2.5 million people were displaced within the country**

Map 1.2. Number of people internally displaced in 2011<sup>6</sup>



In the second half of 2012 the crisis in Mali generated approximately 150,000 refugees and 230,000 displaced persons. At the same time the serious wave of inter-community violence in the Indian state of Assam forced between 300,000 and 400,000 people to abandon their homes in the second half of the year. Another 250,000 people were displaced in Yemen as a result of the growing conflict between the government and the armed group AQAP.


The latest global data available with regard to internal displacement, offered by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, which refer to the situation at the end of 2011, estimated 26.4 million internally displaced persons in the world due to armed conflicts, generalised violence and/or human rights violations, which represented a reduction from the 27.5 million in 2010. Even so, despite some decreases in specific years, the overall trend since 1997 has been upward. In addition, the drop in 2011 may be partly explained by the unclear status of populations from South Sudan in Sudan, which ceased to be recorded as a displaced internal population once South Sudan achieved independence in 2011. **The number of newly displaced in 2011 was 3.5 million people, up 20% from 2010**, an increase linked to the further large-scale displacements in the Middle East and the north of Africa (Yemen,

Libya, Syria) and sub-Saharan Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, South Sudan, DR Congo, Sudan and Somalia). By region, Africa remained the continent most affected (9.7 million), although to a lesser extent than in the previous year (11.1). In all the continents, except Europe, there was new internal displacement in 2011. With respect to countries, at the end of 2011 there were five states with more than one million internally displaced persons: Colombia (3.9-5.3 million), Iraq (2.3-5.3), Sudan (2.3-2.6), DR Congo (1.7) and Somalia (1.5). Turkey and Pakistan also approached the one million mark, with more than 900,000 displaced persons within their borders. These displaced populations continued to face problems due to their situations, including threats to their physical security and integrity, a lack of access to potable water, food, housing, health care, and specific violations of their rights.

In addition to internal displacement there was also that involving the crossing of national borders. Thus, the latest global figures available, referring also to 2011 and drawn from the annual report by the UNHCR, **estimated 800,000 new refugees –the largest increase in a decade– yielding a total of 15.2 million refugees at the end of 2011**, including the 4.8 million Palestinians receiving assistance from the UNRWA. To this were added nearly 900,000 people waiting for answers to

6 Figure based on the map from International Displacement Monitoring Centre, with data from January to December 2011, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-overview-map.pdf>.

Graph 1.4. Evolution of forced displacement<sup>7</sup>



their asylum applications. **The cumulative refugee population in 2011, nevertheless, was lower than in 2010** (15.4 million). In 2012 532,000 people were voluntarily repatriated, more than double that in 2010, although this continued to be a very low figure compared to those recorded in the last decade. Close to half of the global refugee population were women and girls (48%). The countries generating the largest refugee populations continued to be Afghanistan (2.7 million people), Iraq (1.4), Somalia (1.1) and Sudan (500,000), while in 2011 Pakistan, Iran and Syria headed the list of receiving countries. The UNHCR, meanwhile, called attention once again to the vulnerability and lack of protection enjoyed by stateless persons, a situation affecting 12 million people at the end of 2011.

**The use of sexual violence against women as a weapon of war continued to be widespread in the context of armed conflicts**, evidencing the significance of the gender dimension in armed conflict and the impact which it has on the civilian population.<sup>8</sup> In 2012 its use was confirmed in contexts such as DR Congo, Somalia, Mali, Sudan, Syria and Colombia, among others. Sexual violence against men was also verified in some contexts, including Syria. Civilian women faced challenges and specific problems caused or aggravated by armed conflicts, including threats to their physical safety, their sexual and reproductive health, and their freedom of movement, among many other aspects related to the human rights sphere. In regards to this issue, 81% of armed conflicts for which there was data on gender equality took place in contexts marked by serious gender inequalities.

Furthermore, **minors continued to be affected in a specific and disproportionate way by conflicts**. In its annual report for 2012, covering the period between May 2011 and May 2012, UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy

called attention to the violation of children's human rights and their being deprived of their socioeconomic rights by armed conflicts, including access to education. According to the report, as many as two thirds of all children who should be receiving primary education, based on their ages, but are not enrolled in schools, live in countries racked by armed conflicts. Other impacts affecting boys and girls include their being denied access to health and humanitarian assistance, their recruitment or use by armed actors (governmental and opposition), murder, kidnapping and sexual violence, among others. During the period analysed there were new cases of minors who suffered from arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, torture, mistreatment, and that were used to carry out suicide attacks, or as human shields.

**The impunity characterising offences against children was once again identified as a serious problem for the defence of their human rights.** With regards to

*Armed conflicts continued to affect minors in a very specific way, while the number of actors persistently violating their human rights increased*

this Coomaraswamy pointed out **the increase in actors who persistently violate children's rights in contexts of armed conflict**. In any case, in 2012 a ruling was issued with regards to the question of the recruitment of minors which may set a precedent affecting international jurisprudence applied to future cases. The verdict in question was that handed down by the International Criminal Court against Thomas Lubanga for war crimes for having mandatorily recruited and drafted children under the age of 15 into

the Congolese armed group the FPLC and involving them in its hostilities.

The annual report by Coomaraswamy also identified as a growing concern the use of explosive weapons by governments and opposition actors, especially in heavily populated areas, since these have a devastating impact on the civilian population, including children. Among these weapons of particular concern are those which are highly explosive, such as multiple rocket launchers, high power artillery and mortars, car bombs and other improvised explosive devices. The deaths of thousands of children in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Somalia and Sudan manifest the seriousness of the problem. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned of the impact of explosive weapons on the civilian population in general, specifically stressing the damage done and interference caused to health services and their administration. Ban Ki-moon cited new figures published in 2012 regarding these armaments: in 2011 at least 21,499 civilians were killed or injured by these weapons, mostly in populated areas such as markets, schools, places of worship and homes, with civilians accounting for 71% of these fatalities.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends 2011, 2012, <http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.html>.  
<sup>8</sup> See chapter 4 (Gender).



Table 1.2. Actors in conflict which violate children's rights, according to the UN<sup>9</sup>

Conflict	Recruitment and use	Killing and mutilation	Rape and other forms of sexual violence	Attacks on schools and hospitals
Afghanistan	-Afghan National Police, including Afghan Local Police -Haqqani network -Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar -Taliban forces, including the Tora Bora Front, the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia and the Latif Mansur Network	-Haqqani network -Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar -Taliban forces, including the Tora Bora Front, the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia and the Latif Mansur Network	--	- Taliban forces, including the Tora Bora Front, the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia and the Latif Mansur Network
Central Africa (LRA)	<b>-LRA</b>	<b>-LRA</b>	<b>-LRA</b>	--
Central African Republic	<b>-APRD</b> <b>-CPJP</b> <b>-FDPC</b> <b>-LRA</b> <b>-MLCJ</b> -Self-defence militias supported by the Government of the Central African Republic <b>-UFDR</b>	<b>-LRA</b>	<b>-LRA</b>	--
Chad	<b>-Army, including newly integrated elements</b> <b>-JEM</b>			
Colombia	<b>-ELN</b> <b>-FARC</b>	--	--	--
DR Congo	<b>-Army, including integrated elements from various armed groups, including the CNDP, as well as elements led by Bosco Ntaganda</b> <b>-FDLR</b> -FRPI/FPJC -LRA <b>-Mai-Mai groups in North and South Kivu, including PARECO</b>	--	<b>-Army, including integrated elements from various armed groups, including the CNDP, as well as elements led by Bosco Ntaganda</b> <b>-FDLR</b> -FRPI/FPJC <b>-LRA</b> <b>-Mai-Mai groups in North and South Kivu, including PARECO</b>	-FDLR
Iraq	-Al-Qaida in Iraq	-Al-Qaida in Iraq -ISI	--	-Al-Qaida in Iraq -ISI
Myanmar	<b>-DKBA</b> <b>-KIA</b> <b>-KNU/KNLA</b> <b>-KNPP/KA</b> <b>-SSA-S</b> <b>-Tatmadaw Kyi, including integrated border guard forces</b> <b>-UWSA</b>	--	--	--
Somalia	-Al-Shabaab <b>-Transitional Federal Government</b>	-Al-Shabaab <b>-Transitional Federal Government</b>	--	--
South Sudan	<b>-LRA</b> <b>-SPLA</b>	<b>-LRA</b>	<b>-LRA</b>	--
Sudan	<b>-JEM</b> <b>-JEM/Peace Wing</b> -PDF <b>-Pro-Government militias</b> <b>-Army</b> <b>-SLA/Abdul Wahid</b> <b>-SLA/Free Will</b> -SLA/Historical Leadership <b>-SLA/Minni Minawi</b> <b>-SLA/Mother Wing (Abu Gasim)</b> -SLA/Peace Wing -SLA/Unity -SPLM-N <b>-Sudan police forces, including the Border Intelligence Forces (BIF) and the Central Reserve Police (CRP)</b>	--	--	--

9 The information in this table was taken from the Annual Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. Radhika Coomaraswamy, *Annual report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict* (New York: Un General Assembly, June 28, 2012). The list identifies actors which recruit or employ minors, kill or mutilate children, rape or commit other kinds of sexual violence against children, or participate in attacks on schools and/or hospitals in situations of armed conflict from amongst those conflicts included on the agenda of the UN Security Council. The report by the special representative –and the table in this chapter– includes only information confirmed by the UN, which implies that in practice there may be many more cases of actors which perpetrate said violations but are not recorded in the report, for various reasons. The table in this chapter also indicates in bold those actors which have appeared in the annexes of the reports of the special representative of the secretary-general for children and armed conflict for more than five years, and which are considered persistent perpetrators.

Conflict	Recruitment and use	Killing and mutilation	Rape and other forms of sexual violence	Attacks on schools and hospitals
Syria	--	-Syrian Government forces, including the Army, the intelligence forces and the Shabbiha militia	--	-Syrian Government forces, including the Army, the intelligence forces and the Shabbiha militia
Philippines (Mindanao- Abu Sayyaf)	<b>-Abu Sayyaf</b>	--	--	--
Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)	<b>-MILF</b>	--	--	--
Philippines (NPA)	<b>-NPA</b>	--	--	--
Yemen	-Al-Houthi rebels -Breakaway First Armoured Division (FAD) -Pro-Government tribal militia -Army	--	--	--

The report of the NGO Child Soldiers International *Louder than words. An agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers* identified 10 states whose armies employed youths under the age of 18 in hostilities between January of 2010 and June of 2012: Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Libya, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, United Kingdom and Yemen. To this list were added additional states for which other bodies of security forces and/or armed groups allied with the states used minors during the same period: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Iraq, Philippines, Rwanda and Thailand. In addition, Colombia, Israel and Syria used minors for military purposes, without formally recruiting them. All of this occurred in a year, 2012, which marked 10 years since the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which entails broad obligations for states, as the report indicated.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, yet another year revealed the difficulty of ascertaining the extent of armed violence of a political nature and the important role of dynamics linked to crime and inter-community violence in armed conflicts. In a whole range of military contexts it was not always easy to identify those responsible for violent actions, such as in northeastern India, southern Thailand, the Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), the Central African Republic and the republics of the North Caucasus, among others. In addition, in several cases the criminal strategies employed by armed groups to secure resources can end up constituting ends in themselves, becoming mixed and merged with other objectives, as in the case of Central Africa (LRA), some armed groups in the Sahel, and

southern Libya, among others. In any case, it should be noted that **of the 526,000 annual deaths due to lethal violence, only one of every 10 occurred in contexts of armed conflict** or terrorist attacks.<sup>11</sup> Of the 14 countries with an average annual rate of more than 30 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants between 2004 and 2009, only six suffered from armed conflicts.<sup>12</sup> In any case, it should be taken into account that the territorial distribution of lethal violence within a state can vary according to regions, cities or even neighbourhoods – depending upon the dynamics of armed conflict and other factors behind the violence, such as crime–, and given that obtaining independent reports on the number of fatalities in armed conflicts is often difficult.<sup>13</sup>

## b) Regional trends

In **Africa** the trend in recent years of **highly complex disputes** continued, **both in relation to their actors and their internationalisation**. In relation to complexity, the high number of armed actors and their degree of fragmentation should be noted. In most cases there were five or more armed actors actively involved in hostilities, especially due to the presence of militias of different types, the fragmentation of armed groups, and the active participation of the armed forces of neighbouring countries. Some of these cases –such as DR Congo, Sudan (Darfur), South Sudan, Somalia and the Central African Republic– were especially complex with regards to the number of insurgent actors involved and their fragmentation. Disputes such as those involving the cross-border groups LRA and AQIM led

10 Child Soldiers International, *Louder than words. An agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers* (London: Child Soldiers International, 2012).

11 The figure of 526,000 deaths per year is an average obtained from the toll of victims during the 2004-2009 period. Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, *The Global Burden of Violence: Lethal Encounters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

12 According to data of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, the 14 countries with an average annual level of more than 30 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants between 2004 and 2009 were: El Salvador, Iraq, Jamaica, Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Sudan, Belize and DR Congo. Of these countries, six were immersed in armed conflicts in 2009, according to data and definitions of the Escola de Cultura de Pau: Iraq, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Central African Republic, Sudan and DR Congo. Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, *The Global Burden of Violence: Lethal Encounters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2010! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peacebuilding*. (Barcelona: Icaria, January, 2010).

13 Ibid.

to the military mobilisation, in different degrees, of a great number of countries (DR Congo, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Uganda, in the case of the LRA; and Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, in the case of AQIM). At the same time, the acute internationalization of conflicts (11 internationalised internal conflicts in Africa, an international conflict and an internal conflict) was linked, as in previous years, to direct and covert interventions by neighbouring countries; the presence of foreign groups and their participation in hostilities; the extension of the scope of action of initially local armed groups to neighbouring countries in the region; and the active participation in combat by peacekeeping missions and other international forces. Thus, during the year of note was the offensive by the government forces of Somalia, supported by the AU and Ethiopia against the al-Shaabab group in Somali territory, which lost several strongholds; the implementation of a regional initiative led by the AU and supported by the UN and the USA with a military component to fight the LRA, which has been operational since September and engages troops from DR Congo, Uganda, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, sustaining the previous joint operations of these countries; and the internationalisation of jihadists armed groups operating in the African region of the Sahel, as evidenced particularly in the conflict in northern Mali. Added to this were more general factors involving logistical, financial and political support given by foreign countries to local insurgencies, such as Rwanda's support for the 2012 uprising of the M23 armed group in DR Congo.

In terms of causes, more than two thirds of the conflicts (nine cases) were linked to opposition to the government or the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state. Regarding the first element, in six cases there were insurgencies fighting the government to bring about its fall or weakening. This represents a slight decrease off the previous year, following the reduction of violence in 2011 in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria (Niger Delta), which ceased to be considered armed conflicts in 2012. **Especially troubling were the dynamics of violence in the case of DR Congo, where a new rebellion, that of the M23, managed to establish a de facto regime in the east of the country; and the Central African Republic, where a new rebellion also appeared.** In relation to the second case, there was a slight rise in the number of conflicts in Africa in which aspirations for a change in the system were one of the main causes. Thus, Algeria (AQIM), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Mali (north) and Somalia featured groups fighting to create Islamic structures or to strengthen the application of Islamic law. In addition, six cases had among their main causes identity-related and self-government demands: Ethiopia (Ogaden), Mali (north), DR Congo (east), Sudan (Darfur), Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) and South Sudan. In another five cases the struggle for the control of resources played a major role –Central Africa (LRA), DR Congo (east), Sudan (Darfur), Sudan (South Kordofan and the Blue Nile) and South Sudan,

though this was a factor that also influenced and exacerbated most conflicts on the continent.

With regards to intensity **Africa accounted for one third of armed conflicts of the greatest intensity in 2012** –DR Congo (east), Somalia and South Sudan– as compared to previous years during which it had accounted for a higher percentage, when crises such as those in Sudan (Darfur), Libya and Côte d'Ivoire raised the levels of violence on the continent. Finally, the average duration of the conflicts in the region was 9.5 years, far below the world average of 15.8 years. Nine of the conflicts had begun –or restarted– in the 21st century. The two longest conflicts –that linked to the Ugandan group the LRA and the Somali conflict– continued to show no signs of resolution, their levels of intensity being low and very high, respectively.

**Asia continued to be characterized by disparate and complex conflict dynamics which include identity disputes, longstanding conflicts, and a great variety of scenarios in terms of the number of actors and the intensity of violence.** With regard to root causes, two thirds of the conflicts (eight cases) were linked to demands for self-government or the recognition of the identity of certain cultural groups and minorities, whether involving demands for greater autonomy, independence, or the recognition of collective rights. Five others had as one of their main causes aspirations for system change, either for religious reasons – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf)– or socioeconomic and political –India (CPI-M) and the Philippines (NPA). As in other continents, the issue of resources exacerbated the conflicts, continuing to play a very important role in the case of Pakistan (Balochistan).

**Conflicts on the Asian continent featured an average duration of 28.1 years, the highest figure in the world** and well above the global average of 15.8 years, evidence of how difficult the resolution of these conflicts has proven and the lack of willingness by the different sides to seek negotiated settlements. The region continued to feature some of the oldest insurgencies, with groups active since the 1940s (some insurgencies in Myanmar) and the 1960s (the CPI-M in India and the NPA in the Philippines). At the root of this longevity there would lie factors such as the difficulty of resolving disputes related to identity, self-determination and the formation of the state. Moreover, in addition to the impact of these factors on conflict resolution, the continent boasts fewer international actors engaged in facilitation and mediation tasks.

In addition to the limited number of external actors involved in the resolution of conflicts, most of the conflicts were also of an internal nature. Such was the case in more than half of the disputes (seven cases). However, five conflicts continued to be of a significantly internationalised nature: Afghanistan, India (Jammu and Kashmir and Assam), Pakistan and the Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf). In any case,



the USA and the other international actors involved in Afghanistan continued the process to transfer security control to the Afghan government, one which is to be completed by 2014, at which point it is to be internally administrated. On the other hand, the USA remained firmly committed to its military operations in Pakistan through aerial operations against Taliban militia, as well as continuing its policy of support for counterinsurgency activities against the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.

The disparate nature of conflicts on the continent was evident in aspects such as their intensity. **The continent featured one third of the world's highest intensity conflicts --Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Pakistan (Balochistan)– while, in contrast, 50% of the disputes in the region (six cases) featured low levels of violence.** In another three contexts the levels of violence were of medium intensity. Some countries featured several different armed conflicts within their borders, such as India, the Philippines and Pakistan. Virtually all governments refer to their different armed opposition groups as “terrorists”. That said, it should be noted that in some cases –such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (Jammu and Kashmir) and the Philippines (Mindanao–Abu Sayyaf)– the governments closely associate their counterinsurgency strategies with the “global war on terrorism”, in this way obtaining political legitimacy and, in some cases, economic and military support.

With reference to conflicts on other continents, **Latin America** continued to be the site of one of the world's most longstanding conflicts, where the rebel forces of the FARC and the ELN are fighting the state and where paramilitary armed actors are involved. During the year exploratory contacts between the government and the FARC gave rise to the start of formal negotiations, a process that opens the door to the possible resolution of a conflict with a major impact on the civilian population. With regards to **Europe**, the region continued to be the location of several low-intensity armed conflicts in the North Caucasus (Russia [Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria]), of recent origin. These conflicts are linked to demands for a system change by interconnected Islamist insurgencies aspiring to the creation of an Islamic emirate in the area. These are fragmented groups, but ones capable of regeneration. In contrast, another active armed conflict on the continent, that between Turkey and the Kurdish armed group the PKK, involves a very unified insurgency with a significant military capacity, driven mainly by its demands for identity recognition and self government. The conflict in south-eastern Turkey is the most longstanding on the continent (29 years), having a major impact on neighbouring countries in the Middle East (Syria, Iran, Iraq), where armed groups or organisations operate with clear links to the PKK in Turkey. Despite a serious escalation in 2012 the resumption of talks between

Turkey and the PKK during the year could lead to an impending reduction of violence on the continent.

Finally, the **Middle East**, which in 2011 had been the site of a significant increase in the number of armed conflicts, in 2012 continued to include several of the world's deadliest disputes, maintaining the continent in the international spotlight. **One third of the world's high-intensity wars took place in the region: Iraq, Syria and Yemen (AQAP).** In these three cases the trend towards increased violence continued, which in the case of Syria rose to 60,000 fatalities since the start of the conflict in 2011. One of the conflicts of the greatest symbolic significance, that between Israel and Palestine, also saw an escalation in violence. On the other hand, in Yemen –in relation to the conflict which led to the removal of Ali Abdullah Saleh from power in 2011– and Iran (northwest) violence was significantly reduced, such that they ceased to be classified as armed conflicts at the end of 2012. With regards to causes, conflicts in the Middle East continued to be characterised by their great diversity and multiplicity. Thus, opposition to the government was one of the main causes in more than half of the conflicts (four), with levels similar to those linked to identity-related and self-government demands (four other cases). Also significant was the number of conflicts with armed groups demanding a change of the system (three cases), spurred by jihadist aspirations. In addition, most of the disputes featured a high degree of internationalisation, mainly due to the participation of foreign countries (such as the USA in Yemen through its air raids against AQAP, and external support provided to parties in the Syrian dispute), the presence of armed groups in neighbouring countries (such as the activity of the Iranian group PJAK in Iraq), and the presence of foreign armed groups in local conflicts, such as Salafi groups made up of foreign fighters in Syria. In any case one must take into account additional, more indirect internationalisation factors such as covert support provided by foreign countries to parties in conflict, including the various armed actors in Syria. A year after the Arab insurrections conflicts which initially sprang from social movements and gave rise to armed conflicts (Syria, Yemen) featured very different situations, with a scenario of a serious civil war in Syria and a turbulent transition process in Yemen.

### c) Arms embargoes

By virtue of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Security Council may adopt coercive measures to maintain or re-establish peace and international security, which range from economic sanctions or those of another sort, to international military intervention.<sup>14</sup> The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to place pressure on a state or entity so that it complies with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force.<sup>15</sup> Sanctions can be economic and commercial, in a broad sense, or take the

14 For further information about the UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, please see <<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/>>.

15 Sanctions, specifically arms embargoes, have been used in an unequal way since the creation of the United Nations. Between 1945 and 1989,

Table 1.3. Arms embargoes by the United Nations, EU, OSCE and the Arab League in 2012

Country*	Coming into effect	Country	Coming into effect
<b>Embargoes declared by the United Nations</b>		<b>Embargoes declared by the European Union</b>	
<b>Afghanistan/Pakistan (Taliban militias and al-Qaeda**)</b>	2002	<b>Afghanistan/Pakistan (Taliban militias and al-Qaeda **)</b>	2002
Côte d'Ivoire	2004	Belarus	2011
DPR Korea	2006	China	1989
<b>DR Congo (except the Government)</b>	2003	Côte d'Ivoire	2004
Eritrea	2009	<b>DR Congo (except the Government)</b>	2003
Iran	2006	DPR Korea	2006
<b>Iraq (except the Government)</b>	2003	Eritrea	2010
Lebanon (except the Government)	2006	Guinea	2009
Liberia (except the Government)	1992	Iran	2007
<b>Libya</b>	2011	<b>Iraq (except the Government)</b>	2003
<b>Somalia (except the Government)</b>	1992	Lebanon (except the Government)	2006
<b>Sudan (Darfur) (except the Government)</b>	2004	Liberia (except the Government)	2001
		<b>Libya</b>	2011
<b>Embargoes declared by the Arab League</b>		<b>Myanmar</b>	1991
<b>Syria</b>	2011	<b>Somalia (except the Government)</b>	2002
<b>Embargoes declared by the OSCE</b>		<b>South Sudan</b>	2011
Armenia - Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1992	<b>Sudan</b>	1994
		<b>Syria</b>	2011
		Zimbabwe	2002

\* In bold, country or group in armed conflict subject to embargo.

\*\* Embargo not linked to a specific country or territory.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2012 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). European Commission, Website, [http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm).

form of more selective measures, such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial or diplomatic restrictions, or a combination of these, selectively or in general. United Nations arms embargoes are imposed by resolutions adopted under article 41 of Chapter VII of its Charter. For passage at least nine of the 15 Member States of the UN Security Council must support a resolution, and none of the permanent members of the UN Security Council of the UN (United States, Russia, China, France and United Kingdom) may veto it. There are two types of Security Council embargoes: voluntary and obligatory. UN Member States are obliged to enforce mandatory arms embargoes.

This section only refers to embargoes and sanctions imposed by international organisations and does not include embargoes and sanctions imposed unilaterally by states. Other organisations, such as the Arab League

and the EU, have also established arms embargoes binding on the Member States of their organisations, which in some cases coincide with the application of arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations, while in other cases they are their own initiatives, as in the case of measures taken against Syria. EU embargoes are imposed via Common Positions adopted unanimously by the EU Council in accordance with the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) framework. In the case of the OSCE and the ECOWAS embargoes are voluntary.

In 2012, a total of **33 arms embargoes were imposed on a total of 19 states and non-state armed groups,<sup>16</sup> one less than in the previous year, as in 2011 the ECOWAS lifted the voluntary arms embargo on Guinea. In 2012 there were no new arms embargoes established by the UN Security Council or the EU.**

they were only used in two contexts, linked to the decolonisation processes in what used to be Southern Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe) between 1968 to 1979 (due to internal instability); and in South Africa between 1977 and 1994 (due to the South African intervention in neighbouring countries, the violence and internal instability and the racial discrimination system of apartheid). The limited use of these tools during the Cold War was framed, like other instruments of the United Nations, within the policy of competition between blocks. As such the end of the Cold War meant, as in other areas, a growing activism of the organisation in this field, facilitating the imposition of arms embargoes. Their use also facilitated the strengthening of the role of the United Nations as a guarantee of peace and international security. Arms embargoes were also progressively seen as a kind of sanction that was more effective than economic sanctions, as they centred on the elites of states and on non-state armed groups, limiting their humanitarian impact.

16 Among these embargoes, there exists a voluntary arms embargo, imposed by the OSCE on Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1992.

It should be noted that 11 of the 19 embargoes established by the EU represent extensions of the implementation of UN Security Council embargoes.<sup>17</sup> The remaining eight correspond to specific EU initiatives: Belarus, China, Guinea, Myanmar, Syria, Sudan, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.<sup>18</sup> However, the EU arms embargo on Syria, which was to be renewed for one year in November, as it expired in December, was only extended for another three months, opening up the possibility for Member States to supply arms to groups opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The United Kingdom promoted this position while expressing its willingness to continue to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Syria, although it became clear that the British position had to be flexible and open to possible changes depending on the unfolding of events.<sup>19</sup> France and the United Kingdom offered formal recognition to the opposition Syrian National Coalition. This decision is a clear sign of western support for the Syrian opposition, which comes in addition to the military support heretofore provided mainly by countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

***There were 29 armed conflicts and 81 socio-political crises in 2012 in which neither the UN Security Council nor the EU levied arms embargoes***

Of the 19 states and non-state armed groups designated by both organisations, nine involved armed conflicts active in 2012 (Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Sudan [Darfur] and South Sudan and armed groups in Iraq, Somalia, DR Congo and Afghanistan). Among the other 10, nine involved scenarios featuring socio-political crises of varying intensity (Côte d'Ivoire, Belarus, China, Eritrea, Iran, Guinea, Lebanon, DPR Korea and Zimbabwe). Liberia is the only country which, despite having recently experienced an armed conflict and not suffering from a tense situation, is under an embargo. **In conclusion, there were 29 active armed conflicts in 2012 in relation to which neither the UN Security Council nor the EU considered the establishment of an arms embargo as a sanction measure.** In addition, there were **81 situations featuring varying degrees of socio-political crisis in which no embargoes were levied either**, and in which, in many cases, the preventive nature of arms embargoes could lead to a mitigation of the conflicts.

#### **d) International missions**

Another of the dimensions which should be noted in relation to global conflict in 2012 is that of international missions and their impact on situations of conflict and socio-political crisis.

In 2012 there were 16 UN peacekeeping operations, a political mission directed and supported by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and 12 political and peacebuilding operations supported by the UN Department of Political Affairs, for a total of 29 missions. With regards to the regional perspective, of the 29 UN missions underway in 2012, more than half (15) were on the African continent, seven in the Middle East, four in Asia, two in Europe and one in Latin America. Along with the United Nations, worthy of note is the participation of other regional organisations in military, political and peacebuilding work, such as the EU (17 missions in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East), the OSCE (with 16 missions in Europe and Central Asia), NATO (five missions in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East), the AU (two missions in Africa), the ECOWAS (two missions in Africa), the ECCAS (a mission in Africa), the OAS (three missions in America), the CIS (a mission in Europe), the Arab League (a mission in Syria) and six multilateral operations under the umbrella of countries or groups of countries, totalling 83 international missions in 2012. Of these, three missions were completed in 2012.

Therefore, from a regional perspective, if one adds to the presence of the United Nations that of the regional organisations, Africa is the continent where there was the greatest presence of active missions in 2012 (31), followed by Europe (21), Asia (14), the Middle East (13) and Latin America (four). However, it should be noted that while more than **half of the interventions on the African continent are of clearly political/military nature, in the rest of the world civilian and police action interventions predominate –with the exceptions of Haiti, Afghanistan, India-Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Cyprus, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Transdniestria and the Middle East.**

Three missions came to an end in 2012: the mission of the Arab League in Syria, which began in November and was forced to leave the country at the end of January 2012 due to the escalation of the fighting; the United Nations mission in Syria (UNSMIS), active from April to August of 2012, which also was forced to leave the country because of the impossibility of fulfilling its mandate for a ceasefire, due to the high levels of violence; and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), which completed its work in June of 2012. This EU mission was the first within the framework of the Common Security and Defence

17 In the case of Sudan, the EU established the embargo for the whole of the country in 1994, and the UN Security Council for the region of Darfur in 2004, in addition to the arms embargo on South Sudan in 2011. In the case of Iran the embargoes established by both organisations apply to different types of armaments.

18 Not included are those countries upon which other types of sanctions have been placed, such as the freezing of funds and other economic resources, entrance restrictions, and travel bans on some citizens, such as the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro and Tunisia. European Commission, *Restrictive measures in force (Article 215 TFEU)*, 2012, [http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measure\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measure_en.pdf).

19 Joshua Chaffin, "EU shortens arms embargo against Syria", *Financial Times*, November 28, 2012, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6be8d4e6-3987-11e2-8881-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2MlfGX24p>.

Policy, and its aim was to facilitate the process of police reform, providing support for the development of local capacities and regional cooperation in the fight against corruption and organised crime.

If in 2011 international attention in terms of peacekeeping was focused on Sudan and Libya, in

2012 the focus shifted to Syria, Mali, and, to a lesser extent, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan and region of Central Africa, where the armed group the LRA operates (South Sudan, Central African Republic, and DR Congo), places where new peacekeeping operations were established. In the case of Syria two missions were established, the first in November 2011, though

**Table 1.4. International missions of 2012\***

UN (29)	EU (17)	OSCE (16)
Afghanistan (UNAMA) -2002-	Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) -2002-	Albania (OSCE Presence in Albania) -1997-
Burundi (BNUB) -2011-	Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA) -2004-	Armenia (OSCE Office in Yerevan) -2000-
Central Africa (UNOCA) -2011-	<i>Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) 2003-2012</i>	Azerbaijan (OSCE Office in Baku) -2000-
Central African Republic (BINUCA) -2009-	DR Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) -2007-	Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (Personal Representative for the Minsk Conference) -1995-
Central Asia (UNRCCA) -2007-	DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) -2005-	Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina) -1995-
Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) -2004-	Georgia – Russia (EUMM Georgia) -2008-	Kazakhstan (OSCE Centre in Astana) -1998-
Cyprus (UNFICYP) -1964-	Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR) -2012-	Kosovo (OMIK, OSCE Mission in Kosovo) -1996-
DR Congo (MONUSCO)-1999/2010-	Iraq (EUJUST Lex Iraq) -2005-	Kyrgyzstan (OSCE Centre in Bishkek) -1999-
East Timor (UNMIT) -2006-	Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) -2008-	Macedonia, FYR (OSCE Mission to Skopje) -1992-
Golan Heights (UNDOF) -1974-	Mali (EUTM Mali) -2013-	Moldova (OSCE Mission to Moldova) -1993-
Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) -2010-	Moldova – Ukraine (EUBAM) -2005-	Montenegro (OSCE Mission to Montenegro) -2006-
Haiti (MINUSTAH) -2004-	Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger) -2012-	Serbia (OSCE Mission to Serbia) -2006-
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) -1949-	Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah) -2005-	Tajikistan (OSCE Office in Tajikistan) -1994-
Iraq (UNAMI) -2003-	Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) -2006-	Turkmenistan (OSCE Centre in Ashgabat) -1999-
Israel – Palestine (UNSCO) -1994-	Somalia (EUNAVFOR Somalia) -2008-	Ukraine (OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine) -1999-
Kosovo (UNMIK) -1999-	Somalia (EUTM Somalia) -2010-	Uzbekistan (OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan) -2006-
Lebanon (UNIFIL) -1978/2006-	South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan) -2012-	<b>ARAB LEAGUE (1)</b>
Lebanon (USCOL) -2007-	<b>NATO (5)</b>	<i>Syria (Arab League Observer Mission in Syria) 2011-2012</i>
Liberia (UNMIL) -2003-	Afghanistan (ISAF) -2001-	<b>CIS (1)</b>
Libya (UNSMIL) -2011-	Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden (Operation Ocean Shield) -2009-	Moldova (Transdniestria) -1992-
Middle East (UNTSO) -1948-	Kosovo (KFOR) -1999-	<b>ECCAS (1)</b>
Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) -2008-	Somalia (NATO assistance to the AMISOM) -2007-	Central African Republic (MICOPAX) -2008-
Somalia (UNPOS) -1995-	The Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour) -2001-	<b>OAS (3)</b>
South Sudan (UNMISS) -2009-	<b>AU (2)</b>	Belize – Guatemala (OAS/AZ Office) -2003-
Sudan – South Sudan (UNISFA) -2011-	Central Africa (LRA) (Regional Co-operation Initiative against the LRA, ICR/LRA) -2012-	Colombia (MAPP OEA) -2004-
Sudan (Darfur) (UNAMID) -2007-	Somalia (AMISOM) -2007-	Colombia (MIB OEA) -2008-
<i>Syria (UNSMIS) -2012-</i>	<b>ECOWAS (2)</b>	<b>Other missions (6)</b>
West Africa (UNOWA) -2001-	Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) -2012-	Côte d'Ivoire (Operation Licorne, France) -2003-
Western Sahara (MINURSO) -1991-	Mali (AFISMA) -2013-	Egypt and Israel -1982-
		Hebron, Palestine (TPIH 2) -1997-
		The Solomon Islands (RAMSI) -2003-
		DPR Korea and Rep. Korea (NSC) -1953-
		East Timor (ISF, Australia) -2006-

\* The start year of the mission is included. In italics, missions finished during 2012.

just two months later it was forced to dissolve due to the severity of the conflict. The UN Security Council subsequently established the UNSMIS to oversee the ceasefire between the parties and the fulfilment of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's plan. However, in August, due to systematic violations of the ceasefire by the parties, mainly the regime of Bashar al-Assad, according to Annan, the UN Security Council decided to terminate the mission.<sup>20</sup> With regards to Mali the proclamation of the Islamic State of Azawad in the north of the country and the progress of the Tuareg and Islamist rebellions triggered a diplomatic offensive which in December 2012 prompted the United Nations to approve the deployment of the **African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)**, headed up by the ECOWAS, although the delay in the implementation of the deployment and concerns regarding the defence of interests in the area spurred France to carry out a military operation with the approval of the Government of Mali to halt the insurgency's progress.<sup>21</sup> In parallel, the EU approved the sending of a training mission (EUTM Mali) which was established in the country in early January.

In 2012 NATO was criticised by the United Nations, Amnesty International and the Council of Europe for its failure to investigate and its inefficient response to the victims of its operation in Libya, which purportedly involved the death of at least 60 people, including about 30 women and children, according to preliminary media and human rights organisation investigations. NATO was also taken to task for the lack of aid provided to refugees during the Libyan crisis, many of whom died in the Mediterranean as they attempted to flee the country.

The UN peacekeeping missions were composed of 117,465 personnel,<sup>22</sup> continuing the downward trend which began in 2010, when there were 124,000 personnel in September of that year. This shows that the end of 2010 marked a turning point, bringing to a close the continuing increase in peacekeeping missions and personnel which had been seen in the last decade. Since June 1999, when the figure reached its lowest point since the end of the Cold War (13,000 blue helmets), until 2010 the increase in peacekeepers had been constant.

However, it is also clear that this reduction in the number of personnel in peacekeeping missions has occurred in parallel with a growing number of personnel in political and peacebuilding missions, which could mark a shift in the type of missions undertaken and the mandates established for them. In September 2010 the staff on political and peacebuilding missions numbered 1,700, a figure which increased to 4,284 personnel in 2011, and remained stable in December 2012 (4,283 personnel).

To this figure of 121,748 personnel on UN missions (117,465 troops on peacekeeping missions and 4,283 on political and peacebuilding missions) should be added the contingents from NATO (about 138,000 personnel, according to the organisation itself, only taking into account the operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq),<sup>23</sup> the EU (almost 6,000 personnel, between police, military and civilian personnel),<sup>24</sup> the CIS (1,249 troops in Transnistria), the ECCAS (MICOPAX, 500 personnel in the Central African Republic), the Arab League (166 personnel in Syria), the AU (9,800 personnel in Somalia), the OSCE (460 personnel), the

OAS (22 personnel, only taking into account the MAPP/OAS) and another six operations by different countries (more than 3,000 personnel).<sup>25</sup> In total, in general terms, **the number of troops on international missions was approximately 281,000 deployed worldwide, not accounting for the civilian personnel accompanying non-UN missions, whose numbers are not fully verified.** This figure is far less than the 327,000 personnel from 2011 due to the conclusion of US operation in Iraq, which terminated in December 2011, at which time it had 39,000 personnel.

The growing recourse to Chapter VII of the UN Charter to devise mandates for UN peace missions is leading to increased engagements in violent environments. These missions, of a multidimensional nature, are being established in contexts that are more and more violent, and feature mandates and agendas that are more and more complex, as evidenced by the fact that the number of UN personnel killed has increased almost fourfold since the end of the Cold War, rising from 800 in 1991 to 3,062 in November of 2012.

*In 2012 there was an increase of missions in Africa and the Middle East linked to the emergence of new conflicts or flare-ups in previously existing ones*

20 See the summaries on Syria in this chapter and chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

21 See "The crisis in Mali and security challenges in the Sahel" in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).

22 Of the 117,465 personnel of the UN peacekeeping missions, 94,090 correspond to military staff and police. 3.74% of this figure (3,521 soldiers and police) are women, representing a slight reduction on the percentage of 2011, when it was situated at 3.76%, though still greater than in 2010, when it stood at 3.33%. The figure remained stable throughout the year. Data on 10th January 2013. UN, website, [www.un.org](http://www.un.org).

23 Data consulted on 10th January 2013. NATO, website, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-4BDA48D6-BA415112/natolive/topics\\_52060.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-4BDA48D6-BA415112/natolive/topics_52060.htm).

24 Data consulted on 10th January 2013. UE, website, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=en>.

25 With regard to the figures concerning troops of the CIS, ECCAS and the other six operations in diverse countries, the data was taken from the latest figures available in the *SIPRI Yearbook 2012*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI Yearbook 2012* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).



## 1.3. Armed conflicts: annual evolution

### Africa

#### a) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Burundi	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, FNL
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=

#### Summary:

The process of political and institutional transition that got under way with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000 was formally completed in 2005. The approval of a new constitution that formalises the distribution of political and military power between the main two communities, the Hutu and Tutsi, and the holding of elections, leading to the formation of a new government, represent an attempt to lay the foundations for overcoming a conflict that began in 1993, constituting the principal opportunity for ending the ethnic-political violence that has plagued the country since its independence in 1962. Nevertheless, mistrust remains between the political parties and power struggles continue to take place within the CNDD-FDD ruling party, and between the government and the political opposition. Added to this situation of tension, there is the positive challenge of incorporating the last armed group in the country, the FNL, which has renounced violence and joined the political fray. However, the 2010 elections, branded as fraudulent by the opposition, meant an impasse that could provoke a regression in the country due to the reconfiguration of one part of the rebel force around its historic leader, Agathon Rwaswa.

**Sporadic violence continued, along with extrajudicial executions and clashes between the armed forces and various militia groups of the re-established FNL, led by Agathon Rwaswa.** Noteworthy are the statements made by the FNL in early September, in which it declared war on the government, which could mark a qualitative shift in the conflict. One of the major military actions during the year involved the death of 41 fighters in a confrontation with a group from DR Congo in the province of Bubanza in June, confirmed by the army. At the same time acts of repression and intimidation actions continued to be carried out by

the government. In addition, the control of institutions by the CNDD-FDD and the absence of a real opposition rendered irrelevant the power-sharing system laid down in the Arusha accords, as indicated by the think tank International Crisis Group (ICG).<sup>26</sup> In October the organisation stated that the crisis the country has suffered since the 2010 elections continues. After the election boycott opposition parties created the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC-Ikibiri) and various opposition leaders again went into exile, including the leader of the former rebellion, Agathon Rwaswa. Since then the climate of violence between the opposition and the party in power, the CNDD-FDD, has intensified, as have the actions of the re-established FNL and civil society's criticisms of the government. The ICG has indicated that neopatrimonialist practices that have affected the country since its independence could threaten its development and governance.<sup>27</sup>

The Investigation Commission set up by the government in the wake of the Human Rights Watch (HRW)<sup>28</sup> report indicating the extrajudicial executions of activists and politicians in the country by both the party in power, the CNDD-FDD, and by opposition groups since 2010, failed to present evidence of such actions in the country, prompting criticisms at the national and international level of the weak effort made by the body. Finally, there were heightened tensions in the country throughout the year over land ownership conflicts arising from the war and forced displacements over the course of decades.

Central Africa (LRA) <sup>29</sup>	
<b>Start:</b>	1986
<b>Type:</b>	Resources <sup>30</sup> International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Ugandan, Central African, Congolese and South Sudanese armed forces, self defence militia from DR Congo and from South Sudan, LRA
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

#### Summary:

The opposition armed group LRA, moved by the religious messianism of its leader, Joseph Kony, was created in 1986 with the aim of overthrowing the government of Uganda, introducing a regime based on the Ten Commandments of the Bible and releasing the northern region of the country from its marginalisation. The violence and insecurity caused by the attacks of the LRA against the civil population, the

26 International Crisis Group, Burundi: *Bye-bye Arusha?*, Africa Report no. 192, October 25, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/192-burundi-bye-bye-arusha.aspx>.

27 International Crisis Group, *Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis*, Africa Report no. 185, March 21, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/185-burundi-la-crise-de-corruption.aspx>.

28 Human Rights Watch, *"You Will Not Have Peace While You Are Living" The Escalation of Political Violence in Burundi*, May, 2012, [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundi0512ForUpload\\_1.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundi0512ForUpload_1.pdf).

29 This name refers to the armed conflict known as "Uganda (north)" in previous reports. Since the end of 2008, the scenario of operations in this conflict has been the border triangle with DR Congo, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. Therefore, the armed conflict is considered international, although it shares some elements included in the internationalised internal type.

30 In recent years, the demands voiced by the LRA on its emergence (Identity, Self-Government) have been watered down; the group's current objective would be mere survival (Resources).

kidnapping of minors to add to its ranks (about 25,000 since the beginning of the conflict) and the confrontations between the armed group and the armed forces (together with the pro-governmental militia) have led to the death of some 200,000 people and the forced displacement of some two million people at the most acute moment of the conflict. The growing military pressure carried out by the Ugandan armed forces obliged the group to take refuge first in South Sudan, later in DR Congo and finally in the Central African Republic. Thus, the LRA increased its activities in the neighbouring countries where it set up its bases, due to the inability to stop it in DR Congo, Central African Republic and the complicity of Sudan. Between 2006 in 2008, a peace process was held that managed to establish an end to hostilities, although it was a failure and in December 2008, the Ugandan, Congolese and South Sudanese armies carried out an offensive against the LRA, which caused the breaking up of the group towards the north of DR Congo, the southeast of the Central African Republic and the southwest of South Sudan, where the offensive continued.

**Over the course of the year the Ugandan armed group the LRA continued to commit looting, abductions and daily attacks, mainly in the southeast of the Central African Republic, but also in north-eastern DR Congo.**

Although its destabilizing capacity remains intact, its lethality has been reduced in recent years, as evidenced by the data provided by the organisations Resolve and Invisible Children,<sup>31</sup> according to which in 2012 there were 50 fatalities and the forced conscription of more than 400 people, mostly minors, though these same organisations indicate that the figures could be higher. The main actions were carried out in the southeast of the Central African Republic, where it is believed that the leader of the rebellion, Joseph Kony, is hiding, although early in the year there was speculation about the possibility that he was located in the Sudanese region of Darfur. The group has approximately 500 fighters.<sup>32</sup> The latest report by the UN Secretary-General in December cited lower numbers for these organisations, reporting 180 attacks allegedly committed by the LRA during the year. Of these 138 were said to have been carried out in DR Congo, and the other 42 in the neighbouring Central African Republic, causing the deaths of 39 civilians. A total of 193 people were said to have been kidnapped: 84 from the Central African Republic, and the remaining 109 from DR Congo, of which one third were children.

In May the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Central Africa, Abou Moussa, announced that **Joseph Kony was moving constantly to elude the joint search and capture operations being**

*LRA leader Joseph Kony was constantly moving to evade the search and capture operations of the African joint mission supported by the USA*

**conducted by the armed forces of the region's nations.** It is worthy of note that the guerrillas' fourth in command, Caesar Acellam, was captured by the Ugandan Armed Forces in the Central African Republic. In March it was estimated that 445,000 people had been displaced as a result of his actions, of which 341,000 were from the Congolese province of Orientale. Over the course of year the United Nations insisted on securing international support in order to strengthen regional efforts against the LRA. Despite the slowness of the response, in March in Juba the Regional Cooperation Initiative Against the LRA (RCI-LRA) was formed, led by the AU and supported by the UN, along with its military arm the AU Regional Task Force (RTF). Over the course of the year the RTF was organised, and was not operational until September. The RTF will list 5,000 soldiers from the four countries in the region: DR Congo, Uganda, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. The military leader of the RTF, Uganda's Colonel Dick Olum, stated in September that his mission still did not have the troops (still less than 3,000) nor funding and equipment needed. The USA continued to provide logistical and intelligence support to the operation. For the first time in many months, in October the LRA's mediating team issued a public announcement. In the statement it criticized Francisco Madeira, the AU's envoy for issues linked to the armed group, as well as the support which the UN was providing, accusing it of promoting war in Central Africa rather than multiplying efforts at peacebuilding. In mid September a group of 20 leaders representing traditional, religious and civil organisations, led by Bishop John Baptist Odama, protested against the decision of Uganda's interior minister to repeal some of the provisions of the Ugandan Amnesty Act. Since its passage in the year 2000 around 26,000 fighters from 25 armed groups have abandoned their respective insurgencies and integrated into society within the framework of the reconciliation plan established by said Act. The LRA, although not active in Uganda, remains a potential threat, and a minority of its current components are originally from Uganda, so they could have recourse to the terms of the law if it is not rescinded.

Central African Republic	
<b>Start:</b>	2006
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, APRD, UFDR, divisions of the UFDR (FURCA, MJLC), FDPC, CPJP, Séléka (made up of factions of the aforementioned groups), France, MICOPAX, Ugandan armed group LRA, Chad armed group FPR, Zaraguinas (criminal gangs)

31 The two organisations created the LRA Crisis Tracker in 2012, a mapping platform and a system for the collection of data on the actions committed by the LRA, drawing on community radio stations, local and international NGOs, governments and UN agencies. See <http://www.lracrisistracker.com>.  
 32 United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and on areas*



<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

### Summary:

During 2006, the situation in the country was aggravated by the increase in the activities of various insurgent groups that complained about the lack of legitimacy of the government of François Bozizé, the result of a coup d'état against the president Ange Félix Patassé between 2002 and 2003. Bozizé's government has been accused of poor management of public funds and of the division of the nation. The rebel forces have two fronts: in the first place, in the populated central and northwest area of the country, the APRD, headed by Jean-Jacques Demafouth, has confronted Bozizé's government vindicating a new division of the political power. The second front is found in the northeast of the country, where we should highlight the escalation of the rebel forces' operations by the coalition of UFDR. This instability is made worse by the rising in the northwest of numerous groups of masked outlaws, known as the Zaraguinas and by the presence of the Ugandan armed group LRA in the southeast of the country. The various rebel groups (APRD, UFDR, FDPC) reached a peace agreement with the government in 2007, and the CPJP joined the agreement in 2011.

**Insecurity continued to affect the north-central and southeast regions of the country, although the resumption of disarmament in May and the sustained reduction of violence in the north-central area of the country in recent years have contributed to an improvement in the situation.**

The rebellion, however, flared up again in December. One of the most important and emblematic armed groups from the last period of instability the country endured, the APRD, was dissolved in May, and various guerrilla leaders were released. In addition, the last armed group in the Central African Republic, the CPJP, and the government reached a peace agreement on 25<sup>th</sup> August 2012.<sup>33</sup> The CPJP fighters had been concentrated in the northwest of the country, where they continued to commit acts of violence until signing an agreement to end hostilities in 2011.

However, in mid September there were attacks in the towns of Damara, Sibut and Dekoa, with a CPJP faction which did not recognise the peace agreement claiming responsibility for them. This faction, along with other divisions of former armed groups, radically altered the situation in December. This set of offshoots and splinter groups of the **CPJP, UFDR and CPSK, called Seleka**, active in the north of the country and which had signed peace agreements in recent years with the government, **launched a rebellion on 10<sup>th</sup> December, taking control of several locations around the country and threatening to topple President François Bozizé**

*Threatening to overthrow the Central African Republic's government, in just one month a new rebellion managed to force the holding of peace talks*

if he did not implement the peace agreement signed in 2007. The rebellion began with the taking of Bria, an important mining town in the north of the country lying 600 km from the capital, and then took control, among others, of Bambari, the country's third largest city and a transportation hub between the different diamond-producing areas. This alliance initially demanded the payment of wages agreed to under the peace agreement, and the release of political prisoners. However, it subsequently ratcheted up its demands, late in the year insisting upon the resignation of the president as a condition for the start of negotiations. Bozizé expressed his willingness to consider the formation of a "government of national unity" headed by himself (which would entail the acceptance of positions in the government for the rebel leaders). The rebellion's progress proved unstoppable, and in a few days it took many towns, with almost no resistance by the Central African Republic's Armed Forces, supported by regional military contingents present on the ground. Seleka halted its advance 75 km from the capital and threatened to take it if its demands were not met. At the last moment the rebellion showed signs of internal rifts between those parties who wished to overthrow Bozizé and those endorsing peace talks with the president, including the CPSK. Bozizé refused to step down, as the rebellion demanded, which generated fears that hostilities would resume. The international community expressed its concern and pressed the government to accept the holding of peace talks in Libreville, Gabon, on 10<sup>th</sup> January. Both sides agreed to convene in Gabon in order to reach an agreement. The USA, France and the EU urged both sides to reach a political solution and to protect the civilian population. France, which has 600 soldiers in the country and in 2006 intervened to save the government of Francois Bozizé by bombing a column of 3,000 UFDR fighters headed for the capital, expressed concern but announced that it would not intervene in the dispute, rejecting Bozizé's request. Paris said that it would only intervene to protect the more than 1,200 French citizens in the country. In response to this refusal hundreds of people gathered in front of the French and American embassies in Bangui, throwing stones and burning the French flag. Chad, Congo, Cameroon and Gabon announced the sending of an undetermined number of soldiers to support Bozizé's government.

Finally, during much of the year sporadic actions by the Chadian armed group the FPR, **led by General Abdel Kader**, aka Baba Laddé, in the north-central area of the country, generated an increase in population displacement and humanitarian needs. In late June the Central African Republic's armed forces blamed the LRA for an attack near the town of Bakouma, although they

*affected by the Lord's Resistance Army*, June 11, 2012, <http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=s/2012/421>.

33 See the summary on Central African Republic in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

later held the RPF responsible. Baba Laddé surrendered in early September and was promptly extradited to Chad. The government established a committee to promote the repatriation of FPR members to Chad.

DR Congo (east)	
<b>Start:</b>	1998
<b>Type:</b>	Government, Identity, Resources Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, Mai-Mai militias, M23 (ex CNDP), FDLR, FRF, PARECO, APCLS, armed Ituri groups, Burundian opposition armed group FNL, Ugandan opposition armed groups ADF-NALU and LRA, Rwanda, MONUSCO
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

**Summary:**

The current conflict has its origins in the coup d'état carried out by Laurent Desiré Kabila in 1996 against Mobutu Sese Seko, which culminated with him handing over power in 1997. Later, in 1998, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, together with various armed groups, tried to overthrow Kabila, who received the support of Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, in a war that has caused around five million fatalities. The control and exploitation of the natural resources has contributed to the perpetuation of the conflict and to the presence of foreign armed forces. The signing of a ceasefire in 1999, and of several peace agreements between 2002 and 2003, led to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the setting up of a transitional government and later an elected government, in 2006, but did not mean the end of violence in this country, due to the role played by Rwanda and the presence of factions of non-demobilised groups and of the FDLR, responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

**During the year there was an escalation of violence not seen since 2009 as a result of the rebellion of the March 23 Movement (M23), supported by Rwanda.**

President Kabila's April announcement that he would seek the arrest of General Bosco Ntaganda, aka Terminator, in response to a request by the International Criminal Court (ICC) –which for over six years has accused him of war crimes and crimes against humanity– triggered the situation. Pressure placed on Kabila by the international community, according to several analysts, as a result of electoral fraud in the November 2011 elections apparently spurred him to make a gesture in defence of human rights and against impunity. Ntaganda, a former ally of Kabila and ex chief of the CNDP's general staff, in late March encouraged the desertion of hundreds of former military members of the CNDP loyal to him. Initially the M23 had risen up in response to the government's alleged non-compliance with the 23<sup>rd</sup> March (hence the name) 2009 agreement, though it subsequently declared that it was fighting to

*During the year there was an escalation of violence in RD Congo not seen since 2009 as a result of the rebellion of the March 23 Movement (M23), supported by Rwanda*

completely liberate DR Congo and overthrow Kabila. **At the end of April the government decided to launch an offensive against the rebellion, leading to heavy clashes.** The fighting provoked the displacement of some half a million people, as well as a wave of looting, an undetermined number of deaths, and an increase in the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.<sup>34</sup> The M23 extended its control to the two provinces of North and South Kivu, where it was evident that the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) had no control over the situation, leading the United Nations to recognise that the M23 had established a de facto regime in the east of the country, and that the group was receiving support mainly from Rwanda, but also from Uganda. This accusation was rejected by both countries, with Uganda threatening to reconsider its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. **The organisation Human Rights Watch also confirmed Rwanda's support of the rebellion, which prompted an uneven and cool reaction by the international community.**

In July Congo's President Joseph Kabila and his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame, agreed to the creation of a regional force to combat the M23 with the support of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which held several meetings to find common ground, but without reaching any concrete agreements. In mid November the M23 stepped up its offensive on the capital of North Kivu, Goma, which easily fell to the rebellion after a series of clashes between the M23 and the FARDC, supported by the MONUSCO. The FARDC handed over the capital and a portion of its troops went over to the M23, while the MONUSCO refused to confront the armed group. After the fall of Goma to the M23 the ICGLR appealed to the M23 for it to withdraw from the city to prevent a disaster, since then insisting that the parties need to find a negotiated solution to the situation. The USA and the UN Secretary-General also asked DR Congo and Rwanda to promote dialogue between the parties. **The United Nations observed that both sides had executed civilians, raped women and looted everything in their path.**

**Regional and international pressures forced the withdrawal of the M23 from Goma through an agreement between the parties.**

The withdrawal of the M23 occurred following an agreement reached between the government and the armed group to hold peace talks a week after the withdrawal. Thus began peace talks between the government and the M23 in Kampala,

Uganda, facilitated by the Ugandan Government on 9<sup>th</sup> December. The negotiations were extended to 31<sup>st</sup> December and continued in January. Congolese security forces returned to the city, where affairs gradually returned to normal. The MONUSCO also began to patrol highways, facilitating the return of Congolese security forces and deploying a rapid response force to prevent the looting carried out by various groups during the

34 See chapter 4 (Gender).

presence of the M23 and the absence of security forces. The United Nations reported that in the town of Minova, close to Goma, 126 rapes had been committed since the withdrawal of Congolese troops. Nine Congolese armed forces soldiers were arrested, two accused of rape, and another seven of having committed acts of looting during their retreat. The UN Security Council decided to levy sanctions on the M23 and Rwanda's FDLR. Some individual sanctions had already been placed on members of both groups, but not on the groups as a whole.

South Sudan <sup>35</sup>	
<b>Start:</b>	2009
<b>Type:</b>	Government, Resources, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, Army (SPLA), South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A), community militias, Sudan
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

#### Summary:

The peace agreement reached in 2005, which put an end to the Sudanese conflict, recognised the right to self-determination of the south through a referendum. However, the end of the war with the North and the later independence for South Sudan in 2011 did not manage to offer stability to the southern region. The disputes for the control of the territory, livestock and political power increased between the multiple communities that inhabit South Sudan, increasing the number, the gravity and the intensity of the confrontations between them. The situation became even worse after the general elections in April 2010, when several military officials who had presented their candidature or had supported political opponents to the incumbent party, the SPLM, did not win the elections. These military officers refused to recognise the results of the elections and decided to take up arms to vindicate their access to the institutions, condemn the Dinka dominance over the institutions and the under representation of other communities within them while branding the South Sudan government as corrupt. Juba's offerings of amnesty did not manage to put an end to insurgence groups, accused of receiving funding and logistical support from Sudan.

**South Sudan was racked by a climate of instability and violence throughout the year. Clashes between the SPLA (South Sudan Armed Forces) and a range of militias proliferated in different parts of South Sudan, mainly in the state of Jonglei, while inter-community violence partially abated.** The United Nations urged the government to develop a comprehensive plan to put an end to the violence in the state of Jonglei after a report came out on inter-community violence between late 2011

and February 2012. **Around 900 people died as a result of young Lou-Nuer militia attacks on villages populated by members of the Murle community.** In turn South Sudan again accused its northern neighbour of providing weapons to the insurgency in South Sudan even as peace talks were conducted between the two countries.<sup>36</sup> In April two rebel groups revealed that David Yau Yau, a military leader of the Murle community, had been appointed general commander of militia forces in the state of Jonglei. The armed group the SSLA stressed that there was an alliance of rebel groups including, in addition to the rebel group the SSDA, David Yau Yau and the self-proclaimed Lou-Nuer prophet Dak Kueth, but the UNMISS could not confirm these links. Since then, however, elements loyal to David Yau Yau have launched attacks against civilians in the state of the Upper Nile and against the government's SPLA positions in the state of Jonglei.

In his November report the UN Secretary-General indicated that government initiatives designed to put an end to the violence between the communities in the state of Jonglei through a campaign of civilian disarmament, begun in March, and the peace process begun in parallel in April by the communities, had yielded promising results, but had encountered many difficulties. The constant acts of violence and reprisals between communities, which claimed the lives of thousands of civilians in 2011, virtually ceased after the start of the two processes and, in part, as a result of the start of the rainy season. Transport links between the affected communities improved and the cattle trade was resumed, the heads of all the communities in Jonglei (Anyuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachipo, Lou-Nuer and the Murle) conducted joint visits to raise public awareness, the liberation and return of children and women was promoted, acts of violence and livestock theft decreased, and permanent detachments of police and the SPLA were established to protect many of the unarmed communities. **Some 300,000 weapons were seized, according to official sources.** However, the lack of food security, the arrival of new refugees from Sudan, the seasonal floods and internal displacement aggravated the country's humanitarian problems. In the month of September some 2.5 million people were receiving humanitarian aid, more than twice the number originally expected.

Sudan (Darfur)	
<b>Start:</b>	2003
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Resources, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, janjaweed pro-governmental militias, JEM, LJM coalition, diverse factions of the SLA and other armed groups
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

35 The Republic of South Sudan formally seceded from Sudan on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011, following a referendum held in January 2011 under the supervision of the international community, and was admitted as a new member state by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14<sup>th</sup> July 2011.

36 See the summary on Sudan – South Sudan in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

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**Summary:**

The conflict in Darfur arose in 2003 around the demands for greater decentralization and development settled by several armed groups, mainly the SLA and the JEM. The government responded to the uprising by sending its armed forces and forming Arab militias, known as *janjaweed*. The magnitude of the violence against civilians carried out by all the armed actors led to claims that genocide was ongoing in the region. 300,000 people have already died in relation to the conflict since the beginning of the hostilities, according to the United Nations. After the signing of a peace agreement between the government and a faction of the SLA in May 2006, the violence intensified, the opposition armed groups started a process of fragmentation and a serious displacement crisis with a regional outreach developed in the region due to the proxy-war between Chad and Sudan. The observation mission of the African Union –AMIS– created in 2004, was integrated into a joint AU/UN mission in 2007, the UNAMID. This mission has been the object of multiple attacks and proven incapable of complying with its mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian staff on the field.

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**The general climate of insecurity plaguing the Darfur region was sustained during the year. Hostilities continued between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the JEM, SLA-AW and SLA-MM armed groups.**

The SAF carried out bombing raids in various locations in Darfur throughout the year, while armed groups protested that the SAF had committed attacks against the civilian population, causing the displacement of thousands of people. In August an armed Darfur group attacked the headquarters of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority in al-Fasher, capital of North Darfur, and temporarily took hostage a regional minister and other members of the government. In November the SLA-MM announced that it had bombed al-Fasher. It should be noted that a faction of the JEM, the JEM-Military Council (JEM-MC), expressed its willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the government to resolve the causes of the conflict in Darfur.<sup>37</sup> The government praised this advance and in October both sides signed an agreement calling for the cessation of hostilities in Doha. In November the JEM-MC chose its leadership at a general conference with a view to the negotiations, which both sides agreed should be based on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), the framework adopted between the government and the LJM armed coalition in 2011. This framework led to the division of the province of Darfur into five States (previously consisting of three) and the appointment of its rulers, which was received with hostility.

In mid September the JEM announced a ban on recruiting young soldiers, a decision which was celebrated by the UNAMID mission. Pressures, harassment, attacks and ambushes against UNAMID peacekeepers were unremitting, and several members of the mission were killed by armed groups and militias closely

*More than one million Sudanese lived in constant fear of suffering bombardments and artillery attacks in areas controlled by the SPLM-N rebellion, according to the group*

associated with the government. On 31<sup>st</sup> July the UN Security Council extended the mission's mandate for one more year. At the end of June a tripartite meeting was held in al-Fasher between the UN, the AU and Sudan, which produced an agreement to scale the UNAMID down. The mission will be drawn down over a period of 18 months after pressure was exerted by Sudan to force its complete withdrawal.

Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile)	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Resources, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, SPLM-N armed group, Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF) armed coalition, pro-governmental PDF militias, South Sudan
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=

**Summary:**

The national reconfiguration of Sudan after the secession of the south in July 2011 aggravated the differences between Khartoum and its new border regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which during the Sudanese armed conflict supported the southern rebel forces of the SPLA. The need for democratic reform and an effective decentralisation, which would permit the economic development of all the regions that make up the new Sudan, are at the root of the resurgence of violence. The lack of recognition of the ethnic and political plural nature, within which political formations linked to the southern SPLM are included, would also be another of the causes of the violence. The counter position between the elite of Khartoum and the states of the central Nile region, which control the economic wealth of Sudan, and the rest of the states that make up the country are found at the centre of the socio-political crises that threaten peace.

**Clashes continued in the regions of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile** between Sudanese armed forces and the armed group SPLM-N, which have already forced the displacement of 908,000 people since the escalation

of the fighting in 2011, according to the OCHA. The Sudanese Interior Minister estimated a death toll of 633 from the conflict in 2011. In 2012 147 people died in South Kordofan and 41 in the Blue Nile, according to the minister. The UN confirmed that the clashes had led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in the two southern states. The USA and humanitarian organisations warned of the possibility of a famine being declared, especially in the areas controlled by the rebellion. Human Rights Watch, meanwhile, noted that the SAF, supported

by the Popular Defence Forces paramilitary militias, had executed civilians in areas controlled by the guerrillas with indiscriminate bombing. They also looted towns,

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37 See the summary on Sudan (Darfur) on chapter 3 (Peace Processes).



set fires, plundered the civil population, made arbitrary arrests, and committed rape.<sup>38</sup> The government denied the accusations, identified the SPLM-N as responsible for attacks on civilians, and stressed that the armed group had bombarded the capital of South Kordofan, Kadugli. HRW claimed to have received news of these events, but the impossibility of access as a result of the government blockade prevented it from confirming the accounts.

More than one million Sudanese lived in constant fear of suffering bombardments and artillery attacks in areas controlled by the rebel SPLM-N in both regions, according to a December report by the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, the humanitarian arm of the SPLM-N. Though the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) attempted to prove otherwise and offer an image of control over the situation, the SPLM-N inflicted a series of severe defeats on them since clashes began in June 2011. To remedy the situation the SAF carried out the indiscriminate bombardment of areas controlled by the armed group, allegedly supported by South Sudan, although the latter has continued to deny this. 200,000 people were displaced towards southern Sudan and Ethiopia, and another 515,000 live in areas controlled by the SPLM-N.

No progress was made in talks between the government and the SPLM-N to allow for the distribution of humanitarian aid, facilitated by the AU, despite the signing of memorandums to this effect. The government had blocked the entrance of humanitarian organisations into the areas controlled by the armed group since the conflict began in South Kordofan in June 2011 and expanded into the Blue Nile in August. Nevertheless, given the urgency of the situation and in response to international pressure, in early August 2012 the Sudanese government signed a memorandum with the AU, the Arab League and the UN to allow access by humanitarian organisations to the area, including the areas controlled by the rebels, establishing a ceasefire to get the help in. A similar memorandum was reached between the SPLM-N and international organisations, although the start date of the aid operation was not specified. In December the government stated that the memorandum had expired.

## b) Horn of Africa

Ethiopian (Ogaden)	
<b>Start:</b>	2007
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, ONLF, OLF, pro-governmental militias, UWSLF
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

38 Human Rights Watch, *Under Siege*, December 12, 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/12/12/under-siege>.

39 See the summary on Ethiopia in chapter 2 (Socio-political Crises).

40 See the summary on Ethiopia in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

### Summary:

Ethiopia has been the object of movements of a secessionist nature or of resistance against the central authority since the 1970s. The ONLF emerged in 1984 and operates in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, in the south east of the country, demanding a greater level of autonomy for the Somali community that lives in this region. On various occasions, the ONLF has carried out rebellious activities beyond Ogaden, in collaboration with the OLF, which has been demanding greater autonomy from the government for the region of Oromia since 1973. The Somali government has supported the ONLF against Ethiopian, which it confronted for control over the region between 1977 and 1978, a war in which Ethiopian defeated Somalia. The end of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000, led to the increase of the government operations to put an end to the rebel forces in Ogaden. Since the elections that were held in 2005, the confrontations between the armed forces and the ONLF have increased.

Over the course of the year clashes continued between Ethiopian armed forces, backed by the pro-government paramilitary body Liyu Police, and the ONLF in the region of Ogaden, which claimed hundreds of lives according to the armed group. These figures, however, could not be confirmed by independent sources. The ONLF has repeatedly accused government security forces of carrying out extrajudicial executions against civilians, indiscriminate arrests, and acts of sexual violence. In April **Human Rights Watch reported that the Armed Forces had carried out extrajudicial killings of civilians** after interviewing people who had fled Ogaden seeking refuge in Somaliland. The government's main actions, as well as ambushes and attacks by the ONLF, took place in the regions of Wardheer and Degahbur (in the centre and north of the Ogaden region, respectively). However, the two major events of the year were the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi<sup>39</sup> and the holding of peace talks between the ONLF and government representatives.<sup>40</sup> Zenawi's death in August led to his succession by Hailemariam Desalegn, who had been deputy prime minister and foreign minister since 2010; the release of two Swedish journalists arrested in 2011, accused of supporting terrorism; and the announcement of the sending of a government delegation to Nairobi **for peace talks with the ONLF**. These negotiations began in September but were halted in mid October when the government demanded that the ONLF recognise the Ethiopian Constitution, despite having previously agreed not to set preconditions. Subsequently, in December, the Sudan Tribune news source reported the presence in Addis Ababa of Abdinur Abdullahi Farah, a leader of an ONLF faction, to resume peace talks with the government. According to the source this faction of the ONLF had announced that it would agree to negotiate within the constitutional framework. The ONLF released a statement stating that there were no peace talks between the group and the Ethiopian government and accusing the latter of attempting to create the false impression

that there were by negotiating with a low-ranking defector. During the period of the peace talks clashes continued, revealing the fragility of the situation, according to several analysts. As the peace talks were interrupted there was an increase in fighting, which insurgent sources claimed caused hundreds of deaths between November and December alone. The organisation Resolve Ogaden Coalition (ROC) accused the international community of ignoring the serious conflict affecting the Ogaden region. Added to this was an announcement by Ethiopian Minister of Mines Sinknesh Ejigu that the government was on the verge of forming a state consortium in the oil sector, the Petroleum Development Enterprise, to boost the exploitation of oil and gas in all the country, including Ogaden, in cooperation with foreign companies, which generated a climate of concern.

Somalia	
<b>Start:</b>	1988
<b>Type:</b>	Government, System Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	New Federal Transitional Government (FTG) –to which the moderate faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) has adhered, and supported by Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ), warlords, Ethiopia, Kenya, USA, France, AMISOM, EU-Navfor, Operation Ocean Shield–, the radical faction of the ARS –made up by part of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Hizbul Islam, al-Shabaab– and supported by Eritrea.
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

#### Summary:

The armed conflict and the absence of effective central authority in the country have their origins in 1988, when a coalition of opposing groups rebelled against the dictatorial power of Siad Barre and three years later managed to overthrow him. This situation led to a new fight within this coalition to occupy the power vacuum, which had led to the destruction of the country and the death of more than 300,000 people since 1991, despite the failed international intervention at the beginning of the 1990s. The diverse peace processes to try and establish a central authority came across numerous difficulties, including the affronts between the different clans and sub-clans of which the Somalia and social structure was made up, the interference of Ethiopia and Eritrea and the power of the various warlords. The last peace initiative was in 2004 by the GFT, which found support in Ethiopia to try to recover control of the country, partially in the hands of the ICU (Islamic Courts Union) The moderate faction of the ICU has joined the GFT and together they confront the militias of the radical faction of the ICU which control part of the southern area of the country.

During the year the offensive by government forces continued **against al-Shabaab**, supported by the AU and

Ethiopia, **with hundreds of victims and the displacement of thousands**, above all in the south of the country. These military developments took place at the same time as progress was made in the **Somali peace process**, with the approval of a new federal constitution, parliament, government and president, though not without serious difficulties and tensions, and despite the emergence of actors who endangered the entire process.<sup>41</sup> The new Federal Parliament of Somalia named Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the country's new president and also approved –in response to a proposal by the president, and by a large majority– Abdi Farah Shirdon (known as Saaid, not linked to the Somali political class) as the new prime minister of the new Federal Government of Somalia. In late February the EU expanded the operation against piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa until 2014, extending its military actions to “land territory”, which could augur an escalation of military action. The UN Security Council approved the expansion of the AU Mission in the country, AMISOM, with troops numbering from 12,000 to 17,731, on the eve of the summit in London, to show its support for the initiative. At the same time the AU announced that the AMISOM would assume the leadership of Kenyan troops present in Somalia as of 30<sup>th</sup> March. **In January Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Augustine Mahiga relocated his office to Mogadishu**, after the institution's 17-year absence in the country. In July the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported high levels of fraud, corruption and embezzlement by the TFG of funds received from the international community, and the instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid.<sup>42</sup> The group also underscored the substantial reduction in Eritrea's support of al-Shabaab and the persistent, systematic violation of the arms embargo, both by states such as Yemen and Ethiopia, along with private US security companies.<sup>43</sup>

During the year **important al-Shabaab strongholds gradually came under the control of the AMISOM-backed government forces, such as the District of Hudur in the region of Bakool, and the towns of Beledweyne, Baidoa, Kismayo and Merca. At the end of the year Jowhar fell. The fighting spread throughout the different regions in the centre and south of the country.** In Mogadishu bomb attacks multiplied, with al-Shabaab claiming responsibility, while the taking of Kismayo by Kenyan troops within the framework of the AU mission was not completed until the beginning of October, after months of offensives and continued bombings which caused hundreds of deaths and the forced displacement of thousands. At the end of August Merca, the second largest port city in the south of the country, was captured. However, important areas in the south remained in the hands of the Islamist insurgency, despite military defeats inflicted by the joint offensive. The armed group was losing control of the major cities, but withdrew to more remote towns in southern Somalia. The insurgency also remained

41 See the summary on Somalia in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

42 United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)*, July 13, 2011, 26, 35, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/545](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/545).

43 Ibid, 20-24.



quite able to infiltrate areas controlled by the government, as observed by numerous analysts. Some military progress against al-Shabaab generated security lapses due to the AMISOM's slowness in deploying in the territories liberated by Ethiopian forces.

**AMISOM and government forces took al-Shabaab's main strongholds, forcing the group to retreat to more remote areas of southern Somalia**

**c) North of Africa and Maghreb**

Algeria (AQIM)	
<b>Start:</b>	1992
<b>Type:</b>	System Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, AQIM (former GSPC), MUJAO, Governments of Mauritania, Mali and Nigeria
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=

**Summary:**

The armed conflict has pitted the security forces against various Islamist groups since the beginning of the 1990s following the rise of the Islamist movement in Algeria due to the population's discontent, the economic crisis and the stifling of political participation. The conflict began when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was made illegal in 1992 after its triumph in the elections against the historic party that had led the independence of the country, the National Liberation Front. The armed struggle brought several groups (EIS, GIA and the GSPC, a division of the GIA that later became AQIM in 2007) into conflict with the army, supported by the self-defence militias. The conflict caused some 150,000 deaths during the 1990s and continues to claim lives, although the levels of violence have decreased since 2002, after some of the groups gave up the armed fight. At present, the conflict is led by AQIM, which has become a transnational organisation extending its operations beyond Algeria and affecting the Sahel countries. Algeria, together with Mali, Mauritania and Niger, has attempted to formulate a regional response to the group and to one of its offshoots, MUJAO, which focuses its activities in West Africa.

The armed conflict pitting the Algerian Government against AQIM continued to be characterized by periodic acts of violence leaving nearly 100 dead. **The dispute also grew increasingly international as the group's scope of action expanded, in a context of regional instability.** This instability in the area was particularly shaped by the crisis in northern Mali and the consequences of the armed conflict in Libya in terms of the circulation of weapons in the Sahel.<sup>44</sup> The violence associated with the conflict between AQIM and Algerian security forces resulted in direct confrontations, offensives with explosives, suicide attacks, and kidnappings of Algerian police officers and diplomats, among other actions. In May AQIM released calculations according to which it had killed more than 53 soldiers in 58 operations in the previous months. The Algerian government was also increasingly involved

in incidents with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which splintered off from the AQIM at the end of 2011. Several violent episodes took place in towns such as Boumerdes, Tizi Ouzou, Tamaransset, and Tinzoutine, among others. One of the deadliest operations occurred in May when an air offensive killed a score of suspected MUJAO militia. In another notable action another nine AQIM militia were killed in a government offensive in August. AQIM and MUJAO continued to exert pressure through their ability to release Algerian and European hostages; the latter group released three European aid workers and three Algerian diplomats, but killed a fourth after the capture of a jihadist leader.

Both groups also took advantage to advance their positions given the crisis in northern Mali. **The leadership of AQIM openly declared its support for the Islamists who took control of northern Mali, and warned that the group would react to any international intervention in the area.** Towards the end of the year, the head of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) stated that AQIM had established training camps in northern Mali, while both the UN and the USA designated MUJAO as a terrorist organisation due to its links with AQIM. Some press reports also indicated new divisions within AQIM after a confrontation between its leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, and one of his lieutenants, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, which reportedly resulted in the creation of a new armed group called the "Signed-in-Blood Battalion". Throughout 2012 the governments of several countries, led by Algeria, continued their coordination efforts in the fight against AQIM and other radical Islamist armed organisations operating in the Sahel. During the second half of the year commanders of the security forces of Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso supported authorisation so that soldiers from countries bordering on Mali could enter the country in pursuit of militia, and agreed to the creation of an anti-terrorist force. Both the UN Security Council, the AU and countries such as the USA expressed grave concerns about the growing threat posed by AQIM in the region and the levels of coordination between the different armed groups in the area.

Libya	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, anti-Gaddafi militias, pro-Gaddafi armed groups, tribal militias
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Summary:</b>	In the context of the uprisings in North Africa, popular

44 See the summaries on Mali (north) and Libya in this chapter.

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protests against the government of Muammar Gaddafi began in February 2011. In power since 1969, his regime was characterized by an authoritarian stance repression of dissent, corruption and serious shortcomings at the institutional level. Internal conflict degenerated into an escalation of violence leading to a civil war and an international military intervention by NATO forces. After months of fighting and the capture and execution of Gaddafi in late October, the rebels announced the liberation of Libya. However, the country remains affected by high levels of violence derived from multiple factors. They include the inability of the new authorities to control the country and ensure a secure environment, the high presence of militias unwilling to surrender their weapons, the persistent clashes between anti-Gaddafi groups and supporters (or alleged collaborators) of the old regime, frequent tribal disputes and the widespread availability of weapons. Instability, episodes of revenge and abuses of human rights coexist with attempts of Libyan society by defining the new institutional framework of the country, in a context of political and regional divisions.

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**Although the intensity of the conflict was down from 2011, the dynamics of violence in Libya persisted in a highly unstable context, and resulted in the deaths of more than 580 people in 2012,** even while the country forged ahead with its transition process after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. The widespread availability of weapons following the outbreak of the armed conflict in 2011 increased the use of violence in all kinds of disputes and led to a rise in crime. The violence took on multiple forms, including clashes between various armed groups (including anti-Gaddafi militias and others presumably loyal to the old regime), tribal clashes, disputes over smuggling routes, offensives against officials, and attacks on western targets. A whole range of analyses concurred in that the on-going activities of the militias constituted one of Libya's main challenges, taking into account that during the fight against Gaddafi more than 1,700 armed groups formed, and that some 200,000 people are reported to own firearms in the country. Some of these armed groups were deployed to provide security in their respective areas, others mobilised for their own interests, revenge, power struggles, and the control of oil, drug and illegal migration flows in border areas. In this context, during the year there were several incidents between government forces and militia for control of the airport in Tripoli, and episodes such as the attack on the offices of the prime minister by more than 200 militia demanding the payment of compensation owed. Many of these militia consider themselves "guardians of the revolution" and refuse to surrender their weapons until the new authorities purge elements of the old regime. One of the main debates on the year was the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants. The government backed some programs to incorporate them into state security forces, but was forced to suspend other measures, such as economic incentives in exchange for weapons, due to corruption

*In 2012 the first elections were held after the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, though the situation continued to be marked by violence and instability*

problems. During the year the issue also touched off constant demonstrations demanding the dismantling of the militias and criticising the government for its inability to bring the armed groups under control. The southern area of Libya was one of the most unstable, especially during the first half of the year, when there were a series of clashes in the areas of Sebha and Kufra. In the latter locality in March there were clashes between Arab and black African tribal militia which left 147 people dead and forced a deployment of government forces. Towards the end of the year the Libyan authorities decided to close the southern border of the country –with Chad, Niger, Sudan and Algeria– with the declared intention of curbing the illegal traffic of people, goods and weapons in the area.

At the same time there were several incidents involving western targets in the country. Among them was a failed attack on the convoy of UN Special Envoy Ian Martin in April, **and the offensive against the American Consulate in Benghazi in September which caused the death of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and another three diplomatic officials following the broadcast of a video considered offensive for its depiction of Muhammad.** This climate of violence and instability constituted the backdrop for the political transition in the country when elections were held on 7<sup>th</sup> July. The vote was preceded by tensions between Tripoli and areas such as Cyrenaica. The ambitions of Cyrenaica (an eastern region rich in energy resources) for greater autonomy generated strong tensions during the first quarter of the year, prompting a warning from the president that Libya's unity would be defended by force if needed. In elections in July, which drew a high turnout and were held under international observation, the victorious party was the National Forces Alliance (NFA) of former Interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, with the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood coming in second. Most of the new Parliament was made up of independent candidates (occupying 120 of the 200 seats). The National Transitional Council handed over power to the National General Congress in early August. Mustafá Abushagour was appointed prime minister, but after failed attempts to form a government it was Ali Zidan who ultimately assumed this position. The swearing in of the new government sparked protests by some sectors demanding the departure of senior officials linked to the Gaddafi era, leading to the occupation of the Parliament building in November. It should be noted that during the year the prosecution of figures from the prior regime began, including former Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, and the controversy continued over whether Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam, will be tried in Libya or in an international court.

Coinciding with the first anniversary of Gaddafi's death, Human Rights Watch released a report which explained the circumstances of the former ruler's death, stating

that rebel militias summarily executed 66 people making up his convoy.<sup>45</sup> At this time there were also clashes between militia groups from Misrata and armed men in Beni Walid, after the death (by torture) of the young man from Misrata who had killed Gaddafi in 2011. Several analysts warned about the isolated situations of Sirte and Beni Walid, the two last bastions of Gaddafi forces and sites of episodes of revenge which caused the displacement of thousands of people in 2012. International organisations called on the new Libyan authorities to urgently address the issue of human rights in the country, especially in light of allegations of lethal torture and the fate of the 8,000 people who remained arbitrarily detained, half of them in the custody of militias.

#### d) West Africa

Mali (north)	
<b>Start:</b>	2012
<b>Type:</b>	System, Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, MNLA, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

##### Summary:

The Tuareg community that inhabits the north of Mali live in a situation of marginalization and underdevelopment that since colonial times has fueled several revolts and the organization of armed fronts against the government. In the nineties and after a brief armed conflict, an agreement was reached that promised peace and development investment for the North. However, the failure to implement its provisions led to the configuration of new armed groups demanding greater autonomy for zone. The fall of Libya's Gaddafi regime, which for years had sheltered Malian Tuareg insurgency and incorporated its members in his security forces, sparked the resurgence of Tuareg rebels in the north, who claim for the independence of "Azawad" (the Tuareg name for the northern region of Mali). The Tuareg armed group Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) advanced positions in the north taking advantage of the political crisis in Mali. However, the MNLA was increasingly displaced on the ground by radical Islamist groups that seek a strict interpretation of Sharia law.

The situation in Mali in 2012 was marked by profound instability produced by the outbreak of an armed conflict in the north of the country and a severe political crisis.<sup>46</sup> The armed conflict commenced early in the year when the Tuareg group the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) launched an offensive against military divisions in several northern localities. With a force of between 2,000 and 3,000 militia, many of the Tuareg combatants had been

exiled in Libya where they had fought with the forces of Muammar Gaddafi, returning to Mali with high-calibre arsenals after his overthrow. During the first quarter of the year the Islamic group Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith), led by renowned Tuareg leader Iyad ag Ghaly, joined the fight against the government for the control of northern Mali. **The advances of the rebel forces were expedited by the fact that they were able to capitalise on the political crisis in the capital of the country after a military coup toppled President Amadou Toumani Touré at the end of March.** The main factor sparking the military uprising was discontent with the government's handling of the crisis in the north and the failure to properly supply troops. The insurgents' actions led to the proclamation of the independence of Azawad (the name the Tuareg assign to northern Mali) on 6<sup>th</sup> April despite the differences in the objectives harboured by the MNLA and Ansar Dine (nationalist Tuareg aspirations vs. the desire to impose a strict interpretation of the Sharia) and the fact that the MNLA denied that coordinated attacks had been launched, in practice both groups joined forces and even announced an agreement for the foundation of an Islamic State in Azawad. However, within just a few weeks dissension between the two organisations became evident, in the following months spawning growing tensions between them. The MNLA lost ground to the radical Islamic forces while the activity of armed groups in the region escalated. Islamist organisations such as the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a splinter group of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb which emerged in late 2011, and the jihadist organisation Ansar al-Sharia, formed in December in the town of Gao, joined the fray. In parallel a range of groups and militias –the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Northern Mali Liberation Front, the Ganda Koy militia, the Alliance of Timbuktu Region Communities, and Armed Forces against the Occupation– organized to oppose the rebels. In late June the MNLA lost control of its bases in Gao to the MUJAO, while Ansar Dine took control of Timbuktu, where it carried out attacks on Sufi mausoleums considered world heritage elements by UNESCO. AQIM also expressed its support for the armed Islamist groups in Mali and warned that international intervention in the area would have consequences.<sup>47</sup>

The dynamics of violence continued during the second half of the year, causing an undetermined number of fatalities and generating some 150,000 refugees while internally displacing some 230,000, according to UNHCR figures. Fears of being attacked drove thousands of members of the Tuareg community to flee Bamako. In a context of increasing control of the north by the Ansar Dine, MUJAO and AQIM, **human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch reported abuses suffered by the local population due to a strict interpretation of Sharia law being imposed in the**

45 Human Rights Watch, *Death of a Dictator: Bloody Vengeance in Sirte*, October 17, 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/10/16/death-dictator-0>.

46 See chapter 2 (Socio-political Crises).

47 See the summary on Algeria (AQIM) in this chapter.

area. Several witnesses reported cases of summary executions, stonings, amputations, arrests, abductions, the forced recruitment of minors and multiple acts of abuse against women.<sup>48</sup> Against this backdrop the MNLA also announced that its aspiration was no longer an independent Tuareg state, but cultural, political and economical independence without secession, similar to the status of Quebec in Canada. In September the Malian President formally asked the ECOWAS for intervention in the country and an agreement was reached for the deployment of 3,300 of the regional organisation's troops. The decision provoked protests in Bamako and averseness among the country's military sectors, as well as with regional powers, such as Algeria. Amidst alarm about the impact of the crisis in the Sahel, meetings were held in Bamako attended by local, regional, AU and EU leaders to discuss formulas to deal with the crisis. The UN Security Council gave the ECOWAS the green light to intervene, but asked the organisation for a detailed plan of action. **It was not until late December that the UN approved the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA),** stressing that efforts should be made towards political reconciliation, the holding of elections, and the training of the Army.<sup>49</sup>

The UN resolution presented a plan divided into stages, including the reconstruction of the Armed Forces –the EU approved the sending of a training mission (EUTM Mali) that would arrive in the country at the beginning of January– which would make it possible, according to analysts, for Malian troops to act jointly with forces led by the ECOWAS. The UN also called for the holding of elections in April (or as soon as possible) although high-ranking Malian government officials were sceptical about the holding of elections before the defeat of armed groups in the north. The date of the mission's deployment was the subject of debate. Countries such as France and organisations such as the AU and the ECOWAS endorsed quick action, in early 2013, while other top UN officials, including the Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, stated that it would not be organised until September or October, to allow for time to explore alternatives to war. Over the course of 2012 attempts had been made to negotiate with rebels through the mediation of the ECOWAS, and in December representatives of the MNLA and Ansar Dine held their first direct meeting with delegates of the Malian government in Burkina Faso, at which they agreed to a ceasefire, committed to the integrity of Mali, and rejected terrorism.<sup>50</sup> **International assistance was rushed in, however, in early January 2013 when France decided to act militarily –in what**

*Islamist groups gradually displaced Tuareg MNLA rebels in the fight for control of northern Mali, imposing a strict interpretation of the Sharia in the area*

**was dubbed Operation Serval– to halt the advance of Islamist insurgents towards the south** in an offensive led by Ansar Dine marking a de facto end to the truce to which the group had committed. International Crisis Group had previously indicated the importance of a coordinated international approach which would properly distinguish between the internal problems of Mali and concerns about insecurity in the Sahel.<sup>51</sup>

Nigeria (Boko Haram)	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	System Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, Boko Haram Islamist group (BH)
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

**Summary:**

The Islamist sect Boko Haram demands the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria and considers that Nigeria's public institutions are "westernised" and, therefore, decadent. The group forms part of the fundamentalist branch initiated by other groups in Nigeria following independence in 1960 and which, invariably, triggered outbreaks of violence of varying intensity. Despite the heavy repression to which its followers have been subjected—in 2009, at least 800 of its members died in confrontations with the army and the police in Bauchi State—the armed group remains active and the scope of its attacks has widened, aggravating insecurity in the country as the government proves incapable of offering an effective response to put an end to the violence. International human rights organizations have warned of the crimes committed by the group, but also on government abuses in its campaign against the organization.

Continuing the trend recorded since the second half of 2011, the armed conflict waged by the Islamist sect Boko Haram in northern Nigeria saw an escalation in 2012, with a death toll of between 800 and 900, figures surpassing the total number of those killed in the conflict in both 2010 and 2011. The total number of lives claimed by this violence since 2009 thus comes to over 3,000. The dynamics of the conflict mainly took the form of Boko Haram attacks against Christian churches and other religious sites, attacks on security targets, fighting between the sect's militia and troops and police, and the killing of Christians (including beheadings and attacks with machetes) by the armed group. January was one of the bloodiest months, with a total of 253 dead between insurgents, civilians and members of security forces.

48 See chapter 4 (Gender) and Human Rights Watch, *Mali: Islamist Armed Groups Spread Fear in the North*, September 25, 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/25/mali-islamist-armed-groups-spread-fear-north>.  
 49 See "The crisis in Mali and security challenges in the Sahel" in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).  
 50 See the summary on Mali in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).  
 51 International Crisis Group, *Mali: The Need for a Determined and Coordinated International Action*, Africa Briefing no. 90, September 24, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/mali/b090-mali-the-need-for-determined-and-coordinated-international-action.aspx>.



June was another of the most lethal months, featuring a series of attacks on churches that left more than 150 dead in the states of Plateau, Borno and Bauchi. The conflict was concentrated in these three regions, as well as the areas of Kano, Kogi, Yobe, Kaduna and Potiskum. A splintering of the group in June apparently gave rise to another armed organisation, Ansaru, which was held responsible for attacks on security forces and the abduction of a French citizen. **In this context, in the middle of the year International Criminal Court prosecutor Fatou Bensouda accused Boko Haram of crimes against humanity, while a number of international organisations condemned its abuses.** Two separate reports issued by Human Rights Watch<sup>52</sup> and Amnesty International<sup>53</sup> accused Boko Haram of committing brutal crimes against Christians and Muslims critical of the sect or accused of cooperating with the government, as well as attacks against journalists and the burning of schools, actions which have helped to intensify the climate of fear in areas where the group operates. Both organisations also coincided in their condemnation of abuses by the Nigerian government in its campaign against the insurgent group. **The Joint Task Forces** (charged with the restoration of law and order in areas affected by the conflict), **the State Security Service, the Army and the Police were accused of human rights violations, which were reported to include disappearances, torture, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests,** the burning of houses, and theft during raids in the areas in which Boko Haram operates. Press reports also announced the murder of dozens of young people in areas considered strongholds of the sect, such as Maiduguri.

As this violence plagued the country, over the course of 2012 information emerged about attempts by the government of Goodluck Jonathan to initiate negotiations with Boko Haram.<sup>54</sup> In the middle of the year, after removing his defence minister and presidential security adviser, Jonathan stated that new tactics were needed to combat the Islamist group, endorsed dialogue with Boko Haram, and urged the organisation to explain the motivations behind their actions. The president also called upon Christians not to take revenge on Muslim communities in order to prevent a spiral of sectarian violence. During the second half of the year there were reports of secret talks between government representatives and the armed group, but subsequently Boko Haram denied the existence of peace talks, and announced the arrest of some of its leaders, including group spokesman Abu Aqa. In 2012 government forces also killed some leaders of the organisation, such as Ibn Saleh Ibrahim, identified as a high commander of Boko Haram and charged with the murder of a general in Maiduguri. In December, the government announced a

***Humans rights organisations condemned the brutal crimes committed by Boko Haram while also pointing out abuses committed by governmental forces in their campaign against the group***

reward of nearly 2,000,000 USD for information leading to the capture of the group's 19 top leaders, including its chief, Abubakar Shekau, designated a terrorist by the USA.

## America

Colombia	
<b>Start:</b>	1964
<b>Type:</b>	System Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, FARC, ELN, new paramilitary groups
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

### Summary:

In 1964, in the context of an agreement for the alternation of power between the Liberal party and the Conservative party (National Front), which excluded other political options, two armed opposition movements emerged with the goal of taking power: the ELN (made up of university students and workers, inspired by Guevara) and the FARC (a communist-oriented organisation that advocates agrarian reform). In the 1970s, various groups were created, such as the M-19 and the EPL, which ended up negotiating with the government and pushing through a new Constitution (1991) that established the foundations of a welfare state. At the end of the 1980s, several paramilitary groups emerged, instigated by sectors of the armed forces, landowners, drug traffickers and traditional politicians, aimed at defending the status quo through a strategy of terror. Drug trafficking activity influenced the economic, political and social spheres and contributed to the increase in violence.

**The conflict in Colombia was shaped throughout the year by the start of talks between the FARC and the government, prompting a strategy of periodic clashes by both parties to gain advantages at the negotiating table. Early in the year attacks by FARC and the ELN guerrillas increased, which generated criticism of the government due to the deterioration of security conditions in the country.** There were numerous attacks on oil pipelines, vehicles and oil company workers, which caused alarm in the sector. The most significant military event occurred in March when the armed forces killed about 100 FARC guerrillas in two of the most important operations against the armed group. The FARC, meanwhile, pledged to release the 10 members of the security forces who remained in captivity, which they did on 2<sup>nd</sup> April. Shortly before the FARC announced that they were abandoning the practice of kidnapping for ransom. These two developments led to

52 Human Rights Watch, *Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria*, October 11, 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/11/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-likely-crimes-against-humanity>.

53 Amnesty International, *Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence*, November 1, 2012, <http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/info/AFR44/043/2012/en>.

54 See the summary on Nigeria in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

speculation about a possible initiation of talks between the government and the guerrillas, but President Santos stated that he hoped for more gestures from the FARC, such as the release of the rest of those they were still holding hostage. Discussions continued with regard to legal guarantees for members of the security forces.

In this regard many citizens and the international community believed that establishing military trials in Colombia could be a form of institutionalizing impunity. For the time being members of the security forces are expected to serve their sentences at military installations. FARC guerrillas finally freed 10 soldiers and police officers they had held for a decade, with the release carried out thanks to logistical air support provided by Brazil. This fact sparked speculation about possible government contacts with the guerrillas, through Cuba, to explore the start of talks. Meanwhile Fernando Londoño, a former minister of the interior and justice under Álvaro Uribe, perished in an attack in which two of his bodyguards were also killed and more than 40 people injured by a bomb placed in his car. It remains unclear who was responsible for the attack. On 15<sup>th</sup> May the Free Trade agreement (FTA) between Colombia and the USA went into force amidst protests from various social, peasant and human rights organisations. According to these organisations the legislation was unfair to small producers. Agriculture Minister Juan Camilo Restrepo said that the FTA would not devastate the country's agricultural production, though it is estimated that 70% of peasants will see a 16% drop in their income due to this trade agreement. **Also passed was Law No. 2012, known as the Legal Framework for Peace, its primary purpose to grant benefits to those who have abandoned their weapons, including those who have committed crimes against humanity and crimes of war.**

An effort was made to put an end to impunity through the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, aware that the International Criminal Court is keeping a close eye on Colombia. To access the benefits established by the law armed groups must release minors in their custody, and it shall not apply to those who have not belonged to armed groups involved in the internal armed conflict. This law provides for measures such as the suspension of sentences and the possibility of political representation. Conceived in the context of transitional justice, it stipulates extrajudicial sanctions, alternative sentences and special modes of sentence execution and fulfilment. In the view of HRW it is a door to impunity, but for the guerrillas it could be an essential tool in the search for a negotiated political solution to the country's social and armed conflict. This issue will be a subject of discussion between the government and the FARC in the second half of 2013. **Coinciding with the announcement that the government had been conducting exploratory communications with the FARC in Havana (Cuba), fighting between the guerrillas and the government diminished.** In September President Santos announced the roadmap for the negotiations, which began in October in Havana. In July, however, clashes occurred in the Department of Cauca, triggering

a displacement of the population. President Santos visited the indigenous people of Cauca, who had expressed their opposition to the presence of both the guerrillas and government forces. 20 indigenous persons were wounded and one killed by the fighting with military forces. Negotiations with the government were organized. At the end of September the FARC and the ELN issued a joint statement reaffirming the unity of their actions and criticizing the Legal Framework for Peace slated to be used to bring about an eventual demobilisation of the guerrillas.

In October six police officers were killed in an attack carried out by FARC guerrillas in northern Cauca. At the same time in Oslo the opening ceremony of the talks between the FARC and the government was being held. Negotiations were also later held in Havana, with Cuba and Norway as guarantors. The first item on the agenda was agricultural policy, which would extend into the first quarter of the following year. The FARC decreed a cessation of offensive operations for two months, a measure which was not reciprocated by the government, and which was violated in several instances. In November six soldiers, four members of the FARC, and three of the ELN were killed. There was also a massacre of peasants by paramilitary groups, generating grave concerns about these groups' increasing activity. In December, despite the ceasefire with the FARC, 25 members of the guerrilla group lost their lives in fighting with the army. According to President Santos 338 members of the FARC and 42 members of the ELN died in 2012.

## Asia and the Pacific

### a) South Asia

Afganistan	
<b>Start:</b>	2001
<b>Type:</b>	System Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, international coalition (led by the USA), ISAF (NATO), Taliban militias, warlords
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	=

#### Summary:

The country has lived with almost uninterrupted armed conflict since the invasion by Soviet troops in 1979, beginning a civil war between the armed forces (with Soviet support) and anti-Communist, Islamist guerrillas (Mujahideen). The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 and the rise of the Mujahideen to power in 1992 in a context of chaos and internal confrontations between the different anti-Communist factions led to the emergence of the Taliban movement, which, at the end of the nineties, controlled almost all Afghan territory. In November 2001, after the Al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September, the USA invaded the country and defeated the Taliban regime. After the signing of the Bonn agreements, an interim government was established,



led by Hamid Karzai and subsequently ratified at the polls. Since 2006, there has been an escalation of violence in the country caused by the reformation of the Taliban militias. In 2011 the international troops began their withdrawal, which was scheduled for 2014.

The situation in the country was marked by the **high rates of violence** recorded throughout the year and the **acute impact of this violence on the civilian population**. The UNAMA published the civil population fatality figures for the first six months of the year, underscoring that there were 1,145 civilian deaths and 1,954 wounded as a result of the armed conflict. These figures represented 15% fewer victims than in the same period last year, finally reversing the upward trend recorded in the five years prior. The UNAMA highlighted that 80% of these victims had been affected by the actions of insurgent groups, 10% by the actions of government security forces and international troops deployed in the country, while responsibility for the remaining 10% could not be determined. iCasualties indicated that some 400 international soldiers died in 2012 in Afghanistan, and various media sources reported that over the course of the year more than 1,000 Afghan soldiers died, which represented an increase of 20% over the previous year. This rise occurred as local forces took on greater responsibilities due to the incipient withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. Throughout the year there were repeated clashes, attacks and shelling in large areas of the country, especially beginning in the month of April, when the arrival of fair weather facilitated an escalation of armed actions. The most serious incidents included an attack that same month against a downtown district of Kabul where a number of embassies are located and which caused the deaths of 50 people; an attack on a hotel in June outside the capital, which killed 20 people; NATO bombing, also in June, in Logar Province which killed 18 civilians; the murder of Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban minister and a peace negotiator with the government at the time of his death, in the second assassination of leaders of the Afghan High Peace Council; and violence in October when 40 people were killed by a suicide attack against a mosque in the province of Faryad, coinciding with the celebration of the Muslim holiday of Eid-al-Adha. Another 18 people were killed in the province of Balkh (six children and seven women among them) when a bomb exploded on the road they were taking to a wedding. In addition, **various incidents in which the USA was implicated led to a serious corrosion of relations with Afghanistan**. A US soldier killed 17 civilians, including nine children, in a district of Kandahar in March. There was also an incident involving the burning of Korans at the US military base in Bagram, which generated protests and insurgent attacks in response, including the murder of two senior US officials at the Afghan Interior Ministry, and attacks on the UN headquarters in Kunduz, which had to

*Various incidents of violence in which American soldiers were implicated, including the killing of civilians and the burning of Korans, undermined relations between Afghanistan and the USA*

withdraw its staff. In another case a video was circulated in which US soldiers urinated on Afghan corpses. Another phenomenon which took on enormous importance was the **increase in attacks perpetrated by alleged members of the Taliban who infiltrated Afghanistan security forces, targeting international ISAF forces during joint operations**, in a phenomenon which has been called “green on blue”. These attacks resulted in the deaths of more than 60 NATO soldiers and prompted the USA to temporarily halt the recruitment and training of local Afghan police.

In the political arena of note was the **draft version of a strategic partnership agreement reached by Afghanistan and the USA, in which the latter committed to lending assistance to Afghanistan for a period of 10 years after the withdrawal of combat troops, slated for 2014**. Although plans call for the USA to contribute 2.7 billion dollars annually for the maintenance of Afghan security forces, the agreement did not clarify the nature of the American military presence in the country, nor

the role planned for its troops. At the same time NATO endorsed the Afghanistan exit plan, which stipulates the transfer of the command over all combat missions to Afghan security forces in the middle of 2013 and the withdrawal of most international troops (130,000) by the end of 2014, at which point the NATO mission will be transformed into an advisory and training venture rather than one that is combat-oriented. However, the exit plan does not address issues such as a possible Taliban emergency after the withdrawal, or how to keep the security situation in Afghanistan from deteriorating even further. Throughout the year different governments engaged in the ISAF expressed their willingness to dramatically expedite withdrawal from the country. Also noteworthy was the breakdown in negotiations between the USA and the Taliban after the latter accused Washington of an erratic attitude and after they reaffirmed their decision to reject negotiations with the Afghan executive, considering it irrelevant. At the end of the year, however, there was a meeting between government and Taliban representatives in France. News got out of the Obama Administration’s attempts to revive talks. The main point of disagreement with the USA was apparently that of its prisoners held at Guantánamo.<sup>55</sup>

India (Assam)	
<b>Start:</b>	1983
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, ULFA, DHD, Black Widow, NDFB, UPDS, KLNLF, KPLT, MULTA, HUM
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

55 See the summary on Afghanistan in chapter 3 (Peace processes).

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**Summary:**

The armed opposition group the ULFA emerged in 1979 with the aim of liberating the state of Assam from Indian colonisation and establishing a sovereign State. The demographic transformations the state underwent after the partition of the Indian subcontinent, with the arrival of two million people from Bangladesh, are the source of the demand from the population of ethnic Assamese origin for recognition of their cultural and civil rights and the establishment of an independent State. During the 1980s and 1990s there were various escalations of violence and failed attempts at negotiation. A peace process began in 2005, leading to a reduction in violence, but this process was interrupted in 2006, giving rise to a new escalation of the conflict. Meanwhile, during the eighties, armed groups of Bodo origin, such as the NDFB, emerged demanding recognition of their identity against the majority Assamese population. Since 2011 there has been a significant reduction in violence and numerous armed groups have laid down their arms or began talks with the government.

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Throughout the year **there were different violent episodes of low intensity, mainly involving clashes between insurgents and security forces, and a range of different kinds of attacks.** One of the most active armed groups was the ULFA-ATF (a faction of the ULFA armed group opposed to peace negotiations with the government), which the executive held responsible for several attacks with explosives, attacks on government buildings, police stations, and companies, including one on an oil refinery that left seven injured. Coinciding with a visit to the state by the president of the governing Indian National Congress party, Sonia Gandhi, one person died in an attack attributed to the ULFA-ATF, which also carried out another attack during the days prior to the visit of Prime Minister Manomhan Singh to Assam in the month of April. Among the areas of the state most affected by insurgent violence, of special note was the district of Sivsagar. A particularly significant development was the handover of weapons during the first months of the year by 700 members of nine armed opposition groups –the APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, UKDA and KRA, of the Kuki community, inhabiting the east of the state, and the Adivasi community, present in northern and western Assam– as a result of various ceasefire agreements signed between the insurgent organisations and the government. The ceasefire agreements, however, did not lead to broader peace processes, which entailed the transfer of insurgents to cantonment sites where they will reside until negotiations start. The government indicated that after these demobilisations the number of armed opposition groups still active in the state was five: the faction opposed to the ULFA's negotiations (ULFA-ATF), with between 225 and 250 members; the NDFB (R), with between 325 and 350 members; the KPLT, with 50 to 70 insurgents; the MULTA, with 60; and the HUM, with 40 members.

*Inter-community violence between the indigenous Bodo population and Muslims took 110 lives and displaced between 300,000 and 400,000 people in the Indian state of Assam*

Along with the insurgent violence during the second half of the year there was **a serious surge in inter-community violence between the indigenous Bodo population and Muslims, resulting in the deaths of close to 110 people and displacing 300,000 to 400,000.** The violence began in the month of July, affecting mainly the districts of Kokrajhar, Chirang, Bongaingaon and Dhubri. The executive imposed curfews, day and night, and security forces were authorised to shoot to put down the unrest, which spread to other cities, such as Mumbai, Pune, Lucknow and Allahabad, where protests over the violence against the Muslim community left two dead –in the case of Mumbai– and dozens wounded. Violence between the two communities has been recurrent in recent decades. The Muslim population claims to descend from East Bengal Muslims brought to the region from the northeast during the era of British colonial rule to work in agriculture. The native people of Assam, however, accuse them of having illegally emigrated from Bangladesh, to the detriment of the local population. Although the most serious fighting took place in July and August, in September the executive stated that the relative calm in the areas affected by the violence made possible the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced people located in refugee camps, as well as the easing of curfews, which in some areas became only to be applied at night. At least two people were killed in September, however, in community-based violence, and in November there was a new flare-up which claimed ten victims.

India (CPI-M)	
<b>Start:</b>	1967
<b>Type:</b>	System Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

**Summary:**

The armed conflict in which the Indian government confronts the armed Maoist group the CPI-M (known as the Naxalites, in honour of the town where the movement was created) affects many states in India. The CPI-M emerged in West Bengal at the end of the sixties with demands relating to the eradication of the land ownership system, as well as strong criticism of the system of parliamentary democracy, which is considered as a colonial legacy. Since then, armed activity has been constant and it has been accompanied by the establishment of parallel systems of government in the areas under its control, which are basically rural ones. Military operations against this group, considered by the Indian government as terrorists, have been constant. In 2004, a negotiation process began which ended in failure.

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In the following years there was an escalation of violence that led the government to label the conflict as the main threat to national security. Since 2011 there has been a significant reduction in hostilities.

**The levels of violence declined in the different states of the country affected by the armed conflict between the Naxalite insurgency and the government.** According to fatalities figures associated with the conflict compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, in 2012 there were 364 dead, of which 116 were insurgents, 104 members of security forces, and 144 civilians. **The states most affected by this violence were Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, followed by Odisha, Maharashtra and Bihar, which accounted for the greatest number of violent incidents and fatalities.** Throughout the year there were clashes, attacks, as well as abductions and extortion perpetrated by insurgents, and operations and arrests carried out by security forces. Among the most serious incidents during the year was the ambush in the state of Jharkhand of a police convoy accompanying a civil official, which killed 13 police officers and wounded two others in the month of January; an explosion on a minibus transporting security personnel in the district of Gadcholi, in the state of Maharashtra, in an attack in March that killed 15 soldiers and seriously injured 28; and a counter-insurgency operation carried out by 300 police in the month of June in Dantewada, in Chhattisgarh state, in which security forces reported 20 insurgents killed in the same area in which 75 police officers had been killed by a Naxalite attack in 2010. This last incident was not without controversy, **as different human rights organisations alleged that the assertions regarding the death of 20 insurgents in the security forces operation in June were false, and that the dead were actually local indigenous people –many of them children– and not Naxalites.** After several weeks during which security forces claimed that they simply responded after being attacked, they finally stated that they regretted if those killed during the confrontation were innocent civilians, but that the police information in their possession indicated that seven of the dead were Naxalites. Dantewada is one of the districts most affected by the armed conflict. Human rights organisations have repeatedly indicated that as part of the Green Hunt operation carried out against the Naxalite insurgency the civilian population has been deliberately targeted in attacks by security forces and paramilitary organisations.

In the context of these different violent incidents, the government of the state of Karnataka proposed in September a unilateral ceasefire for one week to facilitate the surrender of the Naxalite insurgency. The proposal, however, drew no response from the Maoists. The government had pointed out that the announcement came in response to information they had received suggesting that the insurgents were willing to surrender their weapons, but the lack of any response led to the resumption of operations by the security forces.

India (Jammu and Kashmir)	
<b>Start:</b>	1989
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

**Summary:**

The armed conflict in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir has its origin in the dispute over the region of Kashmir which, since the independence and division of India and Pakistan, has confronted both states. On three occasions (1947 to 1948; 1965 and 1971) these countries had suffered from armed conflicts, with both of them claiming sovereignty over the region, divided between India, Pakistan and China. The armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1947 gave rise to the current division and creation of a de facto border between both countries. Since 1989, the armed conflict has been moved to the interior of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where a whole host of rebel groups, in favour of the complete independence of the state or unconditional adherence to Pakistan, confront the Indian security forces. Since the beginning of the peace process between India and Pakistan in 2004, there has been a considerable reduction in the violence, although the armed groups remain active.

**The armed conflict in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir featured relatively low levels of violence throughout the year, in line with the trend which began in 2011.** At year's end 117 people had died in clashes between security forces and insurgent organisations, according to figures compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal. The fatalities consisted of 84 insurgents, 16 civilians, and 17 members of security forces, according to this same source. Earlier this year **the state's police had confirmed a significant reduction in violent episodes, with 190 incidents, the lowest figure since the insurgent organisations began to operate in Jammu and Kashmir.** During the first months of the year a reduction in the infiltration of armed combatants from Pakistan was confirmed, though the arrival of fair weather led to the resumption of border infiltrations. The armed attacks continued, though they were of a sporadic nature. One of the districts most affected by violence was Kupwara, where clashes were recorded at different times of the year resulting in the death of militia belonging to the armed opposition group Lashkar-e-Toiba. In one of the bloodiest incidents five members of this group were killed in the month of March. It should be noted that, corroborating the perception of a reduction in violence in the state, BBC television reported that hundreds of insurgents were abandoning the armed struggle and returning to their homes. The decrease in economic support from the Pakistani authorities, the sensation that the conflict was not producing the expected results, as well as the promises of amnesty extended by the Indian Government, apparently prompted 500 insurgents to return to Jammu and Kashmir in early 2012. The BBC stated that between 3,000 and 4,000 insurgents were in

Muzaffarabad (the capital of Kashmir, administrated by Pakistan) awaiting an opportunity to return. The actions of security forces continued to generate resentment among the local population, sparking protests at different times of the year. In February the death of a young man shot by a soldier, in what was purportedly an accident, resulted in demonstrations and barricades thrown up on roads. In July there were protests again for several consecutive days after the death a young man in the town of Bandipora following his arrest.

India (Manipur)	
<b>Start:</b>	1982
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, PREPAK (Pro), KNF, KNA, KYKL, RPF, UPPK, PCP
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=

#### Summary:

The armed conflict which confronts the government against the various armed groups that operate in the state, and several of them against each other, has its origin in the demands for the independence of various of these groups, as well as the existing tensions between the various ethnic groups that live in the state. In the 1960s and 70s several armed groups were created, some with a Communist inspiration and others with ethnic origins, groups which were to remain active throughout the forthcoming decades. On the other hand, the regional context, in a state that borders with Nagaland, Assam and Myanmar, also marked the development of the conflict in Manipur and the tension between the ethnic Manipur groups and the Nagaland population which would be constant. The economic impoverishment of the state and its isolation with regard to the rest of the country contributed decisively to consolidate a grievance feeling in the Manipur population.

**There were persistent episodes of violence and clashes between security forces and insurgent groups operating in the state throughout the year, with a slight increase in the number of people killed relative to 2011.** Armed conflicts caused 111 deaths, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, mostly members of different armed groups opposed to the government, according to this source. **Dozens of them died as a result of actions by security forces without being publicly identified or the organisations to which they belonged being revealed. Officials attributed most of the attacks and detonations which took place during the year to armed opposition groups, though without assigning specific responsibility for each of them.** It should be noted that during the first quarter of the year, coinciding with the period for state elections, insurgent groups attempted to sabotage the elections through the perpetration of armed attacks. The organisation CorCom, which brings together the insurgent organisations the KCP, KYKL, PREPAK, PREPAK-Pro, RPF, UNLF and the UPPK,

levelled threats at candidates of the Congress Party and carried out a number of detonations of bombs and other explosives targeting members of this party. The districts of Imphal West and Imphal East were those most affected by the violence, accounting for the majority of attacks and clashes. Although there was a reduction in the number of fatalities from violence during the summer months, 21 people were killed in the armed conflict in September. In addition, **several attacks in Imphal, the state's capital, prompted the state government to reconsider the imposition of the anti-terrorism Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in some areas of the capital.** The AFSPA had been partially rescinded after the murder and rape of a woman in 2004 by security forces sparked widespread social protest. This legislation has come in for strong criticism by human rights organisations for shielding security forces and granting them impunity in the context of the armed conflict. Finally, it should be noted that in the month of November the organisation comprised of 16 armed groups from the Kuki opposition, KNO, threatened to resume armed clashes if the central government failed to meet its demands for the start of peace negotiations after the expiration on 22<sup>nd</sup> November of an agreement suspending operations and hostilities reached in 2005. The imminence of an agreement between the Indian government and the Naga armed opposition group the NSCN-IM was believed to be among the reasons for the resumption of the conflict, for fear that part of the territory inhabited by the Kuki people could be compromised under this agreement.

Several soldiers and members of other security forces died as a result of the spike in insurgent activities. However, coinciding with this increase, the government announced that some 200 rebels had surrendered their weapons on two occasions during the third quarter, 72 of them in the month of July and 114 in September, at a ceremony attended by former members of the UNLF, PLA, KCP, KYKL, PREPAK, KNLF, UPPK, UNPC and PULF groups.

Pakistan	
<b>Start:</b>	2001
<b>Type:</b>	System Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias, USA
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	=

#### Summary:

The armed conflict that affects the country is linked to the armed conflict in Afghanistan after the US bombings of 2001. Initially, the main setting of the conflict was the area that includes the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) –which had remained inaccessible to the Pakistan government until 2002, when the first military operations were started in the area– and the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region (formerly known as North West Frontier Province).



Nevertheless, it has gradually spread throughout the territory with continuous attacks by the Taliban rebel forces. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, members of the Taliban militias, with alleged connections to al-Qaeda, took refuge in the north west of Pakistan, which led to large-scale military operations of the Pakistani armed forces (almost 50,000 soldiers were deployed) with the support of the USA. The local population, mainly of Pashtun ethnic origin, have been accused of offering support to combatants from Afghanistan. Since the first operations in 2002, the violence has been on the increase.

Throughout the year **high-intensity violence continued** in the context of the armed conflict pitting Pakistani troops against the Taliban insurgency in different areas of the country, in particular in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, although there were also incidents of violence documented in other areas. **More than 2,600 people died over the course of the year as a result of this armed conflict, according to figures compiled by the Center for Research and Security Studies** in Pakistan. Military operations in Kurram and Orakzai featuring repeated bombardments by the Army caused hundreds of deaths among the insurgents' ranks. In Orakzai security forces claimed to have driven the insurgency out of 92% of the territory. The Khyber Agency was also one of the areas most plagued by violence, featuring particularly serious incidents like the explosion of a bomb in January that killed more than 30 people at a bus station, and the detonation of another explosive allegedly targeted at the pro-government Zakhakhel tribal militia, which also resulted in the death of another 30. The UNHCR stated that the army's military operation in this region had forced the displacement of more than 100,000 people, most of them women and children. The Valley of Tirah was one of the areas most affected by the violence in Khyber, the site of clashes between the Taliban insurgency and the armed opposition group Lashkar-e-Islam, fighting for control of the area and causing the deaths of dozens of people. Noteworthy was the Lashkar-e-Islam suicide bombing attack on a mosque which left more than a dozen dead, and the Taliban suicide attack which killed 23 insurgent members of the enemy group. Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, saw bomb attacks throughout the year. One of the most significant incidents exhibiting the Taliban's strength was the attack on a prison in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which allowed the insurgency to release 400 prisoners, among whom at least 20 who had been classified as "very dangerous" Taliban members. Asimullah Mehsud, a Taliban spokesman, stated that 150 freed insurgents had headed for north Waziristan. Also worth mentioning were the clashes which took place in the month of August in the Bajaur Agency between Pakistani security forces and armed groups from Afghanistan, which resulted in the deaths of at

least 100 people. After two weeks of intense fighting the security forces reported that they had managed to drive the rebels out after what had represented the first time that insurgents coming out of Afghanistan had managed to maintain control of an area of Pakistan for so long.

While clashes between the insurgency and Pakistani armed forces continued, **intense bombings by US drones continued in tribal areas of the country.**<sup>56</sup> **According to numbers compiled by the United Kingdom's Bureau of Investigative Journalism, between 258 and 435 people died in 2012 as a result of these bombings, which not only affected the insurgency, but also struck civilians.** With regards to this issue a report was published by Stanford University and the New York University School of Law underscoring the high number of civil victims which these attacks have caused, and pointing out that, while it is impossible to produce an exact number, from 2004 to 2012 between 474 and 881 civilians were killed by attacks carried out by these aircraft.<sup>57</sup> The issue of drones was one of the main sources of friction between the Pakistani and American government. A leaked NATO report, meanwhile, indicated that the Pakistani government was supporting and maintained close links to Taliban militias from Afghanistan, though the government denied these allegations. The crisis between Pakistan and the USA –caused by a US bombing attack in November 2011 in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed and which prompted Pakistan to cut off NATO supply routes to Afghanistan passing through Pakistani territory– ended only after the Obama Administration finally agreed in July to apologize for the incident, at which point Pakistan authorised the movement of NATO vehicles after seven months of paralysis.

Pakistan (Balochistan)	
<b>Start:</b>	2005
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, BLA, BRA, BLF and BLT
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

**Summary:**

Since the creation of the state of Pakistan in 1947, Balochistan, the richest province in terms of natural resources, but with some of the highest levels of poverty in the country, has suffered from four periods of armed violence (1948, 1958, 1963-69 and 1973-77) in which the rebel forces stated their objective of obtaining greater autonomy and even independence. In 2005, the armed rebel forces reappeared on the scene, basically attacking infrastructures linked to the extraction of gas. The opposition armed group, BLA, became the main opposing force to the presence of the central government, which it accused

56 See "Unmanned aerial vehicles: the challenges of remote-controlled warfare" in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).

57 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic of Stanford Law School, Global Justice Clinic at New York University School of Law, *Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan*, September 2012, <http://livingunderdrones.org>.

of making the most of the wealth of the province without giving any of it back to the local population. As a result of the resurgence of the armed opposition, a military operation was started in 2005 in the province, causing displacement of the civilian population and armed confrontation.

The Pakistani province of Balochistan continued to be racked by violence and clashes between the Baloch nationalist insurgency and security forces, as well as other sources of conflict and tension. **Between 600 and 900 people, including civilians, insurgents and members of security forces, are thought to have died during the year as a result of the armed conflict and sectarian violence affecting the province.**

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, of the 954 fatalities recorded 690 were civilians. The primary source of violence was the struggle pitting security forces against the nationalist Baloch insurgency. Over the course of the year clashes and bomb attacks continued, as well as offensives against energy infrastructures and government facilities. The districts of Quetta and Dera Bugti bore the brunt of the armed conflict, being where most of the security incidents took place. These included the attack which took place in early January when several members of the BLF armed opposition group killed 14 soldiers after attacking the convoy in which they were travelling. Also earlier in the year clashes between security forces and the insurgency left 10 insurgents dead in the area of Behlol. The armed group the BRA claimed responsibility for many of the armed actions carried out during the year, but a significant number of them were the work of unidentified armed groups, such as the killing of 18 workers from Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Punjab in the area of Turbat in the month of July. Dozens of people died as a result of these actions, while their perpetrators were never identified and never claimed responsibility for them. The BLA also reported having shot dead seven miners from the Swat Valley. Another topic of great significance during 2012 was the issue of forced disappearances carried out by security forces, with responsibility primarily attributed to the Pakistani secret services, in the wake of a visit of by a United Nations delegation to the country to investigate these incidents. The visit came by a government invitation –representing a tacit acknowledgement of the existence of the problem. However, the leaders of both the secret services and security forces refused to meet with the investigators, who instead met with the relatives of missing persons. The government's appeals for dialogue were rejected, with no support from the insurgency or the opposition. Interior Minister Rehman Malik announced that all charges against leading Baloch officials in exile would be dropped if they returned to the country, in a proposal aimed mainly at leaders like Hyrbyiar Marri and Brahamdagh Bugti. Provincial Governor Nawaf Sliqar Ali Magsi also insisted that the conflict in Balochistan could only be resolved by involving all the affected parties, including the military and intelligence divisions, but stressed that talks would not be possible with those advancing the independence of Balochistan as a solution.

*A rise in sectarian violence against the Shiite population in the Pakistani province of Balochistan left dozens dead*

Along with the Baloch insurgency, **of special note was the major wave of sectarian violence in the province, whose victims were mainly Shiites, particularly of the Hazara ethnic group, which suffered a number of bloody attacks resulting in dozens of deaths.** In the month of June a bomb attack against a Sunni madrasa in Quetta killed 14 people, five of whom were children, and wounded another 50. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Sunni group later carried out two attacks against the Shiite population. In the first of them a bus carrying Hazara students was attacked, killing five. In the second 14 people from a group of Shiite pilgrims returning from Iran died when the bus in which they were travelling was attacked. In September Jaish-i-Islama group claimed responsibility for an attack in which three people were killed when a bus carrying Shiite pilgrims drove by a bomb placed in the district of Mastung. In the city of Quetta several Shiites belonging to the Hazara ethnic group were shot in different incidents. These attacks sparked protests and demonstrations by Hazara organisations at different times of the year. Finally, it should be noted that **the Taliban insurgency, fighting security forces mainly in the tribal areas of the country, also carried out some armed actions in the province.** Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, is home to the Quetta Shura, comprised of the main Taliban leaders from Afghanistan since the fall of the neighbouring country's regime in 2001.

**b) South-east Asia and Oceania**

Myanmar	
<b>Start:</b>	1948
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, armed groups (KNU, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNU/KNLA, KNPLAC, SSNPLO, KIO)
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

**Summary:**

Since 1948, dozens of armed insurgent groups of ethnic origin have confronted the government of Myanmar, demanding recognition of their particular ethnic and cultural features and calling for reforms in the territorial structure of the State or simply for independence. Since the start of the military dictatorship in 1962, the armed forces have been fighting armed groups in the ethnic states. These groups combined demands for self-determination for minorities with calls for democratisation shared with the political opposition. In 1988, the government began a process of ceasefire agreements with some of the insurgent groups, allowing them to pursue their economic activities (basically trafficking in drugs and precious stones). However, the military operations have been constant during these decades, particularly directed against the civil population in order to do away with the armed groups' bases, leading to the displacement of thousands of people. In 2011 the Government began to approach the insurgency and since then there has been a ceasefire agreements with almost all of the armed groups.



**The situation of armed conflict improved considerably in the country after the government reached ceasefire agreements with practically all of the insurgent organisations,** in particular some of the most active, such as the KNU –an organisation which began operations in 1948 and which, in addition to being the most longstanding armed group, had never signed an agreement with the Government–, among others.<sup>58</sup> **At the end of the year the only armed group with which an agreement had not been reached was the KIO. Clashes continued with the group throughout 2012,** resulting in hundreds or even thousands of deaths, although it was not possible to specify a figure. The year ended with a new escalation of violence and a large-scale operation by security forces throughout Kachin territory. In the month of September official sources stated that 700 members of the KIO armed opposition group had been killed in armed clashes since June 2011 when the conflict resumed. The insurgents, meanwhile, claimed that during this period 10,000 soldiers of the Burmese army had died. The figures, however, could not be corroborated by independent sources. In addition, at least 75,000 were displaced fleeing this violence, according to the United Nations, although local organisations placed the number of displaced people at 90,000. Clashes constantly recurred throughout the year, with daily attacks by both sides for several months. The area of Hpakant (strategic both for the army and for the insurgent group, as it is the location of the country's main jade deposits, and has been the site of repeated armed clashes over control of the ornamental stone) became the epicentre of the conflict. In this area alone between August and December 8,000 people fleeing the conflict were displaced. At the end of August one of the bloodiest episodes took place, with the death of 140 soldiers, according to the KIO, which denied a request by the opposition party, the NLD, to recover the corpses of the deceased. Though different attempts at rapprochement occurred throughout the year, they repeatedly failed. One of the main points of disagreement was the withdrawal of Burmese troops from the area under the armed group's control, which for the KIO is a necessary condition for the signing of a ceasefire. The government indicated that this point could only be discussed once they had reached a ceasefire agreement. Access by humanitarian organisations to the population affected by the violence was impeded throughout the year, although at some specific times agreements were reached with the government that made it possible.

With respect to the rest of the country's insurgent organisations, **violence dropped noticeably as a result of the multiple agreements reached between the government and the armed opposition. However, there were isolated clashes which exposed the fragility of these agreements** and the need to make progress on crucial aspects of negotiations beyond the cessation of violence. At different times of the year the Burmese

armed forces clashed with groups like the SSPP/SSA, SSA-North, RCSS/SSA, KNPP, SSA-South, KNU and DKBA. These groups reported that their bases had been attacked and that clashes had occurred in the territories under their control, which represented violations of the ceasefire agreements signed, jeopardizing their continuity. As a result of these clashes dozens of deaths occurred amongst both insurgent and army ranks, and numerous people were injured. Human Rights Watch reported that despite the reforms undertaken by Myanmar's government and the ceasefire agreements reached with the ethnic insurgency, abuses by the armed forces continued, including the use of sexual violence, forced labour, and attacks on civilians.

Philippines (NPA)	
<b>Start:</b>	1969
<b>Type:</b>	System Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, NPA
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=

**Summary:**

The NPA, the armed branch of the Communist party of the Philippines, started the armed fight in 1969 which reached its zenith during the 1980s under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. Although the internal purges, the democratisation of the country and the offers of amnesty weakened the support and the legitimacy of the NPA at the beginning of the 1990s, it is currently calculated that it is operational in most of the provinces in the country. After the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, its inclusion in the list of terrorist organisations of the USA and the EU greatly eroded confidence between the parties and, to a good degree, caused the interruption of the peace conversations with Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's government. The NPA, whose main objective is to access power and the transformation of the political system and the socio-economic model, has as its political references the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front (NDF), which bring together various Communist organisations. The NDF has been holding peace talks with the government since the early 1990s.

In addition to the lack of progress in negotiations between the government and the NDF and the erosion of confidence which this entailed,<sup>59</sup> both sides continued to clash frequently in the 25 provinces in which the government estimates that the NPA currently operates. **The Government stated that the NPA had reduced its activity in various regions of the archipelago while, on the other hand, increasing it substantially in Mindanao, one of the areas of the country richest in natural resources.** In this regard the NPA asserted in November that its military strength, social base and territorial influence in Mindanao had increased

58 See the summary on Myanmar in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

59 See the summary on The Philippines (NPA) in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

by 10%, and that in 2012 alone it had carried out more than 400 offensive actions. Manila continued to lament the numerous attacks carried out by the NPA against different types of businesses, especially in the Mining and Agricultural sectors. The government believes that the NPA is increasingly a paracriminal organisation, many of whose actions are aimed at obtaining economic resources by extorting businesses and the civilian population, and through other activities of a criminal nature. According to the government about one third of the NPA's actions in 2011 were of this type. Manila also repeatedly accused the NPA of violating international humanitarian law, especially in its use of landmines, and urged various human rights organisations to denounce the NPA's attacks and abuses perpetrated against civilians. The group denied these human rights violations and declared that the accusations of the use of antipersonnel mines made by the executive and the Human Rights Commission were based on false information provided by the government. The NDF, meanwhile, criticized the growing number of human rights violations carried out by the armed forces and police, their impunity, as well as the militarisation of many communities in the framework of the government's counter-insurgency strategy. The NDF stated that under the government of President Benigno Aquino there were almost an additional 100 political prisoners, rising to approximately 400, and that during the same period there had been approximately 100 extrajudicial executions.

In the strictly military sphere the NPA announced an intensification of its armed activities in the month of October, shortly after the death of the family of an NPA member during a clash between the armed group and the military in South Davao. This announcement was strongly criticised by the government, which considered it evidence of the group's weak commitment to undertaking peace negotiations. Previously the government already had accused the NPA of a lack of commitment to the peace process, especially when in September about 50 people, most of them minors, were injured by a grenade thrown by the group. The NPA apologized for the mistake, financially compensated the victims, and pledged to deal with those responsible through the application of internal justice mechanisms, although these measures were described as totally insufficient by the government. In the month of December the NPA announced its willingness to declare a truce in the areas most affected by the passage of Typhoon Bopha, which reportedly killed 900 people and destroyed 150,000 homes in the southern Philippines. On December 20, just days after both sides met, their negotiations facilitated by the government of Norway in an attempt to restart the peace process, the government and the NPA decreed a suspension of hostilities until 15<sup>th</sup> January 2013, this being one of the longest truces in recent years. Both parties accused each other on numerous occasions of violating the truce, and in early January the agreement was on the verge of collapsing due to the NPA's scepticism about the government's

commitment to maintaining the cessation of hostilities until the middle of January. However, tensions were finally calmed and the two parties' commitments to suspending offensive actions were honoured.

Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf)	
<b>Start:</b>	1991
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity, System Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, Abu Sayyaf
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

#### Summary:

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Abu Sayyaf group has been fighting to establish an independent Islamic state in the Sulu Archipelago and the western regions of Mindanao (south). Although it initially recruited hostile members of other armed groups such as the MILF or the MNLF, it later moved away ideologically from both organisations and more systematically resorted to kidnapping, extortion, decapitating and bomb attacks, which led it to be included in the list of the USA and EU terrorist organisations. The government conceded that its counterinsurgency strategy of recent years had greatly weakened the group's leadership and military capacity, however at the same time it warned that Abu Sayyaf continued to be a threat for the state due to the numerous resources that it obtains from kidnapping and from its alleged alliance with organisations that are considered to be terrorist ones, such as Al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah.

In the middle of the year the government recognized that **Abu Sayyaf had increased its attacks, up 19% over the previous year, despite increased military pressure applied by the armed forces, US participation in counterinsurgency tasks, the death or arrest of several of its top leaders, and greater obstacles to the securing of funding.** With regard to this last point President Benigno Aquino announced in the month of June a new law which prohibits and makes more difficult the financing of groups considered terrorist organisations, in a clear attempt to sever the economic ties thought to exist between al-Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf. With regard to this issue some analysts warned about the risk of Abu Sayyaf escalating its kidnappings to offset the losses in revenue which the new law might precipitate. As in previous years the group continued to kidnap numerous targets, including foreign nationals. In fact, some of the most intense fighting of the year occurred during military rescue operations to free those taken hostage. Probably the most significant episode of violence occurred in February when an air raid against an Abu Sayyaf camp in Sulu killed up to 15 members of the group. The executive specified that those killed included one of the founders and top leaders of Abu Sayyaf: Umbra Jumdale (aka Dr. Abu), and two leaders of Yemaah Islamiyah, Zulkipli bin Abdul Hir (alias Marwan) and Muhamad Ali (aka Muawiya). In addition to doubts about the veracity of this information (the Government of Malaysia, for

example, said that Marwan was seriously wounded but not dead), **the air attack by the Philippine armed forces generated controversy for its use of reconnaissance missions flown by US drones.** While the army denied such allegations Benigno Aquino acknowledged the use of this type of aircraft the following month, as well as assistance from the US Government in the area of military intelligence. Aquino, however, denied that US marines participate directly in fighting Abu Sayyaf.

Another important violent incident occurred in the month of July in the region of Sumisip, in Basilan, where nearly 20 people died after an Abu Sayyaf attack on a farm. This attack led to the formation of an investigation commission by the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as well as the temporary closure of the enterprise, which reported the death of 10 of its workers in 2012 and more than 20 since 2010. During the year several of Abu Sayyaf's main leaders were arrested, while the US Government included Radullan Sahiron, one of the group's top leaders, on its list of most wanted persons. With regards to this issue the government stated that the signing of a peace agreement with the MILF armed opposition group would facilitate the arrest of Abu Sayyaf leaders and, in general, the fight against the group. In addition to the actions which Abu Sayyaf carries out in its main strongholds (especially Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga), the government also expressed concerns about the expansion of the group's activities beyond Mindanao. Earlier this year, for example, the government ordered the deployment of thousands of additional police in Manila due to an Abu Sayyaf terrorist threat coinciding with the celebration of a Catholic festival drawing tens of thousands of people. At the close of the year the government also announced that during the Christmas season operations would continue against Abu Sayyaf in order to seek the release of seven hostages, including four foreigners.

Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)	
<b>Start:</b>	1978
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, MILF
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	End

**Summary:**

The armed conflict in Mindanao dates back to the end of the 1960s, when Nur Misuari founded the MNLF to demand from Manila the self-determination of the Moro people, a set of Islamised ethnolinguistic groups, politically organised into independent sultanates since the 15th century. Due to strategic, ideological and leadership reasons, the MILF split from the MNLF at the end of the 1970s and continued with the armed fight, whilst the MNLF signed a peace agreement in 1996, in which certain autonomy was envisaged for the areas of Mindanao with Muslim majority (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). Despite the fact that in 1997 the two parties initiated peace talks, facilitated by Malaysia, and that in 2003 they signed a ceasefire agreement (monitored by an

international mission), the armed conflict remained active in several areas of Mindanao. Nevertheless, the signing of a preliminary peace agreement in October 2012 and the substantial and sustained reduction in clashes between the MILF and the armed forces to negligible levels meant that the armed conflict was no longer considered as such in 2012.

**Thanks to the signing of a preliminary peace agreement between the government and the MILF in the month of October, as well as the absence of significant clashes between the parties in 2012, the dispute between the MILF and the government ceased to be classified as an armed conflict.**

However, the fact that the MILF boasts a significant military capacity (an estimated 11,000 fighters) and a solid social and territorial presence, in addition to the possibility that the signing and implementation of the peace agreement may not meet expectations, make it possible for the armed conflict in the southern Philippines to resume in the future. Moreover, despite the drastic reduction in clashes between the MILF and the government, it should be noted that several violent incidents took place in 2012, including fighting between the MILF and the MNLF; between the MILF and a splinter group of its, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF); and attacks against civilians and state security forces and bodies carried out by the BIFF. With regard to this last point, the most significant development during the year was the wave of attacks launched by the BIFF during the month of August, believed to have killed up to 80 people (the figures vary depending on the sources) and displaced between 25,000 and 50,000. This spiral of violence ended after an agreement between the MILF and the BIFF whereby the latter pledged not to attack military posts or communities to prevent the displacement of the civilian population. According to the MILF this agreement did not represent a tactical alliance between the two groups, nor did it open up the possibility for members of the BIFF to take refuge in MILF strongholds. The former objected that the MNLF had also participated in the attacks, but after angry protests by the latter group it ultimately recognized that it had not been possible to confirm the information. Despite the agreement between the MILF and the BIFF, in early September the two groups clashed again in Maguindanao Province, forcefully displacing hundreds. In addition to these clashes, at different times of the year the government blamed the BIFF for the detonation of explosive devices and other violent incidents. In early September the MILF announced that the declining health of Commander Ameril Umbra Kato, leader and founder of the BIFF, had led to his stepping down from the group's leadership. A few days later a government intelligence report confirmed this information and noted that four lieutenants had taken control of the group.

There were also a **number of clashes between MILF and MNLF members**, although not so much for ideological or strategic reasons as over family- and land-related disputes. In addition to armed clashes the

MILF and the MNLF hurled numerous allegations at each other during the year, especially as the MNLF objected to the peace agreement signed between the government and the MILF. Thus, at the end of the year MNLF founder Nur Misuari declared that thousands of people were abandoning the MILF and seeking to join the MNLF, as they believed that said peace agreement was incompatible with the founding objectives of the group and the aspirations of the Moro people. The MILF denied any such mass defections and, in turn, declared that hundreds of members of the MNLF had joined the MILF, and that both Nur Misuari and the BIFF had attempted to sabotage the signing of the preliminary peace agreement in October. At the same time different factions within the MILF engaged in fighting over lands. In the month of January, for example, two prominent members of the MILF signed a ceasefire agreement after disputes that had reportedly killed some 20 people since 2009. Former or suspected members of the MILF were also allegedly involved in violent incidents, such as the attack carried out in February in which scores of people in the city of Kidapawan (province of North Cotabato) acted to free a former prominent member of the MILF's special operations group. Three people were killed and another 15 were injured. Finally, it should be noted that, although there were no significant clashes between the MILF and the armed forces, at some times of the year tensions between the parties did increase. In the month of July the government submitted a formal complaint to the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities accusing the MILF of involvement in clashes in Basilan that resulted in the death of 10 soldiers. The MILF demanded the government notify it of troop movements in areas held by it to prevent undesired clashes. In November the police urged the MILF to facilitate the arrest of 92 people linked to the massacre of 58 people committed in 2009, allegedly by individuals linked to the Ampatuan political clan, which holds political control over several institutions in Maguindanao Province. The massacre was committed against a group supporting the Ampatuans' political opponent, current Governor Esmael Magudadatu. More than half of the 195 people suspected of having perpetrated the massacre remain at large, and some sources contend that they are hiding in territories controlled by the MILF. The police stated that their intention was to proceed to capture suspects without interfering in the peace negotiations between the MILF and the government.

Thailand (south)	
<b>Start:</b>	2004
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, secessionist opposition armed groups
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=

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**Summary:**

The conflict in the south of Thailand dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, when the then Kingdom of Siam and the British colonial power on the Malaysian peninsula decided to split the Sultanate of Pattani, leaving some territories under the sovereignty of what is currently Malaysia and others (the southern provinces of Songkhla, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat) under Thai sovereignty. During the entire 20th century, there had been groups that had fought to resist the policies of political, cultural and religious homogenisation promoted by Bangkok or to demand the independence of these provinces, of Malay-Muslim majority. The conflict reached its moment of culmination in the 1960s and 70s and decreased in the following decades, thanks to the democratisation of the country. However, the coming into power of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001, involved a drastic turn in the counterinsurgency policy and preceded a breakout of armed conflict from which the region has been suffering since 2004. The civil population, whether Buddhist or Muslim, is the main victim of the violence, which is not normally vindicated by any group.

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Although the government announced that it had violence in the south of the country under control, and launched a new strategy during the year in an effort to resolve the armed conflict (which includes, inter alia, direct negotiations with insurgent groups), levels of violence remained high, with almost daily incidents. The government acknowledged that there are at least 9,400 insurgents operating in the south of the country and that the death toll has surpassed 5,000 since 2004. In this period more than 9,000 people would have been injured in the more than 11,000 episodes of violence reported. Some sources indicated that the armed conflict has driven approximately 30% of the Buddhist population and 10% of the Muslim population to abandon the region in recent years, both for safety reasons and due to the conflict's economic impact. At the end of the year, for example, alleged insurgent groups were reported to have intensified their acts of coercion and violence against shop owners to prevent them from opening on Fridays. This led to a deployment of additional police and military troops to ensure business as usual in those areas boasting the greatest trade and economic activity.

Some of the patterns of violence in the south of the country, similar to those from previous years, included acts of violence for which no responsibility is claimed, remotely detonated explosive devices, attacks by small groups of fighters, the inclusion of civilians among military objectives, and attacks deliberately targeting certain groups of great symbolic importance, such as Buddhist monks and teachers. With regards to this last point Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that since 2004 more than 300 schools have been burned, 152 teachers have been killed (at the end of the year the figure had risen to 157) and many students had died or been injured as a result of attacks by armed secessionist groups against security personnel charged with protecting schools or accompanying students to and from them. In the month of December UNICEF reported that during



this period more than 50 children had been killed and some 340 injured as a consequence of the armed conflict. At the end of the year approximately 1,200 schools in the three southern provinces suspended their activities to protest the situation of insecurity. HRW also stated that these attacks are part of a strategy which aims to frighten the civilian population, drive Buddhists out of the region, and control the Muslim community. It also reported the use of anti-personnel landmines by armed opposition groups, and ties between some of them and organised crime networks, making the conflict more complex. **HRW also noted that it was not only insurgent groups that have violated international humanitarian law, but also state security forces, which engage in practices such as torture, forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions.** In this regard worthy of mention is the criticism that human rights organisations levelled against the government's decision to continue extending every three months the imposition of a state of emergency in the three southern provinces, on the grounds that this status only fuels the impunity with which the state security forces act and, in turn, feeds the conflict's very causes and dynamics. The government had announced its willingness to replace the emergency decree with an Internal Security Law in the regions that had seen an improvement in terms of security, but ultimately ended up applying the controversial legal instrument, which has continued to be enforced in recent years. Amnesty International reported earlier this year that no police or military personnel deployed in the south of the country have been sentenced for human rights violations. Though violent episodes occurred frequently, forming a part of daily life, at certain times of the year there were more. At the end of August, coinciding with the celebration of the National Day of Malaysia and the 55th anniversary of the founding of the secessionist organisation Bersatu, the police announced that several insurgent groups had carried out more than 100 coordinated and concurrent actions, some of them violent and others acts of protest, the latter including the handling or carrying of Malaysian flags. Some analysts were surprised by this fact, as secessionist groups do not tend to demand their annexation to Malaysia. Similarly, in the month of October, coinciding with the commemoration of one of the events that sparked the resumption of armed conflict in 2004 –the death of 79 people by asphyxiation while they were being transported on military convoys, and that of another six by gunfire from armed forces– police announced that insurgent groups had carried out simultaneous attacks on a hotel, several karaoke bars, a market and a police station.

While the dynamics of the armed conflict continued, the government undertook several initiatives to solve or channel the conflict. In addition to direct talks with

*Though the Thai government claimed to have violence in the south under control, and launched a strategy to resolve the conflict, violence levels remained high*

insurgent groups, which reportedly led to the handing over or surrender of over 100 fighters,<sup>60</sup> the government carried out a major administrative restructuring (with the aim of better coordinating the 66 government agencies operating in the south of the country and placing them under the political authority of the deputy prime minister) and suggested the possibility of establishing a special administrative zone encompassing the provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. This latest proposal, however, was rejected by the armed forces and the main opposition party as unnecessary, while civil society organisations in southern Thailand considered it insufficient. Other measures promoted by the government were the approval of a financial compensation package for the victims of the violence in the south of the country, an increase in visits by political and military leaders to the provinces affected by violence, and the advancement of a government plan calling for greater investments in education, housing, social policies and the physical and mental rehabilitation of victims of violence. Finally, worthy of mention was a government delegation's visit to the Indonesian province of Aceh (to see first hand the implementation of Islamic law) and increased cooperation with Malaysia to strengthen border security and southern Thailand's development.

## Europe

### a) Caucasus and Russia

Russia (Chechnya)	
<b>Start:</b>	1999
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity, System Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Russian federal government, Chechen republic government, opposition armed groups
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=

#### Summary:

After the so-called first Chechen War (1994-1996), which confronted the Russian Federation with the Chechen Republic mainly with regard to the independence of Chechnya (self proclaimed in 1991 within the framework of the decomposition of the USSR) and which ended in a peace treaty that did not resolve the status of Chechnya, the conflict re-appeared in 1999, in the so-called second Chechen War, triggered off by some incursions into Dagestan by Chechen rebels and attacks in Russian cities. In a pre-election context and with an anti-terrorist discourse, the Russian army entered Chechnya again to fight against the moderate pro-independent regime which arose after the first war and which was, at the same time, devastated by internal disputes and growing criminality. Russia finished the war

60 See the summary on Thailand in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).



in 2001, without an agreement or a definitive victory, and favoured a state of autonomy and a Chechen pro-Russian administration, however the confrontations continue, in a parallel way to the growing Islamisation of the Chechen rebel ranks and a regional nature of the armed fighting.

The patterns of insurgent and counter-insurgent violence affecting the republic were repeated, with levels similar to 2011. At least 82 people were killed in the conflict (43 members of security forces, 38 insurgents, and a civilian) and another 92 were injured (84 agents, seven civilians and a rebel), according to figures from the independent organisation Caucasian Knot. President Ramzan Kadyrov, meanwhile, presented interior ministry figures citing 54 members of the security forces dead and 42 fatalities among the ranks of the insurgents, in addition to 148 police officers wounded. Moreover, dozens of people were arrested for their alleged support of the insurgency. Over the course of the year various large-scale counter-insurgency operations were carried out, including several in the first quarter, with a score of deaths among security forces. In addition, the governments of **Chechnya and Dagestan reached an agreement to carry out joint operations against the insurgency along their administrative border**. Some of these actions led to high numbers of casualties among the security forces deployed. Some Dagestani officials subsequently denied that there had been any such cooperation. In September authorities announced the capture of Chechen rebel leader Emir Mukharbi Isaev. In July Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov announced the death of three insurgent leaders: Zaurbek Avdorkhanov, Ibragim Avdorkhanov and Ayub Khaladov, in a special operation. However, the president of neighbouring Ingushetia, Yunus-bek Yevkurov, denied that the death of the three rebels had been the result of a special operation, claiming that they had been killed when a bomb they were handling exploded. These divergent accounts of events and other incidents, including disagreements on the demarcations of the border, led to a worsening of relations between the leaders of the two republics.

The insurgency, meanwhile, remained strong and carried out various actions, including a double suicide attack in the Chechen capital of Grozny in August which killed four soldiers and injured three others, including two civilians. In February **the top leader of the Chechen insurgency and the rebel groups in the northern Caucasus, Chechen Doku Umarov, ordered armed organisations in the region not to carry out attacks against Russian civilians**, in a context of increasing protests by the political opposition and Russian civil society against the Russian government. In his appeal Umarov urged the insurgency to focus its attacks on security forces, secret services and political leaders. **Umarov also called for unity amongst the Chechen population. This was the first appeal of this kind since 2007, according to analysts** from The Jamestown Foundation, and also included references to Chechnya's independence as an

objective of the insurgency. He also asked those among the Chechen people who did not support the insurgency at least not to obstruct it. The insurgent leader also asked Russian citizens, especially Muslims, to support the jihad against the government. The situation, marked by chronic human rights violations by both security forces and the insurgency, provoked new protests by citizens, with groups such as Mother's Alert organising demonstrations against forced disappearances.

Russia (Dagestan)	
<b>Start:</b>	2010
<b>Type:</b>	System, Self-government, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Russian federal government, Dagestan republic government, opposition armed groups
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=

**Summary:**

Dagestan, which is the largest, most highly populated republic in the north of the Caucasus, and with the greatest ethnic diversity, has been facing an increase in conflicts since the end of the 1990s. The armed rebel forces of an Islamic nature which defend the creation of an Islamic state in the north of the Caucasus, confront the local and federal authorities, in the context of periodical attacks and counterinsurgency operations. The armed opposition is headed by a network of armed units of an Islamist nature known as Sharia Jamaat. The armed violence in Dagestan is the result of a group of factors, including the regionalisation of the Islam rebel forces from Chechnya as well as the local climate in Dagestan of violations of human rights, often set within the "fight against terrorism". All of this takes place in a fragile social and political context, of social ill due to the abuses of power and the high levels of unemployment and poverty, despite the wealth of natural resources. This is made even more complicated by interethnic tensions, rivalry for political power and violence of a criminal nature.

**The dynamics of violence continued in a context of greater militarisation and confrontation due to the massive transfer of Russian troops from outside the republic**, with numerous attacks and clashes between the insurgency and security forces, and a high death toll linked to the conflict. Over the course of the year 405 people (231 rebels, 110 members of the security forces and 64 civilians) were killed, and other 290 were injured (205 agents, 78 civilians and seven insurgents), according to a report by the independent organisation Caucasian Knot. In 2011 423 people had died and another 411 had been injured, according to the same source. Violent incidents took place almost daily. Among the most serious dynamics seen in 2012 was an increase in the republic's militarisation, which included a transfer of some 30,000 federal interior ministry personnel previously deployed in Chechnya. Among these new forces and those already stationed the deployment of Russian troops rose to 60,000, according to The Jamestown

Foundation, a figure to which 30,000 police officers may be added. At the same time the president of the republic, Magomedislam Magomedov, suggested the possibility of creating self-defence units to combat the insurgency. Faced with a renewed offensive by the local and federal governments, featuring an expanded deployment and numerous operations, the insurgency maintained its consolidated position of strength despite the periodic casualties it suffered. **In February it lost its top leader in the republic, Ibrahimkhalil Daudov, killed in a special security forces operation.** His death was confirmed by the rebels, and in August he was replaced by the emir Abu Muhammad, appointed by the insurgency's maximum authority in the northern Caucasus, the Chechen Doku Umarov. Previously, another potential candidate for the succession died in a counterinsurgency operation in May. **The actions of the insurgency included suicide attacks against police stations;** the shooting down of a Russian helicopter; the murder of at least two imams as well as a well-known Sufi spiritual leader, Said Afandi al-Chirkawi, in a suicide bomb attack on his home –an attack in which another six people were killed–; attacks on several schools –allegedly in response to a decision by the Ministry to use them as temporary bases–; ambushes, and numerous explosions. In this regard the president of the Russian human rights NGO Memorial, Alexander Cherkasov, indicated that the insurgency's actions had escalated over the past three years.

A climate of human rights violations continued to plague the republic, in part linked to the armed conflict, which sparked new protests by civilians. The people of the district of Derbent, for example, decried security forces' illegal arrests of civilians and their aggressive searches. In the same line, 1,000 people demonstrated in Gimry in January to demand an end to the anti-terrorist operation being carried out in the area. Several hundred people blocked a highway to protest the disappearance of a community leader, in a situation marked by numerous disappearances in the republic. Dozens of women also demonstrated in the capital against abuses by security forces. Finally, the Office of the Ombudsman reported an increase in kidnappings in the republic, with 56 abductions and 30 disappearances recorded.

*Dagestan was the site of increased militarisation, with tens of thousand of troops brought in by Russia from Chechnya, marred by more violence and a disregard for human rights*

Russia (Ingushetia)	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	System, Self-government, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Russian federal government, Ingushetian republic government, opposition armed groups (Ingush Jamaat)
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

#### Summary:

The low intensity violence from which Ingushetia has suffered since the beginning of the 21st century confronts the local and federal security forces and a network of armed cells of an Islamic nature, known as the Ingush Jamaat and integrated into the Caucasus Front (a movement that brings together the various rebel forces from the north of the Caucasus). With origins that date back to the participation of the Ingush combatants in the first Chechnya war (1994-1996), since 2002, the Ingush rebel forces were restructured on territorial lines, causing a campaign of local violence which, without the pro-national drive of Chechnya, sought the creation of an Islamic state in the Caucasus. The beginning of the violence in Ingushetia occurred in a parallel way to the presidency in the republic of Murat Zyazikov, to whose term of office (2002-2008) numerous problems of violations of human rights, corruption, poverty and a climate of anarchy and social and political tension were attributed. The Ingush rebel forces periodically attack the military and civil staff of the Russian and local forces. Between 2008 and 2010, the violence increased and from 2011, it significantly subsided.

Violence in the republic was up, especially due to an increase in insurgent activity. According to the federal research services branch in Ingushetia, in the first 10 months of the year the number of insurgency attacks on security forces doubled with respect to the same period the previous year. **Several analysts observed the deterioration in security in the republic, with more insurgent attacks and greater persecution by the authorities of civilians accused of supporting the rebel groups.** This pattern stands in contrast to the positive trend from previous years. Some analysts suggested that the leader of the insurgency in the North Caucasus, the Chechen Dokku Umarov, might be temporarily commanding the Ingushetia insurgency. At least 84 people (40 insurgents, 33 members of security forces and 11 civilians) were killed, and another 83 were injured (58 agents, 21 civilians and four rebels), according to a report by the independent organisation Caucasian Knot. In 2011 70 people died and 38 were wounded in events related to the conflict. Amongst the incidents in 2012 standing out was **a suicide attack during the funeral of a policeman killed earlier, which left seven officers dead and 15 wounded.** The violence transpired in a context common to the entire North Caucasus, marked by human rights violations, including torture and unlawful arrests. Along this line, a score of opposition activists in Ingushetia protested in Moscow before the Parliament and Russian government against the military operations in the republic, the extrajudicial executions carried out, and corruption in the local political administration. Amnesty International expressed its concern with the intimidation suffered by members of the local human rights NGO MASHR by the authorities. MASHR reported the disappearance of one

of its members at the end of February. The authorities announced the shutting down of some 20 NGOs which, according to federal security services, were cooperating with foreign secret services.

Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	System, Self-government, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Russian federal government, Kabardino-Balkaria republic government, opposition armed groups
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓

#### Summary:

The violence and instability that characterise the Federal Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria are related to the armed groups that since the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century have been fighting against Russian presence and defending the creation of an Islamic emirate, along with other armed movements in the North Caucasus, and reflecting the regionalisation of the violence that affected Chechnya in the 1990s. The network of groups that operates in Kabardino-Balkaria, Yarmuk, began operations in 2004 although it was in 2005 when it began to show its offensive capability, with several simultaneous attacks on the capital that claimed dozens of lives and led in turn to the intensification of the counter-insurgent operations of the Russian and local authorities. In 2011, this situation of armed violence escalated significantly. Periodical insurgent and counterinsurgent attacks are launched, the extortion of the civilian population is carried out by rebel forces and human rights violations are committed by the armed forces. There are also underlying tensions linked to the influence of religious currents not related to the republic, problems of corruption and human rights violations, and the disaffection of the local population towards the authorities.

The intensity of violence was down, along with a slight decrease in the number of victims, although the pattern of insurgent attacks and special operations by security forces was repeated. **According to the independent organisation Caucasian Knot, 107 people died (80 insurgents, 19 officers and eight civilians) and another 49 were injured** (30 security forces personnel, 17 civilians and two rebels), compared to the 129 deaths and 44 wounded the previous year. The capital, Nalchik, was the site of many violent incidents. In one of them eight alleged insurgents were killed by a special operation. In another incident in December Boris Zherukov—the deputy minister of transport, leader of the political party United Russia in the regional parliament, and a dean of a local university— was shot dead. A well-known local television journalist was also killed in December. On the other side authorities announced the death at the end of the year of an insurgent leader identified as Alim Lampezhiev. The violence fuelled the general climate of human rights violations affecting the entire North Caucasus. In this context the committee “Kabardino-Balkaria Mothers in Defense of Citizen Rights and Freedoms” was formed.

In one of the actions organised by this organisation 100 people demanded the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The protest was joined by the relatives of insurgency members, who demanded fair trials rather than executions.

#### b) South-east Europe

Turkey (south-east)	
<b>Start:</b>	1984
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, PKK, TAK
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

#### Summary:

The PKK, created in 1978 as a political party of a Marxist-Leninist nature and led by Abdullah Öcalan, announced in 1984, an armed offensive against the government, undertaking a campaign of military rebellion to reclaim the independence of Kurdistan, which was heavily responded to by the government in defence of territorial integrity. The war that was unleashed between the PKK and the government particularly affected the Kurdish civil population in the southeast of Turkey, caught in the crossfire and the victims of the persecutions and campaigns of forced evacuations carried out by the government. In 1999, the conflict took a turn, with the arrest of Öcalan and the later communication by the PKK of giving up the armed fight and the transformation of their objectives, leaving behind their demand for independence to centre on claiming the recognition of the Kurdish identity within Turkey. The conflict remained alive in the form of tension in later years and escalated in 2007, amid a discourse of anti-terrorist fight by Turkey and of self defence by the PKK.

**The security situation deteriorated dramatically, with an intensification in clashes and a more bellicose strategy undertaken by the PKK. At the end of the year, however, a chance for a resolution of the conflict arose with the announcement of talks between the state and PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan,** imprisoned since 1999. The PKK’s more defiant position during the first quarter (warnings of an expansion of the war, calls for resistance and a possible disengagement from the state by the Kurdish population) was reflected in a qualitative shift in July, with the announcement of **a new offensive insurgent strategy, progressing from ambushes to larger scale operations, including control of territories.** Thus, the serious attacks in the first six months (including one with a motorcycle bomb against a police bus in front of the headquarters of the ruling AKP party which left 15 police officers and a civilian injured; the detonation of a bomb when a police car passed it in Hakkari [south-east], which left one student dead and 28 injured, an incident for which the PKK denied responsibility; the suicide bombing of a police station in Kayseri [centre] which killed one policeman and injured 17; an attack

against troops in Hatay [south], with the death of three senior military officers) were followed by intense offensives during the second half of the year. Evidence of the development of a new stage in the armed conflict was **the PKK's siege between July and August of the town of Semdinli (Hakkari Province), in which the army deployed 2,000 troops to counter the offensive.** According to the BDP the PKK came to control an area of between 300 and 400 km<sup>2</sup> for 40 days, a contention which the government denied. The figures from July to September were very divergent: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan cited 500 PKK members killed between mid-August and mid-September, while the International Crisis Group estimated 170 fatalities during the period. At the same time, according to the PKK between May and September 1,035 soldiers and some 100 guerrillas had been killed, a period during which some Turkish media sources reported 88 soldiers and 373 insurgents dead. These conflicting figures aside, the statistics did illustrate the increased lethality and magnitude of the violence.

*Violence between Turkey and the Kurdish group the PKK escalated, with a major deployment by the army and a new insurgent strategy, although in December authorities admitted the existence of talks*

In the second half of the year some clashes and attacks had a severe impact, such as a bomb blast in Gaziantep (southeast) that left nine dead, including four children, and 150 wounded, of whom 70 were civilians –an attack for which authorities blamed the PKK, while it denied its involvement. A PKK attack on a military convoy in Bingol in September killed 10 soldiers and injured another 70. The TAK, a group associated with the PKK, also operated during the year, with at least one attack against a military bus in August which killed two and wounded 12. In October the PKK claimed again to have taken several mountainous areas near Semdinli, announcing that it intended to wear down the army militarily while concurrently moving forward with the establishment of an autonomous administration for the Kurds. The government, meanwhile, announced that the PKK had been defeated in Semdinli in early September by an operation which mobilized 5,000 troops, although some analysts indicated that the PKK had reinforced its presence in several districts of Hakkari Province with the arrival of 1,000 fighters. In a valley of one of those districts 25 soldiers were killed in a single day, according to the PKK. There were also simultaneous attacks in the province of Sirnak. At the end of the year the figures for 2012 offered by the PKK cited 341 of their own killed, 2,221 security force personnel killed, and another 859 wounded. In their statement they described 2012 as the most intense in recent years. During the year the violence also affected northern Iraq, with aerial offensives by the Turkish military targeting the armed group in the region. In October the Turkish parliament renewed its authorisation of cross-border military operations, while in a context of deteriorating

relations between Turkey and Iraq, the latter country's government urged its parliament to abolish those treaties allowing the presence of foreign bases, troops, and their access to Iraqi territory.

The intensification of violence coincided with heightened social and political tensions, in part due to the continuation of mass arrests of Kurds in relation to the judicial process against the Kurdish organisation the KCK. According to Kurdish sources the number of those arrested between 2009 and the first quarter of 2012 was 3,500, between politicians, journalists, lawyers and activists, with dozens more arrested during the year. The government lowered the figure to 700. An added factor that further exacerbated tensions was **the hunger strike which some 700 Kurdish prisoners went on, 60 of them since 12th September, in dozens of Turkish prisons, as the prisoners demanded an end to the solitary confinement of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan** and an end to restrictions on the Kurdish language. BDP deputies and Kurdish public figures also joined the strike. Finally, in mid-November the action was halted by an appeal issued by Öcalan, which strengthened his position as a powerful figure. There were reports that Öcalan held several meetings with security service officials before issuing his appeal. At the same time tensions continued through the end of year with regards to the possibility that the legal immunity of ten BDP members of Parliament would be rescinded, allowing them to be tried for greeting PKK members in a chance encounter. In any case, the situation regarding the conflict changed dramatically at the end of the year with the announcement of contacts and meetings between representatives of the state, including the undersecretary of intelligence, and Öcalan. The government stated that Öcalan was its interlocutor, and that the aim of the talks was to advance towards an end to the violence and disarmament. A visit by two Kurdish members of Parliament and a lawyer to Öcalan was authorised in the first days of January, with additional meetings expected to follow. Thus began a new process of peace negotiations.<sup>61</sup>

## Middle East

### a) Mashreq

Iraq	
<b>Start:</b>	2003
<b>Type:</b>	System, Government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, opposition armed groups (including the Islamic State of Iraq, integrated by al-Qaeda in Iraq/Mesopotamia, among others), militias, USA

61 See the summary on Turkey in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).



Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

#### Summary:

The invasion of Iraq by the international coalition led by the USA in March 2003, using the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction as an argument and with the desire to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein due to his alleged link to the attacks of the 11th September 2001 in the USA, led to the beginning of an armed conflict in which numerous actors progressively became involved: international troops, the Iraqi armed forces, militias and rebel groups and Al Qaeda, among others. The new division of power between Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish groups within the institutional setting set up after the overthrow of Hussein led to discontent among numerous sectors. The violence has increased, with the armed opposition against the international presence in the country superimposing the internal fight for the control of power with a marked sectarian component since February 2006, mainly between Shiites and Sunnis. Following the withdrawal of the US forces in late 2011, the dynamics of violence have persisted with a high impact on the civilian population.

The violence in Iraq claimed the lives of over 4,500 people in 2012, confirming a worsening of the conflict relative to 2011 as US troops were withdrawn from the country. The episodes of violence were marked by their dramatically quotidian nature. **According to figures from the Organisation Iraq Body Count (IBC), the total number of civilian casualties in 2012 came to 4,530 people.** The figure represents an increase with respect to the numbers from previous years: 4,073 in 2010 and 4,136 in 2011, though less than the worst year of the conflict, 2006, when 29,000 people were killed, according to the IBC. These figures bring to nearly 173,000 the total number of casualties – civilians, armed forces and insurgents– since the start of the conflict in 2003.<sup>62</sup> The figures provided by Iraqi authorities were significantly lower than those released by the IBC. The main victims of violence continued to be the Shiite Muslim community and the country's security forces. Responsibility for the most severe attacks was claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq group, which is linked to al-Qaeda. The violence came in the form of suicide attacks, bomb-bearing vehicles (cars, lorries, motorcycles); offensives against military and police patrols, checkpoints and offices; and the detonation of explosives during religious festivities, pilgrimages, and at other crowded places, such as markets. Some attacks occurred on key dates, such as the series which killed over 50 on 20th March on the ninth anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq. On 13th June a set of attacks, most in Baghdad, left more than 100 dead, making it the most deadly day since the withdrawal of US troops. **However, this figure was surpassed on 23<sup>rd</sup> July, the worst day of violence in Iraq in two years, when 29 offensives in 19**

**cities across the country left 115 dead and hundreds injured.** According to official figures September was the worst month since 2010, with a total of 365 deaths due to violence: 182 civilians, 95 soldiers and 88 police officers. In this context several experts called attention to the increase in sectarian violence in the country, which during the first half of the year reportedly took over 600 lives, according to UN data. The UN mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and organisations like Amnesty International also pointed out the fragile human rights situation in the country, particularly with regards to the increase in the number of executions (in the first half there were 70, more than in all 2011), the abuse and torture of inmates, and prolonged detentions without the filing of charges, among other practices.

At the same time it endured this climate of violence and insecurity the country went through a severe political crisis. In the first months of the year the most salient internal problem centred around the prosecution (from the end of 2011) of Vice-president Tareq el-Hashimi, accused by a judicial panel of leading squads responsible for killing Shiites since 2005. The actions against el-Hashemi –who denied the charges and received several death sentences in absentia in 2012 after taking refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan and then in Turkey–, prompted a boycott of Parliament by the coalition to which the Sunni politician belongs, al-Iraqiya, which was not lifted until February. **The conflict later focused on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, accused by several critical sectors – Sunni, Kurdish and Shiite– of authoritarian practices, hoarding military power, and promoting a climate of sectarian polarisation.** Different political forces sought a vote of no confidence against al-Maliki, which ultimately failed. Sectors of the opposition then reformulated their strategy and at the end of year attempted to promote a law preventing the prime minister from opting for the post in the 2014 elections. During the year the central government also squared off against the authorities of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Relations worsened with Turkey due to the Kurdish issue when Ankara refused to extradite al-Hashemi and the two sides continued to exchange accusations and criticisms.<sup>63</sup> In a context of uncertainty and political gridlock, analysis like that by the think tank International Crisis Group (ICG) warned that the chronic political crisis in the country could escalate and bring about a collapse of the political structure unless al-Maliki and his opponents find a compromise solution on key issues.<sup>64</sup> Towards the end of the year the internal situation grew more tense due to measures against another al-Iraqiya Sunni minister, touching off mass protests in Anbar Province, roadblocks on the way to Syria and Jordan, calls for al-Maliki's resignation, and criticism of the government for trying to marginalize the Sunni community. On the other hand, in 2012 the USA approved an arms sale

62 Iraq Body Count, *Iraqi deaths from violence in 2012: Analysis of the year's death toll recorded by Iraq Body Count (IBC)*, January, 2013, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2012/>.

63 See the summary on Iraq (Kurdistan) in chapter 2 (Socio-political Crises).

64 International Crisis Group, *Deja Vu All Over Again: Iraq's Escalating Crisis*, Middle East Report no. 126, July 30, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/126-deja-vu-all-over-again-iraqs-escalating-political-crisis.aspx>.



to Iraq in the amount of \$11 billion, justifying the decision by arguing that the country needed arsenals to control its borders and restore the capabilities of its armed forces. The USA also maintained military and Pentagon personnel to advise on matters related to the purchase of weapons and the training of Iraqi forces. Private security companies work in areas such as oil production and the protection of American employees in the country. At the end of the year an agreement between Russia and Iraq was announced for the sale of \$4.2 billion in arms, which would have made Moscow Bagdad's second leading supplier of weapons, but the deal was unexpectedly called off weeks later, fuelling speculation by experts that the US had exerted pressure to prevent it.

Israel — Palestine	
<b>Start:</b>	2000
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity, Territory International <sup>65</sup>
<b>Main parties:</b>	Israeli government, settlers militias, PA, Fatah (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committes
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

#### Summary:

The conflict between Israel and the various Palestinian actors started up again in 2000 with the outbreak of the Second Intifada, favoured by the failure of the peace process promoted at the beginning of the 1990s (the Oslo Accords, 1993-1994). The Palestinian-Israeli conflict started in 1947 when the United Nations Security Council Resolution 181 divided Palestinian territory under British mandate into two states and soon after proclaimed the state of Israel (1948), without the state of Palestine having been able to materialise itself since then. After the 1948-49 war, Israel annexed West Jerusalem and Egypt and Jordan took over control of Gaza and the West Bank, respectively. In 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza after winning the “Six-Day War” against the Arab countries. It was not until the Oslo Accords that the autonomy of the Palestinian territory would be formally recognised, although its introduction was to be impeded by the military occupation and the control of the territory imposed by Israel.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict saw an escalation in 2012 that was especially evident in the last quarter of the year, with a total number of fatalities exceeding 200, as talks between the two parties came to a standstill.<sup>66</sup> Episodes of violence occurred throughout the year, particularly in the form of aerial and artillery

offensives against Gaza and the launching of rockets from the Strip. During the first quarter of the year the killing of the leader of the Committees of Popular Resistance (CPR), Zuhair al-Qaissi, by Israeli forces prompted a response by various armed Palestinian groups, among them Islamic Jihad, which launched more than 200 rockets at Israel. The majority were intercepted by the Israeli anti-missile shield, while attacks on the Strip left 24 Palestinians dead. The second half of June featured the worst escalation of violence between Hamas and Israel in more than one year, as the Islamist group was involved –through its armed wing, the Ezzedine al-Qassam brigades– in a response to an Israeli offensive on Gaza that left 10 Palestinians dead. The attack by the government of Benjamin Netanyahu came after armed fighters launched a raid on southern Israel from Egypt, which resulted in the death of an Israeli civilian and three militiamen.<sup>67</sup> **The most serious situation during the year came in mid November when Israel launched an offensive on Gaza on the grounds that it was acting to stop the launching of rockets from the Strip**, which had been the site of a growing exchange of fire in the preceding weeks. The operation –dubbed “Defensive Pillar” by Netanyahu’s government– began with the killing of Hamas’s military leader, Ahmed Jabari, who Israel blamed for all the armed activity waged against Israel from Gaza in the last decade. Israel pounded the Strip for a week, while Palestinian armed groups fired projectiles which, boasting a greater range than usual, struck Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. An explosives attack on a bus in the latter city left 28 wounded. It was not until 21<sup>st</sup> November that the parties reached a ceasefire. The conflict caused 164 fatalities: 158 Palestinians (103 civilians, including 30 children) and six Israelis (four civilians and two soldiers). Another two Palestinians were killed in clashes with Israeli forces in the West Bank, where protests against the Israeli offensive were held. The ceasefire signed in Cairo included four points: a commitment by Israel to stop hostilities by sea, land and air on Gaza, including attacks against individual objectives; a commitment by the Palestinian groups to cease their hostilities against Israel, including the launching of rockets and border incursions; the start of talks that would allow the opening up of border crossings in Gaza to facilitate the movement of persons and goods; and, finally, guarantees by the parties to respect the agreement and to investigate possible violations of it. After the signing of the ceasefire there were security incidents in which three Palestinians were killed and several were wounded. Hamas celebrated the end of the conflict as a triumph and at the end of 2012 during a first visit to Gaza one of its top leaders, Khaled Meshal, insisted that the Islamist organisation would not relinquish any portion

65 Despite the fact that Palestine (whose Palestine National Authority is a political association linked to a given population and to a territory) is not an internationally recognised state, the conflict between Israel and Palestine is considered “international” and not “internal”, since it is a territory that is illegally occupied and its intended ownership by Israel is not recognised by International Law or by any UN resolution.

66 See the summary on Israel – Palestine in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

67 See the summary on Israel – Egypt in chapter 2 (Socio-political Crises).

of what had historically been Palestinian territory.

Various analyses pointed out that the Israeli offensive against Gaza was launched weeks before nationwide elections, scheduled for 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2013, similar to the case of Operation Molten Lead, which killed 1,400 in the Strip between December 2008 and January 2009. Other interpretations suggested that the operation could be part of a manoeuvre by the Israeli Government to undermine the efforts of the PA to obtain recognition of Palestine in the UN. After failing in attempts to make Palestine a full member of the UN in 2011, and faced with the threat of a US veto in the Security Council, President Mahmoud Abbas decided to appeal to the General Assembly, where on 29th November, **Palestine obtained an upgrade in its status when it was recognized as a non-member state of the UN**, with 138 votes in favour, nine against, and 41 abstentions. In a context of stalled negotiations Abbas considered the initiative the last chance to save the two-state solution to the conflict with Israel, which rejected the measure. Netanyahu's Government insisted that a Palestinian state could only arise as a result of negotiations, must be demilitarized, and must recognize Israel as a Jewish state. **In a move seen as a form of retaliation for the Palestinian initiative in the UN, Israel announced the construction of 3,000 new homes in the occupied territories**, in an especially sensitive area connecting Jerusalem with the settlement of Maale Adumin. Colonisation in this area, where there had hitherto been no construction, means splitting the West Bank in two, cutting the Palestinians off from Jerusalem and preventing the possibility of the Palestinian territory's continuity. The Israeli announcement drew criticism from the Palestinians and many international players, including the USA, which deemed it counterproductive for the peace negotiations; the Secretary-General of the UN, who noted its serious consequences for the viability of the two-state solution; and the General Assembly, which issued a resolution condemning the decision in mid December.

It should be noted that Israel maintained its policy of settlement expansion throughout the year (prompting an investigation by the UN Human Rights Council) and promoted the demolition of Palestinian homes (as in the case of Hebron) in July to create a military training area. Various reports warned that Israel's policies **could exacerbate poverty among the Palestinian population and trigger a serious deterioration in living conditions in Gaza, which could cease to be habitable by 2020, according to a UN report, if urgent action is not taken to ensure basic services**. In 2012 more than 1,600 Palestinian prisoners also staged a hunger strike to protest the Israeli policy of "administrative detention", living conditions in prisons, and the practice of isolating many detainees for months. The strike was suspended only after Israel pledged to adopt a series of measures, and elicited demonstrations of solidarity both in the Palestinian

***Israel's Operation Defensive Pillar triggered an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the last quarter of 2012***

territories and at the international level. Finally, in 2012 an investigation began in France into the death of Yasser Arafat after discovering the presence of a toxic substance

Syria	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internationalised Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, pro-government militia (Shabbiha), army deserters, Free Syrian Army (FSA), al-Nusra Front, Salafi armed groups
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

**Summary:**

Controlled by the Ba'ath party since 1963, the Republic of Syria has been governed since the 1970s by two presidents: Hafez al-Assad and his son, Bashar, who took office in 2000. A key player in the Middle East, internationally the regime has been characterised by its hostile policies towards Israel and, internally, by its authoritarianism and fierce repression of the opposition. The arrival of Bashar al-Assad in the government raised expectations for change, following the implementation of some liberalising measures. However, the regime put a stop to these initiatives, which alarmed the establishment, made up of the army, the Ba'ath and the Alawi minority. In 2011, popular uprisings in the region encouraged the Syrian population to demand political and economic changes. The brutal response of the government unleashed a severe crisis in the country which led to the beginning of an armed conflict with serious consequences for the civil population.

in the former Palestinian leader's personal belongings. The armed conflict in Syria escalated dramatically throughout the year, with an intensification in its dynamics of violence, the involvement of a greater number of armed actors, and an emergent internationalisation. The situation prompted President Bashar al-Assad to recognize in June that the country was in a state of war. At the end of 2011 the conflict and repression by the Syrian government of the protests against the regime had caused the deaths of some 5,000 people. **In 2012 the number of fatalities since the start of the crisis rose to some 40,000, according to local NGO counts, and 60,000 according to figures from the UN announced in December**. In the first months of the year analyses by groups such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) pointed out the radicalisation of the conflict, born of a growing armed response by the government to quell the rebellion (disregarding the civilian population, and with the intention of recovering areas that had fallen into the hands of the rebels) and also a greater willingness on the part of opposition forces

68 International Crisis Group, *Syria's Phase of Radicalisation*, Middle East Briefing no. 33, April 10, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/b033-syrias-phase-of-radicalisation.aspx>.

to fight the regime employing guerrilla tactics.<sup>68</sup> The serious deterioration in the security situation resulted in clashes between security forces and pro-government militias facing armed insurgent groups, indiscriminate bombing, the use of heavy weapons in cities, and summary executions and massacres. Some of these caused enormous impact, such as that at Daraya in August (300 dead), Tremseh in July (200 dead) or that in Houla in May, in which more than 100 were killed, including dozens of minors, and which led to the expulsion of Syrian diplomats from several countries. Human rights organisations, meanwhile, decried a series of abuses by the regime, including systematic torture, illegal detentions, sexual assault, the abuse of minors and forced disappearances.<sup>69</sup> Accusations were also levelled at rebel forces for their actions, which included torture and summary executions. These abuses, as well as those committed by the regime, could constitute crimes against humanity, as indicated by human rights organisations. The spiral of violence in the country prompted a steady flow of forced displacements; according to UNHCR figures issued at the beginning of 2013 a total of 612,000 people had fled Syria into neighbouring countries, in addition to another 2.5 million internally displaced Syrians.<sup>70</sup>

At the same time there was a growing number of incidents on the Syrian border, including escalating tensions with Turkey, greater instability in Lebanon as a result of the Syrian crisis, and skirmishes on the border with Jordan and Israel.<sup>71</sup> **The internationalisation of the conflict was also shaped by the growing presence of foreign fighters among the rebel forces as the range of armed actors operating in the country widened.** The Free Syrian Army, formed in 2011, was joined by groups like the al-Nusra Front, a jihadist organisation with alleged links to al-Qaeda, which claimed responsibility for car bomb attacks in Damascus that killed dozens. Various analyses also indicated the growing presence of radical Salafi groups.<sup>72</sup> The militarisation of the insurgent forces was also facilitated by their provisioning with arms from outside the country. Some reports suggested that the rebels were receiving support from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Libya, while Iran and the Shiite Islamist group Hezbollah were identified as providing military support to the Syrian regime. The UN Security Council did not reach a consensus on the crisis and an international response was stymied by the refusals of China and Russia –the main supplier of weapons to Damascus– to approve an open resolution condemning

*The armed conflict in Syria escalated dramatically over the course of the year, its dynamics of violence growing more intense, a greater number of armed actors getting involved, and the conflict taking on an increasingly international dimension*

Bashar al-Assad's regime. Despite its criticisms the USA remained reluctant to intervene directly, while countries such as France expressed a greater willingness to undertake armed action. Both the EU and USA did approve sanctions against Syria. The country's possession of non-conventional weapons was of particular concern. In this context efforts were made to initiate international mediation to negotiate a ceasefire and bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed in February as a special envoy for Syria, and presented a six-point peace plan. The initiative failed and resulted in Annan's resignation in the middle of the year.<sup>73</sup> The mediation tasks continued in the hands of Algeria's Lakhdar Brahimi, but in late 2012 no progress had been made.

During the second half of the year rebel forces managed to extend their control over territories (including areas in the north which fell under the control of the Kurdish minority) and to deal the regime several hard blows. The military leadership was decimated by an attack on the general security headquarters in July, and senior officials began to desert in greater numbers. Over the course of the year Syrian opposition groups in exile exhibited disunity and organisational and strategic troubles. The dominant coalition, the Syrian National Council, proved to be ineffective and to wield scant control over groups in the field. In November dissident sectors agreed to the constitution of a new platform, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, which in December was recognized by several international players, including the USA, as the legitimate body representing the Syrian population. In December the Russian government acknowledged that Assad could lose in his fight against the rebels, while the UN warned that the dispute was exhibiting increasingly sectarian tendencies.

## b) The Gulf

Iran (north-west)	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, PJAK, autonomous government of Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	End

69 See the reports by Amnesty International, *'I Wanted to Die' Syria's Torture Survivors Speak Out*, London: AI, March, 2012; and by Human Rights Watch, *Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Enforced Disappearances in Syria's Underground Prisons since March 2011*, HRW, New York, July 3, 2012.

70 See "Violence and the Syrian forced displacement crisis" in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).

71 See the summaries on Syria – Turkey, Lebanon and Israel – Syria, Lebanon in chapter 2 (Socio-political Crises).

72 International Crisis Group, *Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition*, Middle East Report no. 131, October 12, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/131-tentative-jihad-syrias-fundamentalist-opposition.aspx>.

73 See the summary on Syria in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

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**Summary:**

Despite the heterogeneous and multi ethnic nature of Iran, the minorities that live in the country, including the Kurds, have been subjected to centralist, homogenisation policies for decades and have condemned discrimination by the authorities of the Islamic Republic. In this context, since 1946, different political and armed groups of Kurd origin have confronted Tehran government in an attempt to obtain greater autonomy for the Kurd population, which is concentrated in the north-western provinces of the country. Groups such as the KDPI –Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran– and Komala headed this fight for decades. Since 2004, the Free Life of Kurdistan Party (PJAK) has gained a protagonist role in the conflict with Tehran. Its armed wing, the East Kurdistan Defence Forces, periodically confronts the Iranian forces, in particular members of the Revolutionary Guard.

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In contrast to the previous year, in which levels of violence led the case to be classified as an armed conflict, in 2012 the international information on clashes between the PJAK insurgency and Iranian forces was relatively scarce. This led to the context no longer being considered an armed conflict by late 2012. **During the first half of the year the most significant episode took place in April, when four Guardians of the Revolution died in an attack attributed to Kurdish rebels.** According to press reports there were also casualties among the PJAK militia, but no number was specified. Taking into consideration that the lack of access to information may hamper an adequate diagnosis of the conflict's status, the reduction in fighting in 2012 could be related to at least two factors, among others. Firstly, the effective implementation of the ceasefire announced at the end of 2011. One of the PJAK's objectives in signing the truce may have been to prevent collaboration between Turkey and Iran against the Kurdish insurgency. A second factor that may have influenced the development of the conflict in 2012, put forward by some analysts, is a possible agreement between the PKK and Iran to neutralize the PJAK's actions so that the PKK could focus its activities on the Kurdish struggle against Turkey. This shift would presumably have been possible due to the political and militarily ascendance of the PKK over the Kurdish-Iranian group.<sup>74</sup> The pact between the PKK and Tehran may have been the result of the rearrangement of alliances in the region spawned by the Syrian crisis, which led to a deterioration in relations between Turkey and Syria and, indirectly, with Iran, the main ally of Bashar al-Assad's regime in the area.<sup>75</sup>

*The intensity of the armed conflict which brought about the exit of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, decreased significantly relative to the previous year, which made it possible for this context to no longer be considered an armed conflict*

Yemen	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, security forces, pro-government militia, army deserters, armed tribal groups
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	End

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**Summary:**

In recent years, Yemen has faced a climate of deep instability conditioned by the presence of a Shiite rebel force in the north (the Houthis), a secessionist movement in the south and growing al-Qaeda activity in the territory. From 2011, in a regional context of uprisings, the instability in Yemen became more acute when the population staged protests against Ali Abdullah Saleh's attempts to stay in power, after more than three decades in presidency. The peaceful protests, put down brutally by the regime, were eclipsed by growing armed confrontations between sympathisers and opponents of the regime. The clashes have mainly involved the security forces, pro and anti-governmental tribal militias and units of army deserters. Following the signing of a transition agreement in late 2011 that led to the end of Saleh's presidency, the country began a turbulent transition plenty of challenges.

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**The intensity of the armed conflict which brought about the exit of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, after more than three decades in power, decreased significantly relative to the previous year, which made it possible for this context to no longer be considered an armed conflict.** The country, however, continued to be severely affected by other dynamics of violence and several incidents related to the transition process.<sup>76</sup> At the beginning of 2012 the first phase of the agreement promoted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was implemented, including the adoption in January of a controversial law granting immunity to Saleh and his associates from persecution for "politically motivated" crimes during his time in office. The legislation, rejected by a range of different sectors of society and criticized by international human rights organisations, unleashed massive protests in the country demanding accountability for the repression, especially for abuses committed during the previous year. According to the numbers from local organisations more than 2,100 people were killed between February

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74 Pamela Urrutia and Ana Vilellas, "Reopening the Kurdish question: states, communities and proxies in a time of turmoil", Series Assessing the future of the state in fragile contexts, NOREF/ Clingendael, September, 2012, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Themes/Armed-violence-and-conflict-in-fragile-settings/Fragile-states-and-peacebuilding-in-the-new-global-context/Publications/Reopening-the-Kurdish-question-states-communities-and-proxies-in-a-time-of-turmoil>

75 See the summary on Syria – Turkey in chapter 2 (Socio-political Crises).

76 See the summaries on Yemen (Houthis) and Yemen (AQAP) in this chapter and see the summary on Yemen (south) in chapter 2 (Socio-political Crises).



and August 2011, of which some 230 were protesters, 600 soldiers from pro- and anti-government units, and more than 1,300 members of tribal militias both for and against the revolt against Saleh. Following the passage of the immunity law, on 21<sup>st</sup> February presidential elections were held (in practice a referendum with a single candidate) in which Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the former vice president, was formally elected the country's new president. The elections were boycotted by sectors that felt marginalized by the transition agreement, including the Houthis insurgency in the north, and the South Yemen Movement, which called for a day of civil disobedience. Various acts of violence associated with the election day caused the death of more than 30 people –26 of them in an attack for which AQAP claimed responsibility.

*The reluctance of many officials loyal to former president Saleh to leave their positions in the Yemeni security forces resulted in several episodes of violence during the year*

In this context concerns became evident as to the role Saleh and his circle would play in the new era. Over the course of the year several members of his family continued to hold senior positions in the army and the security forces, while the former president decided to stay on as the leader of his party (General People's Congress, GPC). **Saleh was accused of interference for his constant meetings with military officials and senior tribal leaders.** The reluctance by those loyal to the former ruler to abandon their positions, in the context of changes to the security forces backed by Hadi in the first half of the year, generated several episodes of tension and violence. In April the dismissal of the head of the air force and brother of the former president, and the transfer of one of his nephews to a regional command, triggered the occupation and blockade of the capital's airport, Sanaa. At the end of July armed men with close ties to the former government occupied the interior ministry building, demanding to be hired by the Yemeni police, which led to clashes with security forces that resulted in 15 fatalities. In August more than 200 members of the Republican Guard, a force controlled by Saleh's son, attacked the defence ministry to protest reform of the security forces, resulting in clashes with regulars that left four dead and dozens injured. At the same time there were several protests against the continuation of close allies of Saleh in high command posts. Over the course of the year there were also multiple assassination attempts, some of them successful, targeting senior military, intelligence and government figures. Analysts noted that a number of armed actors were not fulfilling their commitment to withdraw, as stipulated in the GCC agreement, and that the demilitarisation of the major cities had only been partially achieved. Various critics argued that the transition agreement did not properly address the conflict of power in Yemen nor the divisions in the armed forces, warning that if measures were not taken there was the danger of fragmentation and a new escalation in the violence. In this context, at the end of December, **in an attempt to curtail the**

**influence of the former president and unify the military forces, Hadi backed new changes in the armed forces which called for the elimination of the Republican Guard, led by Saleh's son, and the First Armed Division, led by General Ali Mohsen, the leader of the military faction which rebelled against the former president in 2011. Analysts warned about the possible instability which may be generated by Saleh's circle as a reaction to that.**

In 2012 **Hadi's government also launched the committee responsible for preparing the National Dialogue, which is to serve as the basis for the elaboration of a new constitution, slated for the end of 2013, and for the holding of general elections in February of 2014,** according to the timetable for the second phase of the transition. The National Dialogue, which was to have begun in the second half of the year, was postponed several times and finally scheduled for 2013, manifesting the difficulties involved in engaging actors relevant to the process, among them representatives of the Southern Movement. At the end of year one of the country's main political coalitions warned that it would boycott the initiative if, as announced, Saleh participates in the dialogue as a representative of the GPC.

Yemen (AQAP)	
<b>Start:</b>	2011
<b>Type:</b>	System Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, AQAP/Ansar Sharia, USA, Saudi Arabia, tribal militias (popular resistance committees)
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑

**Summary:**

With a host of conflicts and internal challenges to deal with, the Yemeni government is under intense international pressure –mainly the USA and Saudi Arabia– to focus on fighting al-Qaeda's presence in the country, especially after the merger of the organisation's Saudi and Yemeni branches, through which al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was founded in 2009. Although al-Qaeda is known to have been active in Yemen since the 1990s and has been responsible for high profile incidents, such as the suicide attack on the US warship USS Cole in 2000, its operations have been stepped up in recent years, coinciding with a change of leadership in the group. The failed attack on an airliner en route to Detroit in December 2009 focused the world's attention on AQAP. The group is considered by the US government as one of its main security threats. Taking advantage of the power vacuum in Yemen as part of the revolt against president Ali Abdullah Saleh, AQAP intensified its operations in the south of the country and expanded the areas under its control. From 2011 the group began to carry out some of its attacks under the name Ansar Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law).



The conflict between AQAP and Yemeni security forces and some local tribes saw a significant escalation in 2012, with the number of fatalities exceeding 1,300, and the forced displacement of some 250,000 people due to the violence. The armed group capitalised on the power vacuum and general instability in the country generated by the transition process to expand its operations and increase its control over territories in the centre and, above all, the south of the country. Responsibility for some of the group's actions was claimed by its new group, Ansar al-Sharia, created by AQAP in response to the growing youth movement in Yemen which had marginalized jihadist sectors seeking the establishment of a radical Islamist regime. During the year there were multiple episodes of violence, including fire fights, suicide attacks, murders, attacks against military installations and local tribal militia opposed to al-Qaeda (popular resistance committees), as well as continuous aerial offensives against AQAP forces. One of the bloodiest episodes of the year occurred in March when a double suicide attack against two military checkpoints in Zinjibar (south) resulted in a series of clashes that left some 200 soldiers and dozens of insurgents dead. In April an AQAP offensive against military barracks in Lawdar sparked additional fighting in which 200 others died in less than a week. Faced with this situation, in May the government decided to launch an offensive against the group, and towards the end of June managed to recover territories that had been under AQAP control, including the capital of the province of Abyan, Zinjibar.

***AQAP took advantage of the power vacuum and general instability affecting Yemen to expand its operations and increase the control of territory***

In response to the government offensive **AQAP carried out the largest attack ever seen in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, killing more than 100 soldiers** who were preparing for a military parade on the occasion of the 22nd anniversary of the unification of the country in May. The attack fuelled speculations about the possible involvement of certain figures in it, with suspicion specifically falling upon those with close ties to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was accused of trying to destabilize the transition and block reform of the military and security apparatus. In retaliation for the military campaign, days later AQAP killed the general in charge of the government offensive in a suicide attack. During the second half of the year the levels of violence abated somewhat, but the conflict continued, with fighting, the detonation of explosives and murders. It should be noted that **throughout the year the government offensives received support from the USA, which launched numerous drone attacks killing dozens of suspected insurgents.**<sup>77</sup> This policy generated controversy in both the USA and Yemen. The use of these aircraft was recognised and appreciated

by Yemen's president, but drew criticism from various sectors in Yemen, from Houthi insurgents, who questioned the intervention by Washington, to Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakul Karman, who condemned its impact on the civilian population. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism between 36 and 56 civilians were killed in Yemen by this type of operation in 2012. At the end of the year Amnesty International also underlined the impact of the conflict on the civilian population in the southern province of Abyan. According to said organisation the human rights situation in this locality was catastrophic as a result of summary executions and inhuman and degrading treatment –amputations, torture, whipping–carried out by Ansar al-Sharia, which also imposed Islamic courts, strict codes of conduct, and gender-based segregation in the areas under its control.<sup>78</sup> Amnesty International also blamed the government for endangering civilians by using inappropriate armament in aerial and ground attacks in residential areas as part of its offensive against AQAP.

Yemen (Houthis)	
<b>Start:</b>	2004
<b>Type:</b>	System, Government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, al-Houthi religious leader followers (al-Shabab al-Mumen), pro-governmental tribes, Salafist militias, Saudi Arabia
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=

**Summary:**

The conflict started in 2004, when the followers of the religious leader al-Houthi, belonging to the Shiite minority, started an armed rebellion in the north of Yemen. The government assured that the rebel forces aimed to re-establish a theocratic regime such as the one that governed in the area for one thousand years, until the triumph of the Republican revolution in 1962. The followers of al-Houthi accused the government of corruption, of not attending to the northern mountainous regions and they opposed the Sanaa alliance with the US in the so-called fight against terrorism. The conflict has cost the lives of thousands of victims and has led to the forced displacement of more than 300,000 people. Various truces signed in recent years have been successively broken with taking up of hostilities again. In August 2009, the government promoted a new offensive against the rebel forces that led to the most violent stage of the conflict, the internationalisation of which became evident after the direct intervention of Saudi Arabian

77 See "Unmanned aerial vehicles: the challenges of remote-controlled warfare" in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).

78 Amnesty International, *Conflict in Yemen: Abyan's Darkest Hour*, December 4, 2012, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE31/010/2012/en/5c85d728-a9ab-4693-afe9-edecc2b8670e/mde310102012en.pdf>.

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forces against the followers of al-Houthi on the border area. The parties agreed on a new ceasefire in February 2010, however, the situation in the area is highly volatile. As part of the rebellion that ended the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, the Houthis took advantage to expand areas under its control in the north of the country and have been increasingly involved in clashes with Salafists militias, armed groups linked to the Islamist party Islah and pro-government tribal militias.

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The armed conflict in northern Yemen which pits Houthi insurgents against security forces, pro-government militia and, increasingly, armed sectors linked to Sunni and Salafi Islamist groups, continued to take dozens of lives and to displace hundreds. Partial counts based on press reports indicate that more than 200 people died in this conflict in 2012, with a larger number of incidents during the first quarter of the year. **Violent episodes affected the provinces of Saada, Hajjah, Amram, and al-Jawf, confirming the expansion of the Houthis' scope of action amidst the country's internal instability** in the wake of the overthrow of the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh at the end of 2011 and the initiation of a transition process.<sup>79</sup> The presence of the group apparently gave rise to the establishment of a new training base for the armed group in Saada, the setting up of roadblocks in some of these provinces, and acts of extortion. Earlier this year UNICEF and local organisations indicated that violence in northern Yemen had caused the displacement of between 580 and 1,000 families, adding to the number of people who have been forced to flee their homes as a result of fighting since the beginning of the armed conflict in 2004. According to the OCHA in September 2012 the number of people displaced by the conflict in the north came to 324,000.

At the same time these acts of violence were committed the Houthis acted to position themselves in preparation for the Yemeni transition following Saleh's departure. After rejecting the transition agreement promoted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in November of 2011 **the Houthis called for a boycott of the presidential elections held in February 2012, which resulted in lower voter turnout in the area of northern Yemen.** Representatives of the armed group were leery of the mediating role played by the USA and Saudi Arabia in the process, and kept their distance from some leading figures in the transition who

*Violent episodes affected the Yemeni provinces of Saada, Hajjah, Amram, and al-Jawf, confirming the expansion of the Houthis' scope of action amidst the country's internal instability*

*There are elements of alert, situational or structural factors that could lead to a deterioration of the situation of armed conflicts in 2013*

in the past had played a key role in the fight against the Houthis. Even so, after meetings with the UN Secretary-General's Envoy for Yemen, Jamal Benomar—who urged them to abandon their weapons and channel their demands through a political party—the Houthis agreed to participate in the National Dialogue process that will take place in 2013, although stressing that this did not mean that they endorsed the agreement promoted by the GCC. Previously the Yemeni transitional Government had refused to accept the conditions for dialogue laid down by the Houthis, which included the release of all political prisoners, neutrality by the media, non-interference by military and security institutions, the resignation of officials who served the former regime, the extension of an apology for abuses committed in the north of the country, and the rejection of foreign interference, especially by the US. It should be noted that during the year the Houthis were especially critical of US drone attacks against AQAP in the south of the country. Representatives of the group warned that the use of this technology in the fight against Houthis would be met with acts of revenge. Demonstrating the potential for the internationalisation of the conflict, in the middle of the year Saudi Arabia and

Iran exchanged accusations that the other country was supporting a side in the conflict; according to Riyadh, Tehran was supporting the insurgents with arms, while the government of the Islamic Republic accused Saudi authorities of using more than 1,000 Somali refugees in the counterinsurgency fight against the Houthis.

## 1.4. Alert factors for 2013

Following the analysis of the evolution of armed conflicts in 2012 it is possible to identify risk factors for an escalation of violence or a worsening of the socio-political situation in a series of cases. These are contexts in which, irrespective of the intensity of violence, there are elements of alert, situational or structural factors that could lead to a deterioration of the situation in 2013. In some of these situations of armed conflict there may exist, at the same time, positive elements and dynamics for potential improvement in the situation. In this respect, the identification of these elements of alert is aimed at spotlighting risk factors and scenarios which need to be addressed to prevent a deterioration in the situation.

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79 See the summary on Yemen in this chapter.

Table 1.5. Alert factors in armed conflicts for 2013

<b>AFRICA</b>	
<b>Great Lakes and Central Africa</b>	
<b>Burundi</b>	Acts of violence and instability will continue to affect the country unless the government undertakes negotiations with the opposition in order to recover the climate of dialogue achieved after the Arusha agreements and abandon the authoritarian approach taken in recent years.
<b>Central Africa (LRA)</b>	Military pressure and coordination between the armed forces of DR Congo, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Uganda, with support from the USA, is helping to curtail the LRA's actions, which are more focused on its survival, although its destabilising potential remains intact, such that violence and population displacement will continue.
<b>Central African Republic</b>	Even if the rebellion and government reach a peace agreement instability will continue to be present in the Central African Republic unless there is a profound change at the political level which addresses the situation's root causes, which have to do with an absence of democracy and the existence of governance problems.
<b>DR Congo (east)</b>	The escalation of violence as a result of the M23 rebellion and support for this armed group by Rwanda may lead to a further destabilisation of eastern DR Congo and the region, and precipitate the loss of all the progress made to date.
<b>South Sudan</b>	Although some advances in the field of disarmament were made, other elements such as food insecurity, the arrival of new refugees and internal displacement as a result of violence prolonged the serious humanitarian situation, which may be aggravated in 2013 by an increase in violence.
<b>Sudan (Darfur)</b>	Despite the progress in the peace process between the government and the JEM-MC faction, as well as with other actors who already have supported the DDPD, the constant violence among major armed groups and governmental pressure for the reduction of the UNAMID could dash the fragile progress made thus far.
<b>Sudan (South Kordofan and the Blue Nile)</b>	The absence of any progress in the agreement on the humanitarian access to the area affected by violence, due to a government blockade, may lead to a humanitarian disaster in 2013.
<b>Horn of Africa</b>	
<b>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</b>	The breakdown of peace negotiations between the ONLF and the government may trigger a new period of instability and violence in the Ogaden region, leading to a deterioration in the humanitarian situation.
<b>Somalia</b>	The military developments in the offensive against al-Shabaab brought with them an escalation in violence and instability in the country and the armed group's loss of control over what were formerly important strongholds. Though the group has retreated to more remote locations it maintains a significant capacity to infiltrate areas controlled by the federal government, generating expectations that it will alter its strategy.
<b>North of Africa and Maghreb</b>	
<b>Algeria (AQIM)</b>	The armed conflict might deteriorate in 2013 due to the territorial expansion of the activities of AQIM, MUJAO and other affiliated groups, in particular due to an escalation arising from international intervention in northern Mali. The proliferation of factions and armed groups throughout the Sahel could render more difficult the response strategies of Algeria and other governments which will, presumably, continue giving priority to a security strategy to address this phenomenon.
<b>Libya</b>	The widespread availability of weapons, the persistence of different types of militias, the difficulties authorities face recruiting former rebels for the establishment of cohesive military and police forces, and the influence of instability on the Sahel are some of the country's main challenges in terms of its security situation. Internal political dynamics will also be shaped in 2013 by the definition of the new institutional architecture in the drafting process of the constitution, prepared by a parliament in which independent lawmakers –whose political alignments are more difficult to predict– will be a key factor.


<b>West Africa</b>	
<b>Mali (north)</b>	The situation in Mali could worsen in a context featuring the proliferation of armed groups and an on-going institutional crisis resulting from an increase in abuses perpetrated by radical armed Islamist groups in the north and the consequences of international military intervention on the dynamics of violence and human security. The UN has warned that the international offensive in the north of the country could swell the numbers of those suffering forced displacement.
<b>Nigeria (Boko Haram)</b>	The escalation of the armed conflict witnessed in recent years will continue in 2013 unless urgent measures are taken to halt the cycle of violence and human rights violations. The conflict is expected to continue to have serious consequences on the civilian population, due to both Boko Haram offensives and indiscriminate actions by government forces. The situation could degenerate even further in a scenario of escalating sectarian violence in Nigeria and as a result of the regional impact of the crisis in Mali.
<b>AMERICA</b>	
<b>Colombia</b>	The end of the FARC's truce in January 2013 could represent an offensive manoeuvre by the guerrilla group to secure a more advantageous position at the negotiating table. The government and the FARC, however, had previously agreed that the military clashes between the two would not affect their peace talks.
<b>ASIA</b>	
<b>South Asia</b>	
<b>Afghanistan</b>	The progressive withdrawal of foreign troops from the country and the inability of local forces to ensure security make likely an increase in violence, rising numbers of Afghan casualties, and the strengthening of the Taliban militia.
<b>India (Assam)</b>	Despite the reduction in insurgent violence in the state, in 2013 there could be repeated outbreaks of inter-communal violence, with a serious impact in terms of human security and human rights violations.
<b>India (CPI-M)</b>	Repeated human rights violations by security forces, as well as scepticism regarding a possible rapprochement between the insurgency and the government, could render violence and conflict increasingly chronic and impede a resolution through negotiations.
<b>India (Jammu and Kashmir)</b>	Human rights violations by Indian security forces and the local population's rejection of their presence and actions could spawn greater social tensions and violence in the state.
<b>India (Manipur)</b>	The increase in violence in Imphal, the capital of the state, and the possibility that antiterrorist legislation will once again be implemented in the areas in which it had been rescinded, as well as the threats issued by the KNO insurgency, could produce an increase in social tensions, violence, and human rights violations.
<b>Pakistan</b>	The recurring operations of security forces, as well as US bombings in tribal areas, augur high levels of violence and fatalities in 2013.
<b>Pakistan (Balochistan)</b>	The increase in sectarian violence against the Hazara Shiite population, coupled with the greater presence of the Taliban insurgency and repeated clashes between security forces and the Balochi insurgency, portends a scenario of greater complexity and on-going violence in the province.
<b>Southeast Asia and Oceania</b>	
<b>Myanmar</b>	The large-scale operation against the Kachin insurgency at the end of the year will thwart any agreement between the KIO armed group and the Myanmar government, and could destabilise agreements reached with other armed organizations in 2012.
<b>Philippines (NPA)</b>	The drastic reduction in hostilities and the potential peace agreement with the MILF mean that the armed forces should be able to use a greater share of their resources in the fight against the NPA, whose military strength has already been seriously undermined in recent years.
<b>Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf)</b>	Increasing military pressure against the Abu Sayyaf in its traditional strongholds, as well as evidence of cooperation between the armed group and transnational terrorist networks, could lead the Abu Sayyaf to carry out armed actions outside its traditional bastions, especially in urban areas.

<b>Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)</b>	The difficulties concretising some aspects of the peace agreement (in particular the disarmament and demobilisation of the MILF), the actions of groups which wish to boycott the peace process (such as the BIFF and sectors of the armed forces), and the rivalries between the MILF and some armed groups operating in Mindanao could hinder and reverse the trend towards reduced violence seen in the last few years.
<b>Thailand (south)</b>	Despite the incipient political response by the state (dialogue with insurgent groups and proposals for decentralization), the enhanced organisation and growing military capacity of the armed groups, as well as the impunity with which the armed forces operate in the south of the country, bodes a continuation of the current levels of violence.
<b>EUROPE AND CAUCASUS</b>	
<b>Caucasus and Russia</b>	
<b>Russia (Chechnya)</b>	There is the risk of the perpetuation of low-intensity violence in Chechnya, in a context of entrenched positions and interests on the part of the armed actors, with the risk of additional violent incidents, including suicide attacks.
<b>Russia (Dagestan)</b>	Increased militarisation by the local and federal authorities, along with the strength of the insurgency, may lead to an even greater extension of the conflict, with a significant impact on the civilian population due to the actions of the various armed actors. At the same time there exists the danger of increased harassment of civilians by authorities, justified by allegations that those in question are supporting the rebels.
<b>Russia (Ingushetia)</b>	Despite the casualties in recent years amongst the insurgency's leadership, the recent pattern of deteriorated security in the republic could mean an increase in rebel attacks and the repression of the civilian population by authorities in 2013.
<b>Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)</b>	Despite the general trend of a decrease in violence, the pattern of selective killings –including of civilians– witnessed during 2012 could grow worse, in a generalised context of impunity and human rights violations.
<b>Southeast Europe</b>	
<b>Turkey (southeast)</b>	The context of regional complexity, with Turkey and the PKK involved in the dynamics of the conflict in Syria, as well as forces linked to sectors in the Turkish state opposed to the end of the Kurdish conflict and the democratisation of Turkey, could foil the new process of negotiations.
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>	
<b>Mashreq</b>	
<b>Iraq</b>	The situation in Iraq could grow even worse due to a chronic political crisis and a persistent climate of violence. There exists the danger that the different actors involved will adopt increasingly sectarian postures, in a context of systematic attacks against the Shiite community and government measures that are perceived as forming part of a campaign to harass and marginalise the Sunni community, all compounded by the impact of the Syrian crisis on the regional scenario. The provincial elections in April, seen as a bellwether of the 2014 legislative elections, will serve to measure the strength of the various political groups, but may also lead to greater tensions and more violence.
<b>Israel – Palestine</b>	The escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seen in 2012 could intensify over the next year, given the repeated breakdowns of negotiations, Israel's maintenance of its positions, the consequences of Israel's policy of settlements on the already weakened prospects for a two-state solution, and the impact of the investigation into the death of Arafat, planned for the first half of 2013, among other factors.
<b>Syria</b>	The pattern of deterioration in Syria could continue in 2013 given the proliferation of armed groups in the country, the brutality of the violence, the growing number of sectarian incidents, low expectations as to the viability of a political solution, and the inability of the international community to facilitate a solution to the crisis, among other factors. In the context of the conflict's internationalisation, the potential decline and collapse of the Assad regime would not mark an end to the violence.
<b>The Gulf</b>	
<b>Iran (northwest)</b>	In 2013 instability in the area will continue to be determined by the Iranian government's handling of the Kurdish question (mainly with a militaristic approach), as well as by regional dynamics and strategic alliances established in what is an evolving scenario.



<b>Yemen</b>	The fragile and unstable situation in Yemen could deteriorate in 2013 in response to multiple factors, particularly if the conflicts associated with the power struggles between political and military circles continue, and if the efforts to carry out the National Dialogue do not yield a platform that is considered legitimate and representative by Yemeni society.
<b>Yemen (AQAP)</b>	Considering the negative trend seen in recent years, the dynamics of the conflict could continue and/or worsen in 2013, with a major impact on the civilian population, affected by combat, aerial offensives by Yemeni and US forces, and the imposition of a radical version of the Sharia in the areas controlled by the armed group.
<b>Yemen (Houthis)</b>	The conflict will be shaped in large measure in 2013 by the general context of instability in the country, the possibility of increased clashes with other armed actors in addition to the security forces, and also by the progress made in the National Dialogue, through which the group could seek to channel its demands. The debates in this forum promise to be extremely challenging given that, among other issues, the creation of a new constitution is at stake.

Map 2.1. Socio-political crises



■ Countries with socio-political crises

## 2. Socio-political Crises

- In 2012, 91 socio-political crises were registered around the world, a very similar figure to that of 2011 (90). The cases were mainly concentrated in Africa (35) and Asia (23), while the remaining socio-political crises occurred in Europe (15), the Middle East (14) and America (four).
- The highest percentage of serious crises in 2012 was concentrated in the Middle East, partly due to the repercussions in the region of the armed conflict in Syria.
- Malian soldiers carried out a coup d'état in March that ousted the government of Amadou Toumani Toure and marked the start of a turbulent transition process mediated by ECOWAS.
- The instability grew more acute in Kenya due to the proximity of the elections in 2013, the stepping up of pressure on the secessionist movement MRC and the consequences of Kenya's intervention in Somalia against al-Shabaab.
- A series of incidents led to an escalation of mutual accusations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, leading the latter to place its army on high alert, while 20 soldiers died due to breaches of the ceasefire.
- In Haiti, groups of former soldiers staged several public shows of strength to demand the reconstitution of the armed forces.
- The dissolution of the constituent assembly in Nepal, having failed to approve a draft constitution, made the country's political crisis more acute.
- The various contexts of conflict and tension in Pakistan claimed 5,000 lives over the course of the year.
- The Chinese government stepped up security measures in areas with a Tibetan presence due to the wave of self-immolations that were carried out to protest against Beijing's repression.
- The situation in Egypt remained unstable, with periodical demonstrations, violent incidents with fatalities and a power struggle between the military, the president and the judiciary.
- The war in Syria led to growing polarisation and violence in Lebanon, along with deterioration in relations between Ankara and Damascus, with exchanges of gunfire along the border.

The present chapter analyses the socio-political crises that occurred in 2012. It is organised into four sections. The socio-political crises and their characteristics are defined in the first section. In the second section an analysis is made of the global and regional trends of socio-political crises in 2012. The third section is devoted to describing the development and key events of the year in the various contexts. In the fourth and final section a series of conflict dynamics are identified that might lead to an escalation of violence and/or a worsening of the situation in 2013 in each of the cases. A map is included at the start of chapter that indicates the socio-political crises registered in 2012.

### 2.1. Socio-political crises: definition

A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by different actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control of resources or territory.

Table 2.1. Summary of socio-political crises in 2012

Socio-political crisis <sup>1</sup>	Type <sup>2</sup>	Main parties	Intensity <sup>3</sup>
			Trend <sup>4</sup>
<b>Africa</b>			
Algeria	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		↓
Angola (Cabinda)	Internal	Government, FLEC-FAC armed group, Cabinda Forum for Dialogue	1
	Self-government, Resources		=
Burkina Faso	Internal	Government, political opposition, state security forces, civil society	1
	Government		↓
Chad	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		↓
Comoros Islands	Internal	Government of the Union of the Comoros headed by Grande Comore, armed forces, political and social opposition (political parties and authorities of the islands of Anjouan, Mohéli and Grande Comore), AU mission	1
	Self-government, Government		=
Congo	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Self-government, Government		=
Côte d'Ivoire	Internationalised Internal	Government, militias loyal to the former president Laurent Gbagbo, mercenaries, UNOCI	3
	Government, Identity		↓
Djibouti	Internal	Government, armed opposition (FRUD), political and social opposition (UAD)	1
	Government		=
DR Congo	Internal	Government, political and social opposition and former armed opposition groups	2
	Government		↑
DR Congo – Rwanda – Uganda	International	Governments of DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda	2
	Identity, Government, Resources		↑
Equatorial Guinea	Internal	Government, political opposition in exile	1
	Government		=
Eritrea	Internationalised Internal	Government, internal political and social opposition, EDA political-military opposition coalition (EPDF, EFD, EIPJD, ELF, EPC, DMLEK, RSADO, ENSF, EIC, Nahda), other groups	2
	Government, Self-government, Identity		=
Eritrea – Ethiopia	International	Eritrea, Ethiopia	2
	Territory		↑
Ethiopia	Internal	Government (EPRDF coalition, led by the TPLF), political and social opposition	1
	Government		↑
Ethiopia (Oromia)	Internal	Central government, regional government, political opposition (OFDM, OPC groups) and armed social opposition (OLF, IFLO)	1
	Self-government, Identity		=

1. This column includes the states in which socio-political crises are taking place, specifying in brackets the region within each state to which the crisis is confined or the name of the armed group involved in the conflict. This last option is used in cases involving more than one socio-political crisis in the same state or in the same territory within a state, for the purpose of distinguishing them.
2. This report classifies and analyses socio-political crises using two criteria: on the one hand, the causes or clashes of interests and, on the other hand, the convergence between the scenario of conflict and the actors involved. The following causes can be distinguished: demands for self-determination and self-government (Self-government) or identity aspirations (Identity); opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state (System) or the internal or international policies of a government (Government), which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or the struggle for the control of resources (Resources) or territory (Territory). In respect of the second type, the socio-political crises may be of an internal, internationalised internal or international nature. As such, an internal socio-political crisis involves actors from the state itself who operate exclusively within its territory. Secondly, internationalised internal socio-political crises are defined as those in which at least one of the main actors is foreign and/or the crisis spills over into the territory of neighbouring countries. Thirdly, international socio-political crises are defined as those that involve conflict between state or non-state actors of two or more countries.
3. The intensity of a socio-political crisis (high, medium or low) and its trend (escalation, decrease, no changes) is mainly evaluated on the basis of the level of violence registered and the degree of socio-political mobilisation.
4. This column compares the trend of the events of 2012 with those of 2011, using the ↑ symbol to indicate that the general situation in 2012 has become more serious than in the previous year, the ↓ symbol to indicate an improvement in the situation and the = symbol to indicate that no significant changes have taken place.

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
<b>Africa</b>			
Guinea	Internal	Government, armed forces, opposition political parties, trade unions	1
	Government		=
Guinea-Bissau	Internationalised Internal	Government, armed forces, opposition political parties, international drug trafficking networks	2
	Government		↑
Kenya	Internationalised Internal	Government, ethnic-based militias, political and social opposition (political parties, civil society organisations), SLDF, Mungiki sect, al-Shabaab Somali armed group	3
	Identity, Government, Resources, Self-government		↑
Madagascar	Internal	High Transitional Authority, opposition leaders, state security forces	1
	Government		=
Malawi	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		=
Mali	Internationalised Internal	Deposed government, military junta, transition government, soldiers loyal to former president Amadou Toumani Toure, ECOWAS	3
	Government		↑
Mauritania	Internationalised Internal	Government, social and political opposition, AQIM, MUJAO	1
	Government, System		↓
Morocco	Internal	Monarchy, government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		↓
Morocco – Western Sahara	International <sup>5</sup>	Morocco, SADR, POLISARIO Front	1
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		=
Nigeria	Internal	Christian and Muslim communities, cattle raising and farming communities, community militias	2
	Identity, Resources		↓
Nigeria (Niger Delta)	Internal	Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, Joint Revolutionary Council, militias of the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ogoni communities, private security groups	2
	Identity, Resources		↓
Rwanda	Internationalised Internal	Government, FDLR armed group, political opposition, dissident sectors of the RPF ruling party, Rwandan diaspora in DR Congo and in the West	1
	Government, Identity		↑
Senegal (Casamance)	Internal	Government, MFDC armed group and its various factions	2
	Self-government		↓
Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland)	Internal	Republic of Somaliland, Autonomous region of Puntland, Khatumo state	3
	Territory		↑
Sudan	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		↑
Sudan – South Sudan	International	Sudan – South Sudan	3
	Resources, Identity, Territory		↑
Swaziland	Internal	Government, political parties, unions, NGOs in defence of human rights and pro-democracy movements	1
	System		=
Tunisia	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	2
	Government		↓
Uganda	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		↑

5. Although Western Sahara is not an internationally recognised state, the socio-political crisis between Morocco and Western Sahara is considered “international” and not “internal” since it is a territory which has yet to be decolonised and Morocco’s claims to the territory are not recognised by International Law or by any United Nations resolution.



Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
<b>Africa</b>			
Zimbabwe	Internal	ZANU-PF and MDC political parties, war veterans and youth militias sympathetic to ZANU-PF	1
	Government		=
<b>America</b>			
Bolivia	Internal	Government, political and social opposition (political parties, authorities and civil society organisations from eastern departments, indigenous groups)	2
	Government, Self-government, Resources		=
Haiti	Internationalised Internal	Government, social and political opposition, MINUSTAH, former soldiers	2
	Government		↑
Paraguay	Internal	Government, EPP	1
	Government		=
Peru	Internal	Government, armed opposition (remaining Shining Path factions), political and social opposition (rural and indigenous organisations)	2
	Government, Resources		=
<b>Asia</b>			
China (East Turkestan)	Internal	Government, armed opposition (ETIM, ETLO), political and social opposition	2
	Self-government, Identity, System		=
China (Tibet)	Internationalised Internal	Chinese government, Dalai Lama and Tibetan government in exile, political and social opposition in Tibet and in bordering provinces and countries	2
	Self-government, Identity, System		↑
China – Japan	International	China, Japan	1
	Territory, Resources		↑
India (Nagaland)	Internal	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM, NSCN (Khole-Kitovi), NNC, ZUF	3
	Identity, Self-government		↑
India (Tripura)	Internal	Government, armed opposition (NLFT, ATTF)	1
	Self-government		=
India – Pakistan	International	India, Pakistan	2
	Identity, Territory		=
Indonesia (Aceh)	Internal	Indonesian government, regional government of Aceh, political opposition	2
	Self-government, Identity, Resources		↑
Indonesia (West Papua)	Internal	Government, OPM armed group, political and social opposition (secessionist, pro-autonomy, indigenous and human rights organisations), Papuan indigenous groups, Freeport mining company	3
	Self-government, Identity, Resources		=
Kazakhstan	Internationalised Internal	Government, political and social opposition, local and regional armed groups	2
	System, Government		↓
Korea, DPR – USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea <sup>6</sup>	International	DPR Korea, USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea, China, Russia	2
	Government		↑
Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea	International	Korea DPR, Rep. of Korea	2
	System		=
Kyrgyzstan	Internationalised Internal	Government, political and social opposition, regional armed groups, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan	1
	System, Government, Identity		=
Lao, PDR	Internationalised Internal	Government, political and armed organisations of Hmong origin	1
	System, Identity		=

6. This international socio-political crisis affects other countries that have not been mentioned, which are involved to varying degrees.

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
<b>Asia</b>			
Myanmar	Internal	Government, political and social opposition (NLD opposition party)	2
	System		↑
Nepal	Internal	Government, armed forces, political parties –UCPN(M), CN, CPN(UML)–, PLA	2
	System		↑
Nepal (Terai)	Internal	Government, Madhesi political organisations (MPRF) and armed organisations (JTMM, MMT, ATLF, among others)	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Pakistan	Internal	Government, political and social opposition, armed opposition (Taliban militias, militias of political parties)	3
	Government, System		=
Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)	Internal	Government, factions of the MNLF armed group	2
	Self-government, Identity		↑
Sri Lanka (north-east)	Internal	Government, Tamil social and political opposition	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Tajikistan	Internationalised Internal	Government, political opposition (Islamic Renaissance Party), social opposition (regional groups: Gharmis and Pamiris), former warlords, Islamist groups (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU]), Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan	3
	Government, System		↑
Thailand	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	2
	Government		↑
Thailand – Cambodia	International	Thailand, Cambodia	1
	Territory		↓
Uzbekistan	Internationalised Internal	Government, political and social opposition, regional armed groups, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan	1
	Government, System		=
<b>Europe</b>			
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	International	Azerbaijan government, government of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Armenia	3
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		↑
Azerbaijan	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		=
Belarus	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		↑
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Internationalised Internal	Central government, government of the Republika Srpska, government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, High Representative of the international community	1
	Self-government, Identity, Government		=
Cyprus	Internationalised Internal	Government of Cyprus, government of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Greece, Turkey	1
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		↑
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Internationalised Internal	Government of Georgia, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia, Russia	1
	Self-government, Identity		↑
Georgia (South Ossetia)	Internationalised Internal	Government of Georgia, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, Russia	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Macedonia	Internal	Government, political opposition, political and social representatives of the Albanian community	1
	Identity, Government		↑
Moldova, Rep. of (Transnistria)	Internationalised Internal	Government of Moldova, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria, Russia	1
	Self-government, Identity		=

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
<b>Europe</b>			
Russia	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		↑
Russia (Karachay-Cherkessia)	Internal	Russian government, government of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, armed opposition groups	1
	System, Identity, Government		↓
Russia (North Ossetia)	Internal	Russian government, government of the Republic of North Ossetia, armed opposition groups	1
	System, Identity, Government		=
Serbia – Kosovo	International <sup>7</sup>	Government of Serbia, government of Kosovo, political and social representatives of the Serbian community in Kosovo, UNMIK, KFOR, EULEX	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Spain (Basque Country)	Internationalised Internal	Spanish government, French government, ETA, Basque government, political parties and social organisations	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	Internationalised Internal	Government of the United Kingdom, local government of Northern Ireland, government of Ireland, Protestant unionist and Catholic republican armed group factions	1
	Self-government, Identity		↑
<b>Middle East</b>			
Bahrain	Internationalised Internal	Government, political and social opposition, Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, Iran	3
	Government, Identity		=
Egypt	Internal	Government, FJP, MB, SCAF, al-Nour Salafist party, other political parties and social movements, National Salvation Front (opposition coalition)	3
	Government		=
Egypt – Israel	International	Egypt, Israel	2
	Government		=
Iran	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		=
Iran (Sistan Balochistan)	Internal	Government, Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran), Jundallah (Soldiers of God / People's Resistance Movement), Harakat Ansar Iran	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Iran – USA, Israel <sup>8</sup>	International	Iran, USA, Israel	2
	System, Government		=
Iraq (Kurdistan)	Internationalised Internal	Government, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Turkey, Iran	2
	Self-government, Identity, Resources, Territory		↑
Israel – Syria – Lebanon	International	Israel, Syria, Hezbollah Lebanese group and its armed wing (Islamic Resistance)	3
	System, Resources, Territory		=
Jordan	Internal	Government, social and political opposition	1
	Government		↑
Lebanon	Internationalised Internal	Government, Hezbollah, March 14 Alliance (led by the Future Movement), Amal, Free Patriotic Movement, Hizb ul-Tahrir, militias	3
	Government		↑
Palestine	Internal	PA, Fatah, al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade armed group, Hamas and its armed wing (Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigade)	1
	Government		=
Saudi Arabia	Internationalised Internal	Government, social and political opposition, AQAP	2
	Government, Identity		↑

7. The socio-political crisis between Kosovo and Serbia is considered “international” since although its international legal status remains unclear, Kosovo has been recognised as a state by more than 90 countries.

8. This international socio-political crisis affects other countries that have not been mentioned, which are involved to varying degrees.

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
<b>Middle East</b>			
<b>Syria – Turkey</b>	International	Syria, Turkey	3
	Government		↑
<b>Yemen (south)</b>	Internal	Government, secessionist and pro-autonomy opposition groups of the south (including the Southern Movement/Al-Hiraak al-Janoubi)	3
	Self-government, Resources, Territory		=

1: low intensity; 2: medium intensity; 3: high intensity.  
 †: escalation of tension; ‡: decrease of tension; =: no changes.  
 The socio-political crises in bold are described in the chapter.

## 2.2. Socio-political crises: analysis of trends in 2012

This section is devoted to a global and regional analysis of the trends observed in contexts of socio-political crisis in 2012.

### a) Global trends

In 2012, 91 socio-political crises were registered around the world, in line with the trend shown in 2011, when 90 cases were registered. As in 2011, **most of the socio-political crises in 2012 were concentrated in Africa and Asia, with 35 and 23 cases, respectively.** The remaining crises occurred in Europe (15), the Middle East (14) and America (four). In the case of Africa, the figure was similar to that of 2011, although the scenarios were not the same. Over the course of 2012, some cases classified as active socio-political crises in 2011 ceased to be classified as such –Chad-Sudan, Djibouti-Eritrea and Niger–, while others were added to the list of active crises in 2012, one example being Sudan, due to the various incidents of instability that affected the government. The cases of Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and the Niger Delta region were no longer classified as armed conflicts in 2012 due to a reduction in the level of violence. However, the continued occurrence of security incidents meant that they were classified as socio-political crises. In Asia the number of socio-political crises rose slightly in respect of 2011. The increase was due to the inclusion in 2012 of the China-Japan case following the escalation in tension due to the dispute over the islands known as the Senkakou Islands in Japan and as the Diayou Islands in China.

*The rising instability in the Middle East led to an increase in the number of high-intensity socio-political crises in the region, where the highest percentage of serious cases is concentrated in respect of other regions in the world*

The number of socio-political crises in Europe fell slightly in respect of 2011 –when 16 cases were registered– due to the fact that the cases of Georgia and Armenia were no longer considered active crises. Meanwhile, the case of Macedonia was added to the list of socio-political crises in 2012. As regards the

Middle East, there was a rise in instability in respect of 2011 (when 11 cases were registered) since in 2012 three new cases were added to the list of socio-political crises: Jordan, due to its internal political instability; Iraq (Kurdistan), due to growing tension between the Iraqi federal government and the authorities of the Kurdish autonomous region; and Syria-Turkey, due to the escalating tension in bilateral relations as a result of the armed conflict in Syria. Finally, in America there was a reduction in the number of socio-political crises in respect of 2011 (when six cases were registered), since the crises in Honduras and Venezuela were no longer considered active.

The socio-political crises in 2012 were linked to a wide variety of situations: scenarios in which armed conflict is on the horizon due to the failure to resolve the underlying problems and in which instability continued –such as in Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Nigeria (Niger Delta)–; military coups d'état –Mali or Guinea-Bissau–; the intensification of political polarisation and/or of the repression of dissidents in the context of electoral processes –Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Guinea or Iran–; difficulties involving constitutional processes –Nepal or Egypt–; bilateral tension involving cross-border incidents –between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey and Syria, or Armenia and Azerbaijan in respect of the dispute over Nagorno Karabakh, for example–; the repression of popular protests, clashes between demonstrators and the police or human rights violations –Bahrain, Kazakhstan or Uganda–; or clashes linked to disputes between government forces and a variety of armed groups whose level of intensity falls below that of an armed conflict –such as the cases of the Shining Path armed group in Peru or of militants in the north-east of India or in the North Caucasus–; among others.

While taking into account that most of the socio-political crises are due to a variety of causes, generally speaking it is possible to conclude that **in the majority of cases there was an element of opposition to the internal or international policies of the government that triggered a struggle to gain or undermine power. This was one of**


**the causes of tension in 58.2% of the cases registered in 2012.** Meanwhile, opposition to the political, social or ideological system of a state was present in 17.5% of the cases. The identity aspirations of a variety of collectives were one of the main causes of 38.4% of the socio-political crises, while demands for self-determination or self-government were a key element in 32.9% of the cases registered in this period. Other underlying causes of the socio-political crises registered in 2012 were disputes over the control of resources (in 15.3% of cases) and over the control of the territory (in 13% of the contexts).

As in previous years, on a global level most of the socio-political crises were of low intensity (47 cases, equivalent to 51.6%) or medium intensity (28 cases or 30.7%). 17.5% of the contexts (16 cases) were considered high-intensity crises. **Unlike in 2011 and other years, in which the largest number of serious cases were in Africa and Asia, in 2012 the greatest number of high-intensity crises were to be found in the Middle East** (six), which can be explained in part by the regional repercussions of the armed conflict in Syria and by the so-called Arab uprisings in this part of the world. As regards the remaining high-intensity crises, five occurred in Africa, four in Asia and one in Europe. The most serious cases in 2012 were Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland), Sudan–South Sudan, India (Nagaland), Indonesia (Western Papua), Pakistan, Tajikistan, Armenia–Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh), Bahrain, Egypt, Israel–Syria–Lebanon, Lebanon, Syria–Turkey and Yemen (south).

The global trend in levels of violence and instability was similar to that of 2011 in most of the socio-political crises, with no noteworthy changes in 41.7% of the cases. In 2012 the percentage of socio-political crises that suffered deterioration was 38.4% (35 of the 91 cases), while in 18 scenarios a positive evolution was perceived (19.7%). This latter trend was associated with a series of factors: a drop in violence or an improvement in the security situation in respect of 2011; a reduction in political and institutional instability (such as in the case of Burkina Faso); initial contacts between opposing actors to resolve their differences through political means or peace negotiations (such as in the case of the Senegalese government and the factions of the MFDC group that operate in Casamance); or because the institutional mechanisms put in place to ease the tension led to an improvement of the situation (such as in the case of the bilateral tension between Thailand and Cambodia).

Finally, and following the trend of previous years, it should be pointed out that **many of the cases (51 out of the 91, or 56%) were of an internal nature.** In other words, the socio-political crisis involves actors from the state itself who operate exclusively within its territory. In another 25 cases (27.4%), the

Graph 2.1. Regional distribution of the number of socio-political crises



significant presence of an international actor in the crisis, the spread of the dispute to other countries, the intervention of foreign troops or regional organisations, or the role played by armed groups operating from foreign bases, among other factors, led them to be classified as internationalised internal socio-political crises. Finally, there were 15 international socio-political crises, equivalent to 16.4% of the total.

### b) Regional trends

In 2012, Africa continued to be the continent with the largest number of socio-political crises, with over a third of the total. One of the changes in respect of 2011 was the fall in the number of high-intensity cases (from seven to five cases) and the reduction in the percentage of crises that deteriorated when compared with the previous period. While in 2011 more than half of the socio-political crises in Africa showed signs of deterioration (51.4%) –a phenomenon partly explained by the impact of the Arab uprisings–, in 2012 the percentage of cases with a negative trend fell to 34.2% (12 out of 35 cases). There were more African scenarios that maintained similar levels of violence and stability (37.1%), while in ten cases a reduction in hostilities or internal convulsion was observed (28.5%).

*In Africa, the dispute between Sudan and South Sudan was the only serious international socio-political crisis, due to the tensions arising after the separation of the two countries in 2011*

These included Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, which had witnessed mass protests and instability in the context of the Arab uprisings. Although in 2012 security incidents and popular protests continued to occur, the general trend was a reduction in violent incidents in these cases. **As regards the five most serious cases on the continent, it should be pointed out that in almost all of them –Kenya, Mali, Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland) and Sudan–South Sudan–, the dynamics indicated a deterioration of the situation, with the exception of Côte d'Ivoire, which continued**

to experience violent incidents and fragility, but not to such a serious extent as in the past.

**The majority of the most serious cases in Africa were internationalised internal crises.** The elements of



internationalisation were evident in 2012 in cases such as Côte d'Ivoire, where the crisis was marked by attacks perpetrated by armed actors loyal to the former president, Laurent Gbagbo, from Liberia and by a serious attack on the peacekeeping forces of the UN mission (UNOCI); Kenya, whose troops carried out an incursion in Somalia that triggered an escalation in the armed activities of the Somalian armed group al-Shabaab in Kenyan territories; or Mali, where the regional organisation ECOWAS played a key role in handling the crisis sparked by the military coup against the president, Amadou Toumani Toure, in parallel to the armed conflict underway in the north of the country. **The socio-political crisis involving Sudan and South Sudan was the only high-intensity international scenario in Africa.** In this case, the dispute was determined by the lack of agreement between the two sides on key issues following the separation of South Sudan in 2011 and support lent by each country to insurgent groups in the other country. The case of the territorial dispute between the regions of Somaliland and Puntland, in Somalia, became the year's most serious internal socio-political crisis in Africa, following the self-declaration of a new autonomous region (Dervish State or Khatumo State), which led to clashes with the security forces of Somaliland. It is worth highlighting that most of the socio-political crises in Africa were internal (24 out of 35 cases or 68.5%) and were classified as low-intensity situations (21 scenarios, equivalent to 60%), in line with the global trend.

In Africa, the most prevalent incompatibility factor among the causes of socio-political crises was opposition to governments' policies and the subsequent struggle to gain or undermine power. This factor stood out significantly in respect of the other possible crisis triggers and applied to 71.4% (25 out of 35 cases) of the socio-political crises registered on the continent. Over the course of 2012, this factor explained protests against various governments over political, social and economic issues which, on occasions, met with a violent response from the authorities. It also lay behind disagreements between opposition sectors and the ruling authorities over electoral or constitutional issues and led to the carrying out of coups d'état (whether foiled or successful) by the military, among other situations.

**America saw the smallest number of socio-political crises globally, with four cases in total, none of which were high-intensity situations.** Most of the socio-political crises on this continent were medium-intensity situations (Bolivia, Haiti and Peru), while one was considered a low-intensity crisis (Paraguay). In almost all the cases the level of violence and/or instability was maintained, except for Haiti, which witnessed an escalation. The situation in this country was affected by an increase in protests against the government due to political problems that highlighted the institutional fragility that ex-

***Demands for self-determination or self-government, along with aspirations to change the system of a state continued to be the main causes of socio-political crises in Asia***

ists there, and by shows of strength staged by groups of former soldiers seeking the reconstitution of the Haitian armed forces. It is worth pointing out that opposition to governments' policies was a factor present in all the socio-political crises registered on the American continent. In some cases it was combined with other sources of incompatibility, such as disputes over resources. This was the case in Peru and Bolivia, where several protests were related to the exploitation of natural resources, in particular mining activity. In Bolivia the situation was also conditioned by the issue of self-determination, in particular issues related to the rights of indigenous peoples. In 2012, this factor mainly showed itself in the dispute between the government and indigenous collectives over the construction of a road in a national park located in indigenous territory. All of the socio-political crises in America were internal in nature, except for Haiti, considered an internationalised internal crisis due to the role played in the country by the UN mission (MINUSTAH). As in 2011, the international mission was the target of criticism and protests by the Haitian population, which accused it of committing abuses.

As regards **Asia**, the most distinctive feature continued to be the prevalence of causes other than opposition to the government (present in most of the cases of other regions, except Europe) when it comes to explaining the source of socio-political crises. **Identity aspirations and opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state** (both present in 47.8% of the cases, or 11 out of 23), **along with demands for self-determination or self-government**, important in 39.1% of the situations (nine case) **were the main causes of the socio-political crises in this part of the world.** Opposition to government was a noteworthy factor of incompatibility in just one third of the cases (seven socio-political crises, or 34%). Most of the socio-political crises in Asia were internal, in line with the global trend. However, unlike Africa, for example, a significant number of the crises were of medium or high intensity (65.2% of the total), whereas one third of the cases were of low intensity (eight out of 23 cases, equivalent to 34.7%).


The high-intensity cases in Asia were India (Nagaland), Tajikistan, Indonesia (Western Papua) and Pakistan. In the last two cases, the level of violence and/or instability was similar to that of 2011. In Tajikistan, the situation deteriorated in 2012 as a consequence of a large-scale operation by government forces in the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in an attempt to neutralise groups of former soldiers. The situation in Nagaland, in India, was especially complex and although an improvement in the general situation was registered (with the prospect of a peace agreement between the armed opposition group NSCN-IM and the government on the horizon), at the same time violent clashes continued to occur and there was an increase

in the number of victims in respect of 2011. Scenarios such as Kazakhstan and Thailand–Cambodia were classified as medium-intensity crises in 2012, having been considered more acute in 2011.

**The socio-political crises in Europe were predominantly considered low-intensity situations** (86.6% of cases, or 13 out of 15). The dispute between Serbia and Kosovo was the only medium-intensity crisis, while the only high-intensity situation was the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Additionally, these were the only two socio-political crises in Europe that were international in nature. In 46.6% of the crises (seven out of 15), the situation deteriorated in respect of 2011. Another unique characteristic of the socio-political crises in Europe was the higher proportion of internationalised internal situations (46.6% of cases) in comparison with other parts of the world. The greater importance of demands related to identity (present in 11 cases or 73.3%) and to self-government (nine of the 15 cases or 60%) also stood out in Europe as causes that explain the socio-political crises, as in Asia. Identity and self-government aspirations were underlying causes of crises both in the west and the south-east of Europe (Northern Ireland, the Basque Country or Bosnia-Herzegovina), as well as in areas of the Caucasus, such as in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Finally, in 2012 the situation in the Middle East was characterised by an increase in the number of cases in respect of 2011 (rising from 11 to 14). The region became the main scenario of high-intensity crises on a global level (six), overtaking Africa (five) and Asia (four), which in previous years were ranked above it in terms of the number of cases of this type. The remaining socio-political crises in the Middle East were split equally between medium-intensity and low-intensity cases (four of each), representing 28.5% respectively. **It is noteworthy that serious socio-political crises in the Middle East represented 42.8% of the total (six out of 14 cases), a significantly higher percentage than in other regions of the world: 14% in Africa, 17% in Asia or 7% in Europe.** Some of the high-intensity crises in the Middle-East were determined by the repercussions of the war in Syria on a regional level. The armed conflict in Syria (and its growing internationalisation in 2012) led to an increase in the

Graph 2.2. Intensity of socio-political crises by region



dynamics of violence and the growing polarisation of political actors in Lebanon, and to the escalation of bilateral relations between Syria and Turkey (including several incidents along the border). It also ensured that tension remained high between Israel, Syria and Lebanon, with incidents involving Hezbollah (which sent a drone over Israel), and led to the first exchange of gunfire in the border area between Israel and Syria since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Other serious socio-political crises in the Middle East were directly related to the consequences of the Arab uprisings that spread across the region in 2011 and that, in some cases (such as Yemen or Egypt), led to the start of troubled transition processes following the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. Instability, social unrest, conflicts between opposition sectors and the government and human rights violations continued to characterise the situation in cases such as Bahrain, Egypt or in the context of the crisis involving groups in the south of Yemen who aspire to self-determination. The effect of the uprisings could also be seen in other lower-intensity crises in the region, such as in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Generally speaking, it should be pointed out that **a larger number of international crises (28.5%) occurred in the Middle East than in any other region in the world**, although most of the cases in this part of the world were internal in nature (six out of 14 cases, or 42.8%). As in Africa and America, opposition to governments' policies was one of the main causes of the socio-political crises in the region, present in 71.4% of the cases in conjunction with other factors of incompatibility.

## 2.3. Socio-political crises: annual evolution

### Africa

#### a) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Chad	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social and political opposition

#### Summary:

The foiled coup d'état of 2004 and the constitutional reform of 2005, boycotted by the opposition, sowed the seeds of an insurgency that intensified over the course of 2006, with the goal of overthrowing the authoritarian government of Idriss Déby. This opposition movement is composed of various groups and soldiers who are disaffected with the regime. Added to this is the antagonism between Arab tribes and the black population in the border area between Sudan and Chad, related to local grievances, competition for resources and the overspill of the war taking place in the neighbouring Sudanese region of Darfur, as a consequence of the cross-border operations of Sudanese armed groups and the *janjaweed* (Sudanese pro-government Arab militias). These militias have attacked towns and refugee camps of Darfur located in the east of Chad, which has contributed to the escalation of tension between Sudan and Chad, which accuse each other of supporting the insurgency in the other country. The signing of an agreement between the two countries in January 2010 led to the gradual return and demobilisation of Chadian armed groups, although some pockets of resistance remain.

Despite the improvement of the situation in the country, in the political sphere the climate of repression and authoritarianism of Idriss Déby's regime remains in place. Over the course of the year there was a **gradual improvement in the security situation, which facilitated the return of thousands of internally displaced people**, according to a report by the IDMC in September. However, despite the normalisation of relations between Chad and Sudan and the growing stability, the United Nations declared that its capacity to monitor the situation and the attacks on the civilian population in the east had been reduced as a consequence of the withdrawal of the MINURCAT peacekeeping mission in 2010.

In the political sphere, on **22<sup>nd</sup> January the first local elections in the country's history were held**. The opposition formed a coalition to stand in the elections (the Coordination of Parties in Defence of the Constitution – CPDC), which aimed to oust the president's ruling party.

The supreme court confirmed on 22<sup>nd</sup> February that the ruling MPS party had won in 19 of the 43 municipal districts, although the opposition coalition CPDC alleged that electoral fraud had been committed. Meanwhile, the level of social and political tension remained high throughout the year. July saw the start of a strike by workers and civil servants who demanded wage rises in compliance with a 2011 agreement that the government had not implemented. The government ignored the demands. The strike had lasted for two months when in mid-September the unions decided to call it off after the church had mediated in order for an agreement to be reached. At the end of October a new three-day strike took place to demand the wage rises once again and on 12<sup>th</sup> October the government announced the expulsion of the Italian bishop Michel Russo due to his criticism of the management of oil revenues. Amnesty International and local human rights defenders urged the government in September to stop using the judiciary to silence and intimidate opposition politicians, trade unionists and journalists in the country when two union leaders and a journalist were sentenced to 18 months in prison after being found guilty of incitement to hatred and defamation. Other important developments included the agreement reached between the AU and Senegal in August for the creation of a special court to try the former president of Chad, Hissène Habré, accused of war crimes. In July, the International Court of Justice ordered Senegal to put on trial or extradite Habré, who has lived in Senegal since he fled Chad in 1990 as a consequence of the coup d'état staged by the current president, Idriss Déby.

Finally, the deterioration in the relations between France and Chad should also be mentioned. This occurred in early October when the French president, François Hollande, requested the reopening of the investigation into the disappearance in 2008 of the opposition leader Ibni Mahamat Saleh. Furthermore, also in October, Hollande cancelled a meeting that had been scheduled with Déby, who responded by not participating in the Francophonie summit held in Kinshasa on 14<sup>th</sup> October.

DR Congo	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political and social opposition and former armed opposition groups

#### Summary:

Between 1998 and 2003, what has been called "Africa's First World War" took place in DR Congo.<sup>9</sup> The signing of a series of peace agreements between 2002 and 2003 involved the withdrawal of foreign troops and the creation of

9. See the summary on DR Congo (east) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

a National Transitional Government (NTG), incorporating the former government, the political opposition, the RCD-Goma, RCD-K-ML, RCD-N and MLC armed groups, and the Mai Mai militias. From June 2003, the NTG was led by President Joseph Kabila and four vice presidents, two of whom belonged to the former insurgency: Azarias Ruberwa of the RCD-Goma and Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC. The NTG drew up the constitution, on which a referendum was held in December 2005. Legislative and presidential elections were held between July and October 2006, in which Kabila was elected president and Jean-Pierre Bemba came second, amid a climate of high tension and accusations of electoral fraud. The formation of the new government in 2007 failed to bring a halt to the instability and disputes taking place in the political sphere. The elections of November 2011, in which a series of irregularities were committed, fuelled the instability.

**The political crisis affecting DR Congo as a consequence of the electoral fraud that took place in November 2011 was eclipsed by the escalating violence occurred in the east of the country.** The authorities, which in April had announced the holding of provincial, urban, municipal and local elections for January 2013 suspended this schedule and decided to review it. The UN Security Council decided in June that the MONUSCO would support the organisation and holding of the provincial and local elections through the provision of technical and logistical support. The president, Joseph Kabila, appointed Aubin Minaku as president of the national assembly and Augustin Matata Ponyo as prime minister, Matata Ponyo having previously served as economy and finance minister. The new prime minister stated that his government's priorities would be to stabilise the Congolese franc and to build infrastructures. The communication minister, Lambert Mende, had pointed out at the end of February that the provincial elections could not be held in 2012 unless international donors agreed to contribute the resources for their funding in time. Meanwhile, the mediation team for the electoral crisis, composed of the former president of Ghana, John Kufuor, and Reverend Jean-Paul Moka, leader of the Mouvement Bleu in DR Congo, criticised the inability of the Congolese political class to find common ground in order to find a way out of the current situation. The Congolese National Episcopal Conference (CENCO) expressed its willingness to establish dialogue between Congolese political leaders.

The supreme court announced the invalidation of 32 members of parliament elected in the legislative elections of November 2011, although this decision had no bearing on the electoral results and the political balance in the national assembly, where the coalition headed by President Kabila retains an absolute majority. The ruling Alliance for the Presidential Majority coalition (AMP), had won 340 of the 482 seats already officially

announced, out of a total of 500 seats. The main opposition party, Étienne Tshisekedi's UDPS, announced that it would boycott the national assembly, although some of its elected candidates did officially register as members of parliament, arguing the need to carry out political opposition from within parliament, a decision that created a split within the party.

In March, the Human Rights Office of the **MONUSCO published a report accusing the security forces of carrying out extrajudicial executions and arbitrary arrests** following the November elections. Finally, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued the first guilty verdict in the ten years that it has been operating and **sentenced Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, leader of the armed group UPC, to 30 years in prison for war crimes**, mainly the recruitment of child soldiers in the Ituri region in 2002 and 2003. This is the first sentence of the seven cases being investigated by the ICC, all focused on African countries.<sup>10</sup>

DR Congo – Rwanda – Uganda	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Identity, Government, Resources International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Governments of DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda

**Summary:**

Between 1998 and 2003, “Africa’s First World War” took place in DR Congo, so called due to the participation of up to eight countries from the region.<sup>11</sup> The signing of a series of peace agreements between 2002 and 2003 led to the withdrawal of hostile foreign troops (mainly Rwanda and Uganda). They justified their presence on the basis of the existence of insurgent groups in Congolese territory, which they aimed to eliminate, given the lack of willingness shown by the Congolese armed forces to do so. In the meantime, they controlled and pillaged the natural resources in the east of the country. With the goal of furthering its own interests, DR Congo has supported these hostile groups in Rwanda and Uganda, mainly the FDLR, which caused the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Relations between the three countries have been made difficult due to the existence of these groups and the failure to implement the agreements to demobilise or eliminate them, have experienced ups and downs.

**Relations between the three countries deteriorated gravely after the UN Group of Experts and Human Rights Watch stated that Rwanda and Uganda had provided support for the Congo’s M23 rebels.** Both countries denied the accusations. The situation met with a varied response by the international community, with some countries withdrawing the aid that they allocated to Rwanda when they received the information on its support

10. See chapter 4 (Gender).  
11. See the summary on DR Congo (east) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).



of the Congolese rebels. In November the Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, visited Kampala to hold a meeting with his Congolese and Ugandan counterparts after the Congolese armed group M23 took control of the city of Goma. Meanwhile, the disappointment expressed by Uganda, even threatening to reconsider its participation in UN peacekeeping missions (of which it is an important contributor), after being accused of supporting the M23 rebels, led the president of the UN Security Council, H.S. Puri to declare that the information that appeared in the report by the UN Group of Experts did not necessarily represent the UN's official stance on the issue, since the report was still at the draft stage and still had to be submitted for consideration by the Committee on Sanctions of the UN concerning DR Congo. The Rwandan government accused the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) of shooting over the border in Gisenyi, injuring three civilians. Furthermore, a Congolese soldier was killed and several Rwandans were injured in early November in Kibumba, near Goma, when a group of Congolese soldiers crossed the border with Rwanda. Both countries urged restraint, declaring that this was an isolated incident that did not affect bilateral relations, which had become tense as a result of recent developments.

On the eve of taking up a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Rwanda announced that it was not prepared to tolerate accusations of this kind in its capacity as Security Council member, a position that it will hold for the next two years, and signalled that it would use its membership to promote actions aimed at fostering dialogue and peace in DR Congo. The US president, Barack Obama, urged the Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, to withdraw his support of the M23 rebels, declaring that support of the armed group went against the desire for peace and stability in Rwanda. Furthermore, Obama called on Kagame to end the support of the armed groups present in DR Congo once and for all, to respect the agreements reached with the presidents of DR Congo and Uganda, and to reach a transparent and credible political agreement that makes it possible, among other things, to end the impunity enjoyed by the M23 commanders and other military leaders who have committed crimes against humanity. Days earlier, Radio Okapi had reported that soldiers of the Rwandan armed forces had entered Congolese territory on 12<sup>th</sup> December through the border posts of Kasizi and Kanyanja, in the north of Goma, towards the area of the Nyragongo volcano, an area currently occupied by the M23 rebels.

In December the AU met in Addis Abeba to consider a proposal concerning the establishment and deployment of a new international peacekeeping force in DR Congo, the Neutral International Force (NIF). The meeting was also attended by regional leaders and representatives of the EU, the ECCAS, the SADC and the UN Security

***Relations between DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda deteriorated after the UN Group of Experts and Human Rights Watch stated that Rwanda and Uganda had provided support for the Congo's M23 rebels.***

Council. The MONUSCO, with 19,000 soldiers stationed in the country, has been criticised for its passive approach. Hervé Ladsous, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, informed the UN Security Council of the possibility of modifying the mandate of the MONUSCO with the goal of enabling it to combat the M23 rebels. The member countries of the SADC met in Tanzania at a summit of heads of state prior to the meeting in Addis Abeba and decided to send 4,000 soldiers for the new mission to be set up in DR Congo. As such, at the summit held on 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> December, the AU discussed the deployment of the NIF and the strengthening of the Expanded Joint Verification Mission (EJVM), which monitors the border.

Rwanda	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Identity, Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, FDLR armed group, political opposition, dissident sectors of the RPF ruling party, Rwandan diaspora in DR Congo and in the West

**Summary:**

The arrival of Belgian colonialism in 1916 exacerbated the ethnic differences between the majority Hutu community and the Tutsi minority. The latter was considered superior and held political, economic and social power in the country with the blessing of Belgium to the detriment of the majority of the population. This situation stirred up great resentment and by 1959 the first outbreaks of ethnic-political violence against the Tutsi community had taken place. Following independence in 1962, the Hutu community took power. 1990 marked the start of an armed conflict between the RPF armed group, led by the Tutsi community in Uganda, having fled in 1959, and the Hutu government, although an agreement was reached in 1993. This agreement was not respected. Between April and June 1994, extremist Hutu groups carried out the genocide of around one million people, mostly Tutsi but also moderate Hutu, abandoned by the international community, which withdrew the UN mission that was supposed to supervise the agreement. The RPF managed to overthrow and expel the genocidal government, committing serious violations of human rights. Some sectors of the population refer to this as a second internal genocide, in addition to the crimes committed by the RPF in Congolese territory as it persecuted those responsible for the 1994 genocide (the former Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe militias, rechristened as the FDLR) and the two million Rwandan refugees who had fled to DR Congo. Since then, the president, Paul Kagame, has ruled in an authoritarian manner, repressing political dissidence.

**The unstable situation in the east of DR Congo and Rwanda's involvement in the conflict of the neighbouring**



country came under the spotlight of the international community and entailed consequences for Rwanda.<sup>12</sup> Despite widespread international condemnation for its role in DR Congo, in October the country obtained a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council as African representative for the next two years. In parallel, **the Rwandan government continued to restrict the political space in 2012, which was clear to see in the trial of the opposition leader Victoire Ingabire.** In April, Ingabire withdrew from the trial in which she is accused of denying the genocide that occurred in the country and of participating in terrorist activities, arguing that there was a lack of judicial independence and that defence witnesses were being intimidated. The trial was prolonged and the verdict was postponed from June to 30<sup>th</sup> October. Finally she was sentenced to **eight years in prison for denying genocide.** In June, President Paul Kagame officially announced the closing of the Gacaca courts, part of a community justice system, considered a success by the government. However, several opposition sectors and organisations for the defence of human rights had stated that the Gacaca courts were being used to mete out revenge and to seize the land and assets of the alleged perpetrators of human rights violations. Furthermore, Amnesty International published a new report stating that the Rwandan secret services were making illegal arrests and torturing detainees.<sup>13</sup> In August, an opposition group in exile asked The Hague to bring charges against Kagame.

Meanwhile, **several grenade explosions occurred, especially in the first quarter of the year,** for which nobody claimed responsibility. At the end of March there were three explosions. The first killed one person and injured five in Musanze, while the other two injured six in Kigali. Another explosion in the Muhanga district killed ten people on 24<sup>th</sup> January. The police announced that two people had died and another 16 were injured in a grenade explosion close to a market in Kigali's Gasabo district at the start of January. Since early 2010, 11 grenade explosions have occurred in Kigali, claiming seven lives and injuring 100 people. The high court sentenced ten people to life imprisonment for their involvement in a series of grenade attacks carried out in Kigali in 2010. Some of the accused were former soldiers with alleged links to the Rwandan armed opposition group FDLR, which is present in the neighbouring DR Congo.

Nevertheless, the explosions ceased in the second quarter of the year, which some analysts related to the offensive carried out by the Congolese armed group M23, supported by Rwanda. This development came under the spotlight of the international community, which domestically gave Rwanda an opportunity to tighten

its control of dissidents and corner them even more. According to some conspiracy theories the government carried out the explosions to create chaos in order to justify the threat of the internal enemy and to silence critics.

Sudan – South Sudan <sup>14</sup>	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Identity, Resources, Territory International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Sudan, South Sudan

**Summary:**

On 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011, South Sudan declared its independence as the culmination of the peace process that began with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. However, the creation of a new nation did not put an end to the disagreements between Khartoum and Juba due to the large number of issues pending resolution between the two governments. The main obstacles to stability include the dispute over the oil-rich enclave of Abyei and the final delimitation of the border between the two nations, along with the lack of an agreement on the exploitation of oil resources (oil fields are located in South Sudan but pipelines for oil export are located in Sudan). Mutual accusations regarding the support of insurgent movements in the neighbouring country have contributed to destabilising the situation even further and to threatening the peaceful coexistence of the two countries.

Over the course of the year there continued to be a high level of tension between the two countries, in parallel with progress in the peace process.<sup>15</sup> According to the UN Secretary-General's November report, the security situation along the border separating Sudan and South Sudan remained tense. The armed forces of the two countries clashed on several occasions. The Sudanese air force even bombed areas close to oil wells and towns in the border states of South Sudan. However, the number of reports of cross-border incidents gradually fell after the approval of Resolution 2046 (2012) of the UN Security Council in May, which urged the two countries to agree a ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops and the independent monitoring of the area. Many of the reported violations could not be confirmed due to the limited access of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to the border areas of the country and to the fact that the United Nations had no presence on the Sudanese side of the border, in the country's South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

As regards the peace process, several meetings and rounds of negotiations took place between Sudan and

12. See the summary on DR Congo – Rwanda – Uganda in this chapter.  
 13. Amnesty International, *Rwanda: Shrouded in Secrecy: Illegal Detention and Torture by Military Intelligence*, October 8, 2012, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/004/2012/en/ca2e51a2-1c3f-4bb4-b7b9-e44ccbb2b8de/afr470042012en.pdf>.  
 14. The socio-political crisis between Sudan and South Sudan has been addressed under the name "Sudan" in previous editions of Alert. The independence of South Sudan on 9th July 2011 also meant a change in the classification of the socio-political crisis, from internal to international.  
 15. See chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

South Sudan, in parallel with growing pressure from the international community. However, it was not until 27<sup>th</sup> September that a partial agreement was reached on security and economic relations, with the mediation of the High-Level Implementation Panel of the AU. In addition to the official mediator of the AU, Thabo Mbeki, the USA and China had considerable influence over the peace talks. The first meeting since April took place in July during the AU summit in Addis Abeba. **Juba had decided to halt oil production in the first quarter, due to the lack of progress in the negotiations** on the fees to be paid for the use of Sudan's oil infrastructures for the transit and export of the oil extracted in South Sudan. The measure **was seen as a strategy to put pressure on Khartoum to accept an agreement.** The UN Security Council had announced that if the two sides had not reached an agreement by 22<sup>nd</sup> September it would impose sanctions. The agreement that was finally reached enabled the resumption of oil exports and the establishment of a plan for the demilitarisation of the common border, thus preventing the outbreak of war. The parliaments of the two countries ratified the agreement, despite the incidents and protests against it. Although the status of the Abyei region is yet to be defined, the Sudanese government stated that it was willing to take part in the meeting of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC), which was held on 22<sup>nd</sup> November. The AJOC is entrusted with implementing the decisions made regarding the Abyei dispute and constitutes the forum for discussing the proposal put forward by the AU, which consists of holding a referendum in October 2013 in the region under dispute, in which only members of the Messiria community who reside in Abyei may take part.

However, the implementation of the agreements remains stalled. To make the situation worse, Sudan was accused by South Sudan of launching a series of air attacks on the other side of the border, of executing five people in Bahr el-Ghazal at the end of December, and of carrying out a coordinated attack involving the SAF and the Popular Defence Forces militias in the Raja County, killing 32 soldiers (the number of civilian deaths is unknown) and injuring dozens of people. This attack took place days before the summit scheduled for early January 2013 in Addis Abeba in order for the two countries to make a fresh attempt to overcome their mutual hostility and implement the agreements reached to date, following the insistence and pressure of the international community, along with the mediation of the former South African president, Thabo Mbeki. South Sudan requested the intervention of the UN Security Council, while Sudan accused South Sudan once again of supporting the SPLM-N in two border states, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Uganda	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social and political opposition

#### Summary:

President Yoweri Museveni has been in power since 1986, when he led an insurgency in the overthrow of Milton Obote's government. Since then he has governed Uganda through an authoritarian regime that is highly unusual on the continent, a "one-party democracy" where all power is concentrated in the hands of Museveni and the NRM (the Movement). In the 2001 presidential elections, Museveni beat the main opposition candidate, Kizza Besigye, former colonel of the NRM, amid accusations of fraud. In a referendum held in July 2005, the Ugandans voted in favour of a return to the multi-party system. Following an amendment to the constitution in 2005 to increase the number of permitted presidential terms from two to three, Museveni finally won the 2006 elections, amid serious accusations of fraud. These were the first multi-party elections since Museveni seized power in 1986. In the presidential elections of 2011 Museveni once again emerged victorious over his long-standing opponent and former ally, Kizza Besigye, amid fresh accusations of fraud, which has generated an escalation of social tension and government repression of demands for democratic change and protests against the rise in the cost of living.

**The social and political unrest in Uganda continued throughout the year**, in parallel with a situation of growing instability in the east of neighbouring DR Congo.<sup>16</sup> **The UN Group of Experts accused Uganda and Rwanda of supporting the Congo rebel group M23.** As regards internal instability, the government outlawed the pressure group Activists for Change (A4C) and accused its leaders of fostering political violence. This triggered a series of protests against the government, especially in the early part of the year. In a protest held in mid-January the police briefly detained the opposition leader Kizza Besigye and several of his supporters during an anti-government march in the capital, Kampala. Members of the opposition stated that the protests would continue until the government agreed to consider their demands. In February Besigye suffered minor injuries when the police broke up a demonstration staged by his supporters in Kampala. At the end of March, the death of a police officer in clashes between the police and members of the opposition coalition, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), during a demonstration, sparked a wave of arrests and Besigye was accused of holding an illegal assembly. In parallel, the opposition leader Ingrid Turinawe, of the FDC, was sexually assaulted and arrested in April when she attended an A4C demonstration in Kampala. The police officer responsible was later suspended. Meanwhile, General Mugisha Muntu was elected president of the FDC coalition in the congress held in November, narrowly beating Nandala Mafabi, with whom

16. See the summary on DR Congo – Rwanda – Uganda in this chapter.

he must agree positions in order to prevent splits in the party, according to several analysts.

The news of the embezzlement of around three million dollars by the prime minister's office that should have gone to the northern Uganda reconstruction ministry triggered a political storm, with the suspension in October of aid from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway and Denmark and the launch of an official investigation. In August, Museveni reshuffled the government, reinstating three senior civil servants accused of corruption. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, visited the country in early August and called for a strengthening of democratic institutions. In June the police broke up a meeting held in defence of gay rights and arrested five participants, on government orders, while in the same month 30 NGOs were prohibited from promoting homosexuality. Furthermore, the government announced at the end of 2012 that it would pass legislation to outlaw homosexuality. It also threatened to expel the international NGO Oxfam for accusing the government of appropriating land and demanded an official apology.

#### b) Horn of Africa

Eritrea	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government, Self-government, Identity Internationalized internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, internal political and social opposition, EDA political-military opposition coalition (EPDF, EFD, EIPJD, ELF, EPC, DMLEK, RSADO, ENSF, EIC, Nahda), other groups

#### Summary:

The single-party regime that has remained in place in Eritrea since 1993 (the former insurgency that contributed to the collapse of Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime in Ethiopia in 1991), is highly authoritarian in nature, silencing and suppressing the political opposition. The government, led by the old guard from the time of independence, has a series of opposition movements to contend with that are calling for progress in democracy and the governability of the country, respect for ethnic minorities and a greater degree of self-government. They also demand official language status for Arabic, an end to the marginalisation of Islam in the country and a halt to the cultural imposition of the Tigray community, or *Tygranisation*, carried out by the PFDJ, which controls all the mechanisms of power. This situation, added to Eritrea's policy in the region of the Horn of Africa, has led the country towards increasing isolationism. In December 2009 the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo, air travel ban and asset freeze on the country's highest-ranking officials due to their support of the Somali armed group al-Shabaab.

The climate of tension in Eritrea persisted throughout the year. The opposition group RSADO once again called on the civilian population, the army and opposition movements to carry out an uprising with the goal of overthrowing the regime of Isaias Afewerki. The RSADO leader, Ibrahim Haron, in exile in Ethiopia, stated that Eritrea was immersed in an unprecedented political, economic, social and human rights crisis, and that it was witnessing a significant and growing split between political and military leaders. In October the RSADO accused the Eritrea government of forcing the displacement of the Afar community far from its ancestral lands by carrying out the targeted displacement of this ethnic group from Galalo, in the north of Dankalia. The objective, according to the RSADO is to replace the indigenous population in Galalo with settlers of the Tigray community, which is dominant in the country. Consequently, the RSADO urged the UN Security Council to implement in full the sanctions set forth in Resolution 1970, of 2010.

**At the start of the year the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group of the arms embargo of the UN (SEMG) denied the accusations that Eritrea was breaching the arms embargo on Somalia by supplying weapons to the Islamist armed group al-Shabaab at the end of 2011, which had contributed to the imposition of the arms embargo on Eritrea. In July, the Monitoring Group stated that in the preceding months it had not found any evidence to back up the accusations that Eritrea was directly supporting al-Shabaab.**<sup>17</sup> According to the group, this was due to frictions between al-Shabaab and the Eritrean authorities and to the pressure being imposed on the group and on Eritrea by the international community. The Eritrean government demanded the lifting of the sanctions since it had been shown that its support of al-Shabaab was invented by Ethiopia. The report also stated that the arms embargo affected the operability of its air force, which had been reduced by a third. Furthermore, it describes the involvement of high-ranking officers of the Eritrean security services in the trafficking of arms and people from Eritrea to Egypt (Sinai) via Sudan, en route to Israel, generating significant profits. The report highlighted that these migrants were routinely captured, tortured, raped and executed, while their kidnappers demand the payment of sums of money. Meanwhile, the authorities imposed significant taxes on members of the Eritrean diaspora who send money to the country, as well as threatening and intimidating their family members in Eritrea.

On other matters, mid-February saw the disappearance of the important opposition figure Mohammed Ali Ibrahim, member of the Central Council of the Eritrean People's Democratic Party (EPDP), having sought refuge

17. UN Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)*, July 13, 2012, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/545](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/545).

in the city of Kassala, in eastern Sudan. Many analysts suspect that the Eritrean secret agents were behind the disappearance. The opposition group accused the Sudanese government of colluding in the kidnapping. Meanwhile, in April the government denied reports on the deteriorating health of the president, Isaias Afewerki, who appeared on Eritrean national television in attempt to quash the rumours. In parallel, relations between the USA and Eritrea worsened still further following the announcement by the USA in mid-May of the suspension of diplomatic and consular services in Eritrea, in response to Eritrea's refusal to guarantee the visas of American diplomatic personnel.

Eritrea – Ethiopia	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Territory International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Eritrea, Ethiopia

#### Summary:

In 1993, Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia, although the border between the two countries was not clearly demarcated, which led to clashes between 1998 and 2000 that claimed 100,000 lives. In June 2000 the two countries signed an agreement for the ending of hostilities, the UN Security Council set up the UNMEE mission to supervise it and the Algiers Peace Agreement was signed in December. Under the terms of this accord they agreed to abide by the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), which was entrusted with delimiting and demarcating the border on the basis of the relevant colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and international law. In April 2002 the EEBC announced its ruling, which assigned the border town of Badme (epicentre of the war and currently governed by Ethiopia) to Eritrea, a decision that was rejected by Ethiopia. At the end of 2005, Eritrea decided to restrict the operations of the UNMEE, frustrated by the lack of progress made in implementing the EEBC ruling, due to the fact that insufficient pressure was exerted on Ethiopia to ensure its fulfilment, which forced the withdrawal of the UNMEE in 2008. A year before this, the EEBC had completed its work without being able to fulfil its mandate due to the obstacles placed in its path by Ethiopia, leading to the stalemate that has endured ever since.

**The dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia escalated over the course of the year. In March the Ethiopian armed forces launched an attack in Eritrea on three military bases in Ramid, Gelahb and Gimbe, advancing some ten miles into Eritrean territory. Ethiopia justified this military action stating that**

Eritrea had been using these bases to train Ethiopian insurgent groups, specifically, the ARDUF group (insurgent group formed by members of Ethiopia's Afar community, with bases in Eritrea), which in January executed five foreign tourists and kidnapped two others in the Ethiopian region of Afar. This is the first time that Ethiopia has admitted military activities on Eritrean soil since the end of the war between the two countries, which lasted from 1998 to 2000. **Eritrea condemned this attack although it ruled out a military response.** Furthermore, it accused the USA of collaborating in the attack and asked the UN Security Council to condemn the incident. Although the UN Secretary-General and Washington asked the parties to show restraint and the UK expressed its concern, no international condemnations were forthcoming.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea<sup>19</sup> did confirm that Eritrea continued to breach resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009) by sheltering and training Ethiopian armed groups from the Ogaden region (ONLF) and from the Oromia region (OLF), whose leaders have their base in Asmara. In mid-April, Ethiopia levelled fresh accusations against Eritrea regarding the alleged kidnappings of Ethiopian miners who work in the goldmines of the Tigray region, in the north-east of the country. These accusations are related to the attack carried out on a group of tourists in January by the ARDUF, which the Ethiopian armed forces attempted to stop, resulting in the death of several tourists.<sup>20</sup> Eritrea subsequently accused Ethiopia of hindering its efforts to rejoin the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The Kenyan president, Mwai Kibaki, urged Eritrea to support the various peacebuilding initiatives in the region before attempting to rejoin the IGAD. Eritrea left the IGAD in 2007 after being accused by the organisation of not cooperating in regional peace initiatives and of being linked to actors with a destabilising role.

Given this situation, at the end of October the government of South Sudan announced its willingness to mediate between Eritrea and Ethiopia with the goal of resolving the border dispute between the two countries. The South Sudanese minister for cabinet affairs, Deng Alor, declared that Addis Ababa and Asmara had given the green light for the start of talks with the goal of resolving the dispute. In December, the new Ethiopian prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, stated his willingness to hold direct talks with Eritrea to resolve the border dispute. Desalegn even stated that he was prepared to travel to the Eritrean capital to discuss the dispute in an interview with al-Jazeera.

18. Simon Tisdall, "Eritrea is an easy target for Ethiopia", *The Guardian*, March 19, 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/mar/19/eritrea-ethiopia-isaias-afewerki>.

19. UN Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)*, July 13, 2012, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/545](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/545).

20. See the summary on Ethiopia in this chapter.



Ethiopia	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government (EPRDF coalition, led by the TPLF), political and social opposition

#### Summary:

The regime that has governed in Ethiopia since 1991 is having to contend with a series of opposition movements that are calling for progress in democracy and the governance of the country, along with a higher degree of self-government. The EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) governmental coalition is controlled by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) party, of the Tigrayan minority that rules the country with increasing authoritarianism and with the consent of the Amhara elites. There is discontent in the country with the ethnic federal regime implemented by the EPRDF, which has not resolved the national issue, leading to the consolidation of a strong political and social opposition. Some political-military sectors consider ethnic federalism to be insufficient to meet their nationalist demands, while other sectors from the ruling classes and with a presence throughout the country consider ethnic federalism to be a stumbling block to consolidating the nation state. In parallel to this, there are demands for the democratisation of institutions. In the 2005 elections this wide-ranging opposition proved to be a real challenge for the EPRDF, which was unwilling to accept multi-party competition and fiercely put down post-election protests.

The most noteworthy development of the year was the **illness and subsequent death of the prime minister, Meles Zenawi**, in August, following months of speculation over the state of his health. This development may have far-reaching national and regional consequences, according to several analysts. Meles Zenawi, who had led the country for the previous 21 years, created the insurgent group of the Tigray region, TPLF, and together with other elites of the Amhara community established the EPRDF alliance, which managed to overthrow Mengistu's dictatorship in 1991 and governed the country in a climate of authoritarianism, showing little respect for human rights. He became the main regional ally of the West, especially the US, due to his policy of combating Islamist terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Once Zenawi's health began to deteriorate, the deputy prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, who had also been foreign minister since 2010, temporarily fulfilled prime ministerial duties. Following Zenawi's death, the EPRDF held an extraordinary congress in September in which Desalegn was appointed on a permanent basis.

***Ethiopia admitted carrying out a military attack on Eritrean soil, the first since the end of the war between the two countries that lasted from 1998 to 2000***

Two of Desalegn's most important early decisions were the release in September of the two Swedish journalists arrested in 2011 for supporting terrorism and the start of peace talks with the ONLF, the armed group of the Ogaden region.<sup>21</sup> The International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report stating that the Ethiopian political system was becoming increasingly unstable due to the growing repressive tactics of the TPLF, which had made a U-turn on the policy of ethnic federalism and was moving towards a system of greater political centralisation. This approach has closed off avenues for channelling grievances and for accommodating the multi-ethnic and multinational reality of the country.<sup>22</sup> According to the analyst Roland Marchal, of France's *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)*, **the main threat to the stability of Ethiopia may come from the EPRDF government coalition itself.**

In parallel, over the course of the year, government pressure on the opposition and the media grew, mainly through the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and the Charities and Societies Law, both of which were passed in 2009. A group of international NGOs urged Ethiopia to state its commitment to safeguarding and promoting human rights following its election in November as representative, together with other countries, of the African Group of the UN Human Rights Council, taking up its seat in January 2013. The manifesto of the NGOs highlights their concern over the law governing NGOs in the country. In October, the agency that regulates the sector closed ten NGOs in application of the law and warned that a further 400 agencies were operating in breach of the rules and regulations of the country. The NGOs also expressed their concern over the anti-terrorism law, the application of which has led to the persecution of dissidents and journalists who are critical of the government. Human rights defence groups declared that some 150 people have been arrested since 2009 as a consequence of this law, including ten journalists, two of whom were the Swedish reporters released in September. Through this law, Ethiopia also declared several groups as terrorist organisations: the ONLF, the OLF, Ginbot 7 (a movement in exile), al-Qaeda and the Somalian armed group al-Shabaab.

Last of all, the growing pressure on the country's Muslim minority must be mentioned. According to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), which promotes religious freedom, this may have a counter-productive effect and destabilise the country. Over the course of the year several incidents occurred, such as the death in October of a police officer and two Muslim demonstrators in the town of Gerba, in the South Wollo Zone (Amhara state), in clashes between demonstrators and the federal

21. See chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts) and chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

22. International Crisis Group, *Ethiopia After Meles*, Africa Briefing no. 89, August 22, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia-eritrea/b089-ethiopia-after-meles.aspx>.



police during the elections for the Muslim council. Dozens of people were also injured in these clashes. The police described the demonstrators who had been killed as Muslim extremists. In May the police executed four Muslims in the town of Asossa in Oromia state, and in July arrested 71 Muslim demonstrators during the summit held by the AU in Addis Ababa. The police stated that those arrested were attempting to create an “extremist group”.

Kenya	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Identity, Government, Resources, Self-government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, ethnic-based militias, political and social opposition (political parties, civil society organisations), SLDF, Mungiki sect, al-Shabaab Somalian armed group

#### Summary:

Kenya's politics and economy have been dominated since its independence in 1963 by the KANU party, controlled by the largest community in the country, the Kikuyu, to the detriment of the remaining ethnic groups. In 2002, the authoritarian and kleptocratic Daniel Arap Moi, who had held power for 24 years, was defeated by Mwai Kibaki on the back of promises to end corruption and redistribute wealth in a poor agricultural country whose growth is based on tourism. However, Kibaki's subsequent broken promises fostered a climate of frustration, which meant that the opposition leader Raila Odinga became a threat to Kibaki's hegemony of power. Odinga did not base his campaign on tribal affiliation but rather on change and on the building of a fairer society. The electoral fraud that took place in 2007 sparked an outbreak of violence in which 1,300 people died and some 300,000 were displaced. This situation led to an agreement between the two sectors through which a fragile government of national unity was created. In parallel, several areas of the country were affected by inter-community disputes over land ownership, also instigated politically during the electoral period. Furthermore, the illegal activities of the Mungiki sect, Kenya's military intervention in Somalia has triggered attacks by the Somalian armed group al-Shabaab in Kenya and the subsequent animosity towards the Somalian population in Kenya, presenting a challenge to the country's stability. Another factor in 2012 has been the growing government pressure on the secessionist movement Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), whose goal is the independence of the country's coastal region.

Over the course of the year the political and social situation in the country deteriorated as a consequence of several factors.<sup>23</sup> **The proximity of the general elections, scheduled for March 2013, increased concern that a period of instability** similar to the one that occurred in 2007 might be triggered. Some of the

measures related to post-election agreements aimed at preventing electoral fraud from reoccurring, such as the electronic registration of voters, were abandoned and the population continued to be exploited for political purposes. Two of the main political leaders, and candidates for the presidential elections, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, former economy and education ministers, respectively, together with four other people, were accused of crimes against humanity and summoned to appear before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2013, one month after the elections. This poses the potential problem of them not appearing since they are standing together for the elections. If they win they may refuse to meet the request of the ICC.

Meanwhile, **the government stepped up the pressure on the secessionist movement Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)**, carrying out a wave of arrests. Although the supreme court ruled in June that the group was legal and could carry out its functions (having been declared illegal by the government in 2010), four months later a local court, at the government's behest, ruled that the group was illegal and ordered the police to arrest its leaders. Finally, the government called on the MRC to register as a political party and abandon its secessionist stance. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Kenya's military intervention in Somalia in October 2011 led **al-Shabaab and sympathisers in Kenya to step up their activities**, as a punishment for the intervention. This triggered growing animosity towards Somalians in the country, especially in the capital, Nairobi. Added to this was the increasing pressure placed by the government on the significant Muslim minority in the country, which could be seen in the new anti-terrorism law, condemned by Muslim organisations and human rights defenders as discriminatory. In August the leader of the extremist group Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), Aboud Rogo Mohammed, was assassinated in Mombasa, triggering strong protests, while in November a bus exploded as it travelled through the suburb of Eastleigh, dubbed *Little Mogadishu*, a predominantly Somali district, which sparked grave reprisals against this community, including the burning and sacking of shops, assaults and even the rape of nine women.

Another noteworthy incident was the death of more than **120 people and the displacement of 30,000 people, according to the Kenyan Red Cross, as a consequence of the clashes between militias of the Pokomo and Oromo communities in the Tana River** district, in the east of the country. The clashes began in mid-August as a consequence of disputes over the ownership and use of land. The violence in cattle-raising areas in the north of Kenya had caused 350 fatalities in 2011, a higher figure than in 2010, when 179 people were killed. Among other factors, this increase was due to the impact of the drought that affected the area in 2011.

23. See “Kenya faced with growing instability in 2013” in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).

Somalia (Somaliland – Puntland)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Territory Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Republic of Somaliland, Autonomous region of Puntland, Khatumo state

#### Summary:

The two regions have been involved in a dispute over the control of the border areas of Sool and Sanaag since 1998. Sool and Sanaag are geographically located within the borders of Somaliland, although most of the clans in the region are associated with those in Puntland. In December 2003 Puntland's armed forces took control of Las Anod, capital of the Sool region. Prior to this both Somaliland and Puntland had official representation in the city. Since then there sporadic clashes and mediation attempts have taken place.

The level of tension remained high in the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC), the control of which is disputed by Somaliland, Puntland and the SSC administration. There were important developments concerning this dispute in 2012. The Khatumo 2 conference was held in January in the historical city of Taleh, in the Sool region, bringing together traditional leaders of the Dhulbahante tribe and of the SSC administration, despite the threats of the government of the autonomous republic of Somaliland. **The meeting ended with the self-proclamation of a new autonomous region in Somalia, known as the Dervish state of Somalia or Khatumo state.** This process began in 2007. The name Dervish state refers to the Islamic entity created at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century by the historical leader Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, who became famous for impeding the colonial advance of the Italians, British and Ethiopians, until he was defeated in 1920 by the British Empire. Taleh has become the capital of the new state, with the support of Puntland.

The formation of the new state involved several meetings between the Federal Transitional Government of Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland to address tensions between them. **From this point there were significant clashes between the militia of the new autonomous entity and the security forces of Somaliland, which according to local sources resulted in dozens of fatalities on both sides.** In August a militia linked to the Khatumo administration reached Garowe (Puntland), announcing its desertion from the Khatumo administration due to its dissatisfaction with the leadership, subsequently joining Puntland. In this respect, relations between Puntland and Khatumo deteriorated in the second half of the year as a consequence of the transition process and the formation of the new government on a national level, since Puntland filled the quota for traditional leaders that corresponded to the Dulbahante sub-clan, to which the population of the new state belongs, along with part of the population of Puntland. This development led the traditional leaders of the sub-clan to address

the UN Secretary-General, asking him to resolve the issue, while at the same time accusing the UN Special Representative in Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, of having favoured Puntland.

### c) North Africa and the Maghreb

Algeria	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social and political opposition

#### Summary:

After living through a civil war that caused more than 150,000 deaths in the 1990s, Algeria still has to contend with armed conflict, now in the shape of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which originated as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. Since 1999 the country has been governed by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, re-elected in 2004 and 2009 after removing the limit to the number of presidential terms that can be served. Power is concentrated in the hands of the president, while parliament is considered a mere advisory body. Poverty, unemployment, corruption and deficient public services have increased discontent among the population in recent years. In this context, the uprisings in North Africa in early 2011 encouraged mobilisations against the Algerian regime. The government has adopted a twin strategy: on the one hand, the repression and deterrence of demonstrations and, on the other hand, the announcement of measures to curb the public discontent, including the lifting of the state of emergency, in force in the country since 1992.

Over the course of 2012 there was a reduction in the level of unrest witnessed in Algeria in 2011 in the context of the Arab uprisings, although some incidents occurred that highlighted the internal tension in the country. During the first quarter there were some security incidents during demonstrations held to demand social improvements, which were violently put down by the security forces. In January the police forcibly dispersed protests in Laghouat, in south-east Algeria, injuring a dozen people and making more than 40 arrests. **In Tialet, in the west of the country, hundreds of people clashed with the police following the death of a salesman who set himself on fire after being intimidated by a group of police officers.** One of the key developments of the year was the holding of legislative elections in May, which were preceded by the government's approval of the formation of more than twenty political parties. Almost 17,500 male candidates and 7,500 female candidates stood in the elections, the first to be monitored by international observers. **The election results confirmed the prior status quo, with the victory of the two main parties of the ruling coalition:** the National Liberation Front (FLN) of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, which

obtained 220 of the 462 parliamentary seats, and the Rally for National Democracy, which obtained 68 seats. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was banned from taking part in the elections. Other Islamist parties that were grouped together as the Green Alliance and that expected better results (taking into account the progress made by Islamists in countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) claimed that electoral fraud had taken place. 145 women were elected to the new parliament. The EU observers validated the elections, despite some irregularities. Analysts reflected on voter turnout (42% according to the authorities, lower in the opinion of the opposition), underlining that part of the population would have preferred to abstain in order to show its disapproval of the political class, conscious of the fact that the elections would not lead to any changes and that the parliament is simply part of an institutional façade, since power is mainly concentrated in the hands of the military. During the second half of the year, the situation in Algeria was marked by the holding of regional elections, by the accusations of corruption made against three officials with close links to Bouteflika and by speculation over a “war of succession” in the upper echelons following the president’s announcement that he would not stand for re-election in 2014. In 2012 it was announced that the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances would monitor the investigation into the disappearances that took place during the civil war in the 1990s.

Mauritania	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Internationalised internal Government, System
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social and political opposition, AQIM, MUJAO

**Summary:**

Military coups have become the standard method of switching power in the country since its independence in 1960. After a 20 years government characterised by authoritarianism and repression directed especially at the country’s black African community, President Ould Taya was overthrown in a coup d’état in 2005. Two years later, Sidi Ould Sheik Abdallahi was elected president although the tensions related to the power struggle between various tribes and political sectors had not been neutralised, in a context of deep economic crisis and Jihadist threats. After leading a new coup d’état in 2008, Mohammed Ould Abdelaziz took office as president in 2009 in elections condemned as fraudulent by his critics. Since then there have been continued tensions between pro-government political forces and the opposition. In recent years, the situation in the country has also been affected by the actions of the Algerian group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in its territory, and by the government’s offensives against this

organisation in neighbouring countries. In 2008 AQIM called for the overthrow of the Mauritanian government, which it considered anti-Islamic. The opposition accuses Abdelaziz of using the fight against AQIM to justify the implementation of abusive laws and policies in the country.

The situation in Mauritania continued to be mainly determined by the internal protests against the government of Mohammed Ould Abdelaziz and by the security challenges posed by armed groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and more recently formed groups such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO). In March, AQIM freed a Mauritanian gendarme who was kidnapped in December 2011 in exchange for the release of one of the members of the insurgent group who had been arrested in Mauritania for the kidnapping of an Italian couple in 2009. This was an important development because it represented a change in strategy for the government of Abdelaziz, which had been reluctant to enter into negotiations or payments of any kind for the release of hostages. Over the ensuing months the focus of insurgent activity shifted towards the MUJAO, an organisation composed of militiamen of different nationalities, which stepped up its activities in Mali in 2012.<sup>24</sup> The alleged leader of the group, the Mauritanian Hamada Ould Mohammed Kheirou, has been arrested in Mauritania in the past for attacks on a mosque that, according to him, had strayed from true Islam. He founded the MUJAO in December 2011 due to an organisational dispute with the leadership of AQIM (related to the prevalence of Algerians in its high command) and not for ideological differences. In July the MUJAO freed three European aid workers in exchange for the release of Salafists held in Nouackchott prison and in exchange for a ransom running into the millions.

Over the course of the year protests against the government continued to take place, along with calls for the president’s resignation by the Coordination of a Democratic Opposition (COD) movement. The protests were especially significant on 25<sup>th</sup> February, on the first anniversary of the demonstrations against the regime during the Arab Spring. The police forcibly dispersed the dissident sectors and arrested several activists. Meanwhile, sectors of the opposition reported an increase in the use of repressive tactics since the new director of security took up his post. The COD organised further protests over the following months, which were also forcibly dispersed, and refused to acknowledge the electoral commission entrusted with monitoring the future elections in the country, due to the fact that the director of the body was appointed by presidential decree. Demonstrations against slavery in the country also took place. In the second half of the year the situation in the country was affected by uncertainty over the president, who was recovering from

24. See the summary on Mali (north) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

bullet wounds suffered in an alleged accident when he was travelling with his official convoy. Suspicions were raised in various sectors of Mauritanian society that the incident had been an attempted assassination. Abdelaziz spent more than a month recovering in France and did not return to Mauritania until the end of November. During his absence some senior officials reportedly met opposition forces to draw up a plan for the post-Abdelaziz era. However, many analysts pointed out that the president enjoys the support of France and the US governments because he is considered a key figure for ensuring the stability of the region, especially in the context of the crisis affecting northern Mali. The president had repeated that Mauritania would not take part in a military operation in the neighbouring country, a stance that coincided with that of the opposition leader, Ould Daddah. Nevertheless, following the start of the French operation in Mali in January 2013, Abdelaziz made Mauritanian troops available and ordered the military strengthening of the border. Another noteworthy development in 2012 in Mauritania was the severe humanitarian crisis caused by the drought, added to the impact of the Malian crisis, which saw the arrival in Mauritania of more than 54,000 refugees.

Morocco	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Monarchy, government, social and political opposition

**Summary:**

A French protectorate from 1912 to 1956, power in Morocco passed into the hands of King Mohammed V, who was succeeded by his son Hassan II in 1961. This monarch's rule lasted almost four decades and was characterised by the strong repression of internal dissidence. The truth commission set up to investigate human rights violations committed during his reign identified almost 10,000 cases. He was succeeded by his son Mohammed VI, who was seen as a moderniser. The monarchy has implemented economic liberalisation measures and has retained political power, keeping civil rights restrictions in place. In early 2011, with uprisings taking place across North Africa, thousands of Moroccans mobilised to demand political reforms, the imposition of limits on the king's power and an end to corruption in the country. In this context, Rabat implemented a reform of the constitution and brought forward the elections that swept the Islamist forces to power.

The situation in Morocco was characterised by ongoing unrest, although with a reduction in the level of protests and violent incidents in respect of 2011. Demonstrations

continued throughout the year, even after the new government took office in January, led by the Islamist Party for Justice and Development (PJD). The cabinet headed by Prime Minister Abdelahi Benikrane was formed in parallel to a team of royal advisers made up of friends of King Mohammed VI and outgoing ministers, perceived as a parallel cabinet. Benikrane criticised the royal setting and warned that the Arab uprisings had not ended. **The social protests were related to demands for measures to combat corruption, the release of political prisoners, economic development, jobs for young people and reforms, in particular of the penal code**, following the suicide of a minor who had been forced to marry her rapist. During the first half of the year, several violent incidents took place during these protests. In Taza and Rif, in the north of the country, several people were injured as a result of police brutality and/or during clashes with the security forces. In the capital, Rabat, five young people attempted to set themselves on fire after taking part in a sit-in against unemployment in front of the interior ministry. One of them died as a result of his injuries. The commemoration of the first anniversary of the mass uprisings against the regime of 20<sup>th</sup> February, which led to the creation of the movement of the same name (20F), also saw an increase in tension. Some of the most noteworthy incidents in the second half of the year were those that took place in Ouarzazte, in the middle of the country, when the police violently put down protests by university students and miners. The king granted a pardon in February to the Islamist leaders and leaders of the 20F movement. However, over the ensuing months reports continued to surface of politically motivated arrests and of harsh sentences being handed down to activists, including long jail sentences, for alleged crimes such as occupying a public area or taking part in non-authorised demonstrations. In 2012 the NGO **Human Rights Watch (HRW) called on Rabat to investigate reports on the torture of activists by the police** and asked the new authorities in the country to put a stop to the violence of the security forces, to review the restrictive laws on human rights and to ensure the independence of the judiciary if they intended to fulfil the commitments undertaken in the new constitution, passed in 2011. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Méndez, also criticised the excessive use of force against demonstrators and called on Rabat to put a stop to this abuse.

Morocco – Western Sahara	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity, Territory International <sup>25</sup>
<b>Main parties:</b>	Morocco, SADR, POLISARIO Front

25. Although Western Sahara is not an internationally recognised state, the socio-political crisis between Morocco and Western Sahara is considered "international" and not "internal" since it is a territory which has yet to be decolonised and Morocco's claims to the territory are not recognised by international law or by any United Nations resolution.



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**Summary:**

The roots of the conflict can be traced to the end of Spanish colonial rule in Western Sahara in the mid-1970s. The splitting of the territory between Morocco and Mauritania without taking into account the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people or the commitment to a referendum on independence in the area led to a large part of the territory being annexed by Rabat, forcing the displacement of thousands of Sahrawi citizens, who sought refuge in Algeria. In 1976, the POLISARIO Front, a nationalist movement, declared a government in exile (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic - SADR) and launched an armed campaign against Morocco. Both parties accepted a peace plan in 1988 and since 1991 the UN mission in the Sahara, MINURSO, has been monitoring the ceasefire and is responsible for organising a referendum for self-determination in the territory. In 2007 Morocco presented the UN with a plan for the autonomy of Western Sahara but the POLISARIO Front demands a referendum that includes the option of independence.

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The conflict between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front over the Western Sahara followed the trend of the previous year, with no significant progress in talks between the parties, despite several rounds of contacts taking place over the course of 2012.<sup>26</sup> One of the year's most significant developments was the publication of a report by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, that was critical of Rabat. The report suggested that Morocco was spying on the UN mission, MINURSO, since there was evidence that confidential information passed between the mission's headquarters in El Aaiún and the UN offices in New York had been compromised. Furthermore, **Ban Ki-moon criticised the fact that the presence of Moroccan security forces discouraged contacts between the international mission and the population. He also considered that obstacles were being placed in the path of international observers that prevented them from carrying out their monitoring activities in the area.** The report also requested freedom of access to the area for diplomats, the press and NGOs. In this context, **at the end of April, Morocco announced that it had lost confidence in the UN Special Envoy, the US diplomat Christopher Ross.** Rabat considered that Ross had not acted impartially and had not made any progress in negotiations. Nevertheless, Ban Ki-moon repeated that he had complete confidence in the diplomat, who remained in his post despite being expected to leave it due to the pressure from Morocco.

The issues dealt with in the meetings organised by Ross over the course of 2012 included trust-building measures, natural resources, demining and the environment. However, the most significant matters of contention of the conflict were not addressed. Towards the end of the year, the diplomat preferred not to schedule fresh rounds of talks between the parties (having reached the opinion that since 2009 these talks had not borne fruit on the main issues) and announced

that his strategy would focus on consultations with key international actors. Following his first visit to the Western Sahara in October, **Ross warned that it would be a grave miscalculation to accept the status quo since frustration stemming from the prolongation of the conflict could lead to new cycles of violence** and that the situation could become especially problematic given the context of instability in the Sahel. Over the course of the year Amnesty International also assessed the situation in the Western Sahara, urging the new Moroccan government to show its willingness to implement changes by ceasing to imprison people for political motives and by guaranteeing freedom of expression and assembly. The organisation underlined the fact that the Western Sahara's pro-independence groups did not enjoy legal recognition and warned that 23 Sahrawi activists remained in military custody for their alleged participation in the clashes that occurred in El Aaiún and the surrounding area in 2010.

Tunisia	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social and political opposition

**Summary:**

In the period stretching from Tunisia's independence in 1956 to the start of 2011, the country was governed by just two presidents. The government of Habib Bourghiba, who ruled for three decades, laid the foundations of the country's authoritarian regime, which Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali kept in place after a coup d'état in 1987, through which he became president. The concentration of power, the persecution of the secular and Islamist opposition and the tight social control that characterised the internal situation of the country were in stark contrast to the international image of stability. Despite being denounced for corruption, electoral fraud and human rights violations, Tunisia was a valued ally of the West for decades. At the end of 2010, the outbreak of a popular uprising exposed the contradictions of the regime, paved the way for a period of transition in the country and encouraged mobilisations against authoritarian governments throughout the Arab world.

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The overall figures for violence were lower than in 2011, marked by the overthrow of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali's regime, but **the situation in Tunisia continued to be affected by periodic bouts of violence, division and animosity between Islamist and secular sectors, strikes and demonstrations against the government.** The most violent incidents occurred in the second half of the year and involved Salafist sectors. In August, an attack by ultraconservative Islamists during a music festival led to clashes with the security forces in which five

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26. See chapter 3 (Peace Processes).



people were killed. One month later, the showing of a film considered offensive to the Prophet Mohammed sparked protests in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa, including Tunisia, where Salafist groups attacked the US embassy and an a US school. The incidents and clashes with the police left four people dead and about fifty injured, triggering protests against Salafist violence. Over the course of the year, Salafist groups were involved in attacks on shops selling alcohol, hotels, bars and art exhibitions, as well as in clashes with other sectors of Tunisian society, including unionists, left-wing sectors and students. In this context, **the government extended on several occasions the state of emergency, in force since 2011, and in June imposed a curfew in eight regions, including the capital**, for two weeks. The country also witnessed several strikes and protests during the year related to the worsening economic situation and unemployment. The Tunisian president, Moncef Marzouki, and the parliamentary spokesperson, Mustapha Ben Jafar, were assaulted in December during events to commemorate the second anniversary of the rebellion against Ben Ali.

The drawing up of the country's new constitution, with the National Constituent Assembly beginning work on the first draft in February, was also the subject of controversy and internal tension. Islamist associations demonstrated to demand the adoption of Islamic law as the sole source of legislation, while secular sectors held counter-demonstrations to voice their rejection of the establishment of an Islamic state. In this context, the Islamist party that heads the government, Ennahda, made it clear that no references to Sharia law would be included in the constitution. The stance of the Islamist party, in particular its relationship and capacity for control over the Salafists, drew criticism from some sectors in Tunisia, which were distrustful of Ennahda's commitment to the civilian nature of the state. The wording of an article of the constitution that defined gender roles (article 28 considers women as men's "partners" in the development of the country and invokes the notion of complementarity of the roles of women and men inside the family, omitting the principle of equality between the sexes) sparked new protests and pressure, as a result of which this provision was removed from the constitutional project. The government was also hit by a political crisis in June due to the decision of the prime minister, Hamadi Jebali, to extradite the Libyan former prime minister, al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, without consulting the Tunisian president beforehand. This incident led 75 members of parliament to present a motion of no confidence against the Ennahda-led government, which was also criticised during the year for harassing members of the opposition and critical journalists. In mid-October the three parties of the governing coalition (Ennahda, Ettakatol and CPR) reached an agreement on the definition of the future political system in Tunisia, a semi-presidential model, which will be enshrined in

***Ravalomanana will not be a candidate at the 2013 presidential elections in Madagascar, which may bring to an end the political crisis that has affected the country since 2009***

the new constitution. It was announced that the next general elections would take place on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2013, with a direct election for the post of president and a possible second round on 7<sup>th</sup> July. The elections will be held following the approval of the new constitution, which requires a two-thirds majority in the constituent assembly. The legal proceedings against the deposed president also continued during 2012. In July, Ben Ali was sentenced *in absentia* to life imprisonment for his role in the death of demonstrators during the uprising in the country.

#### d) Southern Africa

Madagascar	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	High Transitional Authority, opposition leaders, state security forces

#### Summary:

Since the end of the communist regime in the 1990s, the island has been affected by bouts of political turmoil. The unconstitutional seizure of power by the former mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, with the support of the army, triggered a new political crisis in March 2009. The difficulties in reaching a power-sharing agreement among the main political leaders have led to an institutional stalemate, with sporadic outbreaks of violence taking place.

Over the course of the year **the instability that has affected the country since 2009 persisted**. The national independent electoral commission of the transition (CENIT) announced in early August that the presidential elections would be held on 8<sup>th</sup> May 2013. The foreign minister of the Seychelles, Jean-Paul Adam, stated that if the current president, Andry Rajoelina, and the deposed president, Marc Ravalomanana, could not agree on the road map for the vote, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) would consider holding the elections without either of the two candidates. The SADC announced that it would send a mission to the country to evaluate the security situation in view of the return of Ravalomanana, a visit that took place in October. It should be pointed out that Rajoelina and Ravalomanana met again in the Seychelles at the end of July, and in August began new talks with the mediation of the South African president, Jacob Zuma. However no progress was made in these talks or following the SADC summit held in Maputo in mid-August. The Council of Churches began a mediation process at the end of November with the goal of fostering negotiations between the parties. Finally, the president's office of the government of Tanzania announced in December that,

with the goal of ending the political crisis affecting the country, Ravalomanana would not be a candidate at the presidential elections scheduled for May 2013, a decision that may contribute to alleviating the crisis. Meanwhile, in November the SADC condemned the human rights violations taking place in the country. The South African justice authorities announced in August that they would investigate Ravalomanana for crimes against humanity. Since 2009, Ravalomanana has been exiled in South Africa. Three opposition journalists fleeing from the security forces took refuge in the South African embassy in Madagascar. At the end of July, Ravalomanana's wife was deported and put on a plane to Thailand, just hours after touching down in Madagascar.

Meanwhile, **at the end of July, a mutiny took place in a military garrison close to the airport, which was swiftly put down by the army.** The corporal who led the mutiny was executed and an unspecified number of soldiers were arrested. In mid-September, **the government deployed Special Forces to quell an outbreak of violence in the south of the country involving a group of people who had reportedly executed 100 cattle thieves of the Dahalo community** and in which three soldiers died. The Special Forces committed serious abuses and burned 16 villages in mid-October as a punishment. Amnesty International called on the government to put a stop to the atrocities that were being committed by the Special Forces in the south of the country.

Zimbabwe	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	ZANU-PF and MDC political parties, war veterans and youth militias sympathetic to ZANU-PF

**Summary:**

President Robert Mugabe, in power since the country gained independence in 1980 as the leader of ZANU-PF, continues to persecute members of opposition parties and individuals from civil society. The establishment of a government of national unity in 2009 brought an end to the crisis triggered by the elections, in which high levels of violence were recorded. The main opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC, was appointed prime minister and the process for reforming the constitution and electoral legislation began. This measure made it possible to regain the confidence of the international community and to improve the country's serious economic situation, suffering from alarming levels of inflation. However, a series of disagreements between the political groups have brought the transition process to a stalemate, while the opposition's demands for a reform of the security sector remain unanswered.

**The political crisis in the country continued due to the divisions between the ZANU-PF party of Zimbabwe's president, Robert Mugabe, and the MDC, both of which form part of the government. The crisis slowed down the constitutional process.** Mugabe planned to hold elections in 2012 but the delays in the process led him to announce a provisional date of March 2013. However, the members of the MDC who form part of the government put pressure on him to undertake new political reforms that reduce the possibility of a repeat of the violence that marred the 2008 elections. By November the reform of the constitution (a preliminary step for holding the elections) had still not been completed, no review of the electoral register had been carried out and no funds had been raised for holding the elections. The finance minister, Tendai Biti, stated that the estimated cost of the upcoming elections (state elections and referendum on the new constitution) was 215 million dollars and that foreign donations would be needed. There were also tensions within the ZANU-PF, due to the fact that some its leaders wanted the 88-year-old Mugabe to appoint a successor. However, he announced his wish to serve for a further term of office. Many analysts agreed that the party could break up if Mugabe dies before appointing a successor.

The Zimbabwe Constitution Select Committee (COPAC) presented the draft constitution in mid-July, which limits the president's term of office. The MDC endorsed the text, while the ZANU-PF presented over 200 amendments in September. The MDC's refusal to negotiate brought the process to a standstill. Some local analysts highlighted the risk of the ZANU-PF stalling the process as a strategy to scupper the constitutional proposals that limit Mugabe's powers. As regards the pending by-elections for a number of vacant seats, the supreme court stated that its ruling on the date would be postponed until the end of September. Mugabe declared that these by-elections would not be necessary since they may coincide with the upcoming general election. Meanwhile, the media reported on the **growing activity of youth militias.** Moreover, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network warned that some of the torture centres used during the political crisis of the 2008 elections were being prepared again. **The EU's decision to lift the sanctions against 20 entities and 51 people close to Mugabe, whose funds had reportedly been used for the campaign of harassment and attacks waged against opposition politicians and their supporters, was criticised by Human Rights Watch (HRW). A report by the international think tank International Crisis Group (ICG) called into question the effectiveness of these economic sanctions.**<sup>27</sup>

27. International Crisis Group, *Zimbabwe's Sanctions Stand-off*, Africa Briefing no. 86, February 6, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/b086-zimbabwes-sanctions-standoff.aspx>.

## e) West Africa

Burkina Faso	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political opposition, state security forces, civil society

### Summary:

President Blaise Compaoré, in power since 1987, faces a serious crisis of confidence in the country due to rising prices and the progressive deterioration of the population's standard of living. The military, habitually loyal to the regime, began to show its discontent in 2011, taking part in a series of uprisings and violent protests throughout the country. Meanwhile, several demonstrations were held by civil society groups, demanding a response by the government to the crisis, while the opposition called on the president to resign. The instability in the country grew in the first few months of the year in response to the serious political crisis facing Côte d'Ivoire, where the elections triggered armed conflict. A large number of Burkinabè immigrants were forced to return to their homeland, increasing pressure on declining economic resources.

**2012 registered a considerable reduction in the instability experienced in 2011. No serious incidents took place during the year, although the situation remained fragile.** There was no repeat of the 2011 uprisings in 2012, although some smaller-scale demonstrations were staged in February by students and people from the city of Tougan (north-west) protesting against the poor state of the roads. The measures implemented by the regime from 2011 (better salaries for soldiers and civil servants, the restructuring of the army, the stepping up of the fight against corruption and the continuation of food subsidies) ensured that the situation remained relatively stable in 2012. However, **many analysts warned that the crisis had not been resolved**, partly due to the possibility of the president, Blaise Compaoré, opting to run again in the 2015 presidential elections. Meanwhile, parliamentary elections were held at the end of 2012, coinciding for the first time with the municipal elections. President Compaoré's ruling CDP party won the vote, obtaining 70 of the 127 parliamentary seats. As regards the regional situation and the crisis in Mali, Compaoré participated as a mediator in negotiations over the resolution of the conflict affecting Mali.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, **humanitarian aid agencies stepped up security measures in Burkina Faso** (and in Niger) following warnings by analysts of the risk of Western personnel being kidnapped by the Islamist groups that control the north of Mali as a strategy for increasing their economic resources and in preparation for the then imminent military intervention (in which

they could use hostages as human shields), according to reports by the IRIN news agency. The adopted measures include the withdrawal of foreign personnel from many of the areas in which the agencies operate, the use of armed bodyguards by UN agencies or the use of convoys by NGOs in order to gain access to high-risk zones. One of the areas of greatest risk in Burkina Faso includes the northern zone, on the border with Mali, which is currently home to most of the Malian refugees in the country (some 35,000 people). Some analysts also warned of the risk of the Islamist groups in the region increasing their influence in Burkina Faso, given the context of popular discontent, the high youth unemployment rate and young people's distrust of the ruling class due to its failure to find solutions to the underlying problems in the country. In 2011 factors such as the increase in food and fuel prices and unrest related to the non-payment of subsidies, among others, had led to protests and uprisings against the regime.

Côte d'Ivoire	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Government, Identity, Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, militias loyal to the former president Laurent Gbagbo, mercenaries, ONUCI

### Summary:

The political, economic and social discrimination against northern Ivoirians is at the core of the serious crisis that began in the country in the 1980s. Following an initial conflict in 2002 and the resumption of armed violence in 2010, triggered by the presidential elections, stability in the country remains fragile. The end of war in April 2011 and the formation of a new government presided over by Alassane Ouattara (of northern origin) created expectations for change. Justice and reparation for victims, the transformation of discriminatory laws, the resolution of disputes regarding land ownership and the reform of the security sector are some of the great challenges facing the country. The presence of a large number of light weapons, the persistence of violence in the west and the unstable border with Liberia, where mercenary groups remain active, are endangering a fragile peace.

**2012 saw a continuation of instability and violent incidents, some of which involved groups loyal to the former president, Laurent Gbagbo, highlighting how fragile the country remains after the 2010-2011 violent post-election crisis** and the previous armed conflict. Over the course of the year several **armed attacks were carried out on police stations, prisons, military bases, checkpoints and border posts, among other targets, which continued right up to December, causing dozens of fatalities.** One of the most serious incidents was an

28. See the summary on Mali in this chapter and on Mali (north) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

attack in June on UN forces (ONUCI) in which 15 people were killed (seven members of the mission and eight Ivorian civilians). This was considered the first offensive against UN troops. A camp for displaced persons was also attacked in July. In August the attacks were stepped up. Most of these incidents were attributed to forces loyal to Gbagbo. In this climate of instability, **the government announced that a coup d'état supported by followers of the former president had been discovered and broken up. It also announced the launch of a military campaign to capture insurgents in the west of the country.** Organisations linked to Gbagbo were also targets of violence, with attacks being carried out on the FPI headquarters and on the offices of a newspaper sympathetic to Gbagbo.

*Armed attacks took place in Côte d'Ivoire that were mostly attributed to forces loyal to the former president, Gbagbo, including incursions from Liberia*

Some of the incidents that occurred during the year were cross-border attacks. In this respect, the acting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Moustapha Soumare, expressed his concern in March about the alleged training of insurgents in areas of Côte d'Ivoire. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon also warned of the instability and fragility on the Ivorian border. Likewise, the international NGO **Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report in June stating that militias loyal to Gbagbo had made incursions into Côte d'Ivoire from their bases in Liberia**, which had reportedly caused 40 fatalities. Meanwhile, the Liberian government took strong measures, including the temporary closure of the border, large-scale military operations within its territory against mercenary groups (described as the most significant since the Liberian armed conflict), the announcement of joint border operations with Abidjan, the extradition of some 40 Ivorians suspected of participating in the post-election violence of the neighbouring country, and arrests and trials of people suspected of being involved in cross-border attacks. Among those arrested for their participation in the Ivorian crisis was the warlord Bobby Julu. Even so, the Liberian government denied the allegations listed in a report leaked by UN experts that rebel training camps had been set up within its territory. In October the UN Security Council discussed a leaked report stating that Ghana was being used as a rearguard base for forces loyal to Gbagbo and that these forces were recruiting mercenaries in Liberia and extremist militants in the north of Mali. In this respect, Ghana also extradited some 40 Ivorians.

The violence and instability that affected the country throughout the year was also attributed to actions of the state. The illegal arrests and torture of more than 200 people following the armed attacks that occurred in August were attributed by the NGO Amnesty International to the Ivorian security forces. This NGO and local groups condemned the general climate of human rights violations. Human Rights Watch reported human rights violations by the army. Moreover, the continuation of the violence prevented the return of the

refugee population. In the political sphere, at the start of the year, the president, Alassane Ouattara, appointed as prime minister Jeannot Kouadio Ahossou, former justice minister and member of the PDCI (with which Ouattara's RDR formed a coalition for the most recent elections, despite their historical rivalry), in fulfilment of one of the pledges agreed with the opposition during the elections. However, in November Ouattara dissolved the government due to disagreements between his party and other coalition partners, including the PDCI, which meant that the prime minister was also forced to step down. The foreign minister, Kablan Duncan, was appointed as the new prime minister. Meanwhile, **the president visited the west of the country in April with the goal of contributing to the reconciliation process.** Nonetheless, just one day after his visit an attack was made on the town of Sakre, killing five people and causing the displacement of a further 6,000. Furthermore, the government held a meeting with the opposition party, FPI, led by the former president, Gbagbo, days before the publication of a report by the commission investigating the post-election violence. This meeting was interpreted as an attempt to re-establish political dialogue. According to the report, 3,248 people died in the crisis. The report declares that pro-Gbagbo forces were responsible for 1,452 fatalities and that pro-Ouattara forces were responsible for 727 deaths.

Guinea	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, armed forces, opposition political parties, trade unions

**Summary:**

The army took advantage of the death of President Lansana Conté in December 2008, after more than two decades in power, to carry out a new coup d'état and form a military junta. The holding of elections in 2010, won by the opposition leader Alpha Condé, paved the way for a return to the democratic system. However, the elections were marred by violence and by the coming to the fore of identity-related tensions between the country's main ethnic communities. The country remains unstable due to the lack of a strategy for national reconciliation and obstacles to the reform of the security sector, with an army that is omnipresent in Guinean political activity.

**The stand-off between the government and opposition sectors continued; several security incidents occurred and the elections were postponed due to disagreements over the electoral census and the electoral commission.** The apparent willingness shown in the first few months of the year by President Alpha Condé to enter into dialogue was



not shared by the main opposition figures (Cellou Dalein Diallo, Sidya Touré and Lansana Kouyaté), who considered it a political manoeuvre. In this respect, the opposition reported that it was being subjected to harassment by the authorities, with several opposition rallies being forcibly dispersed. In a context of escalating tension and given the proximity of the elections, Condé announced a new postponement of the elections scheduled for 8<sup>th</sup> July, stating that the measure would enable some glitches in the voter registration system to be put right and would ensure the credibility of the vote. The decision was initially welcomed by the opposition, although there was no sign of an abatement of tension; new clashes took place between the police and demonstrators and the government subsequently requested the electoral commission to suspend voter registration. A coalition of parties and social organisations called for the dismantling of the electoral commission. The date was once again postponed and in the second half of the year **the opposition announced that it was withdrawing from all state institutions** following an escalation of tension in August. The incidents that took place in that month included the launch of tear gas bombs by the police against the home of Cellou Dalein Diallo, leader of the opposition party, UFDG, following demonstrations that ended in clashes and the arrest of one hundred activists. Finally, the president of the electoral commission, Louceny Camara, who had been roundly criticised by the opposition, stood down. Following this, the National Transition Council passed new legislation on the commission and, in November, the opposition criticised the government for not including the entire list of ten electoral commissioners elected by the opposition for this body of 25 members. The tension escalated once again in December when the opposition rejected a new date for the elections (May 2013), arguing that only half and not the required two thirds of the members of the electoral commission had supported the decision. In parallel, three people were killed and several others were injured in December in clashes between opposition and government supporters in Gueckedou (south), on the border with Liberia.

As regards developments in the sphere of human rights, **Colonel Moussa Tiegboro Camara, the minister of the presidency, was charged for his involvement in the 2009 massacre that took place during a rally** held in a stadium to protest against the military junta, and in which 157 people were killed and about 100 women were raped. He is the most senior official to be charged by the justice in relation to this incident. The UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Bangura, underlined the need to support the victims of the mass rapes perpetrated in 2009 and was critical of the fact that not a single perpetrator of this violence has been found guilty. Meanwhile, the Guinean president announced a partial reshuffle of his government, showing the door to three generals. The International Federation for Human Rights welcomed the removal of actors allegedly responsible for the violent incidents of 2009.

*A coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau in April brought to a halt the electoral process initiated following the death of the president in January and led to months of instability*

## Guinea-Bissau

<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, armed forces, opposition political parties, international drug trafficking networks

### Summary:

The history of Guinea-Bissau since it achieved independence from Portugal in 1974 is scattered with violence and coups d'état that have prevented the country from achieving political stability as well as thwarting all attempts to implement democracy. The strong influence of the armed forces on the country's politics and the confrontation between parties that represent different ethnic groups constitute a major hurdle to achieving peace. The breakdown of the stability pact signed in 2007 by the main political parties represented another lost opportunity for ending the spiral of violence that dominates political life. The growing impact of international drug trafficking networks in West Africa further complicates the crisis. The assassination of the president, Joao Bernardo Vieira, in March 2009, marked the start of a fresh period of instability.

**Tension escalated due to a coup d'état, which interrupted the electoral process initiated after the death of the president, Malam Bacai Sanha, in January**, and which was followed by a period of instability during which an alleged counter-coup attempt took place. Following Sanha's death, elections were held in April. One of the presidential candidates was the prime minister, Carlos Gomes Junior, who stood after resigning from the government. Gomes Junior obtained 49% of the votes, against the 23% of the former president Kumba Yala, in an election that passed without incident. Although the electoral process was validated by international observers, Yala denounced massive fraud and refused to take part in the second round. In this context, some analysts argued that the popular support for Gomes Junior would not be enough if he did not have the backing of the army. The climate of uncertainty and instability continued with incidents such as the assassination of the former head of military espionage, Samba Diallo, the day after the first round of the election, which in turn led the former chief of staff Jose Xamora Induta to flee the country, both individuals being close to Gomes Junior. The tension culminated in a new coup d'état in April that ousted the interim government that had held power since Sanha's death. Gomes Junior and the interim president, Raimundo Pereira, were arrested and subsequently released, after which they sought refuge in Côte d'Ivoire. Regional and international bodies condemned the coup, which the military justified as a measure to prevent the government from reducing the size of the army, as was its intention, and as a response to the presence of Angolan troops, authorised by Guinea-



Bissau for peacekeeping tasks. The military junta that was set up reached an agreement on the transition process with 22 of the 35 opposition parties, which led to the creation of the National Transition Council. The terms of the agreement, which was facilitated by ECOWAS but was not signed by the former ruling party, PAIGC, included the holding of elections within a year and the pledge to return power to civilian hands. Even so, the interim government, led by the prime minister, Rui Duarte Barros, included two military officers, one in charge of defence and another in charge of veterans' affairs. Some media outlets reported that the interim president, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, had been chosen by the junta leaders. As part of the agreement, the junta accepted the deployment of a 600-strong ECOWAS force from June, which took over from the Angolan army unit. The UN and other bodies imposed some sanctions on the junta leaders.

Over the months following the coup, the high level of tension remained. The army chief of staff, Antonio Indjai, declared that sectors loyal to Gomes Junior were preparing a coup. In this respect, an **attack on an air force base occurred in June, causing six fatalities, in what was declared a foiled coup attempt**. One soldier and four other people were arrested. In December the UN Security Council expressed serious concern about the lack of progress towards a return to a constitutional regime, although it welcomed the opening of the national assembly. The process may be delayed still further by the disagreements over the electoral commission, while the interim government appealed for the elections to be delayed by several years in order to implement prior reforms. Meanwhile, Amnesty International warned in October that the situation of political instability and fragility in which the country has been mired for decades was exacerbated by the coup d'état, which in turn increased the tension between the army and the civilian authorities, constituting a step backwards in the sphere of human rights.

Mali	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Deposed government, military junta, transition government, soldiers loyal to former president Amadou Toumani Touré, ECOWAS

**Summary:**

Since its independence from France in 1960, Mali has lived through several periods of instability, including the coup d'état in 1968, a popular and military rebellion in 1991 and the Tuareg insurgency and uprisings since independence, demanding greater political participation

and the development of the north of the country. Mali held its first multi-party elections in 1992, although since then several elections have taken place amid opposition criticism concerning the lack of democratic guarantees. The army's influence was apparent in a new attempted coup d'état of 2000, which was foiled. The instability increased once again in 2012 when control of the north was seized by Tuareg and Islamist groups and the government was ousted by a coup d'état.

The armed conflict that began in the north of Mali in early 2012 also led to escalating political tension in the country that culminated in a **coup d'état that ousted the president, Amadou Toumani Touré, during the first quarter of the year**.<sup>29</sup> Over the ensuing months the country was plagued by instability and constant rows between politicians and the army. The main trigger for the coup d'état were the disagreements over the handling of the conflict in the north of the country and shortcomings regarding supplies for troops. On 21<sup>st</sup> March a mutiny was staged by soldiers at the Kati base, close to the capital, Bamako, after the defence minister announced the need for reinforcements in the north without arms supplies having been received. The soldiers took control of the presidential palace the next day and ousted the leader just one month before the presidential elections, scheduled for 29<sup>th</sup> April, for which Touré was not planning to stand. The coup perpetrators then formed a military junta led by Captain Amadou Sanogo. Thanks to international and regional pressure (through the intermediation of ECOWAS led by the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré) power was returned to civilian hands in early April. The parliamentary spokesperson, Dioncounda Traoré, was appointed as interim president, while military representatives occupied the other 24 posts of the new provisional government. At the end of April, ECOWAS announced that the transition process would last a year, far longer than the 40 days agreed with the military. As a result, the leader of the military junta condemned breaches of the agreed terms. In this context **soldiers loyal to Touré, the former president, and who formed part of the presidential guard, attempted to launch a counter-coup that was put down by forces loyal to the military junta. 14 people were killed in the clashes while 40 were injured**. Days later, the refusal of ECOWAS to accept the demands of a group of associations and parties sympathetic to the military junta, which requested the appointment of Sanogo as president after the 40 days initially agreed for the transition, led to a new attack on the presidential palace at the end of May, in which the interim president, Traoré, was injured.

The leader returned to the country in July after recovering from his injuries and drove through the formation of a new government that included individuals from the previous administration. In parallel, the divisions between sectors loyal to the deposed leader and groups loyal to the military junta remained. Over the course of

29. See the summary on Mali (north) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

the year, Mali's military showed reluctance to accept an international armed intervention to resolve the armed conflict in the north of the country, preferring the option of financial and logistical aid to deal with the crisis itself. Traoré's decision to formally request action by ECOWAS in September led to several protests in Bamako. In this context, **a significant development in the political crisis occurred in December, when soldiers forced the resignation of the prime minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra**, one of those in favour of international military intervention. Diarra, who had been placed under house arrest by Sanogo, made a resignation speech on television before leaving the country to France. In the weeks leading up to the resignation, relations had become strained between Diarra and the military after it accused him of attempting to scupper initiatives for dialogue and of wishing to cling on to power. The president appointed a new prime minister, Diango Sissoko, who formed a cabinet that included military officials who were to serve as the interior, defence and justice ministers. At the end of December the UN approved a multinational mission for Mali, although at the same time it underlined the need to make efforts to achieve a political reconciliation and showed its support for the holding of elections in April. Sectors of Mali's government voiced their doubts on the possibility of elections being held before defeating the rebel groups operating in the north.

*Mali soldiers carried out a coup d'état in March that led to the removal from government of Amadou Toumani Touré and in December forced the resignation of the prime minister*

A high level of tension remained in the country, in addition to the armed conflict with the Islamist group Boko Haram and the instability that still affects the Delta region,<sup>30</sup> although there was a reduction in violence in respect of 2011, when the climate of conflict was heightened by the elections. On a domestic level, in 2012 **Nigeria witnessed mass protests against the removal of the fuel subsidy, announced in January, which led to a sharp increase in prices.** The protests included a general strike in January, observed by hundreds of thousands of people, and several demonstrations that ended in violence on many occasions and led to the deployment of soldiers in Lagos and Kano. A curfew was imposed in the states of Kaduna, Kano, Niger and Oyo, following serious altercations. Several demonstrators died as a result of the quelling of the protests, in what was condemned as an excessive use of force. Some of the most serious incidents included one in Kano, in which one person died and 18 were injured, one in Lagos, in which one person was killed and a further three were injured, and one in Niger state, in which two demonstrators and one police officer were killed and another six people were injured. This incident also involved the arrest of 150 people. In this context of violence, the president, Goodluck Jonathan, partially reinstated the subsidy, lowering prices by 30% in respect of the previous 117% increase in prices.

**The instability was also related to inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions, with several violent incidents taking place.** The clashes of previous years between members of the Muslim and Christian communities were echoed in 2012, although some appeared to be the result of initial attacks by the Islamist armed group Boko Haram. For instance, a suicide attack that this group claimed to have perpetrated against a church in Jos in February, in which two people were killed and another 38 were injured, led to acts of revenge such as the lynching of two young Muslims by members of the Christian population, along with the burning down of shops and other properties owned by Muslims in the city. Following another suicide attack by the armed group against another church in March, killing nine people, a series of violent incidents took place that caused ten fatalities. Boko Haram issued an ultimatum to the Christian population from the south to leave the north, which led to population displacements. Incidents with an inter-ethnic dimension also occurred related to the issue of resources. In one such incident, Fulani nomads attacked farms of the Ohoror community in Delta state in January, killing at least two people. 16 people died in clashes between the Fulani and Tiv communities in the east, while in the same month another 20 people were injured in altercations between the Hausa and Yoruba communities in Ekiti state. In April, violent clashes in Benue state between farmers and herdsmen caused

Nigeria	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Identity, Resources Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political opposition, Christian and Muslim communities, community militias

**Summary:**

Since 1999, when political power was returned to civilian hands after a succession of dictatorships and coups, the government has not managed to establish a stable democratic system in the country. Huge economic and social differences remain between the states that make up Nigeria, due to the lack of real decentralisation, and between the various social strata, which fosters instability and outbreaks of violence. Moreover, strong inter-religious, inter-ethnic and political differences continue to fuel violence throughout the country. Political corruption and the lack of transparency are the other main stumbling blocks to democracy in Nigeria. Mafia-like practices and the use of political assassination as an electoral strategy have prevented the free exercise of the population's right to vote, leading to increasing discontent and fraudulent practices.

30. See the summary on Nigeria (Niger Delta) in this chapter and the summary on Nigeria (Boko Haram) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

the displacement of about 3,600 people, mostly Fulani nomads. Some 40 people died in clashes between members of the Ikpanya and Ntan Obu-Ukpe communities in Cross River state. The government of Delta state ordered the deployment of the security forces in several areas due to constant clashes between different communities. In Nassarawa state, about 20 people died in November in clashes between members of the Koro and Eggon communities, in which 70 homes were also burned down.

### *Groups of former insurgents staged protests in Nigeria's Niger Delta*

in Delta state to protest about the lack of payments from the amnesty committee. The protesters threatened to converge on the capital, Abuja, if their demands were not met. Several former insurgents also threatened to attack oil facilities in response to being excluded from the amnesty programme. 200 former rebels forced their way into the headquarters of the Niger Delta Development Commission in Port Harcourt (Rivers state) to protest about its policies. Several kidnappings and acts of piracy also took place in a complex scenario involving violence on the part of insurgents or former insurgents, as well as criminal groups, which makes it difficult to pinpoint who is responsible for murders and other acts of violence. One of the kidnap victims was the mother of the finance minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who was later released. This incident involved extensive military operations and resulted in 63 arrests. In the case of some incidents, the forces deployed in the area, the Joint Task Force, rejected the claims of responsibility and attributed the attacks to criminal gangs. Moreover, a special police unit was set up to protect the country's network of oil pipelines and gas pipelines, which have been attacked on several occasions with the goal of extracting oil illegally or sabotaging the network, producing spills that exacerbate the environmental situation in the region. The human rights NGO Amnesty International and the Centre for the Environment, Human Rights and Development (CERHD) stated that the spills of the oil pipelines operated by Shell were mainly due to maintenance failures rather than sabotage. **The activity of the oil industry and the general neglect of the population's needs were once again the focal point of protests by social sectors.** In April, hundreds of protesters blocked waterways in the area to prevent Shell workers from reaching oil rigs, warning them of their obligations towards the Nembe Island community (Bayelsa state)

Nigeria (Niger Delta)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Identity, Resources Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, Joint Revolutionary Council, militias of the Ijaw, Itsekere, Urhobo and Ogoni communities, private security groups

#### **Summary:**

Instability in the Niger Delta is the result of the loss of livelihoods of the population due to oil activity in the area. The lack of financial compensation and development, along with the marginalization of communities led them to demand greater participation in the profits of oil exploitation. Armed groups arose in the 90s and carried out attacks on oil facilities and military posts and the kidnapping of workers. The government responded through military means, with the permanent deployment of special forces in the Delta region who have been accused of committing numerous human rights violations. In 2009 the government decreed an amnesty for all armed groups that agreed to give up the armed struggle. The offer of rehabilitation programs encouraged the leaders of many of these groups to lay down their weapons, which led to a significant reduction of armed violence in the area. However, the stagnation of reintegration and development projects promised by the government could lead to a return to armed struggle.

**Security incidents occurred frequently over the course of the year, including a series of attacks on oil facilities for which responsibility was claimed by alleged members of the armed group MEND, although the level of violence was lower than in the previous years of the armed conflict. Nonetheless, some voices warned of a possible gradual return to insurgent activity in the region. Many people were murdered during the year, including soldiers, in various parts of the region. The MEND claimed that ten soldiers had been killed in clashes in Bayelsa state in March, one of whom was a high-ranking officer. Furthermore, groups of former insurgents were also involved in protests and actions, highlighting, on the one hand, their capacity to mobilise and destabilise, and, on the other hand, the existence of challenges concerning their demobilisation. The actions included a demonstration by some 15,000 former insurgents**

Senegal (Casamance)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, MFDC armed group and its various factions

#### **Summary:**

Casamance is a Senegalese region that is virtually cut off from the country by Gambia, and where, since 1982, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) has demanded independence. The fighting between the armed forces and the MFDC was at its most intense in the 1990s, concluding in 2004 with the signing of the peace agreements by its leader, Diamacoune Senghor. Since then, low intensity clashes have continued between various factions that do not recognise the agreement reached with the government and that are fighting to increase their control over the territory.

Amid tension between the Senegalese government and the various armed factions of the MFDC new violent incidents occurred in 2012. However, hopes were also raised about the prospect of peace talks getting under way in the second half of the year, precisely in the year that marked the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the conflict.<sup>31</sup> The violent incidents were reported above all at the start of the year, leading up to the elections in February and March. MFDC militiamen were involved in a large number of incidents involving the use of force and intimidation, preventing part of the population from voting and actually attacking voting centres and polling stations. **There were about 40 fatalities in the first quarter of the year and the MFDC also claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of eight soldiers.** The army's response to the armed group was to launch offensives against suspected bases of the insurgency, which affected the civilian population. The Casamance conflict was a subject of debate during the presidential campaign. All the presidential candidates made pledges on the issue, including the country's leader Abdoulaye Wade, who had controversially decided to stand again. Wade was unsuccessful in his bid to remain in office and was replaced by the opposition candidate Macky Sall, whose coalition also obtained a convincing victory in the legislative elections. At the start of the year, one of the main leaders of the MFDC, Salif Sadio, proposed searching for a negotiated outcome to the conflict. Following Sall's victory, Sadio repeated the offer, which was accepted by the new leader.

The president took office well aware of the fact that the resolution of the conflict in Casamance would be a complex issue but that it would be one of his government's priorities. Furthermore, he stressed the need to open up dialogue to other important actors in Casamance in addition to the armed group, such as religious authorities, civil society organisations and women's groups. Sall also emphasised the need to involve the neighbouring Guinea-Bissau and Gambia in talks in order to ensure the success of these efforts. In this context, and despite the occurrence of some violent incidents, **the government and representatives of the MFDC began talks with the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio.** The prime minister, Abdoul Mbaye, confirmed in September the holding of "discreet negotiations" and in October it was reported that a meeting had been held between the parties in Rome. In December the MFDC faction led by Sadio released eight soldiers who had been held for almost a year. This measure preceded the announcement of a second round of talks between delegates of the group and the government in Italy in January 2013 to discuss governance models ranging from autonomy to

*After taking office, the new president of the Senegalese government, Macky Sall, initiated talks with factions of the MFDC to address the issue of Casamance*

advanced regionalisation for Casamance. In parallel, towards the end of the year it was reported that the archbishop of Dakar, at the request of President Sall, was holding talks with César Atoute Badiate, the leader of one of the other factions of the MFDC, which had also expressed its willingness to negotiate. The president of Gambia and a former mayor of Ziguinchor were also expected to join the process and facilitate a meeting between the factions of Sadio and Badiate.

## America

### a) North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Haiti	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social and political opposition, MINUSTAH, former soldiers

#### Summary:

Once the former president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, had left the country in February 2004, thus avoiding armed confrontation with the rebel group that had taken control of most of the country, the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) were both deployed to assist the interim government in restoring order and security. A period of greater political, social and economic stability followed the election of a new president, René Préval, in early 2006. However several problems have yet to be addressed: allegations of human rights violations against the MINUSTAH; high crime rates; the control of certain urban areas by armed gangs; difficulties in the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; the demands of former soldiers to reinstate the armed forces; and high levels of corruption, poverty and social exclusion.

**The three main sources of tension in Haiti were, first, anti-government demonstrations, which increased significantly in respect of 2011; second, the emergence of groups of former soldiers who staged several public shows of strength to demand the reconstitution of the armed forces and the payment of back pay and pensions; and, third, political instability, which caused a certain amount of institutional paralysis.** Regarding this last point, a noteworthy development was the resignation in February of the prime minister, Gary Conille, who had been appointed four months after the parliament rejected the nomination of the two previous candidates

31. See chapter 3 (Peace Processes) and "Senegal: prospects of a negotiated outcome to the conflict in Casamance" in chapter 5 (Opportunities for Peace in 2013).



proposed by the president, Michel Martelly. The fact that legislative power is controlled by the opposition meant that the process of appointing Conille's successor dragged on until May, when the foreign minister, Laurent Lamothe, was promoted to the post. In the early part of the year the disagreements between the president and the opposition also affected the elections for one third of the senate or the composition of the electoral commission, the judiciary and other institutions in the country. Furthermore, the political tension increased considerably when it was discovered that the government had begun an investigation into the alleged corruption and drug trafficking activities of the former president, Aristide. This led to protests by thousands of supporters of the former president and clashes with Martelly's supporters. Martelly himself was assaulted in one of these protests. Demonstrations were also triggered by the decision of a magistrate to put on trial the former dictator Jean Claude Duvalier for embezzlement, but not for crimes against humanity.

As regards the possible reconstitution of the army, one of Martelly's electoral pledges, from the start of the year **several groups of former soldiers began to occupy old military bases, along with other public shows of strength, to demand the reconstitution of the armed forces and the payment of back pay and pensions.** According to some sources, there could be thousands of people in some of these bases. In April, after groups of former soldiers forced their way into parliament to make their demands heard, the government began the registration of former soldiers and agreed to pay them the compensation that they were owed. This incident, which led to a joint operation between the police and the MINUSTAH, highlighted the recruitment process that representatives of the former soldiers had been carrying out for months. In May, during a demonstration by former soldiers in Port au Prince, the government arrested 50 people on charges of conspiracy and closed some of the illegally occupied military camps. Most of the former soldiers fled and stayed under the radar over the following months. In November, when rumours surfaced that the former soldiers were planning fresh protests, the government issued a statement warning that it would not tolerate any breach of the peace and carried out raids on old army bases, seizing weapons and munitions.

Meanwhile, in the final quarter of the year, Michel Martelly faced the most significant protests since he took office in May 2011. Thousands of people protested in the country's main cities, with rioting and clashes taking place between demonstrators and police officers or MINUSTAH forces. There were various causes for the protests, including the government's mishandling of the situation regarding the increase in prices of basic products and the deterioration of the population's living conditions, the failure to deliver on election promises, accusations of government corruption, the coming into force of constitutional amendments that some sectors considered unfair and illegal, or the demands by specific

sectors, such as teachers and students, who demanded substantial improvements in education. The population also voiced its complaints about the role of the MINUSTAH (accused by some sectors of being involved in human rights violations and of being responsible for the outbreak of a cholera epidemic, which to 2012 had claimed 7,000 lives) or the precarious situation still faced by more than 400,000 people who were affected by the earthquake in early 2010 or the effects of Hurricane Sandy, which claimed 51 lives, directly affected 200,000 people and, according to the UN, put one and a half million people at risk of food insecurity.

## b) South America

Bolivia	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government, Self-government, Resources Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political and social opposition (political parties, authorities and civil society organisations from eastern departments, indigenous groups)

### Summary:

At the end of 2003, the then president, Gonzalo Sánchez Lozada, went into exile in the USA after more than 100 lives were claimed in February and October when a series of anti-government protests were violently put down. Following a period of uncertainty during which two presidents took office on an interim basis, Evo Morales won the 2005 elections, becoming the country's first indigenous leader. However, his presidency, in particular the agrarian reform or the nationalisation of hydrocarbon resources and the approval of a new constitution, was hindered by fierce opposition to his political project by several political parties and by the eastern regions of the country, which, led by the department of Santa Cruz, demand greater autonomy. In parallel to the political struggle between the government and the opposition, in recent years Bolivia has faced one of the highest rates of social conflict in the entire continent, with protests of different kinds related to the labour demands of various sectors, the activity of mining companies or the rights of indigenous peoples.

The government continues to face high levels of social conflict. In fact, a report drawn up by the UNDP on social protests in Latin America concluded that Bolivia was among the three countries on the continent (the others being Peru and Argentina) with the highest level of conflict. At the end of the year a report by the Unir Bolivia Foundation found that there had been an increase in the number of conflicts in respect of the previous year and that most of them were of a social nature (approximately 50%), followed by institutional and political-cultural conflicts. 26% of the conflicts occurred in the department of La Paz, followed by Cochabamba (16%),



Santa Cruz (13%) and Tarija (13%). The report warned that the purpose of the protests was mainly, and almost solely, to obtain a response to social demands and that efforts in terms of dialogue and conflict prevention are practically non-existent. **One of the conflicts with the greatest political and media impact was the dispute between the government and indigenous groups over the possible construction of a road that would cut through the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS), connecting the north of the department of Cochabamba to the south of the department of Beni.** According to the government, the construction of the road would improve the region's transport connections and aid its development, while those who oppose the project consider that it violates the intangible nature of indigenous ancestral lands, which is safeguarded by the legislation in force. The construction of the road had been ruled out at the end of 2011 due to the constant protests by the indigenous groups opposed to the project. However the march to La Paz in early 2012 by groups in favour of the project (resulting in clashes and rioting), forced the government to reconsider the initiative. It finally decided to hold a referendum on the issue in the 69 indigenous communities of the TIPNIS. Over the following months the indigenous groups opposed to the construction of the road continued to organise marches and demonstrations, such as the 62-day march that culminated in two weeks of protests in La Paz. However, the government did not alter its plans and went ahead with the referendum, which was held between the end of July and early December. According to the government, virtually all of the communities consulted on the issue reject the intangible nature of the indigenous territory and are in favour of the construction of the road. One of the other main sources of tension in 2012 was the opposition of many groups and municipalities to the carrying out of a census (the last one dates back to 2001), since they believe that it may show a loss of inhabitants and territory, leading to a reduction in state funds. Most of the 81 disputes of municipalities over territorial borders were resolved through negotiations, although some major demonstrations and clashes also took place. In November, dozens of people were injured, many of them seriously, during clashes between the police and demonstrators in the southern city of Yacuiba who had blocked one of the country's main roads and the route into Argentina. Demonstrations were also staged in Cochabamba, Oruro and Potosí.

In addition to the conflicts related to the census and the TIPNIS, the **police mutiny that occurred halfway through the year to demand better wages should also be mentioned.** Some violent incidents took place in June when dozens of police officers organised protests in La Paz and seized control of a police barracks in the capital. The government condemned the officers involved in the mutiny, claiming that they were preparing for a coup, and accused the opposition of being behind the incident. The government had already accused the opposition on previous occasions of exploiting social protests to undermine or even

overthrow the government. In turn, the opposition has condemned the political persecution of public officials of the opposition and the exploitation of the judiciary to harass politicians awaiting trial on corruption charges. This situation even led the United Nations to call on the government to guarantee impartiality, the presumption of innocence and transparency in all legal proceedings. The conflict with the police force ended after a pay rise of 20% was agreed. In this respect, it is also worth mentioning the clashes and riots that occurred during the protests and 48-hour strike called by the country's main trade union to demand a pay rise that the government had previously agreed to. At the end of the year there were also protest in six prisons around the country to protest against the overcrowding of prisoners and to demand better prison conditions.

Finally, **some of the conflicts related to the mining sector were also noteworthy.** In July the government announced the nationalisation of two mining concessions in Potosí awarded to the Canadian company South American Silver following a series of violent incidents in the previous weeks and after members of the local population retained against their will six workers of the company and a police officer in order to protest against the company's mining activity. In the region of Colquiri several clashes took place between payroll and self-employed workers ("cooperativists") over the tin and zinc mining operations of the Sinchi Wayra company. The clashes began at the end of May, after the "cooperativists" seized control of the company's facilities and continued until the end of the year, despite the fact that the government nationalised the company and ruled that both collectives (payroll and self-employed workers) must run the mine together. However, differences in interpretation and breaches of the agreement sparked new clashes, in which several people were injured and one worker even died.

Peru	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government, Resources Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, armed opposition (remaining Shining Path factions), political and social opposition (rural and indigenous organisations)

#### Summary:

In 1980, just when democracy had been restored in the country, an armed conflict began between the government and the Maoist armed group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso in Spanish) that lasted for two decades and claimed 60,000 lives. The counter-insurgency policy implemented in the 1990s pushed the state towards authoritarianism under Alberto Fujimori, who in 2000 went into exile in Japan having been deposed by congress and

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accused of numerous cases of corruption and human rights violations. Since 2008, the remaining Shining Path factions have stepped up their operations significantly in the Alto Huallaga region and especially in the VRAE region (Valley between the Apurímac and Ene Rivers). The government, which claims that the Shining Path organisation is involved in drug trafficking, has intensified its military operations in both regions notably and has refused to enter into talks of any sort. It has also intensified the political and legal struggle against its political arm, Movadef. Meanwhile, several collectives, especially indigenous groups, have organised periodical mobilisations to protest against the economic policy of successive governments and against the activity of mining companies.

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As in the previous year, the two main sources of tension were the military struggle against the Shining Path organisation (and the political and legal struggle against Movadef, considered its political arm) and the conflicts related to the exploitation of natural resources. As regards the first aspect, the most significant development in 2012 was **the government's declaration of the military defeat of the faction of the group that operated in the Alto Huallaga region and its announcement that it intended to concentrate and strengthen its military efforts in the region of the Valley between the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM)**. The enormous weakening of Shining Path in the Alto Huallaga region was mainly due to the capture in February of its leader, Florindo Flores Hala, alias Artemio, and by the arrest over the following months of those entrusted with reorganising the group (mainly the insurgents known as Freddy and Braulio). The capture of Artemio, who in recent years had repeated his intention to enter talks with the government, was highly symbolic since he had led Shining Path in the Alto Huallaga region since 1982 and was the last of the members of the organisation's original central committee who remained at large. In the trial held at the end of the year, the chief prosecutor's office accused Artemio of terrorism, drug trafficking and the rape of minors, requesting a life sentence and the payment of 3.9 million dollars in reparations. Artemio denied all the charges and insisted that he had not been captured but rather handed himself in voluntarily.

Faced with the break-up of the group in Alto Huallaga and the power vacuum that it could generate (some media outlets reported that the faction operating in VRAEM had begun operations for its deployment in the Alto Huallaga region), the government voiced its fears that the drug traffickers operating in the area might turn to hired killers to protect their routes and laboratories. Soon after Artemio's arrest, the government announced that its political-military priority was now the VRAEM region and that its strategy would combine the stepping up of the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism

*The Peruvian government declared the military defeat of the faction of the group that operated in the Alto Huallaga region and announced its intention to strengthen its military efforts in the Valley between the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM).*

and the implementation of development projects for the communities. In this respect, Lima announced its intention to install new military bases and police stations in the region and to increase substantially its purchase of military equipment for the state security forces stationed there. In line with this strategy, the US government offered a significant reward for the capture of Víctor Quispe Palomino, alias José, the leader of Shining Path in the VRAEM region. Sporadic clashes occurred in this area between the armed forces and Shining Path insurgents, causing fatalities on both sides (it is estimated that since 2008 some 60 members of the armed forces have been killed in clashes of this kind). One of the most significant incidents was the kidnapping of 36 workers of two gas companies (one Swedish and one Peruvian) and the temporary seizure of a small town, which led to the imposition of a state of emergency and the launch of "Operation Freedom", one of the largest-scale counter-insurgent operations in recent years. Although the hostages were finally released, the death of ten soldiers during the operation drew much criticism and led to the resignation of the defence and interior ministers. Shining Path declared that the hostages had been released by the group itself.

Also noteworthy were the attacks by Shining Path on at least four helicopters (more than ten have been destroyed since 2008) and the release of some minors by the army (the government estimates that Shining Path is still holding some 80 minors).

In the political sphere, one important development was the government's announcement of a **new strategy to prevent Movadef (the organisation considered by the government to be the political arm of Shining Path) from gaining access to political institutions and to counter its growing activity** in urban areas, public universities, unions and in terms of social protests. In this respect, the government announced the modification of the anti-

terrorism law and its intention to call on the judiciary to carry out an in-depth investigation into the links between Movadef and Shining Path. In line with this strategy, in October the interior minister stated that he had reported members of Movadef for belonging to a terrorist organisation. In December, the anti-terrorism police presented a criminal complaint against the secretary general of Movadef with the same charge, which is punished with prison sentences of up to 20 years. Meanwhile, Movadef denounced what it considered a persecution of communist militants and announced its intention to stand in the 2016 presidential elections. Despite the fact that the electoral authorities refused to allow Movadef to register as a political party, the organisation declared its intention to go on trying.

In addition to combating the Shining Path organisation, **another important source of tension were the protests that occurred in several areas of the country, mostly related**

**to the exploitation of natural resources.** At the start of the year, three people died and 40 were injured in the south of the country during clashes between the police and demonstrators who had blocked the Pan-American highway to protest against the introduction of tougher penalties against illegal mining (which represents one third of the country's mining activity) and to demand the promotion and regulation of artisanal mining. In May, two people died and another 50 were injured during protests against the multinational mining company Xstrata. In the northern region of Cajamarca, several groups protested against the environmental consequences of a gold mining project of the Newmont company, although thousands of people also demonstrated to show their support for the company's activity in the region.

*The opposition condemned the lack of real representation of parties in Kazakhstan after elections in which the ruling party consolidated its power, in a context in which the opposition and human rights activists were subjected to constant repression*

In 2012 there was no sign of an end to the tension between the authorities and oil sector workers (which had led to protests at the end of 2011 that ended in clashes and the use of repressive tactics by the security forces, with 15 people being killed and a further 100 left injured, along with the application of exceptional measures), with fresh protests and strikes taking place and the deployment of additional security forces, including on the first anniversary of the incidents. Previously, the state of emergency declared in December 2011 had been extended until the end of January 2012. The trial of 37 workers and other people on charges related to December's violence began in March amid criticism from local and international organisations of the authorities refusal to look into the allegations of torture and ill-treatment being inflicted on the accused. The accused were sentenced in a series of verdicts to many years in prison, on ambiguous charges. Among those standing trial was the leader of the unregistered political party Alga, Vladimir Kozlov, who was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison, in a legal process criticised by organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW). The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights criticised the lack of a transparent and independent investigation into the 2011 incidents. In turn, a report by HRW warned about the systematic violation of the rights of oil workers by the authorities and by some companies in the sector.

In line with the repressive policy of the Kazakh regime with respect to critical and independent sectors, the chief prosecutor's office requested the closure of 40 opposition and independent media outlets, many of which belonged to a single conglomerate, alleging that they propagate extremism, and in turn requested that two unregistered political groups be classified as extremists: the Alga political party and the Khalyk Maydany social movement. Echoing the warnings sounded in this respect by fifteen local NGOs related to defence of human rights, Amnesty International expressed its concern that the few remaining independent voices could be silenced once and for all. As such, with elections taking place in Kazakhstan for the first time as a member country of the Human Rights Council (HRC), for the 2013-2015 period, a fact held up the government as recognition of the country's progress in this respect, organisations such as Amnesty International called on the government to improve its internal situation. Some groups had campaigned for the non-admittance of the country as a member of the HRC. **The regime's repressive tactics were also evident in a year that saw snap parliamentary elections in January, which according to the OSCE did not comply with basic democratic principles.** The ruling party, Nur-Otan, obtained 80.7% of the vote, while two other parties favourable to the government, Ak Zhol and the Popular Communist Party, also entered parliament, while the opposition gained no seats and questioned the

## Asia

### a) Central Asia

Kazakhstan	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	System, Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political and social opposition, local and regional armed groups

#### Summary:

Since its independence from the USSR in 1991, Kazakhstan has undergone strong economic growth in parallel with mostly stable socio-political development. Its extensive mineral and energy resources have been the engine of its economy, while the consolidation of the new nation-state has taken place, with Kazakhs making up more than half the population, with other minorities, especially Russians, accounting for the rest. The main challenges facing the country in the 21<sup>st</sup> century include risks of social conflict related to a lack of democracy and the authoritarian policies of a regime under the tight control of its president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has been in power since 1989. Furthermore, there is an increasing risk of violent incidents related to local and regional Islamist armed groups.

There was a reduction in tension in respect of 2011, which was marked to a high degree by the violent repression of demonstrators in the west of the country at the end of that year. Even so, the **level of tension remained high as a result of the regime's strong repression of opposition sectors, human rights activists and media outlets that did not toe the official line, along with the growing activity of armed groups** and counter-insurgency operations, which caused several fatalities.

degree to which parties were represented. The results and policies of the regime were criticised in several small-scale demonstrations over the course of the year, including in the capital, during which various opposition leaders were arrested. Furthermore, in application of the new legislation on religions of 2011, one third of the country's religious organisations faced closure.

Meanwhile, an increase in insurgent and counter-insurgent activity was registered, with several explosions, including one on the premises of the local department of the interior ministry in Atyrau (west), along with special operations (labelled as anti-terrorism operations). **The security incidents and special operations claimed at least twenty lives and injured many people**, although some of the violence may have been associated with criminal organisations. However, due to the obstacles placed in the path of independent journalists by the regime, the information should not be taken at face value. Judicial proceedings against several alleged insurgents also took place over the course of the year. March saw the start of the trial of 47 people accused of terrorism in relation to two explosions that occurred in October 2011 in Atyrau, for which the Jund al-Khilafah group claimed responsibility. An al-Qaeda-linked media outlet reported the death of the leader of this group in the region of North Waziristan in Pakistan in October. Furthermore, in the first quarter of the year the authorities announced that they had foiled a plan of terrorist attacks that involved members of the opposition such as Muratbek Ketevaev, a key figure in the Alga party who denied the accusations, raising doubts over the regime's possible exploitation of the so-called war on terror.

Kyrgyzstan	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	System, Government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political and social opposition, regional armed groups, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

**Summary:**

Since its emergence as an independent state in August 1991, the former Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan has experienced several periods of instability and socio-political conflict. The presidency of Askar Akayev (1991-2005) began with reformist momentum but gradually drifted towards authoritarianism and corruption. In March 2005 a series of demonstrations denouncing fraud in that year's elections led to a social uprising that forced the collapse of the regime. The promises of change made by the new president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, soon came to nothing, giving way to a regime of authoritarian presidentialism in which corruption and nepotism were rife, especially from the end of 2007. All of this took place in a scenario involving economic difficulties for the population, latent tension between the north and south of the country, and the exclusion of ethnic

minorities from political decision-making processes. Five years later, in April 2010, a new popular uprising led to the overthrow of the regime, with clashes that claimed 85 lives and left hundreds injured. This was followed in June by a wave of violence with an inter-ethnic dimension, claiming more than 400 lives. Other sources of tension in Kyrgyzstan are related to the presence of regional armed groups with Islamist tendencies in the Fergana Valley (an area between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) and border disputes with the neighbouring countries.

There was a constant stream of warnings about the tension in the south of the country, which since 2010 has been characterised by inter-ethnic violence and political fragility. Two years after the outbreak of violence in which several hundred people were killed, thousands were injured and hundreds of thousands were displaced, **human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported the routine use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment**, including beatings, by members of the armed forces during searches, arrests, transfers to detention centres and interrogations. These practices mainly affected the Uzbek population (a minority group in the country, with greater weight in the south, and the worst affected by the violence in 2010 in terms of the number of victims), which continued to be subjected to illegal arrests and ill-treatment by the security forces, according to the International Crisis Group, and to extortion, according to Amnesty International. Of the 5,000 criminal proceedings under way in respect of the violence in 2010, most of those put on trial are members of the Uzbek community, despite this group being the main victim of the violence, according to HRW, which called for a review of all the proceedings in which there were credible allegations of torture and other human rights violations. Amnesty International stated that despite the fact that the 2011 report by the international commission contained evidence of crimes against humanity being perpetrated against the Uzbek population in the city of Osh (south) in the 2010 incidents, no investigation or criminal proceedings were instigated in this respect in 2012. Neither was any progress made regarding the dozens of documented cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence perpetrated in 2010 against Uzbek and Kyrgyz women and against some children and men, according to the same NGO. The constant human rights violations and ill-treatment of the Uzbek population in a climate of impunity for the security forces led several local and international voices (diplomats, organisations and activists) to warn about the high level of underlying tension.

Meanwhile, **the country continued to be affected by political fractures and institutional fragility**. The mayor of Osh, the Kyrgyz nationalist Melis Myrzakmatov, strengthened his credentials as a critic of the central government and as an alternative power option. A demonstration in this city in March, staged by some 10,000 participants and with the support of the former presidential candidates and nationalist leaders



Adakhan Madumarov and Kamchybek Tashiev, called for the resignation of the central government, criticised the social and economic deterioration of the country and voiced their support for Myrzakmatov. Furthermore, the parties of the two leaders, Butun and Ata-Jurt, announced an alliance, strengthening the opposition to the government from the south and, consequently, adding to the dynamics of regional fractures. Another sign of the political tension was the split of the government coalition in August. As a protest against the alleged corruption of the prime minister, Omurbek Babanov, and due to disagreements, the Ata-Meken and Ar-Namys parties left the coalition and formed a new government with the Social Democratic Party, while Babanov's party, Republic, forged a new alliance with the nationalist party Ata-Jurt: Rule of Law and Justice. The opposition's policy of wearing down the government could be seen again in October. Three leaders of Ata-Jurt, including Tashiev, took part in a protest in the capital, Bishkek, to demand the nationalisation of the Kumtor mining company. The demonstrators tried to force their way into the parliament building and Tashiev urged them to depose the government. A dozen people were injured in clashes with the security forces. **The three leaders of Ata-Jurt were arrested on charges of inciting riots in order to seize power, which triggered protests in other areas,** which in turn resulted in clashes in which some people were injured. Meanwhile, in 2012 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, warned that corruption was one of the main problems affecting Kyrgyzstan, along with ethnic, religious and gender-based discrimination. Dozens of activists demonstrated outside parliament against the kidnapping of women for forced marriages, protesting that more than 10,000 women are affected each year, many of them adolescents.

The state maintained the pressure on Islamist sectors, arresting several people accused of being members of the Hizb ut Tahrir organisation. The precarious human rights situation in the country also continued to fuel tension. Inmates in 13 prisons around the country staged protests, including a hunger strike, against prison conditions, which they saw as a breach of their human rights. The protests turned into riots in which one prisoner died and another 30 were injured. Meanwhile, relations with neighbouring countries were once again affected in 2012 by tensions, including several incidents with Uzbekistan in which two guards, one Kyrgyz and one Uzbek, were killed on the border.

*The Tajik government carried out a large-scale security operation against sectors loyal to former opposition commanders in the east of the country*

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**Main parties:** Government, political opposition (Islamic Renaissance Party), social opposition (regional groups Gharimis and Pamiris), former warlords, Islamist groups (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU]), Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan

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**Summary:** The tension in Tajikistan is largely related to the armed conflict that took place from 1992 to 1997 between two main groups marked by strong regional divisions: on the one side, the opposition alliance of Islamist forces and anti-communist liberal sectors (centre and east of the country) and, on the other side, the government forces, which were the heirs of the Soviet regime (north and south). The 1997 peace agreement involved a power-sharing deal, which incorporated the opposition to the government. In its post-war rehabilitation phase, the problems facing the country include regional tensions (including the growing hostility of the Leninabadi population in the north of the country towards its former allies in the south, the Kulyabi, the dominant population group in power since war ended), the presence of some non-demobilised warlords and former opposition combatants in parts of the country, the increasing authoritarianism of the regime, corruption, high levels of poverty and unemployment, tensions with neighbouring Uzbekistan, instability related to the border shared with Afghanistan and the potential threat of armed Islamist groups.

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The tension in the country increased, mainly in the eastern region of the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) where the security forces launched a special operation against former opposition commanders and their supporters. The relative calm that characterised the first half of the year was shaken in July when **the government launched a large-scale security operation in the GBAO, deploying around 2,000 troops against the former opposition commander Tolib Ayombekov** and his armed supporters. Ayombekov, like other former opposition commanders, had been incorporated within the structures of the state as a result of the 1997 peace agreement and since 2008 had been specifically responsible for the committee of a border police unit in a zone of the GBAO, in practice maintaining his status as the region's strongman. The government justified the operation as a response to the death of General Abdullo Nazarov, Head of the National Security Committee for GBAO and Ayombekov's superior, which had occurred earlier on in July. According to the authorities, the special operation caused the death of 17 soldiers, 30 alleged insurgents and one civilian, although media including RFE/RL reported 70 fatalities. According to the official version, a ceasefire implemented by the state was followed by talks with opposition members that produced an agreement and Ayombekov's surrender in August. Having been placed under house

Tajikistan	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government, System Internationalised internal



arrest, Ayombekov claimed that the operation was unnecessary since the government knew that he was willing to hand over any individuals requested by the authorities. Indeed, Ayombekov, who claimed that Nazarov's death had been accidental, stated that the government had carried out this operation to impose its authority in a region that had mostly remained outside its control since the country's independence in 1991, according to some reports in the media. Other significant developments followed Ayombekov's capture, such as the assassination of his fellow former opposition commander Imomnazar Imomnazarov, who had been suspected of being behind Nazarov's death. The death of Imomnazarov triggered protests by thousands of people in the provincial capital, Khorog. Two people were injured during attempts to enter an official building by force. The government denied any involvement in Imomnazarov's assassination, while organisations such as the EU called for an independent investigation into the incident. A subsequent agreement led to the partial withdrawal of troops from the GBAO.

Meanwhile, **the GBAO was also the scenario of tensions that affected the IRP**, the only legal Islamist political party in Central Asia. Its leader in the GBAO, Sabzali Mamadrizoyev, was arrested in Khorog and subsequently murdered. Furthermore, several members of the party were accused by the chief prosecutor's office of inciting the riots in Khorog and of being involved in illegal Islamist groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir organisation, among other charges. For the IRP these accusations formed part of the government's policy of confrontation with the party. An IRP office in the western region of Vahdat was also attacked. Meanwhile, the supposed Islamist insurgent threat frequently referred to by the government continued to serve as a justification for carrying out arrests and initiating legal proceedings against alleged rebels. The trials that took place in 2012 included one in April in which 53 people were given prison sentences of between eight and 30 years or even life sentences in relation to a car bomb attack that occurred in 2010 in Khujand (north). Of these 53 people, 43 were considered members of the IMU. In May, 17 people suspected of being members of the IMU were also imprisoned in Khujand, followed by another 12 in June. Another source of tension in the country was the human rights situation, with the Tajik Coalition against Torture reporting new violations and calling on the authorities to investigate alleged mass beatings of prisoners in prisons around the country. Furthermore, the well known local association Amparo (founded in 2005 by human rights lawyers) was forced to shut down, a measure that met with strong criticism from local and international NGOs. Other local organisations were also threatened with closure and the government blocked access to more than one hundred websites in December.

Uzbekistan	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	System, Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political and social opposition, regional armed groups, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan

**Summary:**

The regime of Islam Karimov, who has held power since 1989 (initially as leader of the Uzbek Communist Party and since 1991 as president of the independent country), has been characterised by the systematic repression of the political, social and religious opposition through a personalistic political system, tight control of public areas and the violation of rights and freedoms. Since the late 1990s, the country has suffered violent attacks by underground Islamist groups, in particular the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Tension began to escalate in the country in May 2005 when the regime violently put down demonstrations in Andijan, which resulted in several hundred civilian fatalities and more than a thousand refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries.

The state maintained its policy of fierce repression against opposition members and human rights activists, as well as against the Muslim population and other religions that profess their beliefs outside officially registered channels. **In 2012 local activists and international organisations once again condemned the systematic use of torture and ill-treatment in detention centres.** The incidents that took place in 2012 included the murder of the human rights defender Akramkhodzha Mukhitdinov in the province of Tashkent in July; the deportation of two international journalists on their arrival in the country in March; and the fleeing from the country in July of the leader of the Free Peasants party, one of the last remaining opposition voices in the country, fearful of being sentenced on charges of attempting to overthrow the government. Moreover, several NGOs reported that each year hundreds of Muslims who worship outside state-approved religious institutions are given prison sentences on ambiguous charges related to religious extremism or the attempted overthrow of the constitutional order, among others. In 2012, Amnesty International once again called on the authorities to carry out an in-depth independent investigation into the violent incidents that occurred in Andijan in 2005, when hundreds of peaceful demonstrators were killed by government forces. Meanwhile, the government warned that the withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan in 2014 could lead to greater insurgent threats in the country. In the regional sphere, some border incidents occurred with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, including a shooting in which two border guards were killed (one Uzbek and one Kyrgyz) and the injuring of an Uzbek guard in an incident with Tajik guards.

## b) East Asia

China (East Turkestan)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, System, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, armed opposition (ETIM, ETLO), political and social opposition

### Summary:

Xinjiang, also known as East Turkestan or Uyghuristan, is China's westernmost region. It contains significant hydrocarbon deposits and has historically been inhabited by the Uyghur population, which is mainly Muslim and boasts important cultural ties with Central Asian countries. Following several decades of acculturation policies, the exploitation of natural resources and intense demographic colonisation, which has substantially altered the population structure and caused community tensions since the 1950s, several armed secessionist groups began armed operations against the Chinese government, especially in the 1990s. Beijing classifies such groups, including the ETIM or the ETLO, as terrorist organisations and has attempted to link its counter-insurgency strategy to the so-called global war on terrorism. In 2008, when the Olympic Games were being held in Beijing, there was an increase in armed attacks by insurgent groups, while 2009 saw the most fierce community clashes in recent decades.

As in the previous year, **no major clashes took place between the armed forces and armed opposition or involving ethnic communities. However, sporadic violent incidents caused dozens of fatalities** and drew criticism from Uyghur organisations, accusing the Chinese government of repression. One of the most significant violent incidents occurred at the end of February, when an attack on a market in Yecheng (Kargilik in Uyghur) killed 20 people and led to the arrest of another 100. The Chinese government attributed the attack to pro-independence armed groups and claimed that the victims were mainly civilians. Nonetheless, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), an organisation in exile, stated that the attack was targeted at the Chinese authorities and that many of the victims were armed personnel. In March, four people died and another 24 were arrested in a police raid on a farm in which explosive devices were allegedly being manufactured. Some of the other major incidents that occurred over the course of the year were the attack on a school in which 17 people, including 12 schoolchildren, were injured (according to the government, by explosive devices of armed opposition groups and, according to the WUC, as a result of the police intervention); clashes between ethnic Uyghurs and the police in the city of Korla, in which several people were killed and injured and which led to raids, arrests and road blockades by the government; demonstrations by the Uyghur people to protest about the expropriation of Uyghur land; or the foiled attempt by ethnic Uyghurs to hijack a plane flying from Hotan and Ürümqi, in which seven people

were injured. At the end of the year, three people were sentenced to death and one to life imprisonment for their role in the hijacking. Government sources stated that the other two people who took part in the attempt died as a result of the injuries caused by passengers and the crew, who foiled the hijacking. However, Uyghur organisations insist that these injuries were caused by the Chinese authorities. In these and other incidents, the government blamed pro-independence armed groups, in particular ETM. In 2012, Beijing accused this group of receiving al-Qaeda funds generated by arms trafficking. It also accused it of supporting al-Qaeda in its struggle against the Syrian government. The government also announced that five alleged ETIM members had died in the Pakistani region of Waziristan during aerial bombardments carried out by the US. In this respect, it should be pointed out that Beijing sought international support to combat pro-independence groups on a political and military level (obtaining a very positive response from countries such as Turkey or Pakistan) and carried out several counter-terrorism exercises with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Meanwhile, during the holding of a congress in Japan in which Rebiya Kadeer was re-elected as leader of the organisation, the WUC declared that the human rights situation of the Uyghur community was deteriorating notably. **In addition to the economic exploitation and cultural restrictions to which, according to Kadeer, the Uyghur people are subjected by the Chinese government, the leader highlighted the growing militarisation of the region (especially in remote areas and towns along the border with Kashmir) and the notable increase in the number of extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances.** As regards enforced disappearances, the WUC stated that the start of the spiral of violence in Xinjiang in July 2009, up to 10,000 people may have been affected by this practice. The WUC warned that the Chinese government has not only failed to sign up to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance but is also pushing through changes in the penal code to legalise this practice. In respect of the militarisation of the region, the Chinese government announced its intention to recruit some 8,000 additional police officers to be deployed in the province. It also plans to allocate an additional 10% for internal security in the 2012 budget, a significant amount of which will be used to tackle the political instability in Xinjiang and Tibet.

China (Tibet)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, System, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Chinese Government, Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in exile, political and social opposition in Tibet and in bordering provinces and countries

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**Summary:**

In 1950, one year after emerging victorious in the Chinese civil war, the communist government of Mao Tse-tung invaded Tibet and over the course of the following decade increased its military, cultural and demographic pressure on the region, putting down several attempted rebellions, in which thousands of people were killed. Faced with the brutality of the occupation, in 1959 the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of people fled from Tibet and went into exile in several countries, especially in Nepal or the north of India, where the government in exile is based. In the last few decades, both the Dalai Lama and numerous human rights organisations have denounced the repression, demographic colonisation and attempted acculturation of the Tibetan population, part of whose territory enjoys autonomous region status. Dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing has been derailed on several occasions by the Chinese government's accusations concerning the alleged secessionist objectives of the Dalai Lama. The outbreak of violence that occurred in 2008, the most virulent in recent decades, interrupted dialogue once again and eroded trust between the parties significantly. The wave of self-immolations that began in 2009 in several Chinese provinces with Tibetan areas provoked a harsh response from Beijing, along with a distancing between the Chinese government and the Tibetan authorities in exile, which are accused by the former of inciting the protests.

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The number of protests increased significantly in respect of the previous year, especially in terms of self-immolations. **The Tibetan government in exile estimates that 100 people have self-immolated since 2009, of whom 80 have died as a result of their injuries.** Most of the self-immolations took place in 2012, especially in November, when 29 people self-immolated during the holding of the congress of the Chinese Communist Party. However, at other points of the year (such as during the celebration of the Tibetan new year in February, or the commemoration in mid-March of the spiral of violence that occurred in Lhasa and other Tibetan regions in 2008), the government stepped up security measures and significant protests took place. Most of the protests were staged in Chinese provinces with a significant Tibetan population, such as Sichuan, Gansu or Qinghai, but incidents also occurred in other countries, including Nepal or India, and even (albeit very sporadically) in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa. In fact, the self-immolations that occurred in Lhasa were considered the most significant protests that had occurred in the city since 2008. Some analysts consider that two important changes have come about in respect of previous years. First of all, the protests and self-immolations were no longer carried out to such a large extent by Buddhist monks and nuns (given that it is easier for the Chinese authorities to control the monasteries) but rather by civilians acting alone or as part of a group. Secondly, the protests no longer

*The Tibetan government in exile estimates that 100 people have self-immolated since 2009, of whom 80 have died as a result of their injuries*

target government personnel or property. The reason for this is to prevent the authorities from classifying them as acts of terrorism and thus being able to justify the increase in repression. Nevertheless, Tibetan organisations in exile warned that the wave of self-immolations had led to the most intense period of repression by the Chinese authorities since the 1960s and 1970s, to the growing militarisation of the areas in which the protests were concentrated, and to a substantial increase in the violation of the human rights of those taking part in the protests. In the legal sphere, the government attempted to criminalise the self-immolations by treating them as intentional homicide, while in the political sphere it accused the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile of being behind the increase in protests. Both the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan prime minister, Lobsang Sangay, condemned the self-immolations and warned about the consequences that they could entail for those who carry them out. However, at the same time they declared that they understood the reasons behind the desperation felt by a significant proportion of the Tibetan community. The two leaders reiterated that they advocated non-violence and sought genuine autonomy for Tibet. They also expressed their willingness to resume talks with Beijing (at a standstill since 2010) at any time and in any place, but the Chinese government ruled out this possibility until the Dalai Lama ceased to support the independence of Tibet and the protests of the Tibetan community.

In the international sphere, **several governments, in particular the US, along with the United Nations and other international bodies, lamented the current wave of self-immolations and called on Beijing to enter negotiations with the Tibetan leaders and to change policies that may generate unrest and grievances among the Tibetan population.** However, Lobsang Sangay and some human rights organisations declared that the international community had not done enough to exert pressure on Beijing and force a change of policy. In December the US government issued a statement arguing that the protests and self-immolations in Tibet had been exacerbated

by the Chinese government's policy towards the Tibetan community. The Chinese government responded by lodging a formal diplomatic complaint, stating that no foreign government could interfere in its internal affairs. Although some sources had speculated about the possibility of significant changes coming about in China's policy towards Tibet following the renewal of the leadership of the communist party and the government in the November party congress, the official stance of the new authorities was one of total continuity. Some sources pointed out that although the protests in themselves are unlikely to achieve significant changes in the Chinese government's policy in the short term, they have served to strengthen the cohesion and solidarity of the Tibetan community, both in China and abroad.

Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	System International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Korea DPR, Rep. of Korea

#### Summary:

After the end of the Second World War and the occupation of the Korean peninsula by Soviet troops (north) and US troops (south), it was split into two countries. The Korean War (1950-53) ended with the signing of an armistice (under the terms of which the two countries remain technically at war) and the establishment of a de facto border at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. Despite the fact that in the 1970s talks began on reunification, the two countries have threatened on several occasions to take military action. As such, in recent decades numerous armed incidents have been recorded, both on the common border between the two countries (one of the most militarised zones in the world) and along the sea border in the Yellow Sea (or West Sea). Although in 2000 the leaders of the two countries held a historic meeting in which they agreed to establish trust-building measures, once Lee Myung-bak took office in 2007 the tension escalated significantly again and some military skirmishes occurred along the border. Subsequently, the death of Kim Jong-il at the end of 2011 (succeeded as supreme leader by his son Kim Jong-un) and the election of Park Geun-hye as the new South Korean president at the end of 2012 seemed to start a new phase in bilateral relations.

**Although no major military incidents were reported, the diplomatic and military tension continued throughout the year and the slight progress made in terms of trust-building and rapprochement between the two countries came to nothing as a result of the military exercises carried out by South Korea and North Korea's warmongering rhetoric and launch of long-range rockets.**

In February, South Korea and the US carried out one of the most important military exercises in recent years, involving approximately 200,000 South Korean soldiers. Previously, South Korea had already carried out live-fire military exercises close to the maritime border between the two countries in the Yellow Sea. North Korea viewed all of these military exercises as a clear threat to its national sovereignty and an affront to its dignity, since at this time the country was still in mourning after the death of its leader, Kim Jong-il. Pyongyang also reproached its neighbour for not offering its condolences to the North Korean people and for failing to send an official delegation to the funeral of Kim Jong-il. As regards the military manoeuvres, both South Korea and the US declared that they were pre-planned exercises that had been known about for some time, that they were strictly defensive in nature and that they were monitored by countries such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway or the United Kingdom. The offer made by the South Korean ministry of unification during the first quarter of the year to enter talks was withdrawn in April when a long-range rocket was launched by North Korea. Pyongyang declared that the

launch was for peaceful purposes, but Seoul interpreted it as a ballistic test prohibited by the United Nations that directly affected its national security. The tension generated by this launch, which took place during the celebrations of the birthday of the founder of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, escalated further still when the North Korean government announced its intention to carry out a nuclear test, which in the end did not go ahead. In this context, South Korea announced the deployment of more missiles aimed at North Korea with the capability of reaching any part of the territory. It is well known that North Korea also possesses medium-range missiles capable of reaching any point of South Korean territory.

Despite the fact that mutual accusations were exchanged by the two countries throughout the year and that **North Korea repeatedly accused the South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, of bringing bilateral relations to their lowest point in many years**, in August, Seoul authorised the dispatch of humanitarian aid to North Korea to help it deal with the aftermath of the flooding that had affected more than 200,000 people. However, in September, one of the most important military incidents of the year occurred, when the South Korean armed forces fired several warning shots after some North Korean boats crossed the maritime border in the Yellow Sea. North Korea's refusal to acknowledge the so-called Northern Limit Line, since it considers that it was imposed unilaterally by South Korea and the United Nations at the end of the Korean War (1950-53), has led to armed clashes between the two countries on several occasions, such as in 1999, 2002, 2009 and 2010. Following this border incident, South Korea raised the alert level for its troops and North Korea warned that incidents of this kind risked triggering a war between the two countries. At the end of the year, South Korea once again carried out military exercises in the Yellow Sea, on this occasion to commemorate the second anniversary of the North Korean attack on the island of Yeonpyeong, in which four people were killed. These were also live-fire exercises but on this occasion the US was not involved. In December, just a few days before the holding of the presidential elections and coinciding with the commemoration of the first anniversary of the death of Kim Jong-il, the tension between the two countries escalated to one of the highest points in recent years after the North Korean government successfully launched a long-range rocket. Nevertheless, at the end of the year the prospects of talks between the two countries improved substantially due to the holding of the South Korean elections and by the rare New year's speech made by Kim Jong-un. The winner of the elections was Park Geun-hye, who narrowly beat his centre-left rival, Moon Jae-in. During the election campaign, Park Geun-hye, daughter of the former dictator Park Chung-hee, who ruled for 18 years until he was assassinated in 1979, had fiercely criticised North Korea's arms programme, but at the same time had expressed her intention to improve bilateral relations with the neighbouring country and had stated that she was willing to meet the North



Korean leader face to face. Kim Jong-un, on the other hand, declared in his New Year's speech (the first made in 19 years in North Korea) that the top priority for 2013 would be to improve the living conditions of the population (through the promotion of agriculture and industry). He announced major changes and expressed his commitment to bringing the confrontation with South Korea to an end. Although he did not go into more detail, he did call for the implementation of the inter-Korean agreements of 2000 and 2007, which he considers good reunification programmes. However, Kim Jong-un also highlighted the need to improve and increase the country's military force and arms capability. Soon after this speech was made, it was reported that the budget allocated by South Korea for inter-Korean cooperation would increase by 9% in 2013. Some of the activities that will benefit from this increase are the support for reuniting families separated by the Korean War (1950-53), the dispatch of humanitarian aid or the strengthening of private organisations whose goal is to promote links with North Korea.

Korea, DPR – USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government International
<b>Main parties:</b>	DPR Korea, USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea, China, Russia

#### Summary:

International concern about North Korea's nuclear programme dates back to the early 1990s, when the North Korean government restricted the presence in the country of observers from the International Atomic Energy Agency and carried out a series of missile tests. Nevertheless, international tension escalated notably after the US Administration of George W. Bush included the North Korean regime within the so-called "axis of evil". A few months after Pyongyang reactivated an important nuclear reactor and withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003, multilateral talks began on the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula in which the governments of North Korea, South Korea, the USA, Japan, China and Russia participated. In April 2009, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the said talks after the United Nations imposed new sanctions after the country launched a long-range missile.

Over the course of the year, very important diplomatic contacts took place for the resumption of multilateral talks on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, **while the tension regarding the North Korean arms programme escalated significantly due to the launch by Pyongyang of two long-range rockets (in April and December) and due to its announcement of plans for a third nuclear test.** The first quarter of the year saw very significant progress towards restoring trust between the countries taking part in the multilateral negotiations. In January, the US, Japanese and South

Korean governments (the three governments with the most openly hostile stance towards the North Korean government) issued a statement in which they expressed their willingness to restart talks, relaxing the two demands that the US and South Korea had insisted on until then for the resumption of dialogue: the end of the uranium enrichment programme and permission for international observers to enter north Korea. A few weeks later, the US and North Korea reached an agreement through which the American government agreed to send 2,400 tons of food aid to North Korea, in exchange for which Pyongyang would declare a nuclear moratorium (which includes the temporary suspension of the uranium enrichment programme, of nuclear tests and of long-range missile launches) and would grant permission to observers from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to re-enter the Yongbyon nuclear complex. However, shortly afterwards, in April, this agreement was breached by the failed launch of a rocket by North Korea. Although Pyongyang stated that the reason for the launch was to put an observation satellite into orbit for scientific purposes, several governments claimed that in reality it was the test of a long-range missile capable of transporting nuclear warheads. The said launch not only led to the suspension of food aid and the threat of new sanctions by the US but also met with the condemnation of the United Nations and several governments. Furthermore, the United Nations imposed sanctions on three North Korean companies (the Chinese government prevented the sanction from affecting 40 companies) for exporting and procuring arms for the North Korean government. Amid the escalation of international tensions, the North Korean government threatened to carry out a third nuclear test (the most recent one was in 2009), although this option was publicly ruled out in June. In August, there was once again growing concern in the international community about the construction, confirmed by the IAEA, of a nuclear reactor that, according to Pyongyang was for peaceful purposes (power generation) but that, according to South Korea and several governments, was for the purpose of uranium enrichment and, therefore, the acceleration of the nuclear arms race.

In September, coinciding with the celebration of the 67<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly, the North Korean government claimed that the hostile policy of the US and its alleged intention to invade North Korea could trigger a thermonuclear war on the peninsula. Among other issues, Pyongyang condemned the joint military exercises carried out each year by the US and South Korea and declared that its weapons arsenal was deterrent that served to defend its sovereignty. Soon after this speech in the United Nations, the South Korean, US, Japanese and Australian governments carried out joint military exercises as part of a Proliferation Security Initiative, mainly aimed at intercepting weapons of mass destruction. Over the following months, as announced by the South Korean government, intensive diplomatic work was carried out to achieve the resumption of multilateral talks and bilateral dialogue between North



Korea and the US, which had been suspended after the breach of the agreement reached in February. In this respect, the North Korean special envoy for multilateral talks announced his intention to travel to the US to discuss with his American counterpart the strategy to be followed in order to achieve the resumption of talks. These efforts once again came to nothing when the North Korean government launched a long-range rocket in mid-December. As it had done in April and on previous occasions, Pyongyang declared that its intention was to launch a satellite for scientific purposes but it met with universal condemnation from the international community, which considered it a ballistic missile test, prohibited by several United Nations resolutions. **North Korea declared that the launch had been a success and that it had managed to put the alleged satellite in orbit. The US and South Korean governments acknowledged this possibility, whereas on previous occasions (1998, 2006, 2009 and April 2012) they had always declared North Korea's ballistic tests a failure.** As a result of this incident concern grew even more acute in the region and especially in the US, which suspects that North Korea is developing long-range missiles that could reach its territory. Soon after the launch of the rocket, South Korean scientists who analysed debris from the rocket that had fallen into the sea warned that the North Korean regime might have the capability of launching rockets 10,000 kilometres, although for the time being it ruled out the possibility of it having the technology to miniaturise an atomic bomb to mount it on a missile. At the end of December, a committee of US experts declared, having examined satellite images, that North Korea could be preparing a new nuclear test in the north-west of the country, which would be the third test carried out by the North Korean government following the failed attempts of 2006 and 2009. The South Korean media also reported this possibility, alleging that North Korea had also carried out nuclear tests after launching rockets, whether successfully or not, and arguing that Kim Jong-un may wish to put on a show of strength before the new presidents of China and South Korea take office in March 2013.

### c) South Asia

India (Nagaland)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Identity, Self-government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM, NSCN (Khole-Kitovi), NNC, ZUF
<b>Summary:</b>	
The conflict affecting the state of Nagaland began following the British decolonisation process in India (1947), when	

a Naga movement emerged that demanded recognition for the collective rights of the Naga population, which is mostly Christian, as opposed to the Indian majority, which is Hindu. The founding of the NCC organisation marked the beginning of political demands for the independence of the Naga people, which over the following decades evolved in terms of both content (independence of Nagaland or the creation of Greater Nagaland, encompassing territories from neighbouring states inhabited by Naga people) and opposition methods, the armed struggle beginning in 1955. In 1980 the NSCN armed opposition group was set up following disagreements with the more moderate political sectors, itself splitting into two separate factions eight years later: Isaac Muivah and Khaplang. Since 1997 the NSCN-IM has maintained a ceasefire agreement and has held talks with the Indian Government, while the NSCN-K reached a ceasefire agreement in 2000. Since then, clashes between the two factions have taken place in parallel with attempts to foster rapprochement and reconciliation among the Naga insurgency. A significant reduction in violence has been observed in recent years.

There was an overall improvement in the socio-political crisis in the Indian state of Nagaland **thanks to the possibility of a peace agreement being signed between the armed opposition group NSCN-IM and the government.**<sup>32</sup> **although sporadic clashes continued to take place between the various insurgent organisations and the number of fatalities rose sharply in respect of the previous year.** According to the figures provided by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, 61 people were killed in 2012, most of whom (55) were linked to armed opposition groups, against the 15 fatalities reported in 2011.<sup>33</sup> The increase in factional clashes and in the number of fatalities was due in large part to the growing tension between the armed opposition groups NSCN (Khole-Kitovi) and NSCN-K, which formed after a split in June 2011. Particularly noteworthy were the clashes that occurred in May, in which one youth was killed. Following these clashes, some 10,000 people demonstrated in the city of Zunheboto to condemn the violence among the Naga insurgent factions. The demonstrators protested about the freedom of movement of insurgents in civilian areas and demanded the full implementation of the ceasefire provisions. However, in June and over the following months fresh clashes occurred involving more fatalities, mainly within the ranks of the insurgents themselves. There were also clashes between the ZUF and NSCN-IM groups, in which four insurgents were killed in November (two from the ZUF and two from the NSCN-IM). Meanwhile, despite the substantial progress made in peace talks between the government and the NSCN-IM, incidents between the insurgency and the government were also reported. In April several members of the security forces were taken hostage by the armed opposition group NSCN-IM in an area close to one of its camps. They were later released after the intervention of the Ceasefire Monitoring Group, although their weapons were not returned. The NSCN-IM

32. See the summary on Nagaland in chapter 3 (Peace Processes) and "A peace agreement for Nagaland" in chapter 5 (Opportunities for Peace in 2013).

33. Figure provided by the think tank SATP. *Alert 2012! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding* reported 11 fatalities as a result of insurgent violence.

reiterated its commitment to the ceasefire despite the incidents with the Indian security forces, which in its opinion constituted flagrant violations of this agreement. The government denied any intention to attack the facilities of the insurgent group.

At various times during the year attempts were made to achieve a rapprochement between the insurgent groups to reduce the violence and facilitate a reconciliation process in the state. Nonetheless, they did not lead to a cessation of hostilities. The start of the year witnessed a historical meeting of the Forum for Naga Reconciliation, in which between 20,000 and 50,000 people participated and which brought together the leaders of the main Naga insurgent organisations: NSCN-IM, NSCN (Khole-Kitovi), NNC/FGN-Singnya, NSCN-K and NNC/FGN-Kiumakam. The Forum specifically called for a cessation of all violence, although this call produced no tangible results. Later on, in May, the Forum for Naga Reconciliation held a meeting in Thailand to resolve the differences between the various Naga insurgent organisations. The NSCN-K and the GRP-NSCN announced their participation but the NSCN-IM declared that it would not attend.

India – Pakistan	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Identity, Territory International
<b>Main parties:</b>	India, Pakistan

**Summary:**

The tension between India and Pakistan dates back to the independence and partition of the two states and the dispute over the region of Kashmir. On three occasions (1947-1948, 1965, 1971) armed conflict has broken out between the two countries, both claiming sovereignty over the region, which is split between India, Pakistan and China. The armed conflict in 1947 led to the present-day division and the *de facto* border between the two countries. In 1989, the armed conflict shifted to the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1999, one year after the two countries carried out nuclear tests, tension almost escalated into a new armed conflict until the USA mediated to calm the situation. In 2004 a peace process got under way. Although no real progress was made in resolving the dispute over Kashmir, there was a significant rapprochement above all in the economic sphere. However, India has continued to level accusations at Pakistan concerning the latter's support of the insurgency that operates in Jammu and Kashmir and sporadic outbreaks of violence have occurred on the *de facto* border that divides the two states. In 2008 serious attacks took place in the Indian city of Mumbai that led to the formal rupture of the peace process after India claimed that the attack had been orchestrated from Pakistan. Since then, relations between the two countries have remained deadlocked although some diplomatic contacts have taken place.

There was no significant development in the relations between the two countries since the formal resumption of the peace process in 2011. **Although no substantial progress was made and no agreements were reached on the key issues of disagreement, diplomatic talks did take place, mainly of a technical nature, which did lead to some agreements.**<sup>34</sup> One of the main issues on the agenda in 2012 was the possible demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier, on which there were no agreements or progress, but which became a key issue when 124 Pakistani soldiers and 14 civilians were killed in an avalanche. The glacier is situated at an altitude of 6,700 metres and more soldiers deployed there have been killed as a consequence of bad weather conditions than in direct clashes between India and Pakistan. Despite the rapprochements, over the course of the year the two countries accused each other of breaching the ceasefire in force along the Line of Control, the *de facto* border between the two countries. In March, India accused Pakistan, declaring that Pakistani troops had opened fire on Indian positions in the district of Rajouri, the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In June, an Indian soldier was shot dead by the Pakistani armed forces in an exchange of fire along the Line of Control. In the summer, India accused Pakistan of having breached the ceasefire along the Line of Control repeatedly (on up to 15 occasions). One Indian soldier was reportedly killed and one Pakistani civilian seriously injured as a consequence of these incidents. Meanwhile, in November, India executed the lone surviving perpetrator of the attacks on Mumbai in 2008, a member of the armed opposition group Lashkar-e-Toiba and a Pakistani national. According to various analysts, it was unlikely that this execution would contribute to a deterioration in relations between the two countries. Negotiations between the two countries were suspended after these attacks and did not resume until 2011.

Nepal	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	System Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, armed forces, political parties –UCPN(M), CN, CPN(UML)–, former Maoist opposition armed group PLA

**Summary:**

1996 marked the start of a decade-long armed conflict between the Nepalese government and the armed wing of the Maoist CPN-M, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which aimed to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Maoist republic, in a country affected by poverty, feudalism, inequality and the absence of democracy. Following a decade of armed conflict and a coup in 2005, through which the king assumed all state powers, at the end of April 2006 King Gyanendra ordered the reopening of parliament after

34. See the summary on India and Pakistan in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

several weeks of intense social protests that claimed some 20 lives. The protests that brought about the overthrow of the king were orchestrated by a coalition of the seven main democratic opposition parties and the Maoists. Following the overthrow of the monarchy they unilaterally declared a ceasefire, which was backed by the interim government. In November 2006 a peace agreement was signed that brought the armed conflict to an end, after which the republic was proclaimed. In 2008 a constituent assembly was established to draw up Nepal's new constitution, although successive political crises and the lack of agreement on key aspects of the peace process, such as territorial decentralisation or the situation of Maoist combatants have led to a stalemate in the peace process.

The situation in Nepal was marked by two key developments related to the peace process that began in 2006, the dissolution of the constituent assembly and the process of integrating Maoist combatants in the armed forces. First of all, it is important to highlight the significant deterioration in the country's political life represented by the **dissolution of the constituent assembly after the deadline passed for approving a draft constitution. No consensus was reached by the main parties for drawing up the text, despite four years of work in the assembly.** Although the government initially considered scheduling elections in November for the formation of a new assembly, the government crisis triggered by the dissolution of the assembly and the decision of various parties to leave the government led these elections to be postponed until 2013. The lack of agreement over which government should call the elections led to their delay. The dissolution of the constituent assembly occurred due to important differences concerning the form that the government should take (the Maoist party UCPN-M is in favour of an elected president vested with full executive powers, while the Nepali Congress and other opposition parties favour a parliamentary system in which the prime minister holds executive powers and the president is merely ceremonial), along with the specific nature of a federal system, mainly defended by the sectors that are traditionally excluded. Another important development occurred in August when 21 political groups (including the UCPN-M and UDMF parties, other Madhesi parties and ethnic minority parties) formed the Federal Republic Democratic Alliance, headed by the Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, "Prachanda", in order to push the federalist agenda. The Nepalese government experienced complicated moments throughout the year, not only due to the political crisis but also because of the internal splits within the UCPN-M, specifically between the sector headed by the prime minister, Baburam Bhattarai, and by "Prachanda" and the more radical sectors that accused them of having betrayed the party's principles. This crisis led to the formation of a new political party,

***The dissolution of the constituent assembly in Nepal having failed to approve a draft constitution made the country's political crisis more acute***

the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, whose ambition is to rediscover the revolutionary spirit of the party.

The second key issue of the year was the **process of integrating former Maoist combatants within the Nepalese armed forces**, in accordance with the agreement reached in this respect in 2011. Following some disagreements over the number of former combatants that could join the army ranks, those selected finally began their training in November. Prior to this, the armed forces had assumed control of the cantonment centres, and the Maoists were offered a second opportunity to opt for voluntary retirement in exchange for economic assistance. Although 9,700 Maoist combatants initially opted for integration, at the second time of asking another 4,000 preferred the option of retirement, which meant that only 5,600 combatants remained in the cantonment centres, much lower than the figure of 6,500 that had initially been agreed.

Pakistan	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government, System Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political and social opposition, armed opposition (Taliban militias, militias of political parties)

**Summary:**

In 1999 the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was brought down by a military coup orchestrated by General Pervez Musharraf, who justified his actions by accusing this and previous governments of mismanagement and corruption. The new military regime initially met with the isolation of the international community. There was a thawing of relations after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, when Musharraf became the main ally of the USA in the region in the persecution of al-Qaeda. The fragile political situation that has characterised the country for several years can be explained by the length of time for which Musharraf held on to power, simultaneously holding the positions of head of state and commander-in-chief, by the attempts to compromise the independence of judicial power and by the increasing power of Taliban militias in the tribal areas of the country on the border with Afghanistan. In 2008 Musharraf resigned as president following defeat in the legislative elections and was replaced by Asif Ali Zardari. However, the country has continued to experience alarming levels of violence.

Pakistan was affected throughout the year by a **major political crisis, made more acute by the high levels of violence** which, according to the Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad, caused **almost 5,000 fatalities in the various contexts of armed conflict and tension in the country.**<sup>35</sup> As regards the political

35. See the summary on Pakistan in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

and government crisis, the situation was conditioned by the strained relations between the government, judiciary and armed forces, which led to the **dismissal of the prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, by the supreme court**. Gilani had refused for several months to ask the Swiss authorities to reopen a corruption case involving the Pakistani president, Asif Ali Zardari, and was formally charged with contempt by the supreme court. As such, he was forced to step down as prime minister and was disqualified from office and parliament for a period of five years. Zardari is accused of using Swiss accounts to launder bribe money when his wife, Benazir Bhutto, was prime minister. Gilani's succession represented a new chapter in the crisis, since the first choice to replace Gilani, Makhdoom Shahabuddin, was served with an arrest warrant for his alleged involvement in drug trafficking. This situation led to the Pakistani parliament to opt for Raja Pervez Ashraf, who was appointed prime minister despite the accusations of corruption hanging over him. Raja Pervez Ashraf finally complied with the directive of the supreme court and contacted the Swiss authorities in order to reopen the case against the president, Asif Ali Zardari, for money laundering in Swiss accounts. As a result of his compliance, the court dropped the charges of contempt that it had brought against the prime minister, having rejected the first two versions of the letter that he had drafted for the Swiss authorities.

Another important element in the Pakistani political crisis was the **high level of tension between the government and the army**, amid rumours of a possible coup d'état that failed to materialise. The difficult relations between the two institutions deteriorated even further after the leaking of a memorandum in which the Pakistani government requested US assistance in dealing with a possible coup d'état following the death of Osama Bin Laden in exchange for replacing the military leadership and stepping up its activities against the Taliban insurgency. The scandal, known as "memogate", is being investigated by the supreme court and by a parliamentary commission. It led to the resignation of the Pakistani ambassador to the US and the dismissal of the defence secretary, accused of gross misconduct. The president and the chief of the armed forces held a initial meeting, after which the military leader met with the prime minister and other members of the government. In parallel to the meetings between the government and the army, parliament passed a motion of confidence in democracy proposed by the prime minister.

In addition to the serious political crisis, it is also necessary to highlight the **escalation of sectarian violence in the country, especially in the city of Karachi, but also in other areas such as Punjab or Balochistan**.<sup>36</sup> Major attacks and clashes between the Shia and Sunni communities occurred throughout the year. Dozens of

*The various contexts of conflict and tension in Pakistan claimed 5,000 lives over the course of the year*

Shia Muslims were killed in the attacks carried out on several occasions during the celebration of religious ceremonies in various parts of the country. Responsibility for some of these attacks was claimed by the armed opposition groups Jundullah and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. The targeted assassinations in Karachi claimed almost 900 lives in 2012 according to figures published by the Center for Research and Security Studies. The armed militias of the main political parties (MQM, PPP and ANP) are the main perpetrators of the violence that occurs in the city, as part of the struggle for the control of power, and a high percentage of the victims of the violence were members of these political parties.

Sri Lanka (north-east)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, Tamil social and political opposition

**Summary:**  
In 1983 the LTTE, the Tamil pro-independence armed opposition group, began the armed conflict that ravaged Sri Lanka for almost three decades. The increasing marginalisation of the Tamil population by the government, mostly composed of members of the Sinhalese elite, following the decolonisation of the island in 1948, led the LTTE to initiate an armed struggle to achieve the creation of an independent Tamil state. From 1983, each of the phases in which the conflict took place ended with a failed peace process. Following the signing of a ceasefire agreement, fresh peace talks began in 2002, mediated by the Norwegian government, the failure of which sparked a fierce resumption of the armed conflict in 2006. In May 2009 the armed forces defeated the LTTE and regained control over the entire country after killing the leader of the armed group, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Since then thousands of Tamils have remained displaced and no measures have been adopted to make progress in reconciliation. Furthermore, the government has refused to investigate the war crimes of the armed conflict, denying that they ever took place.

**There were no substantial developments concerning the country's socio-political crisis in 2012 and no progress was made on resolving the issues that remained pending after the end of the armed conflict in 2009.** The government remained unmoved in its refusal to consider any reform leading to greater decentralisation in the country and **the negotiations between the government and the Tamil party TNA (linked during the years of armed conflict to the armed opposition group LTTE) had been at a standstill since January.** The International Crisis Group warned that the government's refusal to negotiate or agree to any form of decentralisation may

36. See the summary on Pakistan (Balochistan) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).



lead large sectors of Tamil society to adopt a more radical stance, since the political and economic exclusion and the militarisation of the north of the country (where most of the Tamil population is concentrated) are generating a breeding ground for polarisation and social unrest.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, the government continued to refuse to investigate the accusations of war crimes committed during the armed conflict, despite the fact that at the start of the year the UN Human Rights Council itself approved a resolution that called on the government to investigate these grave accusations. In February, the government presented a report that contradicted the conclusions of the Independent Panel of Experts of the United Nations, stating that the number of people who died in the final phase of the armed conflict was 8,000, while the international experts declared that 40,000 had been killed. At the end of the year, the United Nations published an internal report in which it admitted serious failures in respect of protecting the civilian population during the armed conflict. The United Nations admitted in this document that both the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, along with other bodies, failed to meet their responsibilities in terms of protection. Furthermore, the report acknowledged the organisation's refusal to publish figures on the number of victims, its decision to withdraw personnel from the areas affected by the conflict, and its failure to report the evidence that it had of government bombardments. Finally, it should be pointed out that social protests were staged throughout the year, both to show support for the government in its refusal to investigate human rights violations and to protest about its policies of exclusion and discrimination. One of the most noteworthy incidents occurred in November when the armed forces broke up a demonstration in Jaffna to commemorate the Great Heroes' Day, a tribute to fallen LTTE fighters.

#### d) South-east Asia and Oceania

Indonesia (Aceh)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Indonesian Government, Regional Government of Aceh, political opposition

#### Summary:

After almost 30 years of armed conflict between the armed forces and the GAM, a pro-independence armed group, the two sides signed a peace agreement in August 2005, a few months after the tsunami had wreaked total devastation on

the province and led to the arrival of hundreds of NGOs. The peace agreement, which included a significant degree of autonomy for Aceh, the demilitarisation of the region, the disarmament of the GAM and the deployment of an international mission to oversee its implementation, led to a significant reduction in the level of violence and enabled the holding of regional elections for the first time in the history of the region, from which a former GAM leader emerged victorious. Despite the good progress made in the peace process and in reconstruction work, in the years following the signing of the peace agreement several conflicts have taken place related to the reintegration of combatants, demands for the creation of new provinces, the repression of religious minorities and women's groups, or allegations of corruption and incompetence made against the public authorities.

The first part of the year saw a noteworthy increase in violence, coinciding with the holding of provincial elections. However, during the second half of the year no significant violent incidents took place except for some sporadic political or religious attacks. Having been postponed on five occasions, on 9<sup>th</sup> April the elections were finally held to vote for the leaders of the provincial government and the 17 districts that form Aceh, the second election to be held since the 2005 peace agreement. **Since the end of December 2011, the election campaign had been affected by a wave of violence in which dozens of people were killed or injured**, especially in the districts of North Aceh, Banda Aceh, Bireuen and Aceh Besar. The police declared that the modus operandi in several of these violent incidents was similar and mainly affected Javanese immigrant workers. In addition to the proximity of the elections and the possible hostility between the local and immigrant populations over access to natural resources and jobs, the government stated that another possible cause of the violence was the political rivalry between the various factions that had emerged from the former armed opposition group GAM. The two most important factions were the one led by the former member of the GAM and first governor of Aceh following the peace agreement, Irwandi Yusuf (who stood as an independent), and the one led by the Partai Aceh candidate, Zaini Abdullah, supposedly representing the leadership of the GAM. The government declared that during the election campaign there had been 57 cases of intimidation involving supporters of the two factions. One of the main controversies was the possibility of Partai Aceh being barred from the elections, which may have led to a substantial escalation of the tension in the province. In the end, Partai Aceh was allowed to stand in the elections, which took place amid relative calm and from which Abdullah emerged victorious.

The second half of the year was marked by **reports and warnings of the dangers posed by the religious**

37. See International Crisis Group, *Sri Lanka's North I: The Denial of Minority Rights*, Asia Report no.219, March 16, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/219-sri-lankas-north-i-the-denial-of-minority-rights.aspx>, and *Sri Lanka's North II: Rebuilding under the Military*, Asia Report no.220, March 16, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/220-sri-lankas-north-ii-rebuilding-under-the-military.aspx>.



**conservatism of the new governor and other local parties for the rights of religious minorities and women in the province.** Soon after Abdullah took office, three Christian churches were closed down. Later on in the year, in mid-October, the government of Banda Aceh (the capital) announced the closure of nine Christian churches and six Buddhist temples (alleging that their paperwork was not in order) and declared that no new licences would be granted for the construction of buildings of this kind. In November, three people died and another ten were injured after being attacked by some 1,500 people in the district of Bireuen. Although the reasons for the attack remain unknown, it is known that the victims belonged to a religious group. Also in the second half of the year, women's organisations and human rights organisations warned that some of the measures adopted by the judiciary or local authorities (such as the ban on women wearing tight clothing or straddling motorbikes) constituted an attack on women's basic rights. Some analysts consider that the increase in the number of cases of intolerance and violence against religious minorities or the restriction of women's rights is mainly due to the pressure imposed by Islamist groups on the governor, who during the campaign had agreed to promote the observation and stricter implementation of Islamic law. Meanwhile, in respect of the implementation of the 2005 peace agreement, Amnesty International called on the central government and the parliament of Aceh to push through the establishment of a human rights court and of a truth and reconciliation commission. Amnesty International considers that not enough progress has been made in identifying responsibilities for the crimes committed during the armed conflict or in the reparation of victims. In mid-October, the police announced the destruction of 973 illegal weapons that had been either confiscated or voluntarily handed over since the signing of the peace agreement in 2005. Most of the weapons had been held by former combatants of the GAM.

Indonesia (West Papua)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, OPM armed group, political and social opposition (secessionist, pro-autonomy, indigenous and human rights organisations), Papuan indigenous groups, Freeport mining company

**Summary:**

Although Indonesia became independent from Holland in 1949, West Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) was administered for several years by the United Nations and did not formally become part of Indonesia until 1969, following a referendum considered fraudulent by many. Since then, a deep-rooted secessionist movement has existed in the region and an

armed opposition group (OPM) has been involved in a low-intensity armed struggle. In addition to constant demands for self-determination, there are other sources of conflict in the region, such as community clashes between several indigenous groups, tension between the local population (Papuan and mostly animist or Christian) and so-called transmigrants (mostly Muslim Javanese), protests against the Freeport transnational extractive corporation, the largest in the world, or accusations of human rights violations and unjust enrichment levelled at the armed forces.

The levels of violence and political protest were similar to those of the previous year and there was a notable increase in the number of reports by human rights organisations regarding the behaviour and impunity of the state security forces in West Papua. Despite the difficulty in verifying information due to the government ban on journalists entering the region, some sources estimate that more than 50 people may have been killed in the region's various violent hot spots in clashes between the armed forces and the armed opposition group OPM, the attacks on (and between) personnel of the Freeport mining company in the region of Timika or the community-related clashes between different indigenous groups (such as the Dani or the Amungme). As regards the violence that occurred in relation to the Freeport company, the largest in the world in its field, at least 15 people were killed and another 60 were injured in attacks on the company's personnel and facilities. Furthermore, Freeport was temporarily obliged to suspend its mining activities due to clashes between supporters and opponents of the 2011 strikes and due to the unrest generated by its alleged failure to pay workers their salaries for the three months that the strike lasted. **In respect of the clashes between the armed forces and the OPM, in which dozens of people were killed, the main violent incidents occurred in May and June and were concentrated in regions such as Puncak Jaya, Paniai, Meurake, Wamena or Keerom.** During this period, many civilians died and dozens of houses were burned down as a result of the OPM's attacks or the counter-insurgency operations of the armed forces. The government systematically attributed all of the violent incidents to the armed insurgency but several Papua institutions and civil society organisations considered that these accusations were lacking in credibility. As a result of the increase in the number of violent incidents and protests at various points of the year, the government deployed hundreds of additional troops in the region and also announced that in order to improve Papua's socio-political conditions it was willing to enter talks with local organisations, except for those that openly defend independence or the holding of a referendum. Two important developments in this respect were the meeting that the president, vice president and some ministers held with religious leaders to address the problems in the region, and the setting up of a committee in the Indonesian parliament to propose solutions for the political conflict in Papua. The day before Jakarta made its offer of talks, the

OPM had declared its willingness to call a ceasefire if the government agreed to hold a meeting with the participation of the United Nations. In this respect, the US government called on Jakarta to begin talks that could lead to the establishment of real autonomy in Papua, although it also stated that it was against the independence of the region.

In addition to the armed clashes, 2012 also saw several protests and many arrests related to the human rights situation and the actions of the state security forces in the region. In respect of the latter, Kemitraan (Partnership for Governance Reform) and the Legal Aid Institute reported the widespread use of torture by the police, while Amnesty International published a report in April that listed the human rights violations committed by the armed forces. In addition, Komnas HAS (National Human Rights Commission) denounced the systematic violation of economic, social and cultural rights in Papua. Several development agencies operating in the region also warned about growing political pressure and scrutiny of their work by the government due to suspicions that some of the activities of the said agencies benefit pro-independence organisations. Even the United Nations Human Rights Council voiced its concern about the human rights situation in the region and urged the government to push through the legal changes necessary to improve this situation. However, Jakarta denied entry to the region to the media and the UN Special Rapporteurs on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and on Minorities, and also refused to accept other recommendations of the UN Human Rights Council, arguing that its assessment of the situation did not correspond to reality in Papua. As regards protests, **thousands of people demonstrated throughout the year to demand the holding of a referendum or to protest about the government's lack of willingness to resolve the conflict.** Most of these protests were led by the West Papua National Committee. According to some media reports in December, 22 members of this organisation had been assassinated in 2012. Given the legal restrictions on gatherings of this nature, dozens of people were arrested during these protests, some for waving the pro-independence flag of Papua. One of the most noteworthy protests took place in July when the alleged murder by the police of an important pro-independence leader, Mako Tabuni, sparked a series of riots in Jayapura, the capital of West Papua. The organisation International Parliamentarians for West Papua (formed by parliamentarians of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Vanuatu) condemned the assassination of Tabuni and denounced the repression of political activities in Papua. Last of all the Alliance of Independent Journalists reported that in 2012 there had been a substantial increase in the number of cases of violence and intimidation suffered by journalists in respect of 2011.

Myanmar	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	System Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political and social opposition (NLD opposition party)

**Summary:**

The military junta seized power in a coup d'état in 1962 and has remained in government ever since. The military government abolished the federal system and imposed a fierce dictatorship, known as the "Burmese Way to Socialism". In 1988, the economic crisis led thousands of people to voice their discontent in the street. These protests were put down brutally by the military regime, claiming 3,000 lives. Although the government did call elections, it never acknowledged their result, i.e. the victory of the democratic opposition, led by Aung San Suu Kyi. She was subsequently arrested and has been intermittently placed under house arrest ever since. In 2004, the government began a constitutional reform process in an attempt to offer the image of a liberalising regime. This process was discredited by the political opposition to the dictatorship. In 2007, the political opposition and several Buddhist monks led intense social protests against the military regime that were brutally put down. The general elections held in 2010 were considered fraudulent by the international community and the internal opposition.

**Considerable progress was made in respect of the political situation over the course of the year, although the tension and inter-community violence in the state of Rakhine were detrimental to the policy of reforms undertaken by the government and concern about the fragility of the political scenario in Myanmar was voiced from some quarters.**<sup>38</sup>

One of the year's main developments was the holding of **partial parliamentary elections in April, from which the opposition leader and recipient of the Nobel peace prize, Aung San Suu Kyi, emerged as the overwhelming victor.** The party that she leads, the NLD, obtained 43 of the 44 seats for which it stood, of the 45 seats being contested, which represents 6% of the total number of seats in parliament. Furthermore, Aung San Suu Kyi obtained more than 85% of the votes in her constituency. The elections left the ruling USDP party with 343 seats and the military with 116. There was a certain amount of political tension before the NLD members of parliament took up their seats since they initially refused to take the parliamentary oath due to its inclusion of a pledge to "safeguard the constitution", to which the NLD is opposed. The newly elected members did finally take up their seats. Following the elections, the EU announced that the sanctions imposed on the country would be lifted for one year (although the embargo on the sale of arms remained in place), while the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, announced that the US would ease its import ban on goods from Myanmar in recognition of the reforms undertaken by the government, and in response to the demands made by the government and opposition in Myanmar in this

38. See "An uncertain future in Myanmar?" in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).

respect. It is worth highlighting the growing importance of Myanmar on the international agenda, made evident by the number of visits made to the country by foreign leaders (Barack Obama's was the first visit to Myanmar by a US head of state) and senior officials, and by the presence of the Myanmar government and the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in international forums. Her visit to several European countries was particularly important. The trip included a ceremony in Oslo, in which she was handed the Nobel peace prize that had been awarded to her in 1991. She also visited the US. As regards the reforms undertaken by the government, special mention should be made of those announced in June, geared towards the liberalisation of the country, along with the abolishment of the pre-censorship of the media. A large number of journalists highlighted the importance this measure, but stressed that it was still too early to talk about press freedom in the country. On other matters, several political prisoners were released over the course of the year.

As far as the situation in the state of Rakhine is concerned, in May the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman by three Muslim men sparked **a wave of inter-community violence between the Buddhist and Muslim populations that flared up again at various points of the year. The initial period of violence claimed 78 lives according to official sources and left 87 people injured. It also forced the displacement of around 90,000 people** after a large number of homes were burned down. The riots and violence led the Myanmar government to declare a state of emergency, authorising the army to carry out administrative tasks. **The violence flared up again in September and caused 13 fatalities.** Human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch denounced the role played by the security forces in the riots and accused them of being behind the murders, rapes and mass arrests, as well as of failing to protect the population from the violence. Later on, in October, **a new wave of violence had even graver consequences, claiming at least 89 lives. More than 130 people were injured and 5,300 homes were set alight, causing the forced displacement of 30,000 people.** The state of Rakhine is mostly inhabited by ethnic Rakhine Buddhists but there is also a Rohingya Muslim minority, whose members are regarded by the Myanmar government as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

*The inter-community violence between Buddhists and Muslims in the state of Rakhine caused almost 200 fatalities and led to the forced displacement of tens of thousands of people*

Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, factions of the armed group MNLF

#### Summary:

Although independence enjoyed support throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the political structure of the movement dates back to the 1960s, while the armed struggle began in the early 1970s at the hands of the MNLF. A large percentage of the 120,000 fatalities attributed to the conflict in Mindanao date back to the 1970s, in the middle of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. In 1976 the MILF faction splintered from the MNLF soon after the latter signed a peace agreement with the government through which Mindanao was to be granted autonomy (and not independence). Despite the agreement, the armed conflict continued until 1996, when another peace agreement with similar provisions was signed in 1976. However, since then, some MNLF factions that have not disarmed have been involved in violent incidents to demand the full implementation of the peace agreement and the release of the MNLF founder, Nur Misuari, arrested in 2001 after being accused of rebellion. Although there has been a reduction in tension since 2007 due, on the one hand, to an agreement between the parties to review and implement the 1996 peace agreement and, on the other hand, to the fact that Misuari was authorised to carry out political activities, sporadic clashes continue to take place in several regions of Mindanao. In 2012 some factions of the MNLF signalled their intention to resume armed activity if the peace agreement signed that year between the Philippine government and the MILF invalidated any of the contents of the 1996 peace agreement.

There was a sharp escalation in the tension and uncertainty surrounding the MNLF due to the belligerent reaction of one section of the group and its founder, Nur Misuari, to the preliminary peace agreement signed in mid-October between the government and the MILF.<sup>39</sup> Nur Misuari feared becoming politically marginalised and that the peace agreement between the MILF and the government could eclipse and invalidate the contents of the peace agreement reached in 1996 between the government and the MNLF. **As such, he warned that the MNLF might call once again for the independence of Mindanao and that armed conflict in the south of the Philippines could resume.** Misuari also declared that the MNLF continues to enjoy significant military and social strength and announced that thousands of MILF combatants who were disillusioned with their organisation's current strategy were leaving the MILF and joining the ranks of the MNLF. Although the MILF emphatically denied that it was suffering mass desertions, some analysts consider that the MNLF still has a significant capacity to mobilise broad sectors of the population. However, it is important to point out that Nur Misuari only controls one of the three factions into which the group is split and that the most politically active faction and the most important in terms of the number of members, the one led by Muslimin Sema (deputy mayor of Cotobato), did not dismiss the agreement between the MILF and the government but instead proposed setting up a four-party

39. See the summary on the Philippines (Mindanao-MILF) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

forum (Philippine government, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, MILF and MNLF) to harmonise the two negotiation processes and the two peace agreements. In January 2012, Sema was injured in an ambush close to his home in which one person was killed. In December, an MNLF lawyer filed a petition before the supreme court questioning the constitutionality of the preliminary peace agreement between the government and the MILF. According to this petition, the current constitution only applies to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which means that its elimination or replacement would constitute a breach of current legislation.

Important developments in the military sphere included **the clashes between members of the MNLF and MILF over family or land issues, which caused the forced displacement of thousands of people.** At the start of the year, the armed opposition groups Abu Sayyaf and MNLF were also involved in armed clashes on the island of Basilan in which two people were killed and another 13 were injured. Meanwhile, the MILF accused the MNLF of having participated in a wave of attacks carried out by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF, a splinter group of the MILF) in August, in which dozens of people had reportedly been killed (80 according to some sources) and which had caused the forced displacement of up to 50,000 people. The MNLF emphatically denied any involvement and the MILF admitted that it had been unable to verify the evidence on which its accusation was based. The MILF also accused the MNLF faction led by Misuari of conspiring with the BIFF to sabotage the signing of the preliminary peace agreement, although the signing did finally go ahead in October.

***MNLF factions warned of the possibility of taking up their demands for independence once again and resuming armed activity if the peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF invalidated the contents of the 1996 peace agreement***

Thailand	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social and political opposition

**Summary:**

Since Thaksin Shinawatra's began his term in office in 2001, he had been criticised by several sectors for his authoritarian style, his campaign against drug trafficking (which claimed over 2,000 lives) and his militaristic approach to the conflict in the south. However, the socio-political crisis affecting Thailand over the last few years escalated in 2006. That year, after a case of corruption was made public, mass demonstrations took place demanding Shinawatra's resignation and in September a military junta staged a coup that forced him into exile. Despite the approval of a new constitution in a referendum held in August 2007,

the new government failed to reduce the social and political polarisation taking place in the country. It was in this context that a party loyal to Thaksin Shinawatra won the elections in December 2007. However, a series of violent incidents and the mass demonstrations against the government organised by the People's Alliance for Democracy (known as the "yellow shirt movement"), prompted the resignation of two prime ministers and the arrival in power in December 2008 of Abhisit Vejjajiva, a member of the opposition to Thaksin Shinawatra. Since then, there have been periodical mass demonstrations by the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (known as the "red shirt movement", which supports the return of the former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra), demanding the resignation of the government and the holding of early elections.

Although 2012 was not marked by a significant level of violence, there was no end to the huge socio-political polarisation and major protests were once again staged after several months of relative calm. **The key dispute continued to be the degree of influence held by the former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in the current government, along with the government's manoeuvring to enable Thaksin to return to Thailand from exile.** The government, which is headed by Thaksin's sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, argues that its plans for reforming the 2006 constitution or possibly granting an amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes related to the political crisis in which the country has been mired in recent years are aimed at achieving reconciliation among Thailand's citizens. However, opposition organisations in the country argue that the government's plans are a political and legal manoeuvre to cover up the former prime minister's crimes and at the same time enable his return from exile. In April, Thaksin staged a rally in Cambodia in which he announced his intention to return to Thailand in the short term, which led to an escalation in social tension and raised suspicions regarding the government's real intentions. In this respect, the opposition organisation People's Alliance for Democracy (known as the "yellow shirt movement") blocked off the entrance to the parliament building to prevent a debate on the proposed law for granting a political amnesty, while the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (known as the "red shirt movement") protested to demand the resignation of the judges who called a halt to the debate on the constitutional changes that may pave the way for Thaksin Shinawatra's return.

However, the most important social protests took place in the second half of the year. In September the tension escalated notably when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission presented its report on the violent incidents that occurred in Bangkok in April and May 2010, in which 92 people were killed and more than 1,900 were injured. The report stated that both the state security



forces and the demonstrators (mainly “red shirts”) had been responsible for the escalation of violence but did not point the finger of blame at anybody for the death of dozens of people. The UFDD claimed that the report had exonerated the main perpetrators of the violence and announced that the victims would continue to demand justice. In addition to its conclusions on the violent incidents, the commission’s report also made a series of recommendations, two of which were that the army should not interfere in the country’s politics and that Thaksin Shinawatra should not attempt to reclaim a leading role in Thai politics.

**The end of the year saw the largest-scale protests in the entire year, staged by Pitak Siam, a pro-monarchy group, and backed up by a significant number of the “yellow shirts”.** In October, thousands of people (between 6,000 and 8,000 according to the police and more than 20,000 according to the organisers) demonstrated in Bangkok to demand the resignation of the prime minister and her government, which they accuse of nepotism and corruption, of being incapable of meeting the main challenges faced by the country (such as the economic crisis, the armed conflict in the south of the country or the territorial dispute with Cambodia) and, above all, of being subservient to the political orders of Thaksin Shinawatra. The success of the protest, which largely passed without incident, led Pitak Siam to stage another rally attended by thousands of people in November. On this occasion the government deployed 17,000 police officers and invoked the internal security act to deal with the protest, in which 37 people were injured and more than 130 were arrested. The political organisers of the protest, led by a retired general, declared their intention to press ahead with the protests until they achieved the government’s resignation. In December the tension escalated once again when the department of special investigations accused the former prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, of the death of a taxi driver during the anti-government protests that took place in early 2010, considering that he had authorised a disproportionate use of force to handle the protests.

The day after this accusation was made public, the trial began of 24 leaders of the movement known as the “red shirts” for their role in the spiral of violence that occurred during the anti-government protests. The accused included several members of parliament, which may mean that the trial goes on for months or even years due to the parliamentary immunity that they enjoy. The charges faced by the accused may even carry the death penalty. Meanwhile, at the end of December several leaders of the “yellow shirts” movement were formally accused for their participation in the anti-government protests of 2008. If they are found guilty of the charges brought against them (storming a government building and blocking the entrance to the parliament building) they could receive sentences of up to 12 years in prison. Another issue that remains pending is the bringing of charges against the said leaders for their role in occupying Bangkok airport for two weeks, also in 2008.

Thailand – Cambodia	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Territory International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Thailand, Cambodia

**Summary:**

The origin of the dispute between the two countries is the issue of sovereignty over a stretch of land measuring approximately 4.6 km<sup>2</sup> and surrounding the 11<sup>th</sup> century Preah Vihear Buddhist temple, situated on the border between Thailand and Cambodia. Following several centuries of dispute, in 1962 the International Court of Justice ruled that the temple belonged to Cambodia. However, it did not rule on the land around the temple. Thailand’s claims have been fuelled in recent decades by the fact that the temple is most easily reached from the Thai side and by its disagreement regarding the historical maps on which the ruling of the International Court of Justice was based. The disputed border region contains a large number of troops and is heavily mined. After the military tension reached its peak in the first half of 2010, bilateral relations improved considerably after the arrival in power in July 2010 of Yingluck Shinawatra, who maintained a much more fluid political relationship with the Cambodian prime minister, Hun Sen. In this context, the International Court of Justice issued an order that obliged the parties to withdraw their troops from the region under dispute and to allow the deployment of international observers to monitor the cessation of hostilities. Since then, no significant clashes have taken place and both governments have restated their intention to resolve the dispute through political and peaceful methods.

**There was a huge reduction in the tension between the two countries in respect of 2011 and no significant armed clashes were reported along the border. Both sides declared their intention to resolve their dispute by peaceful means and created the institutional mechanisms to make it possible.** January saw the creation of the Joint Working Group (JWG), whose mandate is to implement the ruling made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in July 2010, and to serve as the main forum for talks in order to resolve the dispute. The main responsibilities delegated to the JWG were the coordination of the demining of the area under dispute and the withdrawal and redeployment of troops under the supervision of Indonesian observers. Following several meetings of the JWG and a bilateral meeting between the Cambodian prime minister, Hun Sen, and the Thai prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, in mid-July the two governments initiated the withdrawal of troops (some 500 troops in the case of Thailand and about 400 in the case of Cambodia) as the first step towards the redeployment of their respective armies in the border region under dispute. However, although this step was celebrated by both sides as a trust-building measure that paved the way for a negotiated and peaceful outcome to the conflict, at the end of the year the deployment of international



observers in the demilitarised zone, as stipulated in the ruling of the ICJ, remained pending. Right at the start of the year, the Indonesian government had publicly announced its willingness to send observers to the area (and even to continue to facilitate dialogue between the two sides after its rotating presidency of the ASEAN came to an end). **However, the Thai government did not authorise the deployment of the observers, arguing that there was no longer any military tension between the two countries and that the ruling of the ICJ stipulated that the deployment of observers in the demilitarised zone had to be preceded by the demining of the zone.** Previously, Bangkok had delayed the implementation of this agreement, declaring that the constitution required parliament to authorise both the demining of the zone and the redeployment of troops.

In addition to the meetings of the JWC at the most senior political level, several other trust-building measures were implemented over the course of the year, such as the resumption of bus services between Bangkok and Phnom Pehn, the release of Cambodian prisoners by Thailand and the start of talks on the exchange of prisoners or on increasing bilateral cooperation in combating drug trafficking, contagious diseases or the illegal felling of trees in border regions. This last issue became important after one Cambodian was killed and another two were injured after being shot at by the Thai armed forces when they were illegally felling trees in Thailand. Furthermore, in early March the Joint Boundary Commission agreed to set up a permanent border post and begin the process of demarcating the border between the provinces of Oddar Meanchey (Cambodia) and Surin (Thailand). It was also agreed that the said demarcation process, which had begun in 2006 but which was interrupted in 2008 due to the increase in military tension, would not initially include the zone under dispute surrounding the Preah Vihear temple and that if any difficulties arose it would be halted.

## Europe

### a) Caucasus and Russia

Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity, Territory International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Azerbaijan government, government of Armenia, government of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
<b>Summary:</b>	
The tension between the two countries regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh region, an enclave with an Armenian majority which is formally part of Azerbaijan but which enjoys de facto independence, lies in the failure to resolve	

the underlying issues of the armed conflict that took place between December 1991 and 1994. This began as an internal conflict between the region's self-defence militias and the Azerbaijan security forces over the sovereignty and control of Nagorno-Karabakh and gradually escalated into an inter-state war between Azerbaijan and neighbouring Armenia. The armed conflict, which claimed 20,000 lives and forced the displacement of 200,000 people, as well as enforcing the ethnic homogenisation of the population on either side of the ceasefire line, gave way to a situation of unresolved conflict in which the central issues are the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the return of the population, and which involves sporadic violations of the ceasefire.

Tension increased and relations between the two countries deteriorated even further, with an **alarming rise in military rhetoric** and international calls for moderation while security incidents continued to occur along the border. **More than twenty soldiers died (at least ten on each side) and another ten were injured in 2012 due to ceasefire breaches on both sides,** according to press reports. Additional fatalities were caused by landmine blasts. An Armenian gas pipeline was also sabotaged. As in previous years, mutual accusations and denials were frequent. For instance, in June the two countries accused each other of ordering incursions by troops, which caused fatalities. Armenia blamed Azerbaijan for the death of three Armenian soldiers caused by an incursion in the Armenian region of Tavush, while Azerbaijan denounced an incursion by Armenian forces in the district of Qazah, which caused five Azerbaijani casualties. Furthermore, both Azerbaijan and Armenia carried out military exercises, in the case of the former close to Nagorno-Karabakh and, in the case of the latter, within the de facto independent region. In this context of incidents and stalled negotiations, senior officials in both countries threatened the use of force in order to end of the conflict.

The climate of hostility became more acute when Azerbaijan pardoned and then promoted an Azerbaijani officer who was serving a life sentence in Hungary for the murder of an Armenian officer in 2004 during a NATO training exercise. Hungary had extradited the officer to Azerbaijan, allegedly after receiving official assurances from Azerbaijan that he would serve the rest of the sentence in his own country. The US, NATO and the EU, among others, voiced their concern over the potential impact of the pardon on the negotiation process and on the situation in the region. Furthermore, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed her consternation at the decision, stating that ethnically-motivated hate crimes should be condemned and punished. Following the measure, **Armenia placed its army on high alert.** The ensuing months were plagued by verbal threats. **The Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan, warned that his country would respond disproportionately if Azerbaijan launched an offensive against the region.** Moreover, he accused Baku of continuing to arm itself for a new war. In turn, the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, declared that his country would soon

emerge victorious from the conflict, while his defence minister warned that the Armenian nuclear power plant in Metsamor would be a military target in the event of a resumption of the armed conflict. Adding to the tension, Armenian media reports claimed that the civil airport of Nagorno-Karabakh might be reopened. In 2011, Azerbaijan had already threatened to shoot down aeroplanes if the infrastructure was reopened. This time, Azerbaijan called on the international community to condemn the decision and its ally Turkey threatened to close its airspace to Armenian aircraft, warning that the decision would harm the peace process. Despite the formal commitment of both sides to the negotiation process, no tangible progress was made in the peace process. In January the presidents of the two countries held a meeting mediated by Russia, following which they highlighted the importance of fostering trust-building measures and speeding up talks to reach an agreement on the Basic Principles. However, subsequent meetings held jointly and separately with the two sides by the mediation body, the OSCE Minsk Group, did not yield results,<sup>40</sup> in a year dominated by belligerence.

*A series of incidents led to an escalation of mutual accusations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, leading the latter to place its army on high alert*

Azerbaijan	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political and social opposition

**Summary:**

The former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991. Following this, its energy wealth (oil and gas) and strategic location in the South Caucasus (a region that has been a crossroads of old empires and new powers, historically serving as a source and corridor of raw materials) have made it a key country in the foreign policies of other countries regarding energy security and in terms of international geo-strategic rivalries. Nevertheless, the oil and gas-fuelled economic boom has not led to significant improvements in the overall welfare of its population. Ilham Aliyev has been the president of Azerbaijan since 2003, when he succeeded his father, Heydar Aliyev, the Soviet leader who became an Azerbaijan nationalist leader and who governed newly independent Azerbaijan between 1993 and 2003, amid criticism of authoritarianism. Ilham Aliyev's time in power has also been characterised by repression, corruption and human rights violations, including the intimidation of independent media outlets. Political instability, the repression by the police of anti-government demonstrations and accusations of electoral fraud have featured prominently in the post-Soviet era.

The situation continued to be marked by a certain level of instability due to various factors, the main ones being the actions of local sectors opposed to the regime that defend reforms geared towards greater democratisation, the increase in the use of repressive tactics by the authorities against alleged Islamist threats, and sporadic tensions with neighbouring Iran. As regards the first factor, **the regime maintained its strong restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly, and continued to use repressive tactics against the opposition, according to claims by local human rights activists**

**and international NGOs.** Over the course of the year several demonstrations were staged by political opposition groups and activists from civil society organisations, with demonstrators being dispersed or persecuted by the police. Participation in the demonstrations was low. For instance, a protest staged in March in the capital, Baku, involved a few hundred young people, while between 1,200 and 10,000 people (according to the police and organisers, respectively) took part in the first demonstration to be authorised since the ones staged between March and May of 2011, and several hundred people took part in another demonstration in October, among others. The low participation limited the extent of the threat posed by the protests for the regime. The authorities' response included numerous arrests. There were also several claims of ill-treatment at the hands of the police. Furthermore, in November parliament approved an increase in fines for non-authorized demonstrations through legislative amendments. Throughout the year, international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International voiced their concern about the human rights situation in the country, condemned the restrictions on the population's right to demonstrate peacefully and on its freedom of expression, and called on the authorities to investigate reports of ill-treatment. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media also voiced his concern about the obstacles placed in the way of press freedom and the persecution of independent journalists. And the Rapporteur on Political Prisoners of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe warned about the Azerbaijan government's refusal to allow him into the country. Meanwhile, and also in relation to the internal social and political situation, a new opposition block was formed, the Resistance Movement for a Democratic Society, composed of five parties without parliamentary representation.

A second source of conflict was the **government's response to alleged radical Islamist threats**, which included several arrests and some violent incidents. According to the authorities, a police officer and an alleged insurgent died and another five police officers were injured in a shoot-out between the security forces and alleged Islamist militants in the country's second largest city,

40. See the summary on Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

Ganja, in April. Furthermore, in the same month, the security forces stated that they had killed Vugar Padarov, leader of an allegedly al-Qaeda-linked local group, and that they had arrested almost twenty people in various parts of the country. The government also claimed to have prevented several terrorist attacks during and prior to the holding of the Eurovision song contest in the capital. Meanwhile, a third source of conflict were the country's relations with Iran. As in 2011, the situation remained tense, although intermittently so and with no incidents as serious as the clashes between the two countries' border guards in 2011. However, there were mutual accusations of hostile actions at various points of the year. In October, prison sentences were handed to 20 Azerbaijan nationals who had been arrested in March on accusations of preparing attacks on US and Israeli targets in Azerbaijan, including their embassies, and who were also accused of being linked to the Iranian secret services and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Iran, on the other hand, accused Azerbaijan of sheltering an Israeli agent accused of killing three Iranian scientists.<sup>41</sup> Even so, high level contacts continued to take place, including a visit by Azerbaijan's defence minister to Iran in March and a meeting between the president of Azerbaijan, Ilhan Aliyev, and the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in October. Azerbaijan declared that it would not allow the country to be used as a base for launching attacks on Iran.

Georgia (Abkhazia)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government of Georgia, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia, Russia

#### Summary:

The precarious security situation in the region is due to the failure to resolve the underlying issues that led to armed conflict (1992-1994) between Abkhaz local leaders, backed by Russia, and the Georgian government, respectively defending the independence of the region and the country's territorial integrity, in the context of the break-up of the USSR. Following the war, which forced the displacement of some 200,000 Georgians, the territory of Abkhazia has functioned as a de facto state. Despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement, a negotiation process and international presence throughout these years (UN observers and Russian peacekeeping forces), the situation remained tense, fuelled by geo-strategical issues and aspects related to the balance of power in the Caucasus between Georgia and Russia. The situation escalated into an international war that began in August 2008 in South Ossetia, after which the Abkhaz forces consolidated their hold of

Abkhazia and Russia formally recognised its independence. Frequent security incidents, the uncertain status of the territory, Russia's role and the cumulative impact of the two wars remain constant sources of tension.

The tension escalated over the course of the year, with several incidents and diplomatic reverses taking place, although the victory of the opposition coalition Georgian Dream in the Georgian parliamentary elections in October opened the door at the end of the year to possible progress in Georgian-Abkhaz relations.<sup>42</sup> Many of the security incidents occurred in the first half of the year and **the EU mission in Georgia, the EUMM, voiced its concern in March about the security situation in the border zone and called on both sides to avoid provoking each other.** There was confusion surrounding some of the incidents in terms of who was responsible and what motivation they had. In one of the incidents, a police officer was shot dead in January in the district of Gali (an area with a Georgian majority but under Abkhaz control). Abkhazia held Georgia responsible for the death but the latter denied the allegations and accused criminal gangs. Georgia condemned the attack on a police control post close to Ganmukhuri, on the border. Two police officers and one civilian were shot dead in the city of Gali in May. Another official was murdered in Gali in July. Abkhazia admitted gunning down a Georgian citizen in August, allegedly after he opened fire, claiming that he was a "saboteur" working for Georgia. Furthermore, both Georgia and Abkhazia arrested people in their respective territories who they accused of illegally crossing the border or of preparing attacks. Georgia also reported the kidnapping of a minor in Gali. With the number of incidents growing, the Georgian opposition politician Irakli Alasiana, who at the end of the year was appointed defence minister following the change of government in Georgia, claimed in March that the Georgian authorities were setting up paramilitary groups. Alasania claimed to have documentary evidence to back up his allegations, which he did not make public, and accused the president, Mikhail Saakashvili, of preparing for armed conflict and a civil war. Furthermore, **Abkhazia alleged that Georgia was using illegal armed groups, criticised the EUMM for not following up his claims** and decided in the second quarter of the year to temporarily stop attending the monthly meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.<sup>43</sup> In the meantime, Abkhazia continued to bar the entry of the EUMM in territory under its control. In February an attack was carried out on the convoy of the Abkhaz president, Alexander Ankvab, from which he emerged unscathed but in which two of his bodyguards were killed. Ankvab claimed that the incident was an attempt to destabilise the country from within and pointed the finger of blame at criminal gangs.

41. See the summary on the socio-political crisis involving Iran – Israel, USA in this chapter.

42. See "Georgia: A new post-election boost for relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia?" in chapter 5 (Opportunities for Peace in 2013) and the summary on Georgia in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

43. See the summary on Georgia in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

In contrast to the escalation of tension during most of 2012, **the Georgian parliamentary elections held in early October offered the possibility of changes in bilateral relations**, as well as in respect of the antagonism with Russia, which acts as a guarantor of security in Abkhazia. The opposition coalition Georgian Dream, led by the magnate Bidzina Ivanishvili, won the elections. Ivanishvili stated that he was keen to begin a process of trust-building between the Abkhaz and Georgian populations, as well as to improve relations with Russia. Notable among the first measures was his appointment of Paata Zakareishvili as the new minister for reintegration, entrusted with overseeing relations between the two territories, and recognised by external observers as an active promoter of dialogue. The new government's approach included the recognition of Abkhazia (and that of South Ossetia, another region seeking independence) as a party in the conflict and not as a mere puppet of Russia, although it rules out the independence of both regions, advocating instead their voluntary integration within Georgia as autonomous units. In November, Zakareishvili stated his intention to promote the reopening of the rail link between Georgia and Russia, which passes through Abkhazia, as well as to consider recognising the validity of Abkhaz and Ossetian passports within Georgia. Later on, in December, Georgia and Russia held a round of talks on their commercial relations, postponing issues including the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, Abkhazia remained sceptical about the possibility of real changes occurring and restated its stance in favour of the region's independence.

*The internal crisis in the region of South Ossetia was deactivated thanks to the incorporation of the opposition candidate in the new government, following months of socio-political tension*

Georgia (South Ossetia)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government of Georgia, government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, Russia

**Summary:**

The socio-political crisis in the region is related to the failure to resolve the underlying issues that led to armed conflict between the Ossetian and Georgian forces in 1991-1992. Since then, the two states have maintained their respective stances in favour of independence from or unification with Russia and regarding the territorial integrity of Georgia, while failing to overcome the impasse in the de facto independent region via negotiation. In turn, the internal conflict has been fuelled by tension between Georgia and Russia –related to geo-strategic and balance of power issues in the southern

region of the Caucasus–, which in 2008 escalated into a brief war that began in South Ossetia and later spilled over into Abkhazia and areas under Georgian control. Following the last war and the forced displacement of most of the Georgian population that resided in South Ossetia, the Ossetian position was strengthened. Russia recognised its independence and maintained its military presence in the region. The issue of displaced persons from the 1990s and the second war, the status of the territory and sporadic violations of the ceasefire continue to be sources of tension.

**The internal political crisis in South Ossetia that began at the end of 2011 was finally resolved with the incorporation in the new government of the opposition candidate. However, the tension in relation to the conflict with Georgia increased during 2012**, although the change of government in Georgia in the final quarter of the year led to a more conciliatory approach towards the conflict. As regards the internal crisis, political tension rose and social protests were triggered in January when the independent candidate Alla Dzhioyeva, alleging breaches, revoked the agreement reached in December 2011 (mediated by Moscow) that had partially deactivated the crisis that broke out after the supreme court annulled Dzhioyeva's victory in the presidential elections of November 2011. Dzhioyeva called on the acting president, Vadim Brovtsev, to stand down and threatened to declare herself as president in February, while Brovtsev in turn warned that he would take all the necessary measures to prevent what he would consider a coup d'état. After a police search in February in which Dzhioyeva suffered a heart attack (which her supporters attributed to the police action), the candidate had to be hospitalised. She was not discharged until the end of March, by which time the deadline for repeating the presidential elections had passed. Dzhioyeva labelled the elections illegal, alleging that the four candidates had been selected by "certain forces", although she did not call for a boycott. In the second round, the former chief of the security forces, Leonid Tibilov, emerged victorious with 54.12% of the votes. Finally, **Dzhioyeva was appointed deputy prime minister of the government of Rostilav Khugaev, the new prime minister, a measure that brought at least a temporary respite to the crisis.** Throughout the rest of the year the internal socio-political situation remained stable.

Meanwhile, there was a certain increase in the tension related to the conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia, especially during the third quarter. **The EU mission, the EUMM, warned that there was a greater concentration of Russian troops along the border**, referred to by Georgia as intensive militarisation, while the international mission disregarded the claims made by Ossetia that Georgia was stepping up its militarisation.



Among the incidents that occurred, eight people were injured by a landmine blast close to the border in June, while a former officer of the South Ossetian security services and another two people were injured in July when their vehicle was shot at. Later on in the year, the main investigator of the chief prosecutor's office of the entity, entrusted with investigating the shooting, was kidnapped and murdered. Furthermore, a bomb attack was carried out on the home of the deputy defence minister in September, although there were no victims, and a police officer was shot dead in November. The Ossetian authorities also reported an attack on one of their border posts. Another source of tension were the declarations made by the new Ossetian president concerning the **plans to destroy the remaining houses of the Georgian population of South Ossetia who fled from the entity during the 2008 war**, with the goal of fostering the industrial and agricultural development of these areas. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities declared that if these measures went ahead, they would represent the removal of all traces of Georgian life in the entity and a breach of the rights of the refugee Georgian population that had fled from South Ossetia. Despite the growing tension, South Ossetia and Georgia continued to participate in the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, as well as in the negotiation process under way in Geneva. As a result of talks with the Georgian interior ministry, the Ossetian regime released three Georgian citizens who had been arrested. Meanwhile, the arrival in power of the coalition opposition Georgian Dream after October's parliamentary elections opened the door to a change of approach to the conflict. The new government was committed to fostering trust-building, starting with the implementation of joint economic and business projects, along with community contacts, although it remained steadfast in its opposition to the independence of the regions. South Ossetia, on the other hand, remained sceptical about the possibility of substantial changes.<sup>44</sup>

#### Russia (Karachay-Cherkessia)

<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	System, Identity, Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government of the Russian Federation, government of the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, armed opposition groups

#### Summary:

The socio-political crisis in the republic of Karachay-Cherkessia has been generated by a series of socio-economic, ethnic, and political problems, due both to the legacy of the Soviet era and current problems of governance. Moreover, since the late 1990s it has witnessed the transition to armed combat by sectors associated with Salafist Islam

which, structured as a network of armed groups (*Jamaat*), fight against Russian interests in the republic. This *Jamaat*, set up at the end of the 1980s, forms part of the armed movements in the North Caucasus which, driven by the Chechen wars, support the creation of an Islamic emirate in the region. The instability that characterises the republic features periodical insurgent attacks against the security forces and the pro-government clergy. In turn, in recent years the Russian authorities have stepped up counter-insurgency operations.

#### **There was a reduction in low-intensity violence, with slightly fewer casualties linked to the insurgency and counter-insurgency.**

Between January and October, at least five people died (three members of the security forces and two members of the insurgency) and another two were injured (both police officers). Several clashes took place, including a large-scale special operation in the district of Malokarachevsky. In 2011, Caucasian Knot reported that 12 people had been killed and 22 had been injured, which led this independent organisation and some other analysts to warn about a possible deterioration in the situation in the republic, scenario in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century of one of the most active insurgencies in the North Caucasus, although the level of violence in 2012 was very low. Meanwhile, **an official commission was set up to assist those wishing to lay down their weapons and return to civilian life**. The somewhat unstable security context was accompanied by a certain fragility regarding human rights, a situation that is common to the North Caucasus as a whole, although to varying degrees. In this respect, some fifty relatives of a member of the local parliament murdered in 2009 staged a protest in the second quarter of the year outside the office of Moscow's special envoy for the North Caucasus due to the authorities' failure to deal with the murder. Several crimes against citizens of the republic have not been investigated, including the murder of a Circassian activist and that of a presidential adviser. Some analysts warned about the possibility of an increase in social discontent due to the authorities' failure to act. In this respect, according to some reports, there has been an increase in activism by Circassians in Karachay-Cherkessia, where they constitute a minority, as well as in other territories of the North Caucasus, such as Kabardino-Balkaria or the region of Adygea. As such, in 2012 activists in the three territories carried out actions to demand greater assistance for Syrian Circassians, including a request for the granting of more visas to enable them to leave Syria and for greater support, in the context of the war in which the country is mired. Meanwhile, and despite the generally calm situation regarding socio-economic problems, some fifty people demonstrated in the capital, Cherkessk, in September against the rise in prices for public services, including housing, as part of a state-wide day of protests organised by the communist party of the Russian federation.

44. See "Georgia: a new post-election boost for relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia?" in chapter 5 (Opportunities for Peace in 2013) and the summary on Georgia in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).



Russia (North Ossetia)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	System, Identity, Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government of the Russian Federation, government of the Republic of North Ossetia, armed opposition groups

#### Summary:

Since the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, North Ossetia has periodically witnessed attacks on government representatives and members of the security forces carried out by the armed Islamist insurgency, under the umbrella of the Kataib al-Khoul organisation. This is the most recent of the armed movements in the North Caucasus, which sprang up after the second Chechen war and which pursue the creation of an Islamic emirate separate from Russia. 2004 marked a turning point in North Ossetia due to an insurgent attack on a school in Beslan, which ended with a controversial Russian special hostage rescue operation in which more than 300 people were killed, half of them children. It remains unclear who was responsible for the attack. Some analysts attribute it to combatants from neighbouring republics under Chechen command. Whatever the case, the Ossetian insurgency has remained active, regularly carrying out attacks. Meanwhile, North Ossetia's socio-economic problems, including corruption and high unemployment, have contributed to a climate of social unrest.

**The situation in the republic was mainly one of unstable calm, with very few incidents related to the local insurgency.** As a result of the conflict between the local insurgency and the security forces, at least seven people were killed (four insurgents, one member of the security forces and two civilians) and another seven were injured (all members of the security forces) in a series of incidents. In 2011, the Caucasian Knot organisation reported that four people had been killed and ten had been injured. For now, these figures buck the mortality trend associated with the conflict in most of the republics in the North Caucasus, where more than 100 fatalities are reported each year. One of the most noteworthy incidents occurred in December, when the Islamic cleric and deputy mufti of the republic, Ibragim Dudarove, was shot dead in the capital, Vladikavkaz. Different theories were put forward regarding who was responsible for the crime. One possibility was the Islamist insurgency, which has a history in the region of attacking members of the clergy who are close to the authorities. Other reports claimed that rival sectors to the Muslim minority in the region may have carried out the shooting. Furthermore, some 300 people demonstrated in the capital, Vladikavalaz, in September against the rise in tariffs for public services in a state-wide day of protests organised by the communist party of the Russian federation.

## b) South-east Europe

Bosnia and Herzegovina	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity, Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Central government, government of the Republika Srpska, government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, High Representative of the international community

#### Summary:

The former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by Bosnians, Serbs and Croats, was caught up in a war between 1992 and 1995 (during the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation) in which the country's Serbian political elite, with support from Serbia, as well as Bosniak and Croatian political figures, mobilised their respective populations and forces on the basis of ethnic issues and political plans for self determination which were mutually incompatible. The Dayton peace agreement led to the creation of a fragile state divided into two entities: the Republika Srpska (with a Serb majority and 49% of the territory); and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with a Bosniak and Croatian population and 51% of the territory), both of which enjoyed wide-ranging powers, including military power. Political tension among the nationalist elites of the three communities, and between these elites and the international bodies with the mandate of overseeing the implementation of the agreements, along with the legacy of the impact of the conflict on the population and country, remain active sources of conflict.

**The country continued to face a difficult internal situation due to new political crises both on a state level and within the Muslim-Croat entity, new tensions between international bodies and the Bosnian Serb political class, and pending challenges regarding human rights and transitional justice** resulting from the impact of the war in the 1990s. On a state level some progress was made during the first quarter of the year with the ratification in February of the new government as the result of an agreement at the end of 2011 (finalising an institutional vacuum that had lasted 15 months) between the country's six main parties (the Bosniak SDP and SDA, the Croat HDZ and HDZ 1990, and the Serbian SDS and SNSD), the approval of the census law (with a view to carrying out in 2013 the first census since the start of the war, although the international body that is monitoring the process recommended postponing it) and agreements over defence properties, among others. However, when the two SDA ministers in the state government coalition voted against the state budget proposal for 2012 (which came late, at the end of May) a political crisis broke out between the Bosniak SDA and SDP, who until that point were allies both in

the state government, in the Bosniak-Muslim entity and in several cantons. This generated instability and warnings on a local and international level concerning the persistent political and institutional fragility of the country. The split led to the SDA's involuntary departure from the state government, despite its attempts to block the decision, alleging that it constituted an attack on the key interests of the Bosniak community. The political crisis between the SDP and the SDA led to the formation of another state government coalition, in which the SDA made way for the Bosniak SBB. The appointment of the leader of the SBB, Fahrudin Radoncic, as the new security minister generated a certain amount of controversy due to his alleged links with the drug trafficking kingpin Naser Kelmendi, although the central electoral commission approved the appointment.

As far as state politics are concerned, political tension was also generated when the Serb party SDS called for the resignation of the deputy parliamentary spokesman, Denis Becirevic (SDP), alleging that he sent an unauthorised note of protest to Serbia for referring to the Bosnian Serb entity as the "state", and when the Serb party SNSD called for the dismissal of the foreign minister and leader of the SDP, Zlatko Lagumdžija, alleging that he urged the Bosniak representative in the UN to vote in favour of a resolution on Syria without prior consultation with the government coalition. Only the forced departure of Becirevic came to fruition, which was interpreted by the SDA as a compromise agreement. At the end of November, the new state coalition that was formed after the forced departure of the SDA agreed to focus on constitutional reforms and on the EU road map, which sets some deadlines for implementing changes to facilitate the process towards European integration. In this respect, the successive political crises have slowed down the process of reform in recent years. Some of the changes are also demanded by the European Court of Human Rights, which has called for an end to the discrimination suffered by ethnic minorities, such as the gypsy and Jewish populations, which cannot opt for senior government posts, these being reserved for the three largest communities.

**The crisis between the SDP and the SDA also filtered down to the sub-state level, with attempts by the SDP to force the SDA out of the coalition government of the Muslim-Croat entity.** However, the SDA emerged from the local elections held in the country in October in a much stronger position. Furthermore, throughout the year the relations were strained between the government of the Bosnian Serb entity and international representatives, mainly the high representative, Valentin Inzko. He accused it of divisive policies and secessionist rhetoric. In turn, the Bosnian Serb president, Milorad Dodik, stated that Inzko was the main person to blame for the problems affecting the country. Meanwhile, as regards human rights, the UN special Rapporteur on Violence

Against Women, Rashida Manjoo, warned of the **lack of reparations and justice for women in the country who were victims of violence, including sexual violence.** The International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia sentenced the former intelligence chief of the former army of the Serbian republic of Bosnia, Zdravko Tolimir, to life imprisonment on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 1995 in the enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa. Moreover, according to the ICRC, 8,737 people remained missing in Bosnia as a result of the war in the 1990s. In respect of governance, the national police carried out the largest-scale operation in the post-Dayton era, acting against organised crime in several different locations. 25 people were arrested, including the former director of the narcotics department of the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), Bojan Cvijan. According to the director of the SIPA, some of those arrested formed part of security structures and other branches of the state system.

Serbia – Kosovo	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity International <sup>45</sup>
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government of Serbia, Government of Kosovo, political and social representatives of the Serbian community in Kosovo, UNMIK, KFOR, EULEX

**Summary:**

The socio-political crisis between Serbia and Kosovo is related to the process of determining the political status of the region after the armed conflict of 1998-1999, which pitted both the KLA (Albanian armed group) and NATO against the Serbian government following years of repression inflicted by Slobodan Milosevic's regime on the Albanian population in what was then a province of Serbia within the Yugoslav federation. The NATO offensive, unauthorised by the UN, paved the way for the establishment of an international protectorate. In practice, Kosovo was divided along ethnic lines, with an increase in hostilities against the Serb community, whose isolationism was in turn fostered by Serbia. The final status of the territory and the rights of minorities have remained a constant source of tension, in addition to Kosovo's internal problems, such as unemployment, corruption and criminality. The process of determining this final status, which began in 2006, failed to achieve an agreement between the parties or backing from the UN Security Council for the proposal put forward by the UN special envoy. In 2008, Kosovo's parliament proclaimed the independence of the territory, which was rejected by the Serbian population of Kosovo and by Serbia.

Bilateral relations remained tense although very significant progress was made in the final third of the year in terms of formal negotiations,<sup>46</sup> in a context in

45. The socio-political crisis between Kosovo and Serbia is considered "international" since although its international legal status remains unclear, Kosovo has been recognised as a state by more than 90 countries.  
 46. See the summary on Serbia-Kosovo in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

which the security situation continued to be one of unstable calm, with several sporadic incidents taking place, although fewer than in 2011. Several agreements were reached between the two sides in 2012, including one on Kosovo's representation in regional forums. Nevertheless, misunderstandings and accusations of non-implementation ensured that the level of tension remained high during part of the year. Moreover, the formal rapprochement between Kosovo and Serbia as a result of the negotiations led to protests organised by the Self-determination movement in the first quarter of the year, some of which ended in clashes with the police. Dozens of people were injured in these clashes and almost 150 were arrested, including senior officials of the movement. In September, the International Steering Group on Kosovo, formed by 25 countries that have steered and monitored Kosovo's independence process, considered that the necessary conditions had been met to declare an end to its work and to the mandate of the international civilian representative, Pieter Feith, which was interpreted as giving the green light for the full sovereignty of Kosovo. Nevertheless, the antagonism between Serbia and Kosovo over the status of the latter continued throughout the year. Even so, the change of government in Serbia in the parliamentary and presidential elections of May, in which the Serb nationalist Tomislav Nikolic was elected president, was followed by the **relaunch of the negotiation process facilitated by the EU, which included meetings in the final quarter of the year between the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo.** In the October meeting, the Serbian prime minister, Ivica Dacic, announced Serbia's willingness to debate the status of the territory. These new meetings, along with those of the working groups, gave fresh momentum to the political commitment to the dialogue process and to the implementation of prior agreements, including an agreement in December to roll out integrated border management, a measure that was set in motion that very month. The Self-determination group, opposed to the talks, staged new protests in which 30 people were injured.

The situation in the north of Kosovo, with an ethnic Serb majority and outside the control of the Pristina authorities, was once again a cause for concern at various points of the year due to the slim prospects of a peaceful solution. Throughout the year Serbia pushed for a platform on Kosovo, which includes the drawing up of a document on Kosovo and on north Kosovo, the basis for defending the rights of the Serbian population in Kosovo and the non-acceptance of Kosovo's independence. Representatives of north Kosovo declared their support for the platform at the end of the year. Prior to this, in mid-February, **a referendum had been held in north Kosovo in which 99% of voters (with a turnout of 75%) rejected Pristina's sovereignty.** The Serbian government had criticised the holding of the referendum, considering that it was not in Serbian interests. Meanwhile, **there was tension between Serbia and Kosovo over the Serbian decision to hold its parliamentary and presidential elections in the north of**

**Kosovo as well. In the end they agreed that a mission of the OSCE would monitor the elections in this zone,** although Kosovo continued to label them illegal. The elections took place in a calm and orderly manner. Some incidents occurred during the year in various parts of Kosovo, such as clashes between the Kosovo Serb population and troops of the NATO mission, KFOR, during Serbian protests against the dismantling of barricades in the north; several arrests of Serbian and Albanian individuals by the two administrations; the vandalising of Serbian orthodox monasteries; a blast that killed a Kosovo Albanian and injured two family members in their home in the north of the divided city of Mitrovica; and an attack on Serbian buses in Pristina, which injured 16 children and youths, all of which highlighted the fragility of the human rights and security situation.

### c) Western, Central and Eastern Europe

Belarus	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social and political opposition

#### Summary:

The former Soviet republic of Belarus gained independence in 1991, when it became a presidential republic. Since 1994 it has been governed by Alexander Lukashenko, who managed to extend the length of his term of office and increase his presidential powers in the referendums of 1996 and 2004. Its alignment with Russia in the post-Soviet era, as a result of its energy dependency (despite periodical crises in their relations), and its centralised economy, have kept it at arm's length from Western countries, which have imposed sanctions on the regime due to its internal repression. Authoritarian practices and human rights violations have been the main focus of tension between the government and sectors of the opposition and civil society, leading to the outbreak of violent incidents on several occasions.

**The regime stepped up its repression of opposition politicians, human rights activists, journalists and lawyers, according to the claims of local and international NGOs.** In 2012, the authorities' offensive included an increase in the number of arrests of people participating in demonstrations, along with arbitrary arrests and detentions on allegations of vandalism. Other intimidatory measures included bans on travelling outside the country, harassment in prisons, threats to close down organisations critical of the regime or to imprison their members, among other practices. According to Amnesty International, since the presidential elections were held at the end of 2010, the country has seen an unprecedented deterioration of the human rights situation. Likewise, the Office of

the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned in its report for the Human Rights in April 2012 that a trend had been imposed of systemic human rights violations, a view echoed by Human Rights Watch. This process of deterioration became more acute in the weeks leading up to the parliamentary elections, held in September, which according to the OSCE were neither free nor fair. Over 120 candidates saw their application to register as a parliamentary candidates turned down, including the leader of the opposition group Movement for Freedom, Alyaksandr Milinkevich. The political opposition called for an electoral boycott and pro-boycott demonstrations took place before the elections, leading to the arrest of journalists covering the protests. Several reporters denounced ill-treatment during the arrests. According to the electoral commission, which did not include any opposition representatives, the turnout was 74% and all the seats went to parties loyal to the president, Alexander Lukashenko. The tension between the government and the EU also grew over the course of the year, with new European sanctions being imposed on government officials and companies.

Spain (Basque Country)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Spanish government, French government, ETA, Basque government, political parties and social organisations

**Summary:**

The Basque conflict refers to the disputes regarding the identity-related and self-government aspirations of a significant sector of the Basque population and to the clash of political projects, all within a plurinational and complex demographic context, mainly encompassing the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and part of Navarre, in Spain, along with part of the South of France, also historically considered part of the Basque Country. Cultural, linguistic and territorial elements, among others, have historically mobilised a broad sector of the Basque population. The conflict has been marked since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century by the direct violence perpetrated by the armed group ETA, created in the 1950s during Franco's dictatorship, which demands self-determination for the Basque people and the creation of an independent state. ETA's campaign of violence has claimed 829 lives, while some sources attribute 23 deaths to the para-police organisation GAL, which operated in the 1980s under the sponsorship of officials of the Spanish government in its fight against ETA. Since the restoration of democracy in Spain, which paved the way for the current State of Autonomies, in which specific competences are granted to the Basque Country and Navarre, attempts to negotiate have been made in all the governments that have held power. Issues such as "the right to decide" or "sufficient consensus" have been incorporated in the debate in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In 2011 ETA declared the definitive cessation of armed activities.

**One year after ETA's historical announcement of the definitive cessation of its armed activity in October 2011, the end of the use of violence was confirmed in 2012**, although challenges remain, mainly concerning ETA prisoners and the victims of the terrorist group. The International Verification Commission (a body set up by the International Contact Group), verified in January that the armed group had no intention of resuming the armed struggle. Subsequent statements by ETA, along with declarations by the prisoners' collective ratified the commitment to this decision. In this respect, no attacks or violent incidents occurred in 2012 and both the Basque police force and the Basque employers' association confirmed that ETA had honoured its pledge to end its revolutionary tax. In March, the lack of violence led the government to reduce the number of bodyguards in the Basque Country and Navarre by 54%. **Even so, the government continues to clamp down on the organisation and since the announcement made in October 2011, 30 alleged members of the armed group were arrested**, most of them in other countries, including France, Italy, Belgium and England.

**The government remained steadfast in its refusal to enter into negotiations of any kind with ETA, instead demanding the unconditional dissolution of the group.**

Meanwhile, ETA, the *abertzale* left (left-wing Basque nationalist parties and organisations) and international figures involved in overseeing the process of resolving the conflict urged the government to hold talks with ETA over the consequences of the violence, including the issue of disarmament and the dismantling of the group. In December, the new Basque government stressed that in order for progress to be made towards definitive peace two aspects were vital: discreet talks with ETA and the dignifying of victims. As regards the issue of prisoners, in April the central government announced something of a change in policy in the form of a new prisoner reinsertion plan, which opens the door to bringing ETA prisoners back to the Basque country or closer to the area, although the government stated that this did not mark a change in its prison policy. The conditions for granting transfers have been eased in respect of the policy of the previous socialist government, which in addition to the public rejection of violence and disassociation from ETA (which are still required) demanded a request for forgiveness and reparations for the victim. The plan is applied on a case-by-case basis and does not include any collective measures. The International Contact Group viewed the plan as a step in the right direction, while the *abertzale* left considered that prisoners' rights could not be conditioned by political demands. In any case, within the context of its internal debates, the *abertzale* left's recommendation to ETA prisoners was to accept individual reinsertion and back down from the most extreme demands, such as an amnesty. The prisoners' collective began a debate on the issue in March. In respect of sick prisoners, in September the national court ratified the granting of parole to Iosu Uribeztebarria Bolinaga, sick with cancer.



Meanwhile, the *abertzale* left continued to make progress in the process towards recognising victims through a new document entitled **Solution is Blowing in the Wind**, in which it declared its “profound regret for the consequences of ETA’s armed activities” and for its political stance towards victims, although it denied that there had been any intention to humiliate or cause additional pain. The *abertzale* left took part in several reconciliation initiatives, including a tribute to two *ertzainas* (Basque police officers) assassinated by ETA in 2001, and meetings with victims of ETA. However, these measures were considered insufficient by the main victims’ organisations. 2012 also saw the dissolution of the Askatasuna organisation, which defends the rights of ETA prisoners, and that of the *abertzale* youth organisation Segi. In the political sphere, the constitutional court legalised the *abertzale* political party Sortu, declaring null and void the ruling of the supreme court, which had declared it illegal, considering it an heir to Batasuna. In turn, the party announced its dissolution in December. The first Basque elections to be held in the absence of ETA were won by the PNV with 48 of the 75 seats, while the ***abertzale* left, which stood as the EH Bildu electoral coalition, came second with 21 seats.** The PSE suffered a setback with just 16 seats and was followed by the PP with 10 seats and UPyD with one. Meanwhile, the supreme court confirmed the guilty verdict passed against the *abertzale* leader Arnaldo Otegi and the leader of the LAB union, Rafael Díaz Usabiaga, for belonging to an armed group in the Bateragune case, although it reduced the jail sentence from ten to six and a half years, as well as reducing the sentences of other individuals found guilty in the case.

*The cessation of violence by ETA was ratified, while the Spanish government continued to refuse to negotiate with the armed group and demanded its unconditional dissolution*

United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government of the United Kingdom, local government of Northern Ireland, government of Ireland, Protestant unionist and Catholic nationalist factions

**Summary:**

The tensions between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland date back to the English colonisation of Ireland in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and the discriminatory practices to which the Catholic population was subjected and which continued into the 20<sup>th</sup> century when Ireland gained independence and Northern Ireland (population 60% Protestant, mostly unionists, and 40% Catholic, mainly Irish nationalists) remained within the United Kingdom. From the early 1970s the tensions

escalated into a violent conflict between the IRA armed group and the British government regarding the status of Northern Ireland, in which other paramilitary groups also participated, of which some were Catholic nationalists (e.g. INLA) and others were Protestant unionists (e.g. RHC, UFF, UVF). The signing of the Good Friday peace agreement in 1998 marked the start of the end of a conflict that had claimed more than 3,600 lives since 1969 and paved the way for a power-sharing government in the region. Since then, the post-conflict era has involved many challenges, including the existence of factions of the paramilitary groups and of the IRA itself that sporadically use violence; the disaffection of part of the population in respect of the results of the peace process; and institutional difficulties, among others.

**The year witnessed an increase in the armed activity of dissident republicans and the continuation of inter-community tension with some security incidents taking place.**

Several explosions and armed attacks were carried out over the course of the year. Furthermore, the police located and deactivated explosive devices. Responsibility for some of the incidents was claimed by dissident factions, while others were attributed to these groups by the police. According to the police, these groups pose a serious threat in the region since they are considered to have the capability to act at any time. The dissident group Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) perpetrated several attacks in 2012, including the murder of a man in

County Donegal in February. Two young people were also injured by RAAD members who shot at them following a demonstration against the group in Derry attended by hundreds of people. The murder of a man in the Northern Irish capital, Belfast, was attributed by some republican sources to republican factions. Meanwhile, the Real IRA warned that it would continue to attack British interests, infrastructures and armed forces. **Several dissident groups, including the RAAD and the Real IRA, announced at the end of July that they were joining forces under a single structure and leadership in order to carry out the armed struggle together. Months later this new armed group, which calls itself the New IRA, claimed responsibility for the murder of a prison officer** that occurred in November to the south of Belfast. Furthermore, a man linked to the IRA was murdered in Belfast in October. Some explosions also occurred in Belfast that were attributed to unionist paramilitaries. In March an alleged leader of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a unionist paramilitary group, was arrested in relation to this and other bomb attacks carried out in the Northern Irish capital.

In addition to the actions of armed groups, **some incidents also occurred related to inter-community social tension.** The traditional unionist parades of the Orange Order in Belfast in July once again sparked tension and rioting, leaving nine police officers injured. Rioting also



took place in Derry in July, with clashes taking place on several consecutive nights between youths and police, with no victims. Seven police officers were injured in incidents following the refusal of protestant organisations to respect a ban on marching past a Catholic church in Belfast. In the same city, several days of tension in September between Protestants and Catholics related to a parade resulted in attacks on the police, leaving 65 officers injured. Meanwhile, in December protests were staged over several weeks by **unionists against the decision of the authorities in Belfast to restrict the dates on which the British flag is flown, resulting in riots and attacks on the police. Attacks were also carried out on the houses of several politicians, who received death threats.** Notable developments in the political sphere included the handshake that took place between the Queen of England, Elizabeth II, and the deputy prime minister of Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein number two and former commander of the IRA, Martin McGuinness, during a visit to Belfast by the monarch. The handshake, labelled historic, was considered as a tacit acceptance of British sovereignty by some media outlets. Nonetheless, on several occasions over the course of the year, Sinn Fein argued that it was necessary to hold a referendum on whether to remain part of the United Kingdom or become part of a united Ireland. The secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Owen Paterson, ruled out holding the referendum, while the Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams, stated that it would be held sooner or later.

*Several dissident groups in Northern Ireland announced that they were joining forces under a single structure and leadership and perpetrated acts of violence throughout the year*

## Middle East

### a) Mashreq

Egypt	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, FJP, MB, SCAF, al-Nour Salafist party, other political parties and social movements, National Salvation Front

#### Summary:

For three decades Hosni Mubarak led an autocratic government characterised by the accumulation of power by the military elites, the ruling National Democratic Party and members of the business elite. In a context of artificial political pluralism, with the main opposition movement (the Muslim Brotherhood) outlawed and constant reports emerging of electoral fraud and human rights violations, over the course of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century demands grew for greater freedoms and rights. These demands gained unexpected momentum at the start of 2011. The persistent mass mobilisation of different sectors of the Egyptian

society led to Mubarak's overthrow, following pressure from the armed forces. Since then, the situation in the country has remained unstable and has been characterised by a struggle between sectors that demand greater adherence to the objectives of the uprising, Islamist groups who defend a new position of power and the military, which is seeking to ensure that it preserves its influence and privileges in a new institutional framework.

**The situation in Egypt remained persistently unstable, with periodical popular demonstrations, violent incidents with fatalities, a struggle between the military, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the judiciary, and a growing division between Islamist and secular sectors.**

The year began with the victory of the Islamist forces, which achieved more than 70% of the seats in the People's Assembly (lower house). Following the final round of elections held in January, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the MB's political branch, obtained 235 of the 508 seats in the assembly, while the ultraconservative Salafist al-Nour party obtained 121 seats. In this context, thousands of people commemorated the first anniversary of the uprising against Hosni Mubarak and demanded the immediate transfer of power to civilian hands. The Supreme Council of

the Armed Forces (SCAF) then announced the partial lifting of the state of emergency (completely lifted in May having been in force for 31 years) and granted a pardon to 3,000 people who had been arrested or sentenced in military trials since 2011. The protests against the SCAF continued over the following months. In some cases they were linked to incidents such as the death of 74 people during a sports event in Port Said in February. The military was accused them of allowing the violence, which mainly affected the supporters of a football club who had played an active role in the protests against the SCAF. These incidents triggered new demonstrations and clashes with the police in Cairo in which 12 people were killed and hundreds were injured. **During the first half of the year the violent incidents were also linked to the presidential elections, held in May.** These incidents caused the death of some 20 people and occurred during protests by several sectors against the decision by the electoral commission to rule as ineligible 10 of the 23 presidential candidates, including the Salafist candidate Hazem Abu Ismail, Mubarak's former intelligence chief, Omar Suleimán, and Khairat al-Shater, representative of the MB (despite the fact that the organisation had initially agreed not to present a presidential candidate). With al-Shater ruled ineligible, the MB then put forward Mohammed Morsi, who emerged victorious from the second round of elections held in June with 51.7% of the votes.

Morsi's election as president strained relations between the MB and the SCAF even further. In the months leading up to the elections they had exchanged threats and accusations. Some analysts pointed out then that

although the military was seen by several sectors of Egyptian society as a counter-revolutionary force, others viewed it as an actor with the authority and capacity to guarantee stability in the country.<sup>47</sup> Two weeks before Morsi took office, the SCAF passed a decree that handed control of the budget to the military, as well as the right to a say over the constitutional process and legislative powers until the election of a new parliament, in what was labelled a “soft coup”. One day earlier, the Supreme Constitutional Court issued a decree dissolving the People’s Assembly, controlled by the Islamists, arguing problems with the electoral law.<sup>48</sup> In this context, during the second half of the year, Morsi challenged the military and the judiciary and attempted to increase his power through the adoption of measures that proved controversial. Defying the ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the president ordered the People’s Assembly to reconvene but backed down when faced with the opposition of the judiciary and warnings by the SCAF regarding due respect for the rules. Morsi then implemented a series of measures to reduce the power of the military. In August he sent into retirement more than 70 generals and seven senior army officials, including Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, leader of the SCAF, who just a few days earlier had been appointed as defence minister. He stepped down from this post and became a presidential adviser. **Morsi also revoked the controversial decree issued by the military in June, a decision that was viewed as a “counter-coup”.** The president assumed legislative powers until the holding of new elections, generating unrest in non-Islamist sectors, which accused him of concentrating power in his own hands and of a crackdown on the critical press. **The internal political tensions sparked a crisis at the end of November, after Morsi issued a decree stating that his decisions were “final and unchallengeable”** by any individual or body until the ratification of a new constitution and the election of a new parliament. The measure triggered large-scale demonstrations and clashes between opposition sectors and government supporters in which at least seven people were killed and hundreds were injured over the following weeks.

Morsi’s controversial decree also determined that the assembly entrusted with drawing up the new constitution could not be dissolved by the judiciary. With this measure, the president aimed to protect an institution that had been mired in controversy throughout the year. In early 2012, several political and social sectors decided to boycott the panel, composed of 100 people, criticising the predominance of Islamist forces. Following the dissolution of the first constitutional commission by a judicial ruling, the Egyptian political forces agreed to

*The struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian military intensified further after the election of the Islamist Mohammed Morsi as president*

set up a more representative panel in June. However, the commission continued to be criticised by some sectors in Egypt, and liberal, secular and Coptic representatives boycotted its meetings. Pre-empting an announcement by the Supreme Constitutional Court on its legitimacy and long before the end-of-January deadline set by Morsi, the Constituent Assembly approved the text on 29<sup>th</sup> November. The president called a referendum amid criticism of the constitutional text due to its Islamist influence and its inadequate protection of the rights of women and minorities, such as the Coptic Christians. **The two rounds of the referendum, held on 15<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> December, and in which the opposition reported irregularities, had a turnout of 32.9% and led to the approval of the new constitution with 63.8% of the votes in favour.** Furthermore, it was announced that legislative elections would take place within two months. The crisis triggered by Morsi’s decree led to the formation of a new opposition coalition, the National Salvation Front (NSF). At the end of December, its leaders faced an investigation by the chief prosecutor’s office, having been accused of inciting the overthrow of the president. Another important development in 2012 was the life sentence handed down to Mubarak for his involvement in the death of hundreds of demonstrators during the protests that ousted him from power in 2011.

Egypt – Israel	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Government International
Main parties:	Egypt, Israel

**Summary:**  
In 1979, Egypt became the first Arab state to recognise Israel. The signing of the Camp David Accords put an end to the war between the two countries and led to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai desert. The accords made Egypt a recipient of economic and military aid from the USA. Meanwhile, they permitted Israel to secure its southern border and strengthen its regional position, since it benefited from the divisions generated by the accords in the Arab world. For thirty years the accords have been a key component of Israel’s security strategy. Following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, the continuity of the de facto alliance between Israel and Egypt has been placed in doubt. Egypt’s internal political dynamics, the changes in its foreign policy and its stance regarding the Palestinian question (especially in relation to Hamas and the Gaza Strip) constitute key elements of the new scenario, with direct repercussions for the relationship with Israel.

47. International Crisis Group, *Lost in Transition? The World According to Egypt’s SCAF*, Middle East and North Africa Report no. 121, April 24, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/egypt/121-lost-in-transition-the-world-according-to-egypts-scaf.aspx>.  
48. Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for members of political parties to stand as candidates and contest seats as independents.

The bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel continued to be determined by the changes in Egypt following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak's regime, the instability in the region and the growing isolation of Israel in the area. During the first half of the year, most of the attention focused on the possible changes in the relationship with Israel following the victory of Islamist forces (led by the Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt's legislative and presidential elections.<sup>49</sup> During the campaign, some candidates such as the former leader of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, declared that if they were elected they would reassess the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Meanwhile, the Egyptian gas company decided to suspend exports to Israel over a payment dispute. Although Egyptian public servants stated that the measure was strictly economic, both Israel and the US suggested that the decision was politically motivated. Over the course of the year several attacks on the gas pipelines that supply Israel were reported. **During the second half of the year serious violent incidents occurred in Sinai, triggering the largest-scale Egyptian incursion on the peninsula since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.** The incidents occurred in August when gunmen attempting to enter Israel attacked a checkpoint close to Rafah, killing 16 Egyptian police officers. The Egyptian government responded with a offensive that included air attacks, in which some 20 militants were killed. Immediately after the offensive, representatives of the MB accused Mossad of orchestrating these incidents in order to destabilise the Islamist government in Egypt. However, in September, the Egyptian authorities announced that the military operation against the insurgents had been coordinated with Israel and had ended with 32 fatalities and the arrest of 38 militants.

In this context, several voices in Egypt called for a review of the peace treaty with Israel (which restricts the deployment of arms and soldiers on the peninsula) with the goal of increasing Egyptian presence in the zone. Israel, temporarily accepting an increase in Egyptian forces in the region, was reluctant to review the 1979 treaty. During this period, several analyses also focused on the dilemmas facing the Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi, under pressure from Islamist sectors to ease the blockade on Gaza but, at the same time, wary of the strategic cost of challenging the US or Israel in a context marked by his power struggle with the military. Following the incidents in Sinai, the Egyptian government destroyed and sealed tunnels used for the transport of goods and arms into Gaza. Hamas stated that it was willing to block these routes if Cairo permanently opened the Rafah border crossing. Morsi also held meetings with the two main leaders of Hamas, Khaled Meshal, who fled from his exile in Syria, and the prime minister of Gaza, Ismail Haniye. **Egypt became the main instigator of ceasefire agreements between Israel and Palestinian groups at various points of the year when violence flared up.** An escalation in tension occurred in June when a group of 18 militants attacked

the south of Israel after entering the country through Egypt, an incident in which one Israeli civilian and three militants were killed. Israel then launched an offensive on Gaza in which 10 Palestinians were killed, which met with an armed response from Palestinian groups. The violence ended when Egypt brokered a ceasefire. In November, Egypt also brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, following an escalation of violence in which 158 Palestinians and six Israelis were killed.<sup>50</sup>

Iraq (Kurdistan)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Territory, Resources, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Turkey, Iran

#### Summary:

Concentrated in the north of Iraq, the Kurds represent between 15% and 20% of the country's population. Since the creation of the Iraqi state, and as a result of the broken promises regarding an independent Kurd state in the region, the Kurds have found it difficult to find their place in the Iraqi state and have been subjected to severe repression. In 1992, following the establishment of a no-fly zone in the north of the country, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was created. The self-government model, which was strengthened after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, was legitimised in the federal structure enshrined in the Iraqi constitution of 2005. However, there continues to be conflict due to the fact that the KRG and the state interpret the rights and competencies of the region differently. The disagreements focus on the control of energy resources and the so-called "disputed territories", whose status remains unresolved. The conflict is also influenced by the stance of key actors in the region, such as Turkey and Iran, where Kurd minorities also reside.

2012 saw an escalation in tension in respect of the relations between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Security incidents took place towards at the end of the year and animosity between the two sides was expressed throughout the year due to political differences and to disputes over the control of oil resources and territories, as well as over the distribution of competencies between the region and the central government. During the first half of the year the president of the KRG, Massoud Barzani, was among the key opposition players in state politics who attempted to pass a vote of no confidence in the prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, openly criticising the leader, who he accused of concentrating power. **Barzani warned that the shift towards autocratic governance of the Iraqi government might lead the Kurds to opt for succession** and mooted

49. See the summary on Egypt in this chapter.

50. See the summary on Israel-Palestine in the chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

the possibility of holding a referendum if no agreement was reached on the distribution of powers. In parallel, the KRG also voiced its concern over the purchase of arms by the central government, in particular F-16 fighter jets, expressing fears that they could be used to attack the Kurdish zone of the country. The tension between Erbil and Baghdad was also influenced by the KRG's refusal to hand over to the federal authorities the Iraqi vice president, Tareq el-Hashemi, who sought refuge in the Kurdish region before travelling to Turkey.<sup>51</sup> The dispute between the two sides was conditioned to a large extent by disagreements over the exploitation of energy resources, in particular regarding the measures adopted by the KRG to export oil directly to Turkey and the contracts signed by the regional government with major oil companies, such as Exxon Mobil. Baghdad believes that these decisions form part of a strategy by the KRG to progress towards economic independence (considered the first step in Erbil's political ambitions). As such, it requested help from the US in cancelling the commercial agreement with Exxon, warning that the situation could lead to the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, the KRG maintained its policy and signed new contracts with other international companies without Baghdad's authorisation, including Total, Chevron and Gazprom. In the middle of its dispute with the KRG, al-Maliki's government also criticised Turkey and accused it of interfering in the country's internal affairs, in particular after the visit (unannounced to Baghdad) of the Turkish foreign minister, Ahmed Davutoglu, to Kirkuk, one of the territories disputed by the KRG and the Iraqi government. Despite the climate of tension between Erbil and Baghdad, and partly due to international pressure, in August the KRG resumed the export of oil through the pipelines controlled by Baghdad after four months of suspension. The tension in this respect continued until the end of September, when an agreement was reached on the transfer of funds related to oil production from Baghdad to Erbil.

***The conflict between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government escalated in 2012, leading to clashes and the growing militarisation of the disputed territories***

In this context, in the final quarter of the year a series of incidents occurred that led to a new escalation of tension. **The decision by al-Maliki's government in September to set up a new military command (Tigris Operations Command) for the northern zone of the country, including several of the territories disputed by the KRG, led to the growing militarisation of the disputed territories and to clashes between Iraqi and Kurdish Peshmerga troops** in mid-November in which one person was killed and dozens were injured. Both Erbil and Baghdad intensified the deployment of troops, especially around Kirkuk, and the KRG warned that it was prepared to respond to any aggression by the federal government. The crisis led to the intervention of

a US general and, initially, an agreement was reached with military leaders on both sides to ease the tension. However, until the end of the year Baghdad continued to deploy its Tigris Operations Command, while the KRG refused to withdraw its Peshmerga troops from the disputed territories and to dismantle the Golden Lions joint force, composed of Kurds and Iraqis and promoted by the US before its withdrawal from the country. The efforts to achieve a negotiated outcome to the conflict were also affected by the deteriorating health of the Iraqi president and Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, who had acted as a mediator. In December, a series of incidents occurred that confirmed the climate of animosity between the two sides, including al-Maliki's warnings over the possible outbreak of an ethnic conflict between Kurds and Arabs, a visit by Barzani to Kirkuk and his declarations on the need to protect Kurdish interests, Baghdad's refusal to authorise the visit of

the Turkish energy minister to the territory of the KRG, and the incident in which Kurdish troops fired on an Iraqi helicopter in Kirkuk. There were a growing number of violent incidents in this city throughout the year in which people were killed and injured. It should be pointed out that in 2012 the tension between the KRG and the Iraqi government was also conditioned by the instability in the region as a whole and, in particular, by the crisis in Syria. In the second half of the year, the Kurdish security forces blocked a convoy of Iraqi troops attempting to take control of the border zone between the areas with a Kurdish presence in Syria and the zones under the control of the KRG. The Syrian crisis led to a significant number of refugees fleeing towards the Kurdish autonomous region (more than 9,000 people according to press reports) and led the Kurdish government to begin the training of a military force composed of Kurdish Syrians opposed to the Syrian regime. Barzani also played an important role in forging an agreement between different Kurdish sectors in Syria.<sup>52</sup>

Israel – Syria, Lebanon	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	System, Resources, Territory International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Israel, Syria, Hezbollah Lebanese group and its armed wing (Islamic Resistance)

**Summary:**

The backdrop to this situation of tension is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its consequences in the region. On the one hand, the presence of thousands of Palestinian refugees who settled in Lebanon from 1948, together with the leadership

51. See the summary on Iraq in the chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).  
52. See the summary on Syria in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).



of the PLO in 1979, led Israel to carry out constant attacks in southern Lebanon until it occupied the country in 1982. The founding of Hezbollah, the armed Shiite group, in the early 1980s in Lebanon, with an agenda consisting of challenging Israel and achieving the liberation of Palestine, led to a series of clashes that culminated in a major Israeli offensive in July 2006. Meanwhile, the 1967 war led to the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, which together with Syria's support of Hezbollah explains the tension between Israel and Syria.

As in 2011, events in Syria were the determining factor in the tension between Damascus and Israel and also had an impact on developments in Lebanon.<sup>53</sup> The most significant incidents occurred in the second half of the year. As the armed conflict in Syria grew ever more acute and became increasingly international (with several incidents taking place in border zones), international concern focused in part on Bashar al-Assad's possession of arsenal of non-conventional weapons, in particular chemical weapons. The Damascus government stressed that this arsenal would only be used in the case of an international conflict. Israel voiced its concern about these weapons being transferred to the Lebanese Islamist group Hezbollah, an ally of Syria. **In October, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for flying an unmanned aerial vehicle over Israel.** The aircraft travelled 50 kilometres over the Negev desert before being downed by the Israeli air force. The drone was downed close to Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor. The incident occurred amid growing rumours of a possible Israeli attack on Iran.<sup>54</sup> The leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, stated that the unmanned aerial vehicle had been manufactured in Iran and assembled in Lebanon. The Lebanese president, Michel Suleiman, criticised Hezbollah for this operation, accusing it of pursuing its own agenda towards Israel and calling on it to integrate its military capabilities within the Lebanese army.

Another serious incident occurred in early November, when mortar shells launched from Syria landed in the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since 1967. This incident, which did not cause any damage, raised the alarm concerning a possible escalation of violence in the area. The Israeli military considered that the mortar shells had not been deliberately aimed at the Golan Heights. Days later, **gunfire from Syria reached an Israeli army checkpoint. Although there were no reports of damage or victims, Israel responded with artillery fire, in the first exchange of gunfire between the two countries since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.** The next day, another Israeli checkpoint was hit by rockets. However, the Israeli government insisted that it did not look like a deliberate attack but rather an accidental consequence of the armed conflict in Syria. In this context, and in parallel to a new Israeli offensive on Gaza<sup>55</sup>, the Lebanese

army dismantled two Katyusha rockets equipped with timers that were aimed at Israel. During Israel's Cast Lead Operation against Gaza in 2008 and 2009, several rockets were fired from the south of Lebanon, an area considered a bastion of Hezbollah. The United Nations mission in Lebanon, UNIFIL, renewed its mandate for another year. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, also reiterated his criticism of Israel for its air incursions over Lebanon, warning that they constituted a violation of the neighbouring country's sovereignty and that they discredited the UNIFIL. In 2012 Israel also singled out Hezbollah and Iran for their alleged responsibility in a bomb attack on a bus in Bulgaria in July in which six people were killed, five of them Israeli tourists.

Lebanon	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, Hezbollah, March 14 Alliance (led by the Future Movement), Amal, Free Patriotic Movement, Hizb ul-Tahrir, militias

**Summary:**

The assassination of the Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, in February 2005 sparked the so-called "Cedar Revolution" which, following mass demonstrations, forced the withdrawal of the Syrian Armed Forces (present in the country for three decades), meeting the demands of Security Council resolution 1559, promoted by the USA and France in September 2004. The stand-off between opponents of Syria's influence (led by Hariri's son, who blamed the Syrian regime for the assassination) and sectors more closely linked to Syria, such as Hezbollah, triggered a political, social and institutional crisis influenced by religious divisions. In a climate of persistent internal political division, the armed conflict that broke out in Syria in 2011 has led to an escalation of the tension between Lebanese political and social sectors and to an increase in violence in the country.

The armed conflict in neighbouring Syria had a decisive influence on the year's developments in Lebanon, paving the way to the polarisation of Lebanon's political actors, an escalation in tension and **an increase in the number of violent episodes, in which almost 100 people were killed.** Although the prime minister, Najib Mikati, favoured a policy of "disassociation" from the events occurring in the neighbouring country, the position of the government (of which Hezbollah forms part) was considered more favourable to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which it failed to condemn explicitly for the repression of the uprising. **Hezbollah was accused on repeated occasions of lending political and**

53. See the summary on Lebanon in this chapter.  
 54. See the summary on Iran – USA, Israel in this chapter.  
 55. See the summary on Israel-Palestine in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).



**military support to Damascus, while the main Lebanese opposition platform**, the March 14 Alliance (M14), led by the former prime minister Saad Hariri, **positioned itself openly in favour of the Syrian rebel forces**. During the first quarter of the year various sectors in Lebanon demonstrated peacefully in favour of one side or the other of the Syrian crisis. However, over the following months a series of incidents and clashes occurred involving rival groups. The violence resulted in armed clashes between opponents and sympathisers of the Syrian government with several fatalities (including exchanges of gunfire and grenades), kidnappings and clashes with the security forces. These incidents were initially concentrated in the northern city of Tripoli, but later spread to districts in the capital, Beirut. The fact that the ethnic composition of Lebanon is similar to that of Syria (and that Sunni sectors supported the rebels, while Shiites and Alawites supported Assad's regime) led to warnings concerning the increase of sectarian tension. One of the most serious escalations occurred in May after the death of two clerics opposed to the Syrian regime and close to the Lebanese opposition. Following the incident, attempts to expel a pro-Syrian group from a district in Beirut sparked clashes in which several people were killed. The armed clashes led to the deployment of the army in Tripoli and Beirut. **The kidnapping of Lebanese Shiites by members of the free Syrian Army (FSA) also influenced the tension in Lebanon, leading to reprisals** such as the taking of hostages by a group of Syrians in Beirut, which required the intervention of the Lebanese security forces. Border towns in Lebanon were also the target of Syrian incursions and artillery fire. These incidents were condemned by the Lebanese president and led to the deployment of additional Lebanese military units along the border. At the end of 2012, the death of 20 Lebanese militants who had crossed the border into Syria to join the rebellion against Damascus triggered fresh clashes in Tripoli in which 17 people were killed. It should also be pointed out that the armed conflict in Syria led to an intense flow of refugees into Lebanon.<sup>56</sup>

**The year's most destabilising violent incident occurred in mid-October, when a car bomb in Beirut caused the death of the intelligence chief of the internal security forces, Wissam al-Hassam**, and that of three other people. This was the most serious attack to occur in the Lebanese capital in four years. Al-Hassam, a figure critical of Syria, was close to the M14 alliance and had headed the investigation into the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri. Lebanese opposition sectors, including the Future Movement led by Saad Hariri, accused Syria of perpetrating the attack, for which responsibility was not claimed by any group.

*The war in Syria had a direct impact on Lebanon, leading to the growing polarisation of the country's political actors and to an increase in violence that caused almost 100 fatalities*

Al-Hassam's death triggered new clashes between pro- and anti-Syrian sectors and led the prime minister to tender his resignation, in a context of growing political polarisation. The president, Michel Suleiman, asked Mikati to stay on as prime minister in order to prevent a power vacuum and called on the various political forces to press ahead with reconciliation talks. Suleiman had launched the table of national dialogue, which held its first meetings in July. It was agreed in these meetings to bolster the Lebanese army economically. However, one of the sticking points was the definition of the country's security strategy and how to accommodate Hezbollah. **The M14 alliance left the table of national dialogue on several occasions due to Hezbollah's refusal to discuss its possible disarmament.** The group argues that it will not disarm because it is the only force in the country with the capability to face Israel.<sup>57</sup> The M14 alliance was also critical of Mikati's government, which it accused of failing to control security incidents. Until the end of December, the opposition platform continued to boycott the government and to call for the formation of a national salvation government as a precondition for participating in talks. Right at the end of December, the M14 alliance added to its conditions a commitment by the Hezbollah leader to discuss the transfer of its weapon arsenal to the Lebanese state. The political debate was also affected by differences regarding the electoral law for the 2013 elections and by reports that accused Hariri and a member of parliament of supplying arms to the Syrian rebels. In this context of uncertainty, several experts warned about the risks of destabilisation in Lebanon. It should be pointed out that in 2012 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is investigating the death of Rafik Hariri, announced that the accused (members of Hezbollah) may be tried *in absentia*.

Palestine	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	PA, Fatah, al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, Hamas and its armed wing (Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigade)
<b>Summary:</b>	The disagreements between the various Palestinian sectors in recent decades have mainly featured secular nationalist groups (Fatah and its armed wing al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP, DFLP) and religious groups (Hamas and its armed

56. See "Violence and the Syrian forced displacement crisis" in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).  
57. See the summary on Israel – Syria, Lebanon in this chapter.

wing Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigade, Islamic Jihad). This confrontation is the result of a power struggle to control the Palestinian territories, which, in turn has produced different approaches in terms of relations with Israel. Having controlled Palestinian politics for many years, the Fatah movement led by Yasser Arafat and later by Mahmoud Abbas faced accusations of corruption and of failing to defend Palestinian interests in the peace process, which led to Hamas' victory in the January 2006 elections. This situation triggered a dialectical and armed struggle between the two groups for the control of political institutions and, above all, the security forces. In 2011 Hamas and Fatah announced a reconciliation agreement. However, the discrepancies between the two groups have continued, complicating the task of forming a government of national unity.

The differences between Hamas and Fatah remained in a series of areas, highlighting the difficulties involved in implementing the reconciliation agreement signed in 2011 by the two groups. Following the meetings held by representatives of both groups in Cairo at the end of December 2011, a road map was defined that, among other issues, included the formation of a new government of national unity and the holding of general elections in 2012. Nonetheless, the deadlines passed without any agreements being reached in this respect, partly due to discrepancies between the two groups but also due to friction within Hamas between the leaders in exile and the Islamist leadership in Gaza. The Islamist group was affected by the developments in the armed conflict in Syria, which led the Hamas and its leader, Khaled Meshal, to leave Damascus (having established its headquarters there in 1999, with the political and economical support of the Syrian government) and move to Egypt and Qatar.

The leaders of the Gaza Strip had been somewhat critical of Meshal's rapprochement with the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, which led Fatah to accuse them of attempting to boycott the reconciliation agreement. In February, Hamas and Fatah agreed that Abbas would lead the new government of national unity after Hamas rejected the proposal for the prime minister of the PA, Salam Fayyad, to head the administration. The talks on how to merge the Palestinian security forces were fraught with stumbling blocks, due to the difficulties involved in integrating the units that operate in Gaza and the West Bank within a single cohesive unit. Hamas leaders stated that in order to reach an agreement, Fatah must suspend its cooperation with Israel on security matters. In respect of the holding of elections, an electoral commission initiated the registration of voters in Gaza as part of the preparations. However, **the PA's decision to hold elections on 20<sup>th</sup> October was seen by Hamas as a unilateral measure that was detrimental to reconciliation efforts.** The Islamist group suspended the voting preparations and announced a boycott of the elections (the first to be held in Palestinian territory since

the 2006 general election), which finally went ahead as scheduled but with a low turnout.

The discrepancies between Fatah and Hamas were also evident in the initiative to achieve recognition for Palestine as non-member state of the UN, a key element in the PA's strategy regarding Israel in 2012.<sup>58</sup> Representatives of the Islamist group questioned the focus on questions of terminology when the main challenge continued to be ending the Israeli occupation. Even so, a few days before the vote was due to take place in the UN General Assembly, Hamas publicly announced its support of the proposal. The UN initiative was viewed by some analysts as an attempt by Abbas to present the Palestinian population with a success in a context of growing popular discontent. The second half of the year saw the intensification of demonstrations (which in some cases erupted into violence) against rising prices and the economic stalemate, forcing the PA to revert some of its decisions. These protests were also viewed with concern by Hamas, which has banned demonstrations in Gaza and fears the spread of protests. **Towards the end of the year, Hamas and Fatah showed some signs of rapprochement, such as the announcements by both groups to release political prisoners and the PA's decision to authorise demonstrations by Hamas in the West Bank** to commemorate the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Islamist group, the first events of this kind to take place in the territory controlled by Fatah since 2007. Meshal also participated in these commemorations during his first visit to Gaza in December (his family fled from Palestinian territory in 1967 and he had only visited the West Bank in 1975) and attended meetings in which the issue of Palestinian reconciliation was discussed. It should be pointed out that in 2012 the governments of the PA and Hamas were both criticised by Human Rights Watch for the abuses perpetrated by the security forces in Gaza and the West Bank. The report on Hamas refers to the torture of detainees, arbitrary arrests, forced confessions, trials without legal guarantees and executions.

Syria – Turkey	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Syria, Turkey

**Summary:**

Relations between Syria and Turkey had improved in recent decades following the signing of the Adana agreement in 1998, which forced the expulsion of the Kurdish armed group PKK and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, from Syrian territory. The launch of Turkey's "zero problems with our neighbours"

58. See the summary on Israel-Palestine in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts) and chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

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foreign policy by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan had paved the way for the signing of commercial and border agreements by Damascus and Ankara. The waters were muddied by the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011, leading to a period of distancing between the two countries. After taking the initiative to prevent the isolation of the regime in Damascus and urging Bashar al-Assad, without success, to implement reforms in Syria, Turkey adopted an openly critical stance, publicly supporting the Syrian opposition. Turkey's position has been determined by the intense flow of Syrian refugees that it has been forced to deal with and due to the impact of the crisis on the Kurdish question. The tension has led to a series of incidents that have raised fears concerning the possible escalation of violence between the two countries.

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Relations between Damascus and Ankara were seriously damaged in 2012 as a result of the armed conflict in Syria, which resulted in a series of incidents, including exchanges of gunfire along the border between the two countries.<sup>59</sup> In the first few months of the year, bilateral relations were affected by the critical stance adopted by Turkey in respect of the armed response by Assad's regime to the uprising, as well as by the support lent by the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the Syrian opposition in exile, which established the headquarters of the Syrian National Council in Turkey. Furthermore, the constant flow of refugees from Syria into Turkey led Erdogan to moot the possibility of establishing a buffer zone in Syria that would make it possible to offer protection to those fleeing from the violence. Over the following months, the growing militarisation of the dispute with Syria triggered a series of incidents and led Ankara to protest after Syrian forces opened fire in the border zone, killing two people. **The most serious incident in the first half of the year occurred in June, when the Syrian military downed a Turkish jet.** Damascus argued that the aircraft had been shot down in self-defence after it entered Syrian airspace, while Ankara insisted that the jet was flying above international waters after briefly straying into Syrian airspace. It also pointed out that it was unarmed, was clearly identified and was carrying out standard reconnaissance tasks in the Mediterranean. A second Turkish plane was attacked as it participated in the rescue of the pilots of the downed aircraft. Turkey requested an urgent meeting with NATO, which declared its support of Ankara. NATO stated that no military action would be taken against Syria until all the diplomatic channels for resolving the

*Relations between Damascus and Ankara deteriorated due to the war in Syria and as a result of several incidents, including exchanges of gunfire in the border zone*

crisis had been exhausted. Erdogan warned that any Syrian approach to the border would be treated as a threat and over the following days the two countries put on a show of strength of their respective air forces, with several aircraft overflying the area close to the air border between the two countries.

**The tension in bilateral relations was at its highest in October, when mortar shells fired from Syria killed five civilians** (two women and three children) in the Turkish town of Akcale, in the southern province of Hatay. The incident triggered the first Turkish attack on Syrian military positions and led the Turkish parliament to give the green light to the government to launch military incursions in the neighbouring country, causing international alarm. Thousands of people demonstrated in Turkey by calling for peace, while Erdogan stated that his country had no intention of starting a war but that it would defend its territory. NATO called an emergency meeting and demanded the cessation of hostilities against Turkey (a NATO member), while the

UN Security Council viewed the Syrian attacks as a threat to regional stability and peace. Damascus stated that the incident had been a tragic accident and announced an investigation. Nevertheless, over the following days several exchanges of artillery fire occurred in the border zone. Furthermore, Turkey intercepted a Russian aeroplane that it suspected of transporting munitions to Syria. These incidents led both Syria and Turkey to ban flights from the other country over their respective territory. It should also be pointed out that Turkey's approach to the Syrian crisis was also influenced by the Kurdish question. According to several reports, the Turkish-Syrian conflict had facilitated a rapprochement between Damascus and the PKK. The emergence of a de facto autonomous zone in the north of Syria under the control of Kurdish sectors with links to the PKK caused great alarm in Ankara, due to the fears concerning the expectations that this development might foster for the Kurdish movement in Turkey, given the consolidation of the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq.<sup>60</sup> Towards the end of the year, the fierce fighting in Syria had led to an intensification of the flow of refugees into Turkey, which by December had allowed in more than 140,000 Syrian refugees, according to figures published by UNHCR.<sup>61</sup> In parallel, NATO approved and began the deployment of a Patriot missile battery along the Syrian border, amid speculation that Damascus might resort to the use of chemical weapons.

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59. See the summary on Syria in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

60. See the summary on Turkey (south-east) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

61. See "Violence and the Syrian forced displacement crisis" in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).

## b) The Gulf

Bahrain	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, political and social opposition, Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, Iran

### Summary:

The popular uprisings that spread across countries in the Maghreb and Middle East in 2011 also had an impact on Bahrain. Ruled since the 18<sup>th</sup> century by the al-Khalifa and part of the British protectorate territories from 1861 to 1971, the country formally became a constitutional monarchy in 2002. The family in power is of Sunni faith, unlike most of the country's population, which is of Shiite faith and which denounces systematic policies of discrimination. Internal tensions, which had increased in recent years, turned into open protest from February 2011. Demands for political and social reforms were met by the government with economic incentives and offers of political dialogue, but also with the repression and persecution of government opponents. The threat to the stability of the region led to the intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which sent troops to the country. The situation in Bahrain has fuelled the confrontation between Iran and the Gulf countries (especially Saudi Arabia) and is of special concern to the USA, whose Fifth Fleet is stationed in the archipelago.

Protests against the regime had begun in 2011 and there was no let-up in the tension in Bahrain in 2012, which saw mass demonstrations against the government, police repression, clashes between dissidents and the security forces, arrests and prison sentences for opposition activists, torture and other human rights violations. More than ten people were killed and hundreds were injured in the violent incidents that occurred in the country. On several occasions the protests met with severe repression by the police, which habitually used tear gas to disperse demonstrators, even in residential areas. This situation led organisations such as Physicians for Human Rights to warn that the police was using this gas indiscriminately and as a weapon against dissidents, causing cases of blindness, mutilations and even death.<sup>62</sup> In the first quarter, several people were killed and more than 150 were injured in numerous clashes (including the protests of 14<sup>th</sup> February to commemorate the first anniversary of the mass demonstrations in the country). According to several analyses, some opposition sectors were

*The Formula 1 race in Bahrain was preceded by a series of demonstrations against the regime, preventing the government from using the event as a symbol of normalisation*

resorting to violence in confrontations with the police and the behaviour of the security forces had hardly altered despite the fact that an investigation entrusted by the king to an international commission led by the Egyptian lawyer Cherif Bassiouni (the Bassiouni report) concluded in November 2011 that many abuses had been committed in putting down the protests. **The holding of a Formula 1 race in April was preceded by a series of demonstrations against the regime and in support of detained activists who were on hunger strike**, preventing the government from using the event as a symbol of normalisation. The demonstrations led to some violent incidents in which one person was killed and another 70 were injured. In the second half of the year the government opted to ban demonstrations, using the argument that it was preventing disorder and violence. Nevertheless, incidents did occur, such as clashes between activists and security forces during the funeral of a youth who died in police custody, an attack in which two people were killed in Manama and the death of two adolescents and two police officers after being injured in protests.

Over the course of 2012, **many international organisations criticised the situation in the country and, in particular, the regime's almost complete failure to implement the reforms that it had pledged to introduce** following the publication of the Bassiouni report. Bassiouni himself considered that several recommendations had not been taken on board. The International Crisis Group stated that the government was acting as if the partial implementation of changes would be enough to guarantee calm in the country when in fact the dynamics of violence were intensifying.<sup>63</sup> According to the assessment made by the Project on Middle East Democracy organisation, only three of the 26 recommendations in the Bassiouni report had been fully implemented, while 15 had been partially implemented and seven of the most important had not been implemented at all. The government, on the other hand, considered that 90% of the proposals had been implemented. In November, Amnesty International claimed that the situation had deteriorated and reported cases of torture, some involving minors, and the revocation of dissidents' citizenship. 31 opposition members had their citizenship revoked after being accused of attacking the security of the state. Other opposition leaders were handed jail sentences of between three and 25 years, one of them being the director of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (who in January had reported the extrajudicial execution of 31 people since the publication of the Bassiouni report), who was given a three-year sentence for organising unauthorised protests. In October King

62. Holly Atkinson and Richard Sollom, "Weaponizing Tear Gas: Bahrain's Unprecedented Use of Toxic Chemical Agents Against Civilians", Physicians for Human Rights, August 2012, <http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/weaponizing-tear-gas.html>

63. International Crisis Group, *Alert: Bahrain*, April 16, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2012/mena/bahrain-conflict-risk-alert.aspx>.



Hamad called for national dialogue. At the end of the year, Prince Salma bin Hamad al-Khalifa, considered a more open figure, reiterated the offer of dialogue, which was welcomed by the main opposition group, al-Wefaq. Nevertheless, the organisation stated that the results of talks should be submitted to a referendum and asked for greater US and British involvement in the mediation of the crisis. The internal situation in Bahrain was also conditioned by the possible political, economic and military integration of the countries that form part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The proposal, presented in May by Saudi Arabia, was considered a means of countering Iran's influence and neutralising the potential threat of Shia communities in the region. King Hamad called on the population to prepare for this union, criticised by the opposition and by Tehran.

Iran	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social, political and religious opposition

#### Summary:

Since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office in 2005, his presidency has been questioned internally by numerous sectors. Both the way foreign policy is conducted (defiantly defending the right to possess nuclear capability) and the results of domestic policies have generated growing opposition within the country. The polarisation that has existed for decades between conservatives and reformists has in recent years led Ahmadinejad to clash with several political figures that were ousted from power in 2005. Moreover, the religious authorities and the armed forces, mainly the Revolutionary Guard, have played a crucial role in the evolution of Iran. Internal tensions escalated in mid-2009, when Ahmadinejad was re-elected in elections that were denounced as fraudulent by the opposition and that triggered the largest popular protests in the country since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Over the course of the year, political tension remained clearly evident in Iran, both in clashes between opposition sectors and the government and in the stand-off between the various conservative forces of the regime.

**The repression in the country intensified during the first quarter, leading up to the legislative elections of 2<sup>nd</sup> March, the first elections to be held in the country since the controversial re-election of the president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009.** During this period there were a growing number of reports concerning the harassment of dissidents, which involved the persecution and arrest of journalists, opposition activists, representatives of ethnic minorities, human rights defenders and leaders

of women's movements. Furthermore, the government created a police unit specialised in new technologies and the internet in order to control dissidents' online activities. In this context, Amnesty International presented a report in which it condemned these practices and in which it warned about the general deterioration of the human rights situation in the country, especially regarding the number of summary executions, which increased fourfold in 2011 in respect of 2010.<sup>64</sup> Amnesty International also highlighted the situation of two of the main opposition leaders, Mehdi Karoubi and Hussein Mousavi, who have remained under de facto house arrest since February 2011. The conservative allies of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emerged victorious from the March elections, a sign of the weakening of Ahmadinejad's circle. The new parliament re-elected one of the president's main adversaries, the conservative Ali Larijani, as its spokesman. During the first quarter, Ahmadinejad was summoned to parliament to explain several of his policies (a situation that had not occurred since the triumph of the Islamic revolution in 1979), in particular a series of economic measures. The president was also questioned for originally refusing to obey an order by Khamenei, who finally forced Ahmadinejad to reinstate the head of the Iranian secret services in April 2011. The parliament also ruled to remove the leader from the board of directors of the main oil companies.

During the second half of the year **the economic problems generated by the imposition of sanctions on Iran due to its nuclear programme, together with the fall in value of the Iranian currency in respect of the dollar, sparked protests in the country that ended in clashes between demonstrators and the police** and in the arrest of more than 50 people. The demonstrators pointed the finger of blame at Ahmadinejad for the country's critical economic situation. This panorama led to speculation that the president (whose term of office comes to an end in mid 2013) could be forced by the Supreme Leader to step down if the popular unrest intensified. However, in November, Ayatollah Khamenei called on parliament to waive the requirement for the president to appear in order to explain his political and economic measures, arguing that the situation could be exploited by the "country's enemies". In December, one of the key issues of the political debate were the possible modifications of the electoral law that must govern the elections of 14<sup>th</sup> June, in which Ahmadinejad cannot stand due to having served two terms in office, the maximum number allowed by the constitution. Parliament aimed to increase its competencies in the candidate registration process and reduce the government's role in the elections. At the end of 2012, the analyses considered that the conservative sectors opposed to Ahmadinejad would attempt to favour the candidature of somebody who did not represent a threat to the Supreme Leader. One of the possible candidates would be Ali Larijani, who is very close to Khamenei. The president would

64. Amnesty International, "We Are Ordered to Crush You": *Expanding Repression of Dissent in Iran*, February 28, 2012, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/we-are-ordered-to-crush-you-expanding-repression-of-dissent-in-iran>.



attempt to ensure that he was succeeded by a member of his circle, probably his controversial chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashael. A promoter of nationalist ideas, Mashael was viewed with mistrust by clerics and conservative sectors, who consider him a threat to the system. The reformist sector, which could be represented by the former president Mohamed Khatami, stated that it would not stand in the elections unless the house arrest of the two leaders Mousavi and Kharoubi was lifted.

Iran (Sistan Balochistan)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	1
<b>Trend:</b>	↓
<b>Type:</b>	Identity, Self-government Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran), Jundallah (Soldiers of God /People's Resistance Movement), Harakat Ansar Iran

#### Summary:

Since 2005, the Jundallah group (Soldiers of God) has been waging an insurgent campaign in Sistan Balochistan, a province in the south east of Iran with a Sunni majority, as opposed to the rest of the country, where Shiite Muslims predominate. The organisation, which also calls itself the People's Resistance Movement, was set up in 2002 and denounces sectarian persecution by Tehran. It states that its purpose is to defend the rights, culture and religion of the Baloch people but denies that it has a separatist agenda and links abroad. Meanwhile, the Iranian government accuses Jundallah of being in contact with the USA, the UK, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the al-Qaeda network. The province of Sistan Balochistan shares a border with Afghanistan and Pakistan –the Baloch population lives on both sides of the border– and is an area with a high poverty rate where smuggling is rife and drug trafficking routes are located. Concerned about the possibility of this area becoming destabilised, Tehran has strengthened its security measures and has sentenced Jundallah militants to death. The insurgent group's actions include kidnappings and attacks (including suicide attacks), several which have targeted the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran). Following the capture and execution of Jundallah's leader in 2010, there has been a reduction in the group's activities.

In line with the trend of the previous year, the activities of the insurgent group Jundallah had less international repercussion in 2012. The organisation's activities were reduced after the capture and execution of its leader, Adolmalek Rigj, in 2010, and also as a result of Tehran's activity in combating its offensives. The most significant **development in 2012 occurred in October, when a suicide attack on a mosque in Chabahar, in the province of Sistan Balochistan, caused**

*During the first half of the year, much of the attention was focused on the possibility of an Israeli offensive on Iran*

**the death of two members of the pro-government militia Basij and left another six people injured.** Responsibility for the attack was claimed by an armed group that goes by the name of Harakat Ansar Iran, which recognises the deceased leader of Jundallah as its spiritual leader. The group claimed that the target of the offensive were the Iranian security forces. In a subsequent declaration, Harakat Ansar Iran called on the Baloch people to join the attacks on Iran and denounced the discrimination of Sunni minorities in the country. Two days after the suicide attack, the Iranian authorities announced the execution of three alleged members of Jundallah accused of an offensive that claimed 38 lives in December 2010.

Iran – USA, Israel <sup>65</sup>	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	System, Government International
<b>Main parties:</b>	Iran, USA, Israel

#### Summary:

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution that toppled the regime of US ally Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi and proclaimed Ayatollah Khomeini as the country's supreme leader, relations between the USA and Iran have been tense. In this context, the Iranian nuclear programme has been an issue of particular concern. The international pressure on Iran increased after the attacks of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001. Under George W. Bush's government, Iran, like North Korea, was declared part of the "axis of evil" and an enemy state for its alleged links to terrorism. In Iran, the victory of the ultra-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections led to a strengthening of nationalist rhetoric that affirms the right to develop a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes. Meanwhile, sectors of the international community warn that a regime considered hostile to Western interests in the region will soon have the capability to build a nuclear bomb.

The tension between Iran and other countries, including the US and Israel, remained at a similar level to 2011 and was characterised by constant exchanges of threats, military manoeuvres in the Gulf area, alarm over the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, new rounds of international sanctions and a series of meetings in which no progress was made on the issue of the Islamic republic's nuclear programme.

**During the first half of the year, much of the attention was focused on the possibility of an Israeli offensive on Iran,** since several reports concluded that a situation of this kind could occur in this period. Although the US warned about the consequences of a possible "preventive" attack and stated that it favoured the use of diplomatic channels, Barack Obama's government

65. This international socio-political crisis affects other countries that have not been mentioned, but which are involved to varying degrees.

highlighted that all the options remained on the table and that, if necessary, it would not hesitate in resorting to the use of force. The Iranian authorities reacted to these warnings by stating that they would respond to any aggression and by insisting that their nuclear programme did not have military objectives. Over the course of 2012, particularly in the early months, the tension was reflected in Iran's threats to block the Strait of Hormuz (a key route for the sea transport of one fifth of the world's oil production), in the deployment of six warships by the US, France and the UK in this area, in the sailing of Iranian warships into the Mediterranean and in mid-range missile tests, among other developments. **In 2012 Israel also accused Iran of being behind a series of attacks on Israeli interests in India, Thailand and Georgia** in which several people were injured in February, along with a bomb attack on a bus carrying Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in July, in which six people were killed. Tehran denied any involvement in these incidents and in turn accused Israel and the US of being behind the attacks in which an Iranian nuclear scientist was killed and another was injured, as well as being responsible for the cyber attacks on several Iranian organisations and industries.

Over the course of the year, new rounds of international sanctions against the Islamic republic were approved, both by the US and the EU, which halfway through the year decided to impose an oil embargo on Iran. In parallel, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) made several visits to Iran and held meetings with the country's authorities, after which it issued a series of reports criticising the lack of clarification regarding the potential military purposes of the Iranian nuclear programme, the refusal to allow them entry to some atomic plants, the increase in uranium enrichment levels and Iran's growing capabilities, among other issues. Even so, May saw the resumption of talks between Iran and the G5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) after 15 months of stalled talks. A series of meetings were held in Istanbul, Baghdad, Moscow and New York. However, no progress was made in these meetings. In 2012 some analysts considered that it was necessary to give negotiations a boost in order to avoid a dangerous armed conflict, recovering initiatives such as those promoted by Brazil and Turkey in 2010.<sup>66</sup> The UN General Assembly once again witnessed clashes between the leaders of Israel and Iran, with mutual recriminations and threats of aggression. Towards the end of the year, following Barack Obama's re-election, Washington and Tehran reiterated their willingness to hold talks within the framework of the G5+1. According to press reports, the US issued the Iranian authorities

***The tension surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme escalated due to a potential Israeli attack in Iran, by Tehran's threats to close the Strait of Hormuz and by a series of military manoeuvres***

with an ultimatum, giving them until March 2013 to collaborate substantially with the IAEA; otherwise it would take the case to the UN Security Council.

It should be pointed out that in 2012 the international tension involving Iran was also affected by **the increasingly strained relations between Tehran and the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia**. Iran urged Riyadh not to place itself in a "dangerous position" after the Saudi monarchy offered to make up the shortfall in oil production caused by the oil embargo imposed on Iran by increasing

Saudi Arabia's production. This tension was also marked by a verbal escalation between Tehran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) following a visit by the Iranian president and other senior military officials to a group of islands whose sovereignty is disputed by the United Arab Emirates. Following a GCC meeting in December, the member countries of the regional organisation warned Iran about interfering in their internal affairs and announced the development of a common defence system and a joint military command. The relations between Iran and the Gulf countries were also affected by the opposing positions adopted by the parties in respect of the armed conflict in Syria, with Riyadh supporting the rebels and Tehran aligning itself with Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Saudi Arabia	
<b>Intensity:</b>	2
<b>Trend:</b>	↑
<b>Type:</b>	Government, Identity Internationalised internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, social and political opposition, AQAP

**Summary:**

Governed since the 18<sup>th</sup> century by the al-Saud family and established as a state in 1932, Saudi Arabia is characterised by its religious conservatism and wealth, based on its oil reserves, and its regional power. Internally, the Sunni monarchy holds the political power and is in charge of government institutions, leaving little room for dissidence. Political parties are not allowed, freedom of expression is curtailed and many basic rights are restricted. The Shiite minority, concentrated in the eastern part of the country, has denounced its marginalisation and exclusion from the state's structures. The authorities have been accused of implementing repressive measures on the pretext of ensuring security in the country and in the context of anti-terrorism campaigns, the targets of which include militants of al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In the context

66. International Crisis Group, *In Heavy Waters: Iran's Nuclear Program, the Risk of War and Lessons from Turkey*, Middle East and North Africa Report no. 116, February 23, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/116-in-heavy-waters-irans-nuclear-program-the-risk-of-war-and-lessons-from-turkey.aspx>.

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of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, pro-reform and pro-democracy protests met with a repressive response from the government, which claimed that attempts to destabilise Saudi Arabia were being orchestrated from outside the country.

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The internal situation in Saudi Arabia continued to be marked by sporadic protests against the authorities, the repression of demonstrations by the security forces and clashes between demonstrators and the police, along with some incidents linked to the conflict with al-Qaeda. Most of the violent incidents occurred in Qatif and Awamiya, in Eastern Province, where the Shia minority is concentrated (10% of the 28 million inhabitants), which claims to be discriminated against by Riyadh. **The incidents reportedly caused at least 16 fatalities, a high figure when compared to the seven fatalities registered in 2011 when demonstrations were staged in the country at the time of the Arab uprisings.** One of the most noteworthy incidents was the violent arrest in July of the cleric Nimr al-Nimr, who was injured in the operation. His arrest, triggered by his incendiary sermons (in which, according to the government, he incited violence and secession) and by declarations in which he called for celebrations of the death of the crown prince Nayef, led to protests in which two people died. There are no independent reports on the violence. According to figures published by local NGOs, the police had shot 71 people, of whom 14 had died. The government, on the other hand, states that 32 members of the security forces have been injured by gunfire in the last year, two of whom later died from their injuries. Some demonstrators erected barricades, burned tires, launched Molotov cocktails and used firearms. Given the situation, some analysts considered that conflict had escalated (with a greater propensity on the part of the security forces to employ force and an increasing tendency on the part of the opposition to resort to violence) and stated that **the country was experiencing the worst unrest in years, at a particularly difficult time for the country due to its stand-off with Iran.** The tension between the two countries was clear to see in their mutual accusations of breaches of their respective maritime space, in their contrasting positions concerning the Syrian crisis, in Riyadh's claims that Tehran was interfering in its internal affairs, and in Saudi Arabia's attempts to consolidate a regional defence system within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).<sup>67</sup>

In this context, the Saudi authorities accused the demonstrators of being puppets of Tehran of being linked to Hezbollah and of attempting to destabilise the country. The Shia demonstrators denied these links and insisted that they were not seeking the overthrow of

*The repression of popular protests and clashes between demonstrators and police officers caused at least 16 fatalities in Saudi Arabia*

the government but rather an end to the discrimination against their community. Their demands focused on respect for basic rights and on issues such as religious freedom (permits for constructing mosques), greater development for towns in the east of the country (in which the largest number of oil wells are concentrated), greater access to employment and public sector jobs (Shiites do not tend to be appointed as senior government officials) and the release of political prisoners. **International human rights organisations** such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International **reported significant abuse on the part of government forces, including the arbitrary arrest of demonstrators, imprisonment without charge, house arrests, bans on leaving the country, intimidation, ill-treatment and torture.** Local NGOs reported the arrest of 723 demonstrators, of whom more than 100 remained in prison, some of them minors. In respect of the conflict with al-Qaeda, the most serious incidents occurred in the second half of the year, when clashes between Saudi border guards and alleged AQAP members claimed two lives. Days later a Saudi diplomat was shot dead in the Yemeni capital.<sup>68</sup> In August, the Saudi government announced that it had foiled a terrorist plot and had arrested another eight alleged members of AQAP (two Saudis and six Yemenis). In 2012 Saudi Arabia was also singled out as one of the countries responsible for the rise in the application of the death penalty in the Middle East, since 82 people were executed in the country in 2011, against 27 in 2010. It should also be pointed out that demonstrations by women were staged during the year to protest against the discriminatory system and laws, especially in the educational sphere. Some 50 women were injured in protests on 8<sup>th</sup> March.

Yemen (south)	
<b>Intensity:</b>	3
<b>Trend:</b>	=
<b>Type:</b>	Self-government, Resources, Territory Internal
<b>Main parties:</b>	Government, secessionist and pro-autonomy opposition groups of the south (including the Southern Movement/Al-Hiraak al-Janoubi)

**Summary:**

Yemen is the result of a problematic process of unification that in 1990 joined together the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. Since then, the balance of power has tilted northwards and President Ali Abdullah Saleh (leader of the former YAR since 1978 and the unified Yemen from 1990 to 2012) ruled without alternation. The

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67. See the summary on Bahrain in this chapter and on Syria in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

68. See the summary on Yemen (AQAP) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

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fragile political balance established with the creation of the new state led to the outbreak of civil war in 1994, from which the northern forces emerged victorious. The situation remains tense and in recent years demonstrations protesting against discrimination towards the south have intensified, especially concerning control over resources. There have also been clashes with the security forces. The southern protest movement is not structured around a single organisation but rather it is composed of groups with a variety of agendas, whose demands range from greater autonomy to secession, which are exerting pressure to achieve a new north-south relationship within the framework of the transition process that began in Yemen at the end of 2011.

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The tension between Yemen's central government and sectors in the south with aspirations for independence or greater autonomy was evident in several violent incidents in which more than 20 people were killed in 2012 and in a series of disagreements over the transition process that began in the country at the end of 2011. The Southern Movement (al-Hiraak al Janoubi or "Hiraak") expressed reservations about the transition agreement promoted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which resulted in the formation of a government of unity comprising the party of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and the opposition forces in the parliament. Hiraak was especially critical of the approval in January of a decree of immunity for the former ruler and his supporters and called for a boycott of the February elections that finally went ahead and were won by the then vice president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. The Southern Movement called for a day of civil disobedience and the peaceful obstruction of the elections. It also organised demonstrations against the electoral process in which thousands of people participated. As a result of these actions the turnout for the election was much lower in the south of the country. Some violent incidents also took place in which at least 15 people died, including campaigners against the election, soldiers guarding polling booths, in addition to police officers and members of Hiraak who clashed in the province of Hadramawt. In the days leading up to the elections, 30 people were injured in Aden in clashes between those opposed to and those in favour of the electoral process, while a suicide attack on an election office forced the cancellation of all the campaign events in the area. **The demonstrations in the south of the country continued throughout the rest of the year, in parallel to a series**

*Tension between Yemen's central government and sectors in the south with aspirations for independence or greater autonomy was evident in several violent incidents in which more than 20 people were killed*

*Following the analysis of the trend of socio-political crises in 2012 it is possible to identify factors that indicate a risk of escalating violence or of the deterioration of the crisis in a series of cases*

**of security incidents.** Several people were killed or injured in these incidents, which included the violent repression of the protests, clashes between the security forces and armed supporters of the Southern Movement, attempts to free Hiraak prisoners by force and reported assassinations of activists.

Meanwhile, leaders of the Southern Movement insisted that the agreement promoted by the GCC did not offer sufficient guarantees that the demands of the south would be addressed during the transition. These sectors emphasised that the solution to the conflict lay in independence or in the renegotiation of the terms under which unity with the north was defined. As such, in respect of the national dialogue that is supposed to lead to a new constitution in 2013, they were opposed to the establishment of red lines regarding the "unity" of Yemen and attempted to impose conditions, such as including the debate on the southern issue as a priority in the process and subjecting the process to international monitoring. **The attempts to guarantee the participation of the most important groups of the Southern Movement in the platform for national dialogue constituted one of the reasons for the delay in the launch of this initiative, postponed** from mid-2012 to early 2013. At the end of the year, it was reported that various groups in the south had accepted the proposal that delegates from the southern zone should represent 50% of the national dialogue platform, which will be composed of 565 seats.

## 2.4. Alert factors for 2013

Following the analysis of the trend of socio-political crises in 2012 it is possible to identify factors that indicate a risk of escalating violence or of the deterioration of the crisis in a series of cases. These are situations which, irrespective of the intensity of the violence or the level of destabilisation, involve related or structural alert factors that may lead to a deterioration of the situation over the course of 2013. Positive dynamics and elements may simultaneously exist in some of these crises that might contribute to a potential improvement of the situation. As such, the goal is to highlight both the alert factors and the situations of risk on which it is necessary to focus in order to prevent their negative development.

Table 2.2. Alert factors in socio-political crises for 2013

AFRICA	
<b>Great Lakes and Central Africa</b>	
<b>Chad</b>	Despite the improvement of the situation in the east of the country, accusations of electoral fraud, corruption related to the management of oil revenues and the regime's authoritarianism continue to fuel the socio-political crisis in the country and represent a constant source of instability.
<b>DR Congo</b>	The escalation of the war in the east of the country may contribute to increasing political instability and become the focus of national and international attention, thus diluting efforts to resolve the post-election crisis.
<b>DR Congo – Rwanda – Uganda</b>	The involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in the armed conflict affecting the east of DR Congo is a threat to regional stability that can only be neutralised if decisive action is taken by the international community on several fronts (military, political and economic).
<b>Rwanda</b>	The instability in the east of DR Congo and the involvement of Rwanda in the M23 rebellion may become the focus of attention of the international community, taking the spotlight away from the internal repression of the political opposition in Rwanda.
<b>Sudan – South Sudan</b>	The lack of progress in resolving the disputes between the two countries (oil management, border demarcation, Abyei enclave) may take them back to the brink of armed conflict in 2013. The incursions and bombings carried out by the Sudanese army on South Sudanese soil and the military occupation of Abyei since 2011 may lead to a new period of instability.
<b>Uganda</b>	The repression of growing social and political protests may lead to an increase in unrest, trigger more protests and deepen the political crisis affecting the country.
<b>Horn of Africa</b>	
<b>Eritrea</b>	The growing authoritarianism of the Eritrean dictatorship, international sanctions and isolation are pushing Eritrea into a corner, which could trigger an outbreak in violence at any time by the Eritrean insurgency or lead the government to cause a bloodbath in an attempt to regain control of the situation.
<b>Eritrea – Ethiopia</b>	Following years of stalemate in resolving the border dispute, the Ethiopian invasion in March led to a new escalation of the situation that could turn into a fully-fledged armed conflict. This situation has brought about regional initiatives to promote talks that should have the support of the international community if they are to be fair and long-lasting. The current inaction on the part of the United Nations is a risk that highlights the double standards of the West when it comes to dealing with the situation.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	The death of the prime minister, Meles Zenawi, may trigger a power struggle between the various factions of the governing coalition, EPRDF, and at the same time lead to greater repression of the political and social opposition.
<b>Kenya</b>	The country could face a new period of instability in the run-up to the elections in 2013 as a consequence of the mishandling of the transition process after the post-election violence of 2007, growing government pressure on the secessionist movement MRC and intervention of the Kenyan armed forces in Somalia, which has led al-Shabaab and related sectors in Kenya to step up their violent actions, as a punishment for the intervention. The intensification of al-Shabaab's activities has in turn stoked hostility towards the Somali community in Kenya.
<b>Somaliland – Puntland</b>	The creation of Khatumo State represents a new element of tension between Somaliland and Puntland that may generate greater instability between them and complicate the national transition process under way in Somalia.
<b>Maghreb and North Africa</b>	
<b>Algeria</b>	The downward trend in social unrest and security incidents in Algeria could be reversed, considering the frustration of sectors of the population with the political system and its institutions. With the 2014 elections on the horizon, the power struggle within the ruling party over Bouteflika's succession may become more evident in 2013.
<b>Mauritania</b>	Together with the persistence of internal protests against the government, the situation in the country in 2013 could be strongly influenced by the instability in the Sahel, in particular due to the proliferation of Jihadist armed groups and as a consequence of the international military intervention in the north of Mali.
<b>Morocco</b>	Despite the relative reduction in political and social unrest and in the number of security incidents in Morocco, a change in trend could be witnessed in 2013 if the violent repression of demonstrations, restrictions on the exercise of basic rights and the socio-economic problems in the country persist.
<b>Morocco – Western Sahara</b>	As the UN special envoy warned, the maintenance of the status quo and the frustration associated with this conflict may lead to the deterioration of the situation and trigger violence, especially in the highly turbulent context in the Sahel.



<b>Tunisia</b>	In 2013 Tunisia could see a continuation or intensification of the trend of instability that has affected the country since the overthrow of Ben Ali if the violence involving Salafists continues, if the population's frustration over the lack of changes in the country (especially in the economic sphere) grows, and if the divide between secularists and Islamists grows wider, above all in the context of the approval of the new constitution and the elections scheduled for mid-2013.
<b>Southern Africa</b>	
<b>Madagascar</b>	The holding of elections in May 2012 may lead to an increase in the existing instability due to the fragility of the situation. A legitimately and transparently elected government may contribute to laying the foundations for resolving the political crisis in which the country has been mired since 2009.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	The divisions between the ZANU-PF and the MDC slowed down the pending reforms related to the constitutional process, to which the growing activity of youth militias and Mugabe's refusal to designate a successor must be added, which means that the scenario of instability will continue in 2013.
<b>West Africa</b>	
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	Armed actors in Mali might extend their radius of action to the border zone of northern Burkina Faso, with actions such as kidnappings of humanitarian personnel or the recruitment of young people, in a context made more acute by internal popular discontent.
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	There is a risk that militias loyal to the former president, Laurent Gbagbo, will step up their armed attacks, endangering the process of stabilisation and reconciliation in the country, and that regional tension will escalate, given the growing number of reports of cross-border incursions by mercenaries and the start of joint military operations between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.
<b>Guinea</b>	The lack of agreement on the electoral calendar, which has already been delayed, might lead to an increase in tension and instability related to the elections, with a risk of new incidents of police repression and clashes taking place.
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	The transition process following the military coup of April 2012 might stall given the lack of consensus, increasing instability and the risk of violent incidents and human rights violations in 2013.
<b>Mali</b>	The political crisis in Mali could become more acute in 2013 if the various actors continue to disagree over how to deal with the armed conflict in the north of the country, if the armed forces continue to interfere in the transition process following the military coup, if mediation efforts do not bring reconciliation any closer and if internal tensions become more acute in the run-up to the elections.
<b>Nigeria</b>	The sectarian violence of the Islamist group Boko Haram threatens to exacerbate tense inter-community relations in the country, which could lead to greater outbreaks of violence between the Muslim and Christian populations.
<b>Nigeria (Niger Delta)</b>	Groups of former insurgents could be involved in new incidents if their grievances and demands are not satisfied, coupled with the risk of an escalation in the activity of some armed actors in the region, including kidnappings.
<b>Senegal (Casamance)</b>	Despite the expectations raised by the start of negotiations and contacts between the new Senegalese government and different factions of the MFDC, the unfolding of events in 2013 may be affected by various factors, including difficulties in finding a political solution acceptable to all the parties involved and the actions of actors opposed to the peace process, which could lead to frustration and new violent incidents.
<b>AMERICA</b>	
<b>North America, Central America and the Caribbean</b>	
<b>Haiti</b>	In a context of political crisis, economic fragility, humanitarian emergency and strong dependence on the international community, the government may face serious problems in dealing with the shows of strength staged by former soldiers demanding the reinstatement of the armed forces and with the protests by collectives that are disillusioned with the government's action.
<b>South America</b>	
<b>Bolivia</b>	As has occurred in other countries in the region, such as Peru or Ecuador, there could be an increase in the number of conflicts related to the exploitation of natural resources and the activity of mining companies, especially in regions inhabited by the indigenous population.
<b>Peru</b>	The government's significant stepping up of military efforts to defeat Shining Path and the pretensions of the Shining Path faction that operates in the VRAEM region to occupy the power vacuum created in Alto Huallaga following the arrest of Comrade Artemio point towards an increase in hostilities.

## ASIA

### Central Asia

<b>Kazakhstan</b>	President Nazarbayev's regime might step up the persecution of critical sectors, which entails the risk of violent incidents occurring, in a context made more acute by a lack of accountability and the silence of the international community. Meanwhile, there is also a risk of an increase in the insurgent activity of Islamist groups.
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	The undermining of the central government's authority by nationalist opposition members and alternative power options based in the south may trigger sporadic violent incidents and deepen the country's institutional and political fragility.
<b>Tajikistan</b>	Struggles over the control of the territory between the government and alternative power options, including former opposition commanders from the civil war, may lead to new violent clashes in peripheral areas of the country.
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	The regime could intensify its policy of systematic repression and human rights violations, justified in institutional rhetoric concerning the possibility of an increase in local and regional insurgent activity, linked in part to the future withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan.

### Eastern Asia

<b>China (East Turkestan)</b>	The growing military pressure exerted on Uyghur secessionist armed groups by China and neighbouring countries, along with the alleged use by Beijing of practices such as enforced disappearances or extrajudicial executions, may trigger an escalation in the number of attacks carried out by these armed groups.
<b>China (Tibet)</b>	The media coverage and international pressure generated by the wave of self-immolations may trigger an increase in the repression and militarisation of the regions inhabited by the Buddhist community. The situation may also be exacerbated by Beijing's refusal to resume talks with the Tibetan authorities and to resolve the conflict in Tibet through political means.
<b>Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea</b>	New political and military clashes may occur due to the constant joint military exercises carried out by South Korea and the US in border regions, the priority given by Kim Jong-un to North Korea's armed forces and military capability, and the difficulties that the new South Korean president may encounter in implementing her programme of rapprochement with the North Korean government if the latter continues with its arms programme.
<b>Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea, USA and other countries</b>	The international condemnation and even greater isolation that could be triggered if North Korea carries out a new nuclear test, along with the growing perception on the part of the US that North Korea poses a serious threat if it continues to develop its long-range missiles, may prevent the resumption of multilateral talks and provoke a defensive and bellicose response on the part of Pyongyang.

### South Asia

<b>India (Nagaland)</b>	The exclusion of several insurgent groups from the peace negotiations in Nagaland may lead to the signing of a fragile and unstable agreement that does not represent a peaceful and sustainable solution to the conflict with India.
<b>India – Pakistan</b>	The negotiation process could stall and relations between the two countries could deteriorate if the key issues are not addressed and the governments do not abandon their inflexible stance and show a genuine willingness to move towards a rapprochement.
<b>Nepal</b>	The socio-political crisis concerning the drafting of the constitution may become more acute if the political parties do not search for a way forward through dialogue and do not look beyond their own interests and ambitions to remain in power. It is necessary for the main focus of the political debate to return to the key issues on the peace process agenda.
<b>Pakistan</b>	The growing sectarian violence in areas of the country such as the province of Balochistan and the city of Karachi may escalate due to the government's passivity, leading to a deterioration of the living conditions of the country's various minorities.
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	The government's lack of willingness to search for solutions to the structural causes of the conflict and the stalemate in negotiations with the Tamil political opposition may lead to growing discontent in Tamil civil society, to growing social tension and to a possible resurgence of violence, even if on a small scale.

### Southeast Asia

<b>Thailand – Cambodia</b>	The Thai government's obstruction of the deployment of international observers in the region under dispute, along with the internal pressure exerted on Bangkok not to back down in the resolution of the conflict, may lead to a new escalation of diplomatic and military tension between the two countries.
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<b>Thailand</b>	The perception among a large percentage of the population that the former president, Thaksin Shinawatra, wishes to return to the political fray in Thailand and that the current government is not going to stand in his way continues to generate huge socio-political polarisation, which could grow significantly and lead to riots and violence if the leaders of the organisations who have staged protests in recent years are found guilty in the trials that are being held in the country.
<b>Indonesia (Aceh)</b>	Human rights groups have warned about a possible increase in the number of incidents related to the strict observance of Sharia law and about the growing use of violence by the authorities to ensure compliance with the law.
<b>Indonesia (West Papua)</b>	The growing international political and diplomatic activity carried out by nationalist groups pushing for the repetition of the referendum on self-determination or to protest about the human rights situation in Papua may lead to a clampdown on them by the Indonesian authorities, for which memories are still fresh of the effects of the internationalisation of the conflict in Timor-Leste.
<b>The Philippines (MNLF)</b>	The strong opposition of certain factions of the MNLF to the peace agreement signed by the government and the MILF, along with the possible holding of elections in the ARMM and the existence of strong rivalries within the MNLF point towards an increase in protests by the sectors closest to the group's founder, Nur Misuari.
<b>Myanmar</b>	The inter-community violence in the state of Rakhine may spread to other parts of the country where local tensions exist and harm progress in the process of democratic reforms under way in Myanmar.
<b>EUROPE AND THE CAUCASUS</b>	

#### Caucasus and Russia

<b>Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)</b>	The escalation of bellicose rhetoric seen in recent years continued in 2012 and, coupled with frequent breaches of the ceasefire, may give way to more serious incidents in 2013 and beyond if the sides do not moderate their positions and stop provoking each other.
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	The country could face escalating instability due to the growing number of sources of tension, including protests by the opposition and the alleged threat of Islamist armed actors, and the largely violent response of the authorities in dealing with them.
<b>Georgia (Abkhazia)</b>	Excessive optimism and expectations on the part of the new Georgian government with respect to a rapprochement with the independence-seeking regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia may clash in 2013 with the position and reality of Abkhazia, which has remained outside Tbilisi's grasp for two decades. Meanwhile, a decision by Abkhazia to leave the Prevention and Response Mechanism will make the security situation even more precarious.
<b>Georgia (South Ossetia)</b>	The steps taken in recent years by South Ossetia to eliminate the presence and all traces of Georgian reality in the independence-seeking region threaten to slam shut all the doors on the possibility of the return of displaced Georgians and of inter-community coexistence, even if the diplomatic tension between Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia eases in 2013.
<b>Russia (Karachay-Cherkessia)</b>	The impunity and inaction of the local regime in respect of the abuses and crimes committed in the republic may lead to an increase in social unrest and protests, including those by Circassian nationalist sectors.
<b>Russia (North Ossetia)</b>	Despite the general calm in the republic, the gradual spread of violence in recent years throughout the North Caucasus means that prudence is required in terms of future developments in North Ossetia, where it is necessary to strengthen the mechanisms against corruption and impunity.

#### Southeast Europe

<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	The institutional crises on a state and sub-state level threaten to deepen the political stalemate in 2013 and widen the gap between the elites and the general population, increasing the population's disaffection, largely contained until now. Meanwhile, there is an added risk of continued inaction over current issues partly related to the war of the 1990s, such as the widespread violence against women.
<b>Serbia – Kosovo</b>	There is a risk that the status quo in the north of Kosovo (with a Serb majority and outside Pristina's control) may be maintained if Kosovo remains inflexible in its opposition to granting greater autonomy to the region, despite the progress made in relations between Kosovo and Serbia and Kosovo's many international alliances.

#### Western, Central and Eastern Europe

<b>Belarus</b>	The persecution of the political and social opposition could escalate even further given the systematic repression of any voicing of discontent and dissent, and due to the stand-off between the regime and international political actors, such as the EU.
<b>Spain (Basque Country)</b>	There is a risk of the process towards definitive peace slowing down if no steps are taken in 2013 in respect of ETA prisoners, including an end to dispersion and, in turn, their transfer to prisons in the Basque country. More progress also needs to be made in terms of historical memory and the issue of victims.

<b>United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)</b>	The dissident republican groups seem prepared to step up their armed activity and their struggle with the authorities, which could involve an increase in the number of attacks on the police, in a context in which the unification of the groups under a single structure may represent a significant increase in their capacity to organise attacks.
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### MIDDLE EAST

#### Mashreq

<b>Egypt</b>	Egypt faces a volatile situation, in a politically polarised context with the potential to deteriorate into violence in 2013. The commemoration of the second anniversary of Mubarak's overthrow and the holding of elections for the popular assembly constitute the first challenges of the year, in a scenario also marked by frustration concerning the economic problems affecting the country and the lack of reforms on key issues such as security or corruption. Mursi's presidency will continue to be criticised by the opposition, which has voiced concern about the persecution of dissidents. The role played the military in this period will continue to be essential in terms of how the situation develops in the country.
<b>Egypt – Israel</b>	Relations between Egypt and Israel will continue to be determined by the political developments in each country, with the Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt subjected to pressure from several fronts and an Israeli government that must address growing regional isolation following the distancing of other regional powers, such as Turkey. The bilateral tension could increase as a consequence of the regional instability caused by the crisis in Syria and negative developments in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
<b>Iraq (Kurdistan)</b>	The growing tension between Baghdad and Erbil could intensify over the course of 2013, taking into account the security incidents and militarisation of the conflict seen towards the end of 2012 and the inability shown by both sides over many years to reach agreements on the key issues that must still be defined. A greater commitment to unilateral measures on the part of the KRG, the possible interest of al-Maliki's government in exploiting the Kurdish issue with the goal of garnering support among the Arab population in the north of the country, and the possible reduction in the capacity to influence of those mediating in the conflict are factors that may lead to an escalation.
<b>Israel – Syria – Lebanon</b>	The regional polarisation caused by the Syrian crisis and the explosive atmosphere surrounding relations between Israel, Syria, Iran and the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah may lead to an escalation of violence in 2013. The greater willingness of the various actors involved in the dispute to stage shows of strength threatens to intensify the climate of hostility and encourage incidents that could spark a larger-scale regional crisis, with serious repercussions for the populations in the area.
<b>Lebanon</b>	The repercussions of the crisis in Syria and the persistence of internal tensions may lead to greater instability in Lebanon in 2013. Several factors exist that may contribute to an escalation in tension in 2013: the adoption of increasingly radical positions by the main Lebanese political actors in favour of one side or the other in the Syrian conflict; the possibility of violence growing due to the porous Syrian-Lebanese border; the empathy between several communities in the two countries; difficulties in handling the internal political crisis through dialogue; the proximity of the legislative elections; and new developments in the first half of the year concerning the trial over Hariri's death.
<b>Palestine</b>	The situation in the Palestinian territories may be affected by several factors in 2013: growing frustration among the population over the lack of progress made in appealing to Israel (despite the UN's recognition of Palestine); growing popular discontent in Gaza and the West Bank due to economic difficulties; the stalemate in the process of forming the government of national unity and complying with the timeline for reconciliation; and US pressure and Israeli reprisals in the event of Hamas and Fatah reaching an agreement over the joint administration of the Palestinian territories.
<b>Syria – Turkey</b>	In the context of the increasing militarisation of the border dispute in 2012, the tension between Turkey and Syria in 2013 could become more acute due to deliberate action taken by either of the two countries or due to a miscalculation or violent incident that might trigger an escalation. NATO's backing of Turkey and the support of Syrian interests by countries such as Iran and Russia make for a potentially explosive situation, but at the same time may oblige the sides to adopt a policy of containment, conscious of the impact of an open conflict.


#### The Gulf

<b>Bahrain</b>	The persistent instability in Bahrain in 2012 could intensify in 2013 if clashes continue to occur between the opposition and the security forces and if there is a swell in the number of dissident sectors willing to resort to violence in their protests against the regime. The almost complete failure to implement reforms, despite being called upon to do so on several occasions by international bodies, and the constant human rights abuses may also trigger an escalation in tension, especially if the necessary conditions are not created in order for the political forces to commit to dialogue.
<b>Iran</b>	The political situation in Iran will be determined by the presidential elections in 2013, in which Ahmadinejad's successor will be chosen. As on previous occasions, the period leading up to the elections could see an increase in the repression of dissidents, controversies regarding the registration of candidates and a growing polarisation between sectors close to the president, which will support a candidate committed to the continuation of Ahmadinejad's policies, and conservative groups, which would prefer to see somebody who is more cooperative with the supreme leader.

<b>Iran (Sistan Balochistan)</b>	There was a reduction in violence associated with clashes between Baloch insurgent groups and the Iranian forces and this trend may continue in 2013. However, there is a risk of the dispute being reactivated, taking into account that the political, economic and social grievances in the region, which in the past led to the emergence of armed groups such as Jundollah, have still not been addressed.
<b>Iran – USA, Israel</b>	The international tension surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme may be affected in 2013 by several factors, including the possibility of a more aggressive stance being adopted by the Israeli government that emerges from January's elections, a new stalemate in negotiations with the G5+1 and a more defiant stance on the part of the Iranian authorities in the context of the presidential campaign. The impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy, which was already seen in 2012, the election of Ahmadinejad's successor in the June elections, and the possible change of regime in Syria, a key ally, are factors that will affect the definition of Iran's foreign policy in 2013.
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	The tension in Saudi Arabia, already high, could escalate further in 2013 if the dynamics seen in 2012 continue, that is, a growing willingness on the part of both the security forces and demonstrators to resort to violence, as well as the general climate of human rights restrictions and abuses in the country.
<b>Yemen (south)</b>	The tension between the north and south of Yemen will be directly affected in 2013 by the progress of national dialogue. If the participation in talks of representatives of the south is confirmed, an intense debate could take place on how to resolve the autonomy and/or secession aspirations of the south, as well as on the definition of the new state's structure when it comes to drawing up the new constitution. This debate could trigger an increase in tension.



Map 3.1. Peace processes



Countries with formal or exploratory negotiations

### 3. Peace Processes

- 13 armed groups laid down their weapons over the course of the year. 10 of them are based in India.
- Exploratory talks began in Senegal (Casamance) between the government and the MFDC, with the mediation of the Community of Sant’Egidio.
- The Philippine government and the MILF reached an agreement in principle to create the Bangsamoro entity on the island of Mindanao. The final peace agreement will be signed in early 2013.
- The Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla organisation began talks in Cuba, with a pre-agreed and limited agenda. The talks are mediated by Norway and Cuba.
- The Kurdish guerrilla organisation PKK began talks with the Turkish government.

This chapter provides an analysis of 54 contexts of negotiation. Over the course of the year, 13 groups in four countries laid down their weapons on reaching peace agreements with their respective governments.

Table 3.1. Status of the negotiations at the end of 2012

Good (12)	In difficulties (15)	Bad (7)	At an exploratory stage (7)	Resolved (13)
India (NDFB(P) India (NCSN-IM) Myanmar (KNU,ABSDF, NMSP, ALP, CNF, RCSS- SSA,KNPP) Philippines (MILF) Senegal (MFDC) Sudan (JEM)	Colombia (FARC) Cyprus DR Congo (M23) Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) India (ULFA) India (NSCN-K) India-Pakistan Moldavia (Transnistria) Philippines (MNLF) Philippines (NPA) Serbia-Kosovo Somalia Sudan (JEM-MC) Sudan-South Sudan	Afghanistan Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh) Ethiopia (ONLF) Israel-Palestine Mali Morocco-Western Sahara Syria	CAR (CPJP faction) Colombia (ELN) India (NDFB) India (NDFB(R) faction) Myanmar (ABSDF) Sudan (SPLM-N) Turkey (PKK)	CAR (CPJP) India (APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO,HPC, UKDA, KRA,DHD) Myanmar (SSAS) Nepal (SKTMMM)

In general terms, in 2012 **46.3% of the analysed negotiations went well or concluded satisfactorily**. 27.8% of the negotiations had to overcome serious difficulties, while 13% went very badly.

#### 3.1. Peace processes: definitions and types

**Negotiation** is understood as the process through which two or more parties involved in a dispute (whether countries or internal actors within a country) are willing to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to seek a satisfactory solution to their demands. This negotiation may be direct or with the mediation of third parties. Formal negotiations tend to have a prior or exploratory phase that enables the framework of the future negotiations to be defined (format, place, conditions, guarantees, etc.). **Peace process** is understood as the consolidation of a negotiation process, once the agenda points, procedures to be followed, timeline and

facilitators have been defined. As such, negotiation constitutes one of the stages of a peace process.

**Ceasefire** is understood as the military decision to cease all combat or use of arms for a specified period, while **cessation of hostilities** encompasses not only a ceasefire but also a commitment not to carry out kidnappings, harass civilians or make threats, etc.

Depending on the final goals that are sought or the dynamics pursued during the various negotiation stages, most peace processes can be placed in one of the five **categories or models** listed below, although there may occasionally be processes that combine two categories:

- a) Demobilisation and reinsertion
- b) Political, military or economic power-sharing
- c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for withdrawal, peace for recognition of rights, etc.)
- d) Trust-building measures
- e) Self-government formulas or “intermediate political structures”

The process model is usually linked to the type of demands put forward and to the actors' ability to exert pressure or make demands (level of military, political and social symmetry), although other influential factors include mentoring and facilitation, the level of exhaustion of those involved, the support that they receive and other less rational factors more closely related to leaders' pathologies, world views or historical momentum. On a handful of occasions, especially in drawn-out processes, the initial classification (a, for example) may become inappropriate if demands are later increased. In such cases the process must then be placed in a more complex category. It is also important to recall that not all the processes or their prior phases of exploration, talks and negotiation are carried out with sincerity, since they frequently form part of the war strategy itself, whether to gain time, internationalise the dispute and raise its profile, or rearm, among other motives.

Last of all, it should be pointed out that what is commonly referred to as a "peace process" is in fact a "process to put an end to violence and the armed struggle". The signing of a cessation of hostilities and the subsequent signing of a peace agreement is no more than the start of the real "peace process", linked to a stage called "post-war rehabilitation", which is always difficult but during which decisions will really be taken and policies will be implemented that, if successful, will enable other forms of violence (structural and cultural) to be overcome. This is when it becomes appropriate to refer to the "achievement of peace". However, this yearbook provides an analysis of the efforts made in the initial stages of this long process, without which it would not be possible to achieve the final goal.

## 3.2. Evolution of the negotiations

### Africa

#### a) Great Lakes and Central Africa

One of the year's most important developments was the signing of the **peace agreement between the armed group Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP) and the government of the Central African Republic** on 25<sup>th</sup> August. The CPJP was the last remaining active Central African armed group in the country, since the other four main armed groups signed a series of peace agreements in 2008. Nevertheless, in some cases the armed groups have maintained a strong presence in the area and have guaranteed security in places where the presence of the Central African armed forces is practically non-existent. The CPJP agreed a temporary cessation of hostilities halfway through the year but violent incidents continued to take place sporadically. One faction of the group did not recognise the agreement reached on 25<sup>th</sup> August by its leader and claimed responsibility for several armed actions carried out in mid-September. On 10<sup>th</sup> December, an alliance of several armed groups

known as Seléka embarked on a rebellion. Seléka included factions of the various armed groups that had not been demobilised. However, peace talks were scheduled for January 2013 in Libreville (Gabon).

In December, **peace talks began between the government of the DR Congo and the armed group the M23** in Kampala (Uganda), with the mediation of the Ugandan government. The sides were unable to agree on the ceasefire proposal made by the M23 group. It was agreed that the city of Goma and the surrounding area would be demilitarised. The scheduled talks will include the assessment of the agreements of 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2009, the breach of which was the argument used by the M23 for initiating the rebellion. The discussions will also centre on a raft of issues concerning security, political, economic and social problems, and the mechanism for implementing the various agreements and resolutions that are reached and passed. However, there continued to be significant disagreement over the draft agenda for talks on security issues. The peace talks were held under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

#### b) Horn of Africa

During the third quarter, **talks were held between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF**. It should be pointed out that a small faction of the group reached an agreement with the government in October 2010. According to several analysts, the death of the prime minister, Meles Zenawi, on 20<sup>th</sup> August may have constituted a boost and opportunity for progress in the process. These negotiations were made public in early September, although the ONLF pointed out that talks between the two sides had been going on for months. They both met in Nairobi, Kenya, in early September to hold preliminary talks, in which they agreed a framework for negotiations aimed at bringing 28 years of insurgency to an end. The ONLF declared in a statement that a date had been set for the next meeting and that both sides had agreed to implement specific trust-building measures with a view to formal negotiations. The Ethiopian communication minister, Bereket Simon, called the talks a "very positive step" and stated that the government had the will to see the talks through to a positive conclusion. In October, the peace talks stalled. According to the foreign secretary of the ONLF, Abdirahman Mahdi, **the talks stalled when the government demanded that the ONLF recognise the Ethiopian constitution**. The delegation headed by the Ethiopian defence minister, Siraj Fergessa, stated that the ONLF refused to recognise the Ethiopian constitution. Mahdi claimed that during the initial round of talks, in order to create a favourable environment for dialogue, both sides had agreed not to impose pre-conditions, which meant that once the government made the recognition of the constitution a prerequisite for continuing talks, the dialogue came to a halt. Mahdi pointed out that the struggle against Ethiopia had been

going on since 1984 and that the current constitution dates to 1994, which meant that the group could not be forced to recognise the Ethiopian constitution. In December, Abdullah Farah, the alleged leader of one faction of the ONLF, arrived in Addis Abeba with the goal of resuming peace talks with the government. This faction of the ONLF announced that it was prepared to negotiate within the framework of the constitution.

In October, **the government of South Sudan announced its willingness to mediate between Eritrea and Ethiopia** with the goal of resolving the border dispute between the two countries. The South Sudanese minister for cabinet affairs, Deng Alor, declared that Addis Abeba and Asmara had given the green light for the start of talks with the goal of resolving the dispute. Alor stated that President Salva Kiir and other Sudanese senior officials were discussing the composition of the mediation team that will soon travel to both capitals. South Sudan is on good terms with both countries. In January 2013, Egypt offered to mediate in the dispute between the two countries.

In **Somalia**, the leaders who met in Puntland reached an **agreement in January on the road map for the peace process in the country**. The representatives of the Federal Transitional Government (FTG), of the region of Puntland, the region of Galmudug and of the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa group signed the Garowe Principles in the Constitutional Conference held in Garowe. According to the new agreement, Somalia will have a two-chamber parliament, of which the upper chamber will be for representatives of the federal states. This two-chamber federal parliament will come into force in 2016. Between June 2012 and June 2016, the federal parliament will have a chamber of representatives composed of 225 members of parliament selected through the clan-based 4.5 formula. 20% of the seats in the new parliament will be allocated to women, according to the Garowe Principles. In parallel, the decision was made to set up a national constituent assembly, with a 30% allocation for women delegates, which in May 2012 was to convene in order to ratify the new federal constitution. However, this date was not respected. The signatories of the road map (president of the Federal Transitional Government, prime minister, president of the parliament, the presidents of the regions of Puntland and Galmudug, and representatives of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a) agreed on a constitution project and made it public in order to be approved. In accordance with the provisions of the road map, on 1<sup>st</sup> August **the provisional constitution was approved by the national constituent assembly (NCA)**, composed of 825 members elected by a group of 135 Somalian elders (the traditional authority in the country). This draft federal constitution must be approved through a national referendum that will be held when the security situation has improved. The group of elders also discussed the election of members for the new federal parliament. The elders chose these members in August and later on in the same month (28<sup>th</sup> August) appointed Mohammed Osman Jawari as new president of the parliament. On 10<sup>th</sup> September,

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was appointed as the country's new president, which marked the end of the transition process, and Abdi Farah Shirdon (known as Saaid) was later appointed as prime minister. In December, a delegation from the federal government met with the representatives of the Jubaland authorities in Kismayo to discuss the process of creating a new state in Jubaland and its integration in the Somalian structure.

In the third quarter, in the region of **Darfur (Sudan)**, a split took place within the JEM. This faction, led by the commander Bakheit Abdallah Abdel-Karim (known as Dabajo), stated its willingness to negotiate with the Sudanese government, and appointed Mohamed Bashr as the new leader of the armed group. Dabajo had been relieved of his post on 9<sup>th</sup> August by the leader of the JEM group, Gibril Ibrahim, due to rumours that Dabajo was planned to wrest the leadership of the armed group from him. Mohammed Bashr stated that he wished for a solid international commitment to the peace process. He also announced that he had received a letter from the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, informing him that the Sudanese government was prepared to work towards a negotiated outcome to the Darfur conflict. The leader of the JEM, Gibril Ibrahim, reacted to these developments by accusing the Chadian government of supporting the dissident faction of the JEM and of collaborating with Sudan in its goal of dismantling the main armed group, the JEM, which refused to sign up to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), despite having participated in the Doha peace process. In October, **representatives of the government and of the dissident faction of the JEM signed a cessation of hostilities and announced that they would enter peace talks**. The two sides held secret talks in Doha, after which they agreed to negotiate within the framework of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). The talks will be held in January 2013. However the dissident faction of the JEM stated that it needed to hold a general conference in November prior to the scheduled talks, since in a meeting held in early September it was agreed that the leadership of the group would be chosen before the peace talks took place. The vice commander of the dissident group, Arko Dahiah, pointed out that they had expelled the leader of the JEM, Gibril Ibrahim, for dictatorial practices and for forging links with the Sudanese Islamist opposition leader Hassan al-Turabi, which is why the faction supposedly expelled from the JEM was also known as the al-Turabi group. Meanwhile, the government representative, Amin Hassan Omer, former head of the government negotiation team and current head of the DDPD follow-up office, stated that the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement and a framework agreement with the group would improve the security situation in the state of North Darfur, where the group is based.

In the Sudanese regions of Kordofan and Blue Nile, controlled by the rebel group SPLM-N, the Sudanese presidential adviser, Nafie Ali Nafie, declared that peace with this group could only be achieved if it abandoned its regime change goal as a precondition for

negotiations. On the other hand, the SPLM-N demands that Khartoum allow humanitarian access to the areas that it controls in both states before peace talks begin, and even proposed a cessation of hostilities if access was given to humanitarian aid.

In February, **Sudan and South Sudan** signed a **non-aggression pact** in Addis Abeba with the mediation of the High-Level Implementation Panel of the African Union (AU). The agreement included the creation of an observation mechanism that would investigate breaches of the said agreement. However, just a few weeks after the agreement was signed the first clashes took place between the armies of the two countries in Jau, a disputed border town, due to the failure to implement the final demarcation of the border. **During the third quarter, several meetings and rounds of negotiations took place between the two countries, but it was not until 27<sup>th</sup> September that they reached a partial agreement on security and economic relations** with the mediation of the High-Level Implementation Panel of the AU. The agreement enabled the resumption of oil exports and the establishment of a plan for the demilitarisation of the common border, thus preventing a military escalation with greater consequences. Nevertheless, several key points remain unresolved, including the status of the disputed region of Abyei and several border zones disputed by the two countries. In this respect, according to several analysts, the agreement in principle was aimed at laying the foundations in order for the pending issues to be addressed in the near future. In October, the Peace and Security Council of the AU unanimously agreed the preparation of mediation efforts with the goal of addressing the status of Abyei, disputed by Sudan and South Sudan. The AU proposal called for the holding of a referendum in October 2013 in the disputed region in which only members of the Messiria community who reside in Abyei may take part. This proposal was made one day after the African mediators proposed prolonging the negotiations another six months with the goal of enabling the two sides to reach an agreement over the disputed issues, including the final status of Abyei. The AU text regarding the referendum was in line with South Sudan's proposal but not with that of Sudan, since Khartoum proposed dividing the disputed area. The USA, the UK and the EU declared their support for the referendum proposal, while Russia stated that it was in favour of splitting Abyei, in line with Khartoum's stance. On 5<sup>th</sup> January 2013, the presidents of the two countries held a meeting in an effort to overcome their mutual hostility and implement the agreements that had been reached. Egypt offered to mediate in the dispute between the two countries.

### c) Maghreb

As regards the **Western Sahara** conflict, during the first quarter a new round of negotiations took place in which delegates of Morocco, the POLISARIO Front, Algeria and Mauritania participated. The meeting was held

between 11<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> March in the outskirts of New York but no significant progress was made. In April, **the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, made veiled accusations against Morocco of spying on the UN mission in the Western Sahara (MINURSO)**. In a report sent to the Security Council, Ban warned that indications existed of confidential communication between the mission in El Aaiún and the UN headquarters in New York having been compromised. Although he did not explicitly refer to Morocco, diplomatic sources stated that he was referring to Rabat. Ban Ki-moon also complained in the report that the MINURSO's access to the population was controlled by Morocco and that the presence of Moroccan security forces at the entrance to the mission's headquarters discouraged people from entering. In May, Morocco announced that it had lost confidence in the UN Special Envoy for the Western Sahara, the American diplomat Christopher Ross. However, in a telephone conversation with King Mohammed VI at the end of August, Ban Ki-moon reiterated that the United Nations had no intention of changing the terms of its mediation in the Western Sahara, focused on achieving a solution acceptable to both sides. The UN Secretary-General stressed the wish to reach an understanding with Morocco in order to address this problem and make progress in re-establishing diplomatic relations with Algeria. In mid-September, representatives of the MINURSO, the POLISARIO Front and Morocco met in Geneva (Switzerland) to assess together the implementation of a series of trust-building measures. At the end of September, in his report to the UN General Assembly on the situation in the Western Sahara, Ban pointed out that no progress had been made on key issues during the talks between the sides and highlighted the importance of ensuring that international actors (including the MINURSO, diplomats and journalists) had free access to the Western Sahara and to Sahrawi refugee camps. In December, the UN Special Envoy for the Western Sahara preferred not to schedule fresh rounds of informal talks with the POLISARIO Front and Morocco, having concluded that the new talks held since August 2009 had not borne fruit.

### d) West Africa

In **Mali**, the north of the country saw the start of an armed conflict in 2012 involving the Tuareg armed group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The radical Islamist armed group Ansar Dine later joined the insurgent rebellion, which began in January. Discontent with the government's handling of the crisis led to a military coup that ousted the president, Amadou Toumani Touré. The regional organisation ECOWAS then intervened to facilitate the resolution of the crisis. The mediation, led by Burkina Faso, made it possible to negotiate Touré's departure from the country and a transfer of power from the military junta to civilian hands. Over the following months the transition process encountered a series of difficulties: the formation of a second interim government (after the first government



was called into question), an attempted counter-coup by sectors loyal to Touré and new pressure from military sectors, which in December forced the prime minister to stand down. Making the most of the destabilisation in the capital, rebel groups advanced their positions in the north and declared the independence of Azawad in early April. The situation in the area, where radical Islamist groups displaced Tuareg groups, led the government to request military intervention from ECOWAS. After requesting a detailed plan on the characteristics of the military deployment, at the end of December the UN passed resolution 2085, which gave the green light to a military mission led by African countries. However, the UN raised the need to address beforehand the reconstruction of the armed forces and the consolidation of the political transition, with the possible holding of elections in April 2013. One of the goals was to offer the possibility of negotiations with the armed groups that had captured the north of Mali.

During the year, **ECOWAS had attempted to establish contacts with the insurgent organisations** on the condition that they renounced terrorism and respected the territorial integrity of Mali. After being displaced from several key cities in the north, the MNLA had given up its independence plans for Azawad and focused its demands on achieving an autonomy status similar to that of Quebec in Canada. Towards the end of 2012, both the MNLA and Ansar Dine held their first meeting with representatives of the Malian government in Burkina Faso and agreed to a truce. However, over the first few days of 2013, Ansar Dine decided to advance its positions towards the south of the country, which triggered an armed intervention by France (Operation Serval).

In the first quarter of the year, in **Nigeria**, the first **attempt by the government to establish dialogue with the Islamist group Boko Haram** concluded with the departure of the main mediator. Datti Ahmed, president of the Supreme Council for Sharia, close to the founder of the sect, Mohammed Yusuf, expressed his discontent about the leaking of information to the press about the initial contacts with Boko Haram, raising doubts about his neutrality and the necessary implementation of trust-building measures. The Boko Haram spokesman, who went under the pseudonym of Abu Qaqa, announced to the media that **the channels of negotiation with the government were closed** and that the Islamist group had serious doubts about the government's will to fulfil its promises. According to press reports, Boko Haram had shown its willingness to initiate a process of reconciliation with the government and demanded the release of its imprisoned members in exchange for declaring a ceasefire.

In **Senegal**, the positive signs regarding the possible establishment of **dialogue between the government and the armed group the MFDC of Casamance** were confirmed by the official announcement of the establishment of negotiations between the two sides over the course of the third quarter. Following the victory of the coalition

headed by the president, Macky Sall, in the legislative elections of 1<sup>st</sup> July, the first steps towards dialogue were taken. The leaders of the MFDC, Salif Sadio and César Badiate Atoute, declared their willingness to negotiate with the government, with the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio. As such, meetings were held between the two sides in Guinea Bissau in July. One and a half months later, the Senegalese prime minister, Abdoul Mbaye, confirmed the establishment of "discreet negotiations" with the MFDC, which in the future would be opened up to other actors involved in the crisis. Mbaye insisted that the dialogue is aimed at bringing peace back to Casamance, that the region is a priority for Sall's government and that the focus will be on a process of decentralisation that guarantees the transfer of competences and an improvement in the living conditions of the area's population. In mid-October, a government delegation met in Rome with an MFDC delegation to discuss a peace agreement. The meeting was held at the facilities of the Community of Sant'Egidio. A second meeting was held in January 2013. The archbishop of Dakar, on the instructions of the president, Macky Sall, attempted to establish contacts with César Atoute Badiate, military chief of the another faction of the MFDC.

## America

At the end of August, the president of **Colombia**, Juan Manuel Santos, officially announced the existence of exploratory talks with FARC delegates and declared that formal negotiations would begin in the first half of October in Oslo, in Norway, which had been an official observer at the exploratory talks, which would later continue in Havana. In early September, in an official ceremony, **President Santos (in Bogota) and the FARC (in Cuba) announced the start of a serious, dignified, realistic and efficient peace process**, presenting a five-point road map: 1) comprehensive agricultural development policy, 2) political participation, 3) end of the conflict, 4) solution to the problem of illegal drugs, and 5) victims. The FARC proposed dealing with the ceasefire issue at the start of the talks, but President Santos ruled out this possibility, stating that it would only be discussed at the end of the process. Citizen participation is channelled through the Regional Working Tables, which aim to ensure that the various social actors that participate in them present their proposals concerning the key issues of the *General Agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable, lasting peace*. A website was also created to receive citizens' proposals, which will be categorised and delivered to the talks table of the government and the FARC-EP in documents that will list the proposals of several tables, along with one final consolidated document. On 19<sup>th</sup> November, talks began in Havana, addressing the points on the agreed agenda. The FARC made the surprise announcement of a unilateral two-month ceasefire, in order to facilitate the talks. The government and FARC delegations also agreed to set up

the first citizen participation forum of the talks table, namely the “Comprehensive Agricultural Development Policy (Territorial Approach)” Forum, held in Bogota over three days in December. In early December, the president set November 2013 as the deadline for the successful completion of peace negotiations with the FARC. Meanwhile, **both the government and the ELN guerrilla group expressed their willingness to enter peace talks.** In early November, the ELN proposed a bilateral ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities. A few days later, in its magazine, it announced that the ELN delegation for exploratory talks with the government had been chosen and was ready to do its duty for Colombia. A few days, in an editorial of its magazine, it stated that talks with the insurgency was only the first step and insisted that peace could only be achieved by tackling the underlying causes of the conflict and with the participation of society as a whole. At the end of November there was speculation that the ELN and the government might begin exploratory peace talks in Cuba but in January 2013, President Santos ruled out pursuing the possibility.

## Asia

### a) South Asia

In January, **the Taliban insurgency announced the opening of a political office in Qatar**, a measure that was finally accepted by the government of **Afghanistan**, which had been extremely reluctant to continue with the process. However, the Taliban still preferred to negotiate directly with the USA rather than with the Afghan government. The Taliban ruled out recognising the Afghan constitution and accused Karzai of heading a puppet government, stating that they wished to negotiate the release of prisoners from Guantánamo, and that they remained steadfast in their intention to establish an Islamic state in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, **in March, the Taliban announced that they were temporarily suspending negotiations with the US government.** They blamed the erratic attitude of the USA and repeated that they considered any negotiations with the Afghan government irrelevant. Military sources pointed out that it would be difficult to make progress in negotiations with the Taliban before the withdrawal of NATO troops from the country, scheduled for 2014. As regards developments concerning the Afghan government, in August, official representatives met with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, former second-in-command of the Quetta Shura and somebody who is very close to Mullah Omar. Baradar is currently imprisoned in Pakistan. According to Pangin Spanta (national security adviser to Hamid Karzai and one of the architects of the peace negotiations), the aim of the meeting was to ask for Baradar’s opinion of the negotiations. The meeting was arranged with the authorisation and collaboration of Pakistan. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan with respect to the peace negotiations in Afghanistan improved notably in July when they agreed to resume the work of the joint

peace commission, suspended after the assassination of the Afghan peace envoy, Burhanuddin Rabbani. In November, Pakistan released a group of Afghan Taliban prisoners, a gesture interpreted by Afghanistan as a sign of Pakistan’s willingness to facilitate the Afghan government’s negotiations with the Taliban insurgency and the efforts carried out by the Afghan High Council for Peace. December saw the first meeting between leaders of the Taliban insurgency and representatives of the Afghan government in France, organised by the Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique. Meanwhile, contacts between the USA and the Taliban remained suspended and there was speculation that Pakistan might take over the leadership of the negotiations from the USA.

In the state of **Assam (India)**, almost **700 insurgents from nine armed opposition groups handed in their weapons** to the Indian interior minister, P. Chidambaram, in January. The insurgents belonged to the armed groups the APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, UKDA and KRA. The nine groups formed part of the Kuki community, which inhabits the east of the state, and of the Adivasi community, present in the north and west of Assam. Although all the groups had ceasefire agreements with the government, formal peace negotiations had not yet begun. Meanwhile, **the Indian government will carry out talks with the pro-negotiations faction of the ULFA.** This will be the first round of formal negotiations since the group presented its proposal for talks in October. The faction in favour of reaching an agreement with the government had reportedly accepted constitutional reforms to protect the identity and natural resources of the state, abandoning its initial demands for sovereignty, according to Baruah. This faction demanded a separate constitution similar to those of Jammu and Kashmir, ensuring complete autonomy for the management of economic, forestry, land, water and mining resources. Furthermore, it demanded the inclusion of a clause by virtue of which any change in the territorial demarcation of the state must necessarily have the consent of the Assam parliament. In June, the Indian government and the pro-negotiations faction of the ULFA had what was described by the government as a fruitful meeting in Delhi. Although no specific details were made public on what the sides had agreed, the government had reportedly agreed to implement several of the armed group’s proposals regarding the control of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, as well as the safeguarding of the political rights of Assam’s population. Other issues were also discussed in the meeting, such as infrastructures and flood control measures in the state.

In October, the Indian government and the government of the state of Assam signed a **peace agreement with the two factions of the armed opposition group the DHD.** The agreement, reached after several rounds of negotiations, entailed the dissolution of the armed group within a period of six months and greater decentralisation in the district of Dima Hasao. Both factions of the group, DHD(N) and DHD(J) signed up to the agreement. As such,

the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council will become the Dima Hasao Autonomous Territorial Council and a process of administrative reorganisation will be carried out, along with socio-economic development projects.

**The Indian government might start negotiations with the faction led by Ranjan Daimary of the armed opposition group National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)** and is reportedly awaiting a formal letter from the government of Assam that ratifies the agreement between the two governments in order to start the talks. The interlocutor of the central government, PC Haldar, has held several meetings with Ranjan Daimary in Guwahati prison and the armed group formally expressed its wish to enter talks. Contacts between the government and the armed group have taken place over the last two years. In parallel, the central government and the government of Assam stepped up their efforts in order for one of the NDFB's splinter groups, the NDFB (R), led by commander-in-chief IK Songbijit, to join the peace talks scheduled with this group. The NDFB (P), which is holding peace talks with the Indian government, welcomed the decision by the Indian interior minister, Sushil Kumar Shinde, to hold a multi-party meeting on the issue of creating a new state for the Bodo people.

In **Nagaland (India)**, the armed opposition group the NSCN(IM) reiterated its commitment to the ceasefire agreement despite the incidents with the Indian security forces, which in its opinion constituted flagrant breaches of this agreement. The peace process made significant progress during the third quarter when all the parliamentarians of the Assembly of Nagaland travelled to Delhi to meet the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh. The parliamentarians, who in 2009 formed the "Joint Legislators' Forum (JLF) of Nagaland Legislative Assembly on the Naga political issue" with the goal of promoting the peace process, told the Indian prime minister that they were willing to give up their seats if this helped to achieve a new political agreement between the government and the insurgents before the elections scheduled for February 2013. In October, **the Indian government and the NSCN-IM were reportedly close to signing a peace agreement.** The two sides were working on a memorandum of understanding that encompassed various proposals. The first of these was to turn the legislative assembly of Nagaland into a two-chamber institution. The NSCN-IM also called for an increase in the number of seats and the Indian state insisted that it could not be called a parliament. Furthermore, the agreement would entail establishing autonomous development councils, the state's own flag, more autonomy and special status, in addition to formal recognition of the unique history of the Naga people. In December, the leaders of the NSCN-IM expressed their optimism regarding the imminent possibility of solution to the Naga conflict. In November, reports surfaced that **the armed opposition group the NSCN-K and the government might begin peace negotiations,** although no official confirmation was forthcoming. An insurgent delegation held an informal meeting with the

government, although the armed group was awaiting a formal invitation from the government to initiate the process, having received a verbal invitation. Since a ceasefire agreement was reached in 2001, no peace negotiations had taken place.

As regards relations between **India and Pakistan, the Pakistani president, Asif Ali Zardari, visited India** in April, on a private trip, and met the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh. This was the first visit by a Pakistani head of state to India in seven years and the first meeting between the two leaders since 2009. Singh accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan for which no date was set. The Indian government authorised direct foreign investment from Pakistan, as part of a strategy that it has termed "trade diplomacy". 600 Pakistani businessmen participated in a trade fair in India. In November the Pakistani government agreed to grant India the status of most favoured nation. In June, **the Pakistani foreign secretary invited independence-seeking Kashmiri leaders to hold negotiations** over the course of a trip to Delhi. Pakistan invited the leaders of the organisations JKLF and APHC. The Pakistani foreign secretary will meet Kashmiri leaders prior to the meeting scheduled with his Indian counterpart. The Kashmir leaders stated that they were not opposed to negotiations between India and Pakistan but indicated that there must be progress on the dispute over Kashmir and that the Kashmiri people should be included in the talks.

In **Nepal (Terai)**, the government and the armed opposition group the SKTMMM reached an agreement in April through which the group renounced violence and laid down its weapons in order to participate in political life. In exchange for being considered a political group rather than a terrorist organisation, for guaranteeing the security of its leaders during negotiations and for dropping the criminal charges against its members, the SKTMMM agreed to work towards achieving peace. The minister for peace and reconstruction, Satya Pahadi, headed the negotiations.

## b) Southeast Asia

After 15 years of negotiations, the president of the **Philippines**, Benigno Aquino, announced in early October that the MILF and the government had reached a **framework agreement, signed halfway through the month, which contained a road map and the key content for a future definitive peace agreement.** The said agreement, reached during the 32<sup>nd</sup> round of peace negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, established the **creation of a new political entity, called Bangsamoro, which should replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, with greater competences, economic resources and territorial scope.** Some of the exclusive competences of the central government will be defence and external security, foreign policy, the currency and the post office, among others. Meanwhile, some of the matters over which the new political entity will have

greater competences are justice, security, tax collection and the exploitation of natural resources. The MILF thanked President Aquino for his efforts and expressed its optimism regarding the future of the peace process. However, at the same time, it pointed out that the agreement that had been reached was only a road map for an agreement that is expected to be implemented by the end of the president's term in office, in 2016. Furthermore, the MILF itself acknowledged that it was considering the possibility of forming a political party to stand in the elections for the new Bangsamoro entity. In January 2013, the government declared that it should not take more than two months to agree the four annexes that accompany the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro signed in October 2012 and that will enable the signing of a definitive comprehensive peace agreement.

In the third quarter, the Philippine armed opposition group the MNLF declared that during the rounds of three-way negotiations (between the government, the MNLF and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), agreement had been reached on 42 points concerning aspects such as the sharing of power and economic resources, the management of natural resources, education, regional security or self-government structures and their competences. According to the MNLF, the agreements were very similar to those being reached by the government and the MILF. In October, during the third round of informal talks held in Davao, the MILF and the MNLF agreed the creation of a unity committee and an ad hoc joint secretariat to discuss aspects concerning both of them and to promote a joint agenda. The tensions between the MILF and certain factions of the MNLF (especially the one led by Nur Misuari) became notably more acute following the peace agreement of 15<sup>th</sup> October between the government and the MILF. Nur Misuari declared that the agreement had no legitimacy and urged the MILF to join the negotiations between the MNLF and the government concerning the full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement.

In mid-June, **the NDF and the Philippine government met in Oslo, where they decided to resume negotiations.** The NDF demanded the release of all or most of its 14 imprisoned members. The group considers that these prisoners are advisers in the peace process and should therefore be granted immunity. One of the advisers on the negotiation panel of the NDF, Edre Olalia, declared that **the NDF had proposed to the government a “special channel” (called the Proposal for Alliance and Peace), the aim of which is to speed up and complement the negotiation process agreed between the two sides in early 2011.** Some of the elements included in the proposal made by the NDF were the strengthening of national independence, the promotion of industrial development, the implementation of an agricultural reform or the signing of a truce leading to lasting peace. Furthermore, Olalia also declared that Benigno Aquino's government sent a presidential envoy to Holland in October to hold talks with the leadership of the NDF, and was somewhat hopeful that talks could resume in

the short or medium term through this parallel channel. In December, the chair of the government panel, Alex Padilla, publicly announced his optimism regarding the possible resumption of talks and the future of the peace process. Days earlier, as part of the “special parallel channel”, representatives of the government met in The Hague (Netherlands) with members of the leadership of the NDF, with the mediation of Norway. In the said meeting it was agreed to forge a Common Declaration of National Unity and Just Peace, to declare a cessation of hostilities between 20<sup>th</sup> December and 15<sup>th</sup> January (the longest ever agreed between the parties) and to resume the negotiation process.

The government of **Myanmar** reached agreements with most of the armed groups and established a peace strategy with ethnic groups through a three-phase process: the first phase encompasses the ceasefire, the opening of liaison offices and freedom of movement when no weapons are carried; the second phase involves trust-building measures, political dialogue and regional development; and the third phase comprises the signing of an agreement in the presence of members of parliament. For the time being, no political dialogue is envisaged, which makes it difficult to ensure a comprehensive process. The armed opposition group the **KNU reached a ceasefire agreement with the government in January.** In February, the KNU called for the withdrawal of government troops from ethnic zones and for the implementation of the ceasefire through a four-phase road map. The road map comprised a lasting ceasefire agreement, initial political dialogue, the resolution of underlying political problems through national reconciliation and, last of all, political participation. In the second quarter, a KNU delegation met for the first time with the president, Thein Sein, and with the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, in Rangoon. The leaders of the KNU stated that the meeting with the president had been constructive, highlighting that he had pointed to the possibility of legalising the group.

Meanwhile, **the leaders of the armed group the ABSDF held negotiations with representatives of the government of Myanmar for the first time** on the border with Thailand and agreed to hold additional meetings with the goal of reaching a ceasefire and peace agreement. In early June, informal negotiations were also held with the KIO, the only group with which armed clashes remained active at the end of the year. The group dropped its demand for the government troops to withdraw from its control zone. It also declared that its goal was not the signing of a ceasefire but rather an end to the conflict. Furthermore, the KIO requested the presence of international observers as witnesses of a possible peace agreement. In October, government and KIO representatives met in the city of Ruili, on the Sino-Burmese border. Following the meeting, the armed group stated that **the government had agreed to initiate political dialogue** and declared that it had not wished to address the issue of a possible ceasefire, explaining that without political



negotiations a ceasefire agreement could be broken at any time. Meanwhile, the government stated that the lack of presence of senior KIO leaders at the meeting had proved a stumbling block. The government sent a delegation that included four ministers and other senior civil servants. The government called on the KIO to guarantee peace and security along the road that connects the cities of Myitkyina and Putao. A meeting was scheduled for 2013.

In February, **the government and the NMSP signed a four-point agreement after three rounds of negotiations.** The NMSP stated that this agreement was different from the ceasefire agreement reached in 1995, since the new agreement included political dialogue. In April, seven **NMSP delegates met with a government delegation** headed by the railway minister, Aung Min. This was the fifth meeting with the government after the signing of a preliminary five-point agreement in early February. The NMSP opened four liaison offices. In May, **the Burmese government and the armed opposition group the SSA-S signed a peace agreement, together with the RCSS.** The 12-point agreement included issues such as territorial demarcation, the eradication of opium cultivation (one of the key issues of the agreement) and economic development. Furthermore, the possibility will be explored of enabling the return of those displaced as a consequence of the armed conflict. In April, **the ALP and the government of Rakhine State signed a five-point agreement** that permitted offices to be opened, prohibited crossing into the areas of other states with weapons and made it possible to travel around the country. Later on, the 18 delegates of the ALP met with Aung San Suu Kyi. The ALP has been clashing with the government for more than 40 years. Meanwhile, **the CNF and the government signed a 15-point agreement in May** that included a ceasefire, the opening of a liaison office, freedom of movement for members of the CNF and visas for travelling abroad. Upcoming negotiations will address the abolition of opium cultivation, ethnic issues, democratisation and development cooperation. The next meeting will be in January 2013. In May, **government representatives met with members of the PNLO**, which had maintained a ceasefire since December.

In the third quarter, the PNLO signed a ceasefire agreement with the government and agreed that peace negotiations would be held over the following three months. Also in May, **the RCSS-SSA and the government signed a 12-point agreement**, which included combating the illegal drugs trade, the opening of liaison offices, the establishment of a joint peacekeeping force, economic development projects and the release of detainees. Furthermore, **the Karenni armed opposition group signed a ceasefire agreement** with the government in the second quarter following negotiations held between the two sides in Kayah State. Following the signing of this agreement, the KIO was the only armed group that remained involved in clashes with the armed forces. **In October, the alliance of armed opposition groups, the United Nationalities Federation**

**Council (UNFC), announced that it was planning a meeting with a government peace delegation** headed by the minister Aung Min. This was the first meeting of its kind, since until now all peace negotiations with the insurgency have been bilateral rather than multilateral. The meeting will take place in Thailand and will address issues of a political nature.

## Europe

### a) Caucasus

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the arms purchases, orders and purchase plans of **Armenia and Azerbaijan** might increase the risk of a conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Azerbaijan has increased its volume of arms imports considerably (especially from Israel, South Africa and Turkey), while Armenia has announced plans to acquire more advanced weapons systems, in particular from Russia. In January, the presidents of the two countries, Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev, respectively, met with the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, to address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Sarkisian and Aliyev agreed to speed up talks and in a statement following the meeting praised the mediation work of the Minsk Group of the OSCE, along with the work carried out since the previous meeting. The Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, declared that the two leaders had agreed to back down from such extreme positions. However, no specific progress was made and the formal declarations were made amid mutual accusations of breaches of the ceasefire. In June, **the tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan** escalated. Several armed incidents occurred, causing ten fatalities, amid mutual accusations of breaches of the ceasefire. The Minsk Group voiced its concern over the lack of tangible progress in the process. In October, the Armenian president, Serzh Sarkisian, accused Azerbaijan of preparing for war in Nagorno-Karabakh and claimed that the government of Azerbaijan had been acquiring arms in readiness for a new conflict.

In February, the **Georgian** foreign minister, Grigol Vashadze, accused Russia of attempting to derail the dialogue process in Geneva over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, reducing the frequency of rounds of talks and rejecting key discussions within the two working groups that form part of the negotiation process: the group focusing on security issues and the group focusing on humanitarian aspects. The eighth round of negotiations took place in Geneva in June, with no progress to report. This round took place in a context in which the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism had been suspended by Abkhazia since March, when Abkhazia declared the Head of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, *persona non grata*. In the third quarter, **the Abkhaz foreign minister, Vyacheslav Chirikba, declared that it was necessary to change the format of the process, stating that the current structure limited effective decision making**, although he did not



go into details on which aspects needed to be changed. In October, the Georgian government formed after the victory in the parliamentary elections of the opposition party Georgian Dream, placed the emphasis in its conflict resolution programme on public diplomacy, on joint economic and business projects, and on boosting contacts between the population on both sides of the border. According to the programme, the establishment of democratic institutions and the solving of socio-economic problems in Georgia will prove decisive in resolving the conflicts, with the goal of persuading the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the advantages of living in a united state. Reforms are also planned for the governments in exile of Abkhazia and South Ossetia based in Georgia, to which functions will be transferred regarding the displaced population and the formation of representative bodies of the displaced population through elections. Abkhazia had previously proposed changing the negotiation format from one of experts to one of delegations.

In November, the foreign minister of Abkhazia, Vyacheslav Chirikba, stated that his government was willing to sign a non-use of force agreement with Georgia on condition that the format of the Geneva negotiations was altered in such a way that the status of Abkhaz participation was changed to “delegation” level. Abkhazia insisted that its objective was to obtain international recognition, especially from Georgia, of its situation of independence. Chirikba also stated that despite the change of government in Georgia he was not expecting major changes in the Georgian position in the negotiation process. At the end of the year, relations continued to improve between Georgia and Russia after the arrival in power of the Georgian Dream coalition, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili. The possibility of direct bilateral dialogue to address issues concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia was not ruled out but less thorny issues must be resolved first, such as commercial and economic relations between Russia and Georgia. Meanwhile, the 22<sup>nd</sup> round of negotiations of the Geneva process was held in December, in which a draft non-use of force agreement was produced.

## **b) South-east Europe**

In **Cyprus**, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, announced in April to the leaders of the island’s Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities that not enough progress had been made in the negotiation process to warrant the holding of an international conference on the reunification of the island. His view was shared by his Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alexander Downer. According to Downer, the talks had stalled on the issue of power-sharing within the federal framework, as well as on the question of private property lost during the conflict. Ban Ki-moon called on both sides to adopt decisive measures to continue the process. In May, the Turkish Cypriot leadership proposed the implementation by the UN of trust-building measures between the Turkish Cypriot and

Greek Cypriot communities, since it felt that there would be no imminent progress in talks on reunification. In the third quarter, **the direct peace talks stalled with the 2013 Greek Cypriot elections on the horizon, although dialogue between the two sides was kept alive through meetings between their respective technical committees.** The stalemate coincided with Cyprus’ rotating presidency of the EU, between July and December.

In February, **Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement on the representation of Kosovo in regional forums.** According to the agreement, Kosovo will participate in the forums under the name “Kosovo” and with a footnote on documents referring both to UN Resolution 1244 and to the non-binding opinion of the International Court of Justice. In parallel, the sides also agreed a technical protocol for the implementation of the agreement on integrated border management (IBM). The agreements were reached within the framework of a new round of talks with the mediation of the EU. In May, **Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement on the holding of Serbia’s parliamentary and presidential elections in Kosovo.** Kosovo was opposed to them taking place in Kosovo, while Serbia defended the right of the Serbian population in Kosovo to take part in the elections. Finally, negotiations between Belgrade, Pristina and Brussels produced an agreement by virtue of which Kosovo accepted the holding of the elections in Kosovo under the monitoring of the OSCE. Meanwhile, **the Pristina government stated that it was prepared to address the past and carry out a reconciliation process with Serbia.** However, it called on Serbia to apologise for the crimes committed before and during the war in Kosovo. Furthermore, Serbia and Kosovo agreed to cooperate in the task of exhuming the remains of people who disappeared during the conflict. Serbia declared in September that it was ready to begin to implement the agreement on integrated border management, which involves both sides. In November, the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo, Ivica Dacic and Hashim Thaci, met again in Brussels as part of the talks process mediated by the EU. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, stated that the talks had been open and honest. In the meeting the sides agreed to continue to work towards the full implementation of all the agreements and viewed the results of the joint working group on integrated border management positively. Thaci also took the opportunity in the meeting to request Serbia’s cooperation in finding the location of 1,700 people who disappeared during the armed conflict of 1999. In December, the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement on the start of the implementation of the agreement on integrated border management, reached at the end of 2011. They also reached an agreement that enabled goods being sent to the north of Kosovo, with a Serb majority, to enter Kosovo without being liable to taxes.

In respect of **Moldova (Transnistria)**, February saw the holding of the second round of negotiations in 5+2 format that resumed at the end of 2011 following

six years of stalemate. The round of talks, held in the Irish capital, Dublin, took place in a climate of certain optimism and rapprochement between the sides and was preceded by a series of measures adopted by Transdniestria after the region's new leader, Yevgeny Shevchuk, took office. These measures, welcomed by Moldova, included the total lifting of taxes on goods entering the region from Moldova, the simplification of customs and border processes, and the start of broadcasting of two Moldovan television channels in Transdniestria. In June, the leaders of Moldova and Transdniestria agreed to re-establish all the transport routes between the two territories, including the rehabilitation of a bridge over the River Dniester. The measure included re-establishing all the rail routes as quickly as possible, as well as lifting restrictions on transport professionals. In September a new round of talks was held in Vienna between Carpov and Shtanski, with the presence of mediators and observers, which concluded with **agreements to intensify dialogue on human rights, as well as to establish a joint forum for dialogue with civil society and the media of the two territories**. This new meeting also focused on education, including issues such as the recognition of diplomas, as well as on freedom of movement, including talks on the reopening of the Gura Bîcului bridge to road traffic. The round of talks was considered highly constructive.

In **Turkey**, some limited progress was made in the third quarter related to the prospects of resolving the Kurdish problem, despite the grave deterioration in security matters. At the end of September, the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that it would be possible to carry out fresh negotiations with the PKK, including with its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan. He reiterated the possibility in several media appearances. However, on many of these occasions, Erdogan declared that these negotiations would only be possible if the PKK handed over its weapons, declaring that a ceasefire would not be enough. In November, **once the hunger strike staged by 700 Kurdish prisoners came to an end, the Turkish prime minister stated that he was not opposed to the resumption of formal negotiations with the PKK**. Erdogan declared that the Turkish secret services (MIT) could meet with the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. According to Erdogan, it was not a problem for them to meet because the key issue was to find a solution to the conflict. He also explained that the MIT and Öcalan met at the latter's behest to discuss the hunger strike. According to reports published in the Turkish newspaper Radikal, three meetings were held on this issue before Öcalan called for an end to the strike. Meanwhile, after the end of the hunger strike, the Turkish president, Abdullah Gül, declared that the time had come for parliament to debate and speed up efforts to resolve the Kurdish question. Furthermore, prior to the end of the hunger strike, the Turkish deputy prime minister, Besir Atalay, stated that the government had been preparing the ground for the resumption of negotiations with the PKK, but that the hunger strike had sabotaged the process. In December, **the**


**government announced the existence of talks between the state and the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan**, which opened the door to a new negotiation process to resolve the conflict. There was speculation that the PKK might begin a disarmament process in the spring. According to some media reports, in this disarmament process senior officials of the PKK would be given the option of going into exile in non-EU countries that do not share a border with Turkey.

## Middle East

As regards the conflict between **Israel and Palestine**, in early January a meeting was held in Jordan between the Israeli and Palestinian representatives, Yitzhak Molcho and Saeb Erekat, the first direct meeting between senior officials of the two sides since September 2010. According to press reports, no progress was made at the meeting, although according to Jordanian sources the Israelis had agreed to study a Palestinian proposal on border and security issues. In any case, the process remained deadlocked throughout the year. In June, press reports revealed that in the last period, representatives of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and of Israel had held meetings with the goal of identifying formulas to unblock the peace process. According to the sources cited by the press, the Palestinian negotiation team was headed by Ahmed Qurea, while the Israeli team was led by the defence minister, Ehud Barak. In November, **the United Nations General Assembly raised the status of Palestine in the international organisation and recognised it as a non-member state**.

In respect of the crisis in **Syria**, in mid-February the Arab League and the United Nations appointed the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, as Joint Special Envoy to the country. He called upon those involved in the conflict to cooperate in searching for a peaceful solution and carried out intensive diplomatic work with Chinese and Russian representatives to gain their support for a peace proposal. Annan proposed a plan composed of six points: the opening of an inclusive political process that reflected the aspirations of the Syrian people, the cessation of violence by all sides under the supervision of the UN, guarantees of access to humanitarian aid, the release of political prisoners, guarantees of freedom of expression and of the freedom of movement of journalists, and respect for the right to assembly and to demonstrate peacefully. Given the failure of his peace plan and of his attempts to bring the sides together in finding a peaceful outcome to the conflict, the UN and Arab League Joint Special Envoy decided to resign from his post in early August. On 1<sup>st</sup> September, the Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed to the mediation post left vacant by Annan. Brahimi maintained contacts with several actors involved in the conflict, including the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, but had not been successful in his efforts by the end of 2012.

Map 4.1. Gender Inequalities



■ Countries with serious gender inequalities

# 4. The Gender Dimension in Peacebuilding

- 77 countries suffered serious gender inequalities, 48 of which stood out in particular, mainly concentrated in Africa and Asia. 81% of the armed conflicts for which data was available on gender equality took place in contexts with serious gender inequalities.
- In 2012 the use of sexual violence as a weapon in situations of armed conflict and socio-political crisis was registered in countries including DR Congo, Somalia, Mali, Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Colombia or Sri Lanka.
- The UN Secretary-General presented the first report on sexual violence in armed conflicts, which includes a list of the armed, government and opposition actors responsible for crimes of sexual violence.
- Women's organisations in Mali, Somalia, Colombia, Myanmar and Afghanistan demanded to play a greater role in the peace processes currently under way in these countries.
- Civil society organisations called for the Arms Trade Treaty to take into account the gender dimension and the specific gender impacts of the arms trade.

This chapter provides an analysis of the various initiatives being implemented in peacebuilding processes from a gender perspective by the United Nations and by other local and international organisations and movements.<sup>1</sup> An analysis through this perspective makes it possible to highlight the specific impacts of armed conflict on men and women, as well as the extent to which and the way in which they participate in peacebuilding, in particular the contributions being made by women in this respect. The chapter is structured into three main sections: the first assesses the global gender inequality situation through an analysis of the Gender Inequality Index; the second section analyses the gender dimension in the impact of armed conflicts and socio-political crises; and the final section is devoted to peacebuilding from a gender perspective. A map is included at the start of each chapter that highlights the countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender Inequality Index.

## 4.1. Gender inequalities

The **Gender Inequality Index (GII)**<sup>2</sup> reflects women's disadvantage in relation to the situation of men by analysing three dimensions: reproductive health (maternal mortality rate and adolescent fertility rate<sup>3</sup>), empowerment (women and men with at least secondary education and the share of parliamentary seats held by each sex), and the labour market (participation rate of women and men in the workforce). The GII shows the loss in human development due to inequality when comparing the achievements of women and men in the said dimensions. It ranges from zero, where there is a situation of full equality between men and women, to one, when one gender presents the worst performance possible in all the measured dimensions. The importance of this index lies in the fact that it does not merely break down information according to sex but rather analyses this information on the basis of the relations of inequality established between men and women. In other words, it is a gender-sensitive index.<sup>4</sup>

According to the GII, **the situation of women was serious in 77 countries<sup>5</sup>, being especially serious in 48 cases,**

1. As an analytical category, gender makes it clear that inequalities between men and women are the product of social norms rather than a result of nature, and sets out to underline this social and cultural construction to distinguish it from the biological differences of the sexes. The gender perspective aims to highlight the social construction of sexual difference and the sexual division of work and power. It also attempts to show that the differences between men and women are a social construction resulting from unequal power relations that have been historically established in the patriarchal system. The goal of gender as an analytical category is to demonstrate the historical and situated nature of sexual differences.
2. UNDP, "Gender Inequality Index", *Human Development Report 2011. Sustainability and equality: A better future for all* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
3. The reproductive health indicators used in the GII do not have equivalent indicators for men, which means that in this dimension, the reproductive health of girls and women is compared with what should be social objectives, i.e. for there to be no maternal deaths or adolescent pregnancies. UNDP, "Gender Inequality Index", *Human Development Report 2011. Sustainability and equality: A better future for all* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
4. While statistics broken down according to sex provide factual information on the situation regarding women, a gender-sensitive indicator provides direct evidence of women's status in respect of a certain standard or reference group, in this case men. Susan Schmeidl and Eugenia Piza-Lopez. *Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action*, International Alert and Swiss Peace Foundation, 2002, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D2489588422D1A37C1256C3000383049-fewer-gender-jun02.pdf>.
5. This data refers to 2011, which is the most recent year for which data is available.

**Table 4.1. Countries with serious gender inequalities**

Countries with a GII of between 0.4 and 0.5		
<b>Algeria</b> Belize Bhutan <i>Bolivia</i> Brazil <b>Burundi</b> <b>Colombia</b> Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador	<i>Georgia</i> <b>Iran</b> Jamaica Jordan <i>Lebanon</i> Mexico Mongolia <b>Myanmar</b> Namibia Panama	<i>Paraguay</i> <i>Peru</i> <b>Philippines</b> <i>Rwanda</i> <i>Sri Lanka</i> <b>Syria</b> South Africa <b>Turkey</b> Venezuela
Countries with a GII of over 0.5		
<b>Afghanistan</b> Bangladesh Benin Botswana <i>Burkina Faso</i> <i>Cambodia</i> Cameroon <b>Central African Republic</b> <i>Chad</i> <i>Congo</i> <i>Côte d'Ivoire</i> <b>DR Congo</b> Gabon Gambia Ghana Guatemala	Guyana <i>Haiti</i> Honduras <b>India</b> <i>Indonesia</i> <b>Iraq</b> <i>Kenya</i> <i>Lao, PDR</i> Lesotho Liberia <i>Malawi</i> <b>Mali</b> <i>Mauritania</i> <i>Morocco</i> Mozambique <i>Nepal</i> Nicaragua	Niger <b>Pakistan</b> Papua New Guinea Qatar <i>Saudi Arabia</i> <i>Senegal</i> Sierra Leone <b>Sudan</b> <i>Swaziland</i> Tanzania Togo <b>Uganda</b> <b>Yemen</b> Zambia <i>Zimbabwe</i>

The GII ranges from 0, which would indicate a situation of full equality, to 1, which would indicate the greatest possible inequality. The score of 0.4 has been taken as a reference since 0.39 is the global average.

Countries are listed in alphabetical order.

Countries with one or more active armed conflicts are listed in **bold** while countries with one or more active socio-political crises in 2012 are listed in *italics*.

Source: Own elaboration based on the GII 2011.

mainly concentrated in Africa and Asia.<sup>6</sup> The analysis obtained by cross-referencing the data of this indicator with that of countries in a situation of armed conflict reveals that 18 of the 77 countries with a serious situation of gender inequality were embroiled in one or several armed conflicts in 2012. It is necessary to point out that for five of the countries in which there is one or more armed conflicts there is no data available on gender equality (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia and South Sudan). This means that 26 of the 38 armed conflicts that took place over the course of 2012 occurred in countries in which there were serious gender inequalities and that six of these conflicts occurred in countries for which there is no available data in this respect. As such, 81% of the armed conflicts for which data was available on gender equality took place in contexts with serious gender inequalities. The gender equality figures remained below the threshold of seriousness established in this report in just four of the countries in which one or more armed conflicts were taking place (Israel, Russia, Thailand and Libya). This reality would seem to coincide with the theory put forward by some authors that gender inequality in a country increases the likelihood of internal armed

conflict taking place there.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, in 39 of the countries with serious inequalities there were one or more socio-political crises. This means that at least 47 of the 91 socio-political crises that remained active in 2012 took place in countries in which there were serious gender inequalities, which represents 52% of the socio-political crises on which data was available.

## 4.2. The impact of violence and conflicts from a gender perspective

This section focuses on the gender dimension in the cycle of conflict, particularly regarding violence against women. Armed conflicts and socio-political crises are phenomena with a significant gender dimension. First of all, the gender analysis pulls apart the traditional view of armed conflicts as neutral scenarios and brings into question the belief that the genesis of armed conflicts is independent of the power structures in place in certain societies in terms of gender. From this perspective, serious doubts are also raised about statements that attempt to place the consequences of conflicts under the same umbrella without taking into account the gender dimension and inequalities.

### a) Sexual violence as a weapon of war

The use of sexual violence as a weapon of war is widespread in a large number of the armed conflicts currently taking place and is used with the aim of damaging the social fabric of the communities affected by this war crime, as well as causing harm to its women victims that is difficult to repair. Sexual violence has become a key issue on the international agenda regarding the gender dimension in armed conflicts, especially since 2008, following the approval of Resolution 1820 by the UN Security Council. Over the course of 2012, the use of sexual violence as a weapon was recorded in several countries affected by armed conflicts or socio-political crises.

In January the UN Secretary-General presented its report on sexual violence in armed conflicts, in compliance with the provisions of UN Security Council resolutions 1960 (2010), 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009). This is the first report in which detailed information has been compiled on the carrying out of acts of violence in various contexts of armed conflict, post-war scenarios and socio-political crises. The report also includes a list of government and opposition armed actors that are responsible for crimes of sexual violence in these contexts. The report addresses the sexual violence carried out and documented in the period from December 2010 to November 2011, of which a summary is provided in table 4.2.

6. The author of this study is responsible for this classification, not the UNDP. All the countries with scores of between 0.4 and 0.5 are considered to be in a serious situation in terms of gender equality, such situations being considered especially serious in countries with scores of over 0.5.  
7. Mary Caprioli, "Gender equality and state aggression: the impact of domestic gender equality on state first use of force," *International Interactions* 29, no. 3 (2003): 195-214.



Table 4.2. **Sexual violence in contexts of armed conflict, post-war scenarios and socio-political crises<sup>8</sup>**

Armed conflicts	
<b>Colombia</b>	Sexual violence, including mass rape, has been prevalent in the conflict and in some instances may have been systematically directed against the civilian population both by the armed forces and armed groups. The Constitutional Court of Colombia recognises that sexual violence is a habitual, widespread, systematic and invisible practice in the conflict.
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	Sexual violence against civilians increased in the period following the 2010 elections. All the parties involved in the conflict were responsible: 1. Armed militias: - Alliance patriotique de l'ethnie Wé (APWE). - Front pour la libération du Grand Ouest (FLGO). - Mouvement ivoirien de libération de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire (MILOCI). - Union patriotique de résistance du Grand Ouest (UPRGO). 2. Former Forces armées des forces nouvelles (FAFN). 3. Former Forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS). 4. Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI).
<b>DR Congo</b>	Sexual violence took place in North and South Kivu, the scenario of the armed conflict. The report singles out the following responsible parties: 1. Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS). 2. The Congolese armed forces (FARDC), including elements incorporated from several armed groups, such as Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), formerly led by Laurent Nkunda and elements currently led by Bosco Ntaganda. 3. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). 4. Forces de résistance patriotique en Ituri/Front populaire pour la Justice au Congo (FRPI/FPJC). 5. Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). 6. Mai-Mai groups in North and South Kivu, including Mai-Mai Cheka and Patriotes résistants congolais (PARECO).  The United Nations registered 625 cases of sexual violence: 602 in which the victims were women and girls and 23 in which they were men or boys. Half of the cases were attributed to the armed forces. Meanwhile, 3,527 victims of sexual violence received medical and psychosocial treatment. 250 members of the security forces were put on trial and 150 were sentenced for rape and other forms of sexual violence.
<b>Libya</b>	Acts of sexual violence were documented against men and women committed by the parties in conflict between February and October 2011. Women were kidnapped from their homes and vehicles or in the street and raped in locations unknown to them, while men were subject to sexual violence in prisons and detention centres. Sexual violence was used to punish opponents of Muammar Gaddafi. Incidents were also reported by followers of Gaddafi currently detained.
<b>Myanmar</b>	Rape was committed on a large scale by the armed forces in the militarised ethnic areas, especially in the eastern part of the country. This violence was authorised by military commanders.
<b>Somalia</b>	The forces of the opposition group al-Shabaab committed sexual violence against women. Most of the victims of sexual violence in the conflict were women and girls living in camps for displaced persons.
<b>South Sudan</b>	The sexual violence took place in the camps of the army (SPLA) and in the surrounding areas. The crimes were reported when the armed forces remained in the area for some time without participating actively in the conflict. It also took place during the military operations that the SPLA undertook against militia groups. The report accuses the armed opposition group LRA of perpetrating sexual violence in this country.
<b>Sudan (Darfur)</b>	There was an increase in the number of cases of violence in the region. Clashes between the Sudanese armed forces and the opposition groups SLA-MM and JEM led to the large-scale displacement of the population, which increased the vulnerability of women and girls. The huge militarisation of the area led to an increase in insecurity. Sexual assaults were reported in the three states of Darfur. Furthermore, the armed forces were accused of attacking displaced women accused of supporting armed groups. UNAMID registered 66 cases of sexual violence involving 111 victims, of which 43 were minors. 17% of the victims identified the government security forces as their attackers.
Post-war contexts	
<b>Central African Republic and Chad</b>	In these two countries there were constant reports of sexual assaults on women and girls perpetrated mostly by civilians but also by members of the former armed opposition groups. In the Central African Republic, members of the armed opposition group CPJP, <i>zaraguinas</i> (road bandits) and the Ugandan armed group LRA have been identified as the perpetrators of sexual violence. As regards Chad, despite the improvement in camps for refugees and displaced persons, cases of sexual violence continued to be reported.
<b>Nepal</b>	The Secretary-General condemned the impunity in the country in respect of these crimes, and the fact that the victims of sexual violence have been excluded from government rehabilitation programmes. Moreover, even in the cases reported to the police, the perpetrators have not been formally accused of crimes.
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	The report voices concerns about the situation of vulnerability of women and girls in the areas that were affected by the armed conflict, along with the high risk generated by the militarisation of these areas.
<b>Bosnia Herzegovina, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste</b>	The high levels of sexual violence registered in these countries can be traced back to the sexual violence perpetrated during the armed conflicts that affected them. In Liberia mass rapes have become widespread with very young girls among their victims. In Bosnia and Timor-Leste domestic violence has increased significantly. The report highlights that sexual violence prevents the full re-establishment of peace in societies in post-war situations. In Sierra Leone, of the estimated 250,000 cases of sexual violence that took place during the armed conflict, only 3,600 survivors have been registered in order to benefit from reparations.

8. The table below is a summary of the information provided in the UN Secretary-General's report, *Conflict-related sexual violence. Report of the Secretary General A/66/657-S/2012/33*, January 13, 2012. The report of the Secretary-General does not refer to socio-political crises but rather to "contexts of elections, political strife and civil unrest". In the table, armed opposition groups are named in the same way as in the report. United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council, *Conflict-related sexual violence. Report of the Secretary-General*, January 13, 2012, <http://www.un.org/es/globalissues/women/informe2012.pdf>.

**Contexts of elections, political conflicts and civil unrest**

<b>Egypt</b>	During the popular uprisings of January and February 2011, men and women were subjected to torture, beatings, verbal and physical assaults, arrests, sexual violence and abuse by groups of police officers and the security forces, as well as by suspected agents of the regime and people paid to intimidate demonstrators and media professionals. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces acknowledged that it had subjected women demonstrators to virginity tests. An increase was registered in the number of cases of violence and sexual abuse reported during and in the aftermath of the revolution.
<b>Guinea and Kenya</b>	In both countries there was a clear link between the elections and the use of sexual violence as a way of achieving political objectives. This violence was perpetrated against women, men and children, and included mass rape and sexual mutilation. In Kenya 1,500 cases of sexual violence were documented, although it is estimated that the real number was much higher and that many rape victims were subsequently murdered. In Guinea 109 women and girls were raped by the security forces.
<b>Syria</b>	The various observation missions mandated by the United Nations Human Rights Council received reports of sexual violence, rape and sexual torture. Sexual torture was carried out on men detained in military facilities, where women may also have been sexually tortured. The Syrian government reported that the armed opposition committed sexual violence.

The presentation of the Secretary-General's report was accompanied by a Security Council debate on this issue. Various civil society organisations highlighted the need for the debate on sexual violence to be accompanied by an analysis of how the proliferation of arms and militarisation contribute to exacerbating this violence and how sexual assaults also undermine women's chances of participating in the public sphere. Some states (Russia, Pakistan, India, Egypt, China and Indonesia) accused the UN Special Representative of going beyond her mandate since the Secretary-General's report contains allusions to contexts that are not classified as armed conflicts. However, she declared that all the information presented should be understood within the framework of the provisions of Resolution 1960 (2010).

Meanwhile, reports appeared throughout the year of the use of sexual violence in different contexts of armed conflict and socio-political crises. Some of the places where reports of sexual violence were constant were Somalia, DR Congo and Myanmar, among others.

In **Somalia**, a United Nations report addressed the grave situation faced by women in terms of gender violence and sexual violence, in particular those displaced as a consequence of the armed conflict.<sup>9</sup> The report pointed out that despite the serious difficulties involved in monitoring and documenting the violations of women's human rights, it can be stated that gender violence is widespread throughout the country and particularly affects women in central and southern areas of Somalia controlled by different actors of the conflict. The violence is heightened by the prevailing climate of impunity and the scant attention paid by the authorities to its prevalence and impact on women's lives. Internally displaced women are the main victims of this violence and collective assaults are becoming commonplace in shelter camps for displaced persons. Furthermore, according to humanitarian agencies, 30% of the reported cases involve minors. In the areas controlled by the al-Shabaab armed opposition group, its members repeatedly abused women, with practices that included the forced marriage of women and girls with militiamen, on occasions as a way of rewarding insurgents who

volunteer to carry out suicide attacks. In the areas under the control of the Federal Transitional Government, both human rights organisations and humanitarian workers declared that rape had become endemic and was perpetrated by uniformed men identified by the victims as soldiers or policemen. The lack of a central government contributed to this climate of violence but the United Nations stated that even in the areas where the authorities were present, the climate of impunity was widespread and victims were denied any access to justice.

In parallel to the information made public by the United Nations, local organisations reported an increase in the number of cases of domestic violence and sexual violence in the camps for displaced persons in **Somaliland**. In this respect, local organisations have pointed out that the drought has led to a grave deterioration in the population's living conditions, which in turn has led to increased insecurity.

As regards the situation in **DR Congo**, there were once again reports of alarming levels of sexual violence in the country. At the start of the year, the then UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, expressed her concern about clashes that had taken place during the first quarter in the east of the country and the effects that they were having on the civilian population. The clashes took place in areas where the widespread perpetration of sexual violence by armed actors against the civilian population had already been reported on previous occasions.

Later on in the year, the international organisation CARE reported the increase of sexual violence in North Kivu, in the east of the country, as a consequence of the escalation of the armed conflict in the region. Fear of this sexual violence is driving women and entire families to move to other areas. Along the same lines, in July the acting UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Vijay Nambiar, reported the serious sexual crimes committed by Mai-Mai militias and the M23 armed group, led by General Bosco Ntaganda. A warrant for his arrest was issued in July by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes including rape and

9. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)*, July 13, 2012, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544).

sexual slavery, which came on top of a previous arrest warrant for the recruitment of minors as soldiers. At the end of 2012, the Heal Africa local hospital in Goma (capital of North Kivu) stated that more than 5,000 rapes of women and girls had been reported in the province over the course of the year in the context of clashes between government forces and the M23.

In **Mali**, the human rights organisation HRW stated that there was evidence of women in the north of the country being raped by the Tuareg armed groups operating in the region, in particular the MNLA. These assaults had been on the rise since January. HRW documented cases of rape of women and girls, along with kidnappings in which sexual abuse had probably taken place. Furthermore, women in the area declared that as a consequence of the presence in and control of the area by radical Islamist groups, women's rights were being brutally restricted due to the application of Sharia law promoted by these organisations. Meanwhile, the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict also made declarations in this respect, explaining that several reports of sexual violence in the north of the country had been documented, and underlining the fact that these crimes not only contributed to destabilising the region and constituted serious violations of women's human rights but could also be classified as war crimes or crimes against humanity.

In the Ogaden region in **Ethiopia**, the pro-independence news agency Ogaden Online reported the rape of dozens of women in the town of Dig, in Degahbour, in the context of the armed conflict taking place between the Ethiopian army and the armed opposition group ONLF.

**Sudanese** activists stated that women participating in social protest actions were being subjected to persecution, sexual violence and excessive punishments by the security forces. Incidents included the shooting dead of a girl participating in student protests, the detention and torture in an unknown location of a dozen activists, and reports by several women that they had been sexually assaulted by the security forces during the many protests that had taken place recently in Khartoum. Furthermore, several journalists were prohibited from reporting on the rape of a woman by the security forces, a crime that she had formally reported.

Some organisations and international figures condemned the use of sexual violence as a form of political repression in the conflict taking place in **Syria**. Various sources pointed out that sexual violence was being used by the state security forces as a form of torture against opposition detainees, both men and women or even minors. Although the scale of its use could not be verified, various human rights organisations stated that they had received constant reports of its use. The human rights organisation HRW declared that in the

last year it had documented at least 20 cases of sexual abuse perpetrated by the security forces. Although the organisation states that it has no evidence to confirm that this sexual violence has been specifically ordered by military commanders, it condemns the fact that it has been carried out with total impunity without the authorities doing anything to prevent it.

**Colombia** was another scenario where sexual violence became a prominent issue over the course of the year. The UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, declared that the Colombian government should make greater efforts to put an end to the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of crimes of sexual violence, as well as increase the amount of assistance given to victims and survivors of this violence.

It should be pointed out that in the context of the armed conflict affecting the country, a soldier, sub-lieutenant Raúl Muñoz, was sentenced to 60 years in prison for the rape and murder of a 14 year old girl. This sentence was welcomed by several human rights organisations, which highlighted the exceptional nature of the punishment handed down to a perpetrator of human rights violations. Although the Constitutional Court of Colombia has acknowledged that conflict-related sexual violence is a habitual and widespread practice, most cases are not investigated, let alone punished.

Meanwhile, Amnesty International published a report evaluating the efforts made by the Colombian authorities to combat sexual violence.<sup>10</sup> The organisation warned that the formal progress that has taken place in recent months in legal and institutional terms has not yet had any real impact on the lives of women, who continue to face enormous difficulties in gaining access to justice. Furthermore, protection mechanisms remain excessively fragile. Amnesty International states that there is a situation of widespread impunity in respect of the sexual violence perpetrated in the context of the armed conflict. Nevertheless, the organisation saw positive signs in the possibility of a new law being prepared to address the issue of impunity in cases of conflict-related sexual violence, which is being promoted by both parliamentarians and the Office of the Public Ombudsman, which could be the first important step along the way to combating sexual violence effectively.

In **Myanmar**, the armed forces were accused of the systematic use of sexual violence in the armed conflict being waged with the Kachin armed opposition group KIO in Kachin State. Kachin Women's Association Thailand documented 43 cases of sexual abuse carried out by the army since the breach of the ceasefire between the KIO and the government in 2011. In 21 cases the victims were murdered. Meanwhile, HRW reported that the murder and rape of members of the Rohingya population had been carried out by the

10. Amnesty International, *Colombia: Hidden from Justice. Impunity for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, a Follow-up report*, October, 2012, <http://www.amnistiainternacional.org/publicacion-214>.

security forces in the context of the unrest that broke out in the previous quarter in Rakhine State, when the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman by three Muslim men led to significant rioting and clashes between the two communities.

***The armed forces in Myanmar made systematic use of sexual violence in clashes with KIO armed group***

Also noteworthy was the increase in the number of cases of sexual violence in **Egypt**, in particular against women who demonstrated in Tahrir Square in Cairo, the epicentre of the popular uprisings in the so-called Arab Spring. Several women were sexually assaulted by men while they demonstrated in the square. In addition to individual attacks, the assaults on women participating in a meeting to condemn this sexual violence on 8<sup>th</sup> June must also be mentioned. The protest had to be suspended due to the violence of these assaults. The process of militarisation that the country has undergone and increasing socio-political instability, together with the greater public presence of women, who have become important social actors in the popular uprisings, are some of the factors that may explain the increase in sexual violence against women.

In **Haiti**, two Pakistani police officers serving as part of the United Nations mission in the country, MINUSTAH, were sentenced by a Pakistani military court to one year in prison and hard labour after being found guilty of sexual exploitation and abuse. Furthermore, the United Nations pointed out that Pakistan intended to compensate the victims, without stating the amount. In parallel to this case, which occurred in the city of Gonaïves, the United Nations was also investigating other accusations of sexual abuse, purportedly carried out by UN police officers in Port au Prince.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report on the situation of insecurity for women in the north and east of **Sri Lanka** in the post-war scenario.<sup>11</sup> The strong militarisation of this area has led to growing problems of insecurity for women, reducing their possibilities of receiving assistance. As a consequence of the armed conflict that took place between 1983 and 2009, tens of thousands of homes are

headed by women, who experience serious difficulties in gaining access to dwellings in decent condition and to the economic resources necessary to support their families. Furthermore, there are alarming levels of domestic violence, people trafficking and forced prostitution, along with an increase in adolescent pregnancies and the fear of being victims of abuse, which is hindering women's access to education. According to the ICG there are credible reports of sexual violence perpetrated against Tamil women in a general climate of impunity. The government's response to these reports has been to deny them.

Amnesty International published a report in which it condemned the climate of impunity that prevails in **Bosnia Herzegovina** with respect to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war during the years of conflict.<sup>12</sup> Of the tens of thousands of sexual crimes committed, fewer than 40 cases have been tried, either by local courts or by the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the victims have constantly been denied access to justice and psychosocial assistance in order to deal with the trauma caused by this violence. Amnesty International points to the constant denials by the political class that these crimes took place and to the lack of political will to combat impunity as the main reasons for explaining why the perpetrators of sexual violence have not been brought to justice.

**Box 4.1. Estimates of the impact of sexual violence in quantitative terms**

Quantifying the impact of conflict-related sexual violence is an extraordinarily complex task, given the difficulties involved in obtaining reliable figures in this respect. Generally speaking, the impact of sexual violence tends to be underestimated since it is an under-reported crime. The huge difficulties facing victims in terms of gaining access to justice systems, along with the fear of social stigmatisation and even reprisals by the perpetrators, are just some of the obstacles that must be overcome in order to know the true impact of this violence.

Some analysts have pointed out that on most occasions the scale of the impact of sexual violence is underestimated.<sup>13</sup> Some examples of countries where the publicly circulated figures for sexual violence almost certainly underestimate its real impact are Bosnia, Rwanda and DR Congo. In the case of Bosnia, the figure most frequently referred to is that of 20,000 rape cases. However, this figure originally appeared in a 1993 report by the European Commission and the conflict lasted until 1995, which means that it only referred to the sexual violence that took place over part of the conflict. As regards Rwanda, the figure of between 250,000 and 500,000 female victims of sexual violence during the 1994 genocide, provided by the then UN Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, René Degni-Ségui, was calculated on the basis of the number of pregnancies recorded as a consequence of the violence. Nevertheless, a review of these calculations indicates a potentially higher figure. However, there have also been some cases where the opposite has occurred and the violence has been overestimated. One such case is

11. International Crisis Group, *Sri Lanka: Women's Insecurity in the North and East*, Asia Report no. 217, December 20, 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/217-sri-lanka-womens-insecurity-in-the-north-and-east.aspx>.  
12. Amnesty International, *Old Crimes, Same Suffering. No Justice for Survivors of Wartime Rape in North-East Bosnia and Herzegovina*, March 29, 2012, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR63/002/2012/en>.  
13. Tia Palermo and Amber Peterman, "Undercounting, overcounting and the longevity of flawed estimates: statistics on sexual violence in conflict," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 89 (2011), doi: 10.2471/BLT.11.089888.

Liberia, where it has often been claimed that more than 75% of the country's women were raped during the armed conflict. Nonetheless, other studies state that the prevalence of sexual violence is between 9.2% and 15% since the figure of 75% refers to the percentage of women who had been raped out of the total number of women who were subjected to some kind of sexual violence.<sup>14</sup>

With the goal of alleviating these difficulties, Resolution 1960 (2010) of the UN Security Council urged the Secretary General "to work with the entities of the United Nations, national institutions, civil society organisations, healthcare service providers and women's groups to improve data gathering and the analysis of incidents, trends and systematic cases related to rape and other forms of sexual violence" in order to improve the institution's capacity to deal with this violence. As such, it is necessary to improve research and the gathering of data on sexual violence in order to offer appropriate prevention, response and victim care strategies, in line with the real impact of this violence.

The *Human Security Report 2012*<sup>15</sup> specifically addressed the impact of conflict-related sexual violence, placing special emphasis on the mainstream narrative of this phenomenon and analysing it from a critical perspective on the basis of five elements. First of all, according to the report, this narrative has focused disproportionate attention on the relatively small number of countries in which conflict-related sexual violence was widespread (Bosnia, Rwanda, DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan), extrapolating these levels to armed conflicts as a whole. Secondly, the report points out that from this standpoint it is claimed that sexual violence is on the rise, although little evidence is provided to support such a claim, since, according to the authors of the Human Security Report, what has increased is the reporting of sexual violence. They claim that indirect evidence points to a decrease in sexual violence. Thirdly, the report states that on the basis of this narrative it is argued that strategic rape (the use of rape as a weapon of war) is a pervasive and growing threat, without presenting any evidence to support this claim. Fourthly, the report states that men are presented as perpetrators of sexual violence, while women and girls are presented as the victims. Little is said about sexual violence against males, while female perpetration is ignored almost completely. Finally, the mainstream narrative concentrates on sexual violence perpetrated by combatants while ignoring non-combatant sexual violence, despite the latter being much more widespread than the former, according to the report's authors.

The report's conclusions have been heavily criticised by women's organisations and feminist academics devoted to research into sexual violence as a weapon of war. Many of the criticisms have focused on the conclusions concerning the supposed decrease in conflict-related sexual violence. Various analysts have argued that no evidence exists to affirm that sexual violence is either increasing or decreasing, and that in any case it is not a

particularly important debate since the key issue is the existence itself of the violence rather than its impact in quantitative terms.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, it is pointed out that claims of a decrease may lead to fewer resources being assigned to putting an end to this violence. Meanwhile, these analyses have highlighted that the number of cases that have been monitored is much higher than the one listed by the Human Security Report, including scenarios such as Syria, Libya, Iraq and Somalia, among others. Some authors have also underlined the fact that the Human Security Report only selects some of the research being carried out on this issue, ignoring dozens of contributions made by feminist academics in the 1990s, the conclusions of which enable a much wider panorama to be obtained on this issue.<sup>17</sup>

### **b) Response to sexual violence used as a weapon of war**

The United Nations appointed a new **UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict**, after Margot Wallström, who had held the post since it was created, resigned for personal reasons. She was replaced by Zainab Hawa Bangura, who until then had been health minister of Sierra Leone.

Coinciding with the celebration of the 67<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Women, the UN Special Representative, the International Campaign to Stop Rape & Gender Violence in Conflict and the United Kingdom organised a high-level panel on the prevention of sexual violence. The panel, which included the Nobel Peace Prize recipients Shirin Ebadi, Leymah Gbowee and Jody Williams, along with representatives of 30 civil society organisations, highlighted the need to guarantee access to justice as a form of reparation for victims and to support them in their recovery, as well as combating poverty.

14. Shana Swiss et al., "Violence Against Women During the Liberian Civil Conflict," *JAMA* 279, no. 8 (1998): 625-629; Kirsten Johnson, et. al., "Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence With Health and Mental Health Outcomes in Postconflict Liberia," *JAMA* 300, no. 6 (2008): 676-690, doi: 10.1001/jama.300.6.676.
15. Human Security Research Group, *Human Security Report 2012. Sexual Violence, Education, and War: Beyond the Mainstream Narrative* (Vancouver: Human Security Press, 2012).
16. Megan MacKenzie, "War Rape is Not Declining," *The Duck of Minerva*, October 17, 2012, <http://www.whiteoliphant.com/duckofminerva/2012/10/war-rape-is-not-declining.html>.
17. Laura J. Shepherd, "Narrative closure: The Human Security Report 2012", *Gender In Global Governance Net-work*, October 22, 2012, <http://genderinglobalgovernancenetwork.net/comment/narrative-closure-the-human-security-report-2012>.



The importance of access to justice was also underlined by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, in another event devoted to this issue. The diplomat singled out three vital aspects through which countries must commit to guaranteeing this access: repealing of legislation that discriminates against women and girls, increasing the involvement of women in justice systems and investing at least 15% of the budget devoted to justice in breaking down the obstacles that hinder women's access. According to UN Women, **eight out of ten women in the world do not have access to the formal justice systems in their countries** and in more than 100 countries legal inequalities remain in place in aspects such as women's capacity to sign contracts, travel abroad, manage a property or interact with the public authorities or the private sector.

***Eight out of ten women in the world do not have access to formal justice systems in their countries***

As regards the work of the ICC, the new chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, who was sworn into office in June, stated that the priority of her mandate would be victims, in particular women and children. This announcement was welcomed by human rights defence organisations and above all by victims, although they also voiced their scepticism about the real possibilities of it being carried out given the budget cuts that have affected the ICC and that directly affect the reparations from which victims may benefit. Also noteworthy was Bensouda's appointment of Brigid Inder as her new special adviser on gender issues. Inder had until then been the executive director of the organisation Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, which has been very active in promoting the integration of the gender perspective in the court's work. Inder replaces the feminist academic Catherine MacKinnon, who has held the post since November 2008.

Meanwhile, in August the ICC issued its first decision concerning reparations for victims in the case of Thomas Lubanga.<sup>18</sup> This decision stipulates that the Trust Fund for Victims must guarantee reparations for those who were directly or indirectly harmed as a consequence of the recruitment and use of children under the age of 15 as soldiers. The ICC established that the gender dimension should be taken into account and that the reparations should be implemented without committing discrimination for reasons of age, ethnicity or gender and should take into account the fact that the victims may have suffered sexual violence. Furthermore, it stated that among the victims priority must be given to those who have suffered sexual or gender violence.

In parallel, the government of **Mali** signalled that it intended to ask the ICC to investigate the atrocities committed by the armed groups that occupy the north of the country, which included rape.

In **Sierra Leone**, the government passed the Law against Sexual Crimes, which includes various categories of such crimes, prohibits forced conjugal sexual relations, aims to protect minors (especially girls) from abuse by traditional or religious leaders and teachers, and increases the sentences for this abuse. Both women's organisations and the United Nations stressed the importance of this new legislation in a country with high levels of sexual violence that were particularly significant during the years of armed conflict (between 1991 and 2002).

The Congress of **Peru** passed a law to extend the right to reparation to victims of sexual violence during the armed conflict with Shining Path. The previous legislation only included compensation for rape victims, whereas under the modified law, victims of sexual slavery, kidnappings, forced prostitution and forced abortion may also opt to claim reparations. Some 3,000 women were victims of this sexual violence, perpetrated by the state armed forces (army, navy and police force) and to a lesser extent by insurgent actors (Shining Path and MRTA).

### **c) Gender violence in contexts of socio-political crisis or armed conflict**

In **Afghanistan**, the UNAMA provided figures of civilian victims of the armed conflict broken down by gender and age, pointing out that during the period between 1<sup>st</sup> January 2012 and 30<sup>th</sup> June 2012, of the 3,099 civilian victims (1,145 killed and 1,954 injured), 578 were minors (231 killed and 347 injured) and 347 were women (118 killed and 229 injured). The figures for women and minors represented 30% of the total number of civilian victims, which represented an increase of 1% in respect of the previous period between July and December 2011.

A report by Oxfam revealed that four out of five women in **Yemen** felt that their lives had worsened in the last year and that the role played by women in the popular uprisings that took place in the country did not lead to an improvement in their situation.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, the grave humanitarian crisis affecting the country is having a serious impact on women, as are the conflicts and insecurity in which the country is immersed, which has led to an increase in gender violence and in forced marriages and child marriage. Furthermore, displaced women have been victims of especially difficult situations and conditions remained too complicated for them to return safely.

In **Bolivia**, the Legislative Assembly passed the Law against Harassment and Political Violence against Women, promoted by the Association of Bolivian

18. International Criminal Court, *Situation In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo In The Case Of The Prosecutor V. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations*, ICC-01/04-01/06, August 7, 2012, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf>.

19. Sultana Begum, *Still Waiting for Change in Yemen. Making the political transition work for women*, Oxfam, September 24, 2012, <http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/still-waiting-change-yemen>.

The global economic crisis that began in 2008 is having a gender impact that is difficult to ignore due to the direct consequences that it has generated for the lives of millions of people throughout the world. Some authors coincide in highlighting the strong links that exist between patriarchy and capitalism when searching for the causes of the current situation, caused by the spreading of the crisis in the financial market to all sectors of the economy, pointing out that the financial sector is a hyper-masculine sector that has sustained a sexist economy that has generated profound inequalities.<sup>20</sup> However, beyond incorporating the gender perspective in the analysis of the causes of this crisis, with respect to the consequences, men and women have been gravely affected by this crisis in terms of unemployment, impoverishment and loss of welfare or restricted access to public services. Nevertheless, these effects have been unequal in terms of gender.

Although it is true that, above all in the early stages, one of the first consequences was the increase in unemployment in predominantly masculine labour sectors,<sup>21</sup> this reality must be qualified in terms of its geographical and time scope. The increase in male unemployment as a consequence of the crisis in areas such as construction, industry or the automotive sector, with a mostly male workforce, was basically concentrated in industrialised countries and not in countries where the economic importance of these sectors is very small. As such, the impact of the crisis in respect of female employment in other parts of the world was notable from the start, as seen in the huge loss of employment in predominantly female sectors, such as the export-led manufacturing industry.<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, the subsequent spreading of the crisis to other economic sectors, basically the public sector, through the policies for cutting social services promoted by international financial institutions, has had a strong impact, with serious repercussions in terms of gender. First of all because this is a labour sector with high female presence, especially in western economies, which has led male and female unemployment rates to level out. Secondly, because the reduction in the provision of social services generates huge repercussions in respect of gender inequality by transferring the provision of these services from the public to the private sphere.<sup>23</sup> As such, the economic crisis is having a strong impact on the reproductive economy, since it has made inequalities that already existed even more acute.<sup>24</sup> The double burden borne by many women as a consequence of their participation in the productive and reproductive spheres of the economy has increased for various reasons.<sup>25</sup> On the one hand, the increase in male unemployment led many women, especially at the onset of the crisis, to be the main breadwinners in their homes. On the other hand, the reduction in public services (healthcare, education, etc.) has transferred the responsibility for these services disproportionately onto women in the private sphere.

This growing gender inequality triggered by the economic crisis can be viewed from the perspective of structural violence against women. The global economic crisis is increasingly impeding the full development of women's capacities and preventing their basic needs from being met, since it has led to an increase in the amount of time devoted to both productive and reproductive work in conditions of growing precariousness and vulnerability, while at the same time strengthening impoverishment, one of the clearest signs of this violence.

Councilwomen (Asociación de Concejalas de Bolivia, ACOBOL) and other women's organisations in civil society, with the goal of putting an end to this harassment. In recent years there have been more than 4,000 reports of harassment against women who participate in the political sphere, including murder cases. Thanks to the passing of this law, harassment and political violence against women now constitute crimes punishable by the penal code. Meanwhile, the Congress is debating the Violence against Women Law and the incorporation of the crime of femicide in the penal code.

The government announced the drafting of a proposal for a law aimed at dismantling the patriarchal system, guaranteeing gender parity and alternation between male and female holders of public and trade union posts.

### d) Participation of women in armed conflict

With respect to the impact of armed conflict from a gender perspective and to the active participation of women in armed conflicts, the armed opposition group

20. Valentine M. Moghadam, "Women, Gender and Economic Crisis Revisited," *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 10, no. 1 (2011): 30-40; Elisabeth Prügl, "'If Lehman Brothers Had Been Lehman Sisters...': Gender and Myth in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis," *International Political Sociology* 6, no. 1 (2012): 21-35, doi: 10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00149.x.
21. According to the ILO "in 2008, the male unemployment rate in developed economies and the European Union was 6.6 percent, which represents a 1.1 percent increase on 2007, against 6.8 percent for women, which represents an increase of 0.8 percent in respect of 2007. This means that in 2008 the gender gap closed in terms of the unemployment rate but only due to the fact that the situation in the labour market became worse for men than it did for women". International Labour Organization, *Global Employment Trends for Women: March 2009* (Geneva: ILO, 2009).
22. Bethan Emmett, *Paying the Price for the Economic Crisis*, Oxfam International Discussion Paper, March, 2009, <http://www.oxfam.org/policy/women-workers-pay-price-global-economic-crisis>.
23. Ruth Pearson, "The impact of the economic crisis on women – two years on," *Policy and Practice Blog*, Oxfam International, March 27, 2012, <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/blog/2012/03/economic-crisis-two-years-on>.
24. Richard King and Caroline Sweetman, *Gender Perspectives on the Global Economic Crisis*, Oxfam International Discussion Paper, February, 2010, <http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/gender-perspectives-global-economic-crisis>.
25. Lourdes Benería and Carmen Sarasúa, "¿A quién afecta el recorte del gasto?," *El País*, October 28, 2010.

Lashkar-e-Toiba created a unit made up exclusively of women, called Dukhtaran-e-Toiba, which replaced the existing Dukhtaram-e-Millat, also made up entirely of women. According to Indian intelligence sources, the aim of this organisation is to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir across the Line of Control.

In June a group of women from the Syrian city of Homs announced the creation of an armed group made up exclusively of women, called the Banat al-Walid battalion. The members stated that they were not linked to any other organisation and that their goal was to assist injured people and refugees, to provide women with training in the use of arms to protect themselves from the militias of the Syrian president, and to ensure that the crimes committed by the regime were reported by the media. The media outlet Asharq Al-Awsat stated that there was evidence that the members of the armed group were doctors and nurses from Homs whose work had been made enormously difficult by the destruction of healthcare facilities.

### 4.3. Peacebuilding from a gender perspective

This section contains an analysis of some of the most noteworthy initiatives that have been implemented to incorporate the gender perspective within the various spheres of peacebuilding.

#### a) Resolution 1325

In October the UN Secretary-General presented his annual report on women, peace and security to the UN Security Council, in compliance with the provisions of Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council of 2000.<sup>26</sup> In the report presented in 2012 the Secretary-General continued his analysis of the achievements accomplished in this respect on the basis of the indicators approved in 2010. The analysis of these indicators focused on the areas of prevention, participation, protection, relief and recovery, referring to the achievements accomplished in 2011. The Secretary-General singled out as one of the main obstacles to the achievement of greater progress the fact that there is a great lack of coordination between the information that is sent to the UN Security Council on the situation of women and girls in situations of armed conflict and the response to these problems offered by the body. Nevertheless, Ban Ki-moon pointed to the decrease in the amount of information transmitted to the Security Council as evidence of the fact that fewer reports presented by the UN international missions deployed on the ground contained data on the violation of the human rights

of women and girls than in the previous year (79% of reports against 90%). Consequently, only 38% of the Security Council's resolutions contained references to Resolution 1325. The analysis of other indicators in the report highlighted some significant data, such as the fact that during 2011 102 reports of abuse and sexual exploitation perpetrated by members of the peacekeeping forces were registered. As regards the participation of women in peace processes and the inclusion of the gender perspective in these processes, the report stated that with respect to the 14 peace negotiations in which the United Nations took part in 2011, 12 included women in the mediation support teams but women were only present in four of the delegations that participated in the talks. Meanwhile, of the nine peace agreements signed in 2011, only two of them mentioned the issue of women, peace and security (Somalia and Yemen). With respect to the participation of women in United Nations missions, the report states that of the 28 missions deployed as of 31<sup>st</sup> December 2011, six were headed by a woman<sup>27</sup> (one more than in mid-2011) and five had women deputy heads (the same number as in the previous period).<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, all the peacekeeping missions and political missions led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations included advisers on gender issues. Notably, the report also stated that of the 12 truth commissions established between 2004 and 2012, only three of them had mandates that included provisions for addressing crimes of sexual and gender violence.

In parallel to the presentation of the report by the UN Secretary-General, the Security Council held its annual debate on women, peace and security, which focused specifically on the role of women's civil society organisations in the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts and in peacebuilding. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom claimed that very few new and specific commitments were raised on this issue by the states taking part in the debate. Moreover, despite the fact that most states welcomed the report presented by the Secretary-General, the governments of Russia and China voiced discontent. Russia declared that civil society organisations must only complement the role of the State and stated that National Action Plans must be used on a voluntary basis and only by countries in a situation of armed conflict. Meanwhile, China asserted that the Security Council is not the appropriate forum for drawing up mandates on universal human rights and that national governments are the bodies responsible for safeguarding women's rights.

#### b) The gender dimension in peace negotiations

In 2012 important formal peace processes took place in countries such as Somalia, Myanmar, the Philippines or

26. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security*, October 2, 2012, <http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=s/2012/732>.

27. Burundi, Cyprus, Liberia, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Timor-Leste.

28. Burundi, Iraq, DR Congo, Sudan (Darfur) and South Sudan.

Colombia, among others. In all of these processes, women's organisations pressed for greater involvement in negotiations and for their demands to be considered over the course of the talks between the parties in conflict.

As part of the peace process in **Somalia**, the Somali constitutional assembly approved a new constitution that recognises equal rights for all citizens regardless of gender, guarantees a 30% quota for women in the future parliament and government institutions, and specifically prohibits female genital mutilation, a practice that at its most severe may affect 98% of the country's women. In the months leading up to the approval of the new constitution, women's organisations, together with other civil society actors, had carried out various protest actions. In January more than 3,000 women demonstrated in Mogadishu to demand peace in the country. Moreover, the minister for women's development and family care, Mariam Aweis Jama, and the director for women's issues in the presidential palace, underlined at that time the need for a greater presence of women in parliament and in ministerial posts, in line with the provisions of the federal transition charter. In February, coinciding with a conference in London on Somalia, Somali women's organisations in the United Kingdom called on the British prime minister to demand that women were not excluded from the peace process, as well as for the important role that women have played in peacebuilding in Somalia to be recognised. The Somali women condemned the fact that until then all the negotiation processes had been dominated by men, in the case of both Somalis and representatives of the international community. Another noteworthy development was the participation of women in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Conference on Somalia held on 31<sup>st</sup> May and 1<sup>st</sup> June in Istanbul and facilitated by the Turkish government. Other sectors of civil society, such as traditional and religious leaders, young people, representatives of the diaspora and representatives of the private sector also took part. The conference ended with a declaration of support for the road map and the agreements signed to date (Garowe Principles I and II, Galkayo Principles, and the Addis Abeba declaration of 23<sup>rd</sup> May).

One of the highlights in respect of the various negotiation processes that took place in **Myanmar** in 2012 was the need expressed by the Women's League of Burma (WLB) (an umbrella group of 13 women's organisations of different ethnic groups) **for women to be included in the ongoing peace negotiations between the government of Myanmar and the various ethnic insurgencies**. The WLB stated that women had been consistently excluded from negotiations with the armed groups until then, pointing out that with the exception of the secretary general of the KNU, Zipporah Sein, no women had participated

*The Women's League of Burma called for the inclusion of women in the peace negotiations between the government of Myanmar and the ethnic insurgencies*

as leaders in the peace processes. The WLB addressed both the president of Myanmar and the insurgent organisations. Meanwhile, UN Women held training sessions for women from different ethnic groups with the goal of strengthening their capacities with a view to taking part in peace negotiations.

In **Afghanistan**, Gulali Noor Safi, one of the nine women who form part of the High Peace Council (which has 70 members) claimed that women were being excluded from the decision making processes of this body. Safi declared that they were taking part in some of the council's activities but not in the most far-reaching political ones. She also condemned the endorsement given by Karzai's government to a code proposed by religious sectors that allows husbands to beat wives and encourages segregation. Safi affirmed that women are not opposed to negotiating with the Taliban but that guarantees must be provided that women's rights will not be endangered as a result of these negotiations.

Notable among the positive developments that occurred during the year was the **preliminary peace agreement reached between the Philippine government and the armed opposition group MILF**, which will put an end to one of the armed conflicts that affect the region of Mindanao.<sup>29</sup> The **role played by women during the peace negotiations** that paved the way for an agreement was significant. Two of the five people who formed part of the government negotiating panel were women, along with four members of its secretariat. Two of the advisers of the MILF were also women. Women and the gender dimension are explicitly referred to twice in the agreement signed in October 2012.<sup>30</sup> The first mention recognises women's right to participate fully in the political sphere as well as their right to be protected from all forms of violence. The second mention recognises the right to equal opportunities and non-discrimination in socio-economic activities and public services regardless of class, beliefs, disability, gender or ethnicity. Various Philippine women's organisations, in particular those from the region of Mindanao, such as the Mindanao Commission on Women and the Mothers for Peace Movement, welcomed the agreement that had been reached but stressed the importance of women's participation in its implementation, as well as in the process of post-war rehabilitation. They also demanded the inclusion of women in the institutions that will be created on the basis of the signed agreement and that will oversee the implementation of the provisions listed in the agreement.

The announcement of the **start of negotiations between the government of Colombia and the FARC guerilla group** was welcomed by several Colombian women's organisations, which gave their backing to a negotiated out-

29. See the summary on Philippines (Mindanao-MILF) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts), chapter 3 (Peace Processes) and "The signing of a peace agreement between the government and the MILF in Mindanao" in chapter 5 (Opportunities for Peace in 2013).

30. The agreement between the Government of the Philippines and MILF (Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro) can be accessed at the website of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (<http://www.opapp.gov.ph/framework-agreement-on-the-bangsamoro>).



come to the armed conflict, demanded the involvement of women in the talks and asked for their demands to be placed on the negotiation agenda. However, concerns were voiced about the complete lack of women in the negotiating teams. Although during the exploratory phase of the process the FARC negotiating delegation included Sandra Ramírez, widow of the historic leader Manuel Marulanda “Tirofijo”, no woman was present among the main negotiators of the government delegation. Finally, the main negotiating teams in the peace talks that took place in Oslo and Havana were entirely composed of men. Some information filtered through of the participation of the Dutch guerilla Tanja Nijmeijer in the Havana talks, although the specific nature of her role remained unknown.

*Colombian women's organisations welcomed the start of peace negotiations between the government and the FARC but demanded the presence of women and for gender to be placed on the agenda*

Many analysts and activists expressed their concern in this respect, declaring that an important opportunity had been lost to integrate the gender perspective in the Colombian peace process. In this respect, five women's organisations (Red Nacional de Mujeres, Alianza Iniciativa de Mujeres Colombianas por la Paz-IMP, Corporación de Investigación Social y Económica [CIASE], Liga Internacional de Mujeres por la Paz y la Libertad [LIMPAL Colombia] and AFROLIDER) addressed the Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, pointing out the importance of peace negotiations in resolving the armed conflict and declaring their support for the negotiation process. However, they recalled the need to take into account women's contri-

butions as peacebuilders and underlined the importance of their participation in peace negotiations. Furthermore, the Red Nacional de Mujeres presented a series of specific demands in respect of these talks: the observance of a ceasefire during the peace process; the presence of women in the main negotiating teams of the government and the FARC; truth, justice and reparation for victims, specifically for the victims of sexual violence and guarantees that it will not be repeated; and the continuation of the negotiation process until an agreement is reached. Other organisations have pressed for the inclusion of women in the mediation teams of Cuba, Chile, Venezuela and Norway. Meanwhile, the Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres organisation welcomed the announcement by the FARC that it was declaring a two-month ceasefire from November 2012 to January 2013.

The executive director of UN Women, who visited Colombia to take part in the presentation by the government of the National Policy on Gender Equality for Women, expressed her support for the negotiation process, although she also called for the presence of women in the negotiations in order for their specific needs and proposals to be taken into account.

**Women's organisations in Mali demanded to participate in the negotiations under way as part of the transition process in the country.** A delegation of the REPSFECO/Mali network of organisations attended the negotiations that took in

#### Box 4.3. Sexual violence in ceasefire agreements and peace agreements

The United Nations Department of Political Affairs published a guide aimed at conflict mediators and their teams in order to address the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and integrate the issue in ceasefire and peace agreements.<sup>31</sup> The guide presents a series of principles that must govern the actions of mediation teams.

With respect to the **measures that must be adopted during ongoing hostilities and at the beginning of a mediation process**, first of all it is necessary to assess whether there are credible reports of conflict-related sexual violence that may be occurring, or may have occurred. Secondly, it is necessary to actively seek to engage parties to discuss the immediate termination of conflict-related sexual violence, in discussion of other violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Finally, consultation with and inclusion of women and gender experts in the process and as part of the mediation team must be ensured.

During the **drafting and negotiating of ceasefire and peace agreements**, the essential agreement provisions should ensure that sexual violence is included as a prohibited act, especially in the definition or principles of ceasefire. The monitoring for sexual violence must be included in ceasefire agreements, including in relevant annexes. There must be recognition of sexual violence used in conflict as a method and tactic of warfare, as applicable. Furthermore, amnesties for crimes under international law must be prohibited, and arrangements for transitional justice must be included, particularly prosecution, reparations and truth-seeking bodies.

Additionally, **the security provisions** must ensure that command and control structures and codes of conduct for security actors prohibit conflict-related sexual violence and punish misconduct. Individuals credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for conflict-related sexual violence must be excluded from participation or integration into government and the national security system, including armed forces, police, intelligence services and national guard, as well as civilian oversight

31. Mediation Support Unit, *Guidance for Mediators. Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ceasefire and Peace Agreements*, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2012, [http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/sexual\\_violence](http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/sexual_violence).



and control mechanisms and other similar entities. Early, voluntary release and/or registration of those abducted, coerced or forcibly recruited by the armed forces or armed groups must also be ensured. Security sector institutions must be mandated to combat conflict-related sexual violence and training must be provided to develop military and law enforcement capabilities to respond to it, including for military police.

As regards **provisions for justice and reparations**, it is necessary to ensure that amnesties for crimes under international law are prohibited; that provisions for transitional justice processes address issues of conflict-related sexual violence with equal priority to other international crimes; and that provisions for transitional justice mechanisms incorporate specific reference to conflict-related sexual violence, include measures to protect the security and dignity of victims and witnesses, and include women and gender experts in their design and oversight. Finally, provisions for reparations and relief, including for victims of conflict-related sexual violence, must be guaranteed.

place in April in Burkina Faso and urged the president of this country, Blaise Compaoré, the official facilitator of the process, to ensure the presence and participation of women in all the mechanisms and at all levels of the process. Moreover, the women of REPSFECO /Mali (Network of Women for Peace and Security in the ECOWAS region) demanded that urgent measures be adopted to put an end to the sexual violence that is taking place in the north of the country, as well as in order to achieve the unconditional liberation of this area through dialogue and without the use of force. In the months leading up to the negotiations, various women's organisations had publicly called for the greater participation of women in politics and had initiated a process to develop a road map for the inclusion of female mediators in the resolution of the political crisis in which the country is immersed.

### c) Civil society initiatives

In **Colombia**, the group Mujeres del Mundo Gestoras por la Paz pressed for the release of ten members of the Colombian security forces kidnapped and held by the FARC guerilla group for up to 14 years in some cases. The group, led and promoted by the former Colombian senator Piedad Córdoba and the director of the House for Women in Colombia, Olga Amparo Sánchez, is composed of female politicians and international personalities such as Lucía Topolansky (senator-Uruguay), Jody Williams (Nobel Peace Prize recipient-USA), Alice Walker (writer-USA), Elena Poniatowska (writer-Mexico), Mirta Baravalle (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo-Argentina), Isabel Allende (senator-Chile), Rigoberta Menchú (Nobel Peace Prize recipient-Guatemala), Elsie Mongue (human rights defender-Ecuador), Socorro Gomes (President of the World Peace Council-Brazil), Margarita Zapata (political leader-Mexico), Xiomara Castro de Zelaya (political leader-Honduras) and Nidia Díaz (member of parliament-El Salvador). This group of women, linked to the organisation Colombianos y Colombianas por la Paz, has been working since February 2011 to urge women to join in calling on the FARC to release those kidnapped. Following the release, they sent letters to the Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, and the

FARC, urging them to start negotiations to put an end to the armed conflict in which the country is immersed.

In **Pakistan**, the Women's Action Forum, an organisation that defends women's rights, called on the government to resolve the conflict in Balochistan, in line with the wishes and rights of the population of this province. This organisation underlined the important peacebuilding role played by the women of Balochistan and highlighted the need to put an end to the abuse perpetrated by the armed forces and extremist religious groups. Women's Action Forum stressed that it is striving to achieve a secular Pakistan in which women's rights are respected.

Meanwhile, Code Pink, the feminist anti-war organisation, campaigned against the use of US drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and took part in the anti-drone march in Pakistan led by the activist Imran Khan. This march condemned the use of drones and the effect that bombings were having on the civilian population in the affected areas.<sup>32</sup>

In the **Basque Country**, women from different political parties published a joint article in the press entitled "A proposal, in feminine plural, to work towards peace", in which they stressed the need to build peace in the Basque Country on the basis of social plurality. They also referred to the need to construct a memory composed of the different accounts of the conflict, recognising and declaring all the victims. Moreover, they called for a change in Spanish prison policy in order to put an end to the policies of dispersion, as well as to release gravely ill prisoners. Some of the article's signatories had formed part of the Ahotsak initiative, which in 2006 called for a negotiated outcome to the conflict. Ahotsak was formed by women from all the political parties in the Basque Country, with the exception of the Popular Party (PP) as well as from different social, cultural and trade union sectors.

In **Serbia**, the Women in Black organisation announced that it would carry out actions to mark the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo, which lasted for almost four years and in which 11,500 people were killed, including 1,600 minors. The Serbian women demand ac-

32. See "Unmanned aerial vehicles: the challenges of remote-controlled warfare" in chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2013).

countability for what occurred, a demand that is considered an act of treason by many sectors of Serbian society.

Dozens of representatives of women's organisations in **Syria** met in Cairo at the Syrian Women's Forum for Peace, with the goal of strengthening the network of civil society organisations in order to promote national dialogue for a peaceful outcome to the conflict.

The organisation Azzad Jammu & Kashmir Women for Peace Organisation and the Centre for Dialogue Reconciliation held the Intra-Kashmir Cross-LoC Women's Dialogue, in which women from the regions of **Azad Kashmir** (administered by Pakistan) and **Jammu and Kashmir** (administered by India) took part. The participants demanded greater flexibility in the conditions for moving from one region to another, as well as the consolidation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the gradual demilitarisation of the area (including the Siachen glacier and its declaration as a peace park) and justice for victims of the conflict, in particular widows and "half-widows"<sup>33</sup>, missing persons, displaced persons and refugees. They also pressed for the setting up of an independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission, an end to human rights violations and the repeal of anti-terrorism legislation.

Marking the **International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women** on 25<sup>th</sup> November, a campaign was launched entitled "**16 Days of Activism against Gender Violence**", which has been held in recent years on this date. The motto of the 2012 campaign, in which 4,100 organisations from 172 countries took part, was "From peace in the home to peace in the world: let's challenge militarism and end violence against women!". The campaign mainly focused on the role of state actors as perpetrators of gender violence and sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict scenarios, and the proliferation of light weapons and their role in domestic violence.

#### d) International agenda

In July the negotiations for the approval of an **Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)** concluded unsuccessfully due to the refusal of five countries (the US, Cuba, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela) to sign a text that was actually less ambitious than the one originally promoted. The women's organisation that had campaigned to promote the prohibition of the sale of conventional arms to places where there is a risk of them being used to perpetrate or facilitate acts of gender violence, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, condemned the lack of political will of the states that finally blocked the agreement. Nevertheless, they welcomed the will shown by a large number of governments to support the inclusion of references to gender issues. The references were supposed to appear in the preamble and in one of the articles of the treaty.

**Four civil society organisations<sup>34</sup> had called for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to take into account the gender dimension and the specific gender impacts of the arms trade.** The organisations declared that the risk of arms being used to perpetrate or facilitate acts of gender violence must be evaluated on the basis of establishing effective regulation systems that enable the control of arms and the prevention of gender violence, taking into account the evidence on the existence of gender violence. They underlined the fact that arms sales have consequences from a gender perspective. These include the systematic use of sexual violence against the civilian population in armed conflicts; the use of arms by states to carry out repression (including sexual violence against the opposition); or the disproportionate effect of these arms on women in some countries due to high rates of homicides and domestic violence involving firearms.

**The Rio+20 United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development** was held in June. **Women's organisations joined environmental organisations in labelling the document that was finally approved a failure and step backwards.** As far as the gender perspective is concerned, the most noteworthy development was the **failure to recognise sexual and reproductive rights as a key component of sustainable development**, a deliberate omission that represents a blow for the advancement of women's rights. The women's organisations that were present at the summit stated that sexual and reproductive rights represent one of the most effective paths towards women's empowerment, with effects on sustainable development and the reduction of climate change. Criticism was also levelled at aspects such as the promotion of the so-called green economy, which according to several civil society organisations represents nothing more than an image campaign for governments with no beneficial effect on the environment, on sustainable development or on the reduction of poverty. They also criticised the fact that in the final document no mention is made of the use of nuclear energy and radioactive pollution.

At the summit, UN Women brought together various female heads of state and government, who called for the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment in order to promote sustainable development. However, they made no mention in their statement of the issue sexual and reproductive rights.

Meanwhile, the presidents of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and of Malawi, Joyce Banda, the only two African heads of state, agreed to work together to promote African women's rights and to improve their living conditions as part of the Women's Decade approved by the AU in 2010. The person responsible for gender issues in the regional organisation welcomed the decision and declared that the resources held by the AU for the fulfilment of the objectives of the aforementioned Decade would be made available to the presidents.

33. A large number of women are de facto widows whose status has not been formally recognised. These women are known as half-widows. According to Muslim legislation, a missing person cannot be declared dead until seven years have gone by, which also prevents the wife from inheriting property or remarrying during this period.


34. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, IANSA, Amnesty International and Religions for Peace International.

# 5. Opportunities for Peace in 2013

After the 2012 analysis of conflicts and peacebuilding, in this chapter the Escola de Cultura de Pau highlights seven scenarios which offer opportunities for peace in 2013. There are five contexts of current or past armed conflict or socio-political crisis where a series of factors come together that could lead to positive changes, and two issues on the international agenda that could also contribute to advances in peacebuilding. The opportunities identified refer to: the new impulse in Georgia's relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the Georgian parliamentary elections; the positive developments in the negotiations between the Indian government and the NSCN-IM insurgency, which could give rise to the signing of a peace agreement; the signing of the peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the MILF; the dialogue launched between the Senegalese Government and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), which offers hope of a possible peaceful solution to the conflict; the negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC; the second negotiation attempt to approve an arms trade treaty; and the role that youth can play as a catalyst for change and dialogue in situations of conflict.

All these opportunities for peace require the effort and genuine commitment of the actors involved and, where needed, the support of international stakeholders so that the positive synergies and factors already found can contribute to the construction of peace. In this sense, the Escola de Cultura de Pau's analysis aims to offer a realistic view of these scenarios, identifying the positive features that nurture the expectations for change, as well as stating the difficulties that exist and that could be obstacles against their materialisation as peace opportunities.

Map 5.1. Opportunities for peace in 2013



## 5.1. Georgia: a new post-election boost for relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

The Georgian parliamentary elections of 1<sup>st</sup> October, surprisingly won by the Georgian Dream (GD) opposition coalition led by the billionaire and philanthropist Bidzina Ivanishvili, have paved the way for a new period in Georgia's domestic and foreign policy, raising questions but also offering opportunities, such as the possibility of a new more positive direction in relations with the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Since unilaterally declaring their secession in the mid-1990s following brief armed conflicts, these territories have consolidated their political, economic and social separation from Georgia, a process that became more intense following the five-day Russia-Georgia war of 2008 and that was facilitated by pragmatic Russian patronage in the form of economic support, diplomatic recognition and military presence. Despite the current standstill in the process, a new opportunity for peace can be glimpsed, partially at least, due to the change in the Georgian government, the failure of previous initiatives and the room for manoeuvre in terms of Russian-Georgian rapprochement, among other factors. However, there are many elements that could close this window of opportunity.

As regards the new government (resulting from a parliament in which GD obtained 85 of the 150 seats and 55% of the votes, encouraging appointments have already been made.

The appointment of Paata Zakareishvili as the new minister for reintegration, entrusted with overseeing relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has been seen by many analysts (including the British NGO Conciliation Resources) as a positive step towards achieving an agreement between the parties. According to the analyst Thomas de Waal (Carnegie Endowment), Zakareishvili is possibly the Georgian who has shown most commitment to dialogue with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including in negotiations over the exchange of prisoners.<sup>1</sup> Another noteworthy appointment is that of the former Georgian ambassador to the UN, Irakli Alasania, as defence minister and deputy prime minister. Alasania was also President Saakashvili's representative in talks with Abkhazia between 2005 and 2008, until he resigned over the Georgian government's handling of the crisis with Russia and joined the opposition. He enjoys a good reputation among Abkhazian politicians.

Zakareishvili, Alasania and Ivanishvili himself have already indicated some of the key aspects that will characterise the new period under the government of the GD party. On the one hand, the new government has expressed its wish to normalise relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia through implementing trust-building measures on a community level, boosting economic links and engaging in direct dialogue with the two territories. The government plans to adopt the approach of ceasing to treat the two territories as mere puppets of Moscow, the stance held by the previous government, which focused its attention on

Russia, especially after the five-day war of August 2008. As regards specific measures, Ivanishvili stated during his election campaign that he would consider reopening the rail link between Georgia and Russia, which passes through Abkhazia. The Gali district, with a Georgian majority but under Abkhazian control, was singled out as a possible starting point for the implementation of the new trust-building measures. The strategy, which will be developed in greater detail as the new government settles in, initially consists of rebuilding trust with the authorities and populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and aims to bring about their rapprochement with a new institutionally reformed Georgia that is no longer hostile to or in conflict with Russia. In this respect, Georgia has stressed from the start that it is committed to finding solutions that do not involve imposition or aggression. However, the government still sees the two entities as forming part of Georgia and completely rules out recognising their independence. In the first meeting of the negotiation process in Geneva (in which Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are taking part, with the mediation of the UN, the OSCE and the EU) with the new Georgian team, held in December, Georgia highlighted the progress made in talks on security.

In addition, the new Georgian government seems willing to combine the pro-European and pro-Atlantic stance of the previous government with an improvement in relations with Russia. The divisions and tensions between the two countries in the last few years have involved geo-strategic, economic and political elements, along with mutual dislike between Putin and Saakashvili. Bilateral relations reached their nadir in 2008 with the five-day war. In the context of the new scenario, both parties have shown their willingness to enter talks. Georgia created the post of special representative of the Georgian prime minister for relations with Russia and the first direct talks took place.

However, there are many factors that may shut this apparent window of opportunity, which is only just opening. They include the divisions that exist within the governing coalition itself, which is made up of disparate groups. Meanwhile, the fact that Saakashvili will remain as president until the end of his term in office in 2013 will lead to splits between the president's office and the government and the parliamentary majority that sustains it. Once his term of office has ended the new constitution will come into force, transferring powers currently held by the president to the prime minister. In turn, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have expressed scepticism regarding the new government. There is a possibility of once again overestimating the appeal of a new Georgia (more flexible, more pragmatic) for two entities that have been effectively cut off from the country for the best part of two decades.

*The new Georgian government is seeking the normalisation of relations with the two de facto independent regions*

1. Robert Coalson, "News Analysis: Ivanishvili and the Russians," *RFE/RL*, October 9, 2012, <http://www.rferl.org/content/analysis-georgia-ivanishvili-and-the-russians/24733895.html>.

## 5.2. A peace agreement for Nagaland

Some significant steps were taken in the Indian state of Nagaland in the last few months of 2012 that may lead to the resolution of a conflict that dates back to pre-independence India. Nagaland, one of the states that make up the north-east region, demanded its independence in 1946 and proclaimed it one day before India achieved its own. However, Nagaland's independence was never accepted by the new Indian state and since then it has been immersed in a situation of tension and armed conflict in various phases. 1956 signalled the start of the armed insurgency which led to a considerable escalation of violence. Although various attempts were made at negotiation and rapprochement between the Indian government and the Naga armed groups, it was not until 1997 that a significant reduction in violence was achieved through the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the Indian government and the NSCN-IM armed group. Since then, the two parties have been involved in a process of dialogue thanks to which the ceasefire agreement has been maintained and renewed and several rounds of talks have been held. In 2001, the NSCN-K, one of the other main insurgent groups in the state, also reached a ceasefire agreement with the government. The signing of the agreements did not signal a complete end to violence in the state and the various insurgent factions remained at loggerheads until 2009, when a significant reduction in factional violence occurred after the signing of the so-called "Covenant of Reconciliation" by the armed groups NSCN-IM, NSCN-K and NNC.

Over the course of 2012 progress has been made at various times, which seems to indicate that the negotiations between the government and the NSCN-IM (ongoing since the signing of the ceasefire in 1997 but unsuccessful to date in terms of specific positive developments) may be close to producing an agreement. First of all it should be pointed out that both the armed group and the government are working on a memorandum of understanding that encompasses various proposals on some of the key issues of the dispute, such as the formal recognition of the unique history of the Naga people and far-reaching institutional reforms that address their aspirations for self-government.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, there were reports that the Indian government was looking into proposals to address the long-standing demand of the Naga insurgency regarding the integration of the entire Naga population present in the various states of India's north-east region and may be drawing up a proposal for the creation of an autonomous institution that preserves the Naga identity and culture in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

The initiatives carried out by the Naga government and the Indian legislative assembly in parallel with the direct negotiations between the government and the insurgency, aimed at giving a significant boost to the peace process, constitute another important development. In this respect, in August

all the parliamentarians and the chief minister of Nagaland himself, Neiphiu Rio (who in 2009 formed the "Joint Legislators' Forum JLF of Nagaland Legislative Assembly on the Naga political issue" with the goal of promoting the peace process), held a meeting with the Indian prime minister in which they expressed their willingness to give up their seats if this helped to achieve a new political agreement on the basis of a peace agreement prior to the elections scheduled for the first quarter of 2013. Meanwhile, the chief minister of Nagaland also headed a delegation that met with the Indian interior minister to call on the central government to ensure that the peace negotiations concluded before the end of the legislative period in Nagaland in March 2013.

### *The progress made in negotiations between the government and the NSCN-IM in 2012 may lead to a peace agreement*

Another significant factor is the social support for a negotiated outcome to the conflict in a state with different groups of civil society working towards peace. Churches, women's organisations, tribal organisations and various social collectives in Nagaland have frequently expressed their wish to see a solution to the conflict that brings an end to the violence and at the same time meets the aspirations of significant sectors of Naga society for greater recognition and sovereignty.

Although the peace process appears to be at a crucial stage that may lead to a long-awaited agreement, some risks exist that may endanger a successful outcome. First of all it should be pointed out that the negotiations for the agreement are being carried out with the NSCN-IM, which is one of the main insurgent groups in the state but not the only one. Other armed groups, such as the NSCN-K may also be about to enter negotiations with the government, although for the time being nothing has been announced. The risk of the other insurgent organisations feeling slighted if they are not taken into account in seeking a solution for Nagaland must be borne in mind if a solution to the end of the conflict is not to be endangered. Meanwhile, although for some years the insurgencies have not been in direct conflict with the security forces, factional clashes between the various armed groups have been an ever-present factor. Although rapprochements between the leaderships of the groups have led to a considerable reduction in this violence in recent years, it has not disappeared completely and its persistence may yet prove a stumbling block to peace. Furthermore, the opposition of the governments of neighbouring states to the creation of Greater Nagaland, bringing together the entire Naga population of the north-east region of India, may also hinder the achievement of an agreement on one of the conflict's crucial aspects. As such, although there are several objective reasons for optimism, those leading the process must also realise that significant obstacles exist that must be addressed in a flexible and creative manner, enabling new perspectives to be adopted in order to overcome the stumbling blocks that have prevented peace from being achieved in the decades that have passed since the start of the conflict half a century ago.

2. For a more detailed analysis of the process, see chapter 3 (Peace Processes).



### 5.3. The signing of a peace agreement between the government of the Philippines and the MILF in Mindanao

On 15<sup>th</sup> October, after more than 15 years of negotiations, the Philippine government and the MILF signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB),<sup>4</sup> paving the way for the resolution of a significant part of the armed conflict that has affected Mindanao for more than four decades. Although the FAB is a preliminary agreement rather than a definitive peace agreement, both the government and the MILF, along with the international community and the media, have considered the signing of the FAB one of the main turning points in the peace process in Mindanao in the last few decades. As such, there are several reasons for optimism.

First of all, the signing of the FAB was preceded by a substantial and sustained reduction in the clashes between the MILF and the armed forces, to such an extent that in 2012 hardly any armed hostilities between the two sides were reported. This can be explained not only by the spirit of cooperation observed in the various rounds of negotiations that took place during the year but also by both parties' willingness to respect the agreement for the cessation of hostilities and by the proper functioning of the mechanisms for verifying the said agreement (mainly the committees that coordinate the verification of the ceasefire and the International Monitoring Team).

Secondly, both sides acknowledge that the high degree of internationalisation of the negotiations improves the possibilities of success in the peace process. In this respect, it is worth highlighting the involvement of the Malaysian government, serving as the official facilitator of the negotiations, the role played by the International Contact Group (made up of several international NGOs and governments) sitting as an official observer in the talks, the recent involvement of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in the dialogue process, the participation of the International Monitoring Team (made up of several countries) in the verification of the ceasefire, or the willingness expressed on many occasions by several governments and by the UN, the EU and other international bodies to play a part in the reconstruction and development of Mindanao once a definitive peace agreement has been reached.

Thirdly, several analysts argue that both the government and the MILF have learned many lessons over so many years of negotiations, especially in terms of negative experiences, such as the 1996 peace agreement between the government and the MNLF or the failure to sign the agreement on the ancestral domain of the Moro people, which triggered a spiral of violence and the paralysis of the peace process. In respect of the agreement of the ancestral domain of the Moro people, the last major attempt to resolve the armed conflict, the FAB is more explicit in recognising the rights of Muslim minority groups and seems to have been more open to the suggestions and concerns of the collectives affected by the agreement. Furthermore, the FAB takes a flexible approach to the more sensitive issues of the negotiations and leaves their final

details for the subsequent approval of the basic law of the Bangsamoro political entity that should replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao within a few years.

However, the government and the MILF have pointed out on several occasions that despite the international repercussion and media coverage enjoyed by the FAB, no definitive peace agreement has yet been reached, and that some of the most controversial aspects of the agenda still need to be negotiated, such as power-sharing, wealth-sharing and, above all, "normalisation", a concept that encompasses the disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion of the MILF's estimated 11,000 combatants and the return to normality of the people and communities affected by so many decades of conflict. In this respect, some voices have already warned the MILF about the risks of handing in its weapons without receiving full assurance that the underlying causes of the conflict are going to be addressed and resolved.

Meanwhile, the existence of a faction of the MILF that is openly opposed to the peace process (the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters - BIFF) may raise doubts about the MILF's commitment to peace. In this respect, the government has occasionally accused the MILF of connivance (with or without the knowledge and authorisation of the group's leaders) with groups such as the MNLF, Abu Sayyaf, the BIFF or even private militias at the service of certain local politicians. As regards the MNLF, the group that broke away from the MILF at the end of the 1970s, the main obstacles to making progress in negotiations are its likely military reaction to ensure that it is not excluded from the political process and, furthermore, the difficulties involved in structuring and harmonising two peace processes that are taking place in parallel and that address similar demands (the same territory and the same collective: the Moro people).<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the government must deal with some political sectors opposed to signing a peace agreement and with the accusations that it could be using the peace process in Mindanao to achieve political objectives (such as the reform of the constitution) that are unrelated to the resolution of the conflict.

The aforementioned difficulties notwithstanding, both the government and the MILF have emphasised that the FAB is a historical milestone and probably contains the basic principles and contents for an eventual comprehensive and definitive peace agreement. The agreement essentially makes it possible, on the one hand, to preserve the territorial integrity and political unity of the Philippines, an absolute condition for the government and for a large swath of the country's population and political class. On the other hand, the FAB recognises the historical grievances of the Moro people, such as their right to self-determination, and opens up the possibility of the creation of a new political structure (called Bangsamoro), with broad powers of self-government.

*The preliminary peace agreement encompasses broad powers of self-government for the Bangsamoro region and opens the door to the consolidation of peace in Mindanao after 15 years of negotiations and 40 years of armed conflict*

## 5.4. Senegal: prospects of a negotiated outcome to the conflict in Casamance

On the eve of the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the conflict in the Casamance region (26<sup>th</sup> December 2012), the Senegalese government and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC, by its French acronym) entered a new round of negotiations that has raised expectations of a possible peaceful and negotiated outcome to the one of the longest-running armed conflicts in the contemporary history of Africa. The situation in Casamance (a geographical area that is virtually cut off from Senegal by Gambia and for which the MFDC demands independence) has been the subject of several rounds of negotiations, peace agreements and ceasefires in the past, none of which have led to a resolution of the conflict. Following the stepping up of violence in 2011 as the elections approached in Senegal, the coming together of a series of factors led to the start of a new phase of dialogue with the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio in the last quarter of 2012.

One of the key factors in bringing about the change of scenario has been the arrival in power of a new president, Macky Sall, bringing Abdoulaye Wade's 12-year rule to an end. At the start of his term in office, Wade had pledged to resolve the Casamance issue within 100 days, yet it was not until 2004 that Wade signed a peace agreement with the historical leader of the MFDC, Diamacoune Senghor. However, the agreement was never implemented, which led to a distancing of the group's most radical factions. Senghor's death in 2007 brought the agreement to a standstill and widened the divisions in the MFDC. Over the following years Wade implemented a policy described by its critics as a "divide and conquer" strategy and as an attempt to "buy peace" (offering money to factions of the MFDC in exchange for a de facto ceasefire) without addressing the underlying causes of the conflict.<sup>3</sup> Sall began his term in office in March 2012 with a new more cautious approach, acknowledging that the resolution of the conflict would take time but insisting that dealing with the situation in Casamance would be a priority for his government.

The new president has also explicitly acknowledged the need to involve Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in a negotiated outcome. The two neighbouring countries have played a significant and ambivalent role in the conflict, alternately supporting and persecuting the MFDC rebels who pass through their respective territories. In this respect, the first visit made by Sall after becoming president of Senegal was to Gambia, with the goal of pledging his support for negotiations. Many observers of the process have also highlighted the importance of the change of discourse offered by Sall, who has publicly declared his willingness to engage in frank talks with the MFDC and, unlike Wade, has not imposed any conditions regarding the location of the negotiations, opening up the possibility of them taking place abroad, in line with the rebels' wishes.<sup>4</sup>

*The new Senegalese president, Macky Sall, has acknowledged the importance of involving the neighbouring countries, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, in a negotiated outcome to the conflict in Casamance*

The creation of a scenario conducive to peace talks has also been determined by the positioning of the various factions of the MFDC, split into two fronts: the south, with factions led by César Atoute Badiate and Ousmane Niantang Diatta; and the north, led by Salif Sadio. Sadio's front (the most powerful in terms of armed capability) expressed its willingness to negotiate at the start of 2012. However, Sadio has rejected maintaining contacts with the other factions of the movement, of which he considers himself the sole representative and interlocutor. In mid-September Badiate and Niantang announced their reunification and declared their willingness to enter talks with the government.

In this context, with a reduction in violence in Casamance, in mid-October 2012 the first meeting was held between representatives of the government and representatives of Sadio's MFDC in Rome. The release in December of eight soldiers held for almost a year by Sadio's faction was seen as a positive gesture and was followed by the announcement of a second round of negotiations for early 2013. In parallel, there were reports that the archbishop of Dakar, at Sall's request, had opened a channel of dialogue with Badiate's MFDC, while the president of Gambia, Yaya Jammeh, was attempting to broker a meeting between the factions of the MFDC in order to promote their reconciliation.

As in the case of other contexts, and bearing in mind the failure of agreements in recent years, the peace negotiations over the conflict in Casamance are fraught with challenges. In respect of the dialogue process, sources close to the mediation team have warned of the problems represented by the division of the MFDC into different factions when it comes to negotiating, while the government has acknowledged that it will have to broaden the process in the future to include other social sectors. The talks must address the grievances at the source of the conflict and reconcile the aspirations for independence of the MFDC with the offers made by the government to implement a decentralised system that transfers powers to Casamance. The process must also take into account the following elements: the interests of Casamance society (the MFDC has lost support in the capital of Casamance, Ziguinchor); the situation of victims and of the civilian population (both sides have been accused of abuse and human rights violations); the influence of the conflict's political economy (a combination of smuggling and illegal drug trading, from which combatants on both sides have benefited); and the reintegration of rebel militias. In what has become a low-intensity conflict, several experts highlight the growing conviction that there is no military solution for the Casamance conflict, which has claimed between 3,000 and 5,000 victims in three decades and has forced the displacement of tens of thousands of people.

3. Cristophe Châtelot, "Boundaries of Casamance remain blurred after 30 years of conflict," *Guardian Weekly*, June 19, 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/19/casamance-guinea-bissau-gambia-senegal>.

4. Rémi Carayol, "Sénégal: Casamance, un mot d'ordre, patience," *Jeune Afrique*, October 5, 2012, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2698p082-083.xml/O/>.

## 5.5. Colombia: towards a peace agreement with the guerrillas

Colombia has been mired in an armed conflict for almost fifty years following the creation in 1964 of two guerrilla organisations, the FARC and the ELN, as a result of the lack of conditions for political participation in a country with profound inequalities and with all the land concentrated in the hands of just a few landowners. Since then, there have been some (rather late) attempts to achieve a peace agreement, which ended in failure. The most recent were between 1998 and 2002 with the FARC, with an extensive area of the country being demilitarised in order to host the negotiations, and between 2005 and 2008 with the ELN, in Cuba. Following these failures, there have been some rapprochements and declarations by the guerrillas in favour of a negotiated political outcome. Nevertheless, it was not until Juan Manuel Santos became president of Colombia in 2010 that a new opportunity for reaching an agreement opened up.

On taking office as president, Juan Manuel Santos stated that he had the key to peace and would use it when the right conditions were in place and the guerrilla groups acted in good faith. The president discretely sent messages to the FARC guerrilla group and initial contacts took place in Venezuela. Then, at the start of 2012 secret exploratory talks took place in Cuba with FARC delegates. In August 2012 the talks were made public and the president announced that an agreement had been reached on a five-point agenda, which would be discussed by both parties from November, in Havana. In October an official launch ceremony of the talks took place in Oslo, attended by the government and FARC delegations. Norway and Cuba act as guarantors at the talks, while representatives from Venezuela and Chile are also present as observers. This event triggered enormous international expectation, in line with the enthusiasm shown by Colombian public opinion, in favour of the talks, and by international society.

The first point up for discussion was that of a sustainable agrarian policy. This is a long-standing issue for the FARC, arising from the excessive concentration of land in Colombia in a few hands. The other points are political participation, ending the conflict, the problem of drug trafficking and victims. Although the government declared that the process may take less than a year, the FARC preferred not to give a time estimate, aware that obstacles may arise. The fact that the talks were not starting from scratch but rather on the basis of a previously agreed realistic and possible agenda was a favourable factor. In early December the president declared that the negotiations should produce results by November 2013. Meanwhile, the FARC insisted on implementing participative mechanisms to take into account the opinion and proposals of civil society. For this purpose the peace commissions of the congress and the senate have held hearings in various regions of the country, the conclusions of which were made known to the negotiating table in Havana. At the same time, it was agreed that the United Nations and the Universidad Nacional would

organise a series of seminars on the first points of the agenda to enrich the discussions of the FARC and government delegations.

As the talks got under way, there was an intense media debate on one of the points of the agenda, that of the victims. On the one hand, the FARC was called on to release individuals that it held and to disclose the whereabouts of those kidnapped in the past. On the other hand, the legal formula that would be applied to the leaders of the FARC once the peace agreement was signed became a controversial issue. The guerrilla group stated that it would not accept prison sentences, while the government and many legal experts, along with human rights associations, proposed transitional justice measures.

At the end of 2012, the ELN stated its wish to enter the negotiations, although at a different table, and appointed a delegation for this purpose. It seems that the government held exploratory talks to see whether it would be possible to initiate peace talks with this guerrilla group in Cuba. However, the ELN declared that it was not a question of negotiating but rather one of implementing mechanisms for consultation with civil society and popular organisations, addressing the underlying issues that originally led to the armed conflict. In light of these rapprochements, there is an opportunity in 2013 for achieving an agreement with the guerrilla groups, which could bring almost 50 years of conflict to an end.

*There is an opportunity in 2013 for achieving an agreement with the guerrilla groups, which could bring almost 50 years of conflict in Colombia to an end*

## 5.6. A strong treaty to control the arms trade: a second attempt?

In 2006 the process began for the adoption of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which should have culminated in July 2012 with its approval. However, the diplomatic conference held for this purpose concluded without the ATT being signed, despite the willingness expressed by most states not only to reach an agreement but also to produce a robust and legally binding text. Months after the conclusion of the diplomatic conference, a new opportunity is opening up for the approval of this treaty after the United Nations member states agreed to hold a final conference in March 2013 with the goal of approving the definitive text of the ATT on the basis of the draft document presented in the July conference. The resolution to hold the final conference was almost unanimously adopted by 157 votes to nil with 18 abstentions and stated that the new text must be approved by consensus, opening the door to the General Assembly voting on the treaty in the event of another failure to reach an agreement.

The draft text on which the governments will work is a text validated by several international NGOs that have been campaigning for years for the approval of an ATT in order to regulate the arms trade and thus contribute to reducing its impact on armed conflicts and crime. However, states should use the months leading up to the final approval of the treaty in March to address some of the weaknesses in the text that these organisations have pointed out and to further strengthen a document that is crucial for peacebuilding on a global scale. The text has several shortcomings that need to be tackled in order to resolve some of the problems concerning the human rights violations and humanitarian consequences resulting from the current lack of control over the arms trade.

The Control Arms international campaign has identified ten of these shortcomings, which states have time to correct in order to improve the ATT. It therefore represents a clear opportunity to contribute to peacebuilding on an international level.<sup>5</sup> First of all, the scope of the ATT treaty is too narrow, since it only includes seven categories of offensive conventional weapons, leaving out many types of conventional weapons, along with munitions, parts and components. Second, there is a lack of clarity regarding what constitutes an international transfer of arms, which could lead to states interpreting the ATT differently. Third, prohibitions relating to arms for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are too narrowly applied since the current wording presumes that there must be an intention on the part of the supplying state for the weapons to be used to commit prohibited acts. Fourth, the threshold for risk assessment of human rights and humanitarian law violations, as well as for the commission of terrorist acts is unclear, which could lead transfers of arms to be refused only in extreme and exceptional circumstances. Fifth, the provisions concern-

ing diversion, corruption, development, and gender-based violence are weak. Sixth, exemptions created by references to “other instruments” and “defence cooperation agreements” may lead states to enter into agreements that undermine the ATT. Seventh, reporting requirements are weak and will therefore do little to enhance transparency in the international arms trade. Eighth, the Entry into Force (EIF) of 65 states is too high and may mean that it takes years before the treaty enters into force, thus paralysing its implementation. Ninth, once the treaty is approved it will be very difficult to strengthen it, since any decision must be taken by consensus. Tenth, the ambiguity over the application of treaty obligations to non-party states opens the door to a lack of control in certain areas.

Although there is a significant level of consensus, both on the part of states, which have mostly shown willingness to approve a robust treaty that genuinely serves to control a trade that does great harm to international peace and security, and on the part of civil society, building on the solid base of the draft treaty, it is also true that the process is at a decisive crossroads. As such, it is necessary

***There is a new opportunity in 2013 for states to approve an Arms Trade Treaty that mitigates the lethal consequences of this trade***

for states to commit to producing an ATT in the diplomatic conference in March that is ambitious enough to make a real contribution to peacebuilding and human security. The ATT must be capable of going beyond the instruments currently in place, such as sanctions and embargoes, which have been proved insufficient for reducing the negative impact of the arms trade in terms of human lives, socio-economic development and respect for human rights. It is therefore crucial to approve a legally binding mechanism that commits signatory states to controlling the international arms trade, guaranteeing that respect for human rights, life, peace and international security will take precedence over national and commercial interests.

5. Control Arms, *Finalizando el trabajo: Hacia un TCA prueba de balas*, Control Arms reports, 2012, <http://speakout.controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Finalizando-el-trabajo-format.pdf>.

## 5.7. Young people: an engine for change and dialogue in contexts of conflict?

Following the International Year of Youth in 2010, proclaimed by the UN General Assembly, the UN Commission on Population and Development decided to focus its 45<sup>th</sup> session, held in 2012, on adolescents and youth, as part of the follow-up of the recommendations made by the International Conference on Population and Development. Although the resolution drawn up by the commission (Resolution 2012/1) hardly touches on the impact of armed conflicts on young people or on the role of young people in promoting peace, it does place the general challenges facing this population group back on the international agenda, including the key issue of health and sexual and reproductive rights, of great importance in war and post-war contexts. This apparent new boost for the youth agenda from several perspectives coincides with a global context in which young people are playing a leading role in recent and surprising social processes, such as the so-called Arab Spring in Tunisia or Egypt, and in several peace initiatives. As such, there is clearly an opportunity for boosting the peace work carried out by young people and for encouraging them as peacebuilders.

*Young people, often seen as victims or as a potential engine of instability, take part in all sorts of peacebuilding initiatives in contexts of conflict*

Of the 6.97 billion people who populate the planet, approximately 1.2 billion are aged between 15 and 24 years. The concept of youth is complex and even disputed; it corresponds to contrasting realities and is understood and classified in a variety of ways depending on cultural and social contexts. It is often categorised as a period of transition from childhood to adulthood and partly overlaps with the category of childhood listed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which defines a child as a person below the age of 18 and to whom special rights are given.

In contexts of armed conflict or socio-political crises, the narratives surrounding youth have prioritised its victimisation (young people as victims, together with children and women) and stigmatisation (young people as potential generators of insecurity and instability). This double perspective is linked in part to the exposure of young people to specific impacts and risk factors, as well as to the challenges and problems resulting from being disproportionately affected by socio-economic problems and the use of violence. As such, the United Nations World Youth Report 2005 listed, among other risk factors and impacts, the recruitment of youths as soldiers and combatants, the impact of conflicts on their chances of economic independence, their vulnerability to sexually transmitted diseases and the risk of being targets of violence, including that of a sexual nature. Meanwhile, although the link between demographic composition and violence is problematic and has been criticised for the stigmatisation that it generates, the existence of a high percentage of youth in the population of a given society (known as “youth bulges”) combined with factors such as high unemployment and socio-economic

difficulties, is often considered a possible engine of instability. Correlations apart, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has stated that the youth unemployment rate, at 12.6% in 2011, has remained close to the high point reached in 2009 with the onset of the economic crisis. In the case of the Middle East 25.5% of young people were unemployed, while in north Africa the figure was 23.8%. These figures are in stark contrast to the 4.8% unemployment rate for adults.

However, beyond victimisation or stigmatisation, young people also play a leading role in peacebuilding initiatives, demonstrations and protests, constituting a population group with great potential for bringing about conflict transformation processes in the long term. In this respect, in many contexts of violence, post-war scenarios and socio-political crises, young people are active in mobilising and transforming society through their participation and leadership in initiatives on a community, local, national and international level, both those specifically promoted by young people and those of an intergenerational nature. There are many examples of such initiatives, some of which involve young people linked to opposing groups or sectors.

Warning of the lack of studies devoted to young people's potential for playing a positive role in peacebuilding, authors such as Del Felice and Wisler tentatively list some of the values frequently identified in young people's initiatives or organisations that point to this potential role: a greater openness towards change in comparison with other age groups, a more forward-looking outlook that is less rooted in the past, innovative and brave attitudes towards the risks associated with protest and a greater facility for connecting with the experiences and needs of other young people, among others.<sup>6</sup>

Resolution 2012/1 of the UN Commission on Population and Development urges states to promote and implement legislation that protects adolescents and young people (including those who live in situations of armed conflict) from all forms of violence (including gender violence and sexual violence) and also calls on governments and other actors to support and encourage the greater participation of young people, organisations led by young people and organisations with a youth-oriented agenda. Among other aspects, the text also invites a wide variety of actors, such as families, teachers, religious, traditional and community leaders and community organisations to promote the development of adolescents and young people.

In short, an opportunity is opening up to recognise the key importance and potential of the role of young people in peacebuilding, for which purpose the narratives of victimisation and stigmatisation must be put to one side.


6. Celina Del Felice and Andria Wisler, “The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders,” *Journal of Peace Conflict & Development*, 11 (2007), <http://www.unoy.org/unoy/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/05/PCD-ISSUE-11-ARTICLE-The-Unexplored-Power-and-Potential-of-Youth-as-Peace-Builders.pdf>.



# 6. Risk Scenarios for 2013

Based on the analysis of the different contexts of conflict and socio-political crisis in 2012, in this chapter the Escola de Cultura de Pau identifies 13 scenarios with circumstances that could deteriorate further and become even more serious sources of instability and violence in 2013. Areas of concern in 2013 refer to: the worsening situation in the Russian republic of Dagestan due to the mounting militarization of the regime and human rights violations; the uncertainties surrounding the political transition in Myanmar; the challenges that are pending fifteen years after the signing of the peace accord in Tajikistan; the possible resumption of armed conflict between the Government and the MNLF in the south of the Philippines; the self-immolations in Tibet as a sign of the desperation of the Tibetan community; the challenges posed by drones in conflicts where they are being used; the problems associated with the pending closing of Guantanamo; the period of growing instability that Kenya is approaching in 2013; the role of Rwanda and the FDLR in the instability that plagues the Great Lakes Region; the crisis of forced displacement of the Syrian population caused by violence; and the security challenges in the Sahel.

Map 6.1. Risk scenarios for 2013



## 6.1. Dagestan, between militarisation and an acute human rights crisis

Dagestan is the largest, most populated and most ethnically diverse Russian republic in the North Caucasus. It is a neighbour of Chechnya, a transit country for hydrocarbon resources and a gateway to the Caspian Sea. In recent years the republic has witnessed a serious increase in violence and instability. This trend may become more acute in the near future due to factors such as the extensive militarisation that took place in 2012, the increasing weight and popularity of the Salafist insurgency and its ideology, and the constant human rights violations perpetrated by the security forces. All of this is taking place in a complex scenario involving not only the armed conflict between the security forces (local and federal) and the insurgency, but also widespread criminal violence and a series of social, political and economic factors that fuel fracture and frustration, such as corruption, impunity, poverty and unemployment. Although the situation of each republic in the North Caucasus has its own dynamics, there are also common threads. As such, the growing violence in Dagestan is in itself an alert factor for the population throughout the North Caucasus.

The risk of the violence in Dagestan spiralling in 2013 and beyond comes as no surprise; it would merely confirm the pattern that has emerged in recent years, as some analysts have signalled, due in part to the strengthening of the Islamist insurgency in Dagestan, the Sharia Jamaat. According to the figures of the independent organisation Caucasian Knot, 378 people were killed in 2010, including 78 civilians, while a further 307 were injured. 2011 proved even more lethal with 413 people killed and 411 injured, including 40% more civilian victims. Attacks against senior public officials were also stepped up. In the first three quarters of 2012 alone there were 365 fatalities, in a territory with just 2.9 million inhabitants. The intensification of the insurgent offensive (with more bombings and attacks and increasingly higher profile targets, including the assassination of the president's spokesman in 2011) is taking place despite the successive assassinations of rebel leaders by the security forces. According to The Jamestown Foundation, since the death of the rebel leader Rapan Khalikov in 2007, very few insurgent leaders have survived longer than a year. The latest, Emir Salikh, died in February 2012 in a counterinsurgency operation. Due to the decentralised and autonomous structure of the insurgency, the death of the leader is followed by a process of succession but, as The Jamestown Foundation points out, the violent activity of the rebels remains uninterrupted. In this respect, human rights organisations such as Memorial have also warned of the growing insurgent violence that has taken place in recent years.

On top of the spiralling violence, 2012 also saw a greater militarisation of the territory. This process included the transfer to Dagestan of 30,000 troops of the federal inte-

rior ministry that had been deployed until then in Chechnya. Given the number of troops already stationed in the republic, The Jamestown Foundation calculated that there were now 60,000 Russian troops in Dagestan. Meanwhile, 30,000 police officers are deployed in the republic, more than 1,000 of whom have been transferred from other regions.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, in the second half of the year, the Dagestan president, Magomedsalam Magomedov, put forward a proposal for creating self-defence units to combat the insurgency, which, if it comes to fruition, may lead to an increase in violence and human rights violations, given the previous experience of the battalions created as personal security guard of the Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov, accused by local human rights activists of violating civilians' human rights.

Meanwhile, the increase in violence is fuelled by growing public support for the Sharia Jamaat, and a greater willingness of young people to join its ranks. According to some analysts, this phenomenon is taking place in a scenario in which the Salafist current of Islam is gaining ground, despite the prevailing religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity that characterises the republic. Some attempts at rapprochement and dialogue between Sufi and Salafist sectors have shown the possibility of building bridges. However, they have not generated positive impacts on the insurgency, nor are there any prospects of this occurring in the short or medium term, especially in a scenario in which the authorities continue to persecute and criminalise civilians for their possible support of or sympathy with the Islamist insurgency.

On top of the conflict between the public authorities (local and federal) and the insurgency, the republic faces a serious human rights crisis, with members of the civilian population who do not participate in the armed struggle being accused of supporting the insurgency. Disappearances and kidnappings, extrajudicial executions and intimidation are some of the violent practices to which the population is subjected, aggravated by the chronic impunity, obstacles and abuse faced by independent organisations, including human rights defenders and journalists. At least some of the kidnappings are carried out by security forces. Moreover, the insurgent violence has continued to claim many civilian lives. In short, the worsening of the armed conflict and of the general human rights situation, with a serious impact on the civilian population, is the scenario envisaged.

***The increasing militarisation of the territory and the strengthening of the insurgency point towards an escalation of violence in the Russian republic Dagestan in 2013 and to an intensification of the human rights crisis***

1. Mairbek Vatchagaev, "Dagestan's Security Situation Remains Problematic Despite Increased Military Presence," *North Caucasus Analysis*, 13 (2012), [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=39558](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39558).

## 6.2. An uncertain future in Myanmar?

The 2010 elections and the change of government in early 2011 signalled the start of the process of political transition in the country, which has generated some significant transformations during this period. Despite the positive nature of the series of changes that are taking place in the country, elements of risk remain in place that could hinder the process towards democracy that has been initiated. The key developments of the last two years have been the political reforms that have been implemented, paving the way towards greater freedom of expression and the release of political prisoners, together with the victory of the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in the partial parliamentary elections held at the start of 2012, in which the NLD obtained 43 of the 44 seats for which it put forward a candidate, out of the 45 seats under contention. Meanwhile, the government has reached agreements with almost all the ethnic armed groups that operate in the country, with the exception of the KIO. In parallel, contacts with the international community have intensified, which has led to a series of visits to the country by distinguished foreign leaders, including the recently re-elected US president, Barack Obama, along with a softening of the sanctions imposed as a consequence of the dictatorship and serious human rights violations. As such, many analysts coincide in taking a positive outlook on the country's future and on the possibilities of representative democracy and respect for human rights being consolidated in the medium term. The next general elections, scheduled for 2015, constitute a significant milestone for evaluating the solidity of the process.

However, despite the progress made, there are also important alert factors that could hinder a process that is still fragile and insufficiently consolidated to be considered irreversible. Various human rights organisations view as overoptimistic the attitude of the international community, which has rushed to congratulate the regime for the progress made. The situation of violence experienced in Rakhine State over the course of 2012 has been identified by various analysts as one of the main signs of this fragility. Clashes between the Buddhist and Muslim communities that inhabit the state have killed 170 people and have left more than 200 injured.<sup>2</sup> Riots occurred on various occasions throughout the year, highlighting the fact that these were not isolated and one-off events but rather that this inter-community violence was a sign of strong social tension. This tension is not exclusive to this state and could spring up in other areas of the country. The violence has been made more acute by the government's inability to deal with the clashes, along with the biased attitude shown by the local authorities and the security forces.<sup>3</sup>

Another important issue that brings home the difficulties involved in consolidating peace in the country is the failure

*Inter-community violence and the fragility of the peace processes under way with ethnic insurgent groups represent serious obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in Myanmar*

to reach an agreement with the armed opposition group KIO, which remains active and which is fighting the armed forces for control of the Hpakant area. This is a strategic area for both sides since it contains the country's main jade mines. Despite various attempts at rapprochement, it has proved impossible to instigate dialogue between the parties and the violence has continued unabated, claiming several hundred lives over the course of the year. This does not only underline the complications involved in bringing this armed conflict to an end but also indicates the fragility of the agreements reached with the other insurgent groups, since until 2011 the KIO itself maintained a ceasefire agreement with the government. If the peace agreements are not consolidated, leading to genuine political negotiation processes, there is a real risk of violence returning to other parts of the country where insurgent groups are present and where conflicts are currently inactive.

The important political, social and economic transformations taking place in the country, together with the greater openness shown by the regime are causing tensions that the dictatorship had managed to suppress for decades to flare up again. The international community is attempting to give the process a significant boost, not only in the interests of promoting democracy but also because Myanmar offers interesting economic prospects given the country's rich natural resources, along with the availability of manpower. That is why it is important to ensure that the reform process is fully implemented, in such a way that the population's human rights are assured in terms of citizenship but also from an economic and labour perspective. These rights must not be compromised at the expense of the interests of an international market economy in which the interests of foreign investments take precedence over those of the local population. The current problems involving the expropriation of land belonging to the local population, linked to the growing importance of Chinese companies in the country, are just one example of the real risk that exists in this respect.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the fact that the process of democratic transformation in Myanmar seems to be making significant progress, it is necessary for the government to take decisive action in addressing some of the challenges that hinder this process, in particular inter-community tensions and the violence with the Kachin insurgency.

2. See chapter 2 (Socio-political Crises).

3. International Crisis Group, *Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon*, Asia Report no. 238, November 12, 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/238-myanmar-storm-clouds-on-the-horizon.aspx>.

4. Tom Kramer and Kevin Woods, "Financing Dispossession - China's Opium Substitution Programme in Northern Burma", Transnational Institute, February 21, 2012, <http://www.tni.org/briefing/financing-dispossession>.

### 6.3. Complex challenges 15 years on from the Tajikistan peace agreement

Tajikistan, the former Soviet country in Central Asia with the lowest human development index and the only one to have been immersed in an armed conflict since its independence, faces multiple and growing challenges related to struggles with former opposition field commanders for control of the territory, local and regional insurgencies, a porous border with Afghanistan, the weight of criminality and illicit traffic, and shortfalls in food and energy security, among many others. Some of these elements have led to growing instability, which may spiral in the coming years.

The 1997 peace agreement that brought an end to the civil war paved the way for a unified army and political power sharing, with 30% of political posts on various levels being reserved for the forces of the United Tajik Opposition alliance (UTO), composed of Islamist and liberal anti-communist sectors, who in the civil war were pitted against the communist government block. A complex situation from an ideological perspective is compounded by divisions, including those of a regional nature. Although the agreement led to the incorporation of important opposition figures in the government, other opposition commanders and warlords opted to remain outside the agreement. Meanwhile, in the post-war period, the presidency, in the hands of Emomali Rakhmonov, forced out a large number of the figures belonging to the former UTO, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG). In some areas, informal power remained in the hands of former opposition commanders, whether they formed part of the regime or not. Recent years have seen an increase in violent clashes with many of these leaders, including in the Rasht valley (an extensive area of the Region of Republic Subordination), especially between 2008 and 2010.

In 2012 this violence flared up again in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), one of the regions in which grievances have built up historically against the political monopoly of other areas of the country and which after the war remained hostile in part to the predominance of the political class of the Khatlon region (south west). The GBAO is also a key area in drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe. Between July and August, the security forces launched a large-scale military operation against the former opposition commander Tolib Ayombekov and his loyal forces, which led to clashes considered the most violent since the end of the civil war, claiming about 70 lives according to some press outlets, and 20 according to the government. The government accused him and another three former opposition commanders of being behind the murder of Abdullo Nazarov, a regional security chief and general who was also a former opposition leader in the civil war. Some analyses linked the murder of Nazarov to struggles for the control

of profits from illegal business. Meanwhile, for Ayombekov, the government's operation was aimed at consolidating its power in the region, insisting that he offered no resistance and that the military offensive was unnecessary.

In this respect, soon after the offensive, Imomnazar Imomnazarov, another of the accused former rebel commanders and a well-known community leader, was assassinated, although the government denied any involvement. His murder led to protests in the regional capital, Khorog, which forced the withdrawal of troops through an agreement. Nevertheless, the government subsequently deployed some 100 officials of the state anti-drugs agency in the region.

Indeed, in 2011 the ICG referred to the allegedly strong connection between drug traffickers and officials in Tajikistan, making it a "narco-state" on a level only surpassed by Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup>

The incidents that took place in 2012 in the GBAO, coming on top of the military operations and clashes that occurred in other areas in previous years, would seem to indicate that the struggles between various power factions in a country beset by fragility and divisions (regional and others), which until now have been contained by the omnipresence of the regime or by its inaction, are set to continue or possibly increase. Furthermore, the growing mistrust of international partners concerning the Rakhmonov regime's ability to guarantee stability, along with the uncertainty surrounding the regional impact of Afghanistan's future, with which it shares a 1,387 kilometre border and which will see the withdrawal of international troops in 2014, may also be influencing the government's belligerent position in the GBAO.

Furthermore, in the short term it appears that the sources of protest of sectors demanding changes in the status quo (by means of a variety of strategies) are growing. These sectors include local and regional Islamist insurgencies, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has stepped up its attacks in Tajikistan since 2010 and which demands the setting up of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia, sectors linked to political and social Islam (some of which are persecuted by the regime) or discontent population sectors that occasionally stage protests (e.g. periodical protests when food prices go up), among others. It remains to be seen whether the increasing pressure will have an impact on the holding of presidential elections in November 2013, given the regime's ability to keep Rakhmonov in power. However, the mixture of created interests, alternative power factions, lack of human security, corruption, authoritarianism and regional conflict in the country represent fertile ground for growing instability in the coming years.

***The large-scale military operation carried out in 2012 in Tajikistan against former opposition commanders underlines the risks associated with power struggles in the fragile Central Asian state***

5. International Crisis Group, *Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats*, Asia Report no. 205, May 24, 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205-tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspx>.

## 6.4. The possible resumption of the armed conflict between the government and the MNLF in the south of the Philippines

The signing in October 2012 of a preliminary peace agreement between the government and the MILF, the main armed group in Mindanao, was fiercely rejected by the MNLF (the armed group that led the insurgency of the Moro people from the 1970s until the signing of a peace agreement with the government in 1996), to such an extent that the MNLF founder, Nur Misuari, threatened to resume the armed struggle for the independence of Mindanao, turning this region in the south of the Philippines into a war zone once again. Although there are some factors that enable the threats made by Nur Misuari to be played down, the fact is that a real risk exists of the current prospects of peace in Mindanao being aborted due to the political and military action of the MNLF if it feels excluded from the construction of a new peace scenario in Mindanao and if it finally deems the 1996 peace agreement to have been eclipsed or invalidated by a possible agreement between the government and the MILF.

First of all, although the military strength of the MNLF remains an unknown quantity, this group (and in particular Nur Misuari) retains a certain amount of legitimacy and a significant capacity to engender support among large sectors of the Moro people. This is evident in the fact that Nur Misuari brought together thousands of people in October to declare his opposition to the peace agreement between the MILF and the government and to warn that the MNLF has hundreds of thousands of combatants at the ready, including 17,000 combatants who have switched allegiance from the MILF to the MNLF. It should be recalled that the MILF is a splinter group of the MNLF. Although the MILF and most analysts coincide in pointing out that these figures have been grossly inflated, other leaders of the MNLF have labelled the group a “sleeping giant”. It is noteworthy, for example, that in 2001, when Misuari was governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and began to feel political pressure from Manila to step down, he instigated a short-lived but intense spiral of violence that claimed dozens of lives.

Beyond the political and military strength of the MNLF itself, it is also necessary to take into account its capacity to forge alliances with other armed groups that operate in Mindanao. On several occasions, the government has accused the group of collaborating with Abu Sayyaf, with the MILF and with one of the MILF’s splinter groups, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). In this respect, the MNLF’s capacity to capitalise on the discontent that may exist within the MILF now or later on, in the event of a possible peace agreement not achieving the desired results, is not to be underestimated. Furthermore, the MNLF could also benefit from the huge number of arms circulating in Mindanao, from the culture of violence that is so deep-rooted in certain sectors after 40 years of armed conflict, and from local phenomena such as the *rido* (clashes between families or clans due to disputes over land, honour or other issues).

### *The MNLF’s opposition to the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the MILF may trigger the resumption of the armed conflict in Mindanao*

There are two other aspects that add uncertainty to the situation of political instability in Mindanao. The first is the announcement made by Nur Misuari concerning his intention to stand in the elections of the ARMM in May 2013. The periods leading up to an electoral process in Mindanao have been historically characterised by a substantial rise in violence. Many local politicians have armed militias at their service, despite the government’s announcement that during the term of office of Benigno Aquino about thirty of these private armies had been dismantled. The fact that Misuari could be elected governor of the ARMM (an institution that is scheduled to be replaced by another structure within a few years, under the terms and conditions of the peace agreement between the government and the MILF) heightens the risk of opposition to the dismantling of the ARMM and, therefore, of violence breaking out. The second factor of uncertainty is the possibility of Nur Misuari attempting to use the military reactivation of the MNLF to recover the political control of the organisation, currently split into three factions. Some years ago, 15 members of the MNLF’s leadership forced Misuari to stand down as president of the organisation. Since then, the Philippine government only recognises one of the three factions of the MNLF, the one led by Muslimin Sema. Nevertheless, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) recognises Misuari as the representative of the MNLF and, as such, continues to invite him to its summits.

On a positive note, the OIC is making notable efforts to conciliate the positions of the MILF and the MNLF and to harmonise the two negotiation processes currently under way: the one between the MILF and the government to reach a peace agreement, and the one between the government and the MNLF to achieve the full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement. The OIC argues that since the demands of both groups refer to the same collective territory, they should be better coordinated. For this purpose it set up the Bangsamoro Coordination Forum, although until now the MNLF has been reluctant to accept this proposal. Meanwhile, both the government and the MILF have expressed their willingness for the MNLF to form part of the Transitional Committee, the body entrusted with drafting the Bangsamoro Basic Law, the new structure scheduled to replace the ARMM. However, the MNLF considers that this option would imply the subordination of the 1996 peace agreement to the negotiations between the MILF and the government and, therefore, the annulment of its contents. The MNLF, on the other hand, proposes that the MILF join the three-way negotiations (MNLF, government, OIC) to achieve the full implementation of the 1996 agreement.

Therefore, if the parties involved in the peace process in Mindanao are incapable of finding a mechanism for harmonising the two ongoing negotiation processes or finding a way to ensure that the MNLF does not feel excluded from the new political prospects opening up in the region, there is a risk of violence becoming more acute in the south of the Philippines.



## 6.5. Self-immolations in Tibet, a symptom of desperation

2012 saw a significant increase in protests by the Tibetan community, especially in the form of self-immolation. Since 2009 some 90 people (most of whom have died) have used this form of protest to highlight the repression carried out by the Chinese authorities and to demand greater freedom for Tibet. Most of the self-immolations took place in 2012 and gathered pace over the course of year. In November, for example, coinciding with the congress of the Chinese Communist Party, more than 20 people set themselves on fire. This would seem to indicate that this form of protest is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Beyond the importance of gaining international attention for the unrest and oppression felt by most of the Tibetan community, there are several alert factors and causes for concern regarding the current political situation in Tibet.

First of all, the repercussion in the media of the self-immolations has led several governments (in particular the USA) and some international bodies (the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay) to lament these actions and urge Beijing to enter into dialogue with the leaders of the Tibetan community to address its unrest and find a negotiated outcome. These calls have been interpreted by the Chinese community as interference in its internal affairs and have probably led to a hardening of its political stance and greater forcefulness in its response to the protests. In this respect, several Tibetan organisations in exile have reported the militarisation of the regions in which the protests have been concentrated, the deployment of paramilitary forces and numerous human rights violations against those involved in the protest. In recent years (especially during 2012) the Chinese authorities have forced their way into several Buddhist monasteries and have conducted search and arrest operations in the neighbouring communities of monasteries. Furthermore, Beijing has attempted to criminalise the protests by declaring that, in line with current legislation, incitement to self-immolation constitutes intentional homicide.

Another aspect that causes concern is the impact that the current protests may have on the dialogue process between the Chinese government and the Tibetan government in exile on how best to accommodate Tibet within China. Beijing's official stance is that the Dalai Lama and the political leaders in exile are fuelling the protests and that talks will not resume until they end their support for social protests and cease declarations considered secessionist by the Chinese government. The talks have been suspended since early 2010. Between 2002 and 2010 some ten rounds of negotiations have taken place, although no significant progress has been made. Meanwhile, both the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan prime minister in exile, Lobsang Sangay, have lamented and condemned the self-immolations, although they have expressed their understanding of the causes that lead to such protests. Furthermore, they have publicly discouraged protests on Chinese soil due to the harsh con-

sequences to which protesters are exposed. At the same time, they have both insisted that their objective is not the independence of Tibet but rather genuine autonomy in aspects that are fundamental for the identity and survival of the Tibetan people. In this respect, both the Dalai Lama and Lobsang Sangay have stepped up their international activity in order to persuade Beijing to resume talks. Ahead of the Chinese Communist Party congress held in November, at which a new set of government and party leaders were set to be ushered in, the Dalai Lama had caused expectations about potential significant changes in the Chinese government's policy on Tibet. However, most analysts coincide in considering that the official government stance in this respect has not varied.

Thirdly, as became clear during the protests and spiral of violence that took place in 2008 (coinciding with the Olympic Games held in Beijing), there is a possibility of large swathes of the Tibetan community, especially the generations born and raised in exile, viewing with increasing scepticism the official stance of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile. They are openly committed to non-violence and demands for autonomy. Faced with

growing military repression and the political stalemate with the Chinese government, and given the lack of progress at the negotiating table, some organisations of Tibetans in exile may opt for implementing strategies that are not strictly peaceful and for voicing stronger political demands. This political friction within the Tibetan community has already led to several meetings being held between the Dalai Lama and some of the organisations in exile, along with the holding of elections and the subsequent election of Lobsang Sangay, somebody who grew up in exile and who supposedly understands and shares the

frustration felt by large sections of the Tibetan community. However, this has not prevented protests both inside and outside Tibet from being staged since then, leading up to the current wave of self-immolations.

The restricted access imposed on independent media outlets in the areas where the self-immolations and other forms of protest are largely taking place make it difficult to verify information. Nonetheless, several analysts agree that the tension has increased significantly in Tibet and that it may become more acute in the future due to the combination of many factors such as the international pressure that Beijing may feel is being imposed for it to change its policy regarding Tibet; the stalemate reached at the negotiating table between the Chinese government and the Tibetan leaders and the lack of any signs of change at the recent congress to renew the leadership of the communist party; the frustration and potential shift towards a more radical stance of some sectors of Tibetan society; or Beijing's response to the self-immolations, which largely involves police and military action and criminal proceedings.

***The self-immolation of dozens of people in 2012 makes it likely that protests against the repression by the Chinese government and calls for greater freedom for Tibet will increase***

## 6.6. The possible reconstitution of the army in Haiti

The incidents that took place in 2012 involving dozens of former soldiers (occupation of old military bases, demonstrations, public shows of strength or the illegal possession of weapons, among others) to demand the reconstitution of the armed forces and the restoration of back pay and pensions created a new focal point of tension in Haiti and brought to the fore the debate on the advisability of restoring an institution (the army) that was abolished in 1995 by the country's former president, Jean Bertrand Aristide. The groups of former soldiers have been encouraged to act by the electoral promise made by the current president, Michel Martelly, who feels that it is necessary to have modern armed forces entrusted with keeping the peace, patrolling borders, coasts and forests, combating drug trafficking, alleviating the effects of natural disasters and safeguarding national sovereignty. Moreover, the current leader also considers that the reconstitution of the army will create jobs, will integrate hundreds of young people and will enable the future replacement of the MINUSTAH, the peacekeeping mission deployed by the UN in 2004 after the spiral of violence that preceded the former president Jean Bertrand Aristide's flight from the country. Although the government has acknowledged that it would be a relatively small army (it is speculated that it would comprise some 1,500 troops), there is reluctance concerning its creation and several factors exist that may bring further instability to an already fragile socio-political situation in Haiti.

First of all, the creation of an army generates wariness among the international community and a large percentage of Haitian society due to the role played in the past by the armed forces in a series of coups d'état and in the repression of the people. Some of the most recent examples are the mass human rights violations committed by the armed forces during Duvalier's dictatorship or following the coup d'état that ousted Jean Bertrand Aristide in 1991. Later on, in the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, several groups of soldiers (many of whom had come from the neighbouring Dominican Republic) played a decisive role in forming the armed group that triggered a brief but intense armed conflict and Aristide's flight from the country in 2004. In this respect, the UN and many of the governments and international bodies with an active presence in Haiti have made public their preference for strengthening the Haitian national police. Meanwhile, in 2012 the MINUSTAH renewed its mandate until October 2013 although with a reduced military presence and transferring some of its functions to the police. The government itself has acknowledged that it is working on strengthening the police force, which in a few years may have 15,000 members. Furthermore, both the international community and some civil society organisations have voiced doubts about Haiti's financial capacity to maintain two institutions (police and army) when the government's difficulties in meeting the most basic needs of the population are well documented.

***The protests staged in Haiti by former soldiers who demand the reconstitution of the armed forces may generate new focal points of tension and represent a serious challenge for the government***

Secondly, there are fears about how sectors sympathetic to the former president Aristide might react to the reconstitution of the armed forces. Under Aristide's presidency, in addition to the police force, the creation of para-police or paramilitary squads known as *chimères* was encouraged. These armed groups, mainly made up of sympathisers of the former president, over time gained control of shanty towns and significant areas of the territory, questioned the monopoly of force on the part of the state and became involved in many illicit and criminal activities. In fact, many of the activities carried out by the MINUSTAH and the police over the last decade have focused on combating groups of this kind in large shanty towns such as Cité Soleil.

Thirdly, the current political instability and delicate humanitarian situation in Haiti make the challenge posed to the government by the demands and actions of former soldiers all the more daunting. As regards the humanitarian situation, it should be recalled that, according to the UN, more than 400,000 people who were made homeless by the earthquake in January 2010 are still living in camps, joined by more than 200,000 people who were made homeless at the end of October by Hurricane Sandy, which claimed 51 lives. In respect of the political situation, at the end of the year Michel Martelly's government faced the most significant protests that had occurred since he took office in 2011. Thousands of people demonstrated in cities across the country in the last quarter of the year to demand that Martelly step down and to protest against the lack of action by the government, the worsening of the population's living conditions and the perceived corruption taking place within the government. These protests, which triggered a series of riots and clashes, occurred at a time when the country's institutions were somewhat discredited due, among other things, to the difficulties and delays that occurred over the course of 2012 in appointing the prime minister, the postponement of the elections that were to have renewed one third of the legislative power and a lack of confidence in the current electoral authority. Furthermore, there are growing protests against the MINUSTAH by large swathes of the population due to its involvement in cases of human rights violations and for its alleged responsibility in the outbreak of a cholera epidemic, which to date has claimed 7,000 lives.

The reconstitution of the armed forces may channel or even meet the demands of a significant sector of the former army that has been staging political protests on and off since the mid-1990s. However, beyond the dilemmas of an ethical, economic and social nature involved in a decision of this magnitude, many doubts persist concerning how a challenge of this kind might be met by a government that has been so politically weakened by the economic and humanitarian situation of the country and placed under so much pressure by the frequent and numerous protests that have been staged in 2012.

## 6.7. Unmanned aerial vehicles: the challenges of remote-controlled warfare

Remote-controlled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are sophisticated vehicles that are no longer used exclusively for surveillance tasks. UAVs or drones have become increasingly important as a military weapon due to a series of advantages attributed to them, including a unique capacity to cover large distances and enter otherwise inaccessible areas to eliminate enemy targets with supposedly surgical precision and effectiveness without exposing soldiers to danger. Their growing use in recent years, especially by the USA, has fuelled critical debates on the legality and legitimacy of this practice and its grave impact in terms of civilian victims. In parallel, the number of international actors with access to this technology is also growing. It is calculated that 40 states and other entities (including groups such as Hezbollah) also boast drones in their arsenals, increasing the challenges posed by this remote-controlled warfare.

Drone attacks have been particularly significant in the last decade in the US campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as in operations in Yemen, Somalia or Libya, where NATO also used these aircraft to attack Muammar Gaddafi's troops. The secret nature of these operations makes it difficult to estimate the number of attacks with precision. However, according to several studies they have increased during the presidency of Barack Obama. More than 300 attacks are reported in the figures, claiming between 2,500 and over 3,500 lives since 2004, according to different counts. The USA implemented its drone attack policy after the attacks of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 and has attempted to confer legitimacy on the policy by citing internal regulations and international law, in the context of its "war on terror". Washington has attempted to justify its stance by referring to international laws that guarantee its right to self-defence, as part of a strategy involving "preventive" or "pre-emptive" attacks that in practice are carried out with or without the consent of local governments when it considers that these governments are not capable of or not willing to act against targets identified as threats. As stated in The New York Times, this has made drones a provocative symbol of American power, running roughshod over national sovereignty.<sup>6</sup>

The legality and legitimacy of drone operations has been widely questioned by many specialists and by UN experts who have appealed to the principles of necessity and proportionality in the use of force, and to due respect for human rights (a suspect must be arrested and tried, not executed for his/her alleged involvement in illicit activities). Furthermore, doubts have been raised about the use of weapons in contexts not recognised as war scenarios by international law.<sup>7</sup> In recent years, UN Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, Summary or

Arbitrary Executions have warned that the US policy represents a challenge for the international system and sets a dangerous precedent since it may encourage other countries to use drones to carry out targeted assassinations using a similar logic, with no geographical limits. Critical voices have highlighted the dangers of the underlying "PlayStation mentality" in the use of this technology, which enables alleged enemies to be executed by remote control like in a video game.

Although official arguments claim otherwise, these aircraft are not precision weapons that limit "collateral damage" in terms of civilian victims. A series of reports have underlined the impact of attacks on the civilian population and the difficulties involved in carrying out independent investigations. According to some analyses, one civilian dies for every four or five suspects. A study by the University of Stanford found that in Pakistan alone from 2004 to mid-2012 between 478 and 881 civilians (including 176 minors) had died, while hundreds of others had been injured. Thousands of people live in terror as drones constantly fly overhead.<sup>8</sup> The USA has developed a protocol known as the "Disposition Matrix" for identifying targets and deciding on attacks. When there is a risk of civilian victims it is the president who gives the green light for operations. Nevertheless, the American press has condemned the lack of transparency of these procedures, the widening of targets (not only Taliban or al-Qaeda leaders or groups linked to the 9/11 attacks), attacks on individuals with no clarity concerning their identity and the controversial method used to calculate the number of civilian victims, which classifies all men of a military age as combatants unless their "innocence" is determined after their death.

Several calls have been made for greater transparency and accountability in order to clarify the conditions under which these machines may be used, to explain the criteria employed for identifying targets and to guarantee compliance with international law. The UN has requested an investigation into reports of abuse. Despite the criticism and the fact that the expediency of using drones has also been questioned due to their counter-productive effects (they have fuelled violence and animosity towards the USA in countries such as Yemen or Pakistan), there is every sign that this policy will gain ground in the future since it is considered less costly in both economic and political terms, given the growing aversion to conventional warfare. This is clear to see in the growth forecasts for the UAV market. The US plans to double its military spending on UAVs over the next decade, taking the figure to over 11 billion dollars. Meanwhile, NATO plans to expand the purchasing programme for which it already pledged 1.7 billion dollars in 2012.

***Several reports have underlined the impact of attacks on the civilian population and the difficulties involved in carrying out independent investigations due to the secrecy surrounding these operations***

6. The New York Times, "Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)", *The New York Times*, November 25, 2012, [http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned\\_aerial\\_vehicles/index.html](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html).
7. Chatam House, *International Law and the Use of Drones*, Summary of the International Law Discussion Group, October 21, 2010, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/ii211010drones.pdf>.
8. Stanford International Human Rights & Conflict Resolution Clinic, *Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan*, Stanford/NYU Report, September, 2012, [www.livingunderdrones.org](http://www.livingunderdrones.org).

## 6.8. The pending closure of Guantanamo

In 2008, the recently elected US president, Barack Obama, announced his intention to close down Guantanamo prison, opened under the George Bush administration on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2002 to detain terror suspects. Four years later, president Obama has been re-elected and no substantial changes have taken place in the situation of Guantanamo's detainees. Although it could be argued that the administration has not been capable of dealing with the refusal of the US Congress to allow the closure of the centre, human rights organisations consider that deeper causes lie behind this failure, including a lack of will on the part of Washington to apply international human rights standards and the war on terrorism that it has been waging since the attacks of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, which totally excludes the application of these rights. However, Guantanamo is no longer on the political agenda and no longer features in the media (the issue was barely referred to in the recent US presidential election campaign). Moreover, very little information on the real situation of this detention centre enters the public domain.

*The closure of Guantanamo is still pending four years after the pledge made by Barack Obama*

The American president has repeated the need to close Guantanamo, arguing that the centre “harms national security” but his discourse ignores the harm caused by the indefinite detention of individuals against whom no charges have been brought and who have not been tried in terms of the defence of the most basic principles of international human rights law. Meanwhile, despite the fact that torture and ill treatment remain a reality in Guantanamo, it is important to highlight the declarations made by president Obama in June 2011, according to which “generations of Americans have understood that torture is inconsistent with our values” and that the use of waterboarding (the controversial form of torture that causes the individual to experience the sensation of drowning, and to which many prisoners have been subjected) is “totally inadmissible”. Despite this, and despite the practice having been documented, those responsible have never been brought to justice.

Furthermore, legal experts and civil rights activists have condemned the fact that Barack Obama ordered the resumption of military commissions in March 2011 to try terrorism suspects, having been critical of them during his 2008 presidential campaign. The death on 8<sup>th</sup> September 2012 of the Yemeni prisoner Adman Farhan Abd Al Latif, detained in Guantanamo Bay, highlighted the need for the US government to try detainees in a civil court or, alternatively, release them. Much of the campaign against the military commissions has focused on the case of Omar Khadr, who was held for ten years in Guantanamo despite having been detained when he was a minor, and having been subsequently transferred to Canada, with no formal recognition of his status as a minor at the time of his detention or of the associated legal obligations.

The official number of detainees in Guantanamo in November 2012 was 166. The prisoners are held in the various enclosures of the naval base, from barracks to maximum

security cells. Most of them are waiting to be transferred to their countries of origin, when the USA signs diplomatic agreements with these countries. However, in November a US government report was made public stating that American prisons could house the prisoners detained in Guantanamo in the event of the base being closed down. It should be pointed out that this information did not refer to possible judicial processes to determine the situation of these prisoners, which means that their detention in American prisons would simply be a prolongation of the situation of legal limbo in which they find themselves. As such, one of the main underlying problems for these individuals, namely the lack of access to justice, will remain unresolved since they are detained without charge and with no prospects of gaining access to a trial in which compliance with international human rights standards is guaranteed.

In short, it is not only necessary for Obama to fulfil his pledge to close the Guantanamo base but also for the situation of legal limbo faced by detainees accused of terrorism to be resolved.

## 6.9. Kenya, faced with growing instability in 2013

Kenya, the most dynamic economy in East Africa, has suffered several outbreaks of violence since the restoration of multi-party politics in the 1990s, particularly in the most recent legislative and presidential elections that took place in 2007. A period of post-electoral violence ensued that claimed more than 1,200 lives and triggered the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. There is real concern that the first elections to be held since then, scheduled for March 2013, could unleash a new cycle of instability. However, beyond the elections themselves, there are other factors that may contribute decisively to the worsening of the situation in 2013, such as the growing pressure exerted by the government on the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) secessionist movement and the intervention of the Kenyan armed forces in Somalia. The consequences of this intervention are, on the one hand, the stepping up of violent actions by al-Shabaab and its sympathisers in Kenya, as a punishment for participating in the intervention and, on the other hand, the growing pressure of anti-Somali sentiment in the country, particularly in the capital, Nairobi.

Kenya's politics and economics were dominated by the KANU party from its independence in 1963 until 2002, when it lost power. KANU, which governed in a single-party system, instigated violence for political purposes. Widespread spirals of violence of varying degrees of severity occurred in almost every electoral process. Following the outbreak of post-electoral violence in 2007, a government of national unity was formed. Its poor handling of the political transition was compounded by a series of fraud cases, the exploitation of the population for political purposes and the breach of post-electoral agreements. The electoral commission is immersed in a serious crisis due to the decision to abandon the electronic registration of voters, which may lead to a new attempt to commit electoral fraud. In parallel, two political leaders and current candidates for the presidential elections, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, former economy and education ministers, respectively, together with four other people, were accused of crimes against humanity and must appear before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2013, after the elections. Many analysts feel that although they have for the moment agreed to appear before the court, if they are elected in March they may renege on this obligation.

This situation has been made more acute by the wave of arrests that were made in 2012 of members of the MRC movement, accused of inciting violence. This group, created in the 1990s, protests against the marginalisation to which the coastal region of the country (Coast Province) has been subjected by the government and calls for the secession of this territory. Following independence in 1963 the government took over certain areas of the country, this zone being a prime example, and distributed them among its supporters as part of a system of patronage that excluded the indigenous population. Around 80% of the coastal population does not pos-

sess the ownership deeds of the land on which it lives and the government has not implemented any policy to redress this situation. Moreover, the Kenyan coast holds significant resources for the country's main economic activity, tourism, although the local population's perception is that this source of resources leaves them with little in the way of profits. The MRC had remained inactive until 2008, when it won support through an awareness raising campaign with the message "the coast is not Kenya" (Pwani si Kenia, in Swahili). The MRC states that it enjoys the support of 1.5 million people and in addition to demanding secession has called for an election boycott. In 2010 the government declared the MRC illegal, although in June 2012 the movement succeeded in getting the Supreme Court to remove the prohibition. Following this, the government called on the MRC to register as a political party and abandon its secessionist stance. Four months later a local court, instigated by the government, declared the group illegal and ordered the police to arrest its leaders. There is speculation over whether this group possesses arms and is linked to the Somali Islamist armed group al-Shabaab, due to erroneously linking the Islam present in Kenya to the Somali Islamist insurgency. Several analysts have pointed out that these accusations show a lack of knowledge of the social reality and are aimed at causing confusion and justifying the repression of the movement, which leads to a vicious circle of violence.

Nonetheless, this accusation serves to introduce the final element of risk, arising from Kenya's military intervention in Somalia in 2011. As a response to the intervention, there has been an increase in the number of violent actions and attacks in the north-east province (mostly populated by Somalis) and in Nairobi, for which al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility. Grenade explosions in shops and Christian places of worship, along with attacks on police stations, have proliferated in a spiral of violence that in turn has fuelled hostility towards the Somali community on the part of the population of other communities in Kenya. At the end of August the leader of the extremist group Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), Aboud Rogo Mohammed, was assassinated in Mombasa, triggering strong protests. Furthermore, the passing of a new anti-terrorism law in mid-August met with the opposition of Muslim groups and human rights groups, which considered it discriminatory. On top of this, in November a bus exploded as it travelled through the suburb of Eastleigh in Nairobi, dubbed *Little Mogadishu*, a predominantly Somali district, which sparked grave reprisals against this community, including the burning and sacking of shops, assaults and even the rape of nine women. Although the police intervened to put a stop to this xenophobic reaction, and the incidents were condemned by the leader of the Muslim clergy in Eastleigh, Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim, relations in this district, in Nairobi and in the North Eastern Province have deteriorated severely. As a result, the country may face an escalation of the situation in the near future that may have disastrous consequences.

***Kenya's military intervention in Somalia has triggered an escalation in the activities of the Somali armed group al-Shabaab in Kenya and hostility towards the Somali community as a whole***



## 6.10. Rwanda and the FDLR, cause and consequence of the instability in the Great Lakes

Unresolved local dynamics and the breach of peace agreements, the destabilising role played by Rwanda in the Great Lakes and the laissez faire attitude of the international community have brought a new period of instability to the east of the DR Congo. Even if the latest episode of violence related to the M23 rebellion is tackled through dialogue between the Congolese government and the M23, and by exerting pressure on Rwanda and the M23, the instability will continue because the roots of this complex situation will remain unresolved.

The rebellion initiated in May 2012 by the M23,<sup>9</sup> whose name refers to the breach of the peace agreements signed on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2009 between the government and the armed groups of the region, including the CNDP, followed the same pattern as the previous ones. First of all, the taking of Bukavu by the rebel leader Laurent Nkunda in 2004, which led to the subsequent creation of the CNDP political party and the integration of rebel troops in the FARDC in 2007. Secondly, the rebellion that culminated in the occupation of Goma in 2008, which ended with Nkunda being neutralised and replaced by Bosco Ntaganda as representative of the group, with the blessing of Rwanda, along with the signing of the agreements of 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2009. As in 2007, the failed agreements of 2009 aimed to achieve the integration of the CNDP in the institutions of the state. However, this integration has never been implemented in the military sphere, due to the existence of parallel command structures put in place by the CNDP, the non-payment of salaries, mistrust between integrated CNDP officers and the other officers of the FARDC, the superiority of the ranks of CNDP officers over the remaining officers, mistrust between the respective soldiers, the deployment of new military units linked to their place of origin, and the existence of “ghost” battalions at the service of Ntaganda. Neither did integration occur in the political sphere, due to the creation of parallel administrations in the territory of Masisi, the restriction of the participation of the CNDP to the presence of deputies in the provincial assembly, and the results of the fraud-plagued legislative elections of November 2011, declared null and void in the CNDP’s heartland, Masisi.

Last of all, the third proposal of the 2009 agreements, demanded by Rwanda, was a failure. This part of the agreement involved exerting military pressure on the remaining armed groups with a presence in the area, in particular the FDLR armed group, perceived as a threat by Rwanda, in order to force its break-up. The military operations of the FARDC, which were supported by the MONUSCO and in which even the Rwandan special forces took part between February 2011 and September 2012 (triggering a new political crisis), did not succeed in breaking up the FDLR.

The lack of a strategy to eliminate the FDLR and the ambiguity of the relations between the FDLR and sectors of the FARDC, the two groups having coexisted and collaborated together on several occasions, contributed to the failure of the various military operations. Furthermore, the pillaging of natural resources by the FARDC and by Ntaganda’s officials in the army continued, the said resources being channelled through Rwanda in the case of the latter.

The warrant for Ntaganda’s arrest issued by the government in April to satisfy the international community, which was unhappy with the fraudulent elections of November 2011, triggered the desertion of soldiers loyal to Ntaganda and the start of the rebellion that once again seized control of Goma in mid-November 2012, unimpeded by the MONUSCO and the FARDC. Although there were clashes between the parties between May and November, the M23 was strengthened during this period, with the support of Rwanda, which is why it decided to force the situation in November. In mid-November the M23 stepped up the pressure and the FARDC ceded control of the area. Moreover, a large number of the latter’s members switched sides.

The present situation will not be resolved with the proposals currently on the table. Other measures that address the deep roots of the conflict should be implemented in order to tackle the situation. So far nobody has been prepared to propose such measures, which means that the instability is set to continue. First of all, on a local level, there is a clear need for a framework designed to resolve the national dispute over land ownership, since corruption, abuse and the exploitation of this issue by politicians is at the root of many local conflicts. Secondly, the military strategy to tackle the FDLR has proved inefficient. It is essential for Rwanda to act in the region in order to deal with the FDLR, and international pressure is crucial. The actions against the FDLR must be accompanied by an offer for political dialogue between Rwanda and the FDLR (and other Rwandan political actors) providing that the group ceases its armed struggle and its belligerent discourse against Paul Kagame’s regime, that it is offered guarantees of integration in Rwanda and that freedom of expression is promoted with the goal of ensuring full reconciliation between the various political actors and that of laying the foundations for overcoming the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Thirdly, as regards the exploitation of natural resources, the international community (the EU and China, mainly) must follow the path initiated by the USA in respect of promoting mechanisms of transparency and control on an international level in order to do away with the illicit funding mechanisms of the actors on a local level, which contribute decisively to prolonging the conflict.

*The foundations for overcoming the conflict in the Great Lakes will not be laid unless Rwanda is forced to accept political dialogue with the FDLR*

9. See chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

## 6.11. Violence and the Syrian forced displacement crisis

The impact the war in Syria is having would make for a long list that is hard to come to terms with: more than 60,000 people killed since the conflict began in 2011, countless human rights abuses, a radicalization of the actors in the conflict giving rise to episodes of revenge and retaliation, an increase in regional instability due to the internationalization of the conflict, as well as many other elements. Undoubtedly, forced displacement is one of the most serious consequences. The only way to escape violence for hundreds of thousands of people has been to leave their homes. In late 2012 the numbers provided by different international organizations gave an idea of the scale of the tragedy: out of a total population of 22.5 million there were more than 600,000 Syrian refugees, mainly in neighbouring countries, and 2.5 million displaced persons within the country, in estimates that were considered “conservative”. Overall, the forced displacement numbers exceeded all of the forecasts made earlier in the year and jumped very rapidly near the end of 2012, which foretold a worsening of the humanitarian crisis in 2013.

The Syrian refugee population is mainly located in neighbouring countries. At the end of December 2012, UNHCR estimates that 162,050 people were registered as refugees in Lebanon, some 148,592 in Jordan, 141,240 in Turkey and 66,048 in Iraq. The number of Syrian men and women that have left the country because of the armed conflict is believed to be even greater, considering that not all of the people who have crossed the border have officially registered as refugees. Jordanian and Turkish authorities, for example, respectively estimated that between 100,000 and 70,000 Syrians were not officially recognized as refugees in these countries. Moreover, not all refugees were located in special areas, only 40% according to UNHCR, although the percentages varied depending on the host country. In Turkey most Syrian refugees were in camps on the Syrian border, while in other countries they were living with relatives or friends, were in a shelter, or had rented a house. After living through traumatic experiences in their places of origin or being exposed to violence –including attacks and bombings–, many refugees were living in precarious conditions after crossing the Syrian border.

Notably, many refugees interviewed in Lebanon and Jordan have admitted that sexual violence was the main reason for fleeing. According to a report by the International Rescue Committee, women and girls have reported being sexually assaulted by armed men in public and in their homes, as well as cases of kidnapping, rape, torture and murder. Resources to provide medical and psychological assistance to these victims are limited, plus many of them continue to be exposed to precarious and insecure situations in refugee camps and to episodes of domestic violence. Another facet of the forced displacement crisis caused by the armed conflict is the situation of thousands of people that had

been living in the country as refugees in recent years and were forced, once again, to leave their homes because of violence. This drama affects communities such as the Palestinians –who sought refuge in Syria after the Arab-Israeli wars in previous decades– or the Iraqis, who had tried to escape the armed conflict in their own country after the 2003 U.S. invasion and, in some cases, have been forced to return to Iraq despite continuing high levels of violence.

The constant flow of refugees throughout 2012 has overwhelmed the capacity of the neighbouring countries –which in some cases has led to restrictions and/or political groups asking for the borders to be closed– and has also triggered some tense situations. Given the destabilizing effect the war in Syria was having on Lebanon and growing inter-communal tensions, it was a particularly sensitive issue in this country where Syrian refugees, mostly Sunnis, had reached almost 5% of the population. In the case of Jordan, Human Rights Watch reported cases of discrimination against Palestinian refugees from Syria.

The situation of the no less than 2.5 million people displaced within Syria’s borders is much more difficult to determine, since humanitarian organizations have been denied access. The available data suggest that many of them are trying to survive by taking shelter in schools, universities or public buildings, in precarious conditions and are constantly exposed to the dynamics of the conflict. According to reports, some of the humanitarian aid that organizations did manage to send, in an attempt to deal with these cases, was manipulated by the rebels and the Government to favour their respective supporters and to guarantee their fidelity.

With a view to 2013, therefore, it seems relevant that any international approach to the conflict must take into account the reality of forced displacement caused by the war in Syria, in particular the constant increase in the need for assistance due to the continuous flow of refugees –UNHCR had only received 62% of the 246 million USD requested to respond to the emergency in Syria–; the urgent need to find ways to help IDPs and the civilian population within the country –according to UN estimates a total of four million people will require humanitarian assistance in early 2013– and the importance of not ignoring the plight of refugees and IDPs in a possible post-conflict scenario to overcome the dynamics of violence and fragmentation in the country.

***The war in Syria prompted more than 600,000 people to flee the country and caused the internal displacement of another 2.5 million people who also left their homes due to violence***

## 6.12. The crisis in Mali and security challenges in the Sahel

The armed conflict in northern Mali has plunged the country into the worst crisis since its independence. The roots of the instability can be found in many internal factors, but also in regional influences on Mali resulting from the war in Libya and the growing internationalization of armed groups that have expanded their area of action in the Sahel. Instability in the Sahel, a belt of semi-arid territory to the south of the Sahara desert that stretches from Mauritania to Sudan, became one of the main causes of concern for the international community in 2012 (especially for Europe due to its geographical proximity). It emerged as one of the great challenges of the future, especially considering the uncertain consequences of the military operation launched by France in Mali in early 2013.

The crisis in Mali has been called by many analysts the second chapter of the war in Libya, which in 2011 toppled Muammar Gaddafi's regime. Although the conflict between Tuareg groups and the Bamako Government is long-standing, in fact, the reactivation of armed initiatives by Tuareg groups in early 2012 was related to the return of a large group of Tuareg fighters who had fought for Gaddafi. The armed conflict in Libya has made weapons widely available in the region. This has benefited the Tuareg, but it has also favoured multiple criminal organizations that control trafficking routes (weapons, drugs, tobacco, immigrants), and jihadists armed groups that have expanded their area of operations and now engage in criminal activity and have begun kidnapping Western nationals in several countries in the region as a source of funds.

The secular Tuareg armed group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was increasingly displaced from the control of northern Mali –equivalent to France in size– by jihadist organizations with different origins and trajectories. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), was founded in Algeria, has had bases in northern Mali since 2007, and a strong presence in Timbuktu. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), an AQIM subsidiary formed mainly by Mauritians and Malians, took control of the city of Gao after clashes with the MNLA. Led by the historic Tuareg leader Iyad ag Ghaly, the Ansar Dine group (Defenders of the Faith) consolidated its position in the northern town of Kidal. The total number of Islamist fighters is hard to determine, but estimates range from 2,000 to 3,000 militants, although some estimates go as high as 6,000. Despite the diversity of groups and interests, some analysts have highlighted the coordination ability of these groups during the offensive in Mali. However, others have suggested that the alliances are fragile and that their ability to recruit may be a question of opportunism or for economic reasons, more than because of a true ideological commitment to the jihadist cause, in a context of poverty, political and social marginalization, and institutional weakness.

*Cross-border activities and the proliferation of jihadist groups in the Sahel have raised international concern, which grew stronger after the crisis in Mali*

In any case, concerns over AQIM cross-border incursions and the proliferation of radical Islamist groups in the Sahel existed before the crisis in Mali and have had an influence on security policies at the regional level. Since the 9-11 attacks, the U.S. has been developing a counter-terrorism strategy in the Sahel and has spent millions of dollars to train the Armed Forces in the area, often in coordination with France, which as a former colonial power remains the most influential foreign actor in the region. Given the increasing cross-border activity of AQIM and its subsidiaries, in recent years Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Mauritania have also tried to set up military cooperation mechanisms to fight terrorism. However, these structures have not led to effective coordination and have given rise to mutual recriminations. Criticism includes the Algeria's alleged lack of commitment with regard to the impact AQIM is having on neighbouring countries, or the tolerance shown by President Amadou Toumani Touré (overthrown in 2012 by a military officer who had been trained in the U.S.) towards jihadist activity in northern Mali.

These regional initiatives were unable to stem the crisis in Mali. The transitional government that took office in the country after the withdrawal of the military Junta sought assistance from ECOWAS to restore its territorial integrity and force the rebels out of the north. Discussions over the mandate of the African mission and whether or not to give priority to political stabilization measures and the restructuring of the Armed Forces in Mali –which were included in UN Security Council resolution 2805 of December 2012 before any military intervention, were overtaken by the events. The French military launched an offensive in early January 2013 against the Islamist movements towards the south. The events in Mali led the West to begin seeing it as a “global threat” and comparing the Sahel to Afghanistan –“Sahelistan”– which set off alarms regarding the possible transformation of the area into a sanctuary for radical Islamist groups. The attack by an AQIM splinter group in January 2013 on an Algerian gas plant –with dozens of foreigners held hostage– reinforced these ideas. However, several analysts warned that there was a risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy if the methods used in Afghanistan were applied to this case.

With France leading a mission made up of troops from several African countries, this new scenario gives rise to many concerns. These include, the limits to the ability to confront the jihadist groups on their own ground, the difficulties in maintaining control over northern Mali once these organizations have been pushed out, the possible spread of radical Islamist cells in an area known for its porous borders, and the fears of people in the north of being subject to retaliatory actions, by both jihadists from the neighbouring countries and members of the Malian Armed Forces, for their alleged cooperation with the rebels. In addition, there is concern over a possible escalation of inter-communal tensions and the challenges posed by the humanitarian crisis prompted by the conflict.



# Annex I. International missions in 2012

## UN peace missions (16 PKO, 1 PO/PKO, 12 PO and PBO)<sup>1</sup>

Country (start-end of armed conflict) <sup>2</sup>	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution) <sup>3</sup>	Beginning – end of mission <sup>4</sup>
<b>AFRICA</b>		
Central Africa	UNOCA (PO), United Nations Regional Office in Central Africa, S/2010/457 (2011)	March 2011
West Africa	UNOWA (PO), United Nations Office in West Africa, S/2001/1128 and S/2001/1129 (2002)	January 2002
Burundi (1993-2006) (2011-)	BNUB <sup>5</sup> (PO), United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, S/RES/1959 (2011)	January 2011
Central African Rep. (1996-2000) (2002-2003) (2006-)	BINUCA (PBO), <sup>6</sup> United Nations Integrated Office in the Central African Republic, S/PRST/2009/5 (2009)	April 2009
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2007)(2011)	UNOCI <sup>7</sup> (PKO), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, S/RES/1528 (2004)	April 2004
DR Congo (1998-)	MONUSCO <sup>8</sup> (PKO), United Nations Stabilization Mission in DR Congo, S/RES/1925 (2010)	July 2010
Guinea Bissau (1998-1999)	UNIOGBIS <sup>9</sup> (PBO), United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau, S/RES/1876 (2010)	January 2010
Liberia (1989-2005)	UNMIL (PKO), United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/RES/1509	September 2003
Libya (2011-)	UNSMIL (PO), United Nations Support Mission in Libya, S/RES/2009 (2011)	September 2011
Morocco – Western Sahara (1975-1991)	MINURSO (PKO), United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, S/RES/690 (1991)	September 1991
Sierra Leone (1991-2001)	UNIPSIL <sup>10</sup> (PBO), United Nations Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone, S/RES/1829	October 2008
Somalia (1988-)	UNPOS <sup>11</sup> (PO), United Nations Political Office in Somalia, S/RES/954	April 1995
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	UNAMID <sup>12</sup> (PKO), United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur, S/RES/1769 (2007)	July 2007
Sudan – South Sudan	UNISFA (PKO), United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, S/RES/1990 (2011)	June 2011
South Sudan (2009-)	UNMISS (PKO) <sup>13</sup> , United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, S/RES/1996 (2011)	July 2011

1. Peace-Keeping Operation (PKO), Political Office Mission (PO) and Peace-Building Operation (PBO). The figures given are based on ongoing UN missions during 2012 and therefore do not include representatives, envoys or special advisers, or personal envoys that are not associated to a specific mission. The political mission UNAMA (Afghanistan) is led and backed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, for which reason it is counted as a PO/PKO hybrid mission.
2. The start and end dates of conflicts are based on the data in Chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts). In cases of ended armed conflicts, which are therefore not included in Chapter 1, dates are those accepted by the academic community.
3. This annex lists the dates of armed conflicts in which the mandate is clearly linked to the armed conflict, although it is possible that there have been previous cycles of violence.
4. In italics, the missions closed or duties completed in 2012.
5. It replaces the BINUB political operation from 1st January 2011, which in turn had replaced the ONUB peacekeeping mission in January 2007. This was preceded by the AU mission (AMIB) which was integrated into the ONUB in June 2004.
6. It replaces BONUCA, created in February 2000, which in turn had replaced the MINURCA peacekeeping mission (1998-2000) (PKO), which was established after the armed conflict started in 1996. In a parallel way, the MINURCAT peacekeeping mission, present in the east of Chad and the northeast of the Central African Republic, culminated its withdrawal in December 2010.
7. There was previously a UN political mission (MINUCI, S/RES/1479) from May 2003, which included the 1,300 soldiers from ECOWAS (ECOMICI, ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire) to April 2004, supported by 4,000 French soldiers (Operation Licorne).
8. It replaces the UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo, MONUC, which had been present in the country since November 1999.
9. It replaces UNOGBIS, which had been present in the country since March 1999.
10. UNOMSIL (1998-1999) (PKO), UNAMSIL (1999-2005) (PKO), UNIOSIL (2006-2008) (PBO).
11. UNOSOM I (1992-1993), UNITAF (1992-1993, USA with mandate from the UN Security Council), UNOSOM II (1993-1995) (PKO). S/RES/954 established the closure of UNOSOM II and stated that the UN would continue observing events in Somalia through a Political Office based in Kenya.
12. The AU mission, AMIS, set up in 2004, has been integrated in the new joint mission UNAMID. It is a hybrid mission of the AU and the UN, with a single command.
13. The UNMIS mandate culminated on 9th July after the interim period established by the Sudanese government and the SPLM in the overall Peace Agreement reached on 9th January 2005 had come to an end. Nevertheless, the UN Security Council determined that the situation in South Sudan continued to be a threat for peace and security in the region, and decided to set up UNMISS for an initial period of one year, starting its task on 9th July. The functions of the political mission UNAMIS (set up in 2004) were transferred to UNMIS under S/RES/1590 of March 2005.



AMERICA		
Haiti (2004-2005)	MINUSTAH (PKO), United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, S/RES/1542 (2004)	June 2004
ASIA		
Central Asia	UNRCCA (PO), United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia, S/2007/279	May 2007
Afghanistan <sup>14</sup> (2001-)	UNAMA (PO/PKO), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, S/RES/1401 (2002), S/RES/1662 (2006), S/RES/1746 (2007)	March 2002
India – Pakistan (1947-48) <sup>15</sup>	UNMOGIP <sup>16</sup> (PKO), United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, S/RES/91 (1951)	January 1949
Timor-Leste (1975-1999)	UNMIT (PKO), United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, S/RES/1704	August 2006
EUROPE		
Cyprus (1963-1964)	UNFICYP (PKO), United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, S/RES/186	March 1964
Serbia – Kosovo (1998-1999)	UNMIK (PKO), United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/RES/1244	June 1999
MIDDLE EAST		
Iraq (2003-)	UNAMI (PO), United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, S/RES/1546 (2004)	August 2003
Israel – Palestine (1948-) <sup>17</sup>	UNSCO <sup>18</sup> (PO), United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East	June 1994
Israel – Syria (Golan Heights) (1967, 1973) <sup>19</sup>	UNDOF (PKO), United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, S/RES/350 (1974)	June 1974
Israel – Lebanon (1978, 1982, 2006) <sup>20</sup>	UNIFIL (PKO), United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, S/RES/425 -SRES/426 (1978) S/RES/1701 (2006)	March 1978
Lebanon	UNSCOL (PO), Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, S/2008/236 and S/2008/237 (2008)	February 2007
Middle East (1948-)	UNTSO (PKO), United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, S/RES/50 (1948)	June 1948
Syria (2011-)	UNSMIS (OMP), United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria, S/RES/2043 (2012)	April – August 2012

### OSCE MISSIONS (16 missions)<sup>21</sup>

CENTRAL ASIA		
Kazakhstan	OSCE Centre in Astana, PC.DEC/797, 21/06/07, previously OSCE centre in Almaty (PC.DEC/243, 23/07/98)	July 1998
Kyrgyzstan	OSCE Centre in Bishek, PC.DEC/245, 23/07/98	January 1999
Tajikistan (1992-1997)	OSCE office in Tajikistan, PC.DEC/852, 19/06/08, <sup>22</sup> previously OSCE centre in Dushanbe (1994)	February 1994

14. The current phase of the armed conflict suffered by the country began with the attacks by the USA and United Kingdom in October 2001, although the country has been in armed conflict since 1979.
15. On three occasions (1947-1948, 1965, 1971) the two countries have clashed, both claiming sovereignty over the Kashmir region, divided between India, Pakistan and China. Since 1989, the conflict has moved into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
16. UNIPOM (1965-1966) (PKO).
17. Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report analyses only the last phase of the conflict, which corresponds to the 2nd Intifada, which began in September 2000.
18. UNEF I (1956-1967) (PKO), UNEF II (1973-1979) (PKO).
19. This lists the dates for which the mandate of the mission is clearly linked to the conflict, although there have been previous cycles of violence between the parties.
20. The annex provides the dates for which the mandate of the mission is clearly linked to the conflict, although there have been previous cycles of violence between the parties. In this case, the forces of Israel and Lebanon fought in the war of 1948, but the UNIFIL mission was not established until after the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978. Its mandate has been changing according to new cycles of violence that have occurred, especially because of the second invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006.
21. The number of missions excludes special representatives not associated with OSCE missions, centres or projects.
22. The OSCE deployed in February 1994 the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan, which was renamed as the OSCE Centre in Dushanbe in October 2002. Finally, in June 2008 the OSCE Permanent Council changed the name and mandate for its presence in the country, and established the OSCE Office in Tajikistan. Its new mandate includes activities to assist the country in developing strategies to address threats to its security and stability, conflict prevention and crisis management, among others. However, there is no reference to the armed conflict that the country experienced between 1992 and 1997.

Turkmenistan	OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, PC.DEC/244, 23/07/98	January 1999
Uzbekistan	OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan, PC.DEC/734, 30/06/06	July 2006
<b>EASTERN EUROPE AND CAUCASUS</b>		
Armenia	OSCE Office in Yerevan, PC.DEC/314, 22/07/99	February 2000
Azerbaijan	OSCE Office in Baku, PC.DEC/318, 16/11/99	July 2000
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (1991-1994)	Personal Representative of Chairman-in-office on the Conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, CIO 10/08/95	August 1995
Moldova, Rep. (Transnistria) (1992)	OSCE Mission to Moldova CSO DEC, 04/02/93	April 1993
Ukraine	OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, <sup>23</sup> PC.DEC/295 01/06/99	July 1999
<b>SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE</b>		
Albania	OSCE Presence in Albania, PC.DEC/ 160, 27/03/97; updated by PC.DEC/588, 18/12/03	April 1997
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, MC/5/DEC 18/12/95	December 1995
Macedonia, FYR (2001)	OSCE Mission to Skopje, 15-CSO/Journal No. 2, Annex 1, 14/08/92; PC. DEC/457, 21/12/01; PC.DEC/977, 16/12/10	September 1992
Montenegro	OSCE Mission to Montenegro, PC.DEC/732, 29/06/06 <sup>24</sup>	June 2006
Serbia	OSCE Mission to Serbia, PC.DEC/733, 29/06/06 <sup>25</sup>	June 2006
Serbia – Kosovo (1998-1999)	OMIK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo), PC.DEC/305, 01/07/99	July 1999

#### NATO Missions (five missions)<sup>26</sup>

Europe – Mediterranean Sea	Operation Active Endeavour	October 2001
Horn of Africa	Operation Ocean Shield, Atlantic North Council 17/08/09 <sup>27</sup>	August 2009
Afghanistan (2001-)	ISAF, S/RES/1386 20/12/01 <sup>28</sup>	August 2003
Iraq (2003-)	NTIM-I, NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, S/RES/1546	August 2004 – December 2011
Serbia – Kosovo (1998-1999)	KFOR, S/RES/1244 10/06/99 and Military – Technical Accord between NATO, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia	June 1999
Somalia (1998-)	NATO assistance to AMISOM <sup>29</sup>	June 2007

#### EU operations (17 missions)<sup>30</sup>

<b>EUROPE AND ASIA</b>		
Afghanistan (2001-) <sup>31</sup>	EUPOL AFGHANISTAN, EU Police Mission for Afghanistan, Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP	June 2007

23. It replaced the OSCE Mission in Ukraine (1994-1999) devoted to managing the crisis in Crimea.

24. It was established as a result of the independence of Montenegro from Serbia in June 2006.

25. The OSCE mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, PC/DEC 401, 11/01/01, became OmiSaM (OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro), PC.DEC 533, 13/02/03, and, finally, became the OSCE Mission in Serbia in 2006.

26. NTIM-I completed its mandate in December 2011, so it does not take it into account for the final number of missions in 2012.

27. The Ocean Shield Operation replaced two previous operations to combat piracy activities: Allied Provider Operation (October – December 2008) and Allied Protector Operation (March – June 2009).

28. The UN Security Council Resolution authorised the ISAF deployment for the first time. Successive resolutions renewed its mandate. NATO assumed the mission leadership in August 2003.

29. NATO has carried out other interventions to support the EU, including the operation to assist the AU mission to Sudan (AMIS), started in 2005 and ended in 2007. NATO has also offered support to the hybrid mission in the Sudanese region of Darfur (UNAMID).

30. Although the mission in Mali begins its term in 2013, it is taken into account for the count for 2012. The total number of missions excludes special representatives that are not associated to a concrete EU mission. In the first days of 2013 the EU had 10 special representatives in Central Asia, Southern Caucasus, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, African Union, Horn of Africa, the Southern Mediterranean region, Sudan–South Sudan and the Middle East.

31. The current phase of the armed conflict suffered by the country began with the attacks by the USA and United Kingdom in October 2001, although the country has been involved in armed conflict since 1979.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUPM, EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP	January 2003 – June 2012
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUFOR ALTHEA <sup>32</sup> , EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP	December 2004
Georgia – Russia (2008)	EUMM, EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP and 2008/759/CFSP	October 2008
Kosovo (1998-1999)	EULEX KOSOVO, EU Mission for the Rule of Law in Kosovo, Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP	December 2008
Moldova – Ukraine	EUBAM, EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, Council Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP	November 2005
<b>AFRICA</b>		
Horn of Africa	EUCAP NESTOR, European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa, Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP	July 2012
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUPOL DR Congo, EU Police Mission in DR Congo, Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP	July 2007
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUSEC DR Congo, Security Sector Aid and Reform Mission in DR Congo, Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP	June 2005
Mali (north) (2012)	EUTM, EU Training Mission in Mali, Council Conclusion, 17/01/13	January 2013
Niger	EUCAP SAHEL Niger, Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP	July 2012
Somalia (1988-)	EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA, S/RES/1816 (2008), S/RES/1838 (2008), Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP and 2008/851/CFSP	December 2008
Somalia (1988-)	EUTM Somalia, EU military mission to contribute to the training of Somali Security Forces, 2010/96/CFSP	April 2010
South Sudan (2009)	EUAVSEC South Sudan, European Union Aviation Security CSDP Mission in South Sudan, Council Decision 2012/312/CFSP, 18/06/12	October 2012
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>		
Iraq (2003-)	EUJUST LEX/Iraq, Integrated EU Mission for the Rule of Law in Iraq, Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP	July 2005
Israel – Palestine (1948-) <sup>33</sup>	EUBAM Rafah, Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point, Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP	November 2005
Israel – Palestine (1948-) <sup>34</sup>	EUPOL COPPS, <sup>35</sup> EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP	January 2006

### OAS (three missions)

Belize and Guatemala	OAS General Secretariat's Office in the Adjacency Zone	February 2003
Colombia (1964-)	OAS Mission to support the peace process in Colombia (OAS/MAPP), CP/RES/859	February 2004
Colombia (1964-) and Ecuador	OAS Good Offices mission in Equator and Colombia, RC.25/Res.1/08 Corr.2	March 2008

### ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) (two missions)

Guinea – Bissau	ECOMIB, ECOWAS Mission in Guinea – Bissau	May 2012
Mali (north) (2012)	AFISMA, International Mission for Mali Assistance, S/RES/2085 of UN Security Council, 20/12/12	January 2013

32. The UN Security Council (S/RES/1551 of 09/07/04) authorised the EUFOR ALTHEA operation as the legal successor to the SFOR, the previous operation headed by NATO. EUFOR ALTHEA has the mandate to implement the Dayton Agreement.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. This mission emerged from the previous work of the EU Coordination Office to assist the Palestinian Police (EU COPPS), established in April 2005.

### AU (two missions)

Central Africa (LRA) (1986-)	RCI/LRA, Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA, Peace and Security Council Decision, 22/11/11	March 2012
Somalia (1988-)	AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), S/RES/1744	March 2007

### Operations by Russia and the Community of Independent States (CIS) (one mission)

Moldova (Transnistria) (1992)	Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (Bilateral, 21/07/92)	July 1992
<b>ARAB LEAGUE (ONE MISSION)</b>		
Syria (2011-)	<i>Arab League Observer Mission in Syria, Arab League Council Resolution 7439, 16/11/12</i>	<i>November 2011–January 2012</i>

### ECCAS (one mission)

Central African Republic (1996-2000) (2002-2003) (2006-)	MICOPAX <sup>36</sup> , Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic	July 2008
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### Other operations (six missions)

Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	Operation Licorne (France) S/RES/1464	February 2003
Egypt (Sinai) – Israel	Multinational Force and Observers (Protocol to the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel 26/03/1979)	April 1982
Israel – Palestine (1948-)	TIPH 2 (Temporary International Presence in Hebron)	February 1997
Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep. of (1950-53)	NSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) Armistice Agreement	July 1953
Solomon Islands	RAMSI, Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (Biketawa Declaration) S/RES/1690	July 2003
Timor-Leste (1975-1999)	ISF (PKO) (Australia) S/RES/1690	May 2006

Sources: Prepared by the authors and updated in December 2012, and SIPRI. SIPRI Yearbook 2012. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

36. MICOPAX replaced the Multinational Force (FOMUC) of CEMAC regional organisation.

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# Glossary

- ADF-NALU:** Allied Defence Forces - National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
- ADSC:** All Darfur Stakeholders Conference
- AFISMA:** African-led International Support Mission to Mali
- AKP:** Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
- ALBA:** Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America)
- ALP:** Arakan Liberation Party
- AMISOM:** African Union Mission in Somalia
- APCLS:** Alliance de Patriots pour un Congo Libre et Souverain
- APHC:** All Parties Hurriyat Conference
- APRD:** Armée Populaire pour la Réstauration de la République et de la Démocratie (Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy)
- AQAP:** Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula
- AQIM:** Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
- ARMM:** Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
- ARS:** Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
- ASEAN:** Association of Southeast Asian Nations
- ASWJ:** Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a
- ATLF:** All Terai Liberation Front
- ATMM:** Akhil Tarai Mukti Morcha
- ATTF:** All Tripura Tiger Force
- AU:** African Union
- BDP:** Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
- BH:** Boko Haram
- BIFM:** Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement
- BNUB:** United Nations Office in Burundi
- BLA:** Baluch Liberation Army
- BLF:** Baluch Liberation Front
- BLT:** Baloch Liberation Tigers
- BINUCA:** United Nations Integrated Office in the Central African Republic
- BRA:** Balochistan Republican Army
- CARICOM:** Caribbean Community
- CAP:** Consolidated Appeal Process
- CEMAC:** Monetary and Economic Community of Central Africa
- CIA:** Central Intelligence Agency
- CHD:** Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
- CNDD-FDD:** Congrès National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
- CNDP:** Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for People's Defence)
- CPA:** Comprehensive Peace Agreement
- CPI-M:** Communist Party of India-Maoist
- CPJP:** Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace)
- CPN-UML:** Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist)
- DDR:** Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
- DHD:** Dima Halim daogah
- DHD (J):** Dima Halim Daogah, Black Widow faction
- DHD (Nunisa):** Dima Halim Daogah (Nunisa)
- DKBA:** Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
- DMLEK:** Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunama
- DPA:** Darfur Peace Agreement
- EA:** Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity)
- ECCAS:** Economic Community of Central African States
- ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States
- EDA:** Eritrean Democratic Alliance
- EEBC:** Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
- EFDM:** Eritrean Federal Democratic Movement
- EIC:** Eritrean Islamic Congress
- EIPJD:** Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development
- ELF:** Eritrean Liberation Front
- ELN:** Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)
- ENSF:** Eritrean National Salvation Front
- EPC:** Eritrean People's Congress
- EPDF:** Eritrean People's Democratic Front
- EPP:** Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (Paraguayan Popular Army)
- EPPF:** Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front
- EPRDF:** Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
- ETA:** Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom)
- ETIM:** East Turkestan Islamic Movement
- ETLO:** East Turkestan Liberation Organization
- EU:** European Union
- EUBAM:** EU Border Assistant Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
- EUBAM Rafah:** European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah
- EU NAVFOR SOMALIA:** European Union Naval Force in Somalia
- EUFOR ALTHEA:** European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EUFOR LIBIA:** European Union Force in Libya
- EUJUST LEX:** EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
- EULEX:** EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
- EUMM:** EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia
- EUPM:** EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EUPOL AFGHANISTAN:** EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
- EUPOL COPPS:** EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
- EUPOL RD CONGO:** EU Police Mission in DR Congo
- EUSEC RD CONGO:** EU Security Sector Reform Mission in DR Congo
- EUTM Mali:** EU Training Mission in Mali
- EUTM SOMALIA:** EU Somalia Training Mission
- FAO:** Food and Agriculture Organization
- FARC:** Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
- FATA:** Federally Administered Tribal Areas
- FDLR:** Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
- FDPC:** Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (Central African People's Democratic Front)

**FEWS NET:** USAID Net of Famine Early Warning System

**FFR:** Front des Forces de Redressement (Front of Forces for Rectification)

**FIS:** Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front)

**FJL:** Freedom and Justice Party

**FLEC-FAC:** Frente de Liberação do Enclave de Cabinda (Cabinda Enclave's Liberation Front)

**FNL:** Forces Nationales de Libération (National Liberation Forces)

**FOMUC:** Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (CEMAC Multinational Forces in Central African Republic)

**FPI:** Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian Popular Front)

**FRF:** Forces Republicaines et Federalistas (Republican and Federalist Forces)

**FRODEBU:** Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Burundi Democratic Front)

**FRUD:** Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et la Démocratie (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy)

**FSA:** Free Syrian Army

**FTG:** Federal Transition Government

**FUC:** Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique (United Front for Democratic Change)

**FUDD:** Frente Unido para la Democracia y Contra la Dictadura (United Front for Democracy and Against Dictatorship)

**FURCA:** Force de l'Union en République Centrafricaine (Union Force in the Central African Republic)

**GAM:** Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)

**GEI:** Gender Equity Index

**GIA:** Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group)

**GIE:** Gender Inequality Index

**GSPC:** Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)

**HAK:** Armenian National Congress

**HIV/AIDS:** Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

**HPG:** Humanitarian Policy Group

**HRC:** Human Rights Council

**HRW:** Human Rights Watch

**IAEA:** International Atomic Energy Agency

**IBC:** Iraq Body Count

**ICC:** International Criminal Court

**ICTR:** International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

**ICTY:** International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia

**ICG:** International Crisis Group

**ICRC:** International Committee of the Red Cross

**ICU:** Islamic Courts Union

**IDMC:** Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

**IDP:** Internally Displaced Person

**IGAD:** Intergovernmental Authority on Development

**IHL:** International Humanitarian Law

**IISS:** International Institute for Strategic Studies

**IMU:** Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

**INLA:** Irish National Liberation Army

**IOM:** International Organization for Migrations

**IRA:** Irish Republican Army

**ISAF:** International Security Assistance Force

**JEM:** Justice and Equality Movement

**JKLF:** Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

**JTMM:** Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (People's Terai Liberation Front)

**KANU:** Kenya African National Union

**KCK:** Koma Civakên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Communities Union)

**KDP:** Kurdistan Democratic Party

**KFOR:** NATO Mission in Kosovo

**KIA:** Kachin Independence Army

**KLA:** Kosovo Liberation Army

**KLNLF:** Karbi Longri National Liberation Front

**KNA:** Kuki Liberation Army

**KNF:** Kuki National Front

**KNPP:** Karenni National Progressive Party

**KNU:** Kayin National Union

**KNU/KNLA:** Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army

**KPF:** Karen Peace Force

**KRG:** Kurdistan Regional Government

**KYKL:** Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (Organization to Save the Revolutionary Movement in Manipur)

**LJM:** Liberation and Justice Movement

**LRA:** Lord's Resistance Army

**LTTE:** Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

**MAS:** Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism)

**MB:** Muslim Brotherhood

**MDC:** Movement for Democratic Change

**MEND:** Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

**MFDC:** Mouvement de las Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance)

**MICOPAX:** Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en République Centrafricaine (CEEAC Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic)

**MILF:** Moro Islamic Liberation Front

**MINURCA:** United Nations Mission in Central African Republic

**MINURCAT:** United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad

**MINURSO:** United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

**MINUSTAH:** United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti.

**MIT:** Turkish National Intelligence Organisation

**MJLC:** Mouvement des Jeunes Libérateurs Centrafricains (Central African Young Liberators Movement)

**MLC:** Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo)

**MMT:** Madhesi Mukti Tigers

**MNLA:** Mouvement National pour la Libération de L'Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)

**MNLF:** Moro National Liberation Front

**MONUC:** United Nations Mission in DR Congo

**MONUSCO:** United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

**MOSOP:** Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

**MOVEDEF:** Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales (Amnesty and Fundamental Rights Movement)

**MPRF:** Madhesi People's Rights Forum

**MQM:** Muttahida Qaumi Movement (United National Movement)



**MRC:** Mombasa Republican Council  
**MSF:** Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctor's Without Borders)  
**MUJAO:** Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa  
**MVK:** Madhesi Virus Killers  
**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NC:** Nepali Congress Party  
**NCP:** National Congress Party  
**NDAA:** National Democratic Alliance Army  
**NDF:** National Democratic Front  
**NDFB:** National Democratic Front of Bodoland  
**NDPVF:** Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force  
**NDV:** Niger Delta Vigilante  
**NGO:** Non Governmental Organization  
**NLD:** National League for Democracy  
**NLFT:** National Liberation Front of Tripura  
**NMSP:** New Mon State Party  
**NNC:** Naga National Council  
**NPA:** New People's Army  
**NSCN-IM:** National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah  
**NSCN-K:** National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang  
**NSF:** National Salvation Front  
**NTC:** National Transitional Council of Lybia  
**NTIM-I:** NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq  
**OAS:** Organization of American States  
**OCHA:** Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
**OIC:** Organisation of Islamic Cooperation  
**OLF:** Oromo Liberation Front  
**OMISAM:** OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro  
**ONLF:** Ogaden National Liberation Front  
**ONUB:** United Nations Mission in Burundi  
**OPM:** Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization)  
**OSCE:** Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
**OXFAM:** Oxford Committee for Famine Relief  
**PALU:** Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (Unified Lumumbist Party)  
**PARECO :** Patriotes Résistants Congolais (Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance)  
**PCP :** Partido Comunista de Perú (Comunist Party of Peru)  
**PDLF:** Palestinian Democratic Liberation Front  
**PFLP:** Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
**PJAK:** Party of Free Life of Kurdistan  
**PKK:** Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker's Party)  
**PLA:** People's Liberation Army  
**PA:** Palestinian Authority  
**POLISARIO Front:** Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro  
**PPP:** Pakistan People's Party  
**PPRD:** Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy)  
**PREPAK:** People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak  
**PREPAK Pro:** People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak Progressive  
**RAMSI:** Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands  
**RFC:** Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement (Coalition of Forces for Change)  
**RPF:** Revolutionary Patriotic Front  
**RPF:** Rwandan Patriotic Front  
**RSADO:** Red See Afar Democratic Organization  
**SADC:** Southern Africa Development Community  
**SADR:** Saharan Arab Democratic Republic  
**SAF:** Sudanese Armed Forces  
**SCUD:** Socle pour le Changement, l'Unité Nationale et la Démocratie (Platform for Change, National Unity and Democracy)  
**SSA-S:** Shan State Army-South  
**SSC:** Sool, Saanag and Cayn  
**SFOR:** NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
**SIPRI:** Stockholm International Peace Research Institute  
**SLA:** Sudan Liberation Army  
**SLA-Nur:** Sudan Liberation Army-Nur  
**SLDF:** Sabao Land Defence Forces  
**SNNPR:** Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region  
**SPLA:** Sudan People's Liberation Army  
**SPLM:** Sudan People's Liberation Movement  
**SPLM-N:** Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North  
**SSDM/A:** South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army  
**SSLA:** South Sudan Liberation Army  
**SSNPLO:** Shan State Nationalities People's Liberation Organization  
**TAK:** Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons)  
**TFG:** Transitional Federal Government  
**TIPH:** Temporary International Presence in Hebron  
**TMLP:** Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party  
**TTP:** Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan  
**UCPN-M:** Unified Communist Party of Nepal  
**UFDD:** Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement (Union of Forces for Democracy and Development)  
**UFDG:** Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (Democratic Forces Union of Guinea)  
**UFDR:** Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (Union of Democratic Forces Coalition)  
**UFF:** Ulster Freedom Fighters  
**UFR:** Union des Forces de la Résistance (United Resistance Forces)  
**ULFA:** United Liberation Front of Assam  
**UN:** United Nations  
**UNAMA:** United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan  
**UNAMI:** United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq  
**UNAMID:** United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur  
**UNAMSIL:** United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone  
**UNDOF:** United Nations Disengagement Observer Force  
**UNDP:** United Nations Development Programme  
**UNEF:** United Nations Emergency Force  
**UNFICYP:** United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus  
**UN-HABITAT:** United Nations Human Settlements Programme  
**UNHCHR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

**UNHCR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
**UNICEF:** United Nations International Children's Fund  
**UNIFIL:** United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon  
**UNIOSIL:** United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone  
**UNIPOM:** United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission.  
**UNIPSIL:** United Nations Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone  
**UNISFA:** United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei  
**UNITAF:** Unified Task Force  
**UNLF:** United National Liberation Front  
**UNMEE:** United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia  
**UNMIK:** United Nations Mission in Kosovo  
**UNMIL:** United Nations Mission in Liberia  
**UNMIN:** United Nations Mission in Nepal  
**UNMIS:** United Nations Mission in Sudan  
**UNMISS:** United Nations Mission in South Sudan  
**UNMIT:** United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste  
**UNOCI:** United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire  
**UNOGBIS:** United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau  
**UNOSOM:** United Nations Operation in Somalia  
**UNOWA:** United Nations Office in West Africa  
**UNPOS:** United Nations Political Office in Somalia  
**UNRWA:** United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East  
**UNSCO:** United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East  
**UNTAET:** United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste  
**UNTSO:** United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine  
**UPDS:** United People's Democratic Solidarity  
**UPPK:** United People's Party of Kangleipak  
**UPRONA:** Union pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress)  
**USA:** United States of America  
**USSR:** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
**USAID:** United States Agency for International Development  
**UVF:** Ulster Volunteer Force  
**UWSA:** United Wa State Army  
**VRAE:** Valley between Rivers Apurimac and Ene  
**WB:** World Bank  
**WILPF:** Women's International League for Peace and Freedom  
**WFP:** World Food Programme  
**WPNL:** West Papua National Coalition for Liberation  
**WTO:** World Trade Organisation  
**WUC:** World Uyghur Congress  
**ZANU-PF:** Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front  
**ZUF:** Zeliangrong United Front



# Escola de Cultura de Pau

The Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace, hereinafter ECP) is an academic peace research institution located at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. It was created in 1999 and it is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who is also the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

The fields of action of the ECP are:

- Research. Its main areas of research include armed conflicts and socio-political crises, peace processes, human rights and transitional justice, the gender dimension in conflict and peacebuilding, and peace education.
- Second track diplomacy. The ECP promotes dialogue and conflict-transformation through second track initiatives, including facilitation tasks with armed actors.
- Consultancy services. The ECP carries out a variety of consultancy services for national and international institutions.
- Teaching and training. ECP staff gives lectures in postgraduate and graduate courses in several universities, including its own Graduate Diploma on Culture of Peace at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. It also provides training sessions on specific issues, including conflict sensitivity and peace education.
- Advocacy and awareness-raising. Initiatives include activities addressed to the Spanish and Catalan society, including contributions to the media.


## **Escola de Cultura de Pau**

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**Alert 2013! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding** is a yearbook which analyzes the state of the world in connection with conflicts and peacebuilding based on four areas of analysis: armed conflicts, socio-political crises, peace processes and the gender dimension on peacebuilding. Focusing on these areas, *Alert 2013!* offers an overview of the world's state of affairs and reveals possible trends and dynamics related to the characteristics and evolution of those areas. The comparison of the data with figures from previous years means the report can act as an early warning tool regarding general trends or situations in specific countries. This can be useful, among other things, to devise foreign policy, development cooperation and arms transfer policies, as well as policies to prevent armed conflicts and consolidate peace processes and post-war recovery.



With the support of:



*Alert 2013!* provides a valuable guide to the armed conflicts and crises that the global community confronts today while helping the serious reader to understand the responses made by peacebuilders as well as human rights and humanitarian workers to these recurring challenges. It is rare to find a compendium that distils lessons learned in diverse regions of conflict and crises in a manner that is thoroughly analytical, respectful of rights, gender-sensitive and forward looking. For policy makers and those engaged in statecraft the sections that identify probable focal points of tension and deal with opportunities for peace are illustrative of the comprehensive approach that the team from the Escola de Cultura de Pau brings to this undertaking. Researchers, scholars, media people, students of politics and parliamentarians alike will find in this annual report an irreplaceable tool not only to better understand the sources of violence in our world but also to rediscover the resources to transform its future to make sure that it is different from the past.

**Ed Garcia**  
Professor and Senior Policy Advisor, *International Alert*

Fortunately, this year's *Alert 2013* report is once again being published, in spite of the current crisis that is affecting both the economy and the university. This is an essential tool for those of us interested in armed conflict and peacebuilding. This one source keeps us current on the ups and downs of each conflict, whether they have been "forgotten" or not, and it presents, in a concise but precise way, the complexity of the causes and the actors and factors present in them. There is no better recipe against reductionist and monocausal narratives that focus on the "ethnic curse" or the "resource curse". Its most valuable contribution, however, is the detailed analysis of peace processes and, in particular, their gender "dimension", rendering visible initiatives by women and the progress and setbacks in their struggle for gender equity. This is an essential element for another type of "peacebuilding" that has an impact on those who are behind the scenes in many of these conflicts: the current global, neoliberal, unfair and patriarchal system.

**Itziar Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta**  
Professor of International Relations and Coordinator of the African Studies Group of Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

*Alert 2013!* is indeed an impressive yearbook that is indispensable to anyone interested in analyses of conflicts, crises and peace processes around the world. Escola de Cultura de Pau of Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona is to be commended for producing for the twelfth year such a comprehensive and insightful report on the trends and vicissitudes related to armed conflict, human rights abuses, and peace work. What I found to be particularly valuable are the sections on gender perspectives and opportunities for peacebuilding. The several tables and charts summarising and illustrating information on country-specific conflict or peacebuilding instances or events allow for quick comparative analysis. This report will serve as a key resource for my Centre in its dialogue and conflict transformation work.

**Alberto Gomes**  
Director of the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University, Australia