

alert 2014!

Report on conflicts,
human rights
and peacebuilding



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Foreword

Twenty-five years of peace processes and the importance of Alert

Christine Bell

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Edinburgh**

The first almost thirty years of my life were spent living in a conflict –in Northern Ireland. As internal conflicts go, it was one of the smaller ones –over 3,000 people were killed in that period, a figure although perhaps the word ‘small’ has to be put into context: as the total population was around 175,000, and so the proportion of deaths was considerable. Beyond this, the personal costs were immeasurably high: the level of fear, the daily attrition of hearing the latest deaths, the huge sections of the population that lived with specific threats against them, and went to work not knowing if they would come home, the women who raised families alone and the many children who grew up without parents, not to mention the hundreds who were injured and disabled in ways they continue to live with.

My oldest child was born just after the first ceasefires were declared. Last year she went to University. She has never lived in the middle of a violent conflict. Those ceasefires of 1994 developed into a more formal peace agreement in 1998. The move from violence had tragic backward steps on the way. However, the conflict as I knew it and lived in it has largely come to an end.

It is a much more complicated matter to assess whether the peace process and agreement have been fully successful. There is still a lot of uncompleted business. At the time of writing, the political institutions in Northern Ireland have been pulled back from the brink of collapse which was threatened when unresolved issues relating to the past came to the fore. Northern Ireland never had a truth commission or other process that could have dealt with these issues holistically. The reality is that, we continue to negotiate our peace, too often while staring into the abyss of its possible failure. As recently as this Christmas Northern Ireland had to set up new formal negotiations chaired by American diplomat and former US Special Envoy to the peace process Richard Haas, in an attempt to deal with unfinished business that was threatening the process. Agreement was nearly reached, but unfortunately –not quite.

However, in the disappointment over how far we still seem to have to go, we should not forget that every day that the violent conflict is gone, lives are saved and that our children grow up in a different and better world to the dark one we grew up in.

The Global Patterns

The story of my life and our conflict and peace process is one tiny thread in a broader tapestry of lives, conflict, peace processes and implementation struggles that stretches over the world. *Alert!* is one of the few publications that attempts to show us a glimpse of the whole tapestry. Behind the meticulously compiled data of conflict, peace negotiations, humanitarian crisis, human rights and transitional justice, are the hundreds of people whose lives are affected and whose story these figures bear witness to.

This is a practice of peace negotiations which reaches its twenty-fifth anniversary this year, if we loosely but not inaccurately take the end of the cold war in 1990 as its starting point. During that time, the practice has changed, and can loosely be sketched in three periods which are useful to reflect on.

The decade of optimism

Between 1990 and 2000 we could talk about the era of optimism. Mediated agreements in a series of apparently intractable and high profile conflicts, notably those of South Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflicts of El Salvador and Guatemala, appeared to mark an era of ‘peace escalation’ in which mediating ends to conflicts started to replace attempts to win that had seemed to turn into wars of attrition in which no side could win. The agreements in these conflicts were often copious in their detail running to hundreds of pages in what were in essence elaborate contracts between the parties that attempted to put in place binding agreement to bridge the lack of trust between parties. Many of the Agreements in this period enjoyed a real degree of success, at least in terms of formally ending the conflict and reducing deaths in it. The process in South Africa led to a fully-fledged transition to democracy, that avoided the large-scale bloodshed it had been designed to avoid. The Dayton Peace Agreement ended the fighting in Bosnia, although not the underlying conflict. Others achieved a measure of success that has been largely forgotten or erased by their eventual failure: the Oslo Accords in the Middle East, played some role in their initial stages at least, in removing the excesses of the occupation during the Intifada. Other processes, such as that of Rwanda, were startlingly unsuccessful –the genocide happening post-peace agreement, with arguments that the peace-agreement balance of power and incentives played a role.

The Decade of Pessimism

The second phase and decade of the practice, from 2000–2010, might be viewed as the era of pessimism, born of sceptical disillusionment. However I would like to argue that it was the decade of ‘unfortunate confluences’. Quite different in-country and international events, appeared to come together to undermine enthusiasm for negotiated settlement as a conflict resolution tool.

First, disillusionment with what peace processes had achieved set in at international and domestic levels. As the decade continued, both in individual countries –for example Colombia, the Middle East, Sri Lanka– the difficulties of implementing peace agreements led countries and their electorates and leaders to retreat from them. Countries that had pursued peace processes dramatically set them aside, to pursue renewed conflict. At the international level too, a sense that peace agreements had not delivered on their great promise supplemented by sometimes dubious academic findings on the ‘failure’, helped propel the move to increased forms of foreign intervention focused on winning or helping one side win the war.

Second, the events of September 11, 2001, marked the beginning of what was known as the ‘war on terror’, and the interventions in Kosovo (in 1999), was followed by post September 11 interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). The move towards a raft of war on terrors measure saw even failed state governments reified as always legitimate when acting against armed opponents, increased proscription of armed groups, US Supreme Court decisions suggesting that providing mediation support might constitute support for terrorism, and what at times seemed to be the complete negation that conflict might need to have political as well as military solutions.

However, a more complicated part of the story of this period was also the third force in this constellation: what we might call the ‘normativisation’ of mediation processes and outcomes. Increasingly, international law, relating to human rights accountability, or international criminal law, was understood to rule certain options –notably amnesty– out of the mediation ‘toolkit’. Arguably a Kuhnian paradigm shift took place whereby the view that mediating peace took priority over hard and fast justice claims, became reversed to prioritise justice now conceived of as investigation, prosecution and punishment.

All these matters came together to make the process of mediating ends to conflict more difficult and less attractive. It was more difficult to get states to agree to negotiate with groups that the international community forced them to label ‘terrorist’. It was even more difficult to get state and non-state actors –now often proscribed under law on terror initiatives– into the same room. It was more difficult to negotiate an agreement focused on local interests without being under pressure to

incorporate a set of normative ‘requirements’ on issues as diverse as human rights, gender, and refugee return. While justice considerations had been neglected in the beginning of the first decade, sometimes the push for normativisation appeared to underestimate how fragile the search for agreement really was, and that with each issue being pushed by a different set of international institutions and NGOs, had all their requirements been adopted on all issues in all processes, there would have been remarkably little room to negotiate anything at all.

The Decade of Ambivalent Re-engagement?

These shifts in the policy and practice of peace negotiation, and scepticism in its benefits could have led to a complete retreat from the practice of mediation. However, *real politik* has dictated that it has not. International actors have a fairly simple choice with regard to conflict within states. First, they can wait and see who wins in conflicts that by their nature appear unwinnable and where the strongest rather than the most just cause tends to bear out. Second, they can intervene to try to ensure a particular outcome with all the mess and moral ambiguity that intervening involves. Or, third, they can attempt to create and support the conditions for negotiated settlement. The costs of the third option, great though they often seem, are usually much less than the political and moral costs of the first two options, both of which tend to lead to greater loss of life.

I hope that this will be the decade or re-balanced engagement. Scepticism about negotiated settlement is now matched by scepticism about foreign intervention, and the moral difficulties of standing by and doing nothing, as the Syrian conflict has demonstrated. Although perhaps, rather than reinforcing a normative approach to mediation, it has left everyone feeling rather sceptical and depressed about any of the possible options for achieving peace and stability. Similarly, on the normative front, some of the difficulties of the ICC in my view should lead to a questioning of the absolutist and narrow framing of what justice requires as focused purely on criminal justice trials and punishment. This approach also now seems to have run its course, with the African Union, now vocally opposed and constantly threatening mass defections from what it sees as a misplaced ‘African regional mechanism’. The need to find some way to enable parties to exit from conflicts is ever present, and requires political imagination, and an approach that takes seriously, first, the need for serious international pressure to be coupled with support for mediation, and second, the importance of both the demands of justice and the demands of mediation –for they are linked.

There are further reasons of *real politik* to be optimistic about re-balanced re-engagement. Peace agreements, rather than once-off contracts, are increasingly viewed as road maps, which continue to need developed

and fleshed out. Furthermore, as Alert's information on peace keeping operations reminds us, in this third decade of peace processes, a now considerable international and regional machinery that exists for dealing with internal or inter-state conflict. This machinery bears no recognition to that of 20 years ago, when questions were still asked as to whether this was the business of these same international organizations. Regional organizations such as the EU, the Council of Europe, the African Union, and the United Nations itself, now have peacebuilding commissions, special Commissions dealing with aspects of transition, and peace-keepers and mediators who are active in processes on an on-going basis. This machinery while channelling a useful and often impressive resource at these conflicts and their processes, also brings with it some less welcome attributes: inter-institutional competition, forum shopping by military actors, and sometimes a form of 'tool-kit' peace-making that fails to pay sufficient attention to the politics and capacity at the local level, or spend time understanding how some its own ways of working will be perceived and understood at the local level. However, by its very existence, it ensures that the practice of mediation continues to be prioritised.

Yet, this is the story of conflict: it is always easier to start than to stop; it creates new wrongs and new pathways which it then follows; and the compromises needed to end it become more and more painful. The very difficult thing for parties and indeed victims and perpetrators –both sets of whom will have lost 'normal life'– to accept is that at the end of conflict –particularly perhaps if there is a mediated end– they will have lost much more than they gained.

The importance of Alert

Told through the cumulative volumes of *Alert!*, are the stories of how conflicts and their peace processes wax and wane. Many years I find opening the volume strangely encouraging. While the world focuses on bad news, and each day stories of conflict abound, the general trend of the data shows the surprising success of parties in reaching peace settlements, and often some lowering of the number of conflicts in the world. I seldom find the story of everything getting worse and worse that I expect to find. Sometimes also strangely encouraging, is the story *Alert!* tells of some steps forward and steps backward. The process of reaching peace never ends with an Agreement, rather the Agreement begins a process of moving forward with the real peace process that lies in the attempt to live peacefully together building new political and legal institutions and community structures and relationships that will make the promise of the

agreement a reality. The move from violence is never easy or linear. Seeing the difficulties of the struggle for peace and understanding it as in some way normal, can be encouraging to those who have been hit by a big setback, pressing them to continue.

Addressing unfinished business

As my own work and experience of conflicts and peace processes has continued, Alert brings home what are two quite different key concerns which in my view need the spotlight shone on them. The first is the difficulties of 'unfinished business', and the incomplete implementation of peace agreements, or a failure to revisit the areas that were too difficult to deal with. A crucial one is some sort of satisfactory dealing with the past. In the Northern Ireland context, the Haas review re-framed the idea to one of 'contending with the past'. I prefer the term: the past is not something you can 'deal with'. Perhaps the best we can do is to use processes to create constructive spaces in which societies can 'contend' with it.

Improving measurement of 'success and failure'

The second area for greater consideration is how to measure and talk about 'success and failure'. This is an area where *Alert!* has been a leader in the field. The Alert methodology which combines attempts to quantify processes as well as conflicts, and to find ways of understanding the fluctuations in processes through a combination of hard data and more textual case study, moves beyond a 'deaths in conflict' approach to success and failure. International organizations are often desperate to latch onto statistics that might point out a clear policy direction, and it means they can reach to the nearest big figure. The data in Alert manages to tell a more complex story, but to tell it clearly and intelligibly. Importantly it is also beginning to tell fuller and fuller stories of how particular populations are differently affected by conflict –for example refugees, women or children, as well as documenting international initiatives and new standard-setting in these areas.

Conclusion

In conclusion, with great pleasure I commend this volume of Alert to you. It once again bears witness to the complexity of conflict, peace settlements, and international law. In doing so, it provides us with a valuable resource with which to address conflict. It should also provide us with a sense of spiritual resilience that the business of ending conflicts as peacefully as possible, is necessary and is possible.

Executive Summary

Alert 2014! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding is a yearbook that analyses the state of the world in terms of conflict and peacebuilding on the basis of four pillars: armed conflicts, socio-political crises, peace processes and the gender dimension in peacebuilding. The analysis of the most important events in 2013 and of the nature, causes, dynamics, actors and consequences of the main armed conflicts and socio-political crises that currently exist in the world makes it possible to provide a comparative regional overview and to identify global trends, as well as risk and early warning elements for the future. The report also identifies opportunities for peacebuilding or for the reduction, prevention or resolution of conflicts. In both cases, one of the main objectives of the present report is to place the information, analysis and identification of alert factors and opportunities for peace at the service of actors responsible for political decision-making, for intervening in the peaceful resolution of conflicts or for raising the political, media or academic profile of the many situations of political and social violence that exist throughout the world.

As regards methodology, the report is largely produced on the basis of the qualitative analysis of reports and news items provided by numerous sources (the United Nations, international bodies, research centres, media outlets or NGOs, among others), as well as from the experience drawn from research on the ground.

Some of the most relevant data and conclusions contained in this report are as follows:

- Throughout 2013, 35 armed conflicts were recorded, mostly in Africa (13) and Asia (11), followed by Europe (5), the Middle East (5) and America (1).
- At the end of 2013, only 32 of the 35 armed conflicts from 2013 continued to be active, after the sustained reduction in violence in Burundi in recent years and the reduction of insurgent violence in the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia (Russian Federation), albeit contrasting with their lack of progress on domestic issues, especially the serious human rights violations in Chechnya.
- More than a quarter of the armed conflicts (10 cases) experienced very high levels of violence, exceeding a thousand annual deaths (Nigeria [Boko Haram], the Central African Republic, DR Congo [east], Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Pakistan [Balochistan], Iraq and Syria).
- Two thirds of the armed conflicts were linked to the opposition to a particular government or state system and to demands of identity and self-government, although the struggle for control over resources or territory was a factor that fuelled and/or aggravated the majority of the conflicts.
- In 2013, 36 arms embargoes were recorded, directed at a total of 23 states and non-state armed groups, three more than the previous year.
- The UN Security Council, the EU, the Arab League and the OSCE proposed imposing an arms embargo as a punitive measure in only nine of the 35 active armed conflicts in 2013.
- During 2013, there were 83 international missions, 35 of which were in Africa. There was also an increase in missions in Africa linked to the worsening of existing conflicts.
- UN peacekeeping missions involved 118,634 troops, slightly higher than the 2012 figure, slowing the downward trend started in 2010 when they reached 124,000 troops in September of that year. From June 1999 (when the lowest figure was reached since the end of the Cold War with 13,000 Blue Helmets) to 2010, the increase in number of peacekeepers had been constant.
- During 2013, 99 cases of socio-political crises were recorded around the world, representing an increase compared to the balance in 2012 (91). These cases were mainly concentrated in Africa (39) and Asia (25), while the rest of the cases were shared between Europe (15), the Middle East (15), and America (4).
- The majority of socio-political crises (75%) were linked to opposition to domestic or international policies implemented by their respective governments (which led to a struggle to seize or to the erosion of power), or to opposition to the political, social or ideological system of the state. Other prevalent causes were identity issues and demands for self-determination and/or self-government, which were a key element in 69% of socio-political crises in 2013.
- The most serious cases of socio-political crises in 2013 took place in Kenya, Madagascar, DR Congo (east-ADF), DR Congo-Rwanda, Bangladesh, China (East Turkestan), the Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF), the Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), India-Pakistan, Indonesia (West Papua), Pakistan, Thailand, Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Egypt, Egypt (Sinai), Israel-Syria-Lebanon, Lebanon, Syria-Turkey and Yemen (south).
- In 2013 three peace agreements were achieved within three peace processes: one between the armed Sudanese group JEM-Bashar and the government in Sudan, and two from India (UPPK and a faction of the KCP-MC).
- Of the 52 negotiation processes analysed in 2013, 28.8% of them went well or were concluded satisfactorily, and the majority involved India. 32.7% of the negotiations had to overcome serious difficulties and 9.6% went badly.
- 75 countries suffered serious gender inequalities, with 42 cases being worthy of note in particular,

mainly concentrated in Africa and Asia. 72% of the armed conflicts for which data on gender equity was available took place in contexts with serious inequalities.

- The use of sexual violence as a weapon of war was found in 2012 in cases of armed conflict and socio-political crises, such as Syria, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Egypt and Myanmar, among others, according to the UN report published in 2013.
- The UN Security Council adopted resolution 2106 on sexual violence in armed conflicts and resolution 2122 on women and peace-building in order to strengthen existing international instruments on these issues, placing greater emphasis on female leadership.
- Women's organisations in Colombia and Syria called for a greater role of women in the peace processes in these countries, and in Colombia two women were incorporated into the government delegation in the negotiations with the FARC.
- In Colombia, the first international truth commission was created in relation to the impact of the conflict on women, which presented its report "The truth of women. Victims of the armed conflict in Colombia."
- The Arms Trade Treaty approved in April included a clause on the impact of arms sales from a gender perspective.
- Seven opportunities for peace in 2014 were identified: the historic agreement on Iran's nuclear program, which may have implications far beyond the nuclear dispute; the highly encouraging feminist proposal on peace-building and the recovery of historical memory promoted by the Colombian Women's Truth Commission, an initiative of the organisation Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres; the strong presence of women in the successful peace process in Mindanao and the important role they have played throughout its different stages, which eventually led to the end of the armed conflict; the successful diplomatic internationalisation of the situation in the Indonesian region of West Papua as an example of breaking the cycle of invisibility of forgotten conflicts; the positive dialogue process between Serbia and Kosovo during 2013, aimed at the pragmatic normalisation of the relations between the two administrations; the important role of the European Court of Human Rights as the people of Chechnya's sole and limited means for seeking justice; and the window of opportunity that the defeat of the armed group M23 creates for achieving peace in the Great Lakes region.
- Eight risk scenarios were noted for 2014: the challenge posed at global level by the increase in

forced population displacement to the worst levels seen since the nineties; the devastating balance of a decade of war in Iraq, a country that is experiencing an increasing upheaval; the internationalisation and radicalisation of the conflict in Syria and its destabilizing effect at regional level; the perceptible worsening of the situation in Eritrea, whose implosion could have unpredictable consequences; the political crisis experienced by Thailand in the last decade, which may worsen in the future; the consequences of the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the power-struggle in East Asia; the increase in violence in the Chinese province of Xinjiang; and lastly, the difficulty in ensuring dialogue between the Turkish government and the armed Kurdish group PKK amid the internal crisis in Turkey and regional instability in the Middle East.

Structure

The report consists of six chapters. In the first two, the conflict is analysed at global level (causes, types, dynamics, evolution, actors in situations of armed conflict or tensions) and we identify elements of risk or early warning signs. The third chapter deals with peace processes, while the fourth analyses the gender dimension in peace-building (the differing impact of armed violence and peace-building from a gender perspective). The fifth chapter identifies opportunities for peace, cases where a climate exists that could favour conflict resolution or the advancement towards, or consolidation of peace initiatives in the coming year. The last chapter discusses risk scenarios for the future. In addition to the six chapters and annexes, the report also includes a fold-out map which indicates the locations of the armed conflicts, the socio-political crises and the negotiation processes, major international missions, arms embargoes by major international organisations and the number and location of displaced persons.

Armed Conflicts

In the first chapter (**Armed Conflicts**) the trend, type, causes and dynamics of the active armed conflicts throughout the year are described. It also provides an analysis of the global trends in armed conflicts in 2013 and reflects on the arms embargoes and international missions.

35 armed conflicts were registered throughout 2013, down slightly from the previous year, when 38 conflicts

1. In this report, an armed conflict is understood as any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible, in which the continuous and organised use of violence: a) causes a minimum of 100 fatalities in a year and/or has a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. injured or displaced persons, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric, or disruption of basic services); and b) aims to achieve objectives different from those of common crime and normally related to:
 - demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues;
 - opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of a government, which in both triggers a struggle to seize or undermine power;
 - the control over the resources or the territory.

were recorded. The slight decrease from one year to the next is due to the fact that in 2013, the cases in the Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), Iran (north-west) and Yemen were no longer considered armed conflicts. Moreover, unlike previous years, in 2013 no new conflicts emerged. In addition, **at the end of 2013 only 32 of the 35 armed conflicts** from 2013 continued to be active, since the pattern of reduced violence led to the armed conflicts in Burundi, Russia (Chechnya) and Russia (Ingushetia) no longer being considered as such. In the case of Burundi, in mid-2013 the sustained reduction in violence, the advances made in the internal political situation and the return to the country of the main opposition leaders all had an effect. In the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia (Russian Federation), the reduction in insurgent violence (as evidenced by the death toll for the year) contrasted with the lack of progress in domestic issues, particularly the serious human rights violations in Chechnya. **Most armed conflicts occurred in Africa and Asia (13 and 11, respectively), followed by the Middle East (5), Europe (5) and America (1).**

35 armed conflicts were registered throughout 2013, a figure slightly lower than the previous years

Of the total number of conflicts, 60% (21 cases) were internationalised internal and a further 34% (12 cases) were internal conflicts. Among the internationalisation factors, notable was the military involvement of third-party actors, whether states (France and Chad in Mali; Ethiopia, USA and France in Somalia; USA in Pakistan and Afghanistan; France in the Central African Republic; USA in Pakistan and Yemen, among others), international missions or forces (MINUSMA and ECOWAS in Mali; MISCA in the Central African Republic; the UN Force Intervention Brigade, under

the mandate of MONUSCO, in DR Congo; AMISOM in Somalia; ISAF in Afghanistan, among others) or regional armed groups or foreign armed groups (the Islamist groups MUJAO and AQIM in Mali [north] and Algeria; various armed groups in DR Congo; ISIS and Hezbollah in Syria, among others). In any case, most of today's conflicts are characterised by a significantly regional and international dimension and influence, due to various factors (population displacement, trafficking in arms and resources, participation of mercenaries and other foreign fighters, support from neighbouring countries, among others). During 2013, Syria was one of the most obvious cases of the complexity of internationalised conflicts, a crisis that has acted as a contagion and worsened other conflicts in the region.

In relation to the underlying causes, most of the armed conflicts were characterised by the fact that they had multiple background causes, with several simultaneous elements acting as motivating factors in the disputes. **Almost two thirds of the conflicts (23 cases) had opposition to a particular government or to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state among their main causes.** Of these 23 active cases in 2013, 18 of the disputes involved armed opposition actors fighting for a change in the system, whether due to their historical aspirations to establish a socialist political and economic system (Colombia [FARC and ELN], Philippines [NPA] and India [CPI-M]) or, more frequently, the desire to create an Islamic political structure or introduce or reinforce elements of Islamic law in the country's institutions or in the form of a state (Algeria [AQIM], Mali [north], Nigeria

Armed conflicts in 2013*

AFRICA (13)	ASIA (11)	MIDDLE EAST (5)
Central Africa (LRA) -1986- Algeria (AQIM) -1992- <i>Burundi 2011-2013</i> Central African Republic -2006- DR Congo (east) -1998- Ethiopia (Ogaden) -2007- Libya -2011- Mali (north) -2012- Nigeria (Boko Haram) - 2011- Somalia -1988- South Sudan -2009- Sudan (Darfur) -2003- Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) -2011-	Afghanistan -2001- India (Assam) -1983- India (CPI-M) -1967- India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989- India (Manipur) -1982- Myanmar -1948- Pakistan -2001- Pakistan (Balochistan) -2005- Philippines (NPA) -1969- Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf) -1991- Thailand (south) -2004-	Iraq -2003- Israel-Palestine -2000- Syria -2011- Yemen (Houthis) -2004- Yemen (AQAP) - 2011-
		EUROPE (5)
		<i>Russia (Chechnya) 1999-2013</i> Russia (Dagestan) -2010- <i>Russia (Ingushetia) 2008-2013</i> Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria) -2011- Turkey (southeast) -1984-
		AMERICA (1)
		Colombia -1964-

*The start date of the armed conflict is shown between hyphens. Conflicts that ended in 2013 appear in italics.

[Boko Haram], Somalia, Afghanistan, Philippines [Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf], Pakistan, Russia [Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria], Iraq, Syria, Yemen [Houthists] and Yemen [AQAP]). In these last 15 cases, in which the objective was to establish an Islamic framework, most **involved armed groups whose idiosyncrasies reached beyond the administrative borders of the territory in which they were fighting, largely due to their cross-border scope of action, their affiliation with regional insurgencies or the fact that, at least rhetorically, their local dynamics and objectives are aligned with the wider global discourse of international Jihad.** In this sense, 2013 was particularly significant due to the displays of force by these types of groups in the Middle East (mainly in Syria, but also once again in Iraq) and in North Africa (with Mali [north] and Algeria being worthy of note). Moreover, in nine of these 23 cases there were armed groups whose focus was not so much to transform the system but rather to overthrow the government and seize power or, faced with insufficient military capability, show their opposition to it by eroding it through violence. This factor of opposition to a government was present in the cases of Burundi (although by mid-year the conflict was no longer considered active following the return of the historic leader of the FNL rebellion as part of the peace process, among other factors), Libya, the Central African Republic (where in fact in 2013 the insurgent Séléka coalition overthrew the government), DR Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen (Houthists). In some of these conflicts, armed anti-government insurgencies coexisted alongside other armed actors also interested in changing the system, such as in Somalia, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

In turn, **demands for self-government and identity continued to be significant factors in the conflict, present in almost two thirds of the disputes** (21 cases). Such conflicts were the majority in Asia and Europe, but were also significant in Africa and the Middle East. Demands for identity and self-government were expressed in several ways, ranging from claims of cultural rights to independence. Such conflicts included both long-term conflicts (Myanmar since 1948, Turkey since 1984, India [Assam] since 1983, among others) and recently emerged conflicts (Sudan [South Kordofan and Blue Nile] since 2011, and Ethiopia [Ogaden] since 2007, among others). In some of these conflicts, the groups with identity demands co-existed alongside other armed actors with different agendas (Mali [north], DR Congo [east], Yemen [Houthists], among others). Some of the longest-running armed conflicts linked to factors of identity and self-government, such as Myanmar and Turkey, took significant steps towards peace throughout the year. In the case of Myanmar, notable was the negotiation


process with the armed opposition, and in particular, the government's agreement with the armed group KIO in May. In Turkey, notable was the dialogue between the government and the leader of the PKK, the ceasefire by the group and the beginning of the withdrawal of its guerrillas. However, the year ended with setbacks and questions hanging over both of these cases, as well as over other cases involving an identity dimension. Similarly, in several cases the struggle for control over resources or territory was another cornerstone of the dispute (Central Africa [LRA], DR Congo [east], Sudan [Darfur and South Kordofan and Blue Nile], South Sudan, Pakistan [Balochistan], Israel-Palestine) in keeping with the trend in previous years. In any case, this is a factor that affects many armed conflicts.

Almost two thirds of the conflicts had opposition to a particular government or the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state among their main causes

Regarding intensity, **more than a quarter of the armed conflicts (10 cases) experienced very high levels of violence**, exceeding a thousand annual deaths (Nigeria [Boko Haram], Central African Republic, DR Congo [east], Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Pakistan [Balochistan], Iraq and Syria). Of these, some exceeded this threshold of violence by several thousand, as was the case in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, while the case of Syria was particularly devastating, with tens of thousands of deaths in 2013 and an accumulated death toll of between 100,000 and 120,000 fatalities since the conflict began in 2011.

The report also examines two key instruments available to the international community to attempt to address the threats to peace and security: arms embargoes and international missions. As for the embargoes, which constitute one of the main coercive actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is notable that 36 arms embargoes were recorded against a total of 23 states and non-state armed groups, three more than the previous year, due to the fact that the **UN Security Council and the EU established an arms embargo in December on the Central African Republic** as a result of the escalation of violence in 2013 and especially in December of that year. Also, **due to the escalation of the situation in**

Regional distribution of the number of armed conflicts



Egypt, the EU also declared a partial arms embargo against this country, although in this case, unlike the rest, this is a political undertaking that is not legally binding. Of the 23 states and non-state armed groups identified by the UN, the EU, the Arab League and the OSCE, **nine were related to actors of armed conflicts active in 2013** (Libya, Myanmar, the Central African Republic, Syria, Sudan [Darfur] and South Sudan and armed groups in Iraq, Somalia and DR Congo). It should be noted here **the embargo against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces**, but although the majority of both of these organisations are located in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the arms embargo does not correspond to any particular territory, according to resolution 1390. **Of the other 13 embargoes, 12 were targeted at countries that are a focus of tensions** of varying intensity (Armenia-Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Guinea, Lebanon, DPR Korea, Sudan and Zimbabwe). **Liberia** is the only country which, despite

There were 26 active armed conflicts in 2013 in which neither the UN Security Council, the EU, the Arab League nor the OSCE raised the possibility of imposing an arms embargo as a punitive measure

having overcome various armed conflicts (1989-1996, 1999-2003) and while not experiencing tensions at present, is still under an embargo. **In conclusion, of the 35 active armed conflicts in 2013, there were 26 cases in which neither the UN Security Council, the EU, the Arab League nor the OSCE raised the possibility of imposing an arms embargo** as a punitive measure. Furthermore, of the current 99 cases of socio-political crisis, **there were 87 cases of varying intensity that were not subject to embargoes** in which, in many cases, the preventive nature of arms embargoes could reduce the violence.

With regard to international missions, of the 29 UN missions during 2013, more than half (17) were in Africa, six in the Middle East, three in Asia, two in Europe and one in America. Moreover, alongside the United Nations, it is worth noting the participation of other regional organisations in military, political and

Arms embargoes by the United Nations, EU, OSCE and the Arab League in 2013

Country*	Coming into effect	Country	Coming into effect
Embargoes declared by the United Nations (13)		Embargoes declared by the EU (21)	
Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities, Taliban militias**	2002	Al-Qaeda and Taliban militias**	2002
		Belarus	2011
Central African Republic	2013	Central African Republic	2013
Côte d'Ivoire	2004	China	1989
DPR Korea	2006	Côte d'Ivoire	2004
DR Congo (except the Government)	2003	DPR Korea	2006
Eritrea	2009	DR Congo (except the Government)	2003
Iran	2006	Egypt	2013
Iraq (except the Government since 2004)	1990	Eritrea	2010
Lebanon (except the Government)	2006	Guinea	2009
Liberia (except the Government since 2009)	1992	Iran	2007
Libya	2011	Iraq (except the Government since desde 2004)	1990
Somalia (except the Government)	1992	Lebanon (except the Government)	2006
Sudan (Darfur) (except the Government)	2004	Liberia (except the Government since 2008)	2001
		Libya	2011
Embargoes declared by the Arab League (1)		Myanmar	1991
Syria	2011	Somalia	2002
Embargoes declared by the OSCE (1)		South Sudan	2011
Armenia - Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1992	Sudan	1994
		Syria	2011
		Zimbabwe	2002

* In bold, country or group in armed conflict subject to embargo.

** Embargo not linked to a specific country or territory.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2013* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). European Commission, Website, http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm.

International missions of 2013*

UN (29)	EU (17)	OSCE (16)
Afghanistan (UNAMA) -2002-	Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) -2002-	Albania (OSCE Presence in Albania) -1997-
Burundi (BNUB) -2011-	Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA)-2004-	Armenia (OSCE Office in Yerevan) -2000-
Central Africa (UNOCA) -2011-	DR Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) -2007-	Azerbaijan (OSCE Office in Baku) -2000-
Central African Republic (BINUCA) -2009-	DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) -2005-	Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (Personal Representative for the Minsk Conference) -1995-
Central Asia (UNRCCA) -2007-	Georgia (EUMM Georgia) -2008-	Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina) -1995-
Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) -2004-	Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR) -2012-	Kazakhstan (OSCE Centre in Astana) -1998-
Cyprus (UNFICYP) -1964-	<i>Iraq (EUJUST Lex Iraq) -2005-2013</i>	Kosovo (OMIK, OSCE Mission in Kosovo) -1996-
DR Congo (MONUSCO) -1999/2010-	Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) -2008-	Kyrgyzstan (OSCE Centre in Bishkek) -1999-
<i>East Timor (UNMIT) -2006-2012-</i>	Libya (EUBAM Libya) -2013-	Macedonia, FYR (OSCE Mission to Skopje) -1992-
Golan Heights (UNDOF) -1974-	Mali (EUTM Mali) -2013-	Moldova (OSCE Mission to Moldova) -1993-
Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) -2010-	Moldova – Ukraine (EUBAM) -2005-	Montenegro (OSCE Mission to Montenegro) -2006-
Haiti (MINUSTAH) -2004-	Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger) -2012-	Serbia (OSCE Mission to Serbia) -2006-
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) -1949-	Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah) -2005-	Tajikistan (OSCE Office in Tajikistan) -1994-
Iraq (UNAMI) -2003-	Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) -2006-	Turkmenistan (OSCE Centre in Ashgabat) -1999-
Israel-Palestine (UNSCO) -1994-	Somalia (EUNAVFOR Somalia) -2008-	Ukraine (OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine) -1999-
Kosovo (UNMIK) -1999-	Somalia (EUTM Somalia) -2010-	Uzbekistan (OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan) -2006-
Lebanon (UNIFIL) -1978/2006-	South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan) -2012-	CIS (1)
Lebanon (USCOL) -2007-	NATO (5)	Moldova (Transdniestria) -1992-
Liberia (UNMIL) -2003-	Afghanistan (ISAF) -2001-	ECCAS (1)
Libya (UNSMIL) -2011-	Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden (Operation Ocean Shield) -2009-	<i>Central African Republic (MICOPAX) -2008-2013-</i>
Mali (north) (Minusma) -2013-	Kosovo (KFOR) -1999-	
Middle East (UNTSO) -1948-	Somalia (NATO assistance to the AMISOM) -2007-	OAS (3)
		Belize-Guatemala (OAS/AZ Office) -2003-
Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) -2008-	The Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour) -2001-	Colombia (MAPP OEA) -2004-
<i>Somalia (UNPOS) -1995-2013-</i>		Colombia (MIB OEA) -2008-
Somalia (UNSOM) -2013-	AU (3)	Other missions (6)
	Central Africa (LRA) (Regional Co-operation Initiative against the LRA, ICR/LRA) -2012-	Côte d'Ivoire (Operation Licorne, France) -2003-
Sudan – South Sudan (UNISFA) -2011-	Central African Republic (MISCA) -2013-	DPR Korea and Rep. Korea (NSC) -1953-
Sudan (Darfur) (UNAMID) -2007-	Somalia (AMISOM) -2007-	<i>East Timor (ISF, Australia) -2006-2013</i>
South Sudan (UNMISS) -2009-	ECOWAS (2)	Egypt and Israel -1982-
Western Sahara (MINURSO) -1991-	Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) -2012-	Hebron, Palestine (TPIH 2) -1997-
West Africa (UNOWA) -2001-	<i>Mali (AFISMA) -2013-</i>	The Solomon Islands (RAMSI) -2003-

* Starting year of the mission included. Missions completed during 2013 are shown in italics. The UNMIT mission is included, which ended on 31 December 2012, although it is not used to calculate the total balance of missions during the year.

peace-building tasks, such as the EU (17 missions in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East), the OSCE (16 missions in the European and Central Asian area), NATO (five missions in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East), the AU (three missions in Africa), ECOWAS (two missions in Africa), ECCAS (one mission Africa), OAS (three missions in America), the CIS (one mission in

Europe), and six multilateral operations under the umbrella of countries or groups of countries, which gives a **total of 83 international missions during 2013, unchanged from the previous year. Of the 83 missions, five finished in 2013: UNPOS (Somalia), EUJUST LEX/ Iraq (Iraq), MISMA (Mali), MICOPAX (Central African Republic) and ISF (Timor-Leste).**

Forced displacement was one of the most visible effects of the armed conflicts, both in terms of population displacement within the borders of their own countries (IDP) and outside the borders of their countries (refugees). The analysis of the overall situation regarding forced displacement indicates that, with the exception of certain years, during the last decade we have seen a steady increase in this phenomenon as a result of armed conflicts, widespread violence and human rights abuses. In mid-2013, the UNHCR released its annual report with the data regarding forced displacement at global level for 2012, which confirmed this trend and has triggered concern.² The figures have reached their worst levels since the mid-nineties of the twentieth century: **45.2 million people were forcibly displaced in late 2012, of which 15.4 million were refugees and 28.8 million internally displaced persons**, while almost one million were asylum seekers.³ According to UNHCR figures, of this total, 7.6 million people (one sixth of the total) had been forced to leave their homes due to violence in 2012, including 6.5 million who moved to other regions within their own countries and 1.1 million who crossed borders and became refugees.

According to UNHCR, forced displacement figures have reached their worst levels since the mid-nineties of the twentieth century, affecting 45.2 million people by the end of 2012, of which 15.4 million were refugees and 28.8 million internally displaced persons

39 socio-political crises were recorded in Africa in 2013, compared to 35 in 2012. New cases of tension were identified in Mozambique, Niger, and also in the eastern region of DR Congo, where the former armed group ADF increased its military actions. With regard to Asia, this region saw 25 cases of tension, compared with 23 in 2012. The increase was due to the outbreak of a new crisis in Bangladesh and the inclusion of the dispute in Mindanao between the Philippine government and the MILF. The latter case ceased to be regarded as an armed conflict in 2012 due to positive developments in the peace process between the parties. However, the levels of violence remained high in the region.

In Europe, it is notable that the escalating political and social confrontation in Ukraine prompted this case to be classified as a socio-political crisis in 2013, although the total number of cases remained at the same level as in 2012 (15). In the case of the Middle East, the upward trend in the number of socio-political crises observed in previous years continued: 11 crises in 2011, 14 in 2012 and 15 in 2013. In the latter year, it is worth noting that two cases arise from contexts that were no longer considered to be active armed conflicts: firstly, the dispute pitting the government of Iran against the armed Kurdish group PJAK in the north-west and, secondly, the political crisis in Yemen linked to the ousting from power of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In both cases, the dynamics of the conflict persist, although with reduced levels of violence.

Socio-political crises

The second chapter (**Socio-political crises**)⁴ offers an analysis of the nature and the most important events related to the socio-political crises recorded during the year and take a comparative look at global and regional trends. Throughout 2013, **99 cases were identified worldwide. As in previous years, the largest number of socio-political crises were found in Africa, with 39 cases, followed by Asia, which reported 25 cases.** Both Europe and the Middle East saw 15 cases of crises, respectively, while in America five cases were observed. **The total number of socio-political crises in 2013 represents an increase compared to the number of crises the previous year, when 91 cases were recorded.** This increase is attributable to two factors: firstly, the emergence of new crises and, secondly, the fact that some cases that were considered armed conflicts in 2012 were reclassified as socio-political crises in 2013. Note that all continents showed variations with respect to the number of cases observed the previous year.


While the socio-political crises may be caused by many factors, an analysis of the scope of these crises in 2013 makes it possible to identify trends as regards their causes or motivations. In line with data observed in previous years, **at global level the majority of the crises (75%) were linked to opposition to domestic or international policies implemented by the respective governments (which led to a struggle to seize or to the erosion of power), or to opposition to the political, social or ideological system of a state.** Other prevalent causes were identity issues and demands for self-determination and/or self-government, which were a key element in 69% of the cases of tension in 2013. Note that in the various cases of tension, the control of territory and/or resources was also a particularly important element in the disputes (28%), although overall it is a factor that fuels many conflicts.

2. UNHCR, *Displacement, The New 21st Century Challenge: UNHCR Global Trends 2012*, June, 2013, http://unhcr.org/globaltrends/june2013/UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V08_web.pdf.

3. See "Global challenge: forced displacement of population at the worst level since the 1990s" in Chapter 6 (Risks Scenarios for 2014).

4. A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by a range of actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may lead to an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity aspirations; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or undermine power; or c) control of resources or territory.

Regional distribution of the number of socio-political crises



In terms of the intensity of the socio-political crises, during 2013 the trends observed in previous years continued. Thus, most cases were low intensity (55%), a quarter of the cases were average intensity, while a fifth of them were high intensity. In comparison with the previous year, it is noteworthy that the number of severe socio-political crises was higher in 2013 than in 2012 (20% versus 18%, respectively) and that **in Asia the number of cases of high intensity crises doubled from four to eight. Consequently, Asia displaced the Middle East, the region which in 2012 had the highest concentration of cases of high intensity crises.** The Middle East maintained its tally of six cases of severe socio-political crises in 2013. A further five contexts of high intensity socio-political crises were found in Africa, and one in Europe, while America did not exhibit any cases of high intensity socio-political crisis. The most serious crises in 2013 were in Kenya, Madagascar, DR Congo (east-ADF), DR Congo-Rwanda, Bangladesh, China (East Turkestan), the Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF), the Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), India-Pakistan, Indonesia (West Papua), Pakistan, Thailand, Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Egypt, Egypt (Sinai), Israel-Syria-Lebanon, Lebanon, Syria-Turkey and Yemen (South).

With regard to the evolution of the levels of violence and destabilisation in 2013, a comparison with the previous year reveals a continuity of trends. Most of the tensions (40%) maintained levels similar to those in 2012, in another 35% of cases a deterioration was noted, while 24% of the cases saw some improvement. This positive evolution towards lower levels of tension has been caused by multiple factors and, in some cases, it was linked to the achievement of agreements to move towards a negotiated solution to the disputes (as in the case

of the agreement between Iran and the powers of the G5+1 on Tehran's nuclear program), the rapprochement between the disputing parties (as in the case of Serbia and Kosovo), or progress in the implementation of peace agreements (as in Nepal, where the integration of the former Maoist opposition group PLA into the Armed Forces was concluded, elections were held and a Constituent Assembly was created).

Finally, and in line with the trend observed in previous years, **most of the socio-political crises in the world were internal (54%), involving state actors operating within the same state.** Additionally, a third of the cases of tension were categorised as internal internationalised, either because some of the major players in the dispute were foreign or due to the contagion of the crisis to a neighbouring country. Only 15% of the socio-political crises in 2013 were international (15 out of 99 cases).

Peace processes

The third chapter (**Peace Processes**)⁵ examines 52 cases of negotiations. Three groups laid down their arms after signing a peace agreement with their respective governments. Some of the **most significant events of the year** in relation to peace processes were:

- Three conflicts finished with a peace agreement: the JEM-Bashar conflict in Sudan and two in India (UPPK and a faction of the KCP-MC).
- At year's end, the government of South Sudan and military supporters of the vice-president decided to meet in Ethiopia to initiate peace talks.
- In DR Congo, after the defeat of the armed group M23, it was agreed that those fighters that were not guilty of war crimes could be integrated into the army or the police.
- In Colombia negotiations continued with the FARC and steps were taken towards beginning talks with the ELN.
 - A process of political dialogue with the Union National Federal Council (UNFC) was begun in Burma, a platform that includes most of the country's insurgency.
 - The Philippines held several rounds of negotiations with the MILF, signing the third of the four remaining annexes to the provisional peace agreement reached in 2012.
 - The leader of the armed Kurdish group PKK called for arms to be laid down in Turkey and for a withdrawal of PKK fighters to outside Turkish territory; however, the withdrawal of the Kurdish guerrilla was halted in September.

99 cases of socio-political crisis were identified worldwide which, as in previous years, were concentrated mainly in Africa (39 cases) and Asia (25 cases)

5. Negotiation is understood as the process through which two or more parties involved in a dispute (whether countries or internal actors within a country) are willing to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to seek a satisfactory solution to their demands. This negotiation may be direct or with the mediation of third parties. Formal negotiations tend to have a prior or exploratory phase that enables the framework of the future negotiations to be defined (format, place, conditions, guarantees, etc.). Peace process is understood as the consolidation of a negotiation process, once the agenda points, procedures to be followed, timeline and facilitators have been defined. As such, negotiation constitutes one of the stages of a peace process.

Conflict overview 2013

Continent	Armed conflicts			Socio-political crises			TOTAL
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low	
Africa	Central African Republic DR Congo (east) Nigeria (Boko Haram) Somalia <i>South Sudan</i>	Algeria (AQIM) Libya <i>Mali (north)</i> <i>Sudan (Darfur)</i> <i>Sudan (South Kordofan Sur and Blue Nile)</i>	Burundi* <i>Central Africa (LRA)</i> <i>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</i>	DR Congo (east-ADF) DR Congo – Rwanda Kenya Madagascar Nigeria	Côte d'Ivoire DR Congo Eritrea Guinea Mali Mozambique Nigeria (Niger Delta) Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland) Sudan <i>Sudan – South Sudan</i> Tunisia	Algeria Angola (Cabinda) Burkina Faso Chad Comoros Congo Djibouti DR Congo – Uganda Eritrea – Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia (Oromia) Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Malawi Mauritania Morocco <i>Morocco – Western Sahara</i> Niger Rwanda <i>Senegal (Casamance)</i> Swazilandia Uganda Zimbabwe	
SUBTOTAL	5	5	3	5	11	23	52
America		<i>Colombia</i>			Haiti Peru	Bolivia Paraguay Venezuela	
SUBTOTAL		1			2	3	6
Asia and Pacific	<i>Afghanistan</i> <i>Pakistan</i> <i>Pakistan (Balochistan)</i>	India (CPI-M) <i>Thailand (south)</i>	<i>India (Assam)</i> India (Jammu and Kashmir) <i>India (Manipur)</i> <i>Philippines (NPA)</i> Philippines (Mindanao – Abu Sayyaf) Myanmar	Bangladesh China (East Turquestan) <i>India – Pakistan</i> Indonesia (West Papua) <i>Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)</i> <i>Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)</i> Pakistan Thailand	China (Tibet) China – Japan India (Nagaland) Korea, DPR – US, Japan, Rep. of Korea Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea <i>Myanmar</i>	India (Tripura) Indonesia (Aceh) Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Lao, PDR Nepal Nepal (Terai) Sri Lanka (north-east) Tajikistan Thailand – Cambodia Uzbekistan	
SUBTOTAL	3	2	6	8	6	11	36
Europe		Russia (Dagestan)	Russia (Chechnya)* Russia (Ingushetia) * Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria) <i>Turkey (south-east)</i>	<i>Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)</i>	Russia Ukraine	Azerbaijan Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina <i>Cyprus</i> <i>Georgia (Abkhazia)</i> <i>Georgia (South Ossetia)</i> <i>Moldova, Rep. of (Transdnistria)</i> Russia (Karachay-Cherkessia) Russia (North Ossetia) <i>Serbia-Kosovo</i> Spain (Basque Country) United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	
SUBTOTAL		1	4	1	2	12	20
Middle East	<i>Iraq</i> <i>Syria</i>	Yemen (AQAP)	<i>Israel – Palestine</i> Yemen (Houthis)	Egypt Egypt (Sinai) Lebanon – Israel – Syria Lebanon Syria – Turkey Yemen (south)	Bahrain Iran (northeast) Iran (Sistan Balochistan) Iran – USA, Israel	Iran Iraq (Kurdistan) Palestine Saudi Arabia <i>Yemen</i>	
SUBTOTAL	2	1	2	6	4	5	20
TOTAL	10	10	15	20	25	54	134

Armed conflicts and socio-political crises with ongoing peace negotiations, whether exploratory or formal, are identified in italics. With asterisk, armed conflicts ended during 2013.

Status of the negotiations at the end of 2013

Good (15)	In difficulties (17)	Bad (5)	At an exploratory stage (7)	Resolved (3)
Mali (MIA) India (ULFA-PTF, URF, KCP-Lamphel, KYKL-MDF, KCP-Pakhanglakpa, KCP-N, KNLF, KRF, NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCN-IM), Philippines (MILF) Serbia-Kosovo Yemen	Mali (MNLA) Senegal (MFDC) Sudan (SPLM-N) South Sudan (Machar faction) Colombia (FARC) Afghanistan (Taliban) India (ULFA-I, NDFB-P) India-Pakistan (Kashmir) Myanmar (UNFC) Thailand (BRN) Moldavia (Transnistria) Turkey (PKK) Armenia- Azerbaijan (Nagorno- Karabakh) Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) Israel-Palestine	Sudan-South Sudan Morocco-Western Sahara Philippines (MNLF) Philippines (NPA) Cyprus	RCA (LRA) Pakistan (Taliban) Ethiopia (ONLF) Colombia (ELN) India (NDFB-R) Thailand (PULO) Syria	Sudan (JEM-Bashar) India (KCP-MC faction and UPKK)

- US Secretary of State, John Kerry, made several visits to Israel and Palestine to encourage a new negotiation process.

Gender issues in peace-building

The fourth chapter (**Gender issues in peace-building**) examines, from a gender perspective, the various initiatives being undertaken by the United Nations⁶ and various local and international organisations and movements in the area of peace-building. This perspective brings to light the various effects of the armed conflicts on women and men, but also to what extent and in what way both women and men are participating in peace-building and the contributions that women are making to this peace-building process. This chapter assesses the gender inequality situation at global level, examines gender equality factors in relation to their impact on armed conflicts and tensions, and finally assesses the various peace-building initiatives from a gender perspective.

As regards the gender equality situation, it should be noted that according to information provided by the IDG, **the equality situation affecting women was severe in 75 countries, with 42 cases being classified as particularly severe, concentrated mainly in Africa and Asia.** The results of a comparative analysis of this indicator against the same indicator in countries that are currently involved in armed conflicts reveals that 14 of the 75 countries which display a severe gender equality situation, experienced one or more armed conflicts in 2013. This means that 21 of the 35 armed conflicts that took place during 2013 occurred in countries where there are severe gender inequalities and that six of these conflicts took place in countries for which no data is


available regarding this factor. Thus, **72% of the armed conflicts for which gender equality data is available took place in contexts with severe gender inequalities.** Furthermore, in 39 of the countries with severe inequalities, there were one or more cases of tension. This means that at least 56 of the 99 active cases of tension during 2013 took place in countries where there are severe gender inequalities, representing 69% of the cases of tension for which data were available.

During 2013, sexual violence as a weapon of war continued to be one of the central issues of the international agenda on women, peace and security. On the one hand, its use was detected in numerous armed conflicts and socio-political tensions active throughout the year, such as Syria, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, among others, with a serious impact on the victims, mainly female civilians. On the other hand, at the institutional level there were various efforts both to increase the visibility of this serious violation of human rights and to try to reduce its impact and the impunity associated with these cases.

In the section on peace-building from a gender perspective, it is noteworthy that in 2013 **progress was made on gender issues in the peace processes in countries such as the Philippines and Colombia.** Moreover, in other contexts such as Syria, there were also efforts by civil society to demand substantive participation of women in the peace negotiations.

Throughout the year, in the **Philippines** negotiations were held between the government and the armed opposition group MILF. The role of women in this process has been described as momentous by many observers. In the case of the peace negotiations between the government of **Colombia** and the FARC, notable was the signing in November of a 15-point agreement on

6. As an analytical category, gender makes it clear that inequalities between men and women are the product of social norms rather than a result of nature, and sets out to underline this social and cultural construction to distinguish it from the biological differences of the sexes. The gender perspective aims to highlight the social construction of sexual difference and the sexual division of work and power. It also attempts to show that the differences between men and women are a social construction resulting from unequal power relations that have been historically established in the patriarchal system. The goal of gender as an analytical category is to demonstrate the historical and situated nature of sexual differences.



political representation. The last of the points agreed provided that the content of the agreement would be implemented with “a focus on gender and ensuring the participation of women.” Following the signing of the agreement, the Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos announced the incorporation of two women onto the government negotiating team.

With regard to the peace negotiations to end the conflict in **Syria**, various women's organisations (such as Syrian Women's Forum for Peace, Syrian Women's League or Syrian Women's Network) as well as female members of Syrian civil society organisations, demanded that the parties to the conflict and the United Nations guarantee the presence of women and civil society representatives in the peace talks scheduled for January 2014 in Geneva. The principal demand was the creation of a third party that is independent of the actors in the conflict (Syrian government and armed opposition) on which women and other civil society organisations would be represented in order to ensure the inclusiveness of the process, as well as to prevent agreements being made that do not take into account the gender factor and the situation of women in Syria. Finally, it should be noted that in **DR Congo**, a group of women from the North Kivu province, the epicentre of the armed conflict, demanded to participate in the peace negotiations between the Congolese government, Uganda and the armed opposition group M23, noting that women in the region have been excluded from the negotiations despite the serious impact

The UN Secretary General presented his report on sexual violence in armed conflicts, which includes a list of various armed groups, and government and opposition actors responsible for crimes of sexual violence


that the armed conflict has had on them.

Finally, noteworthy is the approval of the **Arms Trade Treaty** by a majority of states, which **included a clause on gender violence**, requiring exporters to consider whether the sale of arms, ammunition, parts or components may be used to commit or facilitate acts of violence or violence against women and children.

Opportunities for Peace in 2014

In the fifth chapter (**Opportunities for Peace in 2014**), the report examines seven environments that lend themselves to positive steps being taken in terms of peace-building in 2014. The opportunities identified in 2013 concern a number of different regions and issues.

- **Iran:** The historic agreement on the Iranian nuclear program reached between Iran and the G5+1 and the shift in the relationship between Washington and Tehran opens the way for important positive developments in the negotiations during 2014. The possibility that this peace opportunity could bear fruit will depend, among other factors, on the parties' ability to overcome their mutual distrust, the ability of the leaders who are committed to dialogue to impose their will in the face of internal and external detractors, and the influence of regional dynamics on the progress



of the talks. The potential benefits of a successful outcome extend far beyond the nuclear debate.


- **Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission:** The emergence of this feminist proposal for peace-building and the recovery of historical memory is a milestone in the process in Colombia and could become a benchmark for other peace-building and truth-seeking processes due to the important contributions that this commission has made towards achieving the full participation of women.
- **The Philippines (Mindanao-MILF):** The strong presence of women during the successful peace process in Mindanao and the important role they have played throughout its various stages are an example highlighting the fact that it is possible to create meaningful forums for women to participate in negotiation processes and that, at the same time, this presence could lead to the incorporation of gender factors into the specific agreements reached within the framework of these processes.
- **Indonesia (Papua New Guinea):** The diplomatic internationalisation of the situation in West Papua is an example for breaking the cycle of invisibility of forgotten conflicts and also shows that political and diplomatic activity at international level is probably much more effective than armed struggle in achieving political objectives, especially in cases where, as in West Papua, it is clear that the insurgency does not have the capability to defeat the state or even to force it to begin a negotiated resolution to the conflict.
- **Serbia - Kosovo:** The process of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, launched in 2011 under the auspices of the EU, has seen unprecedented

measures being taken towards a rapprochement during 2013. These positive results could grow in 2014, which puts both administrations on a path to the normalisation of mutual relations.

- **Russia (Chechnya):** The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) represents an opportunity for the Chechen people to seek international protection in the face of the total absence of effective local justice mechanisms against the abuses being committed, as well as legitimizing the work of local organisations working with human rights violation complaints, despite the constraints the court faces in the absence of Russia's enforcement of these judgments.
- **DR Congo (east):** Regional and international diplomatic commitment to support the peace process in the Great Lakes region, the demobilisation and voluntary surrender of various armed groups following the defeat of the armed group M23 and the growing commitment to designing a more transparent and accountable natural resource trading system opens a new window of opportunity to begin laying the groundwork in order to overcome the climate of widespread violence that has marked the history of this country.


Risk scenarios for 2014

In the sixth chapter (**Risk scenarios for 2014**), the report examines eight cases of armed conflict and tension which, due to their conditions, may worsen and become sources of instability and even more serious violence during 2014.



- **Forced population displacement:** The increase in forced displacement, which has reached its worst level since the mid-nineties of the twentieth century, is a major challenge for the humanitarian organisations and authorities in the host regions and countries. In addition, the deterioration of some conflicts and the emergence of new crises in 2013 is an omen that this negative trend will continue in 2014.
- **Iraq:** The devastating balance of a decade of war in the country, in which 174,000 people have been killed (mostly civilians) is compounded by the worsening of the dynamics of violence, which in 2013 reached their worst levels since 2008. Government policies that accentuate the Sunni community's sense of marginalisation, the increasing role of armed groups, the tensions associated with the holding of elections and the increasing interconnectedness of the conflicts of Syria and Iraq, may lead to a worsening climate of violence.
- **Syria:** The proliferation and fragmentation of armed groups, the growing prominence of radical, extremist or Jihadi groups, the increased presence of foreign fighters and clashes between different groups within the opposition camp have added complexity to a dispute that is having a devastating effect on civilians. These factors threaten to exacerbate the conflict in 2014 and make it even more difficult to find a way out of the crisis.
- **Eritrea:** The weakness and fragility displayed by the regime and the growing internal discontent raise fears of an outbreak of violence that could have serious consequences ahead of an upcoming political transition, not only locally but also in the regional context of the Horn of Africa.
- **Thailand:** In 2013, the most important mobilisations in recent years have taken place, both due to their massive and continued nature, and also due to their political impact, and although so far they have not resulted in intense violence, there are a number of indicators pointing to the possibility that this situation could lead to higher levels of violence and even to a coup.
- **China (Xinjiang):** The increase in the frequency, intensity and sophistication of the armed attacks in Xinjiang in 2013 prompted Beijing to recognise the Uighur insurgency as the most real and immediate national security threat to the country. The Chinese government has doubled the budget to combat terrorism and has increased its police and military presence in the province, which may lead to increased violence in 2014.
- **China - Japan (Senkaku/Diaoyu islands):** The dispute between China and Japan over the sovereignty of these islands, as well as the delimitation of their respective exclusive economic zones and their air defence areas in the East China Sea, saw an escalation of tension in 2013. There is a risk of increased tensions between the two countries in the future due to the high geostrategic sensitivity of both the disputed islands and the East China Sea, as well as the conflicting national interests in the region.
- **Turkey (south-east)** Despite the resumption of peace talks in 2012 and 2013, various national and regional elements cast great uncertainty regarding the prospects for dialogue between the government and Kurdish guerrillas in the immediate future, and have led to warnings that another opportunity for a solution may be lost.

Map 1.1. Armed conflicts



1. Armed Conflicts

- In 2013 35 armed conflicts were reported, the majority in Africa (13) and Asia (11), followed by the Middle East (five), Europe (five) and Latin America (one).
- The Central African Republic was plunged into chaos as a result of the coup d'état carried out by the Séléka coalition in March and the December offensive led by groups opposed to the insurgency, which resulted in interfaith clashes.
- France led a military intervention in northern Mali to halt the advancement of radical armed groups, which in the middle of the year led to the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA).
- In Afghanistan there was an increase in the number of civilian casualties as a result of the armed conflict.
- The assassination of the Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud by a US drone in North Waziristan put an end to the peace talks that had been planned with the government of Pakistan.
- In Turkey steps were taken towards peace in the first half of the year, with a PKK ceasefire and the partial withdrawal of its guerrillas to northern Iraq, but the situation worsened in the following months.
- The armed conflict in Iraq saw an escalation in violence that caused the deaths of nearly 10,000 people in 2013, more than double the previous year.
- The escalation of the war in Syria caused massive population displacements and thousands of deaths, bringing the number of people killed since the conflict began in 2011 to more than 100,000.

This chapter analyses the armed conflicts that took place over the course of 2013. It is structured in four parts. The first section outlines the definition of armed conflict and its characteristics. The second examines trends in conflict during 2013, including global and regional trends and other issues related to international conflicts, such as arms embargoes and international missions. The third section describes the evolution of situations and the most important events of the year in their different contexts. Finally, risk scenarios in all the armed conflicts of 2013 are identified with a view to issuing early warnings regarding them. Also included is a map at the beginning of the chapter identifying the active conflicts in 2013.

1.1. Armed conflicts: definition

An **armed conflict** is any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible in which the continuous and organised use of violence a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. wounded or displaced population, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services) and b) aims to achieve objectives that are different than those of common delinquency and are normally linked to:

- demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues;
- the opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of the government, which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power;
- control over the resources or the territory.

Table 1.1. Summary of armed conflicts in 2013

Conflict ¹ -beginning-	Type ²	Main parties ³	Intensity ⁴
			Trend ⁵
Africa			
Algeria (AQIM) -1992-	Internationalised internal	Government, AQIM (formerly GSPC), MUJAO, Signatories in Blood, Government of Libya, Mauritania, Mali and Niger	2
	System		↑
Burundi -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, FNL	1
	Government		End
Central Africa (LRA) -1986-	International	AU Regional Task Force (RTF, comprising Ugandan, Congolese and Southern Sudanese armed forces), self-defence militias from DR Congo and South Sudan, LRA	1
	Resources		↓
Central African Republic -2006-	Internationalised internal	Government, demobilised members of the former rebel coalition Séléka (splinter groups of the former CPJP, UFDR and CPSK groups), anti-balaka militias, France, MICOPAX/FOMAC (converted into MISCA), groups linked to the former government of François Bozizé, other residual forces from armed groups (former armed forces), LRA armed Ugandan group	3
	Government		↑
DR Congo (east) -1998-	Internationalised internal	Government, Mai-Mai militia, FDLR, M23 (formerly CNDP), APCLS, Ituri armed groups, Burundian armed opposition group FNL, Ugandan armed opposition groups ADF-NALU, Rwanda, MONUSCO	3
	Government, Identity, Resources		↑
Ethiopia (Ogaden) -2007-	Internationalised internal	Government, ONLF, OLF, pro-government militias	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Libya -2011-	Internal	Government, armed opposition groups, militias	2
	Government		=
Mali (north) -2012-	Internationalised internal	Government, MNLA, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM, ECOWAS, France, Chad, MISMA, MINUSMA	2
	System, Self-government, Identity		↑

1. This column shows the states in which armed conflicts are taking place, specifying the region in this state to which the conflict is limited in brackets and the name of the armed group involved in the conflict. The latter is given in the case that there is more than one armed conflict in the same state or in the same territory within a state, in order to differentiate them.
2. This report classifies and analyses the armed conflicts from a dual aspect, which deals, on the one hand with the causes or incompatibility of interests and, on the other hand, the convergence between the scenario of the conflict and the actors. With regard to the main causes, the following can be distinguished: the demand for self-determination and self-government (self-government), or identity aspirations (Identity); opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state (System) or the internal or international policy of a government (Government), which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power; or fight to control the resources (Resources) or the territory (Territory). As far as the second aspect is concerned, the armed conflicts may be internal, internationalised internal or international. An internal armed conflict is any confrontation involving armed parties from the same state that operate exclusively in and from within the territory. Secondly, internationalised internal armed conflict is one in which one or more of the adversaries are foreign and/or when the confrontation spreads to neighbouring countries. To consider an armed conflict to be internationalised internal, the fact that the armed groups have their military bases in neighbouring countries, in connivance with those states and launch their attacks from them should be taken into account. Finally, an international conflict is one in which state and non-state parties from two or more countries confront each other. It should also be taken into account that most current armed conflicts have a significant regional or international dimension and influence due, among other things, to the flows of refugees, the arms trade, economic or political interests (such as illegal or illegal exploitation of resources) that the neighbouring countries have in the conflict, the participation of foreign combatants or the logistical and military support provided by other states.
3. This column shows the actors that intervene directly in the hostilities. The main actors that directly participate in the conflicts are made up of a mixture of regular or irregular armed parties. The conflicts usually involve the government, or its armed forces, against one or several armed opposition groups, but can also include other irregular groups such as clans, the guerrillas, warlords, armed groups confronting each other or militias from ethnic or religious communities. Although they most frequently use conventional weapons, and more specifically small arms (which cause most of the deaths in the conflicts), in many cases other methods such as suicide attacks, bombings and sexual violence are used; even hunger is employed as a weapon of war. There are also other actors who do not directly participate in the armed activities, but who do have a significant influence on the conflict.
4. The intensity of an armed conflict (high, medium or low) and its trend (escalation of violence, decrease of violence, unchanged) are evaluated mostly based on how deadly it is (number of fatalities) and other consequences on the population and the territory. In addition, there are other aspects to be considered, such as the systematisation and frequency of the violence or the complexity of the military struggle (the complexity is normally related to the number of parties involved and how fragmented they are, the level of institutionalisation and the capabilities of the state and the degree of internationalisation of the conflict, as well as the flexibility of the objectives and the political willingness of the parties to reach an agreement). Thus, high intensity armed conflicts are usually those that cause over 1,000 battle-related deaths a year and also affect significant parts of the territory and population and include numerous actors (that establish relations of alliances, confrontation or tactical coexistence among themselves). Medium and low intensity conflicts, with over 100 battle-related deaths a year, have the aforementioned characteristics but with a more limited presence and scope. An armed conflict is considered to be ended when a significant and sustained decrease in armed hostilities occurs because of a military victory, agreement between the actors in conflict, demobilisation by one of the parties or because one of the parties abandons the armed struggle or limits it considerably as a strategy to achieve specific objectives. None of these options necessarily imply that the root causes of the armed conflict have been overcome or exclude the possibility of new outbreaks of violence. A temporary halt in hostilities, whether formal or tacit, does not necessarily mean the end of an armed conflict.
5. In this column, the development of the events of the year 2013 are compared with those of 2012, with the symbol of escalation of violence appearing (↑) if the general situation of the conflict during 2013 is more serious than during the previous year, the decrease of violence (↓) if it is better and that of no changes (=) if no significant changes have been experienced.

Conflict -beginning-	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
África			
Nigeria (Boko Haram) - 2011 -	Internal	Government, Boko Haram (BH) radical Islamist group, Ansaru	3
	System		↑
Somalia -1988-	Internationalised internal	Federal Government, USA, France, Ethiopia, AMISOM, EU-Navfor, Operation Ocean Shield, al-Shabaab, Eritrea	3
	Government, System		↑
South Sudan -2009-	Internationalised internal	Government, Army (SPLA), South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A), community militias, Sudan	3
	Government, Resources, Identity		↑
Sudan (Darfur) -2003-	Internationalised internal	Government, pro-government Janjaweed militias, JEM, LJM coalition, various factions of the SLA and other armed groups	2
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		↑
Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, SPLM-N armed group, Sudan Revolutionary Forces armed coalition (SRF), PDF pro-government militias, South Sudan	2
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		=
America			
Colombia -1964-	Internationalised internal	Government, FARC, ELN, paramilitary groups	2
	System		=
Asia			
Afghanistan -2001-	Internationalised internal	Government, international coalition (led by the USA), ISAF (NATO), Taliban militias, warlords	3
	System		=
India (CPI-M) -1967-	Internal	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)	2
	System		↑
India (Assam) -1983-	Internationalised internal	Government, ULFA, NDFB, KPLT, KLO, MULTA, HUM	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989-	Internationalised internal	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	1
	Self-government, Identity		↑
India (Manipur) -1982-	Internal	Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, PREPAK (Pro), KNF, KNA, KYKL, RPF, UPPK, PCP	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Myanmar -1948-	Internal	Government, armed groups (KNU, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNU/KNLA, SSNPLO, KIO)	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Pakistan -2001-	Internationalised internal	Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias, USA	3
	System		=
Pakistan (Baluchistan) -2005-	Internal	Government, BLA, BRA, BLF, BLT, Jundullah, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	3
	Self-government, Identity, Resources		=
Philippines (NPA) -1969-	Internal	Government, NPA	1
	System		=
Philippines (Mindanao- Abu Sayyaf) -1991-	Internationalised internal	Government, Abu Sayyaf	1
	Self-government, Identity, System		=
Thailand (south) -2004-	Internal	Government, secessionist armed opposition groups	2
	Self-government, Identity		=
Europa			
Russia (Chechnya) -1999-	Internal	Russian Federal Government, Government of the Republic of Chechnya, armed opposition groups	1
	System, Self-government, Identity		End

Conflict -beginning-	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
Russia (Dagestan) -2010-	Internal	Russian Federal Government, Government of the Republic of Dagestan, armed opposition groups	2
	System, Self-government, Identity		=
Russia (Ingushetia) -2008-	Internal	Russian Federal Government, Government of the Republic of Ingushetia, armed opposition groups (Ingush Jamaat)	1
	System, Self-government, Identity		End
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria) -2011-	Internal	Russian Federal Government, Government of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, armed opposition groups	1
	System, Self-government, Identity		↓
Turkey (south-east) -1984-	Internationalised internal	Government, PKK, TAK	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Middle East			
Iraq -2003-	Internationalised internal	Government, armed opposition groups –among them Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS, according to its acronym in English), linked to al-Qaeda– militias, USA	3
	System, Government, Identity		↑
Israel-Palestine -2000-	International	Israeli Government, settler militias, ANP, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP, Popular Resistance Committees	1
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		↓
Syria -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, pro-government militias (Shabbiha), Free Syrian Army (FSA), Islamic Front, armed Salafi groups, al-Nusra Front, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), Kurdish militias of the PYD	3
	Government, System		↑
Yemen (Houthis) -2004-	Internationalised internal	Government, followers of the cleric al-Houthi (al-Shabab al-Mumen), tribal militias linked to the al-Ahmar clan, Salafi militias, armed sectors linked to the Islamist party Islah, Saudi Arabia	1
	System, Government, Identity		=
Yemen (AQAP) - 2011 -	Internationalised internal	Government, AQAP/Ansar Sharia, USA, Saudi Arabia, tribal militias (popular resistance committees)	2
	System		↓

1: low intensity; 2: medium intensity; 3: high intensity;

↑: escalation of violence; ↓: decrease of violence; =: unchanged; End: no longer considered an armed conflict

1.2. Armed conflicts: analysis of trends in 2013

This section offers an analysis of the global and regional trends of armed conflicts in 2013 and of other issues related to international disputes, such as arms embargoes and international missions.

a) Global trends

35 armed conflicts were registered throughout 2013, down slightly from the previous year, when 38 conflicts were recorded. The slight decrease from one year to the next is due to the fact that in 2013, the cases in the Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), Iran (north-west) and Yemen were no longer considered armed conflicts. Furthermore, unlike previous years, in 2013 no new conflicts arose, but rather all of them originated in prior periods. In addition, at the end of 2013 only 32 of the 35 armed conflicts from 2013 continued to be active, since the pattern of reduced violence led to the armed conflicts in Burundi, Russia (Chechnya) and Russia (Ingushetia) no longer being considered as such. In the case of Burundi, in mid-2013 the sustained reduction in violence, the advances made in the internal political


situation and the return to the country of the main opposition leaders all had an effect. In the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia (Russian Federation), the reduction in insurgent violence (as evidenced by the death toll for the year) contrasted with the lack of progress in domestic issues, particularly the serious human rights violations in Chechnya.

Most armed conflicts occurred in Africa and Asia (13 and 11, respectively), followed by the Middle East (five), Europe (five) and America (one). Of the total number of conflicts, 60% (21 cases) were internationalised internal and a further 34% (12 cases) were internal conflicts. The remaining two cases (the conflict between Israel and Palestine and the conflict between several central African governments with the armed Ugandan group LRA) were international. Among the internationalisation factors, notable was the military involvement of third-party actors, whether states (France and Chad in Mali; Ethiopia, USA and France in Somalia; USA in Pakistan and Afghanistan; France in the Central African Republic; USA in Pakistan and Yemen, among others), international missions or forces (MINUSMA and ECOWAS in Mali; MISCA in the Central African Republic; the UN Force Intervention Brigade, under the mandate of MONUSCO, in DR Congo; AMISOM in Somalia; ISAF in Afghanistan, among others) or regional

armed groups or foreign armed groups (the Islamist groups MUJAO and AQIM in Mali [north] and Algeria; various armed groups in DR Congo; ISIS and Hezbollah in Syria, among others). In any case, most of today's conflicts are characterised by a significantly regional and international dimension and influence, due to various factors (population displacement, trafficking in arms and resources, participation of mercenaries and other foreign fighters, support from neighbouring countries, among others). During 2013, Syria was one of the most obvious cases of the complexity of internationalised conflicts, a crisis that has acted as a contagion and worsened other conflicts in the region.

Moreover, the average duration of the armed conflicts in 2013 was 17.1 years. However, this is a figure that should be taken as an approximation due to the difficulty in determining an exact date for the beginning of the armed conflict phase and due to the high number of current armed conflicts that have experienced cycles of violence previously, such as Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Thailand (south) or Afghanistan.

Graph 1.1. Regional distribution of the number of armed conflicts




In relation to the underlying causes, most of the armed conflicts were characterised by the fact that they had multiple background causes, with several simultaneous elements acting as motivating factors in the disputes. **Almost two thirds of the conflicts (23 cases) have opposition to a particular government or to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state among their main causes.** Of these 23 active cases in 2013, 18 of the disputes involved armed opposition actors fighting for a change in the system, whether due to their historical aspirations to establish a socialist political and economic system (Colombia [FARC and ELN], Philippines [NPA] and India [CPI-M]) or, more frequently, the desire to create an Islamic political structure or introduce or reinforce elements of Islamic law in the country's institutions or in the form of a state (Algeria [AQIM], Mali [(north), Nigeria [Boko Haram], Somalia, Afghanistan, Philippines [Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf], Pakistan, Russia [Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria], Iraq, Syria, Yemen [Houthists] and Yemen [AQAP]). In these last 15 cases, in which the objective was to establish an Islamic framework, most

involved armed groups whose idiosyncrasies reached beyond the administrative borders of the territory in which they were fighting, largely due to their cross-border scope of action, their affiliation with regional insurgencies or the fact that, at least rhetorically, their local dynamics and objectives are aligned with the wider global discourse of international Jihad. In this sense, 2013 was particularly significant due to the displays of force by these types of groups in the Middle East (mainly in Syria, but also once again in Iraq) and in North Africa (with Mali [north] and Algeria being worthy of note). Moreover, in nine of these 23 cases there were armed groups whose focus was not so much to transform the system but rather to overthrow the government and seize power or, faced with insufficient military capability, show their opposition to it by eroding it through violence. This factor of opposition to a government was present in the cases of Burundi (although by mid-year the conflict was no longer considered active following the return of the historic leader of the FNL rebellion as part of the peace process, among other factors), Libya, the Central African Republic (where in fact in 2013 the insurgent Séléka coalition overthrew the government), DR Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen (Houthists). In some of these conflicts, armed anti-government insurgencies coexisted alongside other armed actors also interested in changing the system, such as Somalia, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

In turn, **demands for self-government and identity continued to be significant factors in the conflict, present in almost two thirds of the disputes (21 cases).** Such conflicts were the majority in Asia and Europe, but were also significant in Africa and the Middle East. Demands for identity and self-government were expressed in several ways, ranging from claims of cultural rights to independence. Such conflicts included both long-term conflicts (Myanmar since 1948, Turkey since 1984, India [Assam] since 1983, among others) and recently emerged conflicts (Sudan [South Kordofan and Blue Nile] since 2011, and Ethiopia [Ogaden] since 2007, among others). In some of these conflicts, the groups with identity demands co-existed alongside other armed actors with different agendas (Mali [north], DR Congo [east], Yemen [Houthists], among others). Some of the longest-running armed conflicts linked to factors of identity and self-government, such as Myanmar and Turkey, took significant steps towards peace throughout the year. In the case of Myanmar, notable was the negotiation process with the armed opposition, and in particular, the government's agreement with the armed group KIO in May. In Turkey, notable was the dialogue between the government and the leader of the PKK, the ceasefire by the group and the beginning of the withdrawal of its guerrillas. However, the year ended with setbacks and questions hanging over both of these cases, as well as over other cases involving an identity dimension. Similarly, in many cases the struggle for control over resources or territory was another cornerstone of the dispute (Central Africa [LRA], DR Congo [east], Sudan [(Darfur and South Kordofan and Blue Nile],

Graph 1.2. Intensity of the armed conflicts




South Sudan, Pakistan [Balochistan], Israel-Palestine) in keeping with the trend in previous years. In any case, this is a factor that affects many armed conflicts.

The armed conflicts had a severe impact on the civilian population, with serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), which produced humanitarian crises or aggravated them. The fatalities as a result of the disputes were compounded by the other common effects of such conflicts, such as forced displacement, food insecurity, recruitment of children, sexual violence, extra-judicial killings, illegal detentions, torture, ill-treatment or restriction of access to humanitarian aid, among others. In his November 2013 report on the protection of civilians in conflicts, which covered the period from May 2012 until its publication, the UN Secretary-General **Ban Ki-moon warned that the civilian population is suffering the majority of the fatalities in the current conflicts and that it is frequently persecuted and subject to indiscriminate attacks and other abuses by the parties to the conflict.**⁶ Among the 14 cases of conflict or socio-political crisis examined in the report, most notable was the warning regarding the devastating impact on the civilian population in Syria, including the worrying number of fatalities, displacements, people in need of humanitarian aid, destruction of homes, and direct and indiscriminate attacks, among others. It also highlighted the increase in suicide attacks in Iraq and the use of indirect fire weapons such as mortars, among others, as well as the apparent resurgence of attacks with heavy casualties in populated areas.

In relation to the emerging challenges in the protection of civilians, the Secretary-General noted in his annual report the impact, in terms of civilian fatalities, of drone strikes used in contexts such as Afghanistan, Palestine, Pakistan or Yemen, among others; as well as the impact of these attacks on communities (e.g. interruption of the right to education, risks of holding cultural and religious events involving meetings between members

Graph 1.3. Intensity of the armed conflicts by region




of the population). The document echoed the doubts surrounding compliance with international human rights law and IHL (distinction, proportionality, precaution, obligation to investigate serious violations) in the use of drones, and warnings on the continued lack of transparency in their use.

Forced displacement was one of the most visible effects of the armed conflicts, both in terms of population displacement within the borders of their own countries (internally displaced persons, IDP) and outside the borders of their countries (refugees). The analysis of the overall situation regarding forced displacement indicates that, with the exception of certain years, during the last decade there has been a steady increase in this phenomenon as a result of armed conflicts, widespread violence and human rights abuses. In mid-2013, the UNHCR released its annual report with the data regarding forced displacement at global level for 2012, which confirmed this trend and triggered concern.⁷ The figures had reached their worst levels since the mid-nineties of the twentieth century: 45.2 million people were forcibly displaced in late 2012, of which 15.4 million were refugees and 28.8 million internally displaced persons, while almost one million were asylum seekers.⁸ According to UNHCR figures, of this total, 7.6 million people (one sixth of the total) had been forced to leave their homes due to violence in 2012, including 6.5 million who moved to other regions within their own countries and 1.1 million who crossed borders and became refugees.

Some of the severe situations of forced displacement in contexts of conflict in 2013 points to a possible continuation of this trend. For confirmation of this, one needs look no further than the evolution of situations such as Syria, the Central African Republic and the Sudanese region of Darfur. In Syria alone, as a result of the bloody war, in late 2013 the number of refugees had risen to over two million people (mostly received by neighbouring countries [Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey]),

6. UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict*, S/2013/689, November 22, 2013, <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2013/689>.
7. UNHCR, *Displacement. The New 21st Century Challenge: UNHCR Global Trends 2012*, June 2013, http://unhcr.org/globaltrends2013/UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V08_web.pdf.
8. See "Global challenge: forced displacements of people at the worst level since the 1990s" in chapter 6 (Risk scenarios for 2014).

Map 1.2. Number of people internally displaced in 2012



Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Global Overview 2012. People internally displaced by conflict and violence*, IDMC, April 2013

while the figure of forced internal displacement had risen to 6.5 million people. Along with abandoning their homes, the displaced population was affected by the traumas of the conflict and the use of violence, by situations of vulnerability and precariousness (poor access to basic services, overcrowding, unemployment) and often were exposed to further abuse in the form of sexual violence, forced recruitment (including children), exposure to human trafficking, discrimination and assault, among other consequences.

The use of sexual violence against women as a weapon of war remained a widespread practice in the context of armed conflict, highlighting the importance of gender factors in armed conflicts and the impact these have on the civilian population.⁹ The annual report by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, on sexual violence in armed conflicts, submitted in March 2013 and covering the year 2012, confirmed the use of sexual violence as a weapon in wars such as those in Syria, the Central African Republic, Somalia and Myanmar, among many others. In 2013, sexual violence continued to be denounced in many contexts,

Throughout the last decade there has been a steady increase in forced displacement as a result of armed conflicts, widespread violence and human rights abuses

mainly against women. Civilian women faced specific challenges and problems arising from or aggravated by the armed conflicts, including their physical safety and integrity, their sexual and reproductive health and their freedom of movement, among many other aspects related to the scope of rights issues. In this sense, 72% of the armed conflicts for which gender equality data was available took place in contexts with severe gender inequalities.

Moreover, children also continued to be specifically and disproportionately affected by the conflicts. In his 12th annual report on children and armed conflict, presented in May 2013 (covering the period between January and December 2012) the UN Secretary-General warned of the unprecedented threats to children caused by the evolving nature and tactics of the armed conflicts.¹⁰ The report expressed concern on the increased vulnerability of children due to the lack of clear war fronts and identifiable opponents, as well as the increased use of terrorist tactics by some armed groups and certain methods used by the security forces. The document also expresses concern over the use of children as suicide

9. See chapter 4 (Gender).

10. General Assembly and UN Security Council, *Children and armed conflict. Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/845-S/2013/245*, May 15, 2013, <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/67/845>.

bombers and human shields; attacks against schools, with a specific impact on girls; juvenile detention for alleged links with armed groups; and the impact on children of unmanned drone strikes, among others.

A total of 46 non-state actors in 14 countries recruited or used children or carried out other serious violations of their rights, according to the list provided in the 12th annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflicts in 2012. In addition, 28 of these 46 actors are considered to be persistent offenders as they have appeared on the list for more than five consecutive years.

Close to fifty armed non-state actors in 14 countries recruited or used children or carried out other serious violations of their rights

Given the general lack of protection of the civilian population, **the annual report on the protection of civilians by the UN Secretary-General recalled that ultimately the responsibility for their protection lies with the parties to the conflict.** Even so, it also urged the UN Security Council to implement its commitments in this area through greater use of targeted measures, fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry and referral of situations to the International Criminal Court. The report also made specific recommendations to the relevant actors in relation to new weapons technology, use of explosives in populated areas, monitoring of death tolls, contacts with armed opposition groups to achieve humanitarian objectives, role of maintenance

operations, humanitarian aid access and accountability. Thus, for example, it urged states to avoid policies that prevent humanitarian actors from engaging with armed non-state actors for purposes of humanitarian aid.

More specifically, the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict echoed the strategies suggested by a number of international forums, such as the increase in political pressure by the UN Security Council, the strengthening of the sanctions framework, increased cooperation between the Council and the International Criminal Court in relation to crimes against children, support for national accountability mechanisms, the inclusion of child protection issues in peace processes and linking the UN framework on due diligence in human rights with the framework on children and armed conflicts. **In late 2013, a total of 20 actors in conflict had implemented or were implementing a total of 18 action plans to remove children from their ranks and release them.**¹¹

Moreover, among the mechanisms existing at international level to create a greater commitment to IHL, there are initiatives devised by non-governmental actors aimed at reducing violence against civilians. On the positive side in 2013, various armed groups signed Deeds of Commitment with the Swiss organisation Geneva Call promising to comply with

Table 1.2 Actors in conflict which violate children's rights, according to the UN¹²

Conflict	Recruitment and use of children	Killing and mutilation	Rape and other forms of sexual violence	Attacks on schools and hospitals
Afghanistan	-Afghan National Police, including Afghan Local Police* -Haqqani network -Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar -Taliban forces, including the Tora Bora Front, the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia and the Latif Mansur Network	-Haqqani network -Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar -Taliban forces, including the Tora Bora Front, the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia and the Latif Mansur Network	--	-Taliban forces, including the Tora Bora Front, the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia and the Latif Mansur Network
Central Africa (LRA)	-LRA	-LRA	-LRA	--
Central African Republic	-CPJP* -CPJP Fondamentale, as part of the Séléka coalition -CPSK, as part of the Séléka Coalition -FDPC -MLCJ -UFDR, as part of the Séléka coalition* -UFR, as part of the Séléka coalition	--	--	--

- Human Rights Council, *Annual Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict*, Leila Zerrougui, A/HRC/25/46, December 26, 2013, <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/HRC/25/46>.
- The information in this table has been extracted from the 12th annual report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, covering the period between January and December 2012. *The UN General Assembly and Security Council, Children and Armed Conflict. Report of the Secretary-General*, A/67/845-S/2013/245, 15 May, 2013. The list identifies the actors that recruit or use children, kill or maim children, commit rape or other forms of sexual violence against children or engage in attacks on schools and/or hospitals in contexts of armed conflict from among those included in the agenda of the UN Security Council. The report of the Secretary-General (and the table in this chapter) includes only information verified by the UN, which means that in practice there may be many more cases of perpetrators of such violations that are not reflected in the report for a number of reasons. The report also leaves out those conflicts that are not the domain of the Security Council, except the cases of Colombia and the Philippines, which although are not conflicts on the agenda of the Security Council are included in the report on another list with similar characteristics.

Conflict	Recruitment and use of children	Killing and mutilation	Rape and other forms of sexual violence	Attacks on schools and hospitals
Chad	-Army*	--	--	--
Colombia	-ELN -FARC	--	--	--
DR Congo	-Army* -FDLR -FRPI/FPJC -APCLS "Colonel Janvier" -Mai-Mai groups "Lafontaine" and former elements of PARECO -Mai Mai group "Tawimbi" -M23	--	-Army* -FDLR -FRPI/FPJC -Mai Mai group Simba "Morgan" -M23	-FDLR
Iraq	-ISI/Al-Qaeda in Iraq	-ISI/Al-Qaeda in Iraq	--	-ISI/Al-Qaeda in Iraq
Mali	-Ansar Dine -MNLA -MUJAO		-Ansar Dine -MNLA -MUJAO	
Myanmar	-DKBA -KIA -KNLA** -Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council -KA** -SSA-S -Tatmadaw Kyi, including integrated border guard forces ** -UWSA	--	--	--
Philippines (NPA)	-NPA	--	--	--
Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf)	-Abu Sayyaf	--	--	--
Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)	-MILF	--	--	--
Somalia	-Al-Shabaab -Army*	-Al-Shabaab -Army*	--	--
South Sudan	-SPLA*	-SPLA*	--	--
Sudan	-Government forces, including the Armed Forces, the Popular Defence Forces, the Sudan police forces (Border Intelligence Forces and Central Reserve Police) -JEM -Pro-Government militias -Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid -Sudan Liberation Army/Historical Leadership -Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi -Sudan Liberation Army/Mother Wing (Abu Gasim) -Sudan Liberation Army/Unity -SPLM-N	--	--	--
Syria	-Free Syrian Army	-Government forces, including the Armed Forces, the intelligence forces and the <i>shabbiha</i> militia	-Government forces, including the Armed Forces, the intelligence forces and the <i>shabbiha</i> militia	-Government forces, including the Armed Forces, the intelligence forces and the <i>shabbiha</i> militia
Yemen	-Al-Houthi -Ansar Al-Sharia -Government forces, including the Armed Forces, the First Armoured Division, the military police, the special security forces, the Republican Guards and pro-Government militias	--	--	--

- Appearing in bold are the actors who have appeared for more than five consecutive years in the annexes to the annual reports of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, and are therefore considered to be persistent perpetrators.

- Those actors that have agreed an action plan with the United Nations are indicated by the symbol *.

- Those actors that have sought to agree an action plan with the United Nations but have been prevented from doing so by the relevant government are indicated with the symbol **.

various humanitarian regulations.¹³ Thus, the KNU/KNLA insurgency in Myanmar vowed to ban the use of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict and to eliminate gender discrimination, as well as reaching an agreement on the protection of children. The Sudanese SPLM-N group signed the deed of commitment of adherence for a total ban on anti-personnel mines and for cooperation in mine action. The Kurdish armed group PKK signed the Deed of Commitment to protect children from the effects of armed conflicts. In turn, the Indian group ZRO signed the deed of commitment prohibiting sexual violence. By signing them, the groups undertook to implement the agreements and to allow external verification of their fulfilment.

Lastly, in 2013 the complexity of the extent of the armed political violence and the role of factors linked to crime or inter-community violence in armed conflicts was once again brought to the fore. In various war contexts it was not always easy to determine authorship of violent acts, such as in north-east India, southern Thailand, the Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), the Central African Republic and the republics of the North Caucasus, among others. Furthermore, in many cases criminal strategies by armed groups to obtain resources may end up becoming an end in themselves, which dilutes or merges with other policy objectives, as in the case of the LRA in the Central African region, various armed groups in the Sahel and southern Libya, among others. In any case, it should be noted that **only one of every 10 deaths per year caused by lethal violent acts occurs in situations of armed conflict** or terrorist attacks.¹⁴ Of the 14 countries with an average annual rate of more than 30 violent deaths per 100,000 people between 2004 and 2009, only six suffered from armed conflicts.¹⁵

b) Regional trends

In **Africa** the trend in recent years for **high complexity in the disputes, both in relation to their actors and their internationalisation**, continued. As regards complexity, it is worth noting the high number of armed actors and their degree of fragmentation. In most cases there were numerous armed groups actively involved in the hostilities, especially due to the presence of militias of various kinds, splinter groups of armed groups, the active participation of the armed forces of neighbouring countries and the participation of international missions in combat operations. During 2013, notable was the devastating 2013 crisis in the Central African Republic,

which saw an important role being taken by the militias, with serious clashes between the armed Séléka coalition (which took power in March) and newly-created self-defence militias opposing Séléka, the “anti-balaka” militias. Countries such as DR Congo, Sudan (Darfur) and Somalia also continued to pose complex challenges due to the number of insurgent actors and their high degree of fragmentation. Disputes such as those involving the cross-border groups LRA and AQIM caused the military mobilisation of a large number of countries to varying degrees (DR Congo, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Uganda, in the case of the LRA; and Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania in the case of AQIM). In turn, the high degree of internationalisation of the conflicts (10 internationalised internal conflicts in Africa, one international conflict and two internal conflicts) was linked, as in previous years, to the direct or covert intervention of neighbouring countries; the presence of foreign groups and their participation in hostilities; the expansion of the scope of action of initially locally-based armed groups to neighbouring countries in the region; and active participation in combat by peacekeeping missions and other international forces. During 2013, highly notable was the expansion of the actions of al-Shabaab to outside Somali territory, following its serious attack in Kenya (70 fatalities), as well as the internationalisation of armed Islamist groups operating in North Africa (e.g. AQIM actions in the region, the merger of the group Signatories in Blood, supposedly an affiliate of AQIM in Algeria, with MUJAO, a group with bases mainly in Mali). In addition, there are more general factors of logistical, financial and political support to local insurgencies by foreign countries, such as the support by Rwanda of the uprising led by the armed group M23 in DR Congo (which was defeated in late 2013).

As for the causes, **more than two thirds of the conflicts (nine cases) were linked to the opposition to the government or the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state**. Regarding the first element, six cases involved insurgencies fighting the government in order to achieve its fall or the erosion of its power. In one such case, the Central African Republic, the Séléka insurgency even managed to overthrow the government, while in DR Congo the armed coalition M23 was defeated. With respect to the second point, aspirations of bringing about a change to the system were present in four cases: Algeria (AQIM), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Mali (north) and Somalia. In all these cases, there was fighting by groups interested in establishing stricter versions of Islamic law or establishing an Islamic state.

13. The Deeds of Commitment are a mechanism devised by the Swiss organisation Geneva Call to promote compliance with international humanitarian law by armed non-state actors since, as they cannot be signatories to international treaties, they sometimes do not feel bound by international regulations or are unaware of them. More information at <http://www.genevacall.org/>.

14. The figure of 526,000 deaths per year is an average obtained from the toll of victims during the 2004-2009 period. Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, *The Global Burden of Violence: Lethal Encounters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

15. According to data of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, the 14 countries with an average annual level of more than 30 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants between 2004 and 2009 were: El Salvador, Iraq, Jamaica, Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Sudan, Belize and DR Congo. Of these countries, six were immersed in armed conflicts in 2009, according to data and definitions of the Escola de Cultura de Pau: Iraq, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Central African Republic, Sudan and DR Congo. Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, *The Global Burden of Violence: Lethal Encounters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2010! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peacebuilding*. (Barcelona: Icaria, January, 2010).

In 2013, despite the withdrawal of some Islamist groups in northern Mali with respect to 2012, the latter continued to participate in clashes with the state; while in Nigeria, the Boko Haram group advanced positions, with a serious escalation of its attacks. In addition, in six cases the root causes were identity or self-government demands (Ethiopia [Ogaden], Mali [north], DR Congo [east], Sudan [Darfur], Sudan [South Kordofan and Blue Nile], South Sudan). Furthermore, in another five cases (Central Africa [LRA], DR Congo [east], Sudan [Darfur], Sudan [South Kordofan and Blue Nile] and South Sudan) the struggle for control of resources was one of the main causes of the conflict, with this also being a factor that influenced the majority of the disputes.

As regards intensity, **half of the most intense armed conflicts in 2013 were concentrated in Africa** (Nigeria [Boko Haram], the Central African Republic, DR Congo [east], Somalia and South Sudan). All of these conflicts were a major concern during the year, with the serious deterioration of the humanitarian situation and human rights in the Central African Republic being particularly notable. Finally, the average duration of conflicts in the region was 10.5 years, well below the world average of 17.1 years. Nine of the 13 conflicts had started (or restarted) in the XXI century. The two longest running conflicts (the one linked to the Ugandan group LRA and the Somali conflict) continued with little expectation of a resolution, although in the case of the LRA, the government of the Central African Republic announced in November 2013 that talks were being held with the historical leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, to encourage his surrender, in parallel with military pressure being exerted by AU forces on the group.

Asia continued to be characterised by its large number of identity disputes, as well as by the widespread presence of long-term disputes. With respect to the underlying causes, almost two thirds of the conflict (seven cases) were linked to identity and self-government demands by certain cultural groups and minorities, whether claiming greater autonomy, independence or recognition of collective rights. Despite the complexity of these conflicts, there were positive developments during 2013, such as the reduction of violence between the Myanmar army and the various ethnic groups as a result of the various negotiation processes, although with risks of a setback at the end of the year. There were also advances in negotiations and a reduction of violence in India (Assam), and the conflict surrounding the secessionist demands of the armed groups in southern Thailand saw the start of peace talks in 2013. It should be recalled that one of the main identity conflicts in Asia in recent decades, pitting the Philippines against the armed group Moro MILF, ended the previous year (in 2012). Among the main causes of a further five cases were aspirations of bringing about a change to the system, whether for religious reasons (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Philippines [Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf]) or for socio-economic and political reasons (India [CPI-M], the Philippines [NPA]). As with other continents,

factors relating to resources aggravated the conflicts and continued to play a very significant role in the case of Pakistan (Balochistan).

Conflicts in the Asian continent had an average duration of 28.5 years, the highest in the world and well above the global average of 17.1 years, which is an indicator of the difficulties in resolving these conflicts. The region continued to be host to some of the longest running insurgencies, with groups active since the forties (various insurgencies in Myanmar) and sixties (the CPI-M in India and the NPA in the Philippines). Behind the long-term nature of these conflicts lie factors such as the difficulty of resolving disputes related to identity, self-determination and state formation. In addition, the continent has a lower presence of international actors in the area of facilitation and mediation tasks, which could be a factor making it difficult to build bridges towards dialogue and negotiation in some of these conflicts and, therefore, diminishes the chances of their resolution.

More than half of the disputes (six cases) were internal, while five conflicts had a significant internationalised dimension (Afghanistan, India [Jammu and Kashmir and Assam], Pakistan and the Philippines [Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf]). Among the other internationalisation elements, highly notable during 2013 were the US drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan, although there was a drastic reduction in the civilian casualties due to these bombings; as well as the NATO attacks in Afghanistan, including a bombing in February that took the lives of 13 people, mostly women and children. Similarly, the armed conflict in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India was affected by the deterioration of relations between the governments of India and Pakistan.

In terms of intensity, **Asia was host to a third of the planet's most violent conflicts (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Pakistan [Balochistan]) although more than half of the disputes in the region (six cases) had low levels of violence**. During 2013, particularly alarming was the increase in civilian deaths in Afghanistan, especially of women and children. Also very severe was the use of terrorist attacks in various conflicts, which caused many deaths, such as in Pakistan.

Moreover, some countries were host to a number of different armed conflicts within their borders, such as India, the Philippines and Pakistan. Some of the conflicts on the continent also had a large number of actors, such as the conflicts in north-east India, Myanmar and Pakistan, among others. In turn, beyond the terrorist label which practically all governments apply to their respective armed opposition groups, it should be noted that in some cases (such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India [Jammu and Kashmir] and the Philippines [Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf]) the governments closely align their counter-insurgency strategies with the so-called global war on terror, from which they derive their political legitimacy and, in some cases, economic and military support.

As for conflicts in other continents, **America** continued to be the scene of one of the longest running conflicts in the world, the conflict between the FARC and ELN insurgencies and the Colombian state, which involves armed paramilitary actors. This is also a conflict that has had a high cumulative impact on the civilian population, including forced displacement. In 2013, the conflict took place alongside formal negotiations with the FARC, initiated in 2012, and exploratory contacts with the ELN. As regards **Europe**, this continent continued to be host to several low intensity armed conflicts in Russia (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria), that mostly emerged only recently and are mostly linked to demands for a system change by interconnected Islamist insurgencies, aspiring to create an Islamic emirate in the area. Due to the pattern in recent years of a sustained reduction in violence in the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia, both contexts were no longer considered armed conflicts at the end of 2013, although they continued to face other challenges, such as the serious human rights abuses in Chechnya. In contrast to the fragmentation of the armed groups in the North Caucasus, the other active armed conflict on the continent, pitting Turkey against the armed Kurdish group PKK, involves a very unified insurgency with a large warfare capability, largely motivated by identity and self-government demands. The armed conflict in south-east Turkey is the oldest on the continent (30 years). During 2013, high expectations were created regarding progress towards its resolution in the first half of the year, with a ceasefire and the start of the withdrawal of guerrillas, which was followed by serious setbacks in the second half. The internationalised dimension of this conflict increased in 2013, against a backdrop of turmoil in Syria, where the organisation that is considered to be a branch of the PKK in Syria, the PYD, began a self-government process in the Kurdish areas under its control.

Finally, **the Middle East was the scene of the most serious armed conflict in recent years: the war in Syria**, which kept the continent in the international spotlight and at the centre of an international dilemma on how to enforce compliance with human rights, international humanitarian law and the principle of the responsibility to protect. In turn, the case of Syria highlighted the complexity of tackling crises involving high-stake conflicting outside interests, as well as regional destabilisation as a result of locally-based crises. Two of the 10 high-intensity wars took place in this region: Syria and Iraq, both with devastating effects that were far greater than other high-intensity conflicts on other

continents. Thus, in late 2013 the conflict in Syria had run up between 100,000 and 120,000 deaths since the start of the war in 2011, as well as 2.4 million refugees and 6.5 million internally displaced persons. And in the case of Iraq, the number of deaths in 2012 doubled and the levels of violence seen in 2008 were repeated, with about 9,500 deaths in 2013 according to some sources. Another two of the total five conflicts affecting the region were low intensity conflicts (Israel-Palestine and Yemen [Houthists]) and one other was a medium intensity conflict (Yemen [AQAP]). In the latter case, there was a reduction in violence in 2013.

Regarding the causes, opposition to the government and the system was one of the key drivers in almost all conflicts (four cases). Notable in 2013 was the proliferation of actors motivated by Islamist and Jihadist aspirations, especially in the wake of the war in Syria, where it was estimated that almost half of the rebel forces were made up of Islamist hardliners or Jihadists. In northern Yemen, in 2013 particularly troubling were the clashes between Houthists and armed sectors linked to Salafist groups.

Similarly, most of the disputes displayed a high degree of internationalisation, mainly due to the involvement of external countries or foreign non-state actors in local conflicts (such as Hezbollah, foreign fighters and regional groups such as ISIS in Syria) and external support for the opposing sides in the same country, or US air strikes against the AQAP group in Yemen.

c) Arms embargoes

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council can take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security, ranging from economic sanctions or other of another sort, to international military intervention.¹⁶ The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to put pressure on a state or body to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force.¹⁷ The sanctions may be economic and commercial, in a broad sense; or more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial or diplomatic restrictions, or a combination of both targeted and general sanctions. UN arms embargoes are imposed by resolutions adopted under Article 41 of Chapter VII of its Charter. At least nine of the 15 Member States of the UN Security Council must support the resolution, and none of the permanent members (USA, Russia, China, France and the UK) can veto it. There

16. UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees>.

17. Sanctions, specifically arms embargoes, have been used in an unequal way since the creation of the United Nations. Between 1945 and 1989, they were only used in two contexts, linked to the decolonisation processes in what used to be Southern Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe) between 1968 to 1979 (due to internal instability); and in South Africa between 1977 and 1994 (due to the South African intervention in neighbouring countries, the violence and internal instability and the racial discrimination system of apartheid). The limited use of these tools during the Cold War was framed, like other instruments of the United Nations, within the policy of competition between blocks. As such the end of the Cold War meant, as in other areas, a growing activism of the organisation in this field, facilitating the imposition of arms embargoes. Their use also facilitated the strengthening of the role of the United Nations as a guarantee of peace and international security. Arms embargoes were also progressively seen as a kind of sanction that was more effective than economic sanctions, as they centred on the elites of states and on non-state armed groups, limiting their humanitarian impact.

Table 1.3. Arms embargoes by the United Nations, EU, OSCE and the Arab League in 2013

Country*	Coming into effect	Country	Coming into effect
Embargoes declared by the United Nations (13)		Embargoes declared by the EU (21)	
Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities, Taliban militias**	2002	Al-Qaeda and Taliban militias**	2002
		Belarus	2011
Central African Republic	2013	Central African Republic	2013
Côte d'Ivoire	2004	China	1989
DPR Korea	2006	Côte d'Ivoire	2004
DR Congo (except the Government)	2003	DPR Korea	2006
Eritrea	2009	DR Congo (except the Government)	2003
Iran	2006	Egipt	2013
Iraq (except the Government since 2004)	1990	Eritrea	2010
Lebanon (except the Government)	2006	Guinea	2009
Liberia (except the Government since 2009)	1992	Iran	2007
Libya	2011	Iraq (except the Government since desde 2004)	1990
Somalia (except the Government)	1992	Lebanon (except the Government)	2006
Sudan (Darfur) (except the Government)	2004	Liberia (except the Government since 2008)	2001
		Libya	2011
Embargoes declared by the Arab League (1)		Myanmar	1991
Syria	2011	Somalia	2002
Embargoes declared by the OSCE (1)		South Sudan	2011
Armenia - Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1992	Sudan	1994
		Syria	2011
		Zimbabwe	2002

* In bold, country or group in armed conflict subject to embargo.

** Embargo not linked to a specific country or territory.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2013* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). European Commission, Website, http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm.

are two types of Security Council embargoes: voluntary and mandatory. UN Member States must comply with mandatory arms embargoes.

This section refers only to arms embargoes imposed, or in force, by international organisations, and does not include embargoes and sanctions unilaterally imposed by states. In addition to the UN, organisations such as the Arab League and the EU also establish binding arms embargoes for the Member States of their own organisations, which in some cases mimic the implementation of arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations (such as the arms embargo imposed on the Central African Republic in 2013) and in other cases are a result of their own initiatives, such as the measures taken against Syria in 2011 by the EU. EU embargoes are imposed by means of Common Positions adopted unanimously by the EU Council in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the case of the OSCE, the embargoes are voluntary.

12 countries and the organisation al-Qaeda (and the entities and individuals associated with it, such as the Taliban militias) were subject to arms embargoes by the UN Security Council in 2013. In six of these countries, the embargoes only affected various non-state actors, and not the government. The EU imposed 21 embargoes on 20 countries, as well as on al-Qaeda and the Taliban militias, which were subject to **21 arms embargoes**. In four of these countries, in addition to al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces, the embargo only affected non-state actors. The **Arab League** maintained its arms embargo on **Syria** imposed in 2011 and the **OSCE** did the same with the voluntary arms embargo hanging over **Armenia and Azerbaijan** in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. In total, adding up the embargoes imposed by the various organisations, in 2013 **36 arms embargoes were recorded against a total of 23 states and non-state armed groups**,¹⁸ three more than the previous year, due to the fact that the **UN Security Council and the EU imposed an arms embargo in December on the**

18. Among these embargoes, there exists a voluntary arms embargo, imposed by the OSCE on Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1992.

Central African Republic as a result of the escalation of violence in 2013 and especially in December of that year. Furthermore, **due to the severity of the situation in Egypt, the EU also declared an arms embargo** against this country, although in this case, unlike the rest, this is a political undertaking that is not legally binding. The UN Security Council declined to state its position on this issue, due to internal dissensions among the permanent members of the Council, nor did it wish to comment on a possible arms embargo against Syria, which the Arab League and the EU themselves did establish. However, **in June the EU lifted a large part of the arms embargo imposed on Syria.**

It should be noted that 12 of the 21 embargoes established by the EU were a result of the implementation of the UN Security Council embargoes.¹⁹ The remaining nine were European initiatives: Belarus, China, Egypt, Guinea, Myanmar, Syria, Sudan, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.²⁰

Of the 23 states and non-state armed groups identified by the UN, the EU, the Arab League and the OSCE, **nine were related to armed conflicts active in 2013** (Libya, Myanmar, the Central African Republic, Syria, Sudan [Darfur] and South Sudan and armed groups in Iraq, Somalia and DR Congo). It should be noted here **the embargo against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces**, but although a large part of both of these organisations may be located in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the arms embargo does not correspond to any particular territory, according to resolution 1390. **Of the other 13 embargoes, 12 were targeted at countries that are a focus of socio-political crises** of varying intensity (Armenia-Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Guinea, Lebanon, DPR Korea, Sudan and Zimbabwe). **Liberia** is the only country which, despite having overcome various armed conflicts (1989-1996, 1999-2003) and while not experiencing socio-political crises at present, is still under an embargo. **In conclusion, of the 35 active armed conflicts in 2013, there were 26 cases in which neither the UN Security Council, the EU, the Arab League nor the OSCE raised the possibility of imposing an arms embargo as a punitive measure.** Furthermore, of the current 99 cases of socio-political crisis, **there were 87 cases of varying intensity that were not subject to embargoes** in which, in many cases, the preventive nature of arms embargoes could reduce the violence.

There were 26 active armed conflicts and 87 cases of socio-political crisis in 2013 in which neither the UN Security Council, the EU, the Arab League nor the OSCE raised the possibility of imposing an arms embargo as a punitive measure

d) International missions

Another dimension worthy of note in relation to the global conflict during 2013 concerns international missions and their impact on contexts of conflict and socio-political crises. **During 2013, 29 UN missions were recorded worldwide**, including 15 UN peacekeeping operations, one political mission directed and supported by the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, and 13 political peace-building operations supported by the UN Department of Political Affairs. With regard to the regional perspective, of the 29 UN missions during 2013, more than half (17) were in Africa, with six in the Middle East, three in Asia, two in Europe and one in America. Moreover, alongside the United Nations, it is worth noting the participation of other regional organisations in military, political and peace-building tasks, such as the EU (17 missions in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East), the OSCE (16 missions in the European and Central Asian area), NATO (five missions in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East), the AU (three missions in Africa), ECOWAS (two missions in Africa), ECCAS (one mission in Africa), OAS (three missions in America), the CIS (one mission in Europe), and six multilateral operations under the umbrella of countries or groups of countries, which gives a total of 83 international missions

during 2013, unchanged from the previous year. **Of the 83 missions, five finished in 2013:** UNPOS (Somalia), EUJUST LEX/Iraq (Iraq), MISMA (Mali), MICOPAX (Central African Republic) and ISF (Timor-Leste).²¹

Therefore, from a regional perspective, if we combine the UN presence and the presence of the remaining regional organisations, Africa was the continent with the largest number of active international missions during 2013 (35, with Africa being the only one where the number of missions increased), followed by Europe (20), Asia (13), the Middle East (11) and America (4). These figures show that since the late nineties of the twentieth century Africa has become the laboratory of ideas of the international community in the field of peace, human rights, development cooperation and international security since the end of the Cold War, with a steady increase that is not without its critics.

It should be noted, however, that more than **half of the interventions on the African continent had a clear political-military dimension, while in the rest of the**

19. In the case of Sudan, the EU established the embargo for the whole of the country in 1994, and the UN Security Council for the region of Darfur in 2004, in addition to the arms embargo on South Sudan in 2011. In the case of Iran the embargoes established by both organisations apply to different types of armaments.

20. Not included are those countries upon which other types of sanctions have been placed, such as the freezing of funds and other economic resources, entrance restrictions, and travel bans on some citizens, such as the cases of Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Moldova and Tunisia. European Commission, Restrictive measures in force (Article 215 TFEU), January 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf.

21. It should also be noted that the UNMIT mission in Timor-Leste came to an end, although as it finished on 31 December 2012 it is not used to calculate the total balance of missions during the year.

Table 1.4. International missions of 2013*

UN (29)	EU (17)	OSCE (16)
Afghanistan (UNAMA) -2002-	Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) -2002-	Albania (OSCE Presence in Albania) -1997-
Burundi (BNUB) -2011-	Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA)-2004-	Armenia (OSCE Office in Yerevan) -2000-
Central Africa (UNOCA) -2011-	DR Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) -2007-	Azerbaijan (OSCE Office in Baku) -2000-
Central African Republic (BINUCA) -2009-	DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) -2005-	Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (Personal Representative for the Minsk Conference) -1995-
Central Asia (UNRCCA) -2007-	Georgia (EUMM Georgia) -2008-	Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina) -1995-
Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) -2004-	Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR) -2012-	Kazakhstan (OSCE Centre in Astana) -1998-
Cyprus (UNFICYP) -1964-	<i>Iraq (EUJUST Lex Iraq) -2005-2013</i>	Kosovo (OMIK, OSCE Mission in Kosovo) -1996-
DR Congo (MONUSCO) -1999/2010-	Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) -2008-	Kyrgyzstan (OSCE Centre in Bishkek) -1999-
<i>East Timor (UNMIT) -2006-2012-</i>	Libya (EUBAM Libya) -2013-	Macedonia, FYR (OSCE Mission to Skopje) -1992-
Golan Heights (UNDOF) -1974-	Mali (EUTM Mali) -2013-	Moldova (OSCE Mission to Moldova) -1993-
Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) -2010-	Moldova – Ukraine (EUBAM) -2005-	Montenegro (OSCE Mission to Montenegro) -2006-
Haiti (MINUSTAH) -2004-	Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger) -2012-	Serbia (OSCE Mission to Serbia) -2006-
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) -1949-	Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah) -2005-	Tajikistan (OSCE Office in Tajikistan) -1994-
Iraq (UNAMI) -2003-	Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) -2006-	Turkmenistan (OSCE Centre in Ashgabat) -1999-
Israel-Palestine (UNSCO) -1994-	Somalia (EUNAVFOR Somalia) -2008-	Ukraine (OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine) -1999-
Kosovo (UNMIK) -1999-	Somalia (EUTM Somalia) -2010-	Uzbekistan (OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan) -2006-
Lebanon (UNIFIL) -1978/2006-	South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan) -2012-	CIS (1)
Lebanon (USCOL) -2007-	NATO (5)	Moldova (Transdniestria) -1992-
Liberia (UNMIL) -2003-	Afghanistan (ISAF) -2001-	ECCAS (1)
Libya (UNSMIL) -2011-	Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden (Operation Ocean Shield) -2009-	<i>Central African Republic (MICOPAX) -2008-2013-</i>
Mali (north) (Minusma) -2013-	Kosovo (KFOR) -1999-	
Middle East (UNTSO) -1948-	Somalia (NATO assistance to the AMISOM) -2007-	OAS (3)
Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) -2008-	The Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour) -2001-	Belize-Guatemala (OAS/AZ Office) -2003-
<i>Somalia (UNPOS) -1995-2013-</i>		Colombia (MAPP OEA) -2004-
Somalia (UNSOM) -2013-	AU (3)	Colombia (MIB OEA) -2008-
	Central Africa (LRA) (Regional Co-operation Initiative against the LRA, ICR/LRA) -2012-	Other missions (6)
Sudan – South Sudan (UNISFA) -2011-	Central African Republic (MISCA) -2013-	Côte d'Ivoire (Operation Licorne, France) -2003-
Sudan (Darfur) (UNAMID) -2007-	Somalia (AMISOM) -2007-	DPR Korea and Rep. Korea (NSC) -1953-
South Sudan (UNMISS) -2009-	ECOWAS (2)	<i>East Timor (ISF, Australia) -2006-2013</i>
Western Sahara (MINURSO) -1991-	Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) -2012-	Egypt and Israel -1982-
West Africa (UNOWA) -2001-	<i>Mali (AFISMA) -2013-</i>	Hebron, Palestine (TPIH 2) -1997-
		The Solomon Islands (RAMSI) -2003-

* Starting year of the mission included. Missions completed during 2013 are shown in italics. The UNMIT mission is included, which ended on 31 December 2012, although it is not used to calculate the total balance of missions during the year.

world interventions of a civil and policing character prevailed, except in Haiti, Afghanistan, India-Pakistan, Cyprus, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Transdniestria and the Middle East. The clearest example of an intervention with a clear offensive mandate was DR Congo, with the creation of the UN force intervention brigade in support of MONUSCO, which drove the rebels of the armed

Congolese group M23 into Uganda. Other examples of military interventions were Mali, Somalia, Central Africa (LRA) and the Central African Republic.

In this sense, the growing application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter in designing UN peacekeeping missions is leading to greater participation in contexts of

violence, with a mandate that increasingly involves the use of force offensively rather than defensively. These missions, with a multidimensional character, are deployed in increasingly violent contexts, with increasingly complex mandates and agendas, as evidenced by the fact that the average death toll of soldiers from UN missions has multiplied since the end of the Cold War, rising from 866 in 1991 to 3,190 at the end of 2013, with an annual average of 105 peacekeepers killed during this period, five times the annual average of 20 peacekeepers killed in the previous period between 1948 and 1991.

The average annual number of peacekeepers killed has increased fivefold between the periods 1948-1991 and 1991-2014, highlighting the complexity of the contexts and the increase in offensive operations

Five missions ended their activities in 2013.²² Firstly, worthy of note is the closure in May 2013 of the United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS), present in the country since 1995, and its replacement in June with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), which has as one of its main functions to provide political advice to the Federal Government and to AMISOM on matters of governance, security sector reform, rule of law, development of the federal system (including preparations for the holding of elections in 2016) and coordination of support from donor countries. Furthermore, the European mission EUJUST LEX/Iraq, present in the country since 2005 in tasks of training Iraqi officials, completed its mandate in December 2013. The mission of the organisation ECOWAS in Mali (MISMA) also completed its mandate. The said mission was created in December 2012 to tackle the threat to regional peace and security caused by the proclamation of the Islamic State of Azawad in the north and the advancement of the Tuareg and Islamist rebellion, although the slowness in executing the deployment and concern for the defence of its interests in the area led France to conduct a military operation with the approval of the government of Mali to slow the progress of the insurgency. The MISMA mission was replaced by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July.²³ Finally, also noteworthy is the end of the ISF mission in Timor-Leste, led by Australia, and present in the country since 2006. Besides those already mentioned, also notable was the launch in May of the European mission EUBAM

Globally, the UN peacekeeping missions were composed of 118,634 troops, slightly higher than the 2012 figure

Libya whose mandate is to support the Libyan authorities in the improvement and development of security along its borders.

In 2012, new developments as regards the role of the international community in the field of peace-building were concentrated particularly in Syria and Mali, and to a lesser extent Niger, Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan and the Central Africa region where the LRA armed group operates (South Sudan, the Central African Republic and DR Congo), locations where new peacekeeping operations were established. In 2013, the Central African Republic was the main focus of new military operations, criticisms and slowness on the part of the international community in responding to situations that threaten peace and international security.

At global level, UN peacekeeping missions involved 118,634 uniformed personnel,²⁴ slightly higher than the 2012 figure, slowing the downward trend started in 2010 when they reached 124,000 troops (September of that year). From June 1999 (when the lowest figure was reached since the end of the Cold War with 13,000 Blue Helmets) to 2010, the increase in the number of peacekeepers had been constant. If we add to this figure the 3,810 uniformed personnel from the UN political and peace-building missions, the total number of troops on UN missions amounted to 122.444.

This figure should be added to the contingents from NATO (around 100,000 troops, according to the organisation itself),²⁵ EU (more than 5,000 personnel including police, military and civilian personnel on its 17 missions),²⁶ CIS (1,140 uniformed personnel in Transnistria), ECCAS (MICOPAX, 391 in the Central African Republic), AU (3,650 in MISCA, 17,700 in AMISOM and about 5,000 in the ICR/LRA), ECOWAS (665), OSCE (320) and six other operations in various countries (over 3,000).²⁷

In total, overall, **the number of troops on international missions exceeded 259,000 deployed worldwide**, excluding civilian personnel accompanying missions that are not UN missions, a figure which is only partially known. This figure is significantly

22. On 31 December 2012, the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), completed its mandate which began in 2006, ending the continued UN presence in the country since the referendum for self-determination of Timor-Leste in 1999.

23. Some analysts pointed out that MINUSMA arose from a particular interpretation of the meaning of peacekeeping, since in the case of Mali no agreement exists that is subject to implementation guarantees.

24. The figures correspond to 30 November 2013. Of the total, 98,200 correspond to military and police personnel, and 3.81% of this figure (3,753 military and police) are women, representing a slight increase over the 2012 percentage, which stood at 3.74 % (3,521 military and police personnel). In 2011 that figure stood at 3.76%, and at 3.33% in 2010. Data as of 8 January 2014. United Nations, www.un.org.

25. Data consulted on January 10, 2014. NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-4BDA48D6-BA415112/natolive/topics_52060.htm.

26. Data consulted on January 10, 2014. EU, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm.

27. As regards the figures for troops of the CIS, the ECCAS and the six other operations in various countries, this report has used the latest figures available from the SIPRI Yearbook 2013, which refers to the figures available for 2012. These data were supplemented with information from the various regional organisations, but in some cases no data were available, and in other cases they are estimates, so should be taken with caution.

lower than the estimated figure for 2012, which was around 281,000 troops, due to the significant reduction in ISAF troops in Afghanistan in the past two years (the NATO mission fell by 29,000 between 2011 and 2012, and by another 50,000 troops by the end of 2013 to reach 52,000 troops, as part of the troop reduction and transfer of responsibilities of the mission to the Afghan army, as agreed between the USA and Afghanistan). This figure is also much lower than 2011, when it reached 327,000 troops. In that year, the end of the operation in Iraq, which was brought to a close in December 2011 and which at that time had 39,000 troops in the country, was the main factor in reducing the overall figure.

1.3. Armed conflicts: annual evolution

Africa

a) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Burundi	
Start:	2011
Type:	Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, FNL
Intensity:	1
Trend:	End

Summary:

The process of political and institutional transition that got under way with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000 was formally completed in 2005. The approval of a new constitution that formalises the distribution of political and military power between the main two communities, the Hutu and Tutsi, and the holding of elections, leading to the formation of a new government, represent an attempt to lay the foundations for overcoming a conflict that began in 1993, constituting the principal opportunity for ending the ethnic-political violence that has plagued the country since its independence in 1962. Nevertheless, mistrust remains between the political parties and power struggles continue to take place within the CNDD-FDD ruling party, and between the government and the political opposition. Added to this situation of tension, there is the positive challenge of incorporating the last armed group in the country, the FNL, which has renounced violence and joined the political fray. However, the 2010 elections, branded as fraudulent by the opposition, meant an impasse that could provoke a regression in the country due to the reconfiguration of one part of the rebel force around its historic leader, Agathon Rwasa.

The absence of acts of violence since 2012, progress in the domestic political situation and the return of the main opposition leaders to the country led to the end of the armed conflict in Burundi. There remained the issue of the integration of the FNL combatants into MONUSCO's DDRRR programme (disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement), with the former still being stationed in the province of South

Kivu in the east of DR Congo, which is a cause of instability. A few remaining sections of the FNL did not demobilised and were not integrated into the Burundian armed forces after the peace agreements of 2006 and the renunciation of the armed struggle in 2009, returning to their armed struggle following the 2010 elections. These groups are active within the framework of alliances with the Congolese Mai Mai Yakutumba militia and the Rwandan Hutu FDLR militias.

Thus, the return in August of the historical leader of the FNL rebellion, Agathon Rwasa, after a three-year absence, was seen by the international community as a decisive step towards consolidating peace in the country. His reappearance is part of the process initiated in March by the UN Office in the country (BNUB) and the Burundian political class ahead of the general elections in 2015, to ensure that they are conducted in a climate of stability. One of the conditions was the return of all of the exiled party leaders, who returned in March, with the exception of Rwasa. However, an indication of the fragility of the situation was the announcement of an investigation to determine the role of Rwasa in the Gatumba slaughter in 2004. Some sectors denounced the political overtones of the investigation, according to several analysts.

The primary flashpoints were caused by the announcement that President Nkurunziza would be able to stand for a third term and, particularly, by the proposal to amend the constitution, which led to resounding opposition and the mobilisation of civil society. The ruling party, the CNDD-FDD, announced that Nkurunziza could stand for a third term, since the constitution apparently does not prevent this (should he win the elections in 2015 it would be his second election victory, since prior to the elections in 2010 his presidency was the result of a political agreement). In parallel, in mid-November, the draft of the new constitution was submitted to the National Assembly despite widespread opposition to the proposal. Given the escalating tensions, the National Assembly (dominated by the CNDD-FDD) decided to hold consultations with civil society and the opposition on 19th and 20th December, in order to discuss possible revisions to the draft of the constitution. A major opposition leader, former vice-president Frédéric Bamvuginyumvira, from the FRODEBU party, was arrested on 5th December on charges of corruption, just days before an important meeting of all political opponents, which was then cancelled. The said reform aims to strengthen the executive and modify the delicate balance of power that exists between the Hutu community (the majority group in the country) and the Tutsi minority, which was enshrined in the Arusha Agreement in 2000, laying the foundations for peace in the country, according to many analysts. The Burundian Episcopal Conference warned that should such a wide-ranging constitutional review be made without a consensus or dialogue, it risked compromising the peace and reconciliation, and requested that the majority of the changes be postponed

until after the 2015 elections. The CNDD-FDD's main proposals were to replace the two vice-presidents, who currently have equal power and respect the ethnic balance, with a symbolic vice-president and a powerful prime minister; to replace the current two-thirds majority required for the approval laws in Parliament with a simple majority; to place a ban on forming unions and the right to strike for judges and security forces; and to restrict parliamentary representation to parties with more than 5% of the vote.

Central Africa (LRA) ²⁸	
Start:	1986
Type:	Resources ²⁹ International
Main parties:	AU Regional Task Force (RTF, comprising Ugandan, Congolese and Southern Sudanese armed forces), self-defence militias from DR Congo and South Sudan, LRA
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The opposition armed group LRA, moved by the religious messianism of its leader, Joseph Kony, was created in 1986 with the aim of overthrowing the government of Uganda, introducing a regime based on the Ten Commandments of the Bible and releasing the northern region of the country from its marginalisation. The violence and insecurity caused by the attacks of the LRA against the civil population, the kidnapping of minors to add to its ranks (about 25,000 since the beginning of the conflict) and the confrontations between the armed group and the armed forces (together with the pro-governmental militia) have led to the death of some 200,000 people and the forced displacement of some two million people at the most acute moment of the conflict. The growing military pressure carried out by the Ugandan armed forces obliged the group to take refuge first in South Sudan, later in DR Congo and finally in the Central African Republic. Thus, the LRA increased its activities in the neighbouring countries where it set up its bases, due to the inability to stop it in DR Congo, Central African Republic and the complicity of Sudan. Between 2006 in 2008, a peace process was held that managed to establish an end to hostilities, although it was a failure and in December 2008, the Ugandan, Congolese and South Sudanese armies carried out an offensive against the LRA, which caused the breaking up of the group towards the north of DR Congo, the southeast of the Central African Republic and the southwest of South Sudan, where the offensive continued. In November 2011, the AU authorised the creation of a cross-regional force composed of military contingents from these three countries, which deployed in September 2012 and has US logistical support.

LRA attacks continued in the remote border areas of the Central African Republic and DR Congo, where state and security institutions are weak or non-existent. According to the UN, a comparison of the periods between January and September 2012 and 2013 indicates that while the number of attacks declined in 2013, the number of deaths and kidnappings was higher. **According to the LRA Crisis Tracker,³⁰ during 2013 the armed group executed 75 civilians and abducted 458 people with the aim of recruiting them into their ranks and/or using them as porters.** The number of LRA members that have died in combat is unknown, and it is estimated that most of the actions took place in the south-east of the Central African Republic and in the north-east of DR Congo, in the border areas with South Sudan. An attack in South Sudan was also reported in November, after almost two years without such incidents, which could mean a return of the LRA to nearby areas. In the Central African Republic, although the LRA remains a threat to the local population in the south-eastern region, during the year the group shifted its activities to the north-east as a result of the security vacuum there, in order to avoid the operations of the AU Regional Task Force in the south-east region. Thus, attacks were reduced in the prefecture of Haut Mbomou, where the Regional Task Force is authorised to act, and increased in the mining province of Haut-Kotto, where most of the attacks were recorded. In September, the Central African authorities reported the possible surrender of between 2,000 and 4,000 suspected members of the LRA, including 500 children, in the village of Nzacko, which ultimately did not materialise.

The Central African government announced in November that it was holding talks with the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, in order to obtain his surrender. Government sources said that Kony was in the central African country and that he demanded security guarantees before surrendering. USA has received this information with skepticism. The report of the UN Secretary General on the activities of the LRA in the area stated that both the announcement of desertions and the unpredictability of the negotiation proposals (the progress of these conversations was unknown at December) could be an indication that the group feels threatened by ongoing military operations and is attempting to gain time in order to alleviate the military pressure. As noted in the same report, there is a broad consensus among military representatives and humanitarian agents regarding a general reduction in the number and intensity of attacks as a result of the military pressure being applied by the Regional Task Force, which limited the ability of the

28. This name refers to the armed conflict known as "Uganda (north)" in previous reports. Since the end of 2008, the scenario of operations in this conflict has been the border triangle with DR Congo, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. Therefore, the armed conflict is considered international, although it shares some elements included in the internationalised internal type.

29. In recent years, the demands voiced by the LRA on its emergence (Identity, Self-Government) have been watered down; the group's current objective would be mere survival (Resources).

30. The US organisations Resolve and Invisible Children created in 2012 the LRA Crisis Tracker, a mapping platform and a system for the collection of data on the actions committed by the LRA, drawing on community radio stations, local and international NGOs, governments and UN agencies. LRA Crisis Tracker Invisible Children – Resolve, <http://www.lracrisistracker.com>.

LRA, reduced the number of its attacks, the killing of civilians in general and its ability to establish bases, and increased the pressure on its fighters to desert. The modus operandi of the LRA also changed, as although it continues to maintain its chain of command, it has split into smaller units that keep a low profile and focus on conducting subsistence activities and small-scale attacks, such as sacking and looting of food and supplies, rather than kidnappings and attacks on civilians. One of the sources of funding for the LRA continues to be the illegal trade in ivory from Garamba National Park in DR Congo. In October, the OCHA indicated the existence of 353,000 displaced people in the LRA's sphere of influence in the three countries, of which 27,000 were refugees.

There was a general reduction in the number and intensity of LRA attacks as a result of the military pressure being applied by the AU Regional Task Force as well as changes in its modus operandi

Central African Republic	
Start:	2006
Type:	Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, demobilised members of the former rebel coalition Séléka (splinter groups of the former CPJP, UFDR and CPSK groups), anti-balaka militias, France, MICOPAX/FOMAC (transformed into MISCA), groups linked to the former government of François Bozizé, other residual forces from armed groups (former armed forces), LRA armed Ugandan group
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:

Since independence in 1960, the situation in the Central African Republic has been characterised by continued political instability, which has resulted in several coups and military dictatorships. The keys to the situation are of an internal and external nature. Internal, because there is a confrontation between political elites from northern and southern ethnic groups who are competing for power and minorities that have been excluded from it. A number of leaders have attempted to establish a system of patronage to ensure their political survival. And external, due to the role played by its neighbours Chad and Libya; due to its natural resources (diamonds, uranium, gold, hardwoods) and the awarding of mining contracts in which these countries compete alongside China and the former colonial power, France, which controls uranium. Conflicts in the region have led to the accumulation of weaponry and combatants who have turned the country into regional sanctuary. This situation has been compounded by a religious dimension due to the fact that the Séléka coalition, which is a Muslim faith organisation formed by a number of historically marginalised groups from the north and which counts foreign fighters amongst its ranks, took power in March 2013 after toppling the former leader, François Bozizé, who for the past 10 years had fought these insurgencies in the north. The inability of the Séléka leader, Michel Djotodia, to control the rebel coalition, which has committed gross violations of human rights, looting and extrajudicial executions, has led to the emergence of Christian militias

executions, has led to the emergence of Christian militias ("anti-balaka"). These militias and sectors of the army, as well as supporters of former President Bozizé, have rebelled against the government and Séléka, creating a climate of chaos and widespread impunity. France and a regional mission intervened militarily to reduce the clashes.

The Central African Republic was plunged into a state of chaos and widespread violence during 2013. Séléka, the Muslim faith insurgent coalition from the north, launched an uprising in December 2012, although some of its members had already been involved in clashes with the government of François Bozizé since 2006. In January 2013, under pressure from the international community, Séléka agreed to reach a peace agreement with the government of Bozizé to share power and to conduct a negotiated transition, but eventually overthrew him in March. Michel Djotodia, the new interim president of the country, who was sworn in in August, had a mandate to restore order and organise elections in the country within 18 months, as agreed by the National Transitional Council (CNT). However, in 2013 the situation in the country began to worsen, laying bare his inability to cope with the many challenges facing the country. Members of the rebel coalition that had placed him in power, Séléka, created a generalised climate of violence and impunity, which has been linked to religious differences in the country. During the year, abuse of the civilian population by Séléka members began to increase and there was a gradual increase in retaliations. The population began to organise self-defence militias, known as "anti-balaka" (anti-machete, which existed previously but were involved in hunting), professing the Christian faith (the majority religion in the country), which have been confronting the Muslim Séléka organisation, who they view to be foreigners, and which effectively does have fighters from neighbouring countries among its members. In September, clashes arose between these self-defence militias and members of Séléka in the north-west, in Bossangoa, which caused the displacement of some 36,000 people, according to OCHA. Although religious authorities and other representatives from Central African civil society sought to mediate between the parties and even travelled to New York to request assistance from the international community, the violence increased. President Djotodia's decision in early October to decree the dissolution of Séléka arrived late and did not halt subsequent events.

In this regard, despite warnings from a number of actors and organisations on the dangers facing the country, months passed without action and the slow response has taken its toll. The Chatham House think tank claimed that the crisis had been seen as a domestic problem with some regional ramifications, rather than as a threat to regional and international peace and security similar to Somalia, the Sahel or RD Congo. HRW documented serious violations of human rights committed by the

rebel coalition Séléka between December 2012 and April 2013, among which it drew particular attention to the mass lootings, killings of civilians, rapes and the settling of scores with members of the army, according to a report published in May. HRW urged the government of Séléka to control its own members, to prevent abuses and to bring those responsible to justice. In April, the UN Security Council expressed concern over the severity of the situation, and in mid-May, the special representative of the UN Secretary General called for additional forces to be deployed to contain the climate of lawlessness. However, as pointed out by the International Crisis Group, the absence of a State, the changing situation at the political level, the fragility of Séléka and religious resentment all contributed to a climate of uncertainty regarding the transition.

Séléka and anti-balaka militias deliberately attacked civilians, committing severe atrocities and violations of human rights in the Central African Republic

In mid-July, the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa greenlit the initiation in early August of the transformation of the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) and its military component (FOMAC) into the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA/AFISM-CAR), headed by the AU. The African organisation decided that its military component, currently numbering 1,200 members, should be increased to 3,650 soldiers from Cameroon, Gabon, Congo and Chad. Its mandate was to be to protect the civilian population and restore the peace, stabilising the country and reforming and restructuring the army. However, few changes occurred on the ground, since although contingents arrived from these and other countries (such as Burundi, Rwanda and DR Congo), the MISCA deployed minimally in the capital and at the airport to ensure its security.

In early December there was a serious outbreak of violence when the anti-balaka militias attacked the capital, triggering a military response from Séléka and leading to **interfaith clashes that killed more than a thousand people**. Heavy weaponry was used in combat. Both sides deliberately attacked civilians, committing severe atrocities and violations of human rights. Soldiers of the former Central African armed forces and the Presidential Guard of ousted President Bozizé joined these self-defence militias. In parallel, **the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights sent a mission in early January to gather testimonies regarding the collusion between Chadian members of Séléka and Chadian soldiers of the MISCA** who allegedly collaborated in actions to seek out anti-balakas and committed extrajudicial executions during the events in early December. The violence in the capital led to the response in Bossangoa, where clashes between both sides caused more than sixty fatalities. There were also killings of dozens of people on both sides in other parts of the country. The UN Security Council authorised France to intervene militarily, which increased its military contingent in the country to 1,600 soldiers

in an attempt to halt the chaos, together with the UA's regional mission, MISCA, which was also raised to 6,000 soldiers. In the capital, forced displacements increased, reaching half a million people at the end of the year, and a million nationwide. In early 2014, the MISCA had 4,400 of the planned 6,000 military personnel and had succeeded, alongside the French military, in reducing violence in the capital. In December, France organised an international summit on the Central African Republic in Paris, where it called for greater involvement of the international community. Subsequently, at a European summit in mid-December, France requested the participation of the EU in the Central African Republic, in order to gain access to European funding (and the creation of a permanent fund) to bear the costs of the intervention and obtain additional personnel. Paris also intends to shed its image as the gendarme of Africa, which could involve the creation of a European mission to the country to replace the French operation, Sangaris. In early January, the situation in the country remained very volatile and ECCAS (CEEAC) held a summit in N'Djamena to enable members of the CNT and representatives of the political parties to attempt to reverse the chaotic situation in the country. They also forced the resignation of Djotodia.

DR Congo (east)	
Start:	1998
Type:	Government, Identity, Resources Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, Mai-Mai militia, FDLR, M23 (formerly CNDP), APCLS, Ituri armed groups, Burundian armed opposition group FNL, Ugandan armed opposition groups ADF-NALU, Rwanda, MONUSCO
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The current conflict has its origins in the coup d'état carried out by Laurent Desiré Kabila in 1996 against Mobutu Sese Seko, which culminated with him handing over power in 1997. Later, in 1998, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, together with various armed groups, tried to overthrow Kabila, who received the support of Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, in a war that has caused around five million fatalities. The control and exploitation of the natural resources has contributed to the perpetuation of the conflict and to the presence of foreign armed forces. The signing of a ceasefire in 1999, and of several peace agreements between 2002 and 2003, led to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the setting up of a transitional government and later an elected government, in 2006, but did not mean the end of violence in this country, due to the role played by Rwanda and the presence of factions of non-demobilised groups and of the FDLR, responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The breach of the 2009 peace accords led to the 2012 desertion of soldiers of the former armed group CNDP, forming part of the Congolese army, who organised a new rebellion, known as the M23, supported by Rwanda.

The rebellion, launched in 2012 by the armed group **The March 23 Movement (M23)**, supported by Rwanda, culminated in November 2013 with the defeat of the armed group and the flight of its leaders. The attempts at negotiation initiated in December 2012 at the insistence of Uganda, following the capture of Goma (capital of North Kivu) by the M23, remained stalled throughout the year, with a number of meetings in Kampala that made no progress on substantive issues. Meanwhile, on the ground armed clashes continued, ending with the victory of the Congolese armed forces, thanks to the support of the UN intervention brigade, created in early 2013.

A key element to tipping the balance of the situation in February was the signing of the peace agreement in Addis Ababa to stabilise eastern DR Congo and the Great Lakes region. Eleven countries pledged not to intervene in conflicts taking place in neighbouring countries and to refrain from supporting rebel groups, which opened the door to the intervention of a UN brigade with an offence-based mandate, with the capability to combat armed groups, especially the M23. This new UN operation, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), the result of numerous discussions at the regional level since late 2012, consisted of about 3,000 troops from Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa, under the leadership of MONUSCO. It was not until late March that the UN Security Council approved the deployment of the intervention force. The Council also approved sending drones to monitor the situation, despite the reluctance of Russia, China and Rwanda. Another notable element was the tension and even clashes within the M23 itself during the early part of the year, involving two factions of the group, one headed by the political leader, Jean-Marie Runiga, and the other led by the military commander, Makenga Sultani, which allegedly caused the surrender of the leader of the former CNDP and of one of the commanders of the M23, Bosco Ntaganda, since the latter was protected by Runiga. Makenga had displayed his willingness to reach a peace agreement with the Congolese government of Joseph Kabila and to negotiate a new integration of its combatants into the armed forces. In this context, **Ntaganda surrendered in March to the US Embassy in Kigali and asked to be transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC)**. The ICC had issued an arrest warrant for Ntaganda on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The surrender of Ntaganda caused the fighting between the two factions of the M23 to cease, which had caused some 150 fatalities. Rwanda expressed its willingness to respect Ntaganda's transfer to The Hague, although neither Rwanda nor the US are parties to the Rome Statute.

Differences in the peace process relating mainly to the granting of a general or selective amnesty to members of the guerrilla group³¹ and the arrival in mid-July of the

UN Force Intervention Brigade were decisive factors to ensuring that by late August the FIB had begun initial interventions in support of the armed forces, which resulted in the first victories over the M23. The arrival of the FIB caused the peace initiatives to stall and the Kampala talks between the government and the M23 were put on hold. The effects of this crackdown by the government and the FIB were noted on the ground, where the M23 suffered several defeats forcing it to retreat to its fiefdoms. Meanwhile, tensions intensified between DR Congo and Rwanda due to the support provided to the M23 by Rwanda. A report by the Expert Group that oversees the exploitation of natural resources in the country determined in June that the M23 had recruited fighters in neighbouring Rwanda in collaboration with the Rwandan army, while the Congolese army had collaborated with the armed Rwandan Hutu group FDLR. Rwanda allegedly supplied weapons and equipment, and some army officers may even have collaborated with the M23. In late October, the joint operation and the fighting intensified pressure on the M23, and in early November the M23 capitulated after a major military offensive by the army supported by the FIB. After the loss of the Chanzu and Runyonyi hills controlled by the M23 on the border between DR Congo with Rwanda and Uganda, the president of the M23, Bertrand Bisimwa, said in a statement that he was putting an end to the rebellion according to the recommendations of the Kampala talks. The death toll as a result of the offensive was over 900 people between 20th May and 5th November, according to military sources. On the government side, 201 soldiers died and 680 were wounded, while on the rebel side 721 deaths were recorded and 543 people were captured, including 72 Rwandans and 28 Ugandans. It is estimated that between 1,500 and 3,000 former rebels of various groups could be integrated into the security forces. Some armed groups (such as APCLS, Nyatura militias) demobilised following the dismantling of the M23, some of them unconditionally. Other self-defence groups in the region of Rutshuru noted that they would not demobilise unless they received some form of economic compensation, in addition to their integration into the army, due to their efforts in the fight against M23.

South Sudan ³²	
Start:	2009
Type:	Government, Resources, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, Army (SPLA), South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A), community militias, Sudan
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↓

31. See the summary on DR Congo in chapter 3 (Peace processes).

32. The Republic of South Sudan formally seceded from Sudan on 9th under the supervision of the international community, and was admitted as a new member state by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14th July 2011, following a referendum held in January 2011. Under international supervision.

Summary:

The peace agreement reached in 2005, which put an end to the Sudanese conflict, recognised the right to self-determination of the south through a referendum. However, the end of the war with the North and the later independence for South Sudan in 2011 did not manage to offer stability to the southern region. The disputes for the control of the territory, livestock and political power increased between the multiple communities that inhabit South Sudan, increasing the number, the gravity and the intensity of the confrontations between them. The situation became even worse after the general elections in April 2010, when several military officials who had presented their candidature or had supported political opponents to the incumbent party, the SPLM, did not win the elections. These military officers refused to recognise the results of the elections and decided to take up arms to vindicate their access to the institutions, condemn the Dinka dominance over the institutions and the under representation of other communities within them while branding the South Sudan government as corrupt. Juba's offerings of amnesty did not manage to put an end to insurgence groups, accused of receiving funding and logistical support from Sudan. In parallel, there was an escalation of violence in late 2013 between supporters of the government of Salva Kiir and those of former Vice President Riek Machar.

Although there were some positive developments in South Sudan during the year, the overall situation was dominated by insecurity. The situation worsened in the state of Jonglei and tensions within the government ended in a coup attempt later in the year which led to clashes that caused at least 1,000 fatalities. South Sudan celebrated the second anniversary of its independence on 9th July amid concerns over potentially destabilizing divisions within the ruling party, the SPLM, a serious security and human rights situation in areas of Jonglei State and uncertainties surrounding the resumption of oil exports. Since then, the country has witnessed positive steps in key areas, as noted by the United Nations, including the appointment of a smaller government on 31st July and the resumption of the flow of oil. While stability has been seen in various parts of the country, the security situation in parts of Jonglei State continued to be very seriously affected.

In this state, the fighting between government forces and armed groups caused the deaths of hundreds of people during the year. The most affected was Pibor county. Between January and September, OCHA noted that there had been at least 265 violent incidents across the country, which had caused nearly 600 deaths and the displacement of 159,130 people. Displacements in Jonglei State accounted for 65% of the total. The fighting in Pibor county between the army and the armed group of David Yau Yau declined in late June, while an increase in the activity of armed groups in Pochalla county was reported, which resulted in the deployment of more army troops in that area. According to UNHCR, from 2012 to September 2013, more than 100,000 people were affected by this wave of violence in Jonglei, especially in the areas of Pibor and Pochalla, making humanitarian access difficult.

Following negotiations regarding their access in mid-July, held with all the parties involved in the hostilities, humanitarian actors were able to reach people affected by violence in various parts of Pibor county. Thus, from the beginning of July, the SPLA reduced its activity against the David Yau Yau group. On 30th July, President Kiir reiterated his offer of amnesty to the armed groups. Although David Yau Yau rejected the offer, he agreed to participate in the talks and several meetings were held. Progress in integrating the groups that had accepted offers of amnesty into the security forces, particularly those headed by Johnson Olony and Ayok Ogat, was slow and talks continued. In parallel, there were severe inter-community clashes in Jonglei, particularly in the northern counties. In August, the situation worsened and the Jonglei State Assembly announced that over 320 people had been killed in this region during the year, mostly belonging to the Murle ethnic group, to which the David Yau Yau rebels belong. According to a September report by Human Rights Watch, **the army had committed serious human rights violations against civilians in Jonglei.** Extrajudicial killings have occurred in the context of the counter-insurgency campaign against the Murle rebels and have caused thousands of people to be displaced in Pibor county. The David Yau Yau militia may also have committed atrocities against the civilian population, according to the report.

Moreover, **the overhauls made to the government by President Salva Kiir, although viewed positively by the UN, subsequently led to a coup attempt.** On 23 July, President Salva Kiir implemented a major overhaul of various government agencies and state powers. Kiir dismissed the government, including the vice-president, Riek Machar. He also suspended the secretary general of the SPLM, Pagan Amum, into whom he then launched an investigation regarding mismanagement of party affairs and inciting violence, subsequently banning him from leaving the country. In addition, Kiir announced in November the dissolution of the power structures of the SPLM. According to Kiir, the delay in holding the national convention to elect the new party leaders motivated this decision. Former Vice-President Riek Machar, expelled from his post in July, and other members of the party opposed this decision and announced possible political reprisals against the president due to violations of the constitution by the latter.

These threats led to an attempted coup in December which the president managed to suppress, although heavy fighting broke out that caused around a thousand deaths. Kiir accused Riek Machar of orchestrating the coup and ordered his arrest, but the latter denied being behind the events. Subsequently, forces loyal to Machar took control of Unity, an important oil region, and Bor, the capital of Jonglei state. Both sides continued fighting over control of other towns, with several skirmishes in various parts of the country. While fears continued to grow that a new conflict was brewing, the UN announced the arrival of more peacekeeping forces. The mission bases in South Sudan (UNMISS), in Bor and Akobo, in Jonglei state,

were looted and at least 20 civilians and three Indian peacekeepers were killed in the attack on Akobo. Concern increased after the march on Bor of 25,000 youths from the Nuer ethnic group belonging to the armed group known as the White Army. Thousands of civilians took refuge in the UN compound in the capital in the face of an imminent attack by the militia. Ethnic leaders managed to persuade several young members of the White Army to leave the city but it is believed that about 5,000 remained. **Although Kiir and Machar reached a fragile agreement to cease the hostilities, clashes took place in Bor and Bentiu. Both sides began peace talks in early January in Addis Ababa. The main topics of discussion were the release of prisoners and the signing of agreements for a ceasefire.** The government announced that it would only consider the release once the relevant investigation and legal process had been carried out. For their part, the rebels declared that the arrest of senior officers by the government remained an obstacle to the peace negotiations. The UN estimated that there had been about 1,000 deaths in the December clashes alone. In addition, more than 800 people were injured and some 180,000 civilians have been displaced as a result of this situation.

Sudan (Darfur)	
Start:	2003
Type:	Self-government, Resources, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, janjaweed pro-governmental militias, JEM, LJM coalition, diverse factions of the SLA and other armed groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The conflict in Darfur arose in 2003 around the demands for greater decentralization and development settled by several armed groups, mainly the SLA and the JEM. The government responded to the uprising by sending its armed forces and forming Arab militias, known as *janjaweed*. The magnitude of the violence against civilians carried out by all the armed actors led to claims that genocide was ongoing in the region. 300,000 people have already died in relation to the conflict since the beginning of the hostilities, according to the United Nations. After the signing of a peace agreement between the government and a faction of the SLA in May 2006, the violence intensified, the opposition armed groups started a process of fragmentation and a serious displacement crisis with a regional outreach developed in the region due to the proxy-war between Chad and Sudan. This dimension is compounded by inter-community tension over the control of resources (land, water, livestock, mining), in some cases instigated by the government itself. The observation mission of the African Union –AMIS– created in 2004, was integrated into a joint AU/UN mission in 2007, the UNAMID. This mission has been the object of multiple attacks and proven incapable of complying with its mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian staff on the field.

Throughout the year inter-community strife and fighting continued between the Sudanese government and

various armed groups in the region of Darfur. Hundreds of people died in separate outbreaks of inter-community violence between the Misseriya and Salamat tribes. There were also armed confrontations between these two tribes and the Ta'aisha community along the border between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. The violence caused the displacement of tens of thousands of people. A further outbreak of inter-community violence between the Maaliya and Reizegat tribes also caused hundreds of fatalities in the region of Adila. Also notable were the inter-community clashes between the Beni Halba and Gimir tribes in Katila, in South Darfur state, which began in April. These acts were linked to disputes over land ownership related to the production of gum arabic. Also worthy of note in 2013 was the new inter-community conflict linked to control of gold mine deposits in the country. Earlier this year there were **clashes between the Arab tribes of Beni Hussein and Reizegat for control of gold mines in Jebel Amir** which left over two hundred dead and displaced 100,000 people, including miners and residents of neighbouring villages which were also looted and burned. The fighting caused one of the most serious crises in recent times in Darfur. Amnesty International reported that government officials were involved in acts of violence and that Reizegat tribe members used government vehicles to attack the Beni Hussein tribe, who controlled the mines. According to Amnesty International, the Sudanese government was trying to gain control over the export of gold, as the country was running out of foreign currency reserves.

UNAMID continued to suffer attacks during the year, which killed 14 soldiers of the mission. In July, the mission suffered the worst attack since 2007, which resulted in the deaths of seven soldiers and wounded 17 others in the region of Khar Abeche. At various times of the year the government prevented UNAMID troops from accessing affected populations. In February, the UN Security Council renewed the mandate of the group of experts that monitors the sanctions and the arms embargo imposed on Sudan in 2005. The army conducted various military operations, including air strikes in various parts of Darfur, and there were clashes between the armed forces, the JEM, the Abdel Wahid faction of the SLA (SLA-AW) and the Minni Minnawi faction of the SLA (SLA-MM) at different times throughout the year. The rapprochement between the SLA-MM, the SLA-AW and the JEM, who had created the SRF coalition in November 2011, was confirmed by a number of joint operations against government forces in Darfur. In November, the SLA-MM claimed to have executed about 200 government soldiers and seized 25 vehicles during an operation in the north of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. However, a government spokesman denied these reports. Also notable was the fighting between the SLA-MM and the Sudanese army, which fought in Marla, South Darfur, with both sides claiming to have inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The rebels also said they had bombed the Nyala airport in April, the capital of South Darfur and

the second largest city in Sudan. In Nyala numerous incidents were observed during the year. In November, the military leader of the JEM, Fidel Mohammed Rahoma, was executed in a military offensive in Abu Zabad. According to the UN, 300,000 people were displaced between January and September 2013, double the number displaced in 2011 and 2012. Of these, 35,000 crossed the border into Chad and the Central African Republic.

Notably, there were disputes within the JEM, one of the main armed groups. After signing a peace agreement with the government in April, the JEM faction led by Mohammed Bashar engaged in combat with the JEM faction led by Jibril Ibrahim. During the conflict, one of the commanders of the Bashar group, Saleh Jerbo, was killed. Jerbo was accused of war crimes by the International Criminal Court. In May, when the delegation of the JEM-Bashar returned to Darfur from Qatar, through Chad, it was attacked by members of the JEM on the border with Sudan. The leaders Mohammed Bashar and Arko Suleiman were killed in the attack, along with five other members of the group.

Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile)	
Start:	2011
Type:	Self-government, Resources, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, SPLM-N armed group, Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF) armed coalition, pro-governmental PDF militias, South Sudan
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:

The national reconfiguration of Sudan after the secession of the south in July 2011 aggravated the differences between Khartoum and its new border regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which during the Sudanese armed conflict supported the southern rebel forces of the SPLA. The need for democratic reform and an effective decentralisation, which would permit the economic development of all the regions that make up the new Sudan, are at the root of the resurgence of violence. The lack of recognition of the ethnic and political plural nature, within which political formations linked to the southern SPLM are included, would also be another of the causes of the violence. The counter position between the elite of Khartoum and the states of the central Nile region, which control the economic wealth of Sudan, and the rest of the states that make up the country are found at the centre of the socio-political crises that threaten peace.

The fighting between the SPLM-N and government forces continued throughout the year in various areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile State. The Sudanese armed forces bombed areas inhabited by civilians

in the region, in particular South Kordofan, which was severely affected during the year by the fighting and aerial bombardment. On several occasions, the SPLM-N bombed the capital of South Kordofan, Kadugli, as well as areas of Abu Kershola and Umm Ruwaba, causing dozens of deaths and the forced displacement of tens of thousands of people, who in some cases fled to North Kordofan. Clashes also broke out in North Kordofan in early March. The armed group JEM, part of the SRF coalition, launched an attack on government forces and occupied the area of Wad Bahr. By contrast, the situation improved in the Blue Nile, where humanitarian organisations were granted greater access to the areas controlled by the government, which increased their presence. OCHA expressed concern about the continued displacement of civilians in South Kordofan and the lack of access to humanitarian aid. The organisations International Refugee Rights Initiative and Sudan Consortium, reported attacks on civilians between June and July. In the bombed areas, there was a clear civilian presence and no clear military objectives. The SPLM-N collaborated with the JEM in the framework of the armed SRF coalition, and announced that they were approaching the capital, Khartoum. Various humanitarian agencies asked the UN Security Council to expand the arms embargo to the whole of Sudan. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported an increase in the levels of violence by the Sudanese armed forces in the border regions with South Sudan. An Amnesty International report accused the Sudanese armed forces of burning and shooting civilians in a scorched earth campaign against the home region of the head of the SPLM-N, Malik Agar, in Blue Nile State during the first half of 2013.

Lastly, notable was the attempt to establish a provisional ceasefire between the government and the SPLM-N in April in Addis Ababa, in order to reach a humanitarian agreement, which was eventually unsuccessful. The government stated that firstly South Sudan had to stop supporting the armed group, while the SPLM-N insisted that the peace process in Blue Nile and South Kordofan had to be linked to the one in Darfur. Subsequently, both parties maintained contacts with the United Nations to enable the implementation of a polio vaccination campaign, which never got off the ground due to breaches by both parties. Although by the end of October it appeared that the terms had been accepted, which involved a cessation of military actions during the first few days of November, in the end mistrust between the parties led to the breakdown of the agreement, which had planned to grant humanitarian organisations easy access, thereby benefiting 165,000 children in the region. Notably, according to UNHCR, about 228,000 people have crossed the border with Ethiopia and South Sudan since the conflict began.

b) Horn of Africa

Ethiopia (Ogaden)	
Start:	2007
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, ONLF, OLF, pro-governmental militias
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=

Summary:

Ethiopia has been the object of movements of a secessionist nature or of resistance against the central authority since the 1970s. The ONLF emerged in 1984 and operates in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, in the south east of the country, demanding a greater level of autonomy for the Somali community that lives in this region. On various occasions, the ONLF has carried out rebellious activities beyond Ogaden, in collaboration with the OLF, which has been demanding greater autonomy from the government for the region of Oromia since 1973. The Somali government has supported the ONLF against Ethiopian, which it confronted for control over the region between 1977 and 1978, a war in which Ethiopian defeated Somalia. The end of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000, led to the increase of the government operations to put an end to the rebel forces in Ogaden. Since the elections that were held in 2005, the confrontations between the armed forces and the ONLF increased, although in recent years the intensity of the conflict has declined.

Throughout the year **there was a persistent low-intensity conflict that pitted the Ethiopian armed forces, supported by Liyu militia, against the armed group ONLF**. Civilians were subject to extrajudicial executions, torture, abuse and looting by security forces, according to pro-independence sources. According to these same sources, between January and May the Ethiopian security forces executed more than 300 civilians in January and the ONLF executed around 80 soldiers and injured another 100, a death toll not confirmed by the army. Notably, in February the Ogadeni rebellion urged the Canadian company Africa Oil Corporation to stop exploration operations in the east of the country and accused it of conspiring with the government to exploit the region's oil resources. However, government sources played down the warning of the ONLF. The organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in October that the Ethiopian authorities subjected political detainees to torture and ill-treatment in order to extract confessions. Pro-independence sources pointed out that in late 2013, 98 people were killed by the army and its associated militia (Liyu) at the Ogaden prison in the capital of the region, Jijiga, most as a result of violence or starvation. In addition, another 500 people detained at this prison were taken to military bases in the city.

However, despite the persistence of the conflict, **in the final quarter of the year information emerged indicating the possible reopening in October of the peace process that had been blocked since 2012, according to the Kenyan negotiators involved**. A facilitation team exists,

promoted by Kenyan government officials of Somali origin led by the former defence minister and member of Parliament for the county of Garissa, Mohamed Yusuf Haji. Kenya's Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, Ambassador Ali Bunow Korane, confirmed that the Ethiopian government and the ONLF leadership had agreed to meet, and the chief negotiator for the ONLF, Abdirahman Mahdi, confirmed the Kenyan initiative. The International Crisis Group (ICG) had also highlighted the possibility that the peace talks could be resumed. However, at year's end it was unknown whether the meeting had taken place.

Somalia	
Start:	1988
Type:	Government, System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Federal Government, USA, France, Ethiopia, AMISOM, EU-Navfor, Operation Ocean Shield, al-Shabaab, Eritrea
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

The armed conflict and the absence of effective central authority in the country have their origins in 1988, when a coalition of opposing groups rebelled against the dictatorial power of Siad Barre and three years later managed to overthrow him. This situation led to a new fight within this coalition to occupy the power vacuum, which had led to the destruction of the country and the death of more than 300,000 people since 1991, despite the failed international intervention at the beginning of the 1990s. The diverse peace processes to try and establish a central authority came across numerous difficulties, including the affronts between the different clans and sub clans of which the Somalia and social structure was made up, the interference of Ethiopia and Eritrea and the power of the various warlords. The last peace initiative was in 2004 by the GFT, which found support in Ethiopia to try to recover control of the country, partially in the hands of the ICU (Islamic Courts Union) The moderate faction of the ICU has joined the GFT and together they confront the militias of the radical faction of the ICU which control part of the southern area of the country. In 2012 the transition that began in 2004 was completed and a new Parliament was formed which elected its first president since 1967. The AU mission, AMISOM (which included the Ethiopian and Kenyan troops present in the country) and government troops are combating al-Shabaab, a group that has suffered internal divisions.

During the year heavy fighting persisted in various parts of the central and southern areas of the country, mainly in Bakool and Hiiraan (regions bordering Ethiopia), Gedo, Bay, Lower Shabelle, Kismayo (the capital of Jubaland) and Mogadishu. Clashes took place between government forces backed by international troops and the armed Islamist group al-Shabaab, causing hundreds of victims during the year. Lower Shabelle remained the main focus of the actions of al-Shabaab, which continued with its sporadic attacks in Puntland. The government offensive, backed by its local allies and AMISOM, forced

the retreat of al-Shabaab and a change in its tactics towards more sporadic actions and bombings. Disputes and divisions within al-Shabaab increased in June and its leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, ordered the arrest and execution of several leaders, including Ibrahim Afghani, Hassan Dahir Aweys and Muktar Robow Abu Mansur. The first was executed, the second gave himself up to the Somali authorities and the third managed to escape to the Bakool region.

One of the incidents that captured international attention was the attack in September against a shopping centre in Nairobi (Kenya) in which 70 people were killed in retaliation for intervention in Somalia

One of the incidents that attracted the greatest international media attention was the attack in September at the Westgate Mall (Nairobi, Kenya) in which 70 people were killed, responsibility for which was claimed by al-Shabaab, which highlighted, according to several analysts, the group's intention to become a threat at regional and international level. According to the UN, there are indications that under the leadership of Godane, al-Shabaab's objective could be moving away from Somalia and its internal politics in order to move closer to the ideology and overall programme of al-Qaeda. Ethiopia expressed its willingness to withdraw its troops from Somalia, but following the Westgate attack it decided in November to add its 8,000 troops to AMISOM. The Assistant Secretary General of the UN, Jan Eliasson, announced in May that more than 3,000 AMISOM soldiers had been killed in the country since 2007, a death toll that was questioned by the mission itself, whose spokesman estimated it to be less than 500 soldiers but did not provide definitive figures. In parallel, in May, the Security Council approved the creation of the UN political mission to Somalia (UNSOM) in order to support peace and reconciliation, assist the government and the African mission AMISOM. The Council partially lifted the arms embargo imposed on Somalia two decades ago. Several human rights organisations condemned the decision, feeling it to be premature. Although the humanitarian situation remained fragile, for the first time in five years the number of people in emergency situations fell to 870,000; however, another 2.3 million people continue to be affected by the fragility of the food situation.

In the political field, notable was the resignation of Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon (known as Saacid) at the insistence of the president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who sought a vote of no confidence barely a year after his appointment. Saacid was initially an ally of the president, a fact that could indicate a shift with respect to the previous political confrontation. However, in November the tension between the two figures was made public, with Saacid claiming that the President was exceeding his remit and was usurping his prerogatives, including the appointment of the cabinet, to which the President wished to incorporate officials close to the faction known as Dam Jadid. The new prime minister, Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed, is an economist, and through him it is hoped that relations with the federate states may be recovered. In

this sense, Puntland halted cooperation with Mogadishu in August, and relations with Jubaland (Lower and Middle Juba regions and Gedo) were tense, although in August the federal government reached an agreement with the president of Jubaland, Ahmed Madobe, facilitated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Tedros A. Ghebreyesus, in his capacity as president of the regional organisation IGAD. The Digil and Mirifle clans expressed their rejection of that agreement which marginalised them within the new federate state. Notably, in September a donors' conference was held

in Brussels in order to raise funds for the reconstruction of the country after more than 20 years of armed conflict. The EU pledged EUR 650 million as part of the process, called the New Deal.

c) North of Africa and Maghreb

Algeria (AQIM)	
Start:	1992
Type:	System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, AQIM (formerly GSPC), MUJAO, Signatories in Blood, Government of Libya, Mauritania, Mali and Niger
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The armed conflict has pitted the security forces against various Islamist groups since the beginning of the 1990s following the rise of the Islamist movement in Algeria due to the population's discontent, the economic crisis and the stifling of political participation. The conflict began when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was made illegal in 1992 after its triumph in the elections against the historic party that had led the independence of the country, the National Liberation Front. The armed struggle brought several groups (EIS, GIA and the GSPC, a division of the GIA that later became AQIM in 2007) into conflict with the army, supported by the self-defence militias. The conflict caused some 150,000 deaths during the 1990s and continues to claim lives, although the levels of violence have decreased since 2002, after some of the groups gave up the armed fight. At present, the conflict is led by AQIM, which has become a transnational organisation extending its operations beyond Algeria and affecting the Sahel countries. Algeria, together with Mali, Mauritania and Niger, has attempted to formulate a regional response to the group and to one of its offshoots, MUJAO, which focuses its activities in West Africa.

The armed conflict between the Algerian government and AQIM militants and members of other armed groups linked to the latter organisation saw an increase in levels of violence in the past year, leaving a death toll of more than 300 people. At the start of the year, the country was rocked by the mass kidnapping of more than a thousand people at a gas plant in Amenas, in the south-east near the border

with Libya. Responsibility for the hostage-taking was claimed by the armed group Signatories in Blood, allegedly a subsidiary of AQIM led by the Algerian former member of the organisation, Mokhtar Belmokhtar. In an attempt to connect the abductions with the war in Mali, the group demanded the withdrawal of French troops from the country, denounced Algeria for allowing the use of its airspace and demanded the release of Islamist prisoners from Algerian prisons. The hostage-taking lasted several days and led to an Algerian military action that resulted in heavy fighting and the execution of some of the hostages during the rescue attempt. According to various accounts, the death toll of the incident was between 68 and 81 people, of which about 40 were hostages, mostly foreigners from Japan, the Philippines, USA, UK, Norway, Romania and France. During the rest of the year, there continued to be periodic episodes of violence: clashes between Algerian troops and armed militia, bombings and security operations and raids by security forces against suspected AQIM militants and other groups, among others. The violence occurred in places such as Boumerdes, Tizi-Ouzou, Bouira, Oued Bahara, Meskeline and Tipaza. **In mid-December, the Algerian government reported that since January it had killed more than 220 insurgents in counter-terrorism operations.**

Responsibility for the hostage-taking of more than a thousand people at a gas plant in Algeria was claimed by the group Signatories in Blood and ended with the deaths of dozens of hostages after the security forces intervened

Highlighting the internationalisation of the conflict led by AQIM, in 2013 news was received of the deaths of leaders of the organisation as a result of the conflict in Mali.³³ These included Mohamed Lemine Ould Hassen, leader of the al-Fourqan Brigade, and Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, commander of the so-called Sahara Emirate. Abou Zeid had carried out kidnappings of Westerners which were widely reported in the media (among them the British citizen Edwin Dyer and the Frenchman Michel Germaneau, both executed), and he died in an operation in the mountains of Ifoghas in an action led by French and Chadian troops that were part of the international mission in northern Mali. Both Abou Zeid and Ould Hassen were replaced by other members of the organisation, of Algerian nationality. In parallel, and in an unprecedented US strategy in the region, in the middle of the year Washington announced a financial reward for information leading to the arrest of prominent leaders of radical armed groups operating in North Africa, including Belmokhtar, Yahya Abou el Hammam, a senior AQIM commander accused of planning attacks and kidnappings in the area; Malik Abou Abdelkarim, commander of the AQIM; and Omar Ould Hamaha, a spokesman for MUJAO. In this context, during the second half of the year the group Signatories in Blood announced that it was merging with MUJAO, which would have its bases primarily in Mali and would be led by a Mauritanian of Tuareg origin. The merger of the two

groups led to the creation of the organisation al-Murabitoun ("The Sentinels"), which proclaimed its allegiance to the leader of the al-Qaeda network, Ayman al-Zawahiri. According to press reports, both sides had acted together during an offensive against a military camp in Niger in April, in which 25 people died.³⁴ For its part, AQIM claimed responsibility in November for the murder of two French journalists in north-eastern Mali in what it described as a retaliatory action against French military operations in Azawad (the name given by the Tuareg to the northern part of Mali). The group also released a video criticising the

Moroccan authorities, urging the youth of the country to join the armed struggle. **Throughout the year, the Algerian authorities reinforced their military presence in the border areas with Libya, Mali, Niger and Tunisia.** Thousands of regular soldiers and special forces were deployed in these areas in order to prevent the spread of instability and prevent the infiltration of armed groups.³⁵ In this context, at the end of the year around twenty official representatives from Maghreb and Sahel countries met in Morocco to strengthen cross-border cooperation in relation to security threats.

Libya	
Start:	2011
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, armed opposition groups, militias of various type
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:

In the context of the uprisings in North Africa, popular protests against the government of Muammar Gaddafi began in February 2011. In power since 1969, his regime was characterized by an authoritarian stance repression of dissent, corruption and serious shortcomings at the institutional level. Internal conflict degenerated into an escalation of violence leading to a civil war and an international military intervention by NATO forces. After months of fighting and the capture and execution of Gaddafi in late October, the rebels announced the liberation of Libya. However, the country remains affected by high levels of violence derived from multiple factors. They include the inability of the new authorities to control the country and ensure a secure environment, the high presence of militias unwilling to surrender their weapons, the persistent clashes between anti-Gaddafi groups and supporters (or alleged collaborators) of the old regime, frequent tribal disputes and the widespread availability of weapons. Instability, episodes of revenge and abuses of human rights coexist with attempts of Libyan society by defining the new institutional framework of the country, in a context of political and regional divisions.

33. See the summary on Mali in this chapter.

34. See the summary on Niger in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

35. See the summaries on Libya and Mali (north) in this chapter and the summaries on Niger and Tunisia in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

The situation in Libya was characterised by continued instability, periodic acts of violence that killed scores of people and the constant challenge that the many militias operating in the country pose for the institutions and authorities of a highly fragile government.

This violence materialised in almost daily killings, armed clashes, bombings, kidnappings, torture, attacks against government officials, the military, the police and intelligence agents; sieges against the Parliament, ministries and embassies, in addition to a high crime rate. The fragile security situation led to the resignation of several senior officials throughout the year (including the chief of staff and two interior ministers) and led to the issuance of security alerts among foreign governments with diplomatic missions in Libya, with the Italian Consulate and Swedish-Finnish Consulate in Benghazi, the French and Russian embassies in Tripoli and a convoy of the US ambassador being subject to attacks during 2013. The numerous militias, which are one of the main factors in the instability of the country (estimates vary and point to the existence of between 300 and 1,700 armed-groups), mobilised themselves for a variety of interests, with and without state authorisation. Some focused their activities on the provision of private or public security, others concentrated on trafficking people, arms and drugs, while some, in a more Islamist vein (and with different degrees of radicalisation), chose the path of vigilantism against organised crime, among many other economic or political motivations. For example, during 2013 a Berber militia attacked the Parliament to demand recognition of its community under the constitution and other militias took control of ports, oil wells or gas plants (with some denouncing corruption and unpaid wages, while others demanded greater autonomy for east Cyrenaica), with the corresponding impact on net sales of hydrocarbons. Other **armed groups besieged the General National Congress (GNC) and various ministries to press for the adoption of a controversial regulation that prohibits senior officials from the Gaddafi era from holding office for a decade.** The so-called Political Isolation Law was finally approved in early May and led to the resignation of the leader of the GNC, Mohamed Magarief (the target of an attempted assassination earlier in the year), who had served as a diplomat for the previous regime. The mobilisation of segments of the population to denounce the chronic lack of security and to demand the disarmament of the militias led to severe skirmishes and clashes, which led to 30 deaths in Benghazi in June and the deaths of a further 50 people and the wounding of hundreds in Tripoli in November.

During the second half of the year, two interconnected events in particular laid bare the weakness of the new Libyan state and the power of the militias. In October, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was kidnapped, or detained for several hours, by an armed group, for no clear reason. It was initially reported that the militia was acting in

The numerous militias operating in Libya continued to mobilise around achieving their interests, laying pressure on and defying the authorities within a highly fragile institutional context

retaliation for the alleged approval of a US operation in the country by the prime minister. This action had ended days prior with the capture of Abu Anas al-Libi, linked to al-Qaeda and suspected of involvement in the attack on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and had caused irritation among certain sectors –including armed groups– which saw it as a violation of sovereignty. Washington's decision to directly detain al-Libi was assessed by many analysts as signalling a lack of confidence in the ability of the Libyan state to arrest and prosecute or process his extradition. Zeidan's abduction was also linked to problems of corruption and was attributed

to the actions of a controversial security body known as Libya Revolutionaries' Operation Room (LROR) –linked to the ministries of the Interior and Defence. **Given the fragile situation in Libya, in 2013 the UN Security Council expressed concern over the wide circulation of weapons in the country (according to press reports the government controls only 20 of the 400 weapons caches in the country) and over the flow of these arsenals to neighbouring countries.** At year's end, the UN also announced that it would be sending nuclear inspectors to assess the situation of the uranium reserves in the country. The international organisation also warned of the human rights situation, claiming that more than 8,000 people continued to be detained by militias. According to a UN report published in the second half of the year, more than a dozen people had died in 2013 in Libyan prisons as a result of torture and ill-treatment, identified as a standard practice. Politically, it is noteworthy that divisions continued (between secular and Islamist forces and between representatives of the different regions, among others) and in late 2013 the GNC decided to extend the transition period by one year, setting August 2014 as the deadline for a new constitution.

d) West Africa

Mali (north)	
Start:	2012
Type:	System, Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, MNLA, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM, ECOWAS, France, Chad, MISMA, MINUSMA
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The Tuareg community that inhabits northern Mali has lived in a situation of marginalisation and underdevelopment since colonial times which has fuelled revolts and led to the establishment of armed fronts against the central government. In the nineties, after a brief armed conflict, a peace agreement was reached that promised investment and development for the north. The failure to implement

the agreement made it impossible to halt the creation of new armed groups demanding greater autonomy for the area. The fall of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011, which for a number of years had been sheltering the Malian Tuareg insurgency and had absorbed a number of its members into its security forces, created conditions that favoured the resurgence of Tuareg rebels in the north of the country, who demand the independence of Azawad (the name which the Tuareg give to the northern region of Mali). After making progress in gaining control of the area by taking advantage of the political instability in Mali in early 2012, the Tuareg armed group, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), was increasingly displaced by radical Islamist groups operating in the region which had made gains in the north of Mali. The internationalisation of the conflict intensified in 2013, following the military intervention of France and the deployment of a peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) in the country.

The armed conflict in northern Mali in 2013 experienced an escalation, in tandem with **the growing internationalisation of the conflict following the military intervention led by France earlier in the year**. Paris launched Operation Serval in January, which had three main objectives: to prevent the armed groups inspired by radical Islamism that had taken control of the north of the country from progressing towards the capital, Bamako; to re-establish the territorial integrity of Mali; and to prevent the country from becoming a source of regional instability and a sanctuary for Jihadi militias. The French government said it had acted at the request of the Malian authorities, although a number of analysts have highlighted the various French strategic interests in the area that may have influenced its stance regarding the conflict, including the presence of French population in the region and the fear of contagion of the crisis to Niger, a key supplier of uranium to France. Following the commencement of the French operation, ECOWAS forces (the regional organisation had received UN authorisation to act in Mali in late 2012, although its arrival was not expected until mid-2013) began to deploy in the country. The operations led by France had the support of Malian troops and the military forces of Chad (which is not part of ECOWAS) and made progress in gaining control of the major cities in the north, including Gao and Timbuktu. **In the following months it became clear that, despite their withdrawal, the armed groups would continue to offer resistance in the north.** These groups continued to be at the forefront of combat actions, car bombings and suicide attacks. Responsibility for some of these actions was claimed by the armed group MUJAO. Partial counts on the basis of press reports indicate that during the first months of 2013 the conflict killed at least 535 people. One of those killed was Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, a senior AQIM leader known for his involvement in the kidnapping of

Westerners in the area,³⁶ who died in an operation in the mountains of Ifoghas led by France and Chad. Notably, during the first half of the year, the MNLA, which began its revolt against the government of Bamako in early 2012 and which has increasingly been displaced by Islamist militias, offered to cooperate in the fight against the Jihadist groups. **The Tuareg group maintained its stronghold in the northern town of Kidal, an area where clashes between Malian troops and the MNLA had been recorded until the signing of a peace agreement in June** in Ouagadougou.³⁷ International human rights organisations and the UN accused both Tuareg forces and the Malian military of abuse and retaliatory actions against civilians due to their ethnicity, including summary executions, torture and arbitrary detentions. In this context, there were also some inter-community clashes in the vicinity of Gao and Kidal.

During the second half of the year, there were continuing reports of periodic episodes of violence, although at lower levels compared to those registered in the first months of the year, within a context marked by progress in the political transition³⁸ and by the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) on 1st July.³⁹ Unanimously approved by the Security Council in April,⁴⁰ the mission foresaw the deployment of up to 12,600 troops by the end of the year, into which the troops from the West African countries already in Mali as part of the international force led by France were integrated (in November 2013, the armed contingent of the MINUSMA was 6,347 personnel, including military and police personnel). France chose to keep troops in Mali, albeit for activities related primarily to combating Jihadist groups. Among MINUSMA's main objectives were the stabilisation of the main population centres in order to prevent the return of armed groups, supporting the Malian authorities in the transition process, creating the conditions for the return of people displaced by the violence, providing humanitarian aid and holding elections in the country. In fact, **one of MINUSMA's first tasks was to ensure security during the first and second round of the presidential elections (July and August) in which Ibrahim Boubakar Keita was elected.**

The following months were marked by renewed violence in the region of Kidal following continued violations of the ceasefire and clashes between the Tuareg militia and Malian troops. The agreement signed in June between the parties contemplated the withdrawal of the MNLA to cantonment areas under MINUSMA supervision and the return of a military presence to Kidal. The parties exchanged accusations that neither was meeting the terms of the agreement (release of prisoners, keeping MNLA militants at their bases) which led the MNLA to announce

36. See the summary on Algeria (AQIM) in this chapter.

37. See chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

38. See the summary on Mali in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

39. Some analysts pointed out that MINUSMA arose from a particular interpretation of the meaning of peacekeeping, since in the case of Mali no agreement exists that is subject to implementation guarantees.

40. Resolution 2100 of the UN Security Council, April 25, 2013, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/documents/mali%20_2100_E_.pdf.

the end of the ceasefire. Although representatives of the group returned to the negotiations in October, in the following weeks the Tuareg group announced a return to its armed struggle (rejected by other MNLA representatives) and new fighting broke out. According to the Ouagadougou Agreement, the government and the MNLA were required to begin substantive talks 60 days after the formation of the cabinet, but the deadline passed in November without an outcome. **Towards the end of the year France, the Malian troops and MINUSMA also launched Operation Hydre to prevent the resurgence of extremist groups in the north.** Therefore, Mali was the scene of renewed violence that left dozens dead: confrontations, inter-community clashes, kidnappings and murders of journalists and attacks on the forces of the UN mission, in which four soldiers died. AQIM claimed responsibility in November for the murder of two French journalists in north-eastern Mali in what it described as a retaliatory action against French military operations in Azawad (the name given by the Tuareg to the northern part of Mali). Similarly, certain sectors of the population expressed concern regarding the ability of MINUSMA to provide critical support to the Malian authorities in creating a climate of security and warned of sexual abuse allegations against some of its members and the resulting negative impact on public perception of the mission. Some analysts warned of difficulties in consolidating control of the north of the country and raised the issue of the need for MINUSMA to increase its capacity to support a long-term stabilisation process.⁴¹ International Crisis Group (ICG) stated that the new government should introduce significant governance reforms and abandon the strategy of partial co-optation of northern sectors, as although this policy may weaken and divide the armed groups in the area, it is necessary to address the root causes of the conflict in order to ensure long-term stability.

The crisis in northern Mali resulted in a military operation led by France and the subsequent establishment of a UN mission (MINUSMA) in the country

Nigeria (Boko Haram)	
Start:	2011
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Government, Boko Haram radical Islamist group (BH), Ansaru
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Summary:	
The Islamist sect Boko Haram demands the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria and considers that Nigeria's public institutions are "westernised" and, therefore, decadent. The group forms part of the fundamentalist branch initiated by other groups in Nigeria following independence in 1960 and which, invariably, triggered outbreaks of violence of varying intensity. Despite the heavy repression to which its followers	

have been subjected—in 2009, at least 800 of its members died in confrontations with the army and the police in Bauchi State—the armed group remains active and the scope of its attacks has widened, aggravating insecurity in the country as the government proves incapable of offering an effective response to put an end to the violence. International human rights organizations have warned of the crimes committed by the group, but also on government abuses in its campaign against the organization.

The armed conflict between the armed group Boko Haram (BH) and Nigerian security forces in the north-east of the country caused an escalation of violence in 2013, a year in which the death toll topped a thousand people. **According to figures released by the UN in mid-December, a total of 1,200 people have been killed in incidents linked to BH since May 2013, when the authorities declared a state of emergency.** This number does not include those killed during military operations, nor those who died in the first months of the year, which would make the total balance for 2013 much higher. The violence continued to be concentrated in the provinces of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa, and took the form of attacks on police stations, prisons, bus stations, banks, markets, mosques and schools. BH resorted

to armed attacks and explosive devices in its offensive, which caused great alarm among the population and led to forced displacement. According to data published by the UNHCR in November, a total of 17,000 people of Nigerian origin had sought refuge in Chad, Cameroon and Niger as a result of the violence. Among the most high-profile offensives in the first half of the year was the murder of nine female workers involved in a vaccination campaign against polio in the province of Kano. BH believed that the campaign was part of a Western plot to cause infertility and reduce the number of Muslims. **Given the escalating attacks by BH, the government decided to launch a large scale campaign in April in Baga, in the state of Borno, in which many civilians were killed and thousands of houses were destroyed.** Nigerian troops accused BH of using civilians as human shields and starting fires. However, local residents reported that Nigerian soldiers had started the fires deliberately in order to encircle BH militants and accused the troops of firing on civilians. Given these allegations, President Goodluck Jonathan announced an investigation into the events. The incident that led to the declaration of the state of emergency came soon after, in May, when BH militants killed 55 people in Bama (Borno), in an offensive against military and police installations which also secured the release of 105 prisoners of the group. The characteristics of this attack encouraged speculation regarding BH's alleged access to more sophisticated weaponry and possible support from foreign organisations linked to al-Qaeda. In parallel, BH announced the taking of Nigerian hostages (mostly women

41. International Crisis Group, *Mali: Reform or Relapse*, Africa Report no. 2010, January 10, 2014, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/mali/210-mali-reform-or-relapse.aspx>.

and children) in response to the government's strategy of arresting family members of suspected militants.

In the context of an advance by BH (Jonathan acknowledged that members of the extremist organisation had taken partial control of Borno State), the Nigerian government launched a large scale military campaign with the stated goal of addressing the militia and restoring the territorial integrity of the country. Thus, **thousands of soldiers were sent to the north-east of the country in what was considered to be the largest operation against BH since the beginning of its armed activity.** The offensive included tracking operations and air strikes against suspected bases of the militant group. The Nigerian authorities have also decided to declare BH and its subsidiary, Ansaru, to be terrorist groups, in a move that was repeated by the USA months later. Notably, Ansaru also carried out some notable operations during the year, including the kidnapping and murder of seven foreign workers towards the beginning of the year. The fighting between Nigerian forces and BH continued in the following months and prompted the government to announce the withdrawal of its troops from Mali and Sudan (Darfur) in order to strengthen the fight against local insurgents. **The announcement by the security forces of the death of the leader of BH, Abubakar Shekau, in an attack which took place between late July and early August was denied by the organisation,** which responded by broadcasting a video allegedly showing the leader. During the second half of the year, BH also continued its attacks on civilians, including several attacks against schools that caused dozens of deaths. Among them, the murder of 42 students in Yobe (forcing regional authorities to close all schools in the face of a threat of new attacks), and another 50 students from a school in the same locality weeks later. In September the authorities also warned of having found more than 142 corpses in Borno, allegedly caused by BH attacks.

During the year, certain information indicated a search for alternative solutions to violence in this conflict. In the first months of the year, there were even some rumours regarding a possible ceasefire announcement by BH, which were refuted by Shekau. In this context, some Nigerian leaders proposed the offer of an amnesty to members of the group, imitating a policy that was applied to MEND militants in the Niger Delta in 2009. This initiative was met with an objection from President Jonathan, who nevertheless urged the formation of a committee to investigate the causes of the BH insurgency and the conditions of a disarmament and a possible amnesty for BH. The committee issued its report in early November, in which it proposed the establishment of a fund to support the victims and indicated that some of the insurgents contacted had responded favourably to the possibility of dialogue. BH, which had already ruled out accepting a government pardon, dismissed the official report, with its leader strengthening the group's radical rhetoric.

The armed conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces led to an escalation of violence in 2013, with a death toll exceeding one thousand people

America

Colombia	
Start:	1964
Type:	System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, FARC, ELN, new paramilitary groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:

In 1964, in the context of an agreement for the alternation of power between the Liberal party and the Conservative party (National Front), which excluded other political options, two armed opposition movements emerged with the goal of taking power: the ELN (made up of university students and workers, inspired by Guevara) and the FARC (a communist-oriented organisation that advocates agrarian reform). In the 1970s, various groups were created, such as the M-19 and the EPL, which ended up negotiating with the government and pushing through a new Constitution (1991) that established the foundations of a welfare state. At the end of the 1980s, several paramilitary groups emerged, instigated by sectors of the armed forces, landowners, drug traffickers and traditional politicians, aimed at defending the status quo through a strategy of terror. Drug trafficking activity influenced the economic, political and social spheres and contributed to the increase in violence.

Clashes continued throughout the year, despite the FARC's insistence that a bilateral ceasefire should be agreed while the negotiations in Havana continued, a proposal that was repeatedly rejected by the government. The FARC, however, declared a one-month unilateral ceasefire over the Christmas holidays. According to the government, the guerrillas of the FARC and ELN suffered nearly 300 combat casualties, 1,017 demobilisations and 1,370 captures. However, both armed groups agreed in December to form a common front to negotiate an end to the armed conflict. The main problem to making this a reality was the electoral process that is set to begin in 2014, which could halt both the negotiations with the FARC and the rapprochement with the ELN.

Furthermore, the company Cifras y Conceptos determined, after more than five years of research, that in a period of 40 years 39,000 Colombians have been the victims of kidnapping, with a rate of impunity of 92%. 37% of the kidnappings were perpetrated by the FARC and 30% by the ELN. On the other hand, a UNHCR report noted that since 1997 there have been 4.7 million forced displacements in Colombia. Furthermore, a report by the organisation "Somos defensores" (Spanish for "We are defenders") noted that in the first half of the year, 37 defenders of human rights were killed. The conclusions of the report on Historical Memory were also published, after six years of work. This document prompted President Santos to recognise the state's responsibility in the conflict and

the FARC to admit its errors throughout its long history. The report noted that between 1958 and 2012, 40,787 soldiers and 177,307 civilians lost their lives. Despite the existence of the report, the FARC called for a more comprehensive study to be carried out, in order to establish responsibility, but also expressed its desire to implement transitional justice measures.

During the year, **negotiations continued with the FARC⁴² and, in December, conditions were laid for the initiation of an exploratory stage with the ELN**, once this guerrilla group has freed several hostages. In October, the Senate approved a bill that, in the event of an eventual peace agreement with the FARC, would allow holding a referendum on the same date as the presidential elections to approve or reject the Peace Agreement. In addition, the US pledged \$68 million for the land restitution process. Some analysts believe that it would be necessary to implement a massive land titling process, to prevent the killings of the peasants who had been daring to return, in dribs and drabs, to repossess their land. Throughout the year, the government and the FARC reached agreements on the first two issues of the agreed Agenda: land reform and political participation. At the end of the year, the FARC submitted its proposals on the third topic of discussion, that of illicit drugs and crops, which would be addressed in early 2014.

Asia and the Pacific

a) South Asia

Afghanistan	
Start:	2001
Type:	System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, international coalition (led by the USA), ISAF (NATO), Taliban militias, warlords
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

The country has lived with almost uninterrupted armed conflict since the invasion by Soviet troops in 1979, beginning a civil war between the armed forces (with Soviet support) and anti-Communist, Islamist guerrillas (Mujahideen). The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 and the rise of the Mujahideen to power in 1992 in a context of chaos and internal confrontations between the different anti-Communist factions led to the emergence of the Taliban movement, which, at the end of the nineties, controlled almost all Afghan territory. In November 2001, after the Al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September, the USA invaded the country

and defeated the Taliban regime. After the signing of the Bonn agreements, an interim government was established, led by Hamid Karzai and subsequently ratified at the polls. Since 2006, there has been an escalation of violence in the country caused by the reformation of the Taliban militias. In 2011 the international troops began their withdrawal, which was scheduled for 2014.

The armed conflict in Afghanistan continued throughout the year with very high levels of violence as a result of armed clashes between the Taliban insurgency and the Afghan armed forces as well as various foreign troops, mainly US troops deployed in the country. As in previous years, **the violence had a particularly severe impact on civilians, leading to very high mortality figures**. The UN mission in the country, UNAMA, warned of an increase in civilian casualties in the report it published on the impact of the armed conflict during 2013.⁴³ This report documented the deaths of 2,959 civilians and also noted that a further 5,656 civilians had been wounded in the armed conflict, which represented a 7% increase in the number of deaths and a 17% increase in injuries relative to 2012. Moreover, in particular, the report also noted that 2013 was the worst year for women and children since 2009, with an increase of 36% in female deaths and 34% in child deaths. With regard to the mortality figures of the international troops deployed in the country, iCasualties indicates that over 160 were killed in 2013, which represents a significant decrease compared to the 402 soldiers killed in 2012 and the 566 killed in 2011. From these figures we can conclude that the conflict has impacted the civilian population much more severely. Some less conservative estimates of the impact since the conflict began state that from October 2001 to September 2013 between 51,000 and 65,000 people were killed.⁴⁴ Furthermore, an article in a US military publication on the impact of drones on the Afghan civilian population revealed that bombings by these aircraft caused ten times more civilian casualties than those conducted with manned aircraft during the period from mid-2010 to mid-2011, although no specific figures were provided since the study was prepared using classified information.⁴⁵ This information contrasted with statements made by US President Barack Obama, who defended the use of drones by claiming that they were more accurate, and therefore, had the lowest impact on the civilian population.

Throughout the year there were numerous clashes, attacks and bombings in different areas of the country. Some of the provinces most affected by the violence were Kandahar, Helmand, Wardak, Kunduz or Farah. In February, Afghan President Hamid Karzai ordered the

42. See the summary on Colombia in chapter 3 (Peace processes).

43. UNAMA, UNOHCHR, *Afghanistan annual report 2013. Protection of civilians in armed conflict*, UNAMA, UNOHCHR, February 2014, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf.

44. Costs of War Project, *Human Costs of War: Direct War Death in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan October 2001- September 2013*, Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies, http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/HMCHART_2013-10-04.pdf.

45. Larry Lewis and Sarah Holeywinski, "Changing of the Guard: Civilian Protection for an evolving Military", *PRISM*, 4, no. 2 (2013); Spencer Ackerman, "US drone strikes more deadly to Afghan civilians than manned aircraft – adviser", *The Guardian*, July 2, 2013.

expulsion of US special forces in the province of Wardak as a result of the accusations of torture and murder of Afghans by these forces. Also in February an air strike by NATO in Kunar province killed 13 people, mostly women and children. In April, in one of the year's most violent months, one of the most severe episodes of 2013 took place, when 54 people died following a Taliban suicide attack on a court in the province of Farah, leaving 90 others injured. Most of the victims were civilians. In May, a suicide bombing in Baghlan province killed 14 people, including the head of the provincial council, and an attack on a NATO convoy in Kabul caused 15 deaths, including six Americans, while another 40 were injured. In June a suicide attack on the Supreme Court in Kabul killed 17 people and injured 39 others. In July, the Ministry of Defence pointed out that due to the operations carried out in the east, 83 insurgents had been killed. During the following months, dozens of insurgents were also killed in the fighting, which also caused numerous casualties among government and international officials. Notably, in October, as a result of a roadside bomb, 18 civilians were killed, mainly women and children, while on their way to a wedding in Ghazni province, which was attributed to a Taliban attack.

The dynamics of the armed conflict were largely marked during the year by the withdrawal of part of the foreign troops that had been present in Afghanistan since 2001 and whose final withdrawal is scheduled for completion in 2014. At various times throughout the year, the US president revealed his desire to speed up the withdrawal of troops. Afghan security forces were gradually assuming greater responsibility for the counter-insurgency task and the provision of security services in the country, but the Taliban insurgency warned that it would not stop its armed attacks until the foreign military presence in the country was completely brought to an end. Numerous voices were raised warning of the risks to the country ahead of the withdrawal. The relationship with the USA also caused an internal crisis in the country after President Karzai refused to sign the bilateral security agreement (BSA) agreed with the US after months of negotiations, despite the fact that the signing of this agreement was approved by the Loya Jirga attended by 2,500 delegates to address this issue, and with many high-profile people in the country urging Karzai to do so. The president introduced new conditions for the signing of the agreement, such as the prohibition on conducting raids on Afghan homes, a commitment to holding free and fair elections on 5th April 2014 and the return of Afghan nationals detained at Guantanamo. The USA warned that the refusal to sign the agreement jeopardised the presence of its troops in the country and opened the door to a complete withdrawal of US troops. In parallel, preparations for the elections scheduled for 2014 also set the political tone in the country, particularly in the second half of the year, when the candidatures for the presidential elections were presented.

The United Nations denounced the increase in the number of civilian casualties as a result of the armed conflict in Afghanistan

India (CPI-M)	
Start:	1967
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The armed conflict in which the Indian government confronts the armed Maoist group the CPI-M (known as the Naxalites, in honour of the town where the movement was created) affects many states in India. The CPI-M emerged in West Bengal at the end of the sixties with demands relating to the eradication of the land ownership system, as well as strong criticism of the system of parliamentary democracy, which is considered as a colonial legacy. Since then, armed activity has been constant and it has been accompanied by the establishment of parallel systems of government in the areas under its control, which are basically rural ones. Military operations against this group, considered by the Indian government as terrorists, have been constant. In 2004, a negotiation process began which ended in failure. In the following years there was an escalation of violence that led the government to label the conflict as the main threat to national security. Since 2011 there has been a significant reduction in hostilities.

The conflict between the Indian security forces and the Naxalite insurgency continued throughout the year, affecting different states of the country. There was a rise in the death toll compared to 2012, although the levels seen prior to this year were not repeated, when more than a thousand victims were recorded. 421 people died in 2013, compared to 367 in 2012, according to figures compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal. **The states where the clashes took on**

a more lethal element were Chhattisgarh, with 128 violent deaths related to the armed conflict; Jharkhand, with 131; Odisha, with 54; Maharashtra, with 45; and Bihar, with 48, all of which were at the epicentre of an armed conflict that, nonetheless, has also reached other Indian states, albeit with less intensity. It is worth noting that in the state of Andhra Pradesh, where 320 deaths were recorded in 2005, only 13 deaths were reported as a result of the conflict. Of the 421 people killed during 2013, 159 were civilians, 111 were members of the security forces and 151 were insurgents. One of the most important episodes of violence occurred in January in the district of Latehar (Jharkhand), when an ambush carried out by the Naxalite insurgency caused the deaths of 10 members of the security forces and three civilians, and wounded 15 others. As a result of this attack the deployment of security forces was reinforced in the states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Jharkhand, with 18,000 additional troops being deployed. In the month of May, another of the most serious incidents of the year occurred when a Naxalite battalion attacked a convoy of members of

the Congress party in Chhattisgarh, killing one of the main party leaders in the state, Mahendra Karma, and another 27 people. Karma was one of the founders of the Salwa Judum organisation in this state, a civil militia created to combat the Maoist insurgency and responsible for numerous human rights violations. Some reports noted that up to 200 insurgents could have participated in the attack. Also in May, another serious incident occurred, when nine people died as a result of an operation led by security forces in this state. Although police said eight of the dead were Maoist insurgents, local people reported that they were civilians, including several children. Allegations of this kind have repeatedly been made by **human rights organisations, which say the civilian population has been very seriously affected by the counter-insurgency operations of the security forces.** In September another serious episode of violence was repeated in the state of Odisha, when 14 Naxalite insurgents died during an operation of the Special Operations Group in this state. In December, a landmine explosion attributed to the insurgency in Bihar state caused the deaths of seven policemen.

Besides these larger events, it is also notable that throughout the year, clashes, ambushes and attacks were once again recorded against the infrastructures or facilities of the security forces, among other forms of violence, which had a serious impact on the lives of the civilian population. It is worth noting that in Bihar, the release of various landowners acquitted of charges of being responsible for the massacre of peasants and *Dalits* resulted in separate attacks by the Maoist insurgency. Moreover, during the month of November, a massive deployment of security forces in Chhattisgarh was made during elections in the state. The Naxalite insurgency had called for these to be boycotted. In addition, noteworthy was the fact that at the end of the year the RCP faction, active in the state of Karnataka, expressed its willingness to lay down its arms and participate in the political process on two conditions: the withdrawal of all of the “false” charges against it and the creation of a climate that would favour its participation in political life. The group stated its rejection of any form of surrender. This initiative came after a group of writers, intellectuals and human rights activists contacted the government of the state to ask it to being a process of rapprochement with the insurgency in order to enter negotiations.

India (Assam)	
Start:	1983
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, ULFA, NDFB, KPLT, KLO, MULTA, HUM
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=

Summary:

The armed opposition group the ULFA emerged in 1979 with the aim of liberating the state of Assam from Indian colonisation and establishing a sovereign State. The demographic transformations the state underwent after the partition of the Indian subcontinent, with the arrival of two million people from Bangladesh, are the source of the demand from the population of ethnic Assamese origin for recognition of their cultural and civil rights and the establishment of an independent State. During the 1980s and 1990s there were various escalations of violence and failed attempts at negotiation. A peace process began in 2005, leading to a reduction in violence, but this process was interrupted in 2006, giving rise to a new escalation of the conflict. Meanwhile, during the eighties, armed groups of Bodo origin, such as the NDFB, emerged demanding recognition of their identity against the majority Assamese population. Since 2011 there has been a significant reduction in violence and numerous armed groups have laid down their arms or began talks with the government.

Throughout the year **the armed conflict between the various armed insurgent groups and the Indian security forces in the state of Assam remained subject to relatively low levels of violence.** As a result of the conflict, 101 people were recorded as having been killed, a figure that is very similar to the previous two years, in which 91 people (2012) and 94 people (2011) died. According to figures provided by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, of the 101 persons killed, 35 were civilians, six were members of the security forces and 60 belonged to a number of militant groups operating in the state, a proportion also similar to previous years. The progress made in the various negotiation processes that the Indian government has been holding with insurgent groups is the cause of these relatively low levels of violence.⁴⁶ One of the most active groups in the state was the faction of the ULFA armed opposition group which is against the negotiations and is led by Paresh Baruah, who in May announced the change of the name of the organisation to ULFA-Independent (ULFA-I), reaffirming its struggle for Assam's independence. According to the Executive, this group consists of around 240 fighters and is one of the largest in the state. Armed activity was also recorded by other organisations, such as the NDFB(R), the KPLT, the KLO, the MULTA and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, although in the case of the NDFB(R), the group declared a unilateral ceasefire in August 2011. The armed group NDFB has suffered numerous splits over the years, and it is notable that the leader of the faction of the NDFB(R) group, Ranjan Daimary, was released on bail in June to facilitate his participation in negotiations with the government. Once these negotiations have begun, the NDFB(S) will be the only faction of the NDFB not participating in them, since the NDFB (Progressive) has been engaged in talks with the government for many years. At different times throughout the year both the Indian government and the government of Assam stated that between 10 and

46. See the summary on India (Assam) in chapter 3 (Peace processes).

12 insurgent organisations remain active in the state (some of them newly formed), and that another 13 armed groups are holding talks with the government.

Goalpara district was one of those most affected by violence. In February, 12 people died, 10 as a result of shooting by the police during the demonstrations and unrest among the people of the Rabha tribe and other ethnic groups protesting against the local elections. In this district several clashes between security forces and insurgent groups were recorded. Episodes of violence linked to the armed conflict were also reported in the district of Kokrajar, one of those most affected by the conflict. In addition, the security forces intensified their operations in the border area with the state of Meghalaya, where members of the NDFB were allegedly attempting to establish a base from which to operate. Notably, in December the security forces led a security operation against the NDFB(S) on the border between the states of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, in collaboration with civil patrols and disarmed factions of the group. The NDFB(S) was attempting to increase its activity in different districts of Assam.

There was an increase in armed violence as a result of the deterioration in relations between India and Pakistan

India (Jammu and Kashmir)	
Start:	1989
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The armed conflict in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir has its origin in the dispute over the region of Kashmir which, since the independence and division of India and Pakistan, has confronted both states. On three occasions (1947 to 1948; 1965 and 1971) these countries had suffered from armed conflicts, with both of them claiming sovereignty over the region, divided between India, Pakistan and China. The armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1947 gave rise to the current division and creation of a de facto border between both countries. Since 1989, the armed conflict has been moved to the interior of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where a whole host of rebel groups, in favour of the complete independence of the state or unconditional adhesion to Pakistan, confront the Indian security forces. Since the beginning of the peace process between India and Pakistan in 2004, there has been a considerable reduction in the violence, although the armed groups remain active.

The situation in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir deteriorated during the year and there was a slight increase in the number of fatalities as a result of clashes between Indian security forces and Kashmiri armed opposition groups. The number of people killed

as a result of the armed conflict was 181, compared to 117 in 2012, and is once again at 2011 levels, when 183 people were killed, according to figures provided by the South Asia Terrorism Portal. Of the fatalities that occurred this year, 20 were civilians, 61 were members of the security forces and 100 were militants from different armed opposition groups operating in the state. It should be noted that **the dynamics of the armed conflict were conditioned largely by the deterioration in relations between the governments of India and Pakistan, especially in the second half of the year, when there were exchanges of fire between the two armies along the Line of Control, the de facto border that divides the two countries.**⁴⁷ The execution in February of Mohammed Afzal Guru, accused

of involvement in the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, led to intense social protests and clashes between police and protesters in which three people died and dozens were injured. Furthermore, the armed opposition groups JeM and LeT threatened to intensify their armed activities to avenge the execution of Guru, who always denied both his involvement in these events and his membership of the armed opposition group Jaish-e-Mohammed, which was blamed for the attack on the Parliament. The execution of Guru also earned the disapproval of the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, and of the EU.

Throughout the year, attacks and clashes between insurgents and security forces continued. In March one of the most serious episodes in recent years occurred with the attack perpetrated by the armed opposition group Hizb-ul-Mujahideen against a police base in Srinagar, close to a school. As a result of this attack, five policemen and two insurgents who participated in the attack were killed, with five other people being injured. The attack was believed to be in retaliation for the execution of Guru. In June, this armed group once again carried out new attacks on the occasion of the visit to the region of the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. Eight soldiers were killed and 14 wounded when the convoy they were travelling in was attacked in Hyderpora. Days earlier, insurgent military actions had caused the deaths of two policemen. In September there was another serious incident in which nine people died as a result of an insurgent attack on a police station in Samba. The Indian government said that the intention of this attack was to hinder the talks with Pakistan at a time of high tension between the two governments. In November, two policemen were shot dead by suspected members of the armed group LeT, in Avantipur. At the same time as these clashes, social protests also occurred throughout the year. The protests noted above in connection with the execution of Guru were compounded by the insurgency's call to close all shops during Singh's visit to the state. There were also notable demonstrations as a result of the arrest

47. See the summary on India – Pakistan in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

of two young men in the town of Shopian accused of inciting violence, which eventually led to their release after four days of protests. The murder of an activist from the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference party and the Kashmiri separatist leader Sardar Arif Shahid in April and May respectively, also resulted in social outrage. Shahid was killed in Rawalpindi, in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

India (Manipur)	
Start:	1982
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, PREPAK (Pro), KNF, KNA, KYKL, RPF, UPPK, PCP
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The armed conflict which confronts the government against the various armed groups that operate in the state, and several of them against each other, has its origin in the demands for the independence of various of these groups, as well as the existing tensions between the various ethnic groups that live in the state. In the 1960s and 70s several armed groups were created, some with a Communist inspiration and others with ethnic origins, groups which were to remain active throughout the forthcoming decades. On the other hand, the regional context, in a state that borders with Nagaland, Assam and Myanmar, also marked the development of the conflict in Manipur and the tension between the ethnic Manipur groups and the Nagaland population which would be constant. The economic impoverishment of the state and its isolation with regard to the rest of the country contributed decisively to consolidate a grievance feeling in the Manipur population.

There was a marked reduction in the violence affecting the state of Manipur where various insurgent organisations are combating the Indian security forces. As a result of this reduction, the number of fatal victims of the armed conflict was significantly reduced and throughout 2013 only 55 deaths were recorded compared to 110 in 2012, according to figures compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal. Of the 55 people who died in 2013, 28 were insurgents, 21 were civilians and six were members of the state security forces, although the number of dead insurgents has traditionally been questioned by human rights organisations, which say that the official numbers conceal a greater number of civilian casualties intentionally classified as armed opponents. Moreover, around 200 armed insurgents from different organisations surrendered and laid down their arms. Throughout the year, sporadic clashes and attacks occurred in different parts of the state. The PLA armed opposition group staged a number of attacks, such as the one that took place in February in the district of Churachandpur which killed one soldier, or the one in the village of Chandel which also killed another soldier, while another three people were

injured by the simultaneous explosion of two bombs. In September, an attack in Imphal, for which the PLA also claimed responsibility, killed eight people, all of them migrant workers. The foreign-born population in Manipur have increasingly become a target of violent attacks. Moreover, in the field of human rights, March saw the conclusion of the investigations by the Justice Commission into the first six of a total of 1,528 cases of alleged extrajudicial executions carried out by the armed forces. In September 2012 the association of families that have been a victim of extrajudicial executions submitted a list of cases since 1979. In addition, alongside the fighting, there were numerous social protests, some of them organised by the armed insurgency, mostly to demand reforms in the administrative organisation of the state, particularly the creation of a Kuki state, or the establishment of specific institutions for the Naga people inhabiting Manipur.

Pakistan	
Start:	2001
Type:	System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias, USA
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

The armed conflict that affects the country is linked to the armed conflict in Afghanistan after the US bombings of 2001. Initially, the main setting of the conflict was the area that includes the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) –which had remained inaccessible to the Pakistan government until 2002, when the first military operations were started in the area– and the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region (formerly known as North West Frontier Province). Nevertheless, it has gradually spread throughout the territory with continuous attacks by the Taliban rebel forces. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, members of the Taliban militias, with alleged connections to al-Qaeda, took refuge in the north west of Pakistan, which led to large-scale military operations of the Pakistani armed forces (almost 50,000 soldiers were deployed) with the support of the USA. The local population, mainly of Pashtun ethnic origin, have been accused of offering support to combatants from Afghanistan. Since the first operations in 2002, the violence has been on the increase.

Throughout the year Pakistan recorded **high levels of violence** as a result of the conflict between the Pakistani authorities and the Taliban insurgency operating mainly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, although the violence also affected other parts of the country. Throughout the year, there were hints of a possibility of talks between the insurgents and the government, however, in the end these were not held. **The killing of the Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud by a US drone in North Waziristan on 1st November, a day before the start of talks with the government, thwarted, at least in the short term, any possibility of negotiation.** Between January and November there were 5,390 violent

deaths throughout the country according to figures from the Center for Research and Security Studies in Pakistan.⁴⁸ Especially severe were the months of May and June with more than 600 deaths, respectively. In October, a considerable decrease in the number of people killed by the armed conflict was recorded, which was calculated at 291. Civilians continued to be the most affected by the violence, with the majority of recorded deaths being of civilians, followed by members of insurgent groups. The figures provided by the Asian Human Rights Commission stated that between January and November, throughout the whole country a total of 7,170 people died as a result of the operations of the security forces (1,526), terrorist attacks (2,286), suicide attacks (820), sectarian violence and targeted assassinations (2,350) and drone operations (188). In addition, over 8,700 people were injured as a result of these acts of violence.

The assassination of the Pakistani Taliban leader by a US drone eliminated the possibility of peace talks between the government and the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan

Throughout the year, there were clashes between the armed forces and the Taliban insurgency, as well as between rival insurgent groups, such as those that caused the deaths of over 80 people in the month of January between the TTP and the Taliban militia group Ansar ul-Islam. **Suicide attacks on military targets were also a constant threat, and caused dozens of deaths in areas such as North Waziristan or in the city of Peshawar. It is worth noting that many civilians were affected by these attacks, which were indiscriminate.** Along with the high mortality rates, serious displacements of the population also occurred as a result of the violence. In April, the UN highlighted that 43,000 people had been forcibly displaced from their homes in Tirah Valley (a Khyber agency of the FATA) as a result of the escalation of clashes between rival militias. These confrontations led the army to launch a special operation in early April in the Tirah Valley, with dozens of deaths. A few days later, the army placed the number of insurgents killed at over a hundred and its own casualties at around twenty as a result of the ground-based military campaign in the area, which according to the army made it possible to regain control of the valley from the Taliban group TTP. The city of Peshawar was also particularly affected by the violence, with numerous attacks throughout the year, but particularly during the month of September, when a wave of attacks was recorded in a single week that left more than a hundred people dead. The most serious of these was the suicide bombing of a church, claimed by two Taliban organisations, Jandullah and Jand-ul-Hafsa, in which 85 people died as a result of the simultaneous explosion of two bombs. Days later, a bus bombing resulted in the deaths of 19 public employees in the city and 42 people were injured. A third attack days later at a shopping centre in the city caused the deaths of 42 people and wounded 107, when a car bomb exploded. The year ended with a large-scale operation by the security forces

in North Waziristan, which according to the latter killed 30 insurgents, a figure that was contested by the local population which reported that up to 70 civilians may have died as a result of the military action. The operation came in response to a suicide attack on a checkpoint on 18th December, for which the armed opposition group Mujahideen-Ansarul, linked to the Taliban insurgency, had claimed responsibility and which killed five people and wounded 34. The group said the attack was an act of revenge for the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud, a Taliban leader who died in a US drone attack in November. In parallel to the clashes between insurgents and the armed forces and the terrorist attacks, **bombings carried out by US drones continued in the tribal areas of the country and caused heavy casualties.** According to figures compiled by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, between 112 and 193 people have died in 2013 in such attacks. Most notably, there was a drastic reduction in the number of civilians killed as a result of these bombings, as only two civilians died in 2013. Worthy of note is the fact that in November the Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud was killed, which led to the cancellation of the peace talks planned with the Pakistani government. The Taliban leader, Mullah Fazlullah, who replaced Mehsud as head of the organisation, ruled out any possibility that it could initiate peace talks with the government after what had happened.

Pakistan (Balochistan)	
Start:	2005
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Government, BLA, BRA, BLF, BLT, Jundullah, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:

Since the creation of the state of Pakistan in 1947, Balochistan, the richest province in terms of natural resources, but with some of the highest levels of poverty in the country, has suffered from four periods of armed violence (1948, 1958, 1963-69 and 1973-77) in which the rebel forces stated their objective of obtaining greater autonomy and even independence. In 2005, the armed rebel forces reappeared on the scene, basically attacking infrastructures linked to the extraction of gas. The opposition armed group, BLA, became the main opposing force to the presence of the central government, which it accused of making the most of the wealth of the province without giving any of it back to the local population. As a result of the resurgence of the armed opposition, a military operation was started in 2005 in the province, causing displacement of the civilian population and armed confrontation. The violence in the province has been exacerbated by the growing presence of the Taliban insurgency, as well as the increase in sectarian violence.

48. This figure refers to all the armed conflicts and tensions in Pakistan as a whole. Please see the summaries, in Pakistan in this chapter and in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

The Pakistani province of Balochistan continued to experience high levels of violence throughout the year as a result of the different foci of violence affecting it. **Hundreds of people died in the attacks and clashes between the security forces and the nationalist insurgency, but also as a result of the sectarian violence which in recent years has been growing in the province and also due to the increasing presence of the Taliban insurgency in the area.** Moreover, allegations of forced disappearances also continued to be made. Human rights organisations report that this has been a common practice since 2001 and that in this time 14,000 people have disappeared. Throughout the year there were clashes and attacks, including attacks on infrastructure and government facilities. The elections on 11th May largely set the tone of the conflict with the Baloch nationalist insurgency during the first half of the year. Prior to the elections, a large scale security operation was carried out in anticipation of possible attacks aiming to derail the elections, and various parties reported receiving threats, particularly from the armed opposition group BLA. In addition, possible actions were expected by Jundullah, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the first two also linked to the Taliban insurgency.

Sectarian violence in Pakistan's Balochistan province caused hundreds of deaths

It is worth noting that as a result of the general elections held in Pakistan in May, the newly elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, appointed Abdul Malik as chief minister for Balochistan, from the Baloch nationalist National Party, in an attempt to build bridges with nationalists in the province. However, in mid-June the BLA carried out an attack on an old building known to have been used as a retreat by the country's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Following the attack a policeman died. The attackers replaced the Pakistani flag with the flag of the BLA, in an attempt to reassert the secessionist aspirations of the armed group. Although the scope of the attack was limited, it had symbolic importance as it occurred after the appointment of the new chief minister of the province. Another serious attack was perpetrated by the BLA in August, when 13 bus passengers were shot. The armed group had argued that they held military or other security credentials. Another attack in January, claimed by the armed opposition group United Baluch Army, killed 12 members of the security forces in a commercial area of Quetta. Furthermore, after the earthquake that took place in September killing 400 people and injuring hundreds more, and which affected up to 300,000 people, the Pakistani government appealed to the Baloch nationalist insurgency to put an end to its armed attacks in order to facilitate humanitarian tasks.

As regards the sectarian violence in the country, throughout the year a number of very serious attacks took place that left hundreds dead. In January one of the most serious attacks of the year took place when several devices exploded at a local billiards hall in the city of Quetta, causing around 100 deaths. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the armed group Lashkar-e-

Jhangvi, which also claimed responsibility for another attack in February that killed 85 others when a bomb exploded in a market in an area of the city inhabited mostly by the Hazara population, which is predominantly of the Shiite faith. As a result of the attack in January, the provincial government was dismissed following the complaints of the Shiite community, the main victim of the attacks by this Sunni armed group. The actions of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi continued throughout the year and increased during the month of June with several more attacks. The double bombing in Quetta against a bus in which several students were travelling and later against the hospital where the victims were being treated killed 24 people and led to clashes with security forces. Later that month, another double bombing also in Quetta, involving the throwing of a grenade and a subsequent suicide attack on a mosque near a Shiite neighbourhood, killed 20 people and injured 60 others. In August, coinciding with the celebration of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr, a shooting at a Sunni mosque killed at least nine people and 20 others were injured in an attack for which no group has yet claimed responsibility, but which had targeted a former provincial minister of the PPP party, who was unharmed. Days earlier, an attack on a mosque during the celebration of the funeral of a policeman who died in a shootout, killed 30 people, of which at least 21 were policemen. More than 60 people were injured. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the armed Taliban opposition group TTP.

a) South-east Asia and Oceania

Myanmar	
Start:	1948
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, armed groups (KNU/ KNLA, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNPLAC, SSNPLO, KIO)
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓

Summary:

Since 1948, dozens of armed insurgent groups of ethnic origin have confronted the government of Myanmar, demanding recognition of their particular ethnic and cultural features and calling for reforms in the territorial structure of the State or simply for independence. Since the start of the military dictatorship in 1962, the armed forces have been fighting armed groups in the ethnic states. These groups combined demands for self-determination for minorities with calls for democratisation shared with the political opposition. In 1988, the government began a process of ceasefire agreements with some of the insurgent groups, allowing them to pursue their economic activities (basically trafficking in drugs and precious stones). However, the military operations have been constant during these decades, particularly directed against the civil population in order to do away with the armed groups' bases, leading

to the displacement of thousands of people. In 2011 the Government began to approach the insurgency and since then there has been a ceasefire agreements with almost all of the armed groups.

The intensity of the armed conflict between the armed forces of Myanmar and various ethnic armed groups decreased significantly over 2013 as a result of the different negotiation processes with the armed opposition and especially after the agreement reached between the government and the Kachin armed opposition group KIO on 30th May.⁴⁹ Although sporadic clashes were reported throughout the year, especially between the armed forces and the KIO, **the progress made in various peace negotiations with the majority of the armed groups operating in the country led to the virtual disappearance of armed violence.** Although during the first months of the year the fighting between the KIO and government forces was more intense, causing the displacement of thousands of people, this reduced gradually during the year as the various stages of the negotiations were entered. In January there were major clashes and the bases of the armed group located in the town of Laiza were repeatedly bombarded, with several civilians dying from these attacks. On 18th January, the government announced a unilateral ceasefire, which it subsequently broke when it carried out air strikes two days later, although at the end of the first month of the year it was announced that the government and the rebels had returned to the peace talks, which at China's urging led to the signing of a seven-point agreement on 30th May. After signing the agreement, sporadic clashes were once again reported.

Noteworthy is the fact that **on 24th December the military launched an offensive against the KIO in southern Kachin state, which led both the armed group and humanitarian organisations on the ground to warn that the deliberate renewal of the violence by the army threatened the continuity of the peace talks** and even the ceasefire agreement for the country as a whole. As a result of the fighting, the civilian population in the area was forced to move. Prior to this offensive at the end of the year, the KIO had highlighted the need to establish a military code of conduct to avoid the skirmishes that had been occurring repeatedly since the agreement had been reached with the government. In September, the United Nations gained access to the Laiza area via two humanitarian convoys, an area that was severely affected by violence until the month of February. This was the first time the area had received humanitarian aid since December 2011. As regards the other insurgent groups, it is notable that in September the armed opposition group SSA-North reported that more than a dozen attacks had been carried out by government forces. Moreover, it should be highlighted that the year ended without a global ceasefire agreement having been reached in the country with all of the insurgent organisations, despite the efforts made in this regard.

Philippines (NPA)	
Start:	1969
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Government, NPA
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=

Summary:

The NPA, the armed branch of the Communist party of the Philippines, started the armed fight in 1969 which reached its zenith during the 1980s under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. Although the internal purges, the democratisation of the country and the offers of amnesty weakened the support and the legitimacy of the NPA at the beginning of the 1990s, it is currently calculated that it is operational in most of the provinces in the country. After the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, its inclusion in the list of terrorist organisations of the USA and the EU greatly eroded confidence between the parties and, to a good degree, caused the interruption of the peace conversations with Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's government. The NPA, whose main objective is to access power and the transformation of the political system and the socio-economic model, has as its political references the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front (NDF), which bring together various Communist organisations. The NDF has been holding peace talks with the government since the early 1990s.

In addition to the derailment of the negotiation process between the government and the NDF and the constant accusations exchanged between the parties,⁵⁰ regular clashes continued to be reported in many provinces across the country between the armed forces and the NPA. As in previous years, Manila indicated that its counter-insurgency strategy (called Oplan Bayanihan) had clearly weakened the group and led to a number of surrenders and desertions. According to the Philippine government, the group currently has about 4,000 fighters (it once had around 25,000) and during the term of the current president the activity of the NPA was neutralised in 29 provinces. Meanwhile, the armed group stated that its military capacity and social support were strengthened during 2013 and that its goal for 2014 was to increase the number of fighters to 25,000 and raise the number of military fronts from the current 110 to 200, distributed throughout 71 of the 81 provinces. Although the year began with the longest truce in recent times (from 20th December 2012 to 15th January 2013), the numerous violations of the truce by both sides, as well as the collapse of the negotiation process earlier in the year, caused the fighting to increase and to become remarkably virulent at specific points of the year. In late March, coinciding with the celebration of the 44th anniversary of the founding of the guerrilla group, the NPA conducted several coordinated attacks in the Davao region. Fighting also intensified between July and September after the NPA declared its intention to regain control over one of its traditional

49. See the summary on Myanmar on chapter 3 (Peace processes).

50. See the summary on the Philippines (NPA) in chapter 3 (Peace processes).

strongholds in northern Mindanao and after the government ordered a high-intensity offensive against the insurgency. As regards military matters, also worthy of note was the truce declared by the NPA between 8th November and 24th December (originally scheduled to end on 24th November and subsequently extended for another month) due to the devastation caused by Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as “Yolanda”). Despite the truce, which was enforced only in the areas most affected by the typhoon in order to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, the government repeatedly accused the NPA of not respecting the ceasefire and of attacking convoys and government units engaged in humanitarian work. Meanwhile, the NPA claimed that the government had not signed any truce nor had it decreased the intensity of its counter-insurgency operations in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon. At the end of the year, the government declared a unilateral suspension of military and police operations between 21st December and 15th January, while the NPA declared a truce for six days over the Christmas holiday, in keeping with its practice over the last few years.

The government continued to accuse the NPA of systematically violating international humanitarian law through practices such as kidnapping, attacks on civilians, public executions and inadequate identification of its fighters. In June, for example, the government increased the state of alert in Mindanao after it was revealed that the NPA had bought around 1,000 police uniforms or camouflage with the intention of impersonating state security forces and thereby operating with greater ease. However, the issues that caused the greatest concern and criticism by the government were the use of landmines, the recruitment of children and the extortion of businesses, civilians and politicians. As regards the use of mines, according to official figures released later this year, since 2010 nearly 130 people have died and 325 have been injured by the explosion of mines detonated by the NPA. In December, the military dismantled the largest production centre of this type of weaponry operated by the NPA in Agusan del Sur and seized 163 mines. On the other hand, the government also repeatedly accused the NPA of recruiting children. In this regard, it is worth highlighting the publication of a report by the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, on the use of children in the Philippines which documents the recruitment and use of 23 under age boys and three under age girls in 2012, a substantially lower figure than in 2011. Most of these cases involve the NPA and Abu Sayyaf (with 11 cases each), while the MILF and the armed forces were responsible for two cases, respectively. The report also notes that 29 children were killed and 37 were injured in 2012 as a result of the different armed conflicts. The armed forces were implicated in 14 cases, the MILF in four cases, the NPA in three and Abu Sayyaf in one. The United Nations expressed satisfaction with the Philippine government's progress in designing and implementing a plan for the prevention of the recruitment of children, but also expressed

concern about the use by the armed forces of schools as temporary military camps. The NPA said that it does not recruit children as combatants, but acknowledged that it does recruit them for informational or courier purposes. As for the accusations of extortion, the government stated that since 1998, the NPA has raised over EUR 25 million through the extortion of politicians and businesses. In this sense, Manila urged the candidates who participated in the local elections in late October not to give in to extortion attempts. Manila also reported that the increase in attacks and extortion against large mining, agricultural and other enterprises by the NPA was causing serious damage to the national economy.

Meanwhile, the NPA also accused the government of numerous human rights violations and believed that the current counter-insurgency strategy is as violent and militaristic as those led by former Philippine governments. The NPA accused the government of extrajudicial killings, attacking civilians and then trying to convince the public that they were combatants, of having more than 400 political prisoners (which includes 13 NDF advisors who it believes are covered by the agreement guaranteeing immunity) and of frequently employing the tactic of aerial bombardment, which according to the group has had a serious impact on the civilian population.

Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf)	
Start:	1991
Type:	Self-government, Identity, System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, Abu Sayyaf
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=

Summary:

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Abu Sayyaf group has been fighting to establish an independent Islamic state in the Sulu Archipelago and the western regions of Mindanao (south). Although it initially recruited hostile members of other armed groups such as the MILF or the MNLF, it later moved away ideologically from both organisations and more systematically resorted to kidnapping, extortion, decapitating and bomb attacks, which led it to be included in the list of the USA and EU terrorist organisations. The government conceded that its counterinsurgency strategy of recent years had greatly weakened the group's leadership and military capacity, however at the same time it warned that Abu Sayyaf continued to be a threat for the state due to the numerous resources that it obtains from kidnapping and from its alleged alliance with organisations that are considered to be terrorist ones, such as Al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah.

The number of fatalities caused by clashes between the armed forces and Abu Sayyaf decreased from the previous year, but the government recognised that the group's existence remained a major threat to the internal security of the country. During the summer, the government declared that its target of neutralizing

the armed group by 2016 continued on track and that currently the organisation Abu Sayyaf had 385 members (14 less than last year), and also that its activities were concentrated mainly in the regions of Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga and Tawi-Tawi. Since the inception of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (called the Bayanihan, initiated in 2011), 175 Abu Sayyaf members had been neutralised. Beyond its mere military strength and the impact of Abu Sayyaf's armed actions against the civilian population, statements made at different times of the year by various government institutions indicate that there are three aspects laying behind Manila's concern in relation to this relatively small organisation. Firstly, its collusion and ability to partner with other groups in the region. In this regard, worthy of note is the emergence during the year of the armed opposition group Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao, which the government claims was formed largely from members of Abu Sayyaf; the joint attacks perpetrated by Abu Sayyaf and the BIFF (a splinter group of the MILF) in Basilan province in September; or the accusations by the Philippine government that some MILF commanders (such as Malista Malanka) were working closely with Abu Sayyaf on all kinds of criminal activities. A second aspect of concern for Manila is the increasing use by Abu Sayyaf of extortion and kidnapping. Note that a significant part of the clashes between the two sides occurs during army operations to rescue hostages. In 2013, Abu Sayyaf freed a number of people, although the armed forces have declared their intention to undertake all necessary efforts to free the estimated 17 people who are still in the hands of the group. Earlier this year, the leader and founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari said that the activities of Abu Sayyaf were tolerated by the government to allow it to justify its military operations in the region and keep tourists and businesses away from Mindanao. Misuari even declared that state agents were involved in the kidnapping of people in urban areas who were then handed over to Abu Sayyaf, a group whose access to certain cities was severely restricted. Finally, another aspect of Abu Sayyaf's actions that causes concern among the Philippine government is the expansion of the group's activities beyond the borders of the Philippines. In 2013, as in the past, Malaysia condemned the kidnapping and murder of a tourist, allegedly perpetrated by the group. In addition, in December, the Malaysian police stated that they were on high alert due to the possibility that outside groups, including Abu Sayyaf and the MNLF, could carry out attacks on the eastern coast of the state of Sabah.

As regards the military effort, the moments of greatest intensity were experienced in the months of February, May and September. **In February, clashes between Abu Sayyaf and the MNLF in Sulu caused the deaths of between 26 and 37 fighters** from both groups (according to sources)

The government of the Philippines stated that its target of neutralizing Abu Sayyaf by 2016 continued on track

and the displacement of hundreds of people. The intensity of this violent episode was exacerbated by the decapitation of eight MNLF fighters. Several sources said the clashes began when an MNLF commander tried to mediate the release of two journalists who had been held captive for months in the jungles of Jolo. Manila stated that the rescue operation by the MNLF was performed without

the knowledge or consent of the government.

In May, 16 people were killed, including seven soldiers, and 24 others were injured in the south of the country during clashes between the army and the armed group. In September, 150 Abu Sayyaf and BIFF fighters carried out several attacks in the region of Lamitan, in Basilan province. Although initially it was speculated that these attacks were a continuation of the MNLF offensive on the city of Zamboanga,⁵¹ eventually it was determined that the two incidents were not connected. Moreover, the government accused Abu Sayyaf, among other organisations such as the BIFF and Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao, of being behind the consecutive detonation of five explosive devices in the middle of the year at various locations in Mindanao, in which 16 people were killed and 80 were injured.

Thailand (south)	
Start:	2004
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, secessionist opposition armed groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:

The conflict in the south of Thailand dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, when the then Kingdom of Siam and the British colonial power on the Malaysian peninsula decided to split the Sultanate of Pattani, leaving some territories under the sovereignty of what is currently Malaysia and others (the southern provinces of Songkhla, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat) under Thai sovereignty. During the entire 20th century, there had been groups that had fought to resist the policies of political, cultural and religious homogenisation promoted by Bangkok or to demand the independence of these provinces, of Malay-Muslim majority. The conflict reached its moment of culmination in the 1960s and 70s and decreased in the following decades, thanks to the democratisation of the country. However, the coming into power of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001, involved a drastic turn in the counterinsurgency policy and preceded a breakout of armed conflict from which the region has been suffering since 2004. The civil population, whether Buddhist or Muslim, is the main victim of the violence, which is not normally vindicated by any group.

Despite the commencement of peace negotiations earlier in the year, and the attempt to agree a truce during the month of Ramadan,⁵² the levels of violence

51. See the summary on the Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF) in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

52. See the summary on Thailand in chapter 3 (Peace processes).

in southern Thailand were similar to those in previous years. **According to official data, between the start of the conflict in 2004 and July 2013, 5,235 people were killed and more than 9,700 were wounded in the south of the country.** More than half of those killed were Muslims. According to the research centre Deep South Watch, since the conflict began in 2004 and until August 2013, 5,377 people have died and over 9,500 have been injured in almost 12,400 violent clashes. According to other sources, the number of fatalities is significantly higher. In late June, Deep South Watch reported that 240 people had died and 460 had been wounded in more than 800 violent incidents recorded in the first months of 2013. This centre also stated that the percentage of civilian casualties had declined from previous years, while those of state agents had increased. In this regard, notable was the bomb attack in mid-2013 in which eight soldiers were killed, one of the largest losses suffered by the armed forces in recent years. In December, five soldiers were killed and 12 others were also injured by the detonation of an explosive device. Other notable violent incidents during the year involved the killing of 16 soldiers in an attack on a military barracks in Narathiwat earlier in the year (which caused a series of 30 simultaneous attacks in the region by insurgent groups), the detonation in December of three consecutive bombs at a hotel and at two police stations in Songkhla province (traditionally the least affected by the violence), and the murder of the deputy governor of Yala in April. In late December, the police claimed to have found a vehicle with a substantial explosive payload parked in a police station on Pukhet island, one of the largest tourist destinations in the whole of Southeast Asia. As in previous years, the daily violence affecting the predominantly Muslim southern provinces led to the closure of dozens of schools and the extension of the government's declaration of a state of emergency, a legal measure which has been renewed on more than 30 occasions and often receives criticism from human rights organisations who believe it encourages impunity among the armed forces.

As regards military operations, one of the developments in 2013 with respect to previous years was the **agreement between the government and the BRN (the group that is engaged in peace talks to reduce the levels of violence in southern Thailand during the month of Ramadan)** between 10th July and 18th August. Although the agreement was not binding, both parties considered the initiative to be an opportunity to demonstrate their degree of sincerity and commitment to the dialogue process. Under the agreement, the BRN committed to reducing its use of attacks with explosive devices and the number of attacks on civilians. For its part, the government agreed to reduce the intensity of its counter-insurgency operations, to replace its troops with police in certain regions and to move certain prisoners closer to their home regions. During the above-mentioned

According to official figures from the Thai government, between the start of the conflict in 2004 and July 2013, 5,235 people were killed and more than 9,700 were wounded in the south

violence reduction period, both sides accused one another of repeatedly violating the agreement and there were periods of intense violence, such as the significant increase in attacks with explosive devices detonated remotely registered between late July and early August. The BRN even went so far as to suspend its participation in the peace negotiations in early August. Some media and research centres, echoing local sources, stated that some of the violence that occurred during this time was led or instigated by government agents, while others, such as the murder of a prominent Imam in early August, had the clear objective of derailing the peace talks. Despite all this, following the conclusion of Ramadan, the Internal Security Operations Command announced that the number of fatalities during this period was the lowest since 2007. Meanwhile, the Deep South Watch organisation was optimistic regarding the future of the dialogue process because the percentage of civilian deaths had fallen since the beginning of the talks and because, according to a survey conducted in June, more than half of the population in the south supported the ongoing peace talks between the government and the BRN.

Europe

a) Caucasus and Russia

Russia (Chechnya)	
Start:	1999
Type:	Self-government, Identity, System Internal
Main parties:	Russian federal government, Chechen republic government, opposition armed groups
Intensity:	1
Trend:	End

Summary:

After the so-called first Chechen War (1994-1996), which confronted the Russian Federation with the Chechen Republic mainly with regard to the independence of Chechnya (self proclaimed in 1991 within the framework of the decomposition of the USSR) and which ended in a peace treaty that did not resolve the status of Chechnya, the conflict re-appeared in 1999, in the so-called second Chechen War, triggered off by some incursions into Dagestan by Chechen rebels and attacks in Russian cities. In a pre-election context and with an anti-terrorist discourse, the Russian army entered Chechnya again to fight against the moderate pro-independent regime which arose after the first war and which was, at the same time, devastated by internal disputes and growing criminality. Russia finished the war in 2001, without an agreement or a definitive victory, and favoured an autonomous status in 2003 and a Chechen pro-Russian administration. Violence continued in following years, although in the form of low-level violence. In parallel, there was a process of growing

Islamisation of the Chechen rebel ranks and the armed fighting acquired regional dimension, especially affecting neighbouring Dagestan. Ramzan Kadyrov's presidency, in office since 2007, has overseen serious human rights violations against the population, according to reports from local organisations, and measures of collective punishment and indiscriminate repression.

Fatalities related to the conflict that pits the Chechen and Russian authorities against the armed insurgency in Chechnya decreased, which led to the case no longer being considered an active armed conflict. Even so, Chechnya continued to be affected by the pattern in previous years of serious human rights violations and abuses by the security forces of the Chechen administration, as reported by local organisations. Regarding the conflict between the administration and the insurgency, **in 2013 at least 39 people were killed and 62 others wounded**, according to the independent website Caucasian Knot, which nonetheless warned of the serious problems in obtaining information in Chechnya, unlike in other neighbouring republics. In 2012 at least 82 people were killed, while in 2011 there were 95 fatalities. Frequent anti-terrorist operations were carried out during the year. Among the most serious episodes, worthy of note were the **clashes in the Vedeno (south) region at the end of January which killed fifteen people, the majority of them rebels**, as well as two policemen, and wounded eight members of the security forces, according to official figures. The figures offered by media sources close to the insurgency indicated that 15 officers were killed or wounded. Among the victims were two suspected insurgents described by Russian authorities as two of the most wanted rebels: the Gakayev brothers. One of these, Khusein Gakayev, was considered to be a lieutenant of the most senior leader of the insurgency in the North Caucasus, the Chechen Dokku Umarov. In a video message released on the Internet in December, Umarov praised both brothers as an example for the insurgency. In turn, the video served to confirm that Umarov was still alive, following renewed claims by Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov of his death. Other acts of violence during the year included a suicide car bomb attack against a police station in Sernovodsk in September, killing three policemen and wounding four others, in the first suicide attack since August last year. **In July, Umarov announced the end of the moratorium on attacks against civilians in Russia, introduced in January 2012. He also urged the North Caucasus insurgency to prevent the Winter Olympic Games from being held**, scheduled for February 2014 in the Russian city of Sochi, near the North Caucasus.

Moreover, in relation to the federal administration's strategies regarding the insurgency, in November the Russian president signed a controversial law amending the Criminal Code, expanding the number of offences

that are considered terrorism, opening the door to harsher prison sentences and holding the families and loved ones of suspected insurgents liable for the payment of financial compensation for damages. The parliamentary process for the approval of the law was brought forward after an attack in the Russian region of Volgograd in October in which six people were killed and 30 wounded, and in the context of the run-up to the Winter Olympic Games.⁵³ In any case, in the region of Chechnya relatives of suspected insurgents have for years been victims of collective punishment measures, including the burning of their houses and the removal of their pension payments and subsidies. Meanwhile, the **Chechen Deputy Minister of the Interior, Apti Alaudinov, said in December that he had unlimited powers granted directly by the Chechen president to fight the insurgency, including authorisation to kill or detain anyone having the appearance of a "militant Islamist"**, as well as planting false evidence. Alaudinov conveyed this message to local agents in the town of Urus-Martan, a region that remains a bastion of the armed insurgency.

Thus, **the internal situation in Chechnya continued to be marked by the climate of terror felt by the population regarding abuses by the authorities**, as human rights defenders and analysts have repeatedly stated, who once again highlighted the serious regression in women's human rights under Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov. The context of serious human rights violations continued to force the Chechen population to flee and seek refuge in other countries. According to German media reports cited by RFE/RL, in 2013 the number of asylum applications to Germany made by Chechens increased significantly. According to official German figures published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, between January and June 2013 nearly 10,000 people of Russian nationality requested asylum (compared to 3,200 in the whole of 2012), of which about 90% were Chechens. Warnings on the rise of xenophobia in Russia towards Russians originating from the Caucasus also increased, including the continuous representation on television of the Chechen population as an enemy of Russia. Moreover, a report by three organisations (the Russian organisation Public Verdict Foundation, the Committee Against Torture and the French Association of Christians for the Abolition of Torture) found that the use of torture in Russia, including in the North Caucasus, is common and routine. The section on Chechnya highlighted the abundance of cases of torture and abuse used to extract confessions, the killing of people who are then subsequently reclassified as insurgents, and also warned of the high levels of impunity.⁵⁴ Also, according to Caucasian Knot, between 18,000 and 20,000 people are still missing in Chechnya, compared to the figure of 1,611 claimed by the authorities. Moreover, **in 2013 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered 14 judgments on complaints from citizens**

53. See the summary on Russia in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

54. Caucasian Knot, "French human rights defenders claim power agents use torture against residents of Northern Caucasus," *Caucasian Knot*, November 16, 2013, <http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/26385/>.

of Chechnya and Ingushetia regarding violations of human rights. In all of these, it highlighted a failure to investigate the allegations. Local activists indicated that, in any case, there could be hundreds of cases of complaints pending resolution. Among these judgments, for the very first time the court found in favour of the family of a person who was kidnapped by security forces in Chechnya in 2009. The victim is still missing. It was the first time that Chechen forces, under Kadyrov's control, were indicted in a case before the European court. In another case, the court ordered Russia to pay EUR 1.16 million to Chechen residents for the air strike launched by Russia in 2000 in the town of Aslanbek-Sheripovo (Shatogoy district), in which 18 family members of the 13 complainants were killed and three of them, as well as other family members, were injured. In other cases the court ordered Russia to compensate Chechen citizens for their missing relatives.

Counter-insurgency operations in the Republic of Dagestan, in Russia, had a heavy impact on the population, while at the same time the persecution of Salafi civilians increased

Russia (Dagestan)	
Start:	2010
Type:	System, Self-government, Identity, Internal
Main parties:	Russian federal government, Dagestan republic government, opposition armed groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Summary:	
Dagestan, which is the largest, most highly populated republic in the north of the Caucasus, and with the greatest ethnic diversity, has been facing an increase in conflicts since the end of the 1990s. The armed rebel forces of an Islamic nature which defend the creation of an Islamic state in the north of the Caucasus, confront the local and federal authorities, in the context of periodical attacks and counterinsurgency operations. The armed opposition is headed by a network of armed units of an Islamist nature known as Sharia Jamaat. The armed violence in Dagestan is the result of a group of factors, including the regionalisation of the Islam rebel forces from Chechnya as well as the local climate in Dagestan of violations of human rights, often set within the "fight against terrorism". All of this takes place in a fragile social and political context, of social ill due to the abuses of power and the high levels of unemployment and poverty, despite the wealth of natural resources. This is made even more complicated by interethnic tensions, rivalry for political power and violence of a criminal nature.	

Dagestan continued to be scene of most of the insurgent and counter-insurgent violence in the North Caucasus, with almost daily violent incidents and a balance of more than 340 people dead and 300 wounded (compared to 405 killed and 290 wounded in 2012), according to the independent website Caucasian Knot. In turn, the conflict had a serious impact in terms of human rights, with **numerous reports of abuses by security forces**, in a year in which the offensive against rebel groups rose

partly in anticipation of the celebration of the Winter Olympics in February 2014 in the Russian city of Sochi. The patterns of violence during the year included, as in previous years, special counter-terrorism operations, targeted killings by the insurgency, suicide bombings and shootings, among others. In regard to counter-insurgency operations, many militants were killed by security forces in the context of ongoing security operations, including characters considered to be local insurgent leaders. Thus, in February the rebel leader in the northern sector of Dagestan, Daniyal Zargalov, known as Emir Seifullah, was killed. In May the local leader of Gubden, Magomed Abdusaidov, was killed in a special operation. Also killed was the leader of the local Buynaksh insurgency, Bamatkhan Sheikhov, who died in a special operation in August in which ten other insurgents lost their lives. In September, police killed a rebel leader and another insurgent from a local group in the Kadar area; and in that same month the police killed five suspected insurgents in the city of Derbent (south), including the local rebel leader Sharif Akhmedov. Moreover, the Dagestani insurgency denied any connection with the attack in Boston (USA) against the Marathon in April, which caused three deaths and over 260 injuries. Two brothers of Dagestani origin resident in the US, one of whom later died at the hands of the police, were charged with the events.

The insurgency also maintained its pressure on sectors considered close to the local and federal government. **During the year several judges were killed, including a federal judge and two judges of the Supreme Court of Dagestan, as well as religious clerics, journalists, teachers and other public figures.** Others were subjected to threats and coercion. Moreover, the insurgency carried out several suicide bombings and attacks. Among these, four policemen were killed in a suicide bombing in February at a checkpoint in the city of Khasavyurt. Four people were killed and 50 were injured in the explosion of two car bombs in May in front of a government building in the capital, Makhachkala. Two other people were killed and 19 wounded by a suicide attack by a female insurgent that month. Two policemen were killed and 17 others were injured by the explosion of a car bomb at a police station in the district of Tabasaran in September. One person was killed and 17 wounded in a double bombing near two grocery stores in the town centre where alcohol was sold. According to media sources close to the insurgency, the establishments were frequented by police and were owned by their superiors.

The conflict also had a strong impact among populations living in areas where the violence occurred, particularly by the security forces during special operations. Thus, a large-scale anti-terrorist operation in April in the town of Guimry received 420 complaints from local residents for damages, including looting and burning of some homes. The Russian human rights NGO Memorial also filed a

complaint with the Prosecutor's Office in this regard. In addition, during the year there were several protests by relatives of victims of abductions and disappearances, with the security forces' acts being denounced for their arbitrariness, as well as for their involvement in kidnappings and other abuses. The impact of the armed conflict was compounded by the general climate of human rights violations affecting the republic. Thus, **the authorities applied strong pressure to sections of the Salafi Muslim civilian population, with measures such as arrests, raids and closures of services linked to that stream of Islam.** Moreover, in political terms, **in April the Dagestani Parliament approved the elimination of direct elections for the president,** and in September the chamber appointed Ramzan Abdulatipov, the president-in-office and candidate nominated by the Russian president, as the new president of Dagestan. Abdulatipov had been in office since January. Among his first measures was the dismantling of the commission for the reintegration of insurgents into civilian life, concluding that it was ineffective. Meanwhile, in June the mayor of the capital, Said Amirov, was arrested in connection with the murder in 2011 of a member of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. Also, a Dagestani parliamentarian was arrested on charges of supporting the insurgency. According to an analyst at International Crisis Group, **the change of power in Dagestan led to a move during the year towards more aggressive measures against the insurgency.**⁵⁵ Experts in the region also highlighted the end of the intra-religious dialogue between various sectors of Islam and the move towards more violent strategies in response to the insurgency (linked to the celebration of the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014), as well as other significant patterns in the evolution of the situation in Dagestan in 2013, according to opinions collected by the independent website Caucasian Knot.

Russia (Ingushetia)	
Start:	2008
Type:	System, Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Russian federal government, Ingushetian republic government, opposition armed groups (Ingush Jamaat)
Intensity:	1
Trend:	End

Summary:

The low intensity violence from which Ingushetia has suffered since the beginning of the 21st century confronts the local and federal security forces and a network of armed cells of an Islamic nature, known as the Ingush Jamaat and integrated into the Caucasus Front (a movement that brings together the various rebel forces from the north of the Caucasus). With origins that date back to the participation of the Ingush combatants in the first Chechnya war

(1994-1996), since 2002, the Ingush rebel forces were restructured on territorial lines, causing a campaign of local violence which, without the pro-national drive of Chechnya, sought the creation of an Islamic state in the Caucasus. The beginning of the violence in Ingushetia occurred in a parallel way to the presidency in the republic of Murat Zyazikov, to whose term of office (2002-2008) numerous problems of violations of human rights, corruption, poverty and a climate of anarchy and social and political tension were attributed. The Ingush rebel forces periodically attack the military and civil staff of the Russian and local forces. Levels of violence have fluctuated in recent years, but have remained at low levels, contrasting with neighbouring republics.

There was a reduction in overall mortality rates from the conflict between the authorities and local armed groups in Ingushetia linked to the Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus. This decrease, preceded by low thresholds in previous years, has led to this case no longer being regarded as an active armed conflict. Events of varying severity continued, but with less frequency, including the halving of killings and extrajudicial executions in 2013 compared to 2012, as highlighted by the chairman of the local human rights organisation Mashr on the independent website Caucasian Knot. During the year, at least 36 people were killed and 58 wounded, according to Caucasian Knot. In any event, there were episodes of low-level violence throughout the year. Among these incidents, the month of May saw the killing of the insurgent commander Jamaleyl Mutaliyev, known as Emir Adam, regarded by the Ingush authorities to be the right hand man of the senior leader in the North Caucasus, Dokku Umarov. Another 13 policemen were wounded in a suicide bombing in the town of Ordzhonikidzevskaya in May. In February, in the city of Nazran the security forces killed the former vice-minister for construction, the brother of an alleged insurgent whom the authorities accused of supporting the local insurgency. In turn, seven insurgents were killed on the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya in March during a special operation by the security services. The home of one of the members of the Russian Muftis Council, Isa Khamkhoyev, was shot at in Nazran, without victims, in January. In April, in a counter-terrorism operation in Sunzha district, four suspected insurgents and one officer were killed, but witnesses reported that two of the alleged insurgents were civilians and were unarmed when they were killed by security forces. In August, the president of the Security Council was assassinated.

The promotion of collective punishment by the federal and local government in the North Caucasus was also echoed in Ingushetia. The re-elected Ingush president, Yunus Bek-Yevkurov, warned that the homes of the families that held insurgents would be demolished, but later clarified that he was referring to abandoned homes. The climate of human rights violations common to the North Caucasus (though to varying degrees,

55. Caucasian Knot, "Northern Caucasus - 2013: independent experts sum up the year (video)," *Caucasian Knot*, December 31, 2013, <http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/26835/>.

depending on the republic) continued, although there were no abductions or disappearances during the year in Ingushetia, according to the local organisation Mashr. However, according to this organisation around 200 cases of abduction were still unresolved and the authorities maintained the levels of repression against human rights defenders and civil society activists. On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights delivered 14 judgments in 2013 concerning cases of human rights violations in Chechnya and Ingushetia. Among the judgments, the court ordered Russia to pay EUR 73,000 in compensation to the family of an Ingush citizen killed by security forces in 2004.

Furthermore, at the political level, the Ingush parliament agreed to eliminate direct elections as the method for choosing the president, who will now be elected by the Parliament, a change that was also adopted in Dagestan. At the proposal of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, Bek-Yevkurov, was re-elected president by the Parliament in September. Tensions continued to be recorded between the Ingush and the Chechen government concerning the control of some towns located on the border between the two republics. Thus, in April there was a confrontation between Ingush and Chechen security forces in the Ingush village of Arshti, which resulted in the wounding of six Ingush officers, according to the Ingush government. About 300 members of the Chechen security forces (with combat vehicles), Chechen parliamentarians and mayors had deployed to Arshti, allegedly as part of an operation against Dokku Umarov, the Chechen rebel leader of the regional Islamist insurgency. The Ingush government claimed that the goal was to organise a rally for the transfer to Chechnya of Arshti sovereignty.

Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	
Start:	2011
Type:	System, Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Russian federal government, Kabardino-Balkaria republic government, opposition armed groups
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The violence and instability that characterise the Federal Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria are related to the armed groups that since the turn of the 21st century have been fighting against Russian presence and defending the creation of an Islamic emirate, along with other armed movements in the North Caucasus, and reflecting the regionalisation of the violence that affected Chechnya in the 1990s. The network of groups that operates in Kabardino-Balkaria, Yarmuk, began operations in 2004 although it was in 2005 when it began to show its offensive capability, with several simultaneous attacks on the capital that claimed dozens of lives and led in turn to the intensification of the counter-insurgent operations of the Russian and local authorities.

In 2011, this situation of armed violence escalated significantly. Periodical insurgent and counterinsurgent attacks are launched, the extortion of the civilian population is carried out by rebel forces and human rights violations are committed by the armed forces. There are also underlying tensions linked to the influence of religious currents not related to the republic, problems of corruption and human rights violations, and the disaffection of the local population towards the authorities.

In 2013, mortality levels linked to the conflict between the local Islamist insurgency and the authorities was slightly reduced. At least 92 people died in insurgent and counterinsurgent violence (in 2012, 107 people died, including 80 insurgents, 19 agents and eight civilians), according to figures from Caucasian Knot. **The tendency for a succession of low-intensity violent incidents, including clashes between insurgents and security forces in the context of counter-terrorism operations, remained.** Several casualties among the insurgent leadership occurred. Thus, **the leader of the insurgency in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia, Khasanbi Fakov, known as Amir Abu Khassan, was killed in a special operation in the capital, Nalchik**, which also killed his wife and two other insurgents. Fakov's death was acknowledged by the insurgency. In a special operation in September, Ruslan Khapov was killed, considered by the Russian National Anti-Terrorist Committee to be the right hand man of the insurgent leader of the group known as Urvan, named after the district of the same name in this republic. In turn, two alleged insurgents were killed in a failed suicide bombing in October outside a mosque in the town of Dygulubgey. In previous months the town was the scene of several actions against the police.

The climate of violence continued to affect the population, in a context of human rights violations. Valery Khatazhukov, president of the Centre for Human Rights, based in Nalchik, reported that frequently during special operations against insurgents young people who are not on the list of people wanted by the authorities are killed even though their legal status is not at issue. Khatazhukov also questioned the effectiveness of the commission for the reintegration of insurgents who lay down their arms, claiming that it was neither serving to rehabilitate nor prevent extremism.

b) South-east Europe

Turkey (south-east)	
Start:	1984
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, PKK, TAK
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The PKK, created in 1978 as a political party of a Marxist-Leninist nature and led by Abdullah Öcalan, announced in 1984, an armed offensive against the government, undertaking a campaign of military rebellion to reclaim the independence of Kurdistan, which was heavily responded to by the government in defence of territorial integrity. The war that was unleashed between the PKK and the government particularly affected the Kurdish civil population in the southeast of Turkey, caught in the crossfire and the victims of the persecutions and campaigns of forced evacuations carried out by the government. In 1999, the conflict took a turn, with the arrest of Öcalan and the later communication by the PKK of giving up the armed fight and the transformation of their objectives, leaving behind their demand for independence to centre on claiming the recognition of the Kurdish identity within Turkey. Since then, the conflict has shifted between periods of ceasefire (mainly between 2000 and 2004) and violence, coexisting alongside democratisation measures and attempts at dialogue. The expectations that had built up since 2009 were dashed by increasing political and social tension and the end of the so-called Oslo talks between Turkey and the PKK in 2011. In late 2012, the government announced the resumption of talks. The war in Syria, which began as a revolt in 2011, once again laid bare the regional dimension of the Kurdish issue and the cross-border scope of the PKK issue, whose Syrian branch took control of the predominantly Kurdish areas in the country.

2013 was a year of great significance for Turkey, due to the dialogue between the government and the PKK, launched in late 2012, following the highest levels of violence seen since the nineties (hundreds of deaths in 2012) and the strengthening of the PKK as a result of the regional war in Syria and antagonism between Turkey and the pro-Assad bloc of countries.⁵⁶ The talks took place among high expectations and uncertainty in the early months and an increase in tension and threats in the second half of the year, and in the form of meetings held between the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and the security services (MIT), visits by members of the pro-Kurdish party BDP to Öcalan and communications between the BDP and the PKK political and military cadres.⁵⁷ Among the incidents during the first months of the year, of particular impact was the assassination in Paris in January of three Kurdish activists, including the co-founder of the PKK, Sakine Cansiz. There were also clashes between the PKK and the army and air strikes against guerrilla bases in northern Iraq, as well as further arrests of Kurdish activists. According to International Crisis Group, twenty deaths were recorded in January, mostly from the PKK.

The release by the PKK of eight Turkish civil servants and military staff in March was the prelude to the historic **appeal by Öcalan to “silence arms” and the process of the withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey.** The message was delivered during the traditional celebration of the Kurdish New Year (Newroz, on 21st March), by hundreds of thousands of people in Diyarbakir (south-east). The PKK formally declared the commencement

of the ceasefire on 21st March, while reserving the right to defend itself. On 8th May it began to withdraw its guerrillas to northern Iraq. The ceasefire and withdrawal were the first of three phases which, according to the PKK, need to be tackled by the resolution process (ceasefire and withdrawal; democratisation reforms; and disarmament and normalisation). Thus, the second quarter of the year passed in an atmosphere of relative calm in the armed conflict, which contrasted with the tense situation on the Turkish-Syrian border and the mass demonstrations in nearly 80 cities in Turkey against the authoritarianism of the Turkish government. The repression of these protests caused four deaths and injured more than 7,800. The Kurdish nationalist movement gave support to the protests but said it would not allow them to negatively affect the peace talks. In late June there were also social protests in south-east Turkey against the increasing number of military posts in the region, which resulted in one fatality and injured nine others in Lice (Diyarbakir province), in turn generating new protests.

Against the background of the events in Syria (takeover by the PKK's branch in Syria, the PYD, of Kurdish areas in Syria, bordering Turkey, and the promotion of a self-government process criticised by the Turkish government), the situation on the ground in Turkey deteriorated in the second half of the year. After mutual accusations of broken promises and a failure to address demands, **in September the PKK halted the withdrawal of its guerrillas, but maintained the unilateral ceasefire.** There were several incidents, such as kidnappings and attacks on infrastructure. The democratisation reforms announced by the government in September were criticised by the Kurdish nationalist movement, which found them to be inadequate and lacking prior consultation. The tense situation between the state and the Kurdish movement and the fragility of the dialogue process continued during the fourth quarter. There were sporadic clashes between the army and the PKK in November, as well as clashes between protesters and the police during protests in Yüksekova (Hakkari Province) due to the alleged vandalism of a cemetery which is a resting ground for deceased guerrillas. Three Kurdish protesters were shot dead by police during the protests. In this context of many months of tension, the second highest ranking member of the PKK after Öcalan, Cemil Bayik (appointed chairman of the executive committee in July, replacing Murat Karayılan), went as far as declaring the peace talks to be over in mid-October, warning of a possible civil war if the government did not agree to enter into substantive negotiations. In addition, the PKK listed three requirements for continuation of the process: improved prison conditions for Öcalan, legal changes and involvement of an independent third party to oversee the process. He also noted that the solution to the Kurdish issue should respond to three demands: the recognition of the Kurdish people, including their identity, culture, law and freedom of thought and

56. See the summary on Syria in this chapter.

57. See the summary on Turkey in chapter 3 (Peace processes).

organisation; recognition of the Kurdish right to self-determination; and recognition of their education in their mother tongue. Even so, the dialogue between the state and Öcalan and the visits by members of parliament to the PKK leader continued. Also a cause for certain tension was the joint visit to Diyarbakir in November by the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the president of the autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq, Massoud Barzani, in a context of intra-Kurdish regional rivalry and an electoral calendar in Turkey (in which the AKP and the BDP will compete for Kurdish votes). Even so, during the visit, for the first time ever Erdogan used the phrase “Iraqi Kurdistan” and also made his first visit to the City Council building (governed by the BDP) where he met with various Kurdish politicians from the Kurdish party. Also, later in the year a political crisis broke out in Turkey due to a corruption scandal involving the arrest of more than 50 people, including the offspring of three ministers and a municipal leader, which led Erdogan to perform a cabinet reshuffle and replace the four ministers concerned. As regards this crisis, the local press and analysts pointed to a behind-the-scenes struggle between the AKP and Hizmet, a religiously inspired movement led by the Muslim theologian Fetullah Gülen, with uncertain implications for the conflict and the peace talks, given the adverse effect on the AKP during the electoral calendar (local elections in March 2014, presidential elections in August that same year and legislative elections in June 2015) and the different strategies of AKP and Hizmet towards the PKK.

The dialogue between Turkey and the PKK remained active throughout 2013, creating an optimistic outlook in the first half of the year due to the ceasefire by the armed group and the withdrawal of its guerrillas to Iraq, although this situation deteriorated in the second half of the year and the PKK halted the withdrawal

Middle East

a) Mashreq

Iraq	
Start:	2003
Type:	System, Government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, armed opposition groups -among them Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS, according to its acronym in English), linked to al- Qaeda- militias, USA
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Summary: The invasion of Iraq by the international coalition led by the USA in March 2003, using the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction as an argument and with the desire to	

overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein due to his alleged link to the attacks of the 11th September 2001 in the USA, led to the beginning of an armed conflict in which numerous actors progressively became involved: international troops, the Iraqi armed forces, militias and rebel groups and Al Qaeda, among others. The new division of power between Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish groups within the institutional setting set up after the overthrow of Hussein led to discontent among numerous sectors. The violence has increased, with the armed opposition against the international presence in the country superimposing the internal fight for the control of power with a marked sectarian component since February 2006, mainly between Shiites and Sunnis. Following the withdrawal of the US forces in late 2011, the dynamics of violence have persisted with a high impact on the civilian population.

The armed conflict that has affected the country for a decade was significantly worsened over the previous year, with an increase in violence that killed nearly

10,000 people in 2013. This figure is double the number of fatalities recorded in 2012 (4,574). According to the calculations released by the UN mission in Iraq (UNAMI), the total number of deaths was 8,836 people, mostly civilians (7,818), and 1,050 agents of the security forces. UNAMI admitted that these figures were conservative and that the total death toll for the year could be higher once information on all the incidents has been confirmed. The organisation Iraq Body Count (IBC) documented a total of 9,475 deaths, confirming that 2013 saw the worst figures in the conflict since 2008. This trend prompted various warnings regarding the possibility that the country could be subjected to spiralling violence, as severe as the violence experienced between 2006 and 2007.⁵⁸ Violence broke out periodically throughout the year

in the form of suicide attacks, bombings, killings and shootings, offensives against the security forces, clashes between armed insurgent groups and the military and/or pro-government militias, offensives on roads, false checkpoints, markets, pilgrimages, places of worship or even during funerals. There were also assassinations of dozens of candidates to the provincial elections in April, the first elections since the withdrawal of US forces from the country in 2011. The violence occurred throughout the country and Shiite neighbourhoods in Baghdad were again one of the areas most affected. During 2013 the fears of escalating sectarian violence were increased due to the impact of the war on neighbouring Syria and the regional polarisation of identities, in a context of growing alienation of the Sunni Arab community in Iraq.

Throughout 2013 the predominantly Sunni areas were the scene of ongoing protests against the

58. See “Iraq: the devastating balance following a decade of war in a context of increasing upheaval” in Chapter 6 (Risk Scenarios for 2014).

government led by the Shiite Nouri al-Maliki, seeking to denounce their marginalisation and protest against what they view as discriminatory and sectarian policies by the government (in the allocation of resources, representation within the security forces and implementation of anti-terrorism laws, among other issues). The protests began in late 2012 after the arrest of the bodyguard of a highly regarded Sunni politician and spread out from Anbar province (Fallujah, Ramadi) towards Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala. The government attributed the response to remnants of Saddam Hussein's Baath party, foreign agents and the consequences of the war in Syria, leading to a response from the security forces that exacerbated the crisis. The protests intensified following the death of seven youths in clashes with the security forces in January and the violence escalated in April after the eviction of a Sunni protest camp in Hawja, near Kirkuk, that caused the deaths of 50 people, with a further 200 dying in fighting during the following week. The course of events empowered the most radical sectors committed to armed struggle as a means to combat the government of al-Maliki, including the Islamic State in Iraq (which announced in April its commitment to fight in Syria), with a number of observers also warning of a resurgence of Shiite militias.⁵⁹ At the end of the year, the decision in Baghdad to arrest a Sunni lawmaker and dismantle another protest camp led to the resignation of more than 40 MPs and a renewed escalation of violence between the military and the ISIS militia in the province of Anbar along the border with Syria. Evidence of the impact of the war on the neighbouring country was seen in Iraq throughout the year, both in the flow of refugees from Syria (many of whom sought refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan)⁶⁰ and in the acts of violence related to the conflict or to the transit of armed actors from one side of the border to the other. During the first quarter of the year, the ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack that killed 51 Syrian soldiers who had crossed the border and a further nine Iraqi military personnel that were escorting them, and denounced the collusion between Baghdad and Damascus. The government of al-Maliki was accused of providing oil and allowing the transport of supplies from Iran, which earned him a warning from the US which demanded that he take measures to prevent the flow of weapons and fighters into Syria. At the same time, however, Washington continued to provide weapons to the authorities in Baghdad, including missiles and drones, and in late 2013 announced an increase in its military aid to the country to contribute to the fight against the insurgency.

The armed conflict in Iraq killed nearly 10,000 people in 2013, more than double the previous year and mostly civilians

Israel-Palestine

Start:	2000
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Territory International ⁶¹
Main parties:	Israeli government, settlers militias, PA, Fatah (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committees
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The conflict between Israel and the various Palestinian actors started up again in 2000 with the outbreak of the Second Intifada, favoured by the failure of the peace process promoted at the beginning of the 1990s (the Oslo Accords, 1993-1994). The Palestinian-Israeli conflict started in 1947 when the United Nations Security Council Resolution 181 divided Palestinian territory under British mandate into two states and soon after proclaimed the state of Israel (1948), without the state of Palestine having been able to materialise itself since then. After the 1948-49 war, Israel annexed West Jerusalem and Egypt and Jordan took over control of Gaza and the West Bank, respectively. In 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza after winning the "Six-Day War" against the Arab countries. It was not until the Oslo Accords that the autonomy of the Palestinian territory would be formally recognised, although its introduction was to be impeded by the military occupation and the control of the territory imposed by Israel.

The levels of violence associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were lower than compared to 2012, a year that was marked by the Israeli offensive in Gaza in which 164 people were killed (158 Palestinians and six Israelis) and which led to a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, promoted by Egypt in November. **Throughout 2013, constant violations of the ceasefire were recorded, as well as other violent incidents in the West Bank that killed dozens of people, mostly Palestinians.** Some incidents were linked to attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians; shootings, arrests and raids by Israeli security forces in the West Bank; clashes between Palestinian protesters and Israeli troops (including towns such as Hebron or the Old City of Jerusalem, after the visit of a group of Israeli tourists to the Temple Mount); mass demonstrations in support of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails after the death in suspicious circumstances of two prisoners (hundreds of people were injured in clashes with Israeli forces); demolitions of Palestinian homes; attacks against Israeli soldiers (three of whom

59. In April, the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq announced his commitment to the armed struggle in Syria. Thereafter, the name of the group became Islamic State in Iraq and "al-Sham", meaning Levant, Syria or Greater Syria in Arabic. The group is popularly known by its English acronym, ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) or ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). See also "Internationalisation and radicalisation of the conflict in Syria" in Chapter 6 (Risk scenarios for 2014).

60. See the summary on Iraq (Kurdistan) in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

61. Despite the fact that Palestine (whose Palestine National Authority is a political association linked to a given population and to a territory) is not an internationally recognised state, the conflict between Israel and Palestine is considered "international" and not "internal", since it is a territory that is illegally occupied and its intended ownership by Israel is not recognised by International Law or by any UN resolution.

died); incidents around the Gaza separation wall; Israeli operations against Hamas militants and other groups in Gaza. According to figures of the Israeli security forces released a year after the ceasefire agreement, between November 2012 and November 2013, 50 projectiles had been launched from Gaza, compared with 1,500 the previous year. At the same time, however, the Israeli government reported an increase in attacks on security forces and also in the number of Israeli casualties, which totalled 132 in 2013, almost double the previous year. Israel presented this data in response to information warning of excessive use of force by Israeli troops in the occupied territories. According to statements released in early 2014, a total of 27 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank during 2013 due to actions by Israeli forces, more than the number that died in the whole of 2011 and 2012 combined, while thousands of others were injured in various incidents, including children.

Israel released Palestinian prisoners as part of the agreement to revive negotiations with the PA, although at the same time it maintained its policy of settlement expansion in the occupied territories

From the second half of 2013, the evolution of the conflict was marked by the resumption of direct negotiations between the PA and Israel at the behest of the US and after a three year stall, albeit in a climate of skepticism and alongside continuing acts of violence.⁶² As part of the agreement to revive the dialogue with the Palestinians, Israel agreed to release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons for crimes committed before 1993, the year of the signing of the Oslo accords. An initial group of 26 detainees was released in August, days before the formal resumption of bilateral talks in Jerusalem, while other groups were released in October and December (a fourth group will be released in 2014). The releases drew the condemnation of sectors of Israeli society, while Palestinian representatives stressed that these were prisoners who had almost served their sentences in full. On the other hand, Palestinian officials waived requesting a stop to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories as a precondition for dialogue. In this context, **the government of Benjamin Netanyahu** (who remained in power after the January elections in Israel) intensified the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, **a policy that resulted in extensive international condemnation in 2013, including a critical report by the UN Human Rights Council.** The EU also adopted new guidelines for financing projects in Israel, explicitly excluding initiatives intended to be carried out in the occupied territories. Before the announcement in November of the construction of 1,700 new homes in Israeli settlements, the US Secretary of State and leader of the negotiations, John Kerry, underscored the

illegitimacy of the measure and warned of the outbreak of a third intifada should the negotiations fail. The Israeli NGO Peace Now then warned that since the inauguration of the new government of Netanyahu in March, the settlements had been significantly increased, which raised serious doubts about the intentions of the prime minister regarding the peace negotiations with the Palestinians and the two-state solution.⁶³ In public statements, Netanyahu insisted that the conflict was not territorial nor was it a result of the Israeli occupation, but rather a product of the Palestinian refusal to recognise Israel as a Jewish state.

The bilateral negotiations were held in private, but information filtered to the press confirmed the persistence of differences between the parties on key issues such as Palestinian refugees' right to return and border issues, particularly with respect to formulas for controlling and administering the Jordan Valley. Some analysts drew attention to the impact of various regional dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, including the overthrow of the Islamist regime in Egypt (and its influence in weakening the position of Hamas, which is against the peace negotiations with Israel);⁶⁴ the empowerment of radical Jihadi groups in the context of the war in Syria and the conflict in Sinai; or Israel's distrust of the displays of understanding between the US and Iran.⁶⁵ Thus, in November, the Netanyahu government decided to shelve the announcement of a project to build 23,786 homes in the settlements not due to Palestinian criticism (the negotiating team had announced its resignation in protest), but due to the fact that it was a measure that had been rejected by the international community at a time when Israel was interested in pressing for a tougher attitude toward Tehran.

Syria	
Start:	2011
Type:	Government, System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, pro-government militias (Shabbiha), Free Syrian Army (FSA), Islamic Front, armed Salafi groups, al-Nusra Front, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), Kurdish militias of the PYD
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

62. See the summary on Israel-Palestine in chapter 3 (Peace processes).

63. Peace Now, *The Settlements Boom of the First 8 Months of Netanyahu's Government*, November 9, 2013, <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/8monthsreport>.

64. See the summary on Palestine in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

65. Yossi Alpher, *How Middle East regional dynamics affect the Israeli-Palestinian peace process*, Expert Analysis, NOREF, December 2013, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Israel-Palestine/Publications/How-Middle-East-regional-dynamics-affect-the-Israeli-Palestinian-peace-process>.

Summary:

Controlled by the Ba'ath party since 1963, the Republic of Syria has been governed since the 1970s by two presidents: Hafez al-Assad and his son, Bashar, who took office in 2000. A key player in the Middle East, internationally the regime has been characterised by its hostile policies towards Israel and, internally, by its authoritarianism and fierce repression of the opposition. The arrival of Bashar al-Assad in the government raised expectations for change, following the implementation of some liberalising measures. However, the regime put a stop to these initiatives, which alarmed the establishment, made up of the army, the Ba'ath and the Alawi minority. In 2011, popular uprisings in the region encouraged the Syrian population to demand political and economic changes. The brutal response of the government unleashed a severe crisis in the country which led to the beginning of an armed conflict with serious consequences for the civil population.

The armed conflict in Syria escalated dramatically during the year, with devastating effects on the civilian population. If in 2011 (the year in which the rebellion against the regime of Bashar al-Assad began), the number of deaths due to the violence was around 5,000 people, in 2012 the figure was 60,000, while **in 2013 the total number of deaths since the war began ranged from between 100,000 to 120,000 people**, according to figures from the UN and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The armed conflict also led to massive forced displacements of the population, both within the country and abroad, mainly to states neighbouring Syria (Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt). According to UNHCR figures, in late December 2013 the Syrian refugee population was over 2.4 million people, more than 10% of the total population. 6.5 million other people were affected by internal displacement. The UN found that more than nine million Syrians required humanitarian assistance, and in late 2013 it demanded urgent international aid to deal with the crisis, which has even led to the resurgence of diseases that had been eradicated from the country, such as poliomyelitis. Throughout the year, the violence resulted in clashes between government troops and rebel militias, bombings, suicide attacks against places of worship, public buildings, schools and universities, among others. Both sides were accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, including summary executions, use of cluster bombs, recruitment of minors and sieges of hospitals. The most significant episodes of violence, which indicated an escalation of the conflict, included the massacre of civilians in the coastal towns of Bayda and Baniyas by pro-government militias in May and the massacres of majority Alawite villages in Latakia perpetrated by opposition groups in October; the launching of barrels full of explosives in

The proliferation of armed groups, the increasing internationalisation and overlapping dynamics of the conflict were key features of the war in Syria, raising the number of fatalities since the start of the conflict to over 100,000

Aleppo at the end of the year and **chemical attacks, including the one in the Ghouta area in August, which killed hundreds of people, more than 1,300 according to some sources**. This last incident led to widespread international condemnation and **prompted the US government to consider military action against the regime**, since the evidence pointed to its involvement in the attack. US intervention at that point appeared to be imminent, but an agreement between Washington and Moscow in September led to the adoption of the first resolution of the UN Security Council on the conflict, which required the dismantling of Syria's chemical arsenals by July 2014.⁶⁶ Thus, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons began monitoring the destruction of these stockpiles.

Key features of the war in Syria in 2013 were the proliferation of armed groups of varying allegiances, a growing internationalisation of the conflict (both due to the increasing presence of foreign fighters and the blurring of the boundaries of the conflict and the spread of instability at regional level⁶⁷), **the radicalisation of armed actors and the overlapping dynamics of the conflict**.⁶⁸ Syria became the scene of many disputes, including the regional stand-off between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with Tehran and Riyadh supporting Damascus and the rebel forces, respectively. The Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah was also openly involved in the stand-off, taking a particularly active role in fighting for control of the city of Al-Quseir, on the border with Lebanon. The latter country experienced an escalation in internal tensions as a result of the Syrian armed conflict, while the border areas of Syria with Israel, Turkey and Iraq reported several incidents. Some of them were linked to the fighting (which intensified in the second half of the year) between a mixture of groups on the side opposing the regime of al-Assad. For example, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Kurdish militias of the PYD (a subsidiary of the PKK in Syria which in November declared the establishment of an autonomous administration of the predominantly Kurdish areas in northern Syria) fought among themselves and also with armed Jihadi groups such as the al-Nusra Front (which declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2013) and **al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)**. **Hailing from Iraq, this group became increasingly involved in operations in Syria, taking advantage of the power vacuum and the intensified sectarian divisions at regional level**. However, its actions in Syria were met with the rejection of other rebel groups, including Islamist groups which in late November joined the so-called Islamic front. This organisation became the largest alliance of armed groups opposed to al-Assad.

66. Resolution 2118 of the UN Security Council, September 27, 2013. <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11135.doc.htm>>

67. See the summary on Lebanon; Israel - Syria, Lebanon, Syria-Turkey; and that on Iraq (Kurdistan) in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises); and the summary on Iraq in this chapter.

68. See "Internationalisation and radicalisation of the conflict in Syria and its destabilising regional impact" in chapter 6 (Risk scenarios for 2014).

According to various analyses, almost half of the rebel forces (formed of around 100,000 troops spread across more than a thousand armed groups) consist of Islamist hardliners or Jihadists, while the other half are mostly moderate Islamist groups and secular forces. Given the increasing weight of radical groups among opposition forces, the US and UK decided to suspend their aid to the rebel side. Several analysts noted that in this context al-Assad could be perceived as a “lesser evil” and highlighted indications of a possible re-legitimisation of his regime. **The fragmentation of the armed Syrian rebel groups was echoed in the fragmentation of their political wings**, which continued to show divisions and failed to develop a cohesive strategy. During 2013 the diplomatic efforts led by the UN and Arab League's Special Envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, focused on holding a peace conference in Switzerland (Geneva II), which was repeatedly postponed and scheduled for late January 2014. Until the end of the year, the Syrian opposition maintained a number of conditions for its participation in the forum, including the resignation of al-Assad; while the government insisted on a meeting without preconditions and on a political solution that did not involve the president leaving power as an indispensable step towards a transition.

b) The Gulf

Yemen (AQAP)	
Start:	2011
Type:	System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, AQAP/Ansar Sharia, USA, Saudi Arabia, tribal militias (popular resistance committees)
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

With a host of conflicts and internal challenges to deal with, the Yemeni government is under intense international pressure –mainly the USA and Saudi Arabia– to focus on fighting al-Qaeda's presence in the country, especially after the merger of the organisation's Saudi and Yemeni branches, through which al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was founded in 2009. Although al-Qaeda is known to have been active in Yemen since the 1990s and has been responsible for high profile incidents, such as the suicide attack on the US warship USS Cole in 2000, its operations have been stepped up in recent years, coinciding with a change of leadership in the group. The failed attack on an airliner en route to Detroit in December 2009 focused the world's attention on AQAP. The group is considered by the US government as one of its main security threats. Taking advantage of the power vacuum in Yemen as part of the revolt against president Ali Abdullah Saleh, AQAP intensified its operations in the south of the country and expanded the areas under its control. From 2011 the group began to carry out some of its attacks under the name Ansar Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law).

The armed conflict pitting AQAP against the Yemeni security forces and a number of tribal militias, continued to generate numerous violent incidents throughout 2013, although overall a de-escalation was observed compared to the serious levels of violence seen the previous year. **The death toll due to the conflict exceeded 300 people in 2013, although in 2012 this figure had reached 1,300 dead, and displaced thousands.** As in previous years, the conflict continued to be characterised by multiple forms of violence, including clashes between AQAP members and Yemeni soldiers or pro-government militias; AQAP bombings and suicide attacks against checkpoints on roads and other facilities of the security forces, intelligence services and police headquarters, or against the People's Committees; deployments of military personnel in attempts to release AQAP hostages; operations to track militants in mountainous areas; shootings and assassinations, among others. These acts of violence also prompted further forced displacement of civilians. Among the most serious incidents of the year was the double car bomb attack on a military camp in the province of Shabwa and an armed assault on a group of soldiers in Maifaa which, in total, left 40 soldiers dead in September; as well as an AQAP offensive against a defence ministry complex in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, where at least 56 people, including several civilians, were killed. **Note that constant air strikes by US drones continued to be a hallmark of this conflict.** In fact, some of these offensives were among the bloodiest episodes of the conflict during 2013, including the killing of 23 alleged members of AQAP in January or the campaign launched against fighters of the armed group during the summer. Between 28th July and 10th August alone, these attacks left 38 dead, according to press reports.

This latest air campaign was conducted in the context of a global warning issued by the USA regarding the possibility of a large-scale attack by AQAP, a fact that prompted the closure of a dozen embassies in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington then acknowledged that the threat came from AQAP, a conclusion reached following the interception of communications between the leader of the al-Qaeda network, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the leader of AQAP, Nasser al-Wuyahisi. In this exchange, both men allegedly referred to plans for one of the most serious attacks since 11-S. In this context, the Yemeni authorities also placed its troops on high alert and tightened security around embassies, government buildings and the airport in Sanaa. Soon after, the Yemeni government announced that it had thwarted an alleged AQAP plan to take control of two of the main ports in the country and perform a major bombing campaign against gas export facilities. The attack had been intended as retaliation for the death earlier in the year of one of the most prominent leaders of AQAP, Said al-Shiri, following a US drone attack. Some analysts noted that while AQAP is not necessarily the largest and most active branch of al-Qaeda, the US considers it to be the most dangerous branch due to

its technical skills, recruitment abilities and capacity to perpetrate actions abroad. Given this perceived threat, according to press reports, Washington has decided to conduct direct action in Yemeni territory through its special forces, in addition to continuing support for the training of Yemeni forces. Various sectors of Yemeni society have historically been against the presence of foreign forces in the country. AQAP, for its part, has tried to take advantage of the growing anti-American sentiment as a result of drone attacks, which have caused dozens of civilian casualties. Finally, it can be highlighted that Saudi Arabia denied having deployed these types of aircraft in Yemen, although it admitted having carried out intelligence operations against AQAP militants in Yemeni territory.

During the second half of 2013 there were several clashes in northern Yemen between Houthist militants and armed actors linked to Salafist groups, to the al-Ahmar tribal clan and to the Islamist party Islah

Yemen (Houthis)	
Start:	2004
Type:	System, Government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, followers of the cleric al-Houthi (al-Shabab al-Mumen), tribal militias linked to the al-Ahmar clan, Salafi militias, armed sectors linked to the Islamist party Islah, Saudi Arabia
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=

Summary:

The conflict started in 2004, when the followers of the religious leader al-Houthi, belonging to the Shiite minority, started an armed rebellion in the north of Yemen. The government assured that the rebel forces aimed to re-establish a theocratic regime such as the one that governed in the area for one thousand years, until the triumph of the Republican revolution in 1962. The followers of al-Houthi accused the government of corruption, of not attending to the northern mountainous regions and they opposed the Sanaa alliance with the US in the so-called fight against terrorism. The conflict has cost the lives of thousands of victims and has led to the forced displacement of more than 300,000 people. Various truces signed in recent years have been successively broken with taking up of hostilities again. In August 2009, the government promoted a new offensive against the rebel forces that led to the most violent stage of the conflict, the internationalisation of which became evident after the direct intervention of Saudi Arabian forces against the followers of al-Houthi on the border area. The parties agreed on a new ceasefire in February 2010, however, the situation in the area is highly volatile. As part of the rebellion that ended the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, the Houthis took advantage to expand areas under its control in the north of the country and have been increasingly involved in clashes with Salafists militias, armed groups linked to the Islamist party Islah and pro-government tribal militias.

The armed conflict recorded levels of violence similar to the previous year, although the incidents were mainly focused in the second half of the year. Despite the difficulties in determining the death toll as a result of the violence in this conflict, it is estimated that about 200 people have died in separate incidents, which often acquired a sectarian flavour. During the first part of the year the situation was marked by the decision of the Houthis to join the national dialogue initiative, which began on 18th March and is considered a key part of the transition in the country after the forced departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh from power

in 2011.⁶⁹ In this context, there was an assassination attempt against Abdo Abo Ras, a prominent leader of the Houthis and a representative of the organisation in the talks being held in the capital, Sanaa. The leader was unharmed, but three of his companions were killed in the offensive, which was interpreted by the group as an act of intimidation and an attempt to dissuade the Houthis from participating in the national talks. There were other acts of violence of various kinds in the following months, including a suicide attack with no clear authorship on a market in Saada, in the area controlled by the Houthis, which killed three people and left many injured; and repression by security forces at a Houthist protest in the Yemeni capital which caused two other deaths and wounded around thirty.

The most serious incidents took place during the second half of the year, with several armed clashes between Houthist militants and gunmen linked to Salafist groups, to the al-Ahmar tribal clan and to the Islamist party Islah.

The block opposing the Houthis had the support of the powerful General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (no relation to the al-Ahmar clan, and who in the past had led military offensives in the southern region) through sectors loyal to the Yemeni army. The Houthis, on the other hand, would have received support from tribal groups opposing the al-Ahmar clan and Islah, some with ties to the party of former President Saleh. The fighting began shortly after the start of Ramadan, in July, and was centred around clashes over control of mosques in the Yemeni capital and a Salafi institute in the north of the country. Subsequent clashes in the provinces of Amran, Saada and Ibb left dozens dead in August, while 60 were killed in September. In this context, the authorities called on the parties not to lead Yemen into a sectarian conflict. Given the deterioration of the situation, mediation was encouraged through presidential committees which led to a truce and a commitment to form a panel that would discuss the root causes of the dispute between these groups. However, new and serious acts of violence occurred once again in November, when fighting between Salafist militants and Houthis caused more than 100 deaths in the city of Dammaj, in Saada province. Salafist sectors made allegations of heresy

69. See the summary on Yemen in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

and unjustified attacks by the Houthis, while the latter denounced the Salafists for attempting to recruit foreigners to carry out extremist actions. By year's end, the fighting had spread north from the border with Saudi Arabia to the areas surrounding the capital.

In this context, hundreds of people protested in Sanaa to demand a stronger and more committed action by the government to stop the violence and ensure the safety of the population. The UN special envoy, Jamal Benomar, became involved in the efforts to try to stop the spiral of violence. However, although agreements were achieved for a partial ceasefire, sporadic clashes continued between the parties. In this context, **in late November one of the Houthist representatives in the national talks was assassinated.** Note that in this forum of dialogue, the Houthis had urged the recognition of and compensation for the victims of the wars in the north since 2004. This demand was backed on the streets by mass demonstrations, which also demanded the release of political prisoners. The Yemeni government issued a statement in August in which it apologised to the people of the north for the successive military

campaigns launched by the Saleh regime in the last decade. Houthist sectors also staged massive protests to denounce what they see as US and Israel interference in the country. The group denied the accusations of alleged links to Iran and Hezbollah.

1. 4. Alert factors for 2014

Following the analysis of the evolution of armed conflicts in 2013 it is possible to identify risk factors for an escalation of violence or a worsening of the socio-political situation in a series of cases. These are contexts in which, irrespective of the intensity of violence, there are elements of alert, situational or structural factors that could lead to a deterioration of the situation in 2014. In some of these situations of armed conflict there may exist, at the same time, positive elements and dynamics for potential improvement in the situation. In this respect, the identification of these elements of alert is aimed at spotlighting risk factors and scenarios which need to be addressed to prevent a deterioration in the situation.


Table 1.5. Alert factors in armed conflicts for 2014

AFRICA	
Great Lakes and Central Africa	
Central Africa (LRA)	There is a general consensus that the number and intensity of LRA attacks has been reduced as a result of military pressure, but any initiative to dismantle the group should be accompanied by offers of dialogue and negotiation that promote an orderly end to this insurgency. Moreover, this reduction in LRA violence and capabilities could be reversed since the situation in the Central African Republic and in South Sudan is causing the Central African, Ugandan and South Sudanese governments to give priority to their internal domestic situations. In the case of Uganda, its troops stationed in the Central African Republic are also being withdrawn to support the South Sudan government of Salva Kiir, who has been facing a serious internal crisis since December 2013.
Central African Republic	Given the gravity of the situation facing the country since late 2012, which has worsened during 2013, if military, political and reconciliation measures to address the evolution of violence and inter-community clashes are not decisively and immediately implemented, the current spiral of ethnic cleansing could become irreversible.
DR Congo (east)	Despite the defeat of the M23 rebels, the existence of other insurgent groups and the fact that the root causes that led to the rise of this insurgency have not been resolved, are a portent of continued instability in the country. In addition, Rwanda persists with its destabilizing policy in the Great Lakes with total impunity, which may be a flashpoint for future conflicts.
South Sudan	The continuing conflict between President Salva Kiir and his former vice-president, Riek Machar, is causing thousands of deaths and a serious humanitarian crisis, and therefore the various attempts at facilitating dialogue must receive the full support of the international community in order to prevent a bloodbath.
Sudan (Darfur)	Violence, bombings and forced displacements of the population continued and even increased during the year. The signing of a peace agreement in April by a faction of the JEM, JEM-Bashar, which joined the DDPD, was reproached by the main faction, the JEM-Jibril. The new inter-community conflicts were compounded by tension in the mining regions due to the government's desire to control gold exports after it ran out of foreign reserves, which could become a new source of instability.
Sudan (South Kordofan and the Blue Nile)	Although there were renewed attempts to establish a humanitarian agreement between the government and the SPLM-N, clashes between the two sides continued, with humanitarian consequences for the population, which could see the situation worsen during 2014.

Horn of Africa	
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	Despite the low intensity of the conflict between the ONLF and the government, the continuing reports of the persistence of extrajudicial killings, torture, abuse and looting by security forces, coupled with the growing political mobilisation throughout the country, could lead to a worsening of the conflict and the failure of the peace initiatives promoted by Kenya.
Somalia	Although the offensive led by the AMISOM and government forces against al-Shabaab is bearing fruit and the confrontations and divisions within the armed group have laid bare its internal tension, the group retains significant capacity to commit armed actions. The civilian population in the south is still subject to the dictates of the insurgency due to the fact that government forces and AMISOM are not able to control the situation outside urban centres.
North of Africa and Maghreb	
Algeria (AQIM)	The movements of extremist groups operating in North Africa and the Sahel have shown their capacity for resilience, transformation and for forging new alliances that threaten the security interests of Algeria. The mobility of these organisations in an unstable regional context and porous borders continues to be a key factor in the dynamics of the conflict, despite attempts by Algeria to shield its borders.
Libya	The possibility of Libya successfully tackling its many political and security challenges will continue to be tied mainly to its ability to overcome the institutional weakness of the state, to circumvent the political deadlock and to curb the frenetic actions of the numerous militias that continue to operate in the country.
West Africa	
Mali (north)	The long-term stabilisation of the northern part of the country will require the reactivation of the Ouagadougou agreement, signed in mid-2013, to facilitate substantive dialogue that will address the root causes of conflict. Given that the negotiations did not begin in late 2013 as planned, an absence of meetings could become a major destabilizing factor, reactivating the violence in the north.
Nigeria (Boko Haram)	Following the trend in recent years, the armed conflict could continue to escalate with a heavy impact on the civilian population, given the radical stance of Boko Haram and the government's military response to the threat of the armed group. The widespread climate of violence may hamper the creation of a climate for seeking alternative ways to address the conflict.
ASIA	
South Asia	
Afghanistan	The deterioration of relations between the US and Afghanistan and the lack of a consensus on the bilateral security agreement that will define their relationship after the withdrawal of troops, will hinder this process and could have a serious impact in terms of security in both Afghanistan and at regional level, especially in Pakistan. In addition, the impasse in negotiations with the Taliban foreshadows a continuation of high levels of violence.
India (CPI-M)	The government's strategy of tackling the conflict with the Naxalite insurgency through security operations without addressing the structural causes of the conflict and improving the living conditions and respect for the human rights of the population in the areas most affected by the conflict, could lead to a new escalation of violence in 2014, repeating the trend in 2013.
India (Assam)	The continued presence of insurgent organisations, the continued existence of legislation granting full powers to the security forces and the fragility of inter-community relationships between the different ethnic groups living in the state are a few of the elements that could lead to a deterioration of the conflict in Assam during 2014.
India (Jammu and Kashmir)	The deterioration in relationships between India and Pakistan and the growing violence between the armed forces of both countries could have a negative impact on the conflict in Kashmir, favouring the actions of insurgent organisations. Furthermore, the high degree of militarisation in the region and its impact on the civilian population could increase tensions in the region.
India (Manipur)	The continuing violations of human rights, the presence in the territory of insurgent organisations, and the high degree of militarisation and tension with other states in the region may lead to increased social tension and violence.
Pakistan	The growing presence of the Taliban insurgency in most areas of the country (e.g. Karachi or Balochistan), the closure of the negotiating channels and the deteriorating context in terms of regional security after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, could lead to the strengthening of this insurgency and to increased violence in its traditional strongholds, but also in other areas.

Pakistan (Balochistan)	The Pakistani government's failure to address the conflict with the Baloch insurgency and the continual human rights violations, including forced disappearances, as well as the growing instability in the state due to the increased presence of the Taliban insurgency and sectarian violence, could lead to the entrenchment of the conflict and increase its complexity, thereby hindering its resolution via negotiations despite recent attempts to establish a dialogue.
Southeast Asia and Oceania	
Myanmar	The continuation of the sporadic clashes between the armed forces and insurgent organisations, and of some larger scale military operations by the army, could jeopardise the progress made with the partial agreements reached with the armed groups. If the global ceasefire agreement is not reached, it could jeopardise the entire peace process and large-scale violence could be resumed.
Philippines (NPA)	The trust between the two sides has been greatly eroded by the prolonged stall in the negotiation process, due to the government's stated intention of neutralizing the NPA by the end of the current president's term and the constant accusations being exchanged between the parties regarding violations of international humanitarian law. In this context, the NPA's intention to significantly increase its number of combatants by 2014 could lead to increased hostilities.
Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf)	The serious clashes between Abu Sayyaf and the MNLF in 2013, and the commitment made to the government by the MILF to combat the activity of Abu Sayyaf (as a part of the historic peace agreement being negotiated by both parties) point to the likelihood of increased clashes between these groups. Furthermore, the examples of sporadic cooperation between Abu Sayyaf and factions of the BIFF (a splinter group of the MILF) and other groups operating in Mindanao, could lead to the increased virulence of counter-insurgency operations.
Thailand (south)	The initiation of an official dialogue process in 2013 could cause a reaction among those sectors of both parties who oppose a negotiated solution to the conflict. So far, the insurgent group present at the negotiating table has not demonstrated a clear and direct control over the groups that are perpetrating the acts of violence. Moreover, certain political and military sectors oppose any political concessions to resolve the conflict and instead wish to expand the military strategy adopted so far.
AMERICA	
Colombia	The positive steps taken in 2013 are an indicator that we can expect further progress towards peace in 2014. Among the steps already taken, worthy of note are the continuation of the talks in Havana between the government and the FARC, although at a pace deemed too slow for the government and sectors of society; the agreement on the first two points of the agenda: land reform and political participation; and the start of negotiations on the third point, relating to illicit crops. In turn, in 2014 there could be new steps towards a rapprochement with the ELN, and in 2013 exploratory talks were launched to determine whether negotiations could start after the presidential elections in 2014.
EUROPE AND CAUCASUS	
Caucasus and Russia	
Russia (Chechnya)	The strong pressure exerted by the regime on the civilian population living in a context of terror, as repeatedly denounced by local human rights activists, could worsen in 2014, with the explicit endorsement by the Kremlin in 2013 of collective punishment measures as part of the so-called fight against terrorism, although the trend of violence between security forces and armed groups has seen a reduction.
Russia (Dagestan)	The increased pressure in 2013 by the authorities on the Salafi population may widen the gap between a large sector of the population and the local and federal regime. Measures such as the successive arrests of dozens of Muslims and the closing of worship centres, may be counterproductive in the context of the end of intra-religious dialogue and the multiplication of security operations. The current climate may lead the republic to enter a stage of greater radicalisation where disenchantment with the levels of corruption and religious persecution are expressed in even greater levels of violence, either within the geographical boundaries of Dagestan or other areas of Russia, where, furthermore, the levels of xenophobia against people from the Caucasus have also seen an alarming increase.
Russia (Ingushetia)	The flashpoints affecting Ingushetia are of a low intensity, but combined could lead in the future to a worsening of the situation, as in previous periods. Among the relevant factors, the tendency of the Kremlin and local authorities in the North Caucasus to replace the ineffective commissions for the reintegration of former combatants and other conciliatory measures with a return to hard-line policies and the promotion of collective punishment could lead to an increase in more radicalised insurgent violence, with new suicide attacks. In Ingushetia, the tension with Chechnya for the control of border towns could lead to new episodes of tension in the coming year. Even so, the violence directly linked to the armed conflict has been greatly reduced in recent years.

Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	The downward trend in insurgent violence could be reversed in the future if measures other than counter-insurgency operations are not implemented. The pressure on the civilian population and relatives of the insurgency throughout the Caucasus could be a paralysing factor for a society that lives in fear of abuse by the security forces but could also lead to some sectors becoming radicalised and, therefore, to the perpetuation of the violence.
Southeast Europe	
Turkey (southeast)	Although there is no expectation of a unilateral ceasefire by the PKK in 2014, the foreseeable polarisation that will accompany the electoral cycle (local elections in March 2014, presidential elections in August and legislative elections in June 2015) and the impact of the evolution of the Kurds' situation in Syria on the Kurdish issue in Turkey, could slow the dialogue process between Turkey and the PKK. The parties are aware of the impasse waiting around the corner, but if they do not at least make some minor gestures of goodwill and keep the process alive, the future scenario could see the dismantling of the dialogue process and a return to unilateral and confrontational positions.
MIDDLE EAST	
Mashreq	
Iraq	The dynamics of the violence, which worsened significantly in 2013, may continue along this negative trend due to the increased activity of armed groups, the intensified sectarian tensions and the impact of the war in Syria. The absence of significant measures to reduce the grievances of the Sunni community may adversely affect the climate of internal upheaval, which may further worsen ahead of the holding of the legislative elections scheduled for April.
Israel – Palestine	A possible derailment of the negotiations initiated in 2013, to which in any case very limited expectations are attached, could lead to an intensification of the conflict in 2014. If successful, however, any agreement resulting from these talks could also promote the reaction of sectors that are against an agreement as it compromises their positions in relation to the conflict. Despite international condemnation, the continuation of controversial policies, such as the construction of new settlements, is expected to lead to the consolidation of Israeli control over the occupied territories.
Syria	The proliferation and radicalisation of armed groups, the involvement of regional actors in the conflict and the use of increasingly brutal combat methods could further aggravate the situation in Syria in 2014. These factors, along with the divisions among the political opposition, its limited control over the armed actors in the field, the regime's reluctance to cede its position of power and the inability of the international community to push for a cessation of violence, may affect the prospects for dialogue, despite the urgency of the need to find solutions to the severe suffering of the civilian population.
The Gulf	
Yemen (AQAP)	AQAP's actions continue to be one of the main sources of destabilisation in the country, given the technical and recruitment capabilities displayed by this al-Qaeda affiliate. A more explicit US intervention in the fight against the organisation may favour the support of AQAP by some Yemeni sectors reluctant to accept the presence of foreign forces in the country and against the US strategy of drone attacks due their impact on the civilian population.
Yemen (Houthis)	The intensification of clashes between Houthis and Salafist sectors could continue if the trend at the end of 2013 is not reversed and should violations of the ceasefire agreements between the parties continue. The evolution of the transition in Yemen and participation of the Houthis in this process may also lead to new episodes of tension in 2014, taking into account that the adoption of the new constitution and the holding of elections are pending.



2. Socio-political crises

- During 2013, 99 contexts of socio-political crises were identified around the world. This figure represents an increase compared to the number registered in 2012 (91). Most of the socio-political crises were found in Africa (39) and Asia (25), while the remaining cases occurred in Europe (15), Middle East (14) and America (four).
- The attacks and plundering by “dahalo” (cattle rustlers) in the south of Madagascar and the response by security forces and private militias caused hundreds of deaths.
- 22 years after the end of the armed conflict in Mozambique, RENAMO carried out attacks and ambushes on the Mozambique security forces demanding political reforms.
- The killing of two opposition leaders in Tunisia made the tension rise between Islamist and secular sectors in the country and led to the transfer of power to a Government of technocrats.
- Divisions in Kyrgyzstan between the Government and sectors of the opposition increased, leading to mobilizations and hotbeds of tension during the year.
- Bangladesh experienced a severe political crisis and hundreds died from the violence.
- Tensions between India and Pakistan severely deteriorated and there were clashes between the Armed Forces of both countries.
- The Philippine Armed Forces and the MNLF embarked on the largest violent episode since the signing of the peace agreement in 1996.
- The frequency and intensity of violence in the Chinese province of Xinjiang increased notoriously.
- Serbia dismantled the political power structures in Serbian areas of Kosovo as part of the process to normalise relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
- In Iran, the arrival of the cleric Hassan Rouhani to the presidency of the country led to high hopes for an internal political change and favoured the signing of an historic agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme.
- Political turmoil and violence in Egypt caused the death of over one thousand people, in a year marked by the military coup that overthrew the Islamist president Mohammed Morsi.
- The war in Syria had a direct impact on the increase of tensions in Lebanon, where several violent events caused more than 200 deaths.

The present chapter analyses the socio-political crises that occurred in 2013. It is organised into four sections. The socio-political crises and their characteristics are defined in the first section. In the second section an analysis is made of the global and regional trends of socio-political crises in 2013. The third section is devoted to describing the development and key events of the year in the various contexts. In the fourth and final section a series of conflict dynamics are identified that might lead to an escalation of violence and/or a worsening of the situation in 2014 in each of the cases. A map is included at the start of chapter that indicates the socio-political crises registered in 2013.

2.1. Socio-political crises: definition

A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by different actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d’état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control of resources or territory.

Table 2.1. Summary of socio-political crises in 2013

Socio-political crisis ¹	Type ²	Main parties	Intensity ³
			Trend ⁴
Africa			
Algeria	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		↓
Angola (Cabinda)	Internal	Government, armed group FLEC-FAC, Cabinda Forum for Dialogue	1
	Self-government, Resources		=
Burkina Faso	Internal	Government, political opposition, State security forces, civil society	1
	Government		↓
Chad	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		↑
Comoros	Internal	Government of the Union of the Comoros ruled by Grand Comora, Armed Forces, political and social opposition (political parties and authorities from the islands of Anjouan, Mohéli, and Grande Comore), AU mission	1
	Self-government, Government		=
Congo	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		=
Côte d'Ivoire	Internationalised internal	Government, militias loyal to former president Laurent Gbagbo, mercenaries, UNOCI	2
	Government, Identity, Resources		↓
Djibouti	Internal	Government, armed opposition (FRUD), political and social opposition (UAD)	1
	Government		=
DR Congo	Internal	Government, political and social opposition and former opposition armed groups	2
	Government		↑
DR Congo (east – ADF)	Internationalised internal	DR Congo, Uganda, Mai-Mai militias, ADF-NALU (ADF) armed opposition group	3
	System, Resources		↑
DR Congo – Rwanda ⁵	International	Governments of DR Congo, Rwanda, armed groups FDLR and M23 (ex CNDP)	3
	Identity, Government, Resources		↑
DR Congo – Uganda ⁶	International	Governments of DR Congo and Rwanda, ADF-NALU, M23, LRA, armed groups operating in Ituri	1
	Identity, Government, Resources,Territory		↑
Equatorial Guinea	Internal	Government, political opposition in exile	1
	Government		=
Eritrea	Internationalised internal	Government, internal political and social opposition, opposition political-military coalition EDA (EPDF, EFD, EIPJD, ELF, EPC, DMLEK, RSADO, ENSF, EIC, Nahda), other groups	2
	Government, Self-government, Identity		↑

1. This column includes the states in which socio-political crises are taking place, specifying in brackets the region within each state to which the crisis is confined or the name of the armed group involved in the conflict. This last option is used in cases involving more than one socio-political crisis in the same state or in the same territory within a state, for the purpose of distinguishing them.
2. This report classifies and analyses socio-political crises using two criteria: on the one hand, the causes or clashes of interests and, on the other hand, the convergence between the scenario of conflict and the actors involved. The following causes can be distinguished: demands for self-determination and self-government (Self-government) or identity aspirations (Identity); opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state (System) or the Internal or International policies of a government (Government), which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or the struggle for the control of resources (Resources) or territory (Territory). In respect of the second type, the socio-political crises may be of an Internal, Internationalised Internal or International nature. As such, an Internal socio-political crisis involves actors from the state itself who operate exclusively within its territory. Secondly, Internationalised Internal socio-political crises are defined as those in which at least one of the main actors is foreign and/or the crisis spills over into the territory of neighbouring countries. Thirdly, International socio-political crises are defined as those that involve conflict between state or non-state actors of two or more countries.
3. The intensity of a socio-political crisis (high, medium or low) and its trend (escalation, decrease, no changes) is mainly evaluated on the basis of the level of violence registered and the degree of socio-political mobilisation.
4. This column compares the trend of the events of 2013 with those of 2012, using the ↑ symbol to indicate that the general situation in 2013 has become more serious than in the previous year, the ↓ symbol to indicate an improvement in the situation and the = symbol to indicate that no significant changes have taken place.
5. In past editions of Alert!, this case had been identified as “DR Congo – Rwanda – Uganda”. Even if they share some characteristics, the cases of “DR Congo – Rwanda” and “DR Congo Uganda” are analysed separately in Alert 2014!
6. Ibid.

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
Africa			
Eritrea – Ethiopia	International	Eritrea, Ethiopia	1
	Territory		↓
Ethiopia	Internal	Government (EPRDF coalition, led by the party TPLF), political and social opposition	1
	Government		↑
Ethiopia (Oromia)	Internal	Central government, regional government, political opposition (OFDM, OPC parties) and social opposition, armed opposition OLF, IFLO	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Guinea	Internal	Government, Armed Forces, political parties in the opposition, trade unions	2
	Government		↑
Guinea-Bissau	Internationalised internal	Transition government, Armed Forces, political parties in the opposition, international drug trafficking networks	1
	Government		↓
Kenya	Internationalised internal	Government, ethnic militias, political and social opposition (political parties and civil society organisations), SLDF, Mungiki sect, MRC, Somali armed group al-Shabaab	3
	Identity, Government, Resources, Self-government		↑
Madagascar	Internal	High Transitional Authority, opposition leaders, State security forces, dahalo (cattle rustlers), self-defence militias, private security companies	3
	Government, Resources		↑
Malawi	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		=
Mali	Internal	Government, former military junta, sectors close to former president Amadou Toumani Touré	2
	Government		↓
Mauritania	Internationalised internal	Government, political and social opposition, AQIM, MUJAO	1
	Government, System		↓
Morocco	Internal	Monarchy, Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		=
Morocco – Western Sahara	International ⁶	Morocco, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), armed group POLISARIO Front	1
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		=
Mozambique	Internal	Government, former armed group RENAMO	2
	Government		↑
Niger	Internationalised internal	Government, political opposition (Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic) and social opposition, MUJAO, Signatories in Blood	1
	Government		↑
Nigeria	Internal	Government, political opposition, Christian and Muslim communities, farmers and livestock risers, community militias	3
	Identity, Resources		↑
Nigeria (Niger Delta)	Internal	Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, Joint Revolutionary Council, militias from the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo & Ogoni communities, private security groups	2
	Identity, Resources		↓
Rwanda	Internationalised internal	Government, Rwandan armed group FDLR, political opposition, dissident factions of the governing party RPF, Rwandan diaspora in DR Congo and in the West	1
	Government, Identity		↑
Senegal (Casamance)	Internal	Government, armed group MFDC and its various factions	1
	Self-government		=
Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland)	Internal	Republic of Somaliland, autonomous region of Puntland, Khatumo state	2
	Territory		=

7. Although Western Sahara is not an internationally recognised state, the socio-political crisis between Morocco and Western Sahara is considered “international” and not “internal” since it is a territory which has yet to be decolonised and Morocco’s claims to the territory are not recognised by International Law or by any United Nations resolution.

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
Africa			
Sudan	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	2
	Government		↑
Sudan – South Sudan	International	Sudan, South Sudan	2
	Resources, Identity		=
Swaziland	Internal	Government, political parties, trade unions, NGOs defending human rights and pro-democracy movements	1
	System		=
Tunisia	Internal	Government, political and social opposition, Ansar al-Sharia	2
	Government		↑
Uganda	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		=
Zimbabwe	Internal	Political parties ZANU-PF and MDC, pro-ZANU-PF militias of veterans and youths	1
	Government		↑
America			
Bolivia	Internal	Government, political and social opposition (political parties, authorities and civil society organisations from the eastern regions)	1
	Government, Self-government, Resources		↓
Haiti	Internationalised internal	Government, political and social opposition, MINUSTAH, former military officials	2
	Government		↑
Paraguay	Internal	Government, EPP	1
	Government		=
Peru	Internal	Government, armed opposition (remnants of Shining Path), political and social opposition (farmer and indigenous organisations)	2
	Government, Resources		↓
Venezuela	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		↑
Asia			
Bangladesh	Internal	Government (Awami League), political opposition (Bangladesh National Party & Jamaat-e-Islami), International Crimes Tribunal	3
	Government		↑
China (Tibet)	Internationalised internal	Chinese Government, Dalai Lama, and Tibetan Government in exile, political and social opposition in Tibet and in neighbouring provinces and countries	2
	Self-government, Identity, System		=
China (East Turkestan)	Internal	Government, armed opposition (ETIM, ETLO), political and social opposition	3
	Self-government, Identity, System		↑
China – Japan	International	China, Japan	2
	Territory, Resources		↑
Korea, DPR –USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea ⁸	International	DPR Korea, USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea, China, Russia	2
	Government		=
Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea	International	DPR Korea, Rep. of Korea	2
	System		=
India (Nagaland)	Internal	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM, NSCN (Khole-Kitovi), NNC, ZUF	2
	Identity, Self-government		↓

8. This international socio-political crisis affects other countries that have not been mentioned, which are involved to varying degrees.

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
Asia			
India (Tripura)	Internal	Government, oposición armada (NLFT, ATTF)	1
	Self-government		=
India – Pakistan	International	India, Pakistan	3
	Identity, Territory		↑
Indonesia (Aceh)	Internal	Indonesian government, regional government of Aceh, political opposition	1
	Self-government, Identity, Resources		↓
Indonesia (West Papua)	Internal	Government, armed group OPM, political and social opposition (autonomist or secessionist organisations, indigenous and human rights organisations), indigenous Papuan groups, Freeport mining company	3
	Self-government, Identity, Resources		=
Kazakhstan	Internationalised internal	Government, political and social opposition, local and regional armed groups	1
	System, Government		↓
Kyrgyzstan	Internationalised internal	Government, political and social opposition, regional armed groups, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan	1
	System, Government, Identity		↑
Lao, PDR	Internationalised internal	Government, political and armed organisations of Hmong origin	1
	System, Identity		=
Myanmar	Internal	Government, political and social opposition (opposition party NLD)	2
	System		=
Nepal	Internal	Government, Armed Forces, political parties –UCPN(M), CPN(UML)–, former Maoist armed opposition group PLA	1
	System		↓
Nepal (Terai)	Internal	Government, Madhesi political organisations (MPRF) and armed organisations (JTMM, MMT, ATLF, among others)	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Pakistan	Internal	Government, political and social opposition, armed opposition (Taliban militias, political party militias)	3
	Government, System		=
Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)	Internal	Government MILF, BIFF	3
	Self-government, Identity		=
Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)	Internal	Government, factions of the armed group MNLF	3
	Self-government, Identity		↑
Sri Lanka (northeast)	Internal	Government, Tamil political and social opposition	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Thailand	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	3
	Government		↑
Thailand – Cambodia	International	Thailand, Cambodia	1
	Territory		↓
Tajikistan	Internationalised internal	Government, political opposition (Islamic Renaissance Party) and social opposition (regional groups: Gharmis, Pamiris), former warlords, illegal Islamist groups (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU]), Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan	1
	Government, System		↓
Uzbekistan	Internationalised internal	Government, social and political opposition, regional armed groups, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan	1
	Government, System		=
Europe			
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	International	Government of Azerbaijan, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia	3
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		=

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
Europe			
Azerbaijan	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		=
Belarus	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		=
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Internationalised internal	Central government, Government of the Republika Srpska, Government of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation, High Representative of the international community	1
	Self-government Identity, Government		↑
Cyprus	Internationalised internal	Government of Cyprus, Government of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Greece, Turkey	1
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		=
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Internationalised internal	Government of Georgia, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia, Russia	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Georgia (South Ossetia)	Internationalised internal	Government of Georgia, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, Russia	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Republic of Moldova (Transnistria)	Internationalised internal	Government of Moldova, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria, Russia	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Spain (Basque Country)	Internationalised internal	Government of Spain, Government of France, ETA, Basque Government, political parties and social organisations	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	Internationalised internal	Government of the United Kingdom, local Government of Northern Ireland, Government of Ireland, factions of unionist protestant and Catholic republican armed groups	1
	Self-government, Identity		↑
Russia	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	2
	Government		↑
Russia (Karachaevo-Cherkessia)	Internal	Government of Russia, Government of the Karachaevo-Cherkessian Republic, armed opposition groups	1
	System, Identity, Government		=
Russia (North Ossetia)	Internal	Government of Russia, Government of North Ossetia, armed opposition groups	1
	System, Identity, Government		=
Serbia – Kosovo	International ⁹	Government of Serbia, Government of Kosovo, political and social representatives of the Serbian community in Kosovo, UNMIK, KFOR, EULEX	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Ukraine	Internationalised internal	Government, political and social opposition, EU, Russia, USA	2
	Government		↑
Middle East			
Bahrain	Internationalised internal	Government, political and social opposition, Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, Iran	2
	Government, Identity		=
Egypt	Internal	Government, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political arm, Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Armed Forces, National Salvation Front coalition (NSF), Salafist al-Nour party, Tamrod Movement, 6 April Youth Movement, Islamist coalition Alliance to Support Legitimacy	3
	Government		↑
Egypt (Sinai)	Internationalised internal	Government, security forces, armed groups based in the Sinai – including Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM)–, Israel	3
	Government, System		↑

9. The socio-political crisis between Kosovo and Serbia is considered “international” since although its international legal status remains unclear, Kosovo has been recognised as a state by more than a hundred of countries.

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
Middle East			
Iran	Internal	Government, political, social and religious opposition	1
	Government		=
Iran (northwest)	Internationalised internal	Government, PJAK, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Iraq	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Iran (Sistan Balochistan)	Internationalised internal	Government, Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), Jundallah (Soldiers of God / People's Resistance Movement), Harakat Ansar Iran, Jaish al-Adl	2
	Self-government, Identity		↑
Iran – USA, Israel ¹⁰	International	Iran, USA, Israel	2
	System, Government		↓
Iraq (Kurdistan)	Internationalised internal	Government, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Turkey, Iran	1
	Self-government, Identity, Resources, Territory		↓
Israel – Syria – Lebanon	International	Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Lebanese group Hezbollah and its armed faction (Islamic Resistance)	3
	System, Resources, Territory		↑
Lebanon	Internationalised internal	Government, Hezbollah, opposition March 14 Alliance (led by Future Movement), Amal, Free Patriotic Movement, Arab Democratic Party (Alawi), Hizb ul-Tahrir, militias, Abdullah Azzam Brigades (affiliated with al-Qaeda)	3
	Government		↑
Palestine	Internal	PA, Fatah, armed group al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Hamas and its armed wing Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades	1
	Government		=
Saudi Arabia	Internationalised internal	Government, political and social opposition, AQAP	1
	Government, Identity		=
Syria - Turkey	International	Syria, Turkey, Syrian opposition armed groups	3
	Government		=
Yemen	Internal	Government, security forces, pro-government militias, defector army officials, armed tribal groups, political and social sectors	1
	Government		↓
Yemen (south)	Internal	Government, secessionist and autonomist opposition groups from the south (including the South Yemen Movement/Al-Hiraak al-Janoubi)	3
	Self-government, Resources, Territory		=

1: low intensity; 2: medium intensity; 3: high intensity.
 ↑: escalation of violence; ↓: decrease of violence; =: no changes.
 Violence marked in bold is described in this chapter.

2.2. Socio-political crises: analysis of trends in 2013

This section is devoted to a global and regional analysis of the trends observed in contexts of sociopolitical crises in 2013.

a) Global trends

During 2013, **99 contexts of socio-political crises were identified around the world. As in previous years, most of the social and political crises were found in Africa, with 39 cases, followed by Asia with 25.** Both, Europe and the Middle East, were the scenario of 15 contexts

of tension each, while America witnessed five cases. **The total number of socio-political crises in 2013 rose compared to the number of social and political crises registered during the previous year, when 91 cases were seen.** This figure can be explained by two factors: on the one hand, by the emergence of new contexts of crisis and, on the other hand, by the fact that some cases considered armed conflicts in 2012 have now been classified as socio-political crises in 2013. It is important to note that all continents showed changes compared to the cases observed during the previous year.

In Africa, 39 social and political crises were identified in 2013, compared to 35 in 2012. It is worth mentioning that new scenarios of tension were registered in Mozambique, Niger, as well as in the eastern region of

10. This international socio-political crisis affects other countries that have not been mentioned, which are involved to varying degrees.

DR Congo, where the former armed group ADF increased its belligerent actions. As for Asia, the region was the scenario of 25 contexts of socio-political crises, compared to 23 in 2012. This rise was caused by the outbreak of a new crisis in Bangladesh and the inclusion of the dispute in Mindanao between the Philippine Government and the MILF. This last case ceased to be considered an armed conflict in 2012 thanks to the positive evolution of the peace process between the parties. Nevertheless, the levels of violence continued to be high in the region, mainly as a consequence of clashes between the Armed Forces and the BIFF, a breakaway faction of the MILF that is against the peace negotiations.

Regarding Europe, it is worth highlighting that the escalation of the political and social confrontation in Ukraine meant this case has been considered a tension in 2013, although the total number of cases remains the same as in 2012 (15). As for the Middle East, the pattern of increasing numbers of socio-political crises observed during previous years continued: 11 crisis situations in 2011, 14 in 2012, and 15 in 2013. Over this past year, it is worth mentioning that two cases come from contexts that ceased to be considered active armed conflicts: on the one hand, the dispute between the Iranian Government and the Kurdish armed group PJAK in the northwest of the country and, on the other hand, the political crisis in Yemen linked to the forced expulsion of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. In both these cases, the conflict dynamics continue, although with lower levels of violence.

Although the situations of violence may be attributed to multiple factors, an analysis of the landscape of socio-political crises in 2013 allows identifying some patterns concerning the main causes or reasons behind them. In line with the data observed in previous years, at a global level **most cases (75%) were linked to the opposition to internal or international policies implemented by the governments –leading to a struggle to access or erode power–, or with opposition to the political, social or ideological position of a State.** Other prevailing causes were identity aspirations and demands for self-determination and/or self-government, key elements in 69% of the socio-political crises in 2013. It is worth pointing out that in several contexts the disputes to control territories and/or resources were another especially relevant element (28%), although in general terms this is a factor that fuels many conflicts.

As for the intensity of the socio-political crises, during 2013 the trends observed in previous years continued. Hence, most cases displayed a low intensity (55%), one quarter of the contexts registered a medium level and one-fifth of these showed high intensity levels. **Compared to the year before, it is important to highlight that the number of serious socio-political crises was higher in 2013 than it was in 2012 (20% compared**


to 18%, respectively) and that in Asia there was double the amount of high-intensity socio-political crises, from four to eight cases. Consequently, Asia overtook the Middle East, the region displaying the largest number of high-intensity socio-political crises in 2012. The Middle East registered the same number of high-intensity cases as last year (6). Five other contexts of high-intensity socio-political crises were identified in Africa and one in Europe, while there were no high-intensity political and social crises in America. The most serious crises were located in DR Congo (east-ADF) DR Congo-Rwanda, Kenya, Madagascar, Bangladesh, China (East Turkestan), India-Pakistan, Indonesia (West Papua), Pakistan, the Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF), the Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), Thailand, Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Egypt, Egypt (Sinai), Israel-Syria-Lebanon, Lebanon, Syria-Turkey and Yemen (south).

As for the evolution of the levels of violence and destabilisation during 2013, the analysis comparing these factors with last year shows that the trends remain the same. Most socio-political crises (40%) remained with similar levels as in 2012; 35% of them experienced a deterioration of the situation, while 24% showed slight improvements. This positive evolution towards lower levels of tension was determined by several factors and, in some cases, was linked to the fact that agreements were reached to advance towards a dialogued way out of the dispute –such as the agreement reached by Iran and the G5+1 powers on Iran’s nuclear programme–, to a rapprochement of positions between confronted parties –such as the case of Serbia and Kosovo–, or to progress achieved in the process of implementing peace agreements –such as the case of Nepal, where the process to incorporate the former Maoist opposition group PLA in the Armed Forces was completed, elections were held and the Constituent Assembly was set in motion.

Finally, in line with the trend observed in previous years, **most socio-political crises around the world were internal (54%) and involved actors from a State operating within it.** Moreover, one third of the contexts were classified

On a global level, the total number of socio-political crises in 2013 rose compared to the figure registered during the previous year, and Asia doubled high intensity contexts

Graph 2.1. Regional distribution of the number of socio-political crises



as internationalised internal either because some of the main actors in dispute were foreign, or because the socio-political crisis extended into the territory of neighbour states. Only 15% of the cases in 2013 were of an international nature (15 out of the 99).

b) Regional trends

As in previous years, in 2013 **the African continent continued to be the main scenario of tensions at a global level**. More than one third (39%) of the contexts of socio-political crises took place in Africa (39 out of 99). In comparative terms, **during 2013 there was an increase in the number of cases that evolved negatively**. If in 2012 one third (34%) of socio-political crises registered a deterioration, in 2013 44% of all cases worsened (17 out of 39). The cases displaying a greater escalation of violence and destabilisation during 2013 included the five tensions with greatest intensity in Africa: Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, DR Congo (east-ADF) and DR Congo-Rwanda. It is worth pointing out that other socio-political crises that were considered serious cases in 2012 –Mali, Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland), Sudan-South Sudan– evolved towards a lower intensity in 2013, although the dynamics of the dispute continued.

Reflecting the trends on a global level, **the vast majority of socio-political crises in Africa were of an internal nature (66%)**. A further 21% of cases displayed elements of internationalisation, including the presence of international troops in the country –such as UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire–, the action of foreign armed groups –such as the organisation of Somali origin al-Shabaab in Kenya, or the actions of armed groups with links to al-Qaeda in Niger–, or were influenced by diaspora sectors –such as the cases of Eritrea or Rwanda–, among other elements. Only five of the 39 tensions in Africa had an international dimension: Eritrea-Ethiopia, Morocco-Western Sahara, DR Congo-Rwanda, DR Congo-Uganda and Sudan-South Sudan.

As for the factors behind the tensions, it is worth mentioning that in Africa a strong prevalence of opposition to the policies implemented by the different Governments is seen as an important explanation. This element was seen in 27 of the 39 tensions registered on the continent in 2013. During the year, this incompatibility with the government was seen through several events, such as popular mobilisations and expressions of social contestation against the authorities for political and social issues –like in Morocco or Tunisia–, episodes of political instability linked to the holding of elections –in Madagascar or Zimbabwe–, or attempted coups –like in Eritrea, at the start of 2013. Additionally, it is worth highlighting that the struggle for **control over resources was another relevant factor in**

Africa, appearing in nine of the 39 tensions. Overall, the continent concentrated the largest number of disputes linked to this factor of incompatibility in 2013. It is also relevant to consider that the dispute over resources was an element that was seen in all of the most serious contexts in Africa, combined with other causality factors.

In Asia, the most significant trend in 2013 was the **increase of high-intensity contexts, which doubled compared to 2012 (from four to eight)**. Two of the serious cases in 2013 had already registered high levels of intensity in 2012 –Indonesia (West Papua) and Pakistan–, while five others responded to an escalation of violence and upheaval. This was the case of Bangladesh –where episodes of political violence caused around 400 casualties–, China (East Turkestan) –where violent incidents intensified, there was a greater militarisation in Xinjiang and an increase in repression against the Uyghur community–, Philippines (MNLF) –in a context of growing confrontation, the dispute between the Philippine Government and the armed group in Mindanao registered

the most serious violent episode since the signing of the peace agreement in 1996–, India-Pakistan –where bilateral tension rose significantly, with regular episodes of violence by both Armies along the de-facto border between these two States– and in Thailand –scenario of mass protests and a growing political and social polarisation between those supporting and those against the Government. The last high-intensity case in Asia during 2013 was the dispute in Mindanao between the Philippine Government and the MILF. This case ceased to be considered an armed conflict in 2012, but during 2013 the dynamics of violence and tension persisted, mainly carried out by the same armed sectors that are against the peace process between the Government and the MILF. Overall, most cases of socio-political crises in Asia registered similar levels of violence and instability than in 2012 (44%), while these levels worsened in 28% of all cases and improved to some extent in a further 28% of cases, compared to the previous year. Among the latter cases, India (Nagaland) and Tajikistan, which in 2012 had been identified as serious contexts, displayed lower levels of violence during 2013.

Continuing with the trend observed in previous years, **one of the distinctive features of socio-political crises in Asia was the relevance of identity ambitions and demands for self-determination and self-government as causal factors**. These elements were present in the vast majority of cases, followed by elements of opposition to a State's political, economic, social or ideological systems and opposition to the local and international policies of a Government. It is worth stating that most of the socio-political crises seen in Asia were of an internal nature (56%), while 20% were international, and 24% were internationalised internal tensions. This internationalisation element –when

one of the main actors in a dispute is foreign and/or when the crisis extends into the territory of neighbour states— was seen in cases such as China (Tibet), Laos, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In the former soviet republics in Central Asia, in general terms the component of internationalisation was due to the presence of armed groups with a regional scope of action and to security incidents along the border area, among other factors.

America experienced the lowest number of socio-political crises on a global level, with a total of five cases in 2013, in line with previous years. None of the cases were high-intensity situations. All the contexts on the American continent showed a medium intensity (Haiti, Peru) or a low intensity (Bolivia, Paraguay, and Venezuela). Among the cases of medium intensity, it is worth highlighting the evolution of Peru, which was marked by a drop in the frequency and intensity of the clashes between the Government forces and the armed group Shining Path, compared to previous years. On the other side of the spectrum is Haiti, which registered higher levels of violence and destabilisation in 2013, linked to an intensification of anti-Government protests by the opposition and greater social discontent with the UN mission in the country (MINUSTAH) due to its alleged responsibility for an outbreak of cholera that killed thousands of people. It is worth mentioning that Haiti was the only context of internationalised internal socio-political crisis in America, precisely because of the role of MINUSTAH in the country. All remaining cases on the continent were internal. **As for the causes of socio-political crises in America, it is relevant that in all contexts, there was an element of opposition to government policies**, in some cases combined with other factors, such as the demands for self-determination and self-government—as in Bolivia, linked to the historical ambitions of the Santa Cruz province— or the struggle for resources—also a feature of the tension in Bolivia, and in Peru, a country that witnessed large environmental and mining protests. It is also worth noting that, while no contexts of socio-political crisis were identified within the US, it was involved in international tensions outside the American continent, both in Asia and in the Middle East. The US was a relevant international actor for North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programmes.

As for Europe, in line with the trend observed in previous years, the landscape of socio-political crises was characterised by the pre-eminence of low intensity situations, representing 80% of cases (12 of 15), while two others displayed a medium intensity—Russia and Ukraine— and, just as in 2012, only one situation was considered serious: the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Most of the tensions registered in Europe evolved in a similar way than in 2012, although there were also four contexts where deterioration was seen. The cases


that worsened in 2013 were Bosnia and Herzegovina—internal tensions rose due to friction between the political coalitions, social protests, constant calls for independence by Republika Srpska, and disagreements between local leaders and actors from the international community—, Northern Ireland—where there were violent incidents by both the unionist and republican sectors—, Russia—the country was the scenario of several attacks and continued to be affected by internal tensions over the Government's terrorism and human rights policies—and Ukraine—towards the end of 2013 it lived one of its worst political and social crises since the so-called Orange Revolution in 2004.

In Europe, Ukraine faced one of its worst political and social crises since the so-called Orange Revolution in 2004

It is worth pointing out that **in Europe there were more internationalised internal conflicts (eight of 15)**, representing 13%, compared to 33% of contexts considered to be internal (five of 15) and 13% were considered to be international (two of 15). Identity aspirations or issues linked to ambitions for self-determination or self-government were underlying causes in most of the socio-political crises in Europe, although half of all cases also were related to the opposition to Government policies or the State system.

Finally, regarding the socio-political crises **in the Middle East, it is worth mentioning that the growing trend of tensions seen in recent years continues**—11 in 2011, 14 in 2012, 15 in 2013—, and that the region continued to harbour a large number of high-intensity tensions. Although in absolute terms Asia overtook the Middle East as the scenario with the highest number of serious cases—eight contexts compared to six—, in relative terms the percentage of high-intensity tensions accounted for 40% in the Middle East, compared to 32% in Asia, 13% in Africa and 7% in Europe (America had no high-intensity situations). **All serious socio-political crises in the Middle East were influenced by the dynamics that emerged after the so-called Arab revolts in 2011.** In many of these cases, the high levels of violence and instability were closely linked to the consequences of the armed conflict in Syria. This impact became evident with the growing

Graph 2.2. Intensity of the socio-political crises by region



confrontation in Lebanon between sectors supporting and against the Syrian regime, where episodes of violence left dozens of casualties; in many incidents along the border between Syria and Turkey; as well as multiple episodes of violence within the framework of tensions between Israel, Syria and Lebanon. There were two other serious tensions in Egypt, stemming from the escalation of violence and the political polarisation in the country –especially after the overthrowing of the Islamist president Mohamed Mursi after a military coup–, and from instability in the Sinai, the scenario of growing clashes between security forces and armed groups based in the peninsula. Yemen (south) was another case of serious tension in the region, stemming from historical grievances in the south of the country vis-à-vis the north, where there were many violent events in the context of the transition started in the country in 2011.

As for the evolution of the socio-political crises in this region, in most cases (40%) the levels of violence and instability remained similar to those in 2012 (6 of 15), while in 27% of cases the situation improved compared to the previous year (four of 15) and 33% showed a negative evolution (five of 15). The trend showing a deterioration of the situation was seen in most high-intensity cases in the region (Egypt, Egypt [Sinai], Lebanon and Israel-Syria-Lebanon), and in one medium-intensity case: the Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan, where a new armed group carried out several attacks and clashes with the security forces. Among the cases that evolved positively in 2013, it is worth referring the dispute between Iran and the US, Israel and other countries after the signing of an historical agreement on Iran's nuclear programme at the end of 2013. **Overall, the Middle East displayed a larger number (47%) of socio-political crises considered as internationalised internal** (six of 15), followed by internal contexts (33% or five of 15 cases), and 20% of international tensions (three of 15 cases). As in the other regions, socio-political crises in the Middle East are explained by multiple factors. The predominant factor in the cases registered in the region was the opposition to the governments' internal or international policies, seen in 66% of cases.

2.3. Socio-political crises: annual evolution

Africa

a) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Chad	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internationalised Internal
Main parties:	Government, social and political opposition

Summary:

The foiled coup d'état of 2004 and the constitutional reform of 2005, boycotted by the opposition, sowed the seeds of an insurgency that intensified over the course of 2006, with the goal of overthrowing the authoritarian government of Idriss Déby. This opposition movement is composed of various groups and soldiers who are disaffected with the regime. Added to this is the antagonism between Arab tribes and the black population in the border area between Sudan and Chad, related to local grievances, competition for resources and the overspill of the war taking place in the neighbouring Sudanese region of Darfur, as a consequence of the cross-border operations of Sudanese armed groups and the janjaweed (Sudanese pro-government Arab militias). They attacked the refugee camps and towns in Darfur, located in the east of Chad, and this contributed to an escalation of tension between Sudan and Chad, accusing each other of supporting the insurgence from the opposite country, respectively. The signature of an agreement between both countries in January 2010 led to a gradual withdrawal and demobilisation of the Chadian armed groups, although there are still some resistance hotspots. In parallel, Idriss Déby continued controlling the country in an authoritarian way.

During the year, the **climate of repression and authoritarianism by Idriss Déby's regime continued**. The main events focused on his **failed attempt to lead a coup**, the announcement made by the UFR that it would resume armed fighting, and the continuous changes in Government that underscored the regime's permanent instability. On 1st May there was a failed attempt to carry out a coup that was dismantled by the Government. Among those attempting the coup was an opposition parliamentarian, Saleh Makki, according to the authorities. In relation to this attempted coup, there was fighting between soldiers and civilians that caused the death of at least three to eight people and around 15 injured, according to military sources. Finally, the toll was raised to 20 dead. After dismantling the coup, the Government went on to carry out a wave of arrests of journalists, opposition activists and even an opposition MP. This wave of arrests and repression was denounced by Amnesty International who published a new report in October exposing the

severe Government repression against all criticism and the restrictions to the freedom of expression in the country.¹¹ In this sense, Amnesty International denounced the frequent extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, illegal detentions and arbitrary arrests against Government critics in the name of protecting national security. Thus, hundreds of people, including parliamentarians, journalists and academics, were illegally arrested and retained with no evidence in deplorable conditions, which in some cases even caused the death of the detainees when they were denied medical assistance. The AU condemned the attempted coup. Amnesty estimated that in October more than 30 people continued under arrest due to the Coup. Previously, the Government had already arrested several senior officers of the Chadian army. In parallel, Chadian president Idriss Déby, announced the return of the first 700 soldiers deployed in Mali, where they had the mission to fight Islamist insurgence in the north of the country. According to several analysts, this measure could be related to the attempted coup.

Also, the leader of the alliance of political and military movements UFR, Timane Erdimi, exiled in Doha, Qatar, announced at the end of March that he wished to resume fighting to overthrow the Chadian regime. Erdimi also announced that he did not plan to travel to Chad, since the group's general staff officers were taking care of the situation along the border between Chad and Sudan. Erdimi was appointed as the leader of the UFR in 2009. The UFR has been affected by many internal divisions since it was established. In 2009, the other great rebel leader of the country, Mhamat Nouri, left the UFR to create the ANCD, which signed agreements with the Government. It is unclear what consequences Erdimi's announcement may have in the short term on the ground. **Finally, it is worth mentioning that, towards the beginning of October, new changes were done in Government, for the fifth time since Joseph Djimrangar Dadnadji was appointed Prime Minister in January 2013.** This change was marked by Daoussa Déby Itno, the older brother of Idriss Déby, into Government. Daoussa Déby led the strategic Chadian embassy in Libya, and took up post at the Ministry of Communications. Finally, it is important to note the growing instability along the border between Chad and Sudan, as a consequence of inter-community fighting at several points during the year, causing thousands of people to be displaced and leading to joint cross-border military operations between Sudan and Chad's Armed Forces, where several soldiers died.

DR Congo	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition and former armed opposition groups

Summary:

Between 1998 and 2003, what has been called "Africa's First World War" took place in DR Congo.¹² The signing of a series of peace agreements between 2002 and 2003 involved the withdrawal of foreign troops and the creation of a National Transitional Government (NTG), incorporating the former government, the political opposition, the RCD-Goma, RCD-K-ML, RCD-N and MLC armed groups, and the Mai Mai militias. From June 2003, the NTG was led by President Joseph Kabila and four vice presidents, two of whom belonged to the former insurgency: Azarias Ruberwa of the RCD-Goma and Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC. The NTG drew up the constitution, on which a referendum was held in December 2005. Legislative and presidential elections were held between July and October 2006, in which Kabila was elected president and Jean-Pierre Bemba came second, amid a climate of high tension and accusations of electoral fraud. The formation of the new government in 2007 failed to bring a halt to the instability and disputes taking place in the political sphere. The elections of November 2011, in which a series of irregularities were committed, fuelled the instability.

There were several events during the year that underscored the tense political situation in the country.

Different instability hotspots marked the political agenda, including the armed conflict in the east between the Armed Forces, supported by the UN intervention brigade, and the armed group M23, supported by Rwanda; the rising tension in Katanga; the actions by the LRA in the northeast; the increase in violence from the armed group ADF-NALU; and the instability in the Ituri region.¹³ Towards the end of December there was **an attempted coup that was suppressed by the authorities.** During this attempted coup, young followers of the religious leader Gideon Mukungubila attacked the state television channel, the airport and a military base in Kinshasa. The death toll was 46 attackers dead and 20 more were arrested by the security forces. **The most noticeable issue on the political arena were the preparations for the national dialogue.** President Kabila, who was re-elected in 2011 after highly contested and controversial elections because of fraud accusations, had initially promised to hold some sort of national concentration at the start of 2013. However this question was not activated until June. These dialogues

11. Amnesty International, *Chad: in the name of security?*, AFR 20/007/2013, London: AI, October 24, 2013, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR20/007/2013/en/1a12f728-84c5-4c58-ab83-830224ebcb47/af200072013fr.pdf>.

12. See the summary on DR Congo (east) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

13. Ibid.

took place in the country's three major cities: the capital Kinshasa; Lubumbashi, the capital city of the rich province of Katanga (in the south-east); and in Kisangani, in the Orientale Province (northeast). The organisation of these dialogues was in the hands of the president of the National Assembly, Aubin Minaku, and also Léon Kengo wa Dondo, the president of the Senate.

This dialogue took place after many discussions between the majority after the legislative and presidential elections in 2011, the opposition, which rejected the electoral results, and civil society. However, the big opposition parties demanded a change in the way the dialogues were organised. The Government did not accept this and **the three large opposition parties, UDPS, MLC and UNC decided to boycott the process.** In July, more than 80 opposition parties considered that the way in which the seats at the national dialogue were allocated did not follow the UN recommendations for a transparent and inclusive political dialogue between the Congolese actors. Finally, the opposition parties MLC and Libéraux (Kengo wa Dondo's party) took part in the national dialogue, which counted with around 800 delegates. The dialogue was facilitated by the President of the Republic of Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso. Among the demands made there it is worth mentioning the inclusion of armed groups, especially M23, that the consultations could lead to reshaping the Government, a discussion on the situation of serious mass human rights violations, the recruitment of child soldiers, the exploitation of natural resources, the creation of a modern republican army, the legitimacy of the institutions and corruption. Thus, the dialogue that took place on the 7th of September and the 5th of October ultimately came down to exchanges between the presidential majority and a part of the civil society, and representatives from some armed groups. President Joseph Kabila promised an amnesty to bring down the political tensions and more than 1,000 prisoners were conditionally released. This was followed by an increase in crime in the capital Kinshasa, according to several analysts, linked to this Government decision. It is worth noting that seven former armed groups were allowed to take part in the consultations, which were postponed. The co-chairs of the consultations submitted a report containing 679 recommendations for essential reforms and other Government initiatives. At the end of October, Kabila presented these recommendations to the two Chambers of Parliament, a session that was attended by President of the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, and the President of the AU's Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Kabila announced the creation of a national unity government. That same day he signed a decree establishing a national supervising committee to oversee the implementation of the recommendations.

Another of the outstanding questions of the year was the **revival of the electoral process, which had practically remained at a standstill since November 2011** due to the crisis that emerged from the elections. In June, the Government appointed, once again, abbot Apollinaire

Malu Malu as the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI, by its French acronym). Malu Malu was responsible for organising the first general elections in 2006 and was considered close to the Presidential Majority coalition, led by President Kabila. This generated controversy on the suitability of his appointment. His recusal was requested, since he was accused of wanting to amend article 220 in the Constitution to allow the outgoing president to run for a third mandate. Although in the new CENI would be represented by two members, one from Étienne Tshisekedi's party UDPS and another from the MLC, many voices raised against his appointment, even that of the Congo National Conference of Bishops (CENCO). Towards the middle of May, among rumours that placed Malu Malu at the head of the CENI again, the CENCO approved a common provision for all members of the Congolese Church prohibiting them from being part of the CENI unless they had an exceptional dispensation. The CENCO had not given dispensation to Malu Malu to chair the CENI. In parallel, **consultations were held to activate the electoral calendar.** Local and municipal elections are due to take place at the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015; and presidential and legislative elections are due for 2015 and 2016.

Finally, it is worth referring to the situation in the Katanga province, where insecurity rose due to the actions of the armed group Bakata Katanga, and due to clashes between this group and the Army, causing dozens of victims. Several analysts pointed out that insecurity could grow in the province due to the battle between the national and provincial leaders over the distribution of revenue from copper exploitation. Katanga, with a history of secessionist movements and which already tried to become independent after the independence of DR Congo in 1960, is one of the main copper production areas in the world (last year it exported 600,000 tonnes). It is also where most of the big multinationals of the sector are established, such as Freeport McMoran and Glencore. Katanga is also the birthplace of President Kabila and of some of his main allies, the reason why there is speculation around the fact that the growing internal divisions in the governing coalition, the Presidential Majority, could be the origin of the violence. Towards the end of March, some 200 Bakata Katanga combatants descended on the capital Lubumbashi in broad daylight, handed themselves in to the MONUSCO and were transferred to Kinshasa for trial.

DR Congo (east-ADF)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	System, Resources Internationalised internal
Main parties:	DR Congo, Uganda, Mai-Mai militias, opposition armed group ADF-NALU (ADF)

Summary:

The Alliance of Democratic Forces - National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU) is an Islamist group led by Ugandan and Congolese combatants operating in the northeast of the Rwenzori Massif (North Kivu, between DR Congo and Uganda). It has between 1,200 and 1,500 fighters mainly recruited in both these countries and in Tanzania, Kenya and Burundi. It is the only group in the area considered an Islamist organisation, and has even been placed on the US list of terrorist organisations. It was created in 1995 by the merging of other Ugandan armed groups taking refuge in DR Congo (Rwenzururu, ADF) and was then called ADF, the dominant ideology is that of the ADF, with its origins in Islamist movements marginalised in Uganda, linked to the conservative movement Salaf Tabliq. During its first years it was used by Mobutu's Zaire (and also by Kabila too) to put pressure on Uganda. It also had the support of Kenya and Sudan and a strong clandestine support in Uganda. Its initial aim was the creation of an Islamic state in Uganda; but in the years 2000 it took hold in the communities hosting it in DR Congo, becoming a local threat for the Congolese administration, although its activity was limited. At the start of 2013 the group started a wave of recruiting and kidnappings.

The Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) became a threat to security in the east of DR Congo in 2013, due to the escalation of armed actions and the expansion of their training camps. According to several analysts, it even stopped being a Congolese-Ugandan problem to become a regional threat. In recent years the group had carried out sporadic violent acts. According to several UN reports from 2013 and the latest report by the Group of Experts published in January 2014, **during the year, ADF became stronger and more aggressive; it kidnapped dozens of inhabitants in the area as well as humanitarian workers, and attacked medical facilities, cargo and staff, as well as MONUSCO peacekeeping personnel, killing dozens.** According to Ugandan intelligence services and UN sources, the ADF has around 1,200 to 1,500 combatants located in the Beni Territory, in the northeast of North Kivu, close to the border with Uganda. These same sources estimate that the total number of ADF members, including women and children, ranges from 1,600 to 2,500 people. The recognised leader of the ADF, Jamil Mukulu, remains in DR. Congo. The Group of Experts did research on ADF's financial support and its possible ties to the Somali Islamist armed group al-Shabaab and with al-Qaeda, but for the time being they haven't been able to prove these ties. The Government pointed out that during 2013 there had been foreigners receiving military and operations training with the ADF. The Group also carried out consultations with the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea and other UN agencies, which do not have evidence on the existence of ties between the ADF and al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, several analysts determined that the group's leader had forced all his combatants to convert to Islam but that, for the time being the actual reasons of the ADF were not known and

could range from promoting a holy war to defending their political and financial interests.

DR Congo – Rwanda²⁵

Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Government, Resources International
Main parties:	Governments of DR Congo, Rwanda, armed groups FDLR and M23 (formerly CNDP)

Summary:

The tense relations between DR Congo and Rwanda date from the beginning of the nineties, when the Zaire dictator Mobutu supported the Rwandan regime of Juvenal Habyarimana to stop the offensive of the RPF, the insurgence led by Paul Kagame, who after the 1994 genocide came to power in Rwanda. Since then, Kagame tried to overthrow Mobutu and persecute those responsible for the 1994 genocide that had escaped to DR Congo. In 1996 he supported Laurent Désiré Kabila to overthrow Mobutu, which he managed to do in 1997. After that, Kabila halted the relations with Rwanda, a country he fell out with because he intended to continue persecuting those responsible for the genocide. From 1998 to 2003 there was the "first African world war", given this name because there were up to eight countries participating, either supporting or against the Congolese Government, as is the case of Rwanda. The signing of a series of peace agreements between 2002 and 2003 led to the withdrawal of hostile foreign troops of Rwanda. They justified their presence on the basis of the existence of insurgent groups in Congolese territory, which they aimed to eliminate, given the lack of willingness shown by the Congolese armed forces to do so. In the meantime, they controlled and pillaged the natural resources in the east of the country directly or through armed groups protected by Rwanda and other countries. With the goal of furthering its own interests, DR Congo has supported these hostile groups in Rwanda, mainly the FDLR, which caused the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Relations between the two countries have been made difficult due to the existence of these groups and the failure to implement the agreements to demobilise or eliminate them, have experienced ups and downs.

The armed group ADF became a threat to security in the east of DR Congo in 2013, due to the escalation of armed actions and the expansion of their training camps

The **attack by the armed group M23 against Congolese security forces and population that started in 2012 and the support given to this group by Rwanda were a decisive contribution to the serious deterioration in the relations between these two countries** during the year. Since the taking of Goma by the M23 in November 2012, intense diplomacy was set in motion in the region to try channelling negotiations that ended in February 2013 with the signing of a peace agreement between 11 African countries in Addis Ababa to stabilise the east of DR Congo and the region of the Great Lakes. This agreement paved the way for the establishment of a peacekeeping force to fight the Congolese armed group together with the Armed Forces. **The signatories agreed not to**

intervene in conflicts taking place in their neighbour countries and to refrain from supporting rebel groups.

The involvement of several countries in the war in DR Congo, especially Rwanda and Uganda, as revealed by the different reports by the UN Group of Experts on the exploitation of natural resources, the organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other organisations, countries and media, contributed to perpetuate the instability and violence. The signatories of the peace agreement were DR Congo, all its neighbour countries –Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), South Sudan, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia– and South Africa. The UN and the AU also participated in this agreement, together with other regional organisations. The agreement did not include any of the armed groups present in the country, especially M23, and opened the door to an intervention by a UN brigade, made up of soldiers from the region's countries under the mandate of MONUSCO. The Security Council approved its creation towards the end of March, although it didn't enter action until July 2013 due to disagreements regarding its mandate and the contribution of troops.

During the second half of the year, tensions between DR Congo and Rwanda grew, after the Congolese Government accused Rwanda of firing some of the rockets that fell on Goma in August, to help M23 and of sending 300 Rwandan soldiers to fight together with M23. The Rwandan Government accused DR Congo of deliberately carrying out up to 34 attacks with bombs on Rwandan territory during the last days of August and accused the country of collusion with the Rwandan opposition armed group FDLR. The UN and the Congolese Government stated that the authorship of the attacks with rockets could have been M23; with this, the Congolese Government suggested that M23 was seeking to get Rwanda involved in the conflict. The UN Secretary General's advisor, Edmond Mulet, also pointed at the existence of credible signs that Rwanda was supporting M23. This information was denied by Rwanda, who accused DR Congo of deliberately firing rockets on the border. In this context, the UN Secretary General called for contention and to avoid an escalation. It is also worth mentioning the report by the Group of Experts monitoring the exploitation of natural resources in the country; this group established in June that M23 had recruited combatants in the neighbouring county of Rwanda with collaboration from the Rwandan Army, while the Congolese Army had collaborated with the FDLR. These accusations made the tensions rise between both countries. Nevertheless, the offensive launched by the Congolese Armed Forces, supported by the Intervention Brigade, increased and at the start of November they managed to defeat M23, whose leaders escaped to Uganda.¹⁴

DR Congo – Uganda

Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Government, Resources, Territory International
Main parties:	DR Congo and Uganda governments, ADF-NALU, M23, LRA, armed groups operating in Ituri

Summary:

Relations between Uganda and the DR Congo have been dominated by the answers found to the internal political conflicts that have transcended the common borders and have derived into a series of alliances between the actors in both countries. The tense relations between these two countries go back in time to the eighties, when Yoweri Museveni came to power in Uganda. The Ugandan Government supported guerrilla movements close to it in neighbour countries, such as Kagame's RDF, seeking to overthrow the Rwandan regime, or the Congolese rebellion led by Laurent Désiré Kabila to overthrow Mobutu and persecute the ADF-NALU in DR Congo. After toppling Mobutu, Kabila stopped collaborating with Uganda, a country he fell out with because he wanted to continue persecuting the rebels who were given protection in DR Congo, such as the ADF-NALU and the LRA. From 1998 to 2003 there was the "first African world war", given this name because there were up to eight countries participating, either supporting or against the Congolese Government, as is the case of Uganda. The signing of a series of peace agreements between 2002 and 2003 led to the withdrawal of hostile foreign troops of Uganda. They justified their presence on the basis of the existence of insurgent groups in Congolese territory, which they aimed to eliminate, given the lack of willingness shown by the Congolese armed forces to do so. In the meantime, they controlled and pillaged the natural resources in the east of the country directly or through armed groups protected by Uganda. With the goal of furthering its own interests, DR Congo has supported these hostile groups in Uganda. Relations between the two countries have been made difficult due to the existence of these groups and the failure to implement the agreements to demobilise or eliminate them, have experienced ups and downs.

The attack by the armed group M23 against Congolese security forces and population that started in 2012 and the support received from Uganda, which was revealed in several reports by the UN Group of Experts on the exploitation of natural resources, HRW and other organisations, countries and media, **were decisive contributions to the deterioration of the relations between both countries** during the year. According to several analysts, Uganda, who had been accused of supporting the armed group (its political representatives were in the country), decided to improve its image vis-à-vis the international community and in 2012 offered to facilitate contacts between the Congolese Government and M23. Both parties accepted these good auspices,

14. See the summary on DR Congo (east) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

so in December 2012 contacts started in Kampala and there were several regional meetings to facilitate the situation. In February 2013, the signing of a peace agreement between 11 African countries of the Great Lakes in Addis Ababa to stabilise the east of DR Congo and the region of the Great Lakes enabled the creation of an intervention force at the end of March.¹⁵

As of July, the offensive by the Congolese Armed Forces, supported by the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), increased the pressure on M23 and towards the beginning of November managed to defeat the group. The main leaders of M23 escaped to Uganda, and even if DR Congo requested Uganda to extradite them, by the end of 2013 there still hadn't been a step in this direction. After the defeat of M23 and the efforts made by Uganda to reach some form of joint statement to close the issue, tensions grew between both Governments due to the failure of the process. Finally, on 2nd December, Kabila travelled to Kampala to meet the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni with a double objective: one the one hand, to reach an agreement on how of concluding the Kampala Dialogue in a mutually acceptable way and, on the other hand, to ease the bilateral tensions caused by the inflammatory remarks made by both Governments after the failure of the signing ceremony on 11th November. In a joint statement, both presidents agreed that the Kampala Dialogue should conclude rapidly to facilitate the return and demobilisation of the former combatants of M23 and the return of the thousands of displaced people. Kabila also reaffirmed his commitment to end with the insurgence movements FDLR and ADF-NALU. On 12th December the Kampala declaration was signed separately by DR Congo and M23.¹⁶

Rwanda	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, FDLR armed group, political opposition, dissident sectors of the RPF ruling party, Rwandan diaspora in DR Congo and in the West

Summary:

The arrival of Belgian colonialism in 1916 exacerbated the ethnic differences between the majority Hutu community and the Tutsi minority. The latter was considered superior and held political, economic and social power in the country with the blessing of Belgium to the detriment of the majority of the population. This situation stirred up great resentment and by 1959 the first outbreaks of ethno-political violence against the Tutsi community had taken place. Following

independence in 1962, the Hutu community took power. 1990 marked the start of an armed conflict between the RPF armed group, led by the Tutsi community in Uganda, having fled in 1959, and the Hutu government, although an agreement was reached in 1993. This agreement was not respected. Between April and June 1994, extremist Hutu groups carried out the genocide of around one million people, mostly Tutsi but also moderate Hutu, abandoned by the international community, which withdrew the UN mission that was supposed to supervise the agreement. The RPF managed to overthrow and expel the genocidal government, committing serious violations of human rights. Some sectors of the population refer to this as a second internal genocide, in addition to the crimes committed by the RPF in Congolese territory as it persecuted those responsible for the 1994 genocide (the former Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe militias, rechristened as the FDLR) and the two million Rwandan refugees who had fled to DR Congo. Since then, the president, Paul Kagame, has ruled in an authoritarian manner, repressing political dissidence.

The **escalation of the conflict in DR Congo and the consequences stemming from this were the highlights of the year. Tensions between Rwanda and DR Congo** experienced a serious increase as a consequence of Rwandan involvement in the conflict affecting DR Congo supporting the armed group M23 and the accusations made by Rwanda that rockets had been fired on its territory from DR Congo.¹⁷ Also, **the rendition of M23's leader, Bosco Ntaganda towards the middle of March at the US Embassy** in Kigali was another significant event of the year.¹⁸ In parallel, on the internal level, it is worth mentioning three important matters that stress the reality of the situation in the country: the regressions in the judicial sphere, the holding of elections that had been won beforehand, and the persistence of violent acts and executions of political leaders in exile.

Regarding the judicial sphere and the freedom of expression, towards the middle of December the Rwandan Supreme Court sentenced the opposition leader Victoire Ingabire Umuhiza, from the unrecognised party United Democratic Forces (UDF) to 15 years in prison. This ruling extended the first court sentence to eight years in prison, handed down by this same Court in October 2012. Victoire Ingabire was sentenced to eight years in prison accused of conspiring against the regime and denying the genocide, but the accounts of spreading the genocide ideology and belonging to an armed group were rejected. After the appeal launched by her and her lawyers to the Rwandan Supreme Court, besides the two clearly politically motivated accounts (as pointed out by several analysts, for which she was sentenced in October 2012) the court added an account of "spreading rumours". Amnesty International published a report in March pointing to the many flaws committed at the time of the arrest, the first trial and the charges against Ingabire.¹⁹ Amnesty

15. See the summary on DR Congo-Rwanda in this chapter and the summary on DR Congo (east) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

16. See the summary on DR Congo (east) in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

17. See the summary on DR Congo (east) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts) and the summary on DR Congo – Rwanda in this chapter.

18. See the summary on DR Congo (east) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

19. Amnesty International, *Rwanda: Justice in Jeopardy: The First Instance Trial of Victoire Ingabire*, AI: London, March 25, 2013, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/001/2013/en/52dac84e-b937-4540-8907-14cb398202d2/af470012013en.pdf>.

International had pointed out that this trial, one of the longest in Rwandan history, was political and legally relevant since it was testing the ability of the Rwandan judicial system to deal with a case of great political relevance for the country independently. Ingabire was first arrested in October 2010, months after returning from exile in the Netherlands, and after trying to question Paul Kagame's regime from inside the country. Besides, in the field of international justice, Rwanda had suffered two important setbacks: in February, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda revoked the sentences issued in 2011 against former ministers Justin Mugenzi and Prosper Muginarezwa, due to failures committed during the trial, causing great consternation for the Rwandan prosecution. Secondly, it is relevant to mention the release of the former head of Laurent Serubuga's Cabinet by a French court in September. The court rejected the extradition request arguing that the genocide and crimes against humanity were not punishable by Rwandan law in 1994.

On a political level, it is worth mentioning the celebration of **legislative elections, where, not surprisingly, the government party RPF led by Paul Kagame swept the elections** held on 16th September with 76.22% of votes. Adding to this result were the votes for the Government's two allied parties, the PSD, with 13.03% of votes and the Liberal Party, with 9.29% of votes, accounting for 98.54% of total votes. The official turnout figure was 98.8%, a usual turnout rate in Rwanda, where the population is strongly encouraged to vote by government institutions. Several analysts pointed out that this overwhelming victory, regardless of how it was achieved, paves the way for Paul Kagame until 2017, when the next presidential elections are to take place, where he could run for a third term in office. Finally, reflecting the climate of the growing instability over the past years, it is also worth noting the launching of grenades happening regularly, although sporadically, in the country. Towards the end of March and again in mid-September, there were attacks with grenades in the Rwandan capital, Kigali. The first cost the life of one person and eight others were injured, whereas in the second case there were two attacks with grenades between the 13th and 14th of September in Kigali, claiming the lives of two people and injuring 14. Also, at the beginning of January 2014 came the announcement of the death of the former Rwandan intelligence chief Patrick Karegeya at a hotel in Johannesburg. Karegeya, an ally of Paul Kagame's in the nineties, had spent the last six years exiled in South Africa. Together with the former leader of the Armed Forces, general Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, who was also exiled in South Africa, they had created a new opposition party in 2010, the Rwandan National Congress. Several opposition leaders in exile have been murdered in recent years, and there are suspicions that Rwanda has been behind these deaths.

Sudan	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition

Summary:

Sudan has been immersed in a long-standing conflict stemming from the concentration of power and resources in the centre of the country. Besides the conflicts in the marginalised regions of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the rest of the country is also undergoing governability problems stemming from the authoritarian regime of President Omar al-Bashir, who came to power after a coup in 1989 and who uses strict control and repression against dissidents through the State's security forces. Tensions worsened in the country with the secession of South Sudan in 2011, since this severely affected the country's economy, 70% of which depended on revenues from oil, mainly located in the south. The Sudanese State coffers saw revenue plummet with the loss of control over oil exports and, later on, due to the lack of agreement with South Sudan over how to transport oil through the oil pipelines crossing Sudan. A financial situation with a high inflation and the devaluation of its currency contributed to the outbreak of significant protests in the Summer of 2012 in several cities around the country that were put out by the security forces.

The overall situation in the country remained tense during the year. During the last months of 2013, political and social tensions grew as a consequence of the increase in oil prices. Thousands of civilians took to the streets in Khartoum and other cities around the country to protest against the elimination of fuel subsidies and this increased the price of crude oil considerably. Protests soon turned into demands to overthrow the regime and claims for more freedoms. There were several violent events; demonstrators set vehicles and petrol stations alight and were dispersed using tear gas by the security forces. According to the Government, between 30 and 40 people died in the protests and around 700 were arrested. However, local and international human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, said that more than 100 people were killed at these demonstrations, most of them from wounds caused by shots. The Government blamed the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), made up of several armed groups, of the death of demonstrators, and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir defended the austerity measures adopted. During the demonstrations, the Internet networks were shut down through the country, in an attempt to try and avoid images of the demonstrations from being shown. These protests made the divisions grow in the NCP governing party. Its reformist groups asking for a change in leadership were against the intervention of security forces. With

a public memorandum addressed to the President, several party members including the former presidential advisor Ghazi Salah al-Deen al-Attarbam demanded the elimination of austerity measures. Later on, the party leadership threatened those who had signed the memorandum with disciplinary sanctions.

Months before, the SRF coalition had called on Sudanese inhabitants to rise against al-Bashir's regime, appealing to their internal divisions. The political alliance uniting 20 opposition parties, the National Consensus Forces (NCF) announced a one hundred-day plan in June to topple the regime and called on the population to take to the streets in a peaceful demonstration against the regime. The NCF said the SRF was a strategic ally in the struggle against the regime, although the NCF is against using arms, meaning that it does share the objectives of the SRF, but doesn't share its methods. In January, both parties had sealed an alliance in Kampala, Uganda, **in order to overthrow the Sudanese Government**. Six opposition leaders were arrested in connection to the pact to replace President al-Bashir's administration with a federal democratic State, based on equality and with a clear separation between Government and religion. Alongside, the UN Human Rights independent expert in Sudan, Mashood Adebayo Baderin, warned of the possible human rights violations committed by the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and called on the Government to act on the matter. Baderin also expressed his concerns over the arrests of political opposition personalities. Human Rights Watch (HRW) called on the Government to free the six opposition leaders jailed for participating in the pact or to file credible charges against them. HRW said that these arrests marked the need to review the Sudanese national security agencies and the laws governing them. Nevertheless, three more members of the opposition were arrested at the end of March when they were calling for the freeing of their jailed colleagues. Furthermore, al-Bashir announced in March that he would not run for the 2015 presidential elections.

Sudan – South Sudan	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Identity, Resources International
Main parties:	Sudan, South Sudan
Summary:	
South Sudan declared independence on 9 th July 2011 marking the end of the peace process started with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. However, the creation of the new State did not end the disagreements between Khartoum and Juba due to the	

multiplicity of matters pending resolution between both Governments. Some of the main obstacles for stability include the dispute of the oil-rich enclave of Abyei and the final delimitation of the border between both countries or the lack of an agreement about the exploitation of oil resources (with oil fields in South Sudan, but with oil pipelines to export it passing through Sudan). Mutual accusations on supporting insurgence movements in the other country have contributed to further destabilise the situation and threaten the peaceful cohabitation in both countries.

Despite the tense situation regarding the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan during the year, in October important progress was made. The presidents of both countries negotiated the final status for Abyei amidst the controversy arising from the non-binding referendum held in the region. The presidents of Sudan and South Sudan, Omar al-Bashir and Salva Kiir, respectively, held a meeting in Juba to talk about the status of the Abyei region. Both agreed the general conditions for the Abyei administration. Among other points, they decided on aspects relating to the Abyei Council and Police, as well as the payment of 2% of oil, including the pending payments to the Abyei administration. The final status for the region has been disputed since 2005. It is currently under UN administration. Until now, Khartoum was against the holding of a referendum because the nomad population of Misseriya ethnicity, who are citizens of Sudan and are favourable to uniting to Khartoum, could not vote. However, months earlier, in June, **the Sudanese Government had threatened to close down the oil pipelines carrying South Sudan crude oil and, in July, it again threatened to close them down.** These threats came as an answer from Sudan to the support given to the rebel coalition Sudanese Revolutionary Front by South Sudan. The UN Security Council called on Sudan not to close down the pipelines and in September the presidents of both countries met in Khartoum to solve the dispute.

Regarding the referendum, thousands of people returned to the region to vote in the unofficial referendum on Abyei held at the end of October. The Referendum, called by the Kngok Dinka community, which is favourable to joining Juba, was considered illegal by two countries involved in the dispute and by the AU. In the context of the preparations for the referendum, the UN Security Council disclosed a statement calling on the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to refrain from any illegal action that could increase the tensions between the countries. In turn, the AU announced it was sending a mission to Abyei to mediate in the negotiations aiming to determine a status for the region, reduce the tensions in the area and avoid any unilateral action from being taken.

b) Horn of Africa

Eritrea	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government, Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, internal political and social opposition, EDA political-military opposition coalition (EPDF, EFD, EIPJD, ELF, EPC, DMLEK, RSADO, ENSF, EPDF, EIC, Nahda), other groups

Summary:

The single-party regime that has remained in place in Eritrea since 1993 (the former insurgency that contributed to the collapse of Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime in Ethiopia in 1991), is highly authoritarian in nature, silencing and suppressing the political opposition. The government, led by the old guard from the time of independence, has a series of opposition movements to contend with that are calling for progress in democracy and the governability of the country, respect for ethnic minorities and a greater degree of self-government. They also demand official language status for Arabic, an end to the marginalisation of Islam in the country and a halt to the cultural imposition of the Tigray community, or Tygranisation, carried out by the PFDJ, which controls all the mechanisms of power. This situation, added to Eritrea's policy in the region of the Horn of Africa, has led the country towards increasing isolationism. In December 2009 the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo, air travel ban and asset freeze on the country's highest-ranking officials due to their support of the Somali armed group al-Shabaab.

Several analysts highlighted the growing tension at the heart of the regime, as was seen by a **military rebellion at the start of 2013 that was suppressed by the authorities**. On 21st January there was a mutiny when around one hundred soldiers occupied the Ministry of Information and broadcast a message on the official TV station where they **called for the implementation of the 1997 Constitution and the release of prisoners of conscience** in the country. They later surrendered to the authorities, who started an investigation and a wave of arrests in February. At a first stage there was speculation that maybe it could be an attempted coup. According to several analysts, the actions taken by the Government did reflect the severity of the situation. On 5th February, the Ministry of Information banned all information on the mutiny and on social protests to Eritreans and the television station al-Jazeera, which was later shut down. Days later, President Afwerki broadcast a recorded message saying there was no reason to worry.

The UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia revealed in July that new fissures were emerging in the Eritrean security institutions

Nevertheless, in order to prevent a revolt in the Armed Forces, Afwerki started to arm the civil population and to structure it into the so-called Hzbawi Serawit, or Popular Army, which in practice is an undefined military service. A report by International Crisis Group published in March warned of the growing unrest and rising social and political divisions, and highlighted the need to move along with a transition in the country to avoid a violent outbreak and a struggle for power that could have severe consequences of a regional outreach.²⁰

In this regard, the **UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia revealed in July that fissures were emerging in the Eritrean security institutions**, as seen with the failed military revolt in January and the high-level defection in the Government's military and civil sectors.²¹ Good proof of this was the defection of the Minister of Information, Ali Abdu, close to Afwerki, whose whereabouts are unknown. These fissures seem to be especially relevant among a group of senior officials of the Armed Forces managing the paramilitary, financial and intelligence apparatus controlled by the President. Also, relations between Eritrea and the Somali Islamist armed group al-Shabaab persisted, despite Eritrea starting to establish relations with the new Somali Federal Government and its regional warlords, according to the UN Group's report. **Eritrea also kept an illegal international system to collect revenue from the diasporas**, especially by charging a 2% tax to Eritrean citizens, as well as another tax to collect revenues for the Armed Forces, according to this report. Government officials had also collected significant revenues from **kidnapping and trafficking with refugees** escaping from Eritrea. The Government also generated hundreds of millions of dollars from its mineral reserves since 2011. The Monitoring Group repeated options to improve due diligence measures to implement in the mining industry in Eritrea. The UN Security Council condemned the continuation of arms being sold to Eritrea despite the embargo that is in place and extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group until November 2014.

The serious situation experienced in Eritrea became evident once again with the intervention of the UN's special rapporteur on human rights, Sheila B. Keetharuth, who in October warned of the serious human rights violations in the country. In May she went on a mission to the region, visiting Djibouti and Ethiopia, but was denied entry into Eritrea. Her report, presented to the UN Human Rights Council in June, detailing the **existence of extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, and solitary confinement, arbitrary arrests and torture, inhuman conditions in prisons, undefined military service** (it was previously for 18 months), lack of freedom of expression and

20. International Crisis Group, *Eritrea: Scenarios for Future Transition*, Africa Report no. 200, March 28, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia-eritrea/200-eritrea-scenarios-for-future-transition.aspx>.

21. UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Eritrea, July 25, 2013, <http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/2013/440>

opinion, reunion, association, movement and religion, as some of the major issues. **According to the UNHCR, 305,723 people left the country in 2012, and 2,000 to 3,000 fled the country each month during 2013.** In this regard, it is important to refer to a report²² presented to the European Parliament in December stating that the country is the scenario of people trafficking, since **around 30,000 Eritreans have been kidnapped since 2007 and moved to the Sinai desert where they suffered tortures and were asked to pay ransoms.** It is estimated that families have paid some 600 million dollars to the gangs acting in connivance with Sudanese officials and with the Eritrean Border Surveillance Unit, since according to the report, people trafficking would not be possible without the direct involvement of Eritrean security forces, given the movement restrictions in place in the country, the existence of visas at the borders and the “shoot to kill” policy at anyone crossing the border illegally. The Eritrean ambassador in the United Kingdom highlighted that Eritrea was a victim of this situation and was working to revert it. Finally, it is relevant to mention the accusations made by the armed opposition group Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement, based in Ethiopia, on connivance of the Sudanese authorities with Eritrea, when they arrested eight of their leaders based in Sudan. This group, which aims at establishing an Islamic regime in the country, has been operating since the eighties from the neighbour country of Ethiopia. Towards the end of September, the EU called for the release of all existing political prisoners. Besides this, the armed group RSADO, from the Afar community, and the SDPM met on 6th September in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, to prepare military actions to overthrow Asmara’s regime.

Criminal gangs have kidnapped 30,000 people in Eritrea since 2007 in connivance with the Eritrean security forces

Eritrea – Ethiopia	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Territory International
Main parties:	Eritrea, Ethiopia

Summary:

In 1993, Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia, although the border between the two countries was not clearly demarcated, which led to clashes between 1998 and 2000 that claimed 100,000 lives. In June 2000 the two countries signed an agreement for the ending of hostilities, the UN Security Council set up the UNMEE mission to supervise it and the Algiers Peace Agreement was signed in December. Under the terms of this agreement they agreed to abide by the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), which was entrusted with delimiting and demarcating the border on the basis of the relevant colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and international

law. In April 2002 the EEBC announced its ruling, which assigned the border town of Badme (epicentre of the war and currently governed by Ethiopia) to Eritrea, a decision that was rejected by Ethiopia. At the end of 2005, Eritrea decided to restrict the operations of the UNMEE, frustrated by the lack of progress made in implementing the EEBC ruling, due to the fact that insufficient pressure was exerted on Ethiopia to ensure its fulfilment, which forced the withdrawal of the UNMEE in 2008. A year before this, the EEBC had completed its work without being able to fulfil its mandate due to the obstacles placed in its path by Ethiopia, leading to the stalemate that has endured ever since

Along the year there were no official advances in resolving the conflict between both these countries, although in recent years several countries in the region have called for dialogue to resume between the parties, especially in 2012. **In 2013 the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn expressed his interest and willingness to start peace conversations twice, at any time and with no pre-conditions.** The fragility of Isaias Afwerki’s Government, according to analysts, could make him take new actions to extend his regime. This situation could also lead to a dialogue process with the international community and a greater openness to receive humanitarian aid. As proof of this situation, in October 2012

South Sudan would have offered to mediate between the parties, an offering that allegedly was accepted, although in 2013 no progress was seen nor was any information on this matter given. At the same time, towards the middle of December 2012, **Qatar announced to the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn on a state visit that the Eritrean President had called for the country to mediate to overcome the conflict between the parties.** Afwerki would have offered to participate in conversations mediated by Qatar with no pre-conditions. Qatar and Ethiopia, two countries that had been in tense relations in recent years normalised these relations in 2012. In turn, during an interview on al-Jazeera, Hailemariam Desalegn would have announced a trip to Eritrea to hold direct conversations with Afwerki, since this was the policy that Ethiopia had always had. According to his words, his predecessor in the post, the late Meles Zenawi, had on many occasions asked for peace conversations with Afwerki. In March 2012 news was also leaked that there may be a meeting of the two of them in Germany, facilitated by Israel and Qatar, but there was no information given to back this news from the Eritrean Ansaba. This small country on the Arabian Peninsula, which has displayed a great interest in the Horn of Africa region, is concerned about Turkey’s growing influence in the area. Qatar also mediated in the conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti. The emirate sent a military contingent to the zone of conflict between the two countries, Ras Doumeira. The Turkish foreign minister also visited Eritrea in 2012 and

22. Mirjam Van Reisen, Meron Estefanos y Conny Rijken, *The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond [Draft]*, Wolf Legal Publishers, Oisterwijk, 2013.

offered to mediate between Eritrea and the new Somali Federal Government, although there was no official progress regarding this matter in 2013.

Ethiopia	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government (EPRDF coalition, led by the TPLF), political and social opposition

Summary:

The regime that has governed in Ethiopia since 1991 is having to contend with a series of opposition movements that are calling for progress in democracy and the governance of the country, along with a higher degree of self-government. The EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) governmental coalition is controlled by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) party, of the Tigrayan minority that rules the country with increasing authoritarianism and with the consent of the Amhara elites. There is discontent in the country with the ethnic federal regime implemented by the EPRDF, which has not resolved the national issue, leading to the consolidation of a strong political and social opposition. Some political-military sectors consider ethnic federalism to be insufficient to meet their nationalist demands, while other sectors from the ruling classes and with a presence throughout the country consider ethnic federalism to be a stumbling block to consolidating the nation state. In parallel to this, there are demands for the democratisation of institutions. In the 2005 elections this wide-ranging opposition proved to be a real challenge for the EPRDF, which was unwilling to accept multi-party competition and fiercely put down post-election protests.

During the year **protests and political mobilisation to defend the freedom of expression and the release of political prisoners increased, as well as repression by the authorities**. In June there was the first authorised demonstration since 2005, where thousands called on the government demanding freedom, justice and the release of political prisoners, independent journalists and jailed Muslim leaders accused of terrorism. Government sources declared that most demonstrators were Muslims and had hidden agendas. The demonstration took place one week after the AU summit, since the Government had banned all demonstrations during the summit. This demonstration coincided with the creation of a new political party, Semeyawi (Blue Party). The protest was peaceful, and this made the political opposition believe that the Government had softened its control to tolerate dissidence, according to several analysts. Nevertheless, the violent response from the security forces in July and August against demonstrations held in several parts of the country proved otherwise.

Towards the middle of July, the Government arrested 42 members of the UDJ opposition party who were calling for reforms and the release of political prisoners. They were released the following day. In August clashes erupted between demonstrators and the Police in several cities around the country –Addis-Ababa, Dessie and in the Oromia region – causing a few deaths. Also, **protests multiplied throughout the country to denounce police persecution against the Muslim population**.

In October, the international human rights defence organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) denounced that Ethiopian authorities habitually subjected political detainees to torture and mistreatment to obtain confessions. The Government said the report was biased and undermined its credibility. Several analysts pointed out that there is a possibility that the growing political mobilisation and repression used against the opposition may mean that opposition is resurfacing after practically remaining in silence and in hiding since the post-electoral violence in 2005. At the same time, 12 members of the governing party EPRDF were murdered and two more were injured at the tourist town of Bahir Dar in an attack carried out by the rebel group Ethiopian Unity and Freedom Force (EUFF). This group claimed the authorship of the attack and targets the members of the EPRDF coalition and their businesses. All those who were executed belonged to the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), one of the four parties in the EPRDF coalition, in power since 1991. The Government has never acknowledged the existence of the EUFF, despite suffering some sporadic attacks. Finally, it is worth noting that during the first half of the year the Government blocked access to the website of al-Jazeera. Previously, Addis Ababa had also blocked the US channel Voice of America and the German Amharic radio station, accusing them of broadcasting destabilising propaganda. Besides, four senior officials of the party TPLF, which is very influential in the EPRDF Government coalition, resigned during the 11th meeting of the party's central committee: Seyoum Mesfin, the former minister of foreign affairs (2001-2010) and currently the ambassador to China; Birhane Gebrekirstos, the vice-minister of foreign affairs; Arkebe Equbay, the former mayor of Addis Ababa, and Zeray Asgedom, the director of the Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency (ERTA). These leaders, all of whom were members of the central committee and founders of TPLF have been in power for over two decades and their resignations is an attempt of the party's to try and include a succession plan and renew the organisation's leadership. Finally, it is also worth highlighting that the progress achieved towards building a dam on the River Nile in Ethiopia, for which around 30% of the works are thought to be completed, was a reason for growing tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt.

Kenya	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Government, Resources, Self-government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, ethnic-based militias, political and social opposition (political parties, civil society organisations), SLDF, Mungiki sect, al-Shabaab Somali armed group

Summary:

Kenya's politics and economy have been dominated since its independence in 1963 by the KANU party, controlled by the largest community in the country, the Kikuyu, to the detriment of the remaining ethnic groups. In 2002, the authoritarian and kleptocratic Daniel Arap Moi, who had held power for 24 years, was defeated by Mwai Kibaki on the back of promises to end corruption and redistribute wealth in a poor agricultural country whose growth is based on tourism. However, Kibaki's subsequent broken promises fostered a climate of frustration, which meant that the opposition leader Raila Odinga became a threat to Kibaki's hegemony of power. Odinga did not base his campaign on tribal affiliation but rather on change and on the building of a fairer society. The electoral fraud that took place in 2007 sparked an outbreak of violence in which 1,300 people died and some 300,000 were displaced. This situation led to an agreement between the two sectors through which a fragile government of national unity was created. In 2013 new elections were held where Uhuru Kenyatta became the president of the country, although he is pending trial at the ICC for his links to the events occurred in 2007. In parallel, several areas of the country were affected by inter-community disputes over land ownership, also instigated politically during the electoral period. Furthermore, the illegal activities of the Mungiki sect, Kenya's military intervention in Somalia has triggered attacks by the Somali armed group al-Shabaab in Kenya and the subsequent animosity towards the Somali population in Kenya, presenting a challenge to the country's stability. Another factor in 2012 has been the growing government pressure on the secessionist movement Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), whose goal is the independence of the country's coastal region.

The three most noticeable events that marked the evolution of the situation in the country were the **presidential elections in March, the request from the ICC for a trial to be held against the country's main leaders and the ongoing military campaign by Kenya in Somalia**, which was reflected in the growing climate of tension towards the Somali and Muslim population and the terrorist attack by the armed group al-Shabaab in a shopping mall in Nairobi. On 4th March presidential elections were held in Kenya, in a peaceful climate except for some riots in Mombasa. The electoral results were ratified by Kenya's Supreme Court and awarded the victory to Uhuru Kenyatta, with 50.1% of votes,

followed by the current Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the leader of the coalition of parties Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD). Kenyatta, who was the vice-Prime Minister in the previous unity Government and the former leader of the party that founded Kenya (KANU), an ally of Mwai Kibaki and the son of the historical first Kenyan president, Jomo Kenyatta, joined a new platform in 2012, The National Alliance (TNA) to prepare for the elections. Odinga accepted the Supreme Court's ruling. During the final stage before the elections, Kenyatta formed an alliance with William Ruto, who had also held several posts in the previous unity Government, to win the elections. Both **Kenyatta and Ruto had belonged to rival groups and are accused of being responsible for the violence after the 2007 elections**. Even if they say they are a model of reconciliation, several analysts point out that this alliance appeared as a way of trying to avoid the International Criminal Court, where they are pending trial accused of crimes against humanity committed in 2007. The country's Supreme Court allowed them to take part in the elections. Kenyatta avoided a second round by winning 50.1% of the votes, with a difference of just 8,100 votes. A UN electoral observation mission certified that no irregularities had been detected and that elections had taken place under a climate of normality. The ICC trial was delayed on several occasions during the year for several reasons.

Finally, in September the trial against Ruto started, but it was adjourned one week for him to return to Kenya and manage the terrorist attack against the Westgate shopping mall in September, which caused 72 dead. In Kenyatta's case, the trial was meant to start on the 12th of November but was also adjourned to February 2014 for the same reason, and there were concerns that it would not be held. Several African leaders pressed for the trial to be delayed until Kenyatta left the presidency of his country, declaring that the process would make it impossible for him to take the reins of the Government. At the same time, the AU accused the ICC of becoming obsessed with African leaders and several countries on the continent threatened to withdraw from the Rome Statute. On 15th November the UN Security Council turned down a resolution aiming to annul the trial. Alongside this, on 21st November the Government suggested amendments to the ICC's Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Party States (ASP) so that it would not be necessary for suspects to be physically present, and the ASP finally endorsed the rules minimising the obligation for suspects to be present.

Linked to this issue, the **Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya published its final report denouncing the injustices committed in the country since its independence in 1963**.²³ The Commission, created after the violent clashes in 2008 after the elections in held in Kenya in December 2007, denounced that from 1895 to 1963, the British

23. Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, The Final Report of The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, 2013, http://www.tjrckenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=573&Itemid=238

administration was responsible for terrible human rights violations; that from 1963 to 1978 President Jomo Kenyatta led a Government that committed many crimes, such as torture, murder, arbitrary detentions and illegal land grabbing. The Commission also pointed out that from 1978 to 2002, President Daniel Arap Moi carried out massacres, systematic torture, financial crimes and that corruption flourished. Also, from 2002 to 2008 the Government led by Mwai Kibaki was responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture and other crimes. The report also highlights that State agents, especially the Police and the Kenyan Army were the main perpetrators of flagrant human rights violations. The report also mentions the historical grievances relating to land issues that are at the origin of the conflicts and tensions in the country; the fact that women and girls have suffered from discrimination in all spheres of life; the unnameable atrocities committed against minors despite the special status they enjoy in the Kenyan society and the discrimination suffered by minorities and indigenous peoples, who for years have been punished collectively.

On another note, it is worth mentioning the **terrorist attack by the Islamist group al-Shabaab against the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi from 21st to 24th September causing the death of 72 people**, including 61 civilians, six soldiers and the five al-Shabaab militants who carried out the attack. Some 200 people were injured. The shopping mall, located in an affluent neighbourhood of the capital, partially remained in hands of the armed group until Kenya's security forces were able to regain control and force the militants to surrender. Al-Shabaab declared the attack was in retaliation for the presence of Kenyan Armed Forces in Somalia. The Westgate siege has been the worst terrorist attack in Kenya since 1998 when the US Embassy in Nairobi was attacked and where 200 people died. The Government arrested 11 people that could be related to the event. A large number of foreigners were among the victims, as well as the Kenyan President's nephew. In parallel, it is worth mentioning that during the year al-Shabaab carried out actions in towns in the northeast province, killing several people, among soldiers, members of the Somali group and civilians.

Finally, during the second half of the year there was another outbreak of inter-community violence between the Horana and Gabra communities, in Marsabit County, bordering Ethiopia, in the Eastern province. The conflict seems to be related to conflicts over land and water use and ownership, caused by the incursion of the Gabra community from Ethiopia. Moyale is a town and marketplace on the border between the two countries. Some analysts said that there might have been the wish to make use of the situation to reduce the presence of the Borana community in the local institutions during the last elections in March. The inter-community conflict would have caused the death of dozens of people and forced more than 60,000 to become displaced during 2013.

An attack by the Islamist group al-Shabaab in Nairobi, Kenya, caused the death of 72 people

Somalia (Somaliland – Puntland)

Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Territory Internal
Main parties:	Republic of Somaliland, autonomous region of Puntland, Khatumo state

Summary:

Both regions are in a conflict over the control of the border regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn since 1998. These three regions, which make up the SSC administration, are geographically within the borders of Somaliland, but most of the clans in the region have ties to those in Puntland. In December 2003 Puntland's Armed Forces took control of Las Anod, the capital city of the Sool region. Since then there have been sporadic clashes and attempts at mediation. Towards the start of 2012 a conference was held in the historical city of Taleh, in the Sool region. This conference brought together hundreds of traditional leaders from the Dhulbahante clan and the SSC administration. The meeting ended with the self-proclamation of a new autonomous region in Somalia, known as the Dervish State of Somalia or Khatumo State. This decision counted with the approval of Puntland and strong rejection in Somaliland. Since then there have been periodic clashes between the militia in this new autonomous region and Somaliland's security forces. According to local sources, these clashes have killed dozens from both sides. In parallel, relations between Khatumo and Puntland also deteriorated as a consequence of the process for transition and the creation of a new national Government, because Puntland occupied the share of traditional elder men leaders corresponding to the Dulbahante sub-clan, the one where the population of the new state, and also part of Puntland's population, belong.

The tense relations between the two confronted regions regarding the control over the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn region (SSC) persisted during the year and event worsened as a consequence of the presidential elections held in Puntland, since the issue about SSC is the main question in Puntland's foreign policy. Also, with the indirect presidential electoral system in Puntland, the 66 members of parliament are elected by the clan leaders, who also choose the President, meaning that the 17 members of parliament from the SSC region play a key role. The man elected as President was finally Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, who had been Somalia's Prime Minister from June 2011 to October 2012, was one of the persons responsible for drafting the roadmap to conclude the transition in Somalia.

Towards the end of November, the situation deteriorated after an attack was carried out by Puntland's security forces against central points in the city of Taleh, the self-proclaimed capital of Khatumo state, where 12 people died. The attack took place at the time when civil society in the Khatumo region was planning to hold a peace conference, Khatumo 3, to consolidate

the administration of the Khatumo state, created one year earlier at the Khatumo 2 conference. On that occasions, the region's traditional leaders and more than 6,000 participants from civil society, according to local sources, had unanimously declared their formal secession from Puntland and Somaliland. The attack on Taleh occurred in the middle of recent visits from the head of the UN mission in Somalia (UNISOM), Nicholas Kay, who did not recognise the announcement made by the Khatumo's traditional leaders stating they would not participate in the Puntland elections, meaning the 17 seats they are entitled, which are decisive to support one or other candidacy for the indirect presidential elections in Puntland, would remain empty. Also, Puntland's President, Farole, intended to occupy the seats pertaining to the Sool, Sanaag and Las Anod with parliamentarians that were supportive of his candidacy so as to be re-elected. This meant the attack was considered a collective punishment against the state of Khatumo. It is worth noting that on the 2nd January 2014 a majority of the Traditional Council and the Executive Council of the state of Khatumo announced that their leaders Ahmed Elmi Osman (Krash) and Abdi-nur Elmi Qaaje (Biindhe) were resigning as members of the Presidential Council of Khatumo. This decision was taken after learning that Krash might have collaborated with Puntland's authorities in the attack carried out in November and that Biindhe would have turned down the idea of organising and participating in the Khatumo 3 Conference.

c) North Africa and the Maghreb

Algeria	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition

Summary:

After living through a civil war that caused more than 150,000 deaths in the 1990s, Algeria still has to contend with armed conflict, now in the shape of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which originated as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. Since 1999 the country has been governed by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, re-elected in 2004 and 2009 after removing the limit to the number of presidential terms that can be served. Power is concentrated in the hands of the president, while parliament is considered a mere advisory body. Poverty, unemployment, corruption and deficient public services have increased discontent among the population in recent years. In this context, the uprisings in North Africa in early 2011 encouraged mobilisations against the Algerian regime. The government has adopted a twin strategy: on the one hand, the repression and deterrence of demonstrations and, on the other hand, the announcement of measures to curb the response, including the lifting of the state of emergency, in force in the country since 1992.

The situation in Algeria continued to be marked by **sporadic demonstrations to denounce the country's financial situation, harassment against the opposition and the tension amidst the political elites in view of the prospects on the succession of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika**, aged 76 and on the verge of completing his third term in office. During the year protesters and critical activists were arrested, and there were also episodes where force was used to disperse the protests. Some mobilisations in May brought thousand of people out onto the streets in cities such as Ghardaïa or Tamanrasset. Some demonstrators also protested outside the residence of the primer minister, in an act that was dispersed with violence by the security forces. At a political level, Bouteflika appointed a commission of experts to review the Constitution, one of the key points he had agreed in the framework of the mass mobilisations in the country during the so-called Arab revolts that started in the region in 2011. Towards the end of April, the president was admitted to a French military hospital and since then his health and the repercussion this is having on the exercise of power in Algeria were at the heart of the internal debate. Some Algerian sectors called for the implementation of an article in the Constitution to transfer powers in the event that the head of State has a serious disease. Analysts turned their speculations to the potential candidates to replace Bouteflika. During the following months information appeared in the press, warning of the increased tensions within the Government elites and the government block faced with the uncertainty regarding the president's health. However, Bouteflika returned to the country after spending 82 days convalescing in France and resumed office. The President reformed his cabinet in September, promoted a reorganisation of the Armed Forces and towards the middle of November – against all odds and speculation during the first half of the year – was designated the candidate for the government party National Liberation Front (FLN) for the elections in April 2014.

Mauritania	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government, System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, social and political opposition, AQIM, MUJAO

Summary:

Military coups have become the standard method of switching power in the country since its independence in 1960. After a 20 years government characterised by authoritarianism and repression directed especially at the country's black African community, President Ould Taya was overthrown in a coup d'état in 2005. Two years later, Sidi Ould Sheik Abdallahi was elected president although the tensions related to the power struggle between various tribes and political sectors had not been neutralised, in a context of deep economic crisis and Jihadist threats. After leading a new coup d'état in 2008, Mohammed Ould Abdelaziz

took office as president in 2009 in elections condemned as fraudulent by his critics. Since then there have been continued tensions between pro-government political forces and the opposition. In recent years, the situation in the country has also been affected by the actions of the Algerian group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in its territory, and by the government's offensives against this organisation in neighbouring countries. In 2008 AQIM called for the overthrow of the Mauritanian government, which it considered anti-Islamic. The opposition accuses Abdelaziz of using the fight against AQIM to justify the implementation of abusive laws and policies in the country.

Mauritania continued to be the focus of internal political tensions in 2013 and was affected by a climate of regional instability due to the armed conflict in Mali. **The crisis in its neighbour country caused thousands of refugees to arrive in the country.** As several international humanitarian organisations warned, the refugee population in Mauritania was surviving in precarious conditions due the scarcity of water supplies and basic services, and this was leading to a high mortality rate, especially among children. During 2013 President Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz announced the deployment of Mauritanian troops to join the international peacekeeping mission deployed in Mali since the middle of the year (MINUSMA). Also, Mauritania participated in joint military exercises with several African countries coordinated by the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and took part in regional meetings to reinforce cooperation in the field of security to face the threat of radical armed groups. During the year, the Mauritanian authorities also reported on the arrest of several people who presumably were linked to groups such as AQIM and announced that one of the alleged spokespersons of Ansar Dine had been brought to justice. As in previous years, political tensions materialised with disputes over the holding of elections in the country, which should have been in 2011. The opposition demanded that President Abdelaziz stepped down, that a new national unity government be created, and that the electoral commission was reformed as the pre-conditions to participate in the elections. During the first months of the year, press reports mentioned the unprecedented dialogue between the Mauritania opposition and some sectors of the party in government, the Union for the Republic (UPR) while President Abdel Aziz was out of the country after being wounded by gunshot at the end of 2012. However, contacts were suspended after the President's return. During the following months, three of the parties in the government coalition deserted. During the second half of the year, the opposition, led by Coordination for Democratic Opposition (COD) rejected the call for legislative and municipal elections for the month of October, arguing that there was a lack of political consensus. The announcement of elections was qualified as a unilateral action and a provocation from the Government, and led to a call to boycott the elections. Despite some attempts to establish dialogue between the opposition and the Government –the first of this kind in four years– the COD finally stepped away from this initiative. In this context, **elections were**

finally held in November, amidst the boycott by the COD parties, although the Islamist organisation Tawassoul decided to take part in the elections. The results were publicly announced at the end of the year awarding the victory to the governing party UPR, while Tawassoul consolidated as the second political force in elections where turnout was around 60%. The COD demanded the annulment of the elections.

Morocco	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Monarchy, government, social and political opposition

Summary:

A French protectorate from 1912 to 1956, power in Morocco passed into the hands of King Mohammed V, who was succeeded by his son Hassan II in 1961. This monarch's rule lasted almost four decades and was characterised by the strong repression of internal dissidence. The truth commission set up to investigate human rights violations committed during his reign identified almost 10,000 cases. He was succeeded by his son Mohammed VI, who was seen as a moderniser. The monarchy has implemented economic liberalisation measures and has retained political power, keeping civil rights restrictions in place. In early 2011, with uprisings taking place across North Africa, thousands of Moroccans mobilised to demand political reforms, the imposition of limits on the king's power and an end to corruption in the country. In this context, Rabat implemented a reform of the constitution and brought forward the elections that swept the Islamist forces to power.

Morocco continued to be the **scene of mobilisations by dissident sectors unhappy with the political and social situation that caused the reaction from the security forces and led to violent events** with at least one dead and several injured. Mobilisations were fuelled by the increase in prices, youth unemployment and by demands for political change, among other reasons. The pro-reform 20 February Movement celebrated the second anniversary since its creation, in the framework of the revolts in the region and during the year it organised protests and action to demand freedom for political prisoners. In March and April there were some of the anti-government protests with a greatest affluence of people, including mobilisations of thousands of people in solidarity with a group of demonstrators that had been arrested at the beginning of March. In this context, clashes erupted between the security forces and students in the city of Fez, causing the death of one demonstrator. During the year there were also actions denouncing the measures to harass critical sectors – including journalists – and the conditions in which at least 70 opposition activists were arrested, six of whom were delivered sentences ranging from one to two years

in prison for participating in anti-government protests in December 2012. In parallel, the country faced a climate of political tension, which was showcased through the exit of the party Istiqlal from the governing coalition, after its ministers resigned in August and after being criticised for how the Islamist Prime Minister Abdelilah Benikrane was managing the social and financial crisis. The organisation had tried stepping out of the government months earlier, but according to press reports, it had been persuaded not to by King Mohamed IV. **During 2013 the Moroccan authorities announced several arrests and the dismantlement of Jihadist cells allegedly linked to al-Qaeda.** In September, a video attributed to AQIM contained criticism against the Monarchy and called on Moroccan youths to join the Jihad.²⁴

Morocco – Western Sahara	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Territory International ²⁵
Main parties:	Morocco, SADR, POLISARIO Front armed group

Summary:

The roots of the conflict can be traced to the end of Spanish colonial rule in Western Sahara in the mid-1970s. The splitting of the territory between Morocco and Mauritania without taking into account the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people or the commitment to a referendum on independence in the area led to a large part of the territory being annexed by Rabat, forcing the displacement of thousands of Sahrawi citizens, who sought refuge in Algeria. In 1976, the POLISARIO Front, a nationalist movement, declared a government in exile (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic - SADR) and launched an armed campaign against Morocco. Both parties accepted a peace plan in 1988 and since 1991 the UN mission in the Sahara, MINURSO, has been monitoring the ceasefire and is responsible for organising a referendum for self-determination in the territory. In 2007 Morocco presented the UN with a plan for the autonomy of Western Sahara but the POLISARIO Front demands a referendum that includes the option of independence.

The conflict in Western Sahara registered similar levels to those in the previous year, with episodes related to human rights abuses, clashes between Sahrawi demonstrators and Moroccan security forces –causing at least one dead and injuries to several–, harassment by Rabat to self-determination supporters, and international tensions between Morocco and Algeria over the Sahrawi issue, among others. **One of the significant events during the first half of the year was the trial held against around 20 Sahrawi who had been under arrest since 2010 for participating in the incidents that took place**

in the Gdeim Izik camps set up by the forces of El-Aaiún as a form of protest against the Moroccan Government. The forced vacation of the camp led to clashes where 11 Moroccan agents died as well as two Sahrawi civilians. Those accused over the case were judged by a military tribunal and were handed down sentences ranging from 20 years imprisonment to live imprisonment (eight of them) for violence against law enforcement officials and belonging to a criminal gang. Two were sentenced to 25 months in prison, which they had already completed while in remand. Several international organisations, including the UN Human Rights Council and Amnesty International expressed their concerns over the lack of judiciary guarantees and the alleged torture of prisoners. The trial also increased the tensions in the part of the Sahara controlled by Morocco, which increased the number of police forces there. During this time Rabat also prohibited a visit to El-Aaiún by a delegation from the EU Parliament, which had passed a declaration in December expressing its concern over the human rights situation in the territory and called on Morocco to free the Sahrawi political prisoners and to facilitate access to the press media and NGOs. At the start of April, **the publication of a new report by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on the situation in Western Sahara highlighted the need, once again, for independent, sustained and impartial monitoring of the human rights situation** both in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf refugee camps in the south of Algeria. International human rights organisations reiterated their demand to increase the mandate of the MINURSO to include competencies in this regard. The USA made a proposal in this line in April to the Group of Friends of Western Sahara that was openly rejected by Rabat. To answer to what Rabat considered an attack on its sovereignty, it cancelled some planned joint military exercises with the USA. In this context, Washington also rejected a formula that was half way –i.e. having the High Commissioner for Human Rights taking on this task instead of the MINURSO– and finally the mandate of the UN mission was renewed without increasing its competencies in this field. The decision gave place to several days of pro-independence protests in cities such as El-Aaiún, Smara and Bjour. The police repression and clashes that followed left dozens of injured.

During the second half of the year another relevant event was the discovery of two mass graves in the Smara region (some 400 km away from the Tindouf camps) where the remains of eight Sahrawi were identified, two of them minors. According to the investigations of a Spanish investigation team, the group had been executed in 1976 by the Moroccan Army and the circumstances of the deaths conflict with the version of the case included in the Moroccan 2006 Equity and Reconciliation Report. **According to the Spanish investigators, the total number of Sahrawi who fell victims to enforced disappearance would**

24. See the summary on Algeria (AQMI) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

25. Although Western Sahara is not an internationally recognised state, the socio-political crisis between Morocco and Western Sahara is considered “international” and not “internal” since it is a territory which has yet to be decolonised and Morocco’s claims to the territory are not recognised by international law or by any United Nations resolution.

total 400 people. The Moroccan Human Rights Council agreed to look into the case, which would also be verified by the MINURSO. In parallel, during the year there were some violent episodes in relation to the fresh clashes between young Sahrawi and the security forces. Some of these events were linked to the dismantling of a camp in the Tizmi region, with protests against the approval of a fishing agreement between the EU and Morocco in December and with the use of force to disperse the pro-independence demonstrations in El Aaiún in mid-October during the three-day visit by the UN special envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, to try and overcome the peace negotiations stalemate.²⁶ At the end of October Ross presented a report to the UN Security Council announcing a change in the conversation dynamics, based on direct and discreet contacts between the parties. It is worth noting that in its analysis on the Sahrawi situation, **the UN warned on the urgent need to advance towards a political way out of the conflict, taking into account the regional context of instability in the Sahel.** Ban Ki-moon expressed special concern over the growing frustration and vulnerability of the young living in the Tindouf camps. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Sahrawi issue tensed the relations between Morocco and Algeria again at the end of 2013. Rabat recalled its ambassador in Algiers after Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika accused Morocco of systematically violating human rights in Western Sahara and called for the creation of an international supervision mechanism.

Although several international actors demanded an independent supervision of human rights in Western Sahara, the mandate of the MINURSO was renewed without including competencies in this field

Tunisia	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, Ansar al-Sharia

Summary:

Since becoming independent in 1956 until the start of 2011, Tunisia only had two presidents. During three decades Habib Bourghiba laid the foundations for the authoritarian regime in the country, a regime that continued after Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came to power in 1987 after a coup. The concentration of power, the persecution of the secular and Islamist political opposition and the iron grip on society that characterised the country's internal situation were in stark contrast to its international image of stability. Despite reports of corruption, electoral fraud and human rights violations, Tunisia for years stood as a privileged ally of the West. In December 2010, the outbreak of a popular revolt sowed the regime's contradictions, and led to the fall of Ben Ali's Government at the start of 2011, inspiring mobilisations against authoritarian governments in the whole of the Arab world. Since then, Tunisia has lived immersed in a bumpy transition process where the tensions between the secular and Islamist sectors have become clear.

The political transition process in Tunisia evolved in a rugged way during 2013, given the unsettling impact of the murders of two opposition leaders that further increased tensions between the Islamist and secular sectors in the country; and also because of an increasing armed action by radical Jihadist groups during the second half of the year. Towards the beginning of the year **the country experienced its worst crisis since the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, after the killing of Chokri Belaid, the leader of the left-wing opposition party Popular Front.** This killing led to increased protests against the Government headed by the Islamist party Ennahda, which was criticised for not acting strongly enough to stop the violence of Salafist sectors. Ennahda denied all responsibility for the killing, causing mass protests –that were in turn answered by demonstrations supporting the Islamists–, strikes, resignations within

the coalition Government, boycott threats and an institutional crisis that made Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali resign. He had been in favour of setting up a government of technocrats to deal with the crisis, but was disowned by Ennahda, which supported the establishment of a national unity government. The person who up until then had been the Minister of the Interior, Ali Larayedh, replaced Jebali at the head of a new Government with the same parties in the previous coalition (Ennahda, Ettakatol and Congress for the Republic) although the Islamists agreed to hand key ministries (Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice

and Defence) to independent government members. The new Government did not stop the opposition's protest, and neither did it stop social demonstrations against the rise in prices or high unemployment rates. Some of these demonstrations ended with clashes with Government supporters and security forces where several people were killed and many more injured, and included self-immolations. **The climate of internal instability worsened during the second half of the year after the killing of the opposition MP Mohamed Brahmi in July,** allegedly by a Salafist who used the same weapon used to kill Belaid. This episode caused new mobilisations from both sides to the conflict, along with accusations made by the opposition against Ennahda for its failure to guarantee security and favouring an Islamist agenda, especially for the drafting of the Constitution. The draft Constitution had been made public a few weeks earlier and had led to strong criticism from Tunisian political experts and sectors who denounced the Islamist bias in several of the project's key points.

In this context, and faced with the decision by 60 dissident parliamentarians to pull out of the Constituent Assembly, Tunisia's powerful UGTT trade union led the mediation to try and overcome the crisis and promote a new Government. Ettakatol, one of the parties in the Government coalition gave in to the

26. See the summary on Morocco – Western Sahara in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

demands for change, and this led to a transition plan in September. On a regional scenario marked by the weakening of Islamist forces after the military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt²⁷, **at the end of September Ennahda agreed to place the Government in the hands of technocrats**. The different Tunisian political sectors then started a national dialogue at the beginning of October following a new roadmap setting the deadlines to hand back power and to pass a new Constitution. The fact that Ennahda conditioned its leaving the Government to a series of measures – ratifying the Constitution, passing a new electoral law, defining the dates for the future presidential and legislative elections, among others– led to new protests from the opposition, accusing the party of delaying the process. Although the discrepancies over the new Prime Minister hampered the transition, an agreement was reached at the end of the year to appoint the person who until then had been the Minister of Industry, Mehdi Jomaa to the post. Thus, in January 2014 Ennahda transferred power to the new Government and adopted the new Constitution.

It is worth highlighting that during the year tensions became evident between the different Islamist forces in the country, particularly between Ennahda and the Salafist group Ansar al-Sharia. Ennahda's senior leaders denounced the Salafist group for encouraging violence in the name of Islam and the Government accused Ansar al-Sharia of acts of terrorism. The followers of the group challenged the prohibition to hold meetings put in place by the Government –arguing they could pose a threat to public security– and confronted the security forces and the Police when trying to free arrested colleagues. In October, a suicide attack with no victims was also attributed to Ansar al-Sharia. In parallel, **the year witnessed increasing insurgence activity that alerted on the likelihood of groups close to AQMI in the country**.²⁸ Violent events relating to Jihadist cells –allegedly linked to the Militia of Uqba Ibn Nafaa, which was partially dismantled in December 2012 –increased in the second half of the year, mainly taking place in the hilly region of Jebel Chaambi (west), close to the border with Algeria. The attacks, clashes, air operations and mines going off in the area killed more than 40 people, among Tunisian soldiers and militiamen, some of who were linked to Ansar al-Sharia. In view of these events, analysts warned on the urgent need for the Tunisian political forces to unite to face the security challenges and to adopt measures to reduce the permeability of the country's borders.

The political situation in Tunisia was affected by the killing of two prominent opposition leaders, further increasing polarisation between the Islamist and secular sectors in the country

d) Southern Africa

Madagascar	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government, Resources Internal
Main parties:	High Transitional Authority, opposition leaders, State security forces, dahalo (cattle rustlers), self defence militias, private security companies

Summary:

Since the end of the communist regime in the 1990s, the island has been affected by bouts of political turmoil. The unconstitutional seizure of power by the former mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, with the support of the army, triggered a new political crisis in March 2009. The difficulties in reaching a power-sharing agreement among the main political leaders have led to an institutional stalemate, with sporadic outbreaks of violence taking place. Besides, since the middle of 2012 a spiral of violence grew in the south of the country stemming from rustling and plundering of the dahalo (rustlers in Malagasy) against civil population, which led to an excessive intervention by the security forces, the establishment of self defence militias and the hiring of private security companies to suppress the crisis.

The country faced a climate of political instability linked to the holding of presidential elections and to the crisis in the south of the country. In the south, the crisis that started in June 2012 continued to increase. Groups of heavily armed and well-organised dahalo (Cattle rustlers in Malagasy) carried out attacks against civilians in the rural areas of the south of the country, stealing cattle and storming homes. The response by the security forces made the situation worse since the dahalo, who are difficult to pick out from the rest of the civilian population, live in the same rural areas. The security forces, in turn, set whole villages alight while persecuting the dahalo. In response to the insecurity, civilians organised self-defence patrols and hired private security companies. The Government encouraged the privatisation of security, causing an escalation of violence. Also, neither the inhabitants of the area nor the private security companies handed the dahalo in to justice. The perspective that they would either be freed by their comrades in arms or declared innocent by the corrupt justice system led to the proliferation of extra-judiciary executions. According to the organisation Women's International League for Peace and

27. See the summary on Egypt in this chapter.

28. See the summary on Algeria (AQIM) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

Freedom (WILPF), by April over 100 dahalo had been executed by the local population, and this led the dahalo to retaliate, causing a spiral of violence. This situation caused a severe humanitarian crisis and thousands of displaced people. European countries such as France and the United Kingdom continued to sell arms to Madagascar, despite the lack of control over arms trade in the country and the fact that civilians had access to the State's arsenals. These weapons were never returned meaning many of these people became dahalo.

The crisis of the “dahalo” in the south of Madagascar worsened and caused the death of hundreds of people

On another note, after delaying the presidential elections twice, in July and in August, due to disagreements regarding candidates, they were finally held on the 25th of October. Since none of the candidates won an absolute majority, there was a second round on the 20th of December, at the same time as the legislative elections, granting a victory to the minister of finance Hery Rajaonarimampianina, the candidate of the outgoing president Andry Rajoelina, with 53.5% of votes, over the former minister of health Jean Louis Robinson, the candidate of ousted president Marc Ravalomanana, who won 46.5% of votes. At the beginning of January, the Supreme Electoral Court ratified the results. The elections were held in a climate of normality, according to the AU and the EU, with the exceptions of the death of a district chief in the southern city of Benenitra, some polling stations that were set alight and the curfew declared in the island of Nosy Be after a group of people lynched three people who were suspected to have executed a minor and trafficking with organs, with the result of 35 arrested. During the year, especially during the months before the elections, there were some sporadic violent events. The roadmap to find a way out of the crisis in Madagascar impeded Ravalomanana and Rajoelina from participating as candidates, despite their attempts to do so and the pressure exerted by them during the year. The Special Electoral Court (CES) rejected the candidacies of Marc Ravalomanana's wife Lalao, and that of the incumbent president, Rajoelina, who accepted not to participate in the elections to find a way out of the crisis after being pressured by the AU, the EU and the UN. The election of a new president, which could have entailed lifting the sanctions imposed on the country since 2009 after Rajoelina's coup, was welcomed by the international community. Rajaonarimampianina, from the Merina high society (a community established in the high lands surrounding Antananarivo) was not the official candidate of the governing party, the TGV, which had chosen Edgard Razafindravahy as a candidate; however, despite entering the electoral race late, the political and financial support he got from Rajoelina, the head of the TGV, prove to be decisive. Robinson, a Catholic francophone with good relationships with France (and thus with fewer supporters in Ravalomanana's ranks) was backed by Marc Ravalomanana when he suggested his wife, Lalao, as a candidate to prime minister. In November the Government announced the

replacement of one third of the regional governors by senior military officials arguing this was for security reasons and due to the national political context, giving rise to a climate of concern. Most of these regions are along the coast, where there is a larger number of inhabitants, making analysts believe that the reasons for this move were to ensure a victory for Rajaonarimampianina in these regions and thus to counter Robinson's predominance in the capital.

Mozambique	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, RENAMO armed group

Summary:

The coup against the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 and the guerrilla war between the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO insurgence drove Mozambique to gain independence from Portugal in 1975. Then Mozambique entered a civil war between the FRELIMO Government and the armed group RENAMO, the latter supported by the white minorities governing in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the *apartheid* South Africa, in the context of the Cold War. The country was also deeply affected by famine and horrendous financial management issues. In 1992 the parties reached a peace agreement that was seen as an example of reconciliation, mediated by the Sant'Egidio Community, ending 16 years of war with one million dead and five million displaced and marking the dawn of a period of political stability and economic development albeit the large inequalities in the country. The leader of RENAMO, Alfonso Dhlakama, has been unable to turn his party into an organised and structured platform that could reach power and since the first elections in 1994 it has gradually lost its share of political power to FRELIMO and other parties such as the MDM (a breakaway party of RENAMO). In parallel, a growing chorus of voices denouncing fraud and irregularities during the successive elections, some of which were verified by international observers, have gone hand in hand with a growing authoritarianism and repression against the opposition, as well as FRELIMO taking over the State (besides the media and the economy). In 2013 RENAMO conditioned its continuity as a political entity to a set of reforms, mainly the national electoral commission and a more equitable distribution of the country's wealth, and threatened to withdraw from the peace agreement signed in 1992.

During the year **the crisis in Mozambique escalated, when it had remained latent in the previous years.** In April the first clashes since the end of the armed conflict erupted between the militia that still exists and is supported by the former armed group RENAMO and the police in Muxungue and Gondola. Since the 1992 peace agreements, RENAMO had some 300 experienced combatants who rejected joining the Armed Forces or the

Police. In turn, the political party RENAMO threatened to boycott and to alter the local elections in November 2013 and the general elections in 2014. RENAMO conditioned its participation to a series of political reforms, basically demanding an equal participation for all political parties in the national electoral commission and a more equitable participation in distributing the country's resources (increasing the resources that political parties receive and a greater presence in the managing boards of public companies). Although the Government of the current president, Armando Buebuza, expressed its willingness to start a constructive dialogue, no progress was made during the year and in October RENAMO announced it was withdrawing from the 1992 peace agreement as a consequence of the attack on its general headquarters in Satunjira, Gorongosa district, by the army on 21st October. Gorongosa is the spiritual stronghold of RENAMO, since it was there that RENAMO started the civil war in 1977. From this stronghold Dhlakama announced his withdrawal from the peace agreements. Dhlakama had been living in Satunjira during the past year and since making his announcement his whereabouts are unknown. The threats flung the population into a climate of concern. From October to December around 10 civilians died as a consequence of the attacks by RENAMO and 26 others were injured, according to the Ministry of Defence. However, Government sources did not disclose the number of deaths among the State security forces or the insurgency. It is estimated that the number of RENAMO combatants varies from 300 to 1,000 and that they have moved back underground. With the start of the rainy season in November (which continues until March) RENAMO increased its attacks and ambushes in the province and may have killed dozens of soldiers.

Zimbabwe	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	ZANU-PF and MDC political parties, war veterans and youth militias sympathetic to ZANU-PF

Summary:

President Robert Mugabe, in power since the country gained independence in 1980 as the leader of ZANU-PF, continues to persecute members of opposition parties and individuals from civil society. The establishment of a government of national unity in 2009 brought an end to the crisis triggered by the elections, in which high levels of violence were recorded. The main opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC, was appointed prime minister and the process for reforming the constitution and electoral legislation began. This measure made it possible to regain the confidence of the international community and to improve the country's serious economic situation, suffering from alarming levels of inflation. However, a series of disagreements between

the political groups have brought the transition process to a stalemate, while the opposition's demands for a reform of the security sector remain unanswered. The reforms, the endorsement of a new Constitution, and the 2013 elections have not helped to improve the situation. Mugabe managed a new victory amid accusations of electoral fraud.

During the year, **the climate of political unrest, intimidations and violence against Robert Mugabe's opponents continued, linked to the constitutional reform process and the presidential elections.** Zimbabwe passed a new Constitution with a referendum held on 16th March. With the two main parties, ZANU-PF and MDC voting "yes", around 94% of votes were in favour. 3.3 million people voted in the referendum, from a census of six million, considered the highest turnout in decades. The new Constitution limits the presidential mandate to two five-year cycles (does not apply retroactively), reduces presidential power and eliminates the right to veto legislation. The document also plans for the devolution of political powers and responsibilities to the provincial authorities. It also includes measures to end the culture of impunity in Zimbabwean politics, as well as a charter of rights to protect the freedom of expression. **The referendum was pacific according to observers, but tensions remained, mainly regarding the elections.**

The **presidential, parliamentary and local elections were held on 31st July.** Contrary to the previous elections in 2008 that were marked by political violence and ended with more than 400 dead, these ones developed with no incidents. The parties of President Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai campaigned in the same areas with no violent incidents, only sporadic events, besides the restrictions and intimidation in the period just before the elections. The outcome of the elections led to Mugabe's victory, with 61.09% of votes, and his party ZANU-PF, which took 158 of the 210 seats in parliament. Tsvangirai's party, MDC took 50 seats. Tsvangirai intended to delay the elections and accused Mugabe of acting illegally, breaching the Constitution. **Mugabe was sworn in as President in August for a further five years, for his seventh term.** The President announced his cabinet, almost entirely made up by people close to Mugabe. Tsvangirai remained as Prime Minister until September, since the new Constitution endorsed in March abolished the post.

However, the elections were full of irregularities, according to several sources. Human Rights Watch documented the registration of "ghost" votes or duplicate votes and reported that many people were deprived of their right to vote. During the pre-electoral period there were also documented cases of partisan statements made by senior officials of the security forces, restrictions and intimidation against journalists and civil society activists, and a biased registration of voters that made voting very difficult for those who were perceived as close to the opposition. Around one million

urban voters, the supporting pillar of Tsvangirai, were not able to vote. The candidate, in turn, denounced that the elections had been a farce and called on people to continue challenging the legitimacy of Mugabe's regime. Some of his critics said that Tsvangirai's defeat was partially due to his decision to withdraw from the 2008 elections and to join Mugabe as Prime Minister at the time when the president was at his lowest due to the financial crisis. Both the AU and the SADC validated the results and stated that even if there had been irregularities, these would not have altered Mugabe's victory. Western governments, including the USA, questioned the results. Press reports pointed out that the ZANU-PF intends to use its 75% majority in Parliament to amend the Constitution. Meanwhile, Mugabe agreed to push forward the "indigenisation" policies, forcing companies to hand over the financial control to black Zimbabweans.

The regional and municipal elections in Côte d'Ivoire took place in a calm ambience, although the former regime's party, the FPI, boycotted them

e) West Africa

Côte d'Ivoire	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government, Identity, Resources Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, militias loyal to the former president Laurent Gbagbo, mercenaries, UNOCI

Summary:

The political, economic and social discrimination against northern Ivorians is at the core of the serious crisis that began in the country in the 1980s. Following an initial conflict in 2002 and the resumption of armed violence in 2010, triggered by the presidential elections, stability in the country remains fragile. The end of war in April 2011 and the formation of a new government presided over by Alassane Ouattara (of northern origin) created expectations for change. Justice and reparation for victims, the transformation of discriminatory laws, the resolution of disputes regarding land ownership and the reform of the security sector are some of the great challenges facing the country. The presence of a large number of light weapons, the persistence of violence in the west and the unstable border with Liberia, where mercenary groups remain active, are endangering a fragile peace.

The political and security climate improved, continuing with the trend observed since the end of the violent post-electoral crisis in 2011, although it remains fragile, with isolated violent incidents and persistent threats relating to the existence of networks linked to the former regime seeking to destabilise the Government; the presence of mercenaries, former combatants and other armed actors along the border with Liberia; the circulation of arms; the presence of organised crime and illegal trafficking

networks; and community tensions related to issues having to do with land tenure and identity. This is how the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon defined the situation in his three reports of the year (March, June and December). The Secretary General also warned that despite the progress made, the human rights situation

continues to be serious. Thus, the UNOCI documented cases of summary executions, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, mistreatment, torture and extortions. Hence, as part of these human rights violations, between January and December at least 27 people were murdered, 85 were tortured and mistreated, seven disappeared and 138 were detained arbitrarily by the security forces or by *dozos* (traditional hunters with no clear mandate but who participate in security actions). A part of the fragile human rights situation, sexual and gender

violence continued to impact the population, especially women. In 2013, 262 cases of rape were reported, including 35 gang rapes. 60% of rapes during the first half of the year were against minors. Nevertheless, impunity continued to prevail for these assaults.

Contrary to earlier periods, there were no large-scale attacks against the security forces or against government facilities. However, there were minor violent incidents during the year, also close to the border with Liberia, mainly against security forces. These incidents include an attack in March in the town of Zilebly (west), not far from the Liberian border, causing six dead. Armed men from Liberia attacked the village of Petit Guiglo resulting in two civilians dead and 2,700 displaced people. An Army post was attacked in May in Agnafoutou, an incident where one soldier and two civilians died. A police station and an Army camp were attacked in May in Abengourou causing the death of one of the attackers. Two people died and 30 were injured in an attack on a public transport vehicle in June. During the second half of the year there was a further dozen attacks against the Armed Forces, as well as clashes between Army members and *dozos*. Besides, there were **episodes of inter-community violence, including between native and non-native population, linked to substantive issues of the conflict, such as land tenure and the control over natural resources**, which caused deaths and material damage during the year. A special operation to end with the illegal occupation of the Mont Peko natural park ended with the detention of a militia chief and the displacement of 9,000 people. The western part of Côte d'Ivoire was especially affected by inter-community violence.

During the year several political milestones were achieved, despite persisting divisions, as could be seen from the **boycott by the previous regime's party, the Ivorian Popular Front (French acronym, FPI) of the local and regional elections on 21st April**, claiming that the opposition had been excluded from the electoral process. Five of the 11 other parties involved in the

national dialogue process joined the decision not to participate in the elections. The UN Secretary General regretted the boycott of the elections that took place in a calm ambience. The turnout was 46% for the regional elections and 37% for the municipal ones. President Alassane Ouattara's party, the Rally of the Republicans (Rassemblement des républicains, RDR) won the elections in a majority of constituencies, followed by its government coalition partner, the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (French acronym, PDCI). Although in overall terms the independent candidates won a greater percentage of votes, most of them were affiliated to the government party RDR. Meanwhile, with the horizon of the presidential elections in 2015, for which Ouattara confirmed he would be running, a large chorus pointed at the need for electoral reforms to ensure fair and inclusive elections. At the same time, **during the year the political dialogue between the Government and the opposition continued through the permanent forum for dialogue. However, the FPI remained out of the forum, in line with its opposition to the elections, although it did hold direct discussions** with the Government in January. Hence, agreements were reached on the need for the Armed Forces to return to their quarters, on the disarmament of non-professional armed factions in the Army, on the demobilisation of the dozors, the protection of opposition sectors, and the end of illegal land exploitation. Nevertheless, there continued to be divergences regarding the demand for a general amnesty made by the FPI and the electoral commission. Disagreements led the conversations to a stalemate in February, although they resumed in September. The FPI suggested a new dialogue mechanism. The Government was quite skeptical about this but agreed to discuss suggestions for the existing mechanism. Meanwhile, in September, a presidential pardon was announced for some 3,000 people who had been detained during the 2011 post-electoral crisis for non-violent offenses. In December, the president of the FPI and the secretary general of the RDR met to discuss ways of making the national dialogue progress. Also, regarding the underlying causes of the conflict, such as land tenure and the identity dimension, the Parliament passed legislation to reduce the restrictions to obtain the nationality and extending the deadlines to regulate the customary law on land.

Guinea	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, armed forces, opposition political parties, trade unions

Summary:

The army took advantage of the death of President Lansana Conté in December 2008, after more than two decades in power, to carry out a new coup d'état and form a military junta. The holding of elections in 2010, won by the

junta. The holding of elections in 2010, won by the opposition leader Alpha Condé, paved the way for a return to the democratic system. However, the elections were marred by violence and by the coming to the fore of identity-related tensions between the country's main ethnic communities. The country remains unstable due to the lack of a strategy for national reconciliation and obstacles to the reform of the security sector, with an army that is omnipresent in Guinean political activity.

Political tension between the Government and the political opposition rose during the year, mainly due to disagreements on the legislative elections within the framework of the transition process.

The elections were postponed on several occasions and finally took place in September, generating **protests throughout the year and causing around thirty dead and more than 250 injured in several clashes between demonstrators and the security forces**. The opposition announced in February that it was withdrawing from the process to prepare the elections, which back then were set to take place in May, to protest against the lack of transparency and the companies chosen to update the electoral census. At least 130 people, including 68 agents were injured in clashes between demonstrators and the security forces in the capital, Conakry. In an attempt to overcome the disputes, the Government launched an initiative for dialogue with the opposition. However, the opposition stepped out of the dialogue at the end of the month because of discrepancies regarding the terms and announced new protests. Contacts resumed after the Government and the opposition agreed to the appointment by the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, of the Algerian diplomat and Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in West Africa Said Djinnit as the new international facilitator for the internal crisis in Guinea, replacing the Senegalese Lamine Cissé, who resigned from the post due to the confrontation between the Government and the opposition. In April, the Guinean president, Alpha Condé, unilaterally announced a new date for the elections, on 30th June. Fresh protests that month, causing injuries to at least fifteen people, moved the political parties to reach an agreement to contain violence and to search for peaceful solutions. Nevertheless, protests continued during June and successive months, causing deaths and injured people. Some of the most violent events caused 15 dead and 90 injured after several days of clashes at the end of May that led the President to replace the minister of Security, who was severely criticised by the opposition for the actions of the security forces, although the Government blamed the violence on the demonstrators.

After the violence in May, the political opposition temporarily walked out of the dialogue to prepare the elections, even if later it resumed conversations in the month of June, with agreements on some points and disagreements on others, and renewed protests. The date for the elections was again delayed to the end of July, a move that was contested by the opposition demanding for more time. As a result of the new agreement with the opposition, elections were moved to the 24th of September

at first and, finally (after new clashes with fifty injured and one dead) to the 28th of September, so as to facilitate the inclusion of new adjustments to the electoral process. **The elections were calm, with an 80% turnout, according to the electoral commission. The opposition denounced fraud and called new mobilisations that ended with clashes and new deaths and injured people.** The Supreme Court validated the results in November, awarding the victory to the ruling party. Finally, in December, the main opposition parties agreed to enter Parliament, including the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea and the Union of Republican Forces. In an announcement, the opposition parties stated they had taken the decision after consulting with their supporters, civil society organisations and representatives of the international community. They stated that by being in Parliament they intended to stop the regime from having full control in Parliament.

During the year there were also several episodes of inter-community violence where, according to sources, from fifty to one hundred people died towards the middle of July and more than 150 were injured during clashes between members of the Konianké and Guerzé communities in N'Zérékoré, Beula and Koulé. The Government agreed to send security forces to the area and declared a curfew in the city of N'Zérékoré.

Several dozen people died and hundreds were injured in clashes between the opposition and security forces in Guinea, in a context of disagreements on the transition process

The climate of instability linked to the military coup in April 2012 and the subsequent transition period continued, although political actors managed to come closer on the transition process, which helped bring down tensions. Even so, in a general context of fragility and political fracture, the elections were finally delayed to 2014, not meeting the planned schedules. Despite remaining out of the 2012 agreement on the transition, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) (the former governing party which continues to hold a majority in Parliament and includes Carlos Gomes Júnior, the candidate to the Presidency who won the most votes in the

first round in 2012, after which the Army carried out a coup) decided to formally support the process and in January signed the political pact for transition and political agreement. Despite this support, it demanded an inclusive Government issued from Parliament. Previously, the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), the second largest in Parliament, had argued that the PAIGC was sufficiently represented in the Transitional Government. With the inclusion of the PAIGC in the process, the political actors signing the pact reached a consensus on 30th April on the key stages to reinstate the constitutional order: the holding of elections in November; the completion of the political transition on 31st December that year; the election of an inclusive transitional government; and the election of a president of the national electoral commission by the National Assembly. Also, civil society organisations, political parties without representation in Parliament and religious leaders also joined the parliamentary commission that was to examine the political pact for the transition. After agreeing to the stages, the National Assembly endorsed the new Transition Pact and Political Agreement, a Roadmap for Transition, and an agreement on the principles to reinstate constitutional order. **After a memorandum of understanding between the PAIGC and the PRS, the interim President appointed a new transitional Government in June that was more inclusive,** where Rui Duarte de Barros remained as the interim Prime Minister. Also, the date for the presidential and parliamentary elections was set for 24th November. Besides, the Parliament turned down a proposal presented by the transitional Government for an amnesty for the authors of the 2012 coup. The PRS announced it would try to push forward the proposal.

Despite the agreements for a more inclusive transition, the work to prepare the elections advanced very slowly, as local and international actors warned at several points during the year, amid tensions and divisions. Finally, the interim President, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo announced that the presidential and parliamentary elections that were due to take place in November 2013 had been postponed to March 2014. Political forces agreed to extend the transition period beyond the end of 2013, when it was initially meant to end. In turn,

Guinea-Bissau	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, armed forces, opposition political parties, international drug trafficking networks

Summary:

The history of Guinea-Bissau since it achieved independence from Portugal in 1974 is scattered with violence and coups d'état that have prevented the country from achieving political stability as well as thwarting all attempts to implement democracy. The strong influence of the armed forces on the country's politics and the confrontation between parties that represent different ethnic groups constitute a major hurdle to achieving peace. The breakdown of the stability pact signed in 2007 by the main political parties represented another lost opportunity for ending the spiral of violence that dominates political life. The growing impact of international drug trafficking networks in West Africa further complicates the crisis. The assassination of the president, Joao Bernardo Vieira, in March 2009, marked the start of a fresh period of instability. In April 2012 the Army carried out a new coup after the first round of the legislative elections when the candidate of the PAIGC, the party in power, won and was questioned by the opposition, despite of the backing from international observers. After the coup, a new transition period started.

Gomes Júnior, in exile after the 2012 coup, announced in August that he intended to return to Guinea-Bissau and run for the presidential elections. A spokesperson of the Armed Forces warned that the Army would not guarantee the candidate's safety if he returned to the country. Gomes Júnior called on the UN and the AU to guarantee his safety when he returned. In parallel, as the UN warned, Army officials continuously interfered with political matters. The Chief of Army Staff accused the international community of using the reform of the security sector to cut back the presence of Balanta ethnicity, to which he belongs, in the Armed Forces. Also, during the year there were several voices, including that of the UN Secretary General, warning that impunity continued to prevail.

The climate of security continued to be stable, yet fragile.

There were human rights violations throughout the year and an increase in intimidation, threats and restrictions to the freedom of expression and reunion were detected. At the end of the year the situation deteriorated with information broadcast on the radio on the alleged kidnapping of minors by Nigerian citizens for organ trafficking. Rumours led to an attack on the Nigerian Embassy, the killing of a Nigerian citizen and some 400 Nigerians belonging to an ECOWAS mission fleeing to a camp. The Police publicly denounced that the rumours were false. In retaliation to these events, armed men attacked residents of several neighbourhoods in Bissau, causing injuries to several of them, one of whom was a PAIGC MP and another an UNIOGBIS official.

Mali	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, former Military Junta, sectors loyal to former President Amadou Toumani Touré

Summary:

Since its independence from France in 1960, Mali has lived through several periods of instability, including the coup d'état in 1968, a popular and military rebellion in 1991 and the Tuareg insurgency and uprisings since independence, demanding greater political participation and the development of the north of the country. Mali held its first multi-party elections in 1992, although since then several elections have taken place amid opposition criticism concerning the lack of democratic guarantees. The army's influence was apparent in a new attempted coup d'état of 2000, which was foiled. The instability increased once again in 2012 when control of the north was seized by Tuareg and Islamist groups and the government was ousted by a coup d'état. After a transition period, Malian elected a new Government that is faced with several political, financial and security challenges amid persisting violence in the north of the country.

The political crisis in Mali was directly conditioned by the evolution of the armed conflict in the north of the country, although in parallel the mechanisms planned within the framework of the transition promoted by the international community and regional actors were set in motion, including elections. At the beginning of the year, interim President Dioncounda Traoré –in power since the military coup that overthrew Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012 – requested help from France to stop the advance of radical Islamist armed groups that had gained ground to the MNLA insurgents in the war in the north of the country. The action of the French troops, with the help of Malian soldiers, and troops from Chad and from other African countries integrating the ECOWAS managed to regain control over the north to a great extent, although throughout the year there continued to be violence in the area. Alongside this, during the first half of the year there were episodes that confronted different military sectors. In February, an incident between followers of ousted President Touré (red berets) and sectors of the Army loyal to the Military Junta and the leader of the military coup, captain Amadou Haya Sanogo (green berets), caused three casualties. The incidents took place shortly before a first contingent of EU instructors arrived to collaborate in restructuring the Armed Forces. This restructuring was seen as a key priority to ensure a successful political transition in the country. In this line, mediation mechanisms were established that bore some fruits towards the middle of the year. The rivalling military factions in Mali held a reconciliatory ceremony at the presidential palace, where the parties announced they would free the prisoners from the other rival and captain Sango apologised to the population. In parallel, **the Malian authorities signed a peace agreement with the armed group MNLA, establishing a cease-fire and ensuring elections would be held in all the country, including the Kidal region, in the hands of the Tuareg.** The Constitutional Court approved the submission of 28 candidacies for the presidential elections, including a woman. During the pre-electoral phase, several local and international actors expressed their concern regarding the conditions to vote –and even suggested it would be convenient to delay the schedule for the elections – faced with doubts on the guarantees for transparency and problems reported regarding the electoral census. According to information in the press, more than a million voters had not been registered before the first round of the elections, while the UNHCR alerted that only a small proportion of displaced people had had access to voting cards. The elections took place under the supervision of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) –which replaced the forces of ECOWAS and France, although in practice they joined the international mission – that was deployed in the country towards the middle of the year to support the political transition process and stabilisation tasks in Mali.

While acknowledging the electoral process was not perfect, the UN Secretary General called on the Malians to validate the results, which after the second round on 11th August, resulted in the former Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubakar Keita as the winner (known as IBK). The leader took 78% of votes compared to the 2% taken by his contender, the also former Prime Minister Soumaïla Cissé, in elections with a 46% turnout. According to analysts, IBK was the favourite candidate among military sectors. Shortly before handing power over to IBK, the outgoing president promoted captain Sanogo to general, a move that was severely criticised by human rights organisations like Human Rights Watch, which highlighted that he had been involved in arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture and other abuses. The appointment of one of Sanogo's lieutenants, Moussa Sinko Coulibaly as the minister of the interior was also criticised by the opposition. In the months that followed, there were several incidents that showed that the existing tensions in the country continued to involve the military. Military officers that were unhappy because they were not promoted as they had expected to be started a mutiny towards the end of September at a military base in Kati, the former stronghold of Sango's. This led the Government to react to recover the control of the facilities (Operation Saniya). The discovery of the bodies of four soldiers, including that of Sanogo's chief of security, caused further commotion in October. Towards the end of November, hundreds protested against Sanogo's arrest, after the courts ruled he was accountable for the abuses committed by the security forces when suppressing an attempted counter-coup led by Touré's supporters in April 2012. **The climate of tension became more evident after the discovery of a mass grave with the bodies of 21 "red berets" that disappeared after the attempted counter-coup in Diago**, in the proximity of a military camp in Kati. Alongside these events, instability in the north continued and differences with Tuareg sectors led to an end to the cease-fire between the Government and the MNLA. At the end of 2013 there were also legislative elections with a low turnout that strengthened the president's position and that of his allies, who won a majority in Parliament. In light of this situation, International Crisis Group (ICG) highlighted that even when it is essential to tackle the core causes of the armed conflict in the north of the country, this task should not relinquish the much needed reforms in the governance mechanisms throughout the country that have caused dysfunctions and instability in the past.³¹

Former Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubakar Keita (IBK) won the presidential elections in Mali, in a vote that was contested but backed by the UN

Niger	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, political opposition (Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic) and social opposition, MUJAO, Signatories in Blood

Summary:

Elections in January and March 2011 reinstated a democratic system in the country after the Military Junta met the schedule to return power to the civil society. In 2009 a coup had ended with the Government of Mamadou Tandja, after he started a set of constitutional reforms to remain in power. Despite the situation in the country has normalised, there continues to be instability in the north, generated by the presence of the Algerian armed group AQMI –with possible collaboration from the Tuareg insurgence – and by the return of Nigerians as a consequence of the conflict in Libya. The armed conflict that broke out in Mali at the beginning of 2012 has made the instability worse and has favoured the actions of regional armed groups in Niger.

The situation in Niger was marked by the consequences of regional instability and by the involvement of the country in the armed conflict in Mali. **The most serious episode was on 23rd May, when there were two explosive attacks against a uranium mine owned by the French multinational Areva, and against some military barracks causing the death of 26 people.** The authorship for these attacks, which happened in Agadez and in Arlit, in the northeast of Niger, was claimed by the armed group MUJAO in retaliation for the participation of troops from Niger in the French-led military operation in Mali. The Government of Niger had sent hundreds of soldiers to join Operation Serval and the action of the ECOWAS in northern Mali to stop the advance of radical Islamist groups towards Bamako. It is worth noting that the action of the armed group MUJAO in Niger was supervised by the armed group Signatories in Blood. In this context, the Government of Niger tried to strengthen regional agreements for security and received support from the US in terms of military equipment to fight against the armed groups. Niamey also authorised US drones to fly over its territory to fight these organisations and for operations against drug trafficking. Also noteworthy is the fact that **Niger maintained its commitment in place to deploy forces in Mali, since its troops joined the international peacekeeping mission in the neighbour country on 1st July (MINUSMA).** The President also

32. International Crisis Group, *Mali: Reform or Relapse*, Africa Report no. 210, January 10, 2014, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/mali/210-mali-reform-or-relapse.aspx>

promoted a government of national unity arguing that this favoured the institutional stability vis-à-vis the security threats. This measure generated some divisions and criticism from the opposition.

Nigeria	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Government, political opposition, Christian and Muslim communities, community militias

Summary:

Since 1999, when political power was returned to civilian hands after a succession of dictatorships and coups, the government has not managed to establish a stable democratic system in the country. Huge economic and social differences remain between the states that make up Nigeria, due to the lack of real decentralisation, and between the various social strata, which fosters instability and outbreaks of violence. Moreover, strong inter-religious, inter-ethnic and political differences continue to fuel violence throughout the country. Political corruption and the lack of transparency are the other main stumbling blocks to democracy in Nigeria. Mafia-like practices and the use of political assassination as an electoral strategy have prevented the free exercise of the population's right to vote, leading to increasing discontent and fraudulent practices.

The multifaceted instability increased in Nigeria –a country faced with an armed conflict with the Islamist group Boko Haram –,³³ due to **inter-community violence and the increase of actions by a militia of ethnic adscription, Ombaste**. This group, described in the press as a traditional worship group of Eggon ethnicity converted into a militia, carried out several violent incidents against other communities, as well as against the security forces. In May violence escalated in the context of a police operation against members of this group who were suspected of engaging its members forcibly. The militia killed around 60 police agents –30 according to police sources, 55-65 according to the local press, and more than 90 according to medical personnel and the group itself– close to Lafia, the capital of the state of Nasarawa. During the year there were other acts of violence linked to Ombaste, such as attacks on several towns in Nasarawa towards mid-September, causing around 40 deaths.

In parallel, included in these inter-community violent episodes during the year, **around fifty people died at the end of March from attacks on Christian villages during several days in the state of Plateau (centre of the country), allegedly by Muslim herdsmen from the Fulani ethnicity, due to conflicts regarding land and grazing rights**. Tens of houses were burnt. At the beginning

of May, almost 40 people died and thirty more were injured from fighting between Christians and Muslim groups in the town of Wukari (state of Taraba, centre). Violence broke out when the funeral procession for a traditional chieftain of the Jukun ethnicity, of Christian majority, was passing through a Muslim neighbourhood, carrying slogans that the Muslim population considered provocative. 48 people died in an attack on the village of Kizara (state of Zamfara, north) carried out by armed men, allegedly cattle rustlers, in retaliation for the organisation of local self-defence groups. Also, around thirty people died in June during attacks by Fulani population in several villages in the state of Plateau due to issues with cattle. According to the toll offered by International Crisis Group, around one hundred people died in July from community violence between Fulani and Alago population in the state of Nasarawa. Despite the truce reached in July, around thirty people died in clashes between people of the Eggon and Alago communities. Another thirty people died in September from inter-community fighting in the state of Benue. Some one hundred people died in similar clashes in that same state in October and December, while dozens died in fighting in other states.

Nigeria (Niger Delta)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Identity, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, Joint Revolutionary Council, militias of the Ijaw, Itsekere, Urhobo and Ogoni communities, private security groups

Summary:

Instability in the Niger Delta is the result of the loss of livelihoods of the population due to oil activity in the area. The lack of financial compensation and development, along with the marginalization of communities led them to demand greater participation in the profits of oil exploitation. Armed groups arose in the 90s and carried out attacks on oil facilities and military posts and the kidnapping of workers. The government responded through military means, with the permanent deployment of special forces in the Delta region who have been accused of committing numerous human rights violations. In 2009 the government decreed an amnesty for all armed groups that agreed to give up the armed struggle. The offer of rehabilitation programs encouraged the leaders of many of these groups to lay down their weapons, which led to a significant reduction of armed violence in the area. However, the stagnation of reintegration and development projects promised by the government could lead to a return to armed struggle.

Instability linked to the conflict in the Niger Delta persisted, with security incidents such as fighting,

33. See the summary on Nigeria (Boko Haram) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

kidnappings and oil theft, partly linked to the crime outbreaks and to sectors of the MEND, even if they were of a lower intensity than in previous periods. The President's adviser on the Niger Delta and the director of the amnesty programme called on the Governments of the Delta states to create jobs and opportunities, in view of the approaching end to the amnesty programme for former MEND combatants in 2015. In turn, two former military leaders, Ateke Tom and Ebikabowei Victor Ben threatened to withdraw their support from President Goodluck Jonathan due to the small impact of the peace dividend. Also, during the year there were protests, mobilisations and incidents carried out by former combatants. Among these incidents was the **death of 12 policemen during an ambush in the state of Baylesa in April, after an attack on a Police boat by armed activists due to the failure to distribute the grants included in the amnesty programme.** MEND, in turn, threatened to attack any vessel or tanker trucks carrying oil or propane gas, as a strategy to push for their demands, which include the freeing of their leader, Henry Okah, in prison for setting off a bomb in 2010. The Police tightened security in Lagos and in the country's oil facilities. The armed group also threatened to attack Islamic institutions in response to the attacks by Boko Haram on churches, but later retracted from this threat. Beyond the threats made by MEND on oil transport infrastructures, there were incidents the authorship of which is questioned, in a context of crime and grievances against local communities, such as oil theft, sabotage and explosions. The former activist leader Ebikabowei Victor Ben warned that oil theft would not stop until the federal Government adopted measures to compensate the local population in the area. Also, 12 people died in August during clashes between the Navy and the attackers of an oil tanker they tried to hijack. An Anglican priest was also kidnapped in September, an incident that the press reported as very rare, compared to the kidnapping of politicians and businessmen, which are quite common in the area. At the same time, there were plans under way to prosecute 500 detainees, accused of oil theft, in the framework of an operation against criminal groups. Also, fighting broke out between pro-Government and opposition youth in the Harcourt oil port towards the middle of the year, where police intervened with tear gas.

Senegal (Casamance)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government Internal
Main parties:	Government, MFDC – Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance armed group and its various factions
Summary: Casamance is a Senegalese region that is virtually cut off from the country by Gambia, and where, since 1982, the	

Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance has demanded independence. The fighting between the armed forces and the MFDC was at its most intense in the 1990s, concluding in 2004 with the signing of the peace agreements by its leader, Diamacoune Senghor. Since then, low intensity clashes have continued between various factions that do not recognise the agreement reached with the government and that are fighting to increase their control over the territory.

The situation in Casamance continued to show sporadic violent events, at the same time that contacts between the armed group MFDC and Senegalese authorities in the framework of the peace negotiations. Tensions in the region became evident in attacks such as the one in February carried out by alleged members of the MFDC against a bank and shops in the city of Kafountine, where three civilians died. Subsequent clashes between the attackers and Senegalese soldiers ended with the death of two of the attackers. This incident was considered to be the most severe since the peace conversations started after President Macky Sall came to power in April 2012. Press reports mentioned the death of two other members of MFDC in isolated incidents in April and highlighted the **kidnapping of 12 mine experts in May. The kidnapping of these workers who were carrying out demining tasks in the Ziguinchor region** (Casamance) was blamed on MFDC. The stance adopted by the armed group if that the deactivation of explosive devices should be included into the framework of peace discussions with the Government. Demining activities were halted temporarily due to this event. In following weeks, three women who were part of the kidnapped group were released in Guinea-Bissau, close to the border with Senegal. The remaining hostages were freed during the second half of the year by the faction of MFDC led by César Badiate, arguing that Senegalese authorities had acknowledged there had been a breach to the boundaries of the demining area.

It is worth noting that during 2013 there were several deaths caused by the presence of landmines in Casamance, including those of two civilians on a road between Diokatou and Kassal at the start of the year and that of a third person when a landmine went off in the department of Bignona, among other incidents. The government body in charge of demining announced during the first half of the year that half of Casamance had been cleared of landmines and that tasks were continuing at a pace that made it possible to forecast that the region would be complete cleared of landmines before 2016, the deadline to clear this type of artefacts set out in the Ottawa Treaty. The process had allowed the population of 61 communities to return to their farmlands and their homes. **It is estimated that the explosion of landmines has caused more than 800 deaths since the outbreak of the conflict in Casamance.** As for the peace negotiations, it is worth noting that dialogue was made easier by the confirmation from the part of the Sant'Egidio Community –mediating in the process –that there was no arrest warrant against the leader of MDFC Salif Sadio. Also, Badiate held a

meeting with Government delegates in Guinea-Bissau, a meeting that was also attended by a US diplomat. The President of Guinea-Bissau stated that he would not participate in the conflict resolution unless Senegal asked him to do so explicitly.

America

a) North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Haiti	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, social and political opposition, MINUSTAH, former soldiers

Summary:

Once the former president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, had left the country in February 2004, thus avoiding armed confrontation with the rebel group that had taken control of most of the country, the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) were both deployed to assist the interim government in restoring order and security. A period of greater political, social and economic stability followed the election of a new president, René Préal, in early 2006. However several problems have yet to be addressed: allegations of human rights violations against the MINUSTAH; high crime rates; the control of certain urban areas by armed gangs; difficulties in the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; the demands of former soldiers to reinstate the armed forces; and high levels of corruption, poverty and social exclusion.

The significant increase in the number and intensity of opposition-led anti-government protests caused several violent episodes and deepened the political crisis engulfing the country for several years now as well as confrontation between the legislative and executive powers. During the year there were mobilisations to protest against President Michel Martelly's mismanagement. Protesters demanded an increase in the minimum wage and a reduction in the prices of basic products, or denounced the corruption in Government. In this regard, it is relevant to highlight the strong mobilisations in the middle of the year due to the alleged involvement of the president in the death of a judge who was investigating a case of corruption allegedly with the involvement of some of Martelly's family members. After the death of this judge in mid-July, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies published reports suggesting that Martelly should be impeached and judged for perjury, and that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice should also be dismissed for interfering in a judicial case. Towards the

The significant increase in the number and intensity of anti-government protests led to some violent episodes and deepened the political crisis engulfing the country for several years now

middle of August, coinciding with the celebration of the 1791 Revolution, thousands took to the streets to protest in the cities of Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, Pétionville or Gonaïves. Mobilisations grew in September on the anniversary of the Coup against former President Jean Bertrand Aristide in 1991. In this regard, it is worth noting that at the start of the year, thousands of people challenged the prohibition to demonstrate by taking to the streets of Port-au-Prince to accompany the former leader on his way to court to offer his testimonial in an investigation into the death of a popular journalist in the year 2000, a period when Aristide was the leader of the Haitian opposition. Some analysts pointed out that Aristide's call to witness could be used to weaken him politically and make it difficult for his party, Lavalas, to participate in the next legislative and presidential elections, since he already stated his intention to run in the elections. In these elections, which have been postponed since November 2011 due to disagreements between the executive and legislative powers on the composition of the electoral tribunal and on what legislation should govern the elections, one third of the Senate should have been renewed and more than 700 local public posts should have been elected. Faced with this political crisis and a certain institutional paralysis, the OAS announced at the end of September that it was willing to deploy a mission in the country if Martelly asked for this, to help the Government prepare and supervise the elections. Despite the high national and international pressure to hold the elections, by the end of the year the Government had not been able to agree on a date for the elections with the opposition, which holds a majority in Congress.

The demonstrations at the end of the year were the most intense in all of 2013. Towards the middle of October, coinciding with the anniversary death of Jean Jacques Dessalines' death, the hero of Haitian independence, Lavalas and the Patriotic Movement for Democratic Opposition (MOPOD, a coalition of around 20 opposition parties) called for new protests in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien, the country's second largest city, to demand that President Martelly resign.

A few days later, the protests grew in intensity after the Police arrested a famous opposition lawyer for participating in these mobilisations. At the time of the lawyer's arrest many clashes erupted between the Police and people, including several MPs, opposing the arrest, considered arbitrary and illegal by human rights organisations. The President of the Chamber of Deputies called on the population to mobilise, since he considered the current Government was against the democratic progress achieved over the last years. During the frequent mobilisations in November and December there were several violent episodes and

clashes between detractors and supporters of Martelly's, who received support from thousands of followers. Some of the protests gathered opposite the US

Embassy because of the support it gives to the Haitian Government. In light of this tension, the Government of the Dominican Republic even closed some of its border posts temporarily. The Government repeatedly called for calm and urged citizens not take part in the protests, while it accused the opposition of receiving foreign financial aid and establishing alliances with foreign mercenaries. Another significant fact worth mentioning is the **growing citizen discontent with the United Nations mission (MINUSTAH) due to its alleged responsibility in spreading an outbreak of cholera that, by the end of 2013, had infected around 650,000 people and had killed 8,500**. During the year, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti filed a lawsuit against the UN at a New York federal court not only for introducing a disease that had already been eradicated into the country, but also for covering and distorting information to deny any responsibility in this outbreak of cholera, which would have started at the end of 2010 and would have reached the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Venezuela. Since then there have been many demonstrations in Haiti against the MINUSTAH. The Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti demands compensation from the UN to the victims and the improvement of the country's water and sanitation infrastructure. Towards the middle of the year, the UN Secretary General appointed a diplomat from Trinidad, Sandra Honoré, as his new special representative for Haiti and the head of the MINUSTAH. Finally, there was also great criticism from human rights organisations due to the lack of protection and vulnerability faced by thousands of those affected by the earthquake that shook the country at the beginning of 2010.

b) South America

Bolivia	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government, Self-government, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition (political parties, authorities and civil society organisations from eastern departments, indigenous groups)

Summary:

At the end of 2003, the then president, Gonzalo Sánchez Lozada, went into exile in the USA after more than 100 lives were claimed in February and October when a series of anti-government protests were violently put down. Following a period of uncertainty during which two presidents took office on an interim basis, Evo Morales won the 2005 elections, becoming the country's first indigenous leader. However, his presidency, in particular the agrarian reform or the nationalisation of hydrocarbon resources and the approval of a new constitution, was hindered by fierce opposition to his political project by several political parties and by the eastern regions of the country, which, led by the department

of Santa Cruz, demand greater autonomy. In parallel to the political struggle between the government and the opposition, in recent years Bolivia has faced one of the highest rates of social conflict in the entire continent, with protests of different kinds related to the labour demands of various sectors, the activity of mining companies or the rights of indigenous peoples.

Bolivia continued to harbour high levels of social and political conflict, even if they decreased compared to previous years. According to statistics reported in the press, in 2011 there were 73 conflicts a month, in 2012 there were 62 and in 2013 there were 55. Around 30% of these conflicts were concentrated in the department of La Paz. During 2013, Evo Morales' Government faced challenges both on the internal and international political levels. As for the external conflicts, it is relevant to mention the discontent generated among several Governments by the nationalisation of several companies, as well as the expulsion from the country of USAID, the US cooperation agency, that was accused by the Government of conspiring and interfering in politics. However, the issue that generated most controversy was the **intensification of the territorial conflict between the Governments of Bolivia and Chile over Bolivia's sovereign access to the Pacific**. In January, three Bolivian soldiers were arrested and accused of crossing the border carrying arms. After several months of tense bilateral relations over this issue, the Bolivian Government decided to file a suite with the International Court of Justice to demand maritime access it lost after the Pacific War in the 19th century and to force Chile to start negotiations on the conflict. In November tension rose again after a strike carried out by Chilean civil servants paralysed a border post and thus, transport between the two countries. La Paz lodged a formal complaint to the Chilean Government on the grounds that this was a breach to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904 and demanded financial compensation for the damage caused by the strike.

On an internal level, special attention is deserved by the increase in tensions between the Government and the opposition, as well as mobilisations by several groups and organisations making sectoral demands. As for the first point, it is relevant to recall the approval granted by the Constitutional Court for Evo Morales, who was re-elected in 2009 after an amendment to the Constitution, to run in the 2014 elections, thus granting him the opportunity of a third term in office. Although the President had not stated his intention to run for the elections, sectors of the opposition denounced that this measure was against the constitution and only aimed to perpetuate in power Morales and his party, the MAS. Besides, **tensions rose between the central Government and some departments controlled by the opposition over the proposal made by the Electoral Supreme Court to re-allocate the number of seats in parliament corresponding to each of the nine departments**. According to this proposal, which emerged after a new census was

made public, the departments of Potosí, Chuquisaca and Beni would lose one seat each, and this caused several protests during the month of September. The people and organisations that are contrary to this re-allocation of seats argue that the census has serious shortfalls and question its reliability. The big beneficiary of this reform would be the department of Santa Cruz, gaining three additional seats to a total of 28. There were also protests in the department of La Paz, which would keep its current 29 seats. Besides this conflict between the Government and the opposition over the President's possible re-election and over an eventual re-allocation of parliamentary seats, in 2013 there were also hundreds of demonstrations and mobilisations by different groups. Some of the most significant were those organised in February by the Túpac Katari Farmers Federation to demand better road and sanitation infrastructures for their community; the protests led by the Takovo Mora Guarani People's Assembly against an oil project of the company YPFB; or the protests lasting several weeks (including road blockades and dynamite explosions) led by groups of miners and trade unions demanding higher salaries. It is also worth adding that on some occasions Government followers also mobilised to counter the protests mentioned above.

Peru	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Government, armed opposition (remaining Shining Path factions), political and social opposition (rural and indigenous organisations)

Summary:

In 1980, just when democracy had been restored in the country, an armed conflict began between the government and the Maoist armed group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso in Spanish) that lasted for two decades and claimed 60,000 lives. The counter-insurgency policy implemented in the 1990s pushed the state towards authoritarianism under Alberto Fujimori, who in 2000 went into exile in Japan having been deposed by congress and accused of numerous cases of corruption and human rights violations. Since 2008, the remaining Shining Path factions have stepped up their operations significantly in the Alto Huallaga region and especially in the VRAE region (Valley between the Apurímac and Ene Rivers). The government, which claims that the Shining Path organisation is involved in drug trafficking, has intensified its military operations in both regions notably and has refused to enter into talks of any sort. It has also intensified the political and legal struggle against its political arm, Movadef. Meanwhile, several collectives, especially indigenous groups, have organised periodical mobilisations to protest against the economic policy of successive governments and against the activity of mining companies.

As in previous years, the main hotbeds of tension were the social protests, especially in the mining industry, and the fight against Shining Path, and organisation that was significantly decimated during the year. **There continued to be some sporadic clashes between the group and the Armed Forces, but with a lower frequency and intensity than in previous years.** Amnesty International reported in 2012 that the conflict had left 30 dead and dozens of injured people. Other sources pointed out that since the year 2005 Shining Path has killed 89 people, 52 on whom would be soldiers. In terms of counter-insurgency activity, the two most relevant facts have been the life imprisonment sentence against Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, "Comrade Artemio" –the last historical leader of Shining Path and the senior leader during the last years in the region of Alta Huallaga–, and the death in combat of Orlando Borda "Alipio" and Marco Antonio Quispe Palomino "Gabriel" in the middle of August, two of the main leaders of Shining Path in the Valley of Rivers Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro (VRAEM). The Government pointed out that the death of these two leaders was a big blow to the group's structure in the region, since they were the persons in charge of the armed actions or collecting the "protection payments" from companies or drug trafficking networks. The prosecutor's office stated that "Gabriel" was allegedly the author of more than 130 murders. President Ollanta Humala revealed that the US had offered support in the form of communication interception equipment for the military operation in VRAEM that caused the death of the two Shining Path leaders. He vowed to put an end to Shining Path before the end of his mandate in 2016. He also was favourable to increasing resources allocated to military intelligence, just as the Armed Forces had requested, and stated that from then on he would focus all his energy on capturing the two top leaders in the region, the brothers Víctor and Jorge Quispe Palomino "José" and "Jorge", respectively. In this regard, it is also worth mentioning the arrest of 23 people at the end of September in the VRAEM region who, according to the Government, were drug traffickers at the service of Shining Path. On another note, within the framework of the celebrations for the tenth anniversary of the report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in August, the relatives of the victims of the conflict asked for greater economic compensation, for a national plan of disappeared people and that cases stopped being filed due to a lack of information. Around those same dates, Peruvian Bishops Association and the National Evangelical Council had demanded that the Government investigated the disappearances in the framework of the conflict –from the nineteen eighties to the year 2000– of more than 15,000 people, including people that were subject to enforced disappearance, others were buried after extrajudicial executions and some fallen in battle. Amnesty International, in turn, highlighted that the progress made regarding human rights violations in relation to the internal armed conflict was slow and criticised that the bill passed in Congress in May

2012 to provide compensation to the victims of sexual violence had not yet been implemented.

During the year there were also many anti-government mobilisations, some of which were social and political in nature, and others, the majority, with a marked environmental nature. Regarding the first ones, it is worth mentioning the massive mobilisations led by students and human rights groups towards the middle of July to protest against what they considered a clear deterioration of the quality of democracy in the country and against the Parliament's election of judges from the Constitutional Court and the Ombudsman who, according to the demonstrators, did not meet the criteria for the post (because of their political activism or because their professional profile was inadequate). As for the environmental protests, it is significant to point out the State of Emergency that was imposed towards the start of the year in several provinces of the north to deal with the protests against a project of the trans-national mining company Newmont Mining; the clashes that emerged as a result of the removal of hundreds of miners working without a license in the mine La Libertad in January; or the protests by indigenous and farmer groups against the approval of new legislation by the Government to facilitate and speed up foreign investment that could therefore entail a loss of land or the pollution of natural resources. Besides, towards the end of September the most intense demonstrations of the year broke out when thousands of small-scale miners tried blockading 14 of the 24 regions in the country setting up road blockades and protests that caused many incidents and led to the deployment of hundreds of security forces in the most affected regions. Tensions dropped when the vast majority of informal small-scale miners in Peru (some 100,000, who mine around 12% of the gold in the country) accepted the Government ultimatum to formalise their franchises as long as they were not located in rivers, nature parks and protected areas.

Asia

a) Central Asia

Kazakhstan	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	System, Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, local and regional armed groups
Summary:	
Since its independence from the USSR in 1991, Kazakhstan has undergone strong economic growth in parallel with mostly stable socio-political development. Its extensive	

mineral and energy resources have been the engine of its economy, while the consolidation of the new nation-state has taken place, with Kazakhs making up more than half the population, with other minorities, especially Russians, accounting for the rest. The main challenges facing the country in the 21st century include risks of social conflict related to a lack of democracy and the authoritarian policies of a regime under the tight control of its president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has been in power since 1989. Furthermore, there is an increasing risk of violent incidents related to local and regional Islamist armed groups.

The climate of restrictions on human rights continued, as the number of incidents relating to insurgence activity or social conflicts dropped. Therefore, the situation during the year remained fairly stable. Both the annual reports published in 2013 by the human rights organisations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch referring to 2012, warned of the unprecedented persecution against the freedom of expression and political plurality, the imprisonment of activists and opponents, and the closure of independent media groups and one owned by the opposition. In 2013 the trend remained the same. During the year, Amnesty International also criticised the human rights violations in the judicial process for the Zhanaozen events that took place at the end of 2011 –protests by workers in the oil industry that led to clashes with the security forces causing 15 dead and injuries to around 100 people, and to the adoption of exceptional measures –, and reiterated its criticism over the excessive use of force by the security forces during those events, while calling for an independent investigation. In 2013, pressure on the opposition and activists continued, as well as human rights violations. Amnesty International called on the Government of Kazakhstan to end torture in the country. The situation in prisons led around 20 prisoners in Oral (west) to harm themselves physically to denounce ill treatment, which added on to other mobilisations and riots that have taken place in Kazakhstan prisons over the last years.

The regime continued with its policy of repression against Islamist sectors, linked to what Human Rights Watch describes as a restrictive law on religious freedoms and that is also framed within the counter-terrorism legislation against Islamist insurgence activity in the country. The Government therefore banned the religious movement Jamaat Tablighi, which is also banned in Russia and Tajikistan. During the year, prison sentences were dictated against dozens of people accused of terrorism. This includes eight people who were convicted in June in the city of Atyrau (west) –the scenario of violent incidents during past years– to prison sentences ranging from 18 to 23 years, accused of terrorism, kidnapping and killings, among other charges. Also, according to the court of justice, the group was planning to fight in Syria. In the same city, nine other people were handed down prison sentences ranging from six to 23 years for participating in terrorist activities and for belonging to a banned group.

Kyrgyzstan	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	System, Government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, regional armed groups, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Summary:

Since its emergence as an independent state in August 1991, the former Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan has experienced several periods of instability and socio-political conflict. The presidency of Askar Akayev (1991-2005) began with reformist momentum but gradually drifted towards authoritarianism and corruption. In March 2005 a series of demonstrations denouncing fraud in that year's elections led to a social uprising that forced the collapse of the regime. The promises of change made by the new president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, soon came to nothing, giving way to a regime of authoritarian presidentialism in which corruption and nepotism were rife, especially from the end of 2007. All of this took place in a scenario involving economic difficulties for the population, latent tension between the north and south of the country, and the exclusion of ethnic minorities from political decision-making processes. Five years later, in April 2010, a new popular uprising led to the overthrow of the regime, with clashes that claimed 85 lives and left hundreds injured. This was followed in June by a wave of violence with an inter-ethnic dimension, claiming more than 400 lives. Other sources of tension in Kyrgyzstan are related to the presence of regional armed groups with Islamist tendencies in the Fergana Valley (an area between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) and border disputes with the neighbouring countries.

The situation in Kyrgyzstan deteriorated, with several active points of tension, including political and social unrest against the Government and opposition sectors with a strong support in the south of the country, which was reflected in protests during the year; inter-community and international tensions around enclaves in the Ferghana Valley –the border area with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan–; and pressure used against religious sectors considered to be extremist by the regime. On a political level, **the struggle between the Government, with a predominant social basis in the north, and opposition sectors with stronger support in the south who are seen as being close to the former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev**, who was ousted after the social mobilisations in 2010. One of the main points of tension in this struggle was the situation of three members of parliament and leaders of the party Ata-Jurt (Fatherland), Kamchybek Tashiev, Sadyr Japarov and Talant Maytov, who were sentenced to prison in March accused of trying to overthrow the Government during the protests in October 2012 in front of the Parliament. These protests were

Tensions rose in Kyrgyzstan between the Government and opposition sectors in the south after three opposition leaders were accused of trying to topple the Government

initially called to demand for the nationalisation of the Kumtor mine (in the north). The mobilisation, where demonstrators tried raiding the Parliament, ended with tens of injured people. Since their arrest at the end of 2012, their supporters held protests during 2013 asking for them to be released; one of these protests led to clashes with the police, and several people were injured. These protests took place at the same time, and sometimes together with the mobilisations asking for the Kumtor mine to be nationalised. The Kyrgyz President, Almazbek Atambayev, argued that former president Bakiyev's family was behind the protests. The prison sentences against these opposition members generated further protests and increased the tension. Among some of the incidents, pro-Ata Jurt demonstrators took an administrative building in Jalal Abad (south) and around one thousand of their supporters for several days blocked the road leading to Osh (south) and the capital, Bishkek. The accused were acquitted by a court in Bishkek in June, at a trial that was marked by violent incidents by the followers of the three members of the opposition. However, **the Supreme Court revoked the acquittal and considered they were guilty of trying to topple the Government**, whereby they were expelled from Parliament. In November, the former Parliament spokesperson and Ata-Jurt member Akmatbek Keldibekov was arrested and accused of abuse of power and embezzlement, which led to mobilisations to support the detainee, including road blockades. Tashiev, the leader of Ata-Jurt called this arrest political oppression. Tension grew in December with the occupation of the Government headquarters in Osh (south) calling for the release of Keldibekov. A new front opened when the mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov, expressed his support to the demonstrators. The mayor is from the opposition party United People's Movement and the nationalist leader in the south, who is also considered an ally of former president Bakiyev. The Government reacted dismissing him, which in turn fuelled new protests in Osh, in a context prior to the local elections in February 2014. Towards the end of the year, Myrzakmatov's party and the Progress party led by Bakyt Torovayev, with its political stronghold in the Jalal-Abad region (south) announced a political alliance to challenge the Government's power and to become a new focus of opposition power to face the predominance of Ata-Jurt.

Besides the political tension there were also **social tensions regarding the Kumtor mine, an issue where environmental protests, nationalist claims and pro-Ata-Jurt mobilisations converged**. Ata-Jurt is the party that adopted a firm stance on the issue as part of its anti-government agenda. Tension escalated after several days of protests in May that led to the declaration of the State of Emergency lasting several days in the district of Jety-Oguz (north) and the arrest of around 200 people. There were also protests in Osh

(south) and in Bishkek, including road blockades. The controversy focused on the environmental impact of the open-air gold mine, operated by a Canadian corporation and which generates an average 12% of the country's GDP. The terms of the operating agreement were also controversial. The Government and the corporation reached a non-binding agreement in September that increased the State participation from 32.7% to 50%. Even then the protests against the Kumtor mine and other mines operated by international corporations continued during the following months and included the kidnapping of a regional governor. The Parliament, in turn, demanded an increase in the State's participation. Towards the end of the year a new state of emergency was put in place in the city of Saruu (north).

During the year there were other points of tension. **Security incidents with an inter-community dimension occurred around several enclaves of neighbouring countries located in Kyrgyzstan, and there were incidents between border guards of Kyrgyzstan and those of neighbouring countries.** In this sense, incidents broke out in January around the enclave of Sokh (of Tayika ethnic majority, belonging to Uzbekistan and surrounded by Kyrgyz territory) due to protests by the inhabitants of the enclave after some electricity pylons were built around a Kyrgyz border post. These protests included clashes, some injured people and the taking of hostages and closure of borders for some days. At the same time, there was tension between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to the exchange of gunfire between the border guards of both countries in the area around the Kyrgyz district of Aksy (south) and the deployment of Uzbek troops at a radio station. Border tensions also affected Tajikistan. There were incidents in the enclave of Vorukh (belonging to Tajikistan but located within a Kyrgyz district) where some 12 people were injured in April from clashes between citizens of both these countries over the construction of a road. Hostages were taken and material damage was caused. New incidents broke out in May that led the Kyrgyz authorities to agree on the need to complete the border demarcation, since there were around 80 points along the border in dispute. During the year there were other episodes of tension, such as the closure of roads linking both countries in December due to an attack on a Kyrgyz's facility in a district of Tajikistan. In a separate event, the Government continued to put pressure on sectors it considered radical Islamists in the context of the fear of the region's governments of the impact of Islamist insurgence and extremist religious groups.

Tajikistan	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government, System Internationalised internal

Main parties:	Government, political opposition (Islamic Renaissance Party), social opposition (regional groups Gharmis and Pamiris), former warlords, Islamist groups (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU]), Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
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Summary:

The tension in Tajikistan is largely related to the armed conflict that took place from 1992 to 1997 between two main groups marked by strong regional divisions: on the one side, the opposition alliance of Islamist forces and anti-communist liberal sectors (centre and east of the country) and, on the other side, the government forces, which were the heirs of the Soviet regime (north and south). The 1997 peace agreement involved a power-sharing deal, which incorporated the opposition to the government. In its post-war rehabilitation phase, the problems facing the country include regional tensions (including the growing hostility of the Leninabadi population in the north of the country towards its former allies in the south, the Kulyabi, the dominant population group in power since war ended), the presence of some non-demobilised warlords and former opposition combatants in parts of the country, the increasing authoritarianism of the regime, corruption, high levels of poverty and unemployment, tensions with neighbouring Uzbekistan, instability related to the border shared with Afghanistan and the potential threat of armed Islamist groups.

Tension dropped compared to the previous year, when there was a large-scale operation with 2,000 troops against a former opposition commander and his followers in the eastern region of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province (GBAO) that killed from 50 to 70 people. During 2013 there continued to be hotbeds of tension in the GBAO but of a lower intensity and in general terms, conflicts in the country were linked to the **pressure used by the regime against the political opposition in a year when there were presidential elections and also linked to insurgence and counter-insurgency operations.** As for the GBAO, the Supreme Court sentenced the regional leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the only authorised Islamic party in the former Soviet central Asia area, to 14 years in prison. The court accused Sherik Karamkhudoev of creating a criminal organisation, organising mass riots and illegally possessing arms. The IRP suffered attacks and repression in 2012 in the GBAO as well as in other parts of the country and had been accused of instigating riots that year to protest against the murder of a former opposition commander and a figure of alternative power in the State, Imomnazar Imomnazarov, during a very turbulent year in the GBAO faced with the Governments attempts to consolidate its presence in the region and displace the centres of alternative power, according to some analysts. The sentence against Karamkhudoev was criticised by the IRP, who denounced political motivations. Besides, in a year with presidential elections, **different sectors of the political opposition in Tajikistan joined forces in 2013 to support the**

candidacy of the lawyer and human rights activist Oinihol Bobonazarova. She was chosen in September to represent the Union of Reformist Forces of Tajikistan (URFT), consisting of the IRP, the Social Democratic Party, NGOs and activists. However, she withdrew from the electoral battle in October as she narrowly failed to get the number of supporting signatures required. The candidate and the opposition block denounced that they were being persecuted by the authorities, including the kidnapping of people who were gathering signatures. Tajikistan's president Emomali Rajmónov, in power since 1992, was re-elected president in November for a further seven years in elections that were questioned by the OSCE since they offered possibility for a genuine election and because there was no substantial plurality. The human rights organisation Amnesty International also denounced the lack of human rights in the country at several stages of the year, including torture and mistreatment in prisons.

Other hotbeds of tension during the year had to do with the alleged increase in the threat posed by Islamist insurgency and the pressure used by the authorities against sectors of Muslim population. The Ministry of the Interior admitted to the existence of insurgence groups in three of the country's region that had, until recently, been fighting in the neighbouring country of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Blake, declared that there was no imminent Islamist threat in the region of Central Asia, despite saying that the regional armed organisation Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan may be trying to increase its presence as part of a long-term strategy. He also pointed at Tajikistan as a vulnerable country. In turn, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, led by Russia and where Tajikistan is a member, agreed to increase the assistance to Tajik forces as a strategy to protect the Tajik-Afghan border. Among the incidents during the year there were several counter-insurgency operations in several areas, such as the Sughd province (west, bordering with Uzbekistan) that caused several casualties and the arrest of around ten insurgents. In this same province the Government closed five of the six Muslim schools of higher education that function legally.

Uzbekistan	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	System, Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, regional armed groups, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
Summary: The regime of Islam Karimov, who has held power since 1989 (initially as leader of the Uzbek Communist Party and since 1991 as president of the independent country), has been characterised by the systematic repression of the political,	

political system, tight control of public areas and the violation of rights and freedoms. Since the late 1990s, the country has suffered violent attacks by underground Islamist groups, in particular the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Tension began to escalate in the country in May 2005 when the regime violently put down demonstrations in Andijan, which resulted in several hundred civilian fatalities and more than a thousand refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries.

The regime's repression against human rights activists, political opposition leaders and religious population mobilised outside the officially registered channels continued during the year. Human rights organisations criticised the fact that the Government delegation denied the existence of political prisoners and the generalised use of torture and mistreatment by the security forces and prison officials at the UN Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights in April. Also, the UN Committee against torture called on Uzbekistan to end the systematic use of torture. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ended its visits to prisoners in the country in April arguing that Uzbek authorities was not allowing these visits to be conducted under ICRC standards, denying private visits. **Repression was used against well-known public figures.** These included the writer Mamadali Makhmudov, who was subjected to another trial shortly before he was going to be released after spending 14 years in prison in degrading conditions, according to Amnesty International. Human Rights Watch also attributed the imprisonment of the human rights activist Bobomurod Razzoqov to reprisals. Besides, the regime also continued with its strategy of repression against sectors it considered radical Islamists. Thus, more than twelve people were sentenced to prison for belonging to an extremist group in the region of Mamangan (east). Three Afghans died in clashes after attacking a border post on the Uzbek-Afghan border. On an internal level and amidst a context of uncertainty over the future succession of president Islam Karimov, in power since 1989, one of his daughters, Gulnara Karimova denounced that the head of the National Security Service was trying to kill her and take power, in a struggle where Gulnara Karimova was supposedly confronting other family members. In December she declared she was forced to leave the country.

b) East Asia

China (East Turkestan)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, System, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, armed opposition (ETIM, ETLO), political and social opposition
Summary: Xinjiang, also known as East Turkestan or Uyghuristan,	

is China's westernmost region. It contains significant hydrocarbon deposits and has historically been inhabited by the Uyghur population, which is mainly Muslim and boasts important cultural ties with Central Asian countries. Following several decades of acculturation policies, the exploitation of natural resources and intense demographic colonisation, which has substantially altered the population structure and caused community tensions since the 1950s, several armed secessionist groups began armed operations against the Chinese government, especially in the 1990s. Beijing classifies such groups, including the ETIM or the ETLO, as terrorist organisations and has attempted to link its counter-insurgency strategy to the so-called global war on terrorism. In 2008, when the Olympic Games were being held in Beijing, there was an increase in armed attacks by insurgent groups, while 2009 saw the most fierce community clashes in recent decades.

The number and fatality of violent episodes increased significantly, causing the death of at least 130 people according to some analysts, and many more according to the World Uyghur Congress. The upward trend in the patterns of violence in the region seems to be confirmed by the Government acknowledging that during 2012 there were almost 200 cases of terrorism and violence in the region, a figure that is higher than during the previous year. In this regard, the Government also stated that the growing instability in the region could be linked to the clear increase in drug trafficking noticed since 2010 in Xinjiang –the border with the region known as the Golden Crescent, which in recent years has become the main opium production and trafficking area in Asia–, as well as the alleged infiltration into the region of combatants and organisations from Syria. According to Beijing, these factors explain the growing military capacity of the armed secessionist groups (especially the ETIM) operating in the area and their availability to carry out armed actions outside Xinjiang. The Government also pointed out that insurgence is operating in smaller cells and is recruiting younger fighters. Despite acknowledging the serious secessionist threat in Xinjiang, it also stated that every year since 2009 more than 100 groups with the capacity to destabilise the region have been arrested.

Some of the most significant violent episodes of the year were the killing of 21 people (most of them police or “community workers”) in Selibuya at the end of April during an attack by an armed group created at the end of 2012. Later on, at the end of June, at least 35 people died in three attacks carried out consecutively in the cities of Hotan, Karakax and Lukqun. Most of the victims were in this last city, after a group of armed people attacked a police station, a public building and some vehicles. In Karakax, some sources report that more than 100 people riding motorbikes and carrying bladed weapons attacked a police station. According to the Government, these attacks were carried out by terrorist groups and took place a few days before the third anniversary of the

inter-community clashes in the region, especially in the city of Urumqi, that caused the death of at least 200 people. The World Uyghur Congress stated that at least 146 people had died in these violent episodes. At the end of August, Uyghur activists in exile and international media alerted on new episodes of violence in a desert area in the region of Yikiqi, where at least 23 people died. One of the violent episodes that received greater international media coverage was one where five people died and 38 were injured at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing when a car crashed into the people congregated in the central square. Finally, in December, at least 24 people died in two separate attacks carried out by armed secessionist groups against police stations or posts, according to the Government. In the first of these attacks, in mid-December, 16 people died in the county of Shufu, while in the second attack eight people died in the county of Yarkand, at the end of December. Faced with the magnitude of the attacks registered during the year, the Chinese Government deployed additional police personnel to the region and sent several Government senior officials to get first-hand knowledge and to control the situation, and design a security plan. The governor of Xinjiang tried to decouple these violent episodes from ethnic and religious tensions in the region and confined them to the fight against secessionism led by the Chinese Government.

Together with the increase in violence in the region, which according to the World Uyghur Congress led to a greater militarisation of the region and a noticeable increase in repression against the Uyghur community, the number of reports on the human rights situation in Xinjiang also increased. Amnesty International, for instance, warned on the lack of freedom of expression and denounced the harsh conditions in prisons around China, stemming from the possible death of a famous Uyghur writer in prison. Besides, both the US Government and human rights organisations denounced growing religious discrimination (mainly against Islam) in Xinjiang, as well as longer prison sentences for spreading religious materials considered extremist on the Internet, the restrictions against women wearing a veil in some official buildings or the prohibition for people aged under 18 to participate in religious activities during Ramadan. The Government denied there was religious discrimination, but made very clear its intention to fight organisations considered as terrorists by Beijing. On another account, several Uyghur organisations also warned that the migrations flow of people of Han ethnicity to Xinjiang, encouraged by the Chinese Government, is favouring a rise in community tensions, especially in schools and in farms. In this regard, they also warned of the continuous forced displacements and the expropriation of lands from Uyghur families. At the beginning of June, for instance, the Chinese authorities confiscated some lands after several peasants refused to give them the land in exchange for a compensation that was 10 times lower than their market value.

China (Tibet)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, System, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Chinese Government, Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in exile, political and social opposition in Tibet and in bordering provinces and countries

Summary:

In 1950, one year after emerging victorious in the Chinese civil war, the communist government of Mao Tse-tung invaded Tibet and over the course of the following decade increased its military, cultural and demographic pressure on the region, putting down several attempted rebellions, in which thousands of people were killed. Faced with the brutality of the occupation, in 1959 the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of people fled from Tibet and went into exile in several countries, especially in Nepal or the north of India, where the government in exile is based. In the last few decades, both the Dalai Lama and numerous human rights organisations have denounced the repression, demographic colonisation and attempted acculturation of the Tibetan population, part of whose territory enjoys autonomous region status. Dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing has been derailed on several occasions by the Chinese government's accusations concerning the alleged secessionist objectives of the Dalai Lama. The outbreak of violence that occurred in 2008, the most virulent in recent decades, interrupted dialogue once again and eroded trust between the parties significantly. The wave of self-immolations that began in 2009 in several Chinese provinces with Tibetan areas provoked a harsh response from Beijing, along with a distancing between the Chinese government and the Tibetan authorities in exile, which are accused by the former of inciting the protests.

During the year there were many environmental as well as political and religious protests (among which it is worth mentioning around 30 self-immolations with fire) and allegations on the deterioration of the human rights situation and increased repression by the Government, especially in February and during the last quarter of the year. At the end of the year, **the total number of people who had committed self-immolations with fire since 2009 to demand greater freedom for Tibet and the return of the Dalai Lama amounted to 125, of which more than 100 had died.** Most of these self-immolations, that are disapproved and unauthorised by the Tibetan Government in exile, happened in Sichuan Province, in the Qiang and Ngaba (Aba in Tibetan) prefecture, and they are being done by young non-religious people and not only Buddhist monks. Beijing, in turn, increased its measures to prevent and punish this form of protests. In February, for example, 70 people were arrested in the Qinghai region accused of encouraging self-immolations with fire. Tibetan organisations denounced a significant increase of repression by the Chinese Government since self-immolations began at the start of 2009, blocking roads, imposing restrictions in monasteries and villages

where protests took place, or deploying State agents to monasteries with political objectives. According to the Tibetan Parliament in exile, over 6,500 of these agents have been deployed to more than 1,800 monasteries to ensure there are now criminal actions or protests. Amnesty International accused the Chinese authorities of not respecting the right to association, expression and religious freedom sufficiently, while other international organisation denounced the deterioration of human rights (use of enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, house arrests to repress the dissidence) and the increase in repression against human rights defenders or political and religious activists –it would seem that more than 280 monks and nuns are held in Chinese prisons currently.

Besides, during the year there were also several **mobilisations against mining, infrastructure and tourist projects promoted by Beijing that could, according to demonstrators, cause serious environmental damage** in the region (such as the pollution of water resources), occupational accidents (like the one in March at a mining camp that caused the death of dozens), and inter-community tensions between Han and Tibetan population. It is especially worth noting the tension caused to the local population when buildings dating back thousands of years and with a rich history were demolished in the ancient capital of Lhasa to build new buildings for tourism or the protests in May in the county of Driru (Briru in Chinese, in the Autonomous Region of Tibet) against the construction of a road and mining activities in a mountain. After the demonstrations, where three people were sentenced to 13 years in prison, Driru became the epicentre of resistance against the Chinese authorities. Tension increased noticeably at the end of the year when the local population refused to fly the Chinese flag in their homes. During police operations in the region four people were killed and 50 more were injured, whole over 1,000 were arrested.

On a political level it is worth recalling the increased pressure on the new Chinese President Xi Jinping from Governments such as the Canadian, French, US or Australian, and from organisations such as the International Federation for Human Rights to resume conversations with the Tibetan Government in exile to try solving the conflict. In this sense, it is worth mentioning that the Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government in Exile, Lobsanf Sangay, called on the Chinese Government to resume the peace conversations that had ended in 2010. From 2002 to 2010 there were nine rounds of negotiation, but Beijing ended them unilaterally due to the political situation in Tibet and because it considered the Dalai Lama was encouraging violent outbreaks that often occur in Tibet. Lobsang Sangay expressed his willingness to resume the conversations at any time and in any place and stated that his Government's position was the "Middle Way", consisting on renouncing to the independence of Tibet in exchange for a true and genuine autonomy for the regions that have historically been inhabited by Tibetan population. Sangay criticised

the decision to divide what is known as the historical Tibet, made up of the regions of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo, and include parts of Kham and Amdo into Chinese provinces that are not part of the Autonomous Region of Tibet. In this sense, the Tibetan leader stated that during the nine rounds of negotiation held so far, his Government had already made a proposal to Beijing to establish an autonomic regime in Tibet that would be fully compatible with the Chinese constitution and with the Law on regional and national autonomy. Finally, Lobsang Sangay indicated that the Tibetan Government in exile's working group in charge of negotiating with Beijing was increased with six new members and that it would soon be studying the new guidelines on the financial policy and security recently approved by Beijing.

At the end of 2013, the total number of people who since 2009 had committed self-immolation with fire to demand a greater freedom for Tibet and the return of the Dalai Lama totalled 125, from which more than 100 had died

included the disputed islands and imposed defensive measures against aircraft that did not comply with the rules of the zone. However, in the following days, military aircraft from Japan, the United States and South Korea flew over the region without notifying the Chinese authorities in advance and with no incidents reported. Several countries in the region condemned China's decision, saying that it could destabilise the entire region of East Asia. In the weeks after Beijing's announcement, various events took place that notably raised tensions in East Asia: the United States and Japan

carried out one of the largest military exercises in the region in recent times; Japan and South Korea conducted military exercises in mid-December; Japan increased air and sea patrols over the disputed area; South Korea expanded its own air defence zone until it overlapped with those of China and Japan; US Vice President Joe Biden travelled to the region to tell China directly that the country did not recognise the new air defence zone and to urge the parties to act with restraint and to establish channels of communication; and at a summit held in Tokyo in mid-December, Japan and the ASEAN countries agreed to strengthen cooperation in matters of defence to ensure freedom of flight in the region, in a veiled reference to the measures recently announced by the Chinese government (in March, Japan and ASEAN had already begun talks to strengthen defence ties).

China – Japan	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Territory, Resources International
Main parties:	China, Japan

Summary:

The dispute between China and Japan (and to a lesser extent, Taiwan) over the sovereignty and administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (as they are known in Japanese and Chinese, respectively) in the East China Sea dates back to the early 1970s, when the United States, which had administered the islands since 1945, ceded control of them to Japan. The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which have high geostrategic value and are estimated to possibly hold huge hydrocarbon reserves, is part of the troubled historical relationship between China and Japan since the early 20th century due to the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and the Second World War. In 2013, China's unilateral declaration of a new Air Defence Identification Zone that included the disputed islands, as well as both sides' unilateral actions before and afterwards, significantly raised bilateral and regional tension around a historical dispute that had been managed relatively peacefully since the early 1970s but which, according to some analysts, could potentially provoke a military incident between the two countries and destabilise the region.

Political and military tension between China and Japan related to their dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea reached unprecedented levels, especially after the Chinese government announced the creation of a new Air Defence Identification Zone in late November that

In addition to these events, the Japanese government took two actions that set off vigorous protest in China and added even more uncertainty to the political crisis between both countries. First, in late December **Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which holds the remains of some Japanese war criminals that actively participated in the Second World War** and in Japanese expansionism at the time, sparking fervent protest in China and criticism in several countries. However, it must be noted that hundreds of MPs and some members of the government had already visited the shrine in April, August and October. In August, Abe gave a speech commemorating the end of the Second World War that avoided condemning or deploring the damage inflicted upon neighbouring countries when they were occupied by the Japanese military. Moreover, in mid-December **the Japanese government announced the entry in force of a new national security strategy and boosted military spending for the next five years for the first time in a decade**. Japan's new national security strategy could mean the end of restrictions on the export of military equipment and technology and changes to the Constitution to allow Japanese troops to fight overseas if one of the country's allies

is attacked. Both the adoption of the new security strategy and the boost in spending were decisions taken fully in line with the expressed desires of the Japanese government to increase its deterrent capability throughout the year. In the months prior, China had criticised some of the Japanese government's decisions related to defence, such as the approval of a white paper in July that identified China as one of the greatest threats to its security, the establishment of a security council under the direct control of the prime minister, the launch of the largest warship since the Second World War in August, the approval in October of a drone interception plan (meanwhile, the Chinese government declared that it would consider the interception of any of its aircraft to be an act of war) and closer military cooperation between Japan and some countries like the United States. Prominent in this regard were the joint military exercises conducted in January (which focused on defending the islands for the first time) and in February (in which Australia also participated), and especially the agreement reached between Japan and the United States in October to upgrade their military alliance for the first time in 16 years. On several occasions throughout the year, the United States declared that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are under Japanese administration and are therefore covered by the bilateral defence treaty between both countries.

Besides unilaterally declaring the new Air Defence Identification Zone in November, the Chinese government stepped up its rhetoric against the Japanese government throughout the year, protesting against Japan's actions formally and diplomatically several times. In March, Beijing announced the merger of the four government agencies that have grappled with security and maritime surveillance issues thus far, carried out military exercises at various times of the year and unveiled a new frigate with guided missiles in the East China Sea. On several occasions, it also questioned Japan's de facto sovereignty and administration of the disputed islands and sent more ships and planes (some of them military) to the area, which notably increased the number of deliberate and accidental incidents. Particularly significant was the Japanese authorities' retention of several boats, the collision of two ships (in which five people were killed and another went missing) and a diplomatic crisis caused by the alleged blocking of Japanese radar by a Chinese frigate near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. As a result of some of these incidents and the constant presence of Chinese ships and aircraft in the area, the Japanese government warned that it reserves the right to launch pre-emptive strikes if it identified imminent risks or threats to its national security.

Despite the increased tension between both countries and the deterioration of China and Japan's political

and diplomatic relations, in May the first official meeting was held between representatives of both governments since 2012 and in the following months, both governments recognised that there were channels of communication and dialogue at various levels to try to prevent or minimise accidental military incidents. These talks crystallised into an improvised meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the Chinese President during the G20 summit held in Saint Petersburg in September. In any case, the Chinese government declined to hold a second meeting (planned for October during an APEC summit), saying that the talks were devoid of content and that the Japanese government was only trying to use the bilateral talks for political reasons.

Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea

Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	System International
Main parties:	Korea DPR, Rep. of Korea

Summary:

After the end of the Second World War and the occupation of the Korean peninsula by Soviet troops (north) and US troops (south), it was split into two countries. The Korean War (1950-53) ended with the signing of an armistice (under the terms of which the two countries remain technically at war) and the establishment of a de facto border at the 38th parallel. Despite the fact that in the 1970s talks began on reunification, the two countries have threatened on several occasions to take military action. As such, in recent decades numerous armed incidents have been recorded, both on the common border between the two countries (one of the most militarised zones in the world) and along the sea border in the Yellow Sea (or West Sea). Although in 2000 the leaders of the two countries held a historic meeting in which they agreed to establish trust-building measures, once Lee Myung-bak took office in 2007 the tension escalated significantly again and some military skirmishes occurred along the border. Subsequently, the death of Kim Jong-il at the end of 2011 (succeeded as supreme leader by his son Kim Jong-un) and the election of Park Geun-hye as the new South Korean president at the end of 2012 marked the start of a new phase in bilateral relations.

As in previous years, **relations between the two countries were marked by the warmongering rhetoric, a show of military force and threats and accusations on the deterioration of the human rights situation in North Korea; however there were no significant bellicose incidents and both countries held talks on some issues for the first time in recent years and even reached some important agreements.** The most significant of these agreements

was the re-opening of the Kaesong industrial complex in mid-September; this is one the main symbols of bilateral cooperation and remained inactive for five months due to the rise in tensions between these two countries during the first half of the year. After several rounds of negotiation in July, towards the middle of August, North Korea and South Korea reached a five-point agreements to re-activate the industrial complex with measures such as allowing more than 30,000 people to go back to their jobs, currency income for North Korea and the economic re-activation for the complex (in fact, G20 delegations and from several international institutions visited the complex in the middle of December as a part of a strategy to internationalise it). The South Korean Government welcomed re-opening of the industrial complex and declared that it hoped it would mark the start of a new stage in bilateral relations. In this regard, at the end of August, just a few days after reaching this important agreement, Pyongyang suggested resuming conversations on the meeting or re-grouping of families that had been separated by the Korean War (the first since 2010) and on tourism visits to the Mount Kumgang complex, which had been suspended since 2008 after a North Korean guard fired at a South Korean tourist who had inadvertently entered a prohibited zone. North Korea unilaterally and surprisingly suspended the start of discussions on tourism trips to Mont Kumgang as well as the first meeting to discuss family meetings – some 100 people from each country were going to meet with the facilitation from the Red Cross, while 40 other families were going to see each other by videoconference because the poor health of some of the people stopped them from travelling. North Korea accused its neighbour country of fuelling confrontation and declared that the planned conversations would not resume until there could be a normal atmosphere for them to take place. South Korea announced it refused to resume dialogue on tourism trips in reply to the sine die suspension of the family re-grouping initiative and warned that failure to progress on this matter could lead to a backwardness in bilateral relations. Besides the rapprochement on these issues, there were also some reconciliation messages launched as some stages during the year from one of the top Korean leaders. The President of South Korea, Park Geun-Hye called for inter-Korean dialogue at several sated and expressed her willingness to meet Kim Jong-un, while at the start of the year the latter launched a conciliating message to its neighbour country during a broadcast speech. However, bilateral relations on a political and military level continued to be tense during the year. In March and April, as a reaction to the joint military exercises between the US and South Korea, and new sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council because of a nuclear test carried out in February, the North Korean Government cancelled the 1956 armistice, cut off all channels of direct communication (even military) with South Korea, performed the largest scale military exercises in years, closed the Kaesong industrial complex, ordered all its missiles and long-range artillery to aim at US military bases and territory, openly declared the state of war

on South Korea and warned there could be an attack with no prior warning at any time. Although tension dropped in the following months, throughout the year there were incidents that placed both countries in a state of alert. Besides the joint military exercises held during the first quarter by South Korea and the US, the two countries carried out other operations in October (joined by Japan) and December (with participation from the UK). On both these occasions, North Korea considered these exercises a provocation and increased the tone of its military threats and its warmongering rhetoric. In May, Pyongyang launched several short-range guided missiles from its eastern coast in the East Sea (or Japan Sea). Although this did not contravene the UN resolutions and several experts considered them as part of routine military exercises, the South Korean Government increased the alert level for its Armed Forces and announced it was deploying high-precision guided missiles on two islands in the Yellow Sea, close to the maritime border between the two countries. At the end of July, on the 60th anniversary of the armistice that marked the end of the Korean War, the North Korean Government put on a display of military force with one of the largest military parades in recent years. On the other hand, it is also worth mentioning the signing of a new military alliance between the US and South Korea in October, to increase the deterrent capacity against the North Korean nuclear and ballistics programmes. This military alliance had been discussed during the year, and even at the meeting held by the US and South Korean presidents in May. Finally, another event was the **execution in mid-December of Chang Song-taek, the uncle-in-law of Kim Jong-un, and a closely trusted person of his father's, Kim Jong-il, accused of being a counter-revolutionary**, and two of his closest collaborators in November; these executions were strongly criticised by the international community and especially by the South Korean Government.

Korea, DPR –USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea

Intensity: 2

Trend: =

Type: Government
International

Main parties: DPR Korea, USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea, China, Russia

Summary:

International concern about North Korea's nuclear programme dates back to the early 1990s, when the North Korean government restricted the presence in the country of observers from the International Atomic Energy Agency and carried out a series of missile tests. Nevertheless, international tension escalated notably after the US Administration of George W. Bush included the North Korean regime within the so-called "axis of evil". A few months after Pyongyang reactivated an important nuclear reactor and withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003, multilateral talks began on the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula

in which the governments of North Korea, South Korea, the USA, Japan, China and Russia participated. In April 2009, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the said talks after the United Nations imposed new sanctions after the country launched a long-range missile.

During the year there was significant progress regarding the possible resuming of multilateral conversation on denuclearising the Korean peninsula, but at the same time there was **an increased concern among the international community about North Korea's nuclear arsenal due to a third nuclear test (and also due to rumours that it could carry out a fourth one) and due to the eventual reactivation of a nuclear reactor.** Indeed, in the middle of February North Korea carried out a third nuclear test (after the ones in 2006 and 2009) according to Pyongyang to respond to the hostile policy of the US and the application or strengthening of sanctions by the international community after launching a satellite in December 2012. This test was condemned unanimously by the international community and led to new or stronger sanctions from the UN Security Council and the EU. The Chinese and Russian governments condemned the test, but called for a deeper dialogue with the North Korean Government and were against a military intervention. The US and Japan called for stronger sanctions against the North Korean regime, while South Korea increased the alert level and expressed it would carry out a preventive attack on its neighbour country if it detected any signs of an imminent nuclear threat from Pyongyang. The North Korean Government, in turn, reacted to the application of new sanctions by increasing its rhetoric and actions against South Korea (breaking the armistice that ended the Korean War, ending all communications with South Korea and closing the Kaesong industrial complex),³⁴ and officially declaring it was a “nuclear State” and announcing a new line of action that would increase its atomic arsenal and would improve the economy at the same time, carrying out large-scale military operations, ordering its missiles to point at US military bases and territory or declaring it was ready to resume activity at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. As for this last point, which was probably the one that generated most controversy during the year, at the end of August, a US research centre said that satellite images seemed to prove the resuming of activity in this reactor, which would be necessary to produce plutonium that could then be used to produce nuclear bombs. After that, a report by the South Korean intelligence presented in Parliament confirmed that this reactor had been reactivated; the reactor was built in the eighties but had not been operating for years,

A third nuclear test and the possibility of reactivating an important nuclear reactor significantly increased the concerns of the international community on North Korea's atomic arsenal

after Pyongyang destroyed part of its facilities in 2008 as a trust-generating measure within the multilateral six-party talks. Both the US Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed deep concerns over the activity observed in Yongbyon and warned it would violate the UN resolutions.

Besides this event, towards the end of September several US scientists warned of the possibility that North Korea may have developed a technology that would enable it to enrich uranium without having to import materials from third countries. This would threaten one of the pillars of the policy followed by the international community to monitor and stop the advance of the North Korean nuclear programme: controlling and prohibiting exporting and importing certain sensitive materials. According to experts, producing plutonium to manufacture nuclear weapons is much easier to monitor than enriching uranium. The international community suspects that North Korea would be at a very advanced stage in the production of nuclear bombs, although it suspected that the country does not yet have the technology required to miniaturize these bombs and assemble them onto long-range missiles. In October, the South Korean intelligence services detected an increase in activity in some of the facilities where nuclear tests are carried out, increasing the suspicions that North Korea might be preparing for a fourth nuclear test.

Despite these events, **in 2013 there were many meetings between the six Governments involved in the multilateral talks that made the rapprochement easier and eventually got discussions to resume again.** It is worth mentioning the relevant meetings between senior officials of North Korea and China –considered as the country that is most influential on Pyongyang's decisions– as well as two informal high-level meetings held in Beijing (September) and London (October) on security and disarmament. On several occasions during the year, North Korea expressed its willingness to go back to the negotiating table, but there continued to be significant differences regarding the previous conditions to resuming discussions. North Korea demands that the UN lifts the sanctions, the end of joint military exercises between the US and South Korea, or that the international community recognises its status as a nuclear state, while the governments of South Korea, the US and Japan consider that North Korea should take clear and irreversible steps towards denuclearisation. Equally, in June Pyongyang offered high-level bilateral conversations to the US to discuss regional security, but Washington asked for an unequivocal commitment from North Korea to nuclear disarmament.

34. See the summary on Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea in this chapter.

c) South Asia

Bangladesh	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government (Awami League), Political opposition (Bangladesh National Party and Jamaat-e-Islami), International Crimes Tribunal

Summary:

Since the creation of Bangladesh as an independent State in 1971, after breaking away from Pakistan in an armed conflict that caused three million deaths, the country has experienced a complex political situation. The 1991 elections led to democracy after a series of authoritarian military governments dominating the country since its independence. The two main parties, BNP and AL have since then succeeded one another in power after several elections, always contested by the losing party, leading to governments that have never met the country's main challenges such as poverty, corruption or the low quality of democracy, and have always given it to one-sided interests. In 2008, the AL came to power after a two-year period dominated by a military interim Government was unsuccessful in its attempt to end the political crisis that had led the country into a spiral of violence during the previous months and that even led to the imprisonment of the leaders of both parties. The call for elections in 2014 in a very fragile political context and with a strong opposition from the BNP to the reforms undertaken by the AL such as eliminating the interim Government to supervise electoral processes led to a serious and violent political crisis in 2013. Alongside this, the establishment of a tribunal to judge crimes committed during the 1971 war, used by the Government to end with the Islamist opposition, especially with the party Jamaat-e-Islami, worsened the situation in the country.

Bangladesh experienced a situation of severe tension during the year with different violent episodes of a political nature that caused the death of around 400 people. Tension was fundamentally on two fronts, inter-related to one another, which showed the fragile political situation in the country. Firstly it is relevant to mention the task taken by the International Crimes Tribunal,³⁵ established in 2010, which has contributed to spread violence in the country over the year. The trials against different leaders of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, who the Government accuses of having collaborated with the Pakistani Army during the 1971 armed conflict and committing numerous atrocities, led

Bangladesh experienced a highly turbulent situation as a consequence of the call to elections and the opposition to the task of the International Crimes Tribunal

to intense social protests at different times during the year. In February the life sentence given to the leader of Jamaat, Abdul Qader Mollah, caused serious clashes between demonstrators –asking for death penalty instead of prison terms for some of the accused–, and the security forces caused at least 32 deaths. During the following months, protests against the tribunal broke out by members of Jamaat and the main opposition party, the BNP, with renewed clashes, dozens of dead and hundreds of injured people. The tribunal was accused of responding to the wishes of the governing AL party and failing to meet international standards for this type of tribunal. The execution of Abdul Qader Mollah in December caused intense protests from the members of his organisation, who confronted the security forces and attacked Government members, causing at least 25 deaths. Secondly, **the call for elections by the Government led to a serious and violent political crisis.** The Government's refusal to name a neutral interim Government to supervise the electoral process, as had been done for previous elections, led the opposition BNP to boycott the elections, and a serious wave of violence. The governing AL party amended the Constitution in 2011 and suppressed the figure of an interim Government during electoral processes that was laid out in the 1996 Constitution to ensure free and fair elections. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's refusal to leave office on the deadline set by the opposition, on 24th October, caused a huge violent political crisis. Hasina's proposal to establish a multi-partite Government to supervise the elections called for 5th January 2014 was rejected by the opposition, who defended appointing a non-partisan Government. The multi-partite government was finally established in November, was rejected by 19 opposition parties and was formed almost exclusively by forces supporting the governing party.

During the months of October, November and December there were protests, strikes, demonstrations, blockades and riots in the streets that killed over 100 people. Besides, in December the Police circled the house of the main opposition leader, the former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, stopping her from participating in the protest. Hundreds were arrested in the days preceding the elections and tens of thousands of soldiers were deployed around the country to monitor the elections. The United Nations sent Óscar Fernández Taranco, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs to the country, who called for an appropriate climate for the holding of elections.

35. Despite its name, it is a national tribunal created to judge the crimes committed during the 1971 war that led to the division of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh as an independent State

India (Nagaland)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Identity, Self-government Internal
Main parties:	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM, NSCN (Khole-Kitovi), NNC, ZUF

Summary:

The conflict affecting the state of Nagaland began following the British decolonisation process in India (1947), when a Naga movement emerged that demanded recognition for the collective rights of the Naga population, which is mostly Christian, as opposed to the Indian majority, which is Hindu. The founding of the NCC organisation marked the beginning of political demands for the independence of the Naga people, which over the following decades evolved in terms of both content (independence of Nagaland or the creation of Greater Nagaland, encompassing territories from neighbouring states inhabited by Naga people) and opposition methods, the armed struggle beginning in 1955. In 1980 the NSCN armed opposition group was set up following disagreements with the more moderate political sectors, itself splitting into two separate factions eight years later: Isaac Muivah and Khaplang. Since 1997 the NSCN-IM has maintained a ceasefire agreement and has held talks with the Indian Government, while the NSCN-K reached a ceasefire agreement in 2000. Since then, clashes between the two factions have taken place in parallel with attempts to foster rapprochement and reconciliation among the Naga insurgency. A significant reduction in violence has been observed in recent years.

The situation in terms of violence improved in 2013 compared to the previous year, with a drop in the number of victims from fighting between the different armed opposition groups in the state, even if the peace process between the Indian Government and the opposition armed group NSC-IM did not experience any significant progress.³⁶ According to the figures gathered by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the total deaths recorded was 32 people, a significant drop compared to the 61 deaths recorded in 2012, but more than in 2011, when only 15 people died. From the 32 killed in 2013, 11 were civilians and 21 were insurgents, according to this same source. Most of the clashes during the year were between the members of the opposed factions NSCN-K and NSCN-KK. At the start of the year members of NSCN-K killed a member of NSCN-KK in the district of Zunheboto. In May there was another incident where members of NSCN-KK killed a member of NSCN-K and a civilian in Dimapur. These factions clashed again on several occasions during the second half of the year, leading the Minister of the Interior of the state, G. Kaito Aye to threaten the armed groups with a Government intervention if violence between the insurgency did not stop. Tension rose in the state during the last days of the year when there were violent riots after members of the armed

opposition group NSCN-IM sexually assaulted two Sumi women (one of the main Naga tribes) originally from Aunachal Pradesh. The clashes between the population and the armed group, that said it would punish those responsible for the assault, but failed to hand them in to the Police, caused two deaths and set alarm bells ringing over the continuity of peace negotiations between the armed group and the Indian Government, after Government members pointed out that the killing of civilians was a breach to the cease-fire agreement. In April there had also been social protests against the NSCN-IM due to the kidnapping of two teachers who refused to pay the armed group and in October there were also protests against the population being extorted.

Another important event of the year was the holding of elections to the state's Assembly on 28th February. The Elections awarded a new victory to the Naga People's Front with 37 of the 60 seats in the assembly. During the elections there were some security incidents, given that some of the Naga insurgency organisations were against the elections. At least two insurgents from the armed opposition group NSCN-KK died from post-electoral violence and two other people died in incidents linked to the elections.

India – Pakistan	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Territory International
Main parties:	India, Pakistan

Summary:

The tension between India and Pakistan dates back to the independence and partition of the two states and the dispute over the region of Kashmir. On three occasions (1947-1948, 1965, 1971) armed conflict has broken out between the two countries, both claiming sovereignty over the region, which is split between India, Pakistan and China. The armed conflict in 1947 led to the present-day division and the de facto border between the two countries. In 1989, the armed conflict shifted to the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1999, one year after the two countries carried out nuclear tests, tension almost escalated into a new armed conflict until the USA mediated to calm the situation. In 2004 a peace process got under way. Although no real progress was made in resolving the dispute over Kashmir, there was a significant rapprochement above all in the economic sphere. However, India has continued to level accusations at Pakistan concerning the latter's support of the insurgency that operates in Jammu and Kashmir and sporadic outbreaks of violence have occurred on the de facto border that divides the two states. In 2008 serious attacks took place in the Indian city of Mumbai that led to the formal rupture of the peace process after India claimed that the attack had been orchestrated from Pakistan. Since then, relations between the two countries have remained deadlocked although some diplomatic contacts have taken place.

36. See the summary on India (Nagaland) in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

Tension between India and Pakistan escalated greatly during 2013, with regular violent incidents between the two Armies on either side of the Line of Control, the *de facto* border between these two States. Around twenty Indian and Pakistani soldiers might have died during the year, as well as several civilians, as a result of the exchange of fire that occurred at several points during the year. The escalation of violence conditioned diplomacy relations, which deteriorated noticeably, although the peace process was not suspended. The first violent episode happened in January when the Pakistani Government accused the Indian Armed Forces of crossing the border and killing a Pakistani soldier and injuring another one; these accusations were denied by India who, besides denying that they had crossed the border, argued that it was a defensive action against Pakistani fire. Violence continued several more days, killing five soldiers during the month of January. Besides the violence, mutual accusations were launched by the two sides, generating a severe diplomatic crisis that was finally overcome with the commitment from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to solve the conflict through dialogue.³⁷ Amid this escalation, the Indian Minister of Defence pointed out that during the period from 2010 to 2012 Pakistan had breached the cease-fire agreement along the Line of Control on 188 occasions. A new episode of tension erupted after India executed the Cashmere insurgent Mohammed Afzal Guru in February, who had been accused of participating in the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. Pakistan condemned this execution and India responded by cancelling several cricket matches with Pakistan, on the basis that it considered this an intrusion on its internal matters.

Tension rose significantly once again after August, when there was an exchange of fire along the border that killed several people in the Indian and Pakistani ranks. During the second half of the year there were several of these incidents. Nevertheless, there were also attempts to calm the tensions and reduce the violence, such as the meeting held between the leaders of both countries in September during the UN General Assembly meeting, where they agreed to end the fighting. The year ended with an escalation of verbal accusations, when Pakistani media relayed the alleged words of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in December saying there was the possibility of an armed conflict in the region, although Sharif's office quickly denied that these words were true. Alongside the crisis, it is worth mentioning the meeting that was held between Indian and Pakistani senior military officials on the border crossing of Wagah.

Tension between India and Pakistan escalated after violent events on the border area caused the death of soldiers from both Armies

Nepal	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Government, armed forces, political parties –UCPN(M), CN, CPN(UML)–, former Maoist opposition armed group PLA

Summary:

1996 marked the start of a decade-long armed conflict between the Nepalese government and the armed wing of the Maoist CPN-M, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which aimed to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Maoist republic, in a country affected by poverty, feudalism, inequality and the absence of democracy. Following a decade of armed conflict and a coup in 2005, through which the king assumed all state powers, at the end of April 2006 King Gyanendra ordered the reopening of parliament after several weeks of intense social protests that claimed some 20 lives. The protests that brought about the overthrow of the king were orchestrated by a coalition of the seven main democratic opposition parties and the Maoists. Following the overthrow of the monarchy they unilaterally declared a ceasefire, which was backed by the interim government. In November 2006 a peace agreement was signed that brought the armed conflict to an end, after which the republic was proclaimed. In 2008 a constituent assembly was established to draw up Nepal's new constitution, although successive political crises and the lack of agreement on key aspects of the peace process, such as territorial decentralisation or the situation of Maoist combatants have led to a stalemate in the peace process.

During the year, the political situation in Nepal turned on the **call for elections to the Constituent Assembly** after the previous Assembly was dissolved in 2012. Tensions between the different political parties as a consequence of the disagreements on some of the fundamental points of the call continued, although finally the main political forces reached the necessary consensus for the elections to take place on 19th November. In February the four main political parties UCPN(M), Madhesi Morcha, Nepali Congress and CPN-UML reached an agreement to establish an interim Government to lead the electoral process, headed by the head of the Supreme Court, Khil Raj Regmi. This appointment was the object of controversy during the year and several political organisations, especially the Maoist dissident faction of CPN-M called for his dismissal on several occasions. This party headed an alliance of political organisations that carried out several protests during the year, including strikes and demonstrations to

37. See the summary on India – Pakistan in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

express their rejection to the holding of elections, where they did not participate finally. Several attempts to negotiate failed between the main political parties in the High Level Political Committee (HLPC); this committee was to supervise the electoral process and the parties against the committee, as well as the demands from the opposition to delay the elections and to dismiss the interim Government were not taken into account. **The elections took place with a turnout close to 70% in a climate of normality** –although it is worth mentioning the explosion of a homemade device at a polling station in Kathmandu that injured three people, including a child, and also the shooting against a candidate of the CPN-UML by unidentified armed men in October. Both local and international observers (Carter Center and the EU) pointed out that the elections had been free and fair. Nevertheless, the Maoist party UCPN(M) denounced irregularities in the process. **The elections awarded a victory to the Nepali Congress party** with 196 of the 601 seats, followed by CPN-UML with 175, and the Maoist UCPN(M) with 80 seats. The electoral defeat of the Maoists, together with their criticism of the process, which they said had been irregular, led to a new political crisis that was solved in December with a four-point agreement that allowed the UCPN(M) to join the Constituent Assembly. This agreement envisaged: 1) the establishment of a parliamentary commission to investigate the electoral irregularities; 2) the drafting of a new Constitution within six months so it could be enacted within one year; 3) the establishment of a permanent multi-partite mechanism to held drafting the Constitution and enables the completion of the peace process; and 4) the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and a commission on disappearances.

The elections and the formation of the Constituent Assembly, as well as the **formal conclusion of the process to integrate the former Maoist armed opposition group into Nepal's Armed Forces** were seen as positive signs of the process to implement the peace agreements that ended the armed conflict in 2006. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that in August 70 former Maoist combatants were appointed as officers of the Nepalese Army. This ceremony marked the official end of the process to integrate both armies, a process that was completed in April with the integration of the last remaining combatants into the Armed Forces. From the 19,000 people who had fought with the insurgence during the years of the armed conflict, in the end only 1,460 joined the Armed Forces, a figure that was much lower than the initially agreed ones, and the rest returned to civilian life through several reintegration packs.

The legislative elections in Pakistan enabled the transfer of power from one elected parliament to another for the first time in the country's history, even if there continued to be high levels of violence throughout the country

Pakistan	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=
Type:	Government, System Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, armed opposition (Taliban militias, militias of political parties)

Summary:

In 1999 the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was brought down by a military coup orchestrated by General Pervez Musharraf, who justified his actions by accusing this and previous governments of mismanagement and corruption. The new military regime initially met with the isolation of the international community. There was a thawing of relations after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, when Musharraf became the main ally of the USA in the region in the persecution of al-Qaeda. The fragile political situation that has characterised the country for several years can be explained by the length of time for which Musharraf held on to power, simultaneously holding the positions of head of state and commander-in-chief, by the attempts to compromise the independence of judicial power and by the increasing power of Taliban militias in the tribal areas of the country on the border with Afghanistan. In 2008 Musharraf resigned as president following defeat in the legislative elections and was replaced by Asif Ali Zardari. However, the country has continued to experience alarming levels of violence.

Pakistan registered alarming levels of violence during the year as a consequence of the different hotbeds of social and political tension affecting the country. From January to November there were **5,390 violent deaths around the country** according to the figures provided by the Pakistani Center for Research and Security Studies. These figures also include the number of deaths caused by the armed conflicts around the country.³⁸ During the year, the sectarian violence with its epicentre in Karachi was especially relevant, but there were also other scenarios of tension linked to the political life in the country. As for the violence in **Karachi**, the figures provided by police sources at the end of the year reflected this trend, since according to the Police, 2,175 people died in 2013. It is worth mentioning that **the serious upturn in violence during the first half of the year in Karachi motivated the authorities to start a large-scale security operation that led to the arrest of thousands of people**. These measures did not avoid the death of hundred of people in the following months as a consequence of sectarian violence, political killings and generalised crime. However, in September the Minister of the Interior declared that selective killings in the city

38. This figure refers to the overall armed conflicts and tension in Pakistan. See the summaries in this chapter and in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

had dropped by two to three per day compared to the previous number of these killings that were 16 or 18 per day. Also, some analysts pointed out that even when, in previous years, violence was mainly focused in certain areas of the city, this violence was growing more and more to the rest of the city and was affecting larger sectors of population. In January, the death of the Sunni cleric Abdul Majeed Deenpuri caused many protests and a strike to denounce sectarian violence. Another serious event during the year was the killing of Zafar Baloch, one of the leaders of the banned organisation Peoples Amn Committee. Another serious event was an attack close to a football stadium that killed 11 people, including several minors.

On a political level there was significant progress, even if the situation in the country continued to be turbulent. In May, legislative elections of a special importance were held, since they enabled **the transfer of power from one elected parliament to another for the first time in the country. This had previously been hampered by the several coups in the country's history.** The turnout at these elections was 60% and the elections were endorsed by local and international observers who stated the elections had been clean, with the exception of some serious irregularities. The party led by Nawaz Sharif, PML(N) was the victor with 125 seats and he was appointed Prime Minister. In January, the Supreme Court issued an arrest warrant against Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf, accused of corruption, but he remained in his post until the end of his mandate. Nevertheless, the months before the elections were politically turbulent, and there was a succession of protests in the streets, as well as attacks and other violent episodes. Another important event was the presidential handover from Asif Ali Hussain, the first elected president who ended his mandate, to Mamnoon Hussain, who renounced his militancy in the political party PML-N after being elected President, in a gesture that was seen as a gesture not to use a partisan mandate. Zadari's mandate was marked by high levels of violence throughout the country, as well as many corruption cases. Another relevant event of the year was the return of the former coup president Pervez Musharraf, who returned in March to take part in the elections. However, he was banned from participating in the elections by the courts of justice and was placed under house arrest, accused of the death of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the killing of a Baloch tribal leader, the house arrest of several judges and organising an operation against the Red Mosque in 2007 that ended with more than 100 people dying. Despite he was meant to appear in court at the end of December accused of treason, he did not, arguing the there were security issues.

Sri Lanka (northeast)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, Tamil social and political opposition

Summary:

In 1983 the LTTE, the Tamil pro-independence armed opposition group, began the armed conflict that ravaged Sri Lanka for almost three decades. The increasing marginalisation of the Tamil population by the government, mostly composed of members of the Sinhalese elite, following the decolonisation of the island in 1948, led the LTTE to initiate an armed struggle to achieve the creation of an independent Tamil state. From 1983, each of the phases in which the conflict took place ended with a failed peace process. Following the signing of a ceasefire agreement, fresh peace talks began in 2002, mediated by the Norwegian government, the failure of which sparked a fierce resumption of the armed conflict in 2006. In May 2009 the armed forces defeated the LTTE and regained control over the entire country after killing the leader of the armed group, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Since then thousands of Tamils have remained displaced and no measures have been adopted to make progress in reconciliation. Furthermore, the government has refused to investigate the war crimes of the armed conflict, denying that they ever took place.

Tension continued in Sri Lanka during the year, with no progress in solving the issues that led to the armed conflict in the country from 1983 to 2009. During the year **there continued to be serious human rights violations and a strong militarisation, especially in the northern and eastern regions, the ones most affected by the armed conflict.** Despite the international pressure there was not progress in the investigation of war crimes that were committed during the armed conflict. The UN High Commissioner for human rights, Navanethem Pillay referred to them at several times during the year and even visited the country in August, where she strongly criticised the Sinhalese Government's authoritarian policy. The Executive rejected Pillay's conclusions. It is worth mentioning that the criticism over the authoritarian drift of Sri Lanka's Government was made on an international level by several actors. The research centre International Crisis Group (ICG) published several reports expressing concern over the situation in Sri Lanka, highlighting the multi-faceted nature of the country's political crisis and signalling that the dismantlement of the democratic institutions such as the independent judicial system to counter the Executive and the Army only contributed to increase the risk of ethnic tensions faced with the lack of decentralisation and recognition of the rights of the Tamil population.³⁹ The Commonwealth

39. International Crisis Group, *Sri Lanka's Potemkin Peace: Democracy Under Fire*, Asia Report N°253, November 13, 2013; <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/253-sri-lanka-s-potemkin-peace-democracy-under-fire.aspx>; International Crisis Group, *Sri Lanka's Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action*, Asia Report N°243, February 20, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/243-sri-lanka-authoritarian-turn-the-need-for-international-action.aspx>.

summit held in Colombo in November also stressed the lack of international support for the Singhalese Government, given the low number of Heads of State that participated (27 of 53), the boycott by some Governments such as India or Canada and the criticism launched by the international press, focusing their coverage of the event on the human rights situation in the country.

Also, it is worth referring to the elections to the Northern Provincial Council on 27th September, where the Tamil party TNA took a wide majority winning 30 of the 38 seats, with 78% of votes. The TNA is the main Tamil opposition party, with strong ties to the former armed opposition group LTTE during the years of armed conflict. ICG highlighted the difficulties the local Government was facing to deal with the rejection by the central Government to implement the decentralisation politics enshrined in the actual Constitution, a point that would barely allow the TNA to manoeuvre. Another relevant event of the year was the dismissal of the President of the Supreme Court, Shirani Bandanarayake in January, undertaken by Parliament and ratified by President Mahinda Rajapaksa. This dismissal reflected the Government's intention to stop any independent investigation into the war crimes and human rights violations in the country. During the year there were several violent episodes and social protests. One of the most serious events happened in August during the demonstrations in the city of Weliweriya against the pollution of drinking water. Three young people died after being shot by the Armed Forces, whose presence to control the demonstration was highly criticised by many sectors and also by international organisations. At other times during the year there were other demonstrations against the harassment to the press, especially after a journalist working for a newspaper that is critical with the Government was shot in February.

d) South-east Asia and Oceania

Indonesia (Aceh)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Indonesian Government, Regional Government of Aceh, political opposition

Summary:

After almost 30 years of armed conflict between the armed forces and the GAM, a pro-independence armed group, the two sides signed a peace agreement in August 2005, a few months after the tsunami had wreaked total devastation on the province and led to the arrival of hundreds of NGOs. The peace agreement, which included a significant degree of autonomy for Aceh, the demilitarisation of the region, the disarmament of the GAM and the deployment of an international mission to oversee its implementation, led to a

significant reduction in the level of violence and enabled the holding of regional elections for the first time in the history of the region, from which a former GAM leader emerged victorious. Despite the good progress made in the peace process and in reconstruction work, in the years following the signing of the peace agreement several conflicts have taken place related to the reintegration of combatants, demands for the creation of new provinces, the repression of religious minorities and women's groups, or allegations of corruption and incompetence made against the public authorities.

Violence dropped drastically compared to last year, which was marked by the holding of provincial elections. There were no significant episodes of violence, beyond a few sporadic incidents such as the attacks against the oil and gas company Medco E&P or the explosion of an explosive device at the headquarters of a newspaper in Banda Aceh at the beginning of September. On a political level, it is worth mentioning the controversy generated by the adoption of the flag of the former armed opposition group GAM as the official flag of the Aceh province, which was strongly opposed by Jakarta and some minorities in Aceh. The governing party in Aceh, the Partai Aceh (mainly established by the GAM) considers the region has the right to choose its symbols and that the flag had ceased to be secessionist after the GAM signed the 2005 peace agreement. Some analysts consider that this event, which was largely supported by society, could increase the electoral expectations of Partai Aceh for the 2014 national elections, could strengthen the image of the current governor, Zainin Abdullah, and could counter the lack of tangible results in many of the Provincial Government's public policies. As for the opposition from the Central Government to the adoption of said flag, several sources consider that giving in to this issues could carry negative consequences in the region of West Papua, where the prohibition to carry pro-independence flags has been the fact leading to the largest protests. Besides this, and looking into the 2014 elections, the Government did not wish to provoke the GAM, aware of its power in the region and the possibility that the political conflict in Aceh could re-start. **The adoption of the GAM flag, which was ruled as being legal by the Constitutional Court, also led to protests from some ethnic minorities in the centre and southwest of the province, and fed the fear that this could fuel campaigns to create two new provinces in these regions, supported by the State intelligence services.** Also on a political level, an issue that also generated controversy and protests in several regions was the election of Malik Mahmud (one of the founders and historical leaders of the GAM) as the Wail Nanggroe (a figure similar to a "Guardian of the State"), highly revered in Aceh's history and in charge of safeguarding and promoting the Aceh culture and values. Some sectors of civil society protested against the appointment of such a significant member of the GAM (he was the Prime Minister in exile and one of GAM's main negotiators in the peace agreement), while the Central Government was strongly opposed to the law

endorsed by Aceh's Legislative Assembly that enshrined supreme authority to the Wali Nanggroe for certain matters. After several months of negotiation between the Central and Aceh Governments, in December Malik Mahmud took office as the Wali Nanggroe, a post that was included in the 2005 peace agreement.

During the year, **several human rights organisations criticised the policies of the Provincial Government in this matter, especially regarding women, and ethnic and religious minorities.** Faced with great criticism, the Aceh Government revised the Islamic Criminal Code to suppress, amend or reduce some of the punishment measures included in the code in 2009, such as stoning to death for adultery, or whip lashes for sexual relations before marriage and homosexual relations, the consumption of alcohol and sexual harassment. Also regarding human rights, the Institute for the Free Flow of Information pointed out that Aceh is the province with the worst record for freedom of press. Also, the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAS) published a report after several months of investigation, pointing out that during the military operations carried out by the Armed Forces in Aceh from 1989 to 2005, there may have been serious human rights violations (according to the crimes contained in the Indonesian human rights law of the year 2000). Komnas HAS advised the Central Government to establish a military tribunal to end impunity and to avoid similar situations from happening again in the future. In 1998 the Congress already conducted its own investigation into the alleged human rights violations committed by the Army in Aceh, but it never disclosed its conclusions. In recent years several human rights organisations have called on the Government to establish a human rights tribunal and a commission for truth and reconciliation, as was included in the 2005 peace agreement between the Government and the GAM. In this regard, towards the middle of the year, a report by Amnesty International denounced that the matters set out in the 2005 peace agreement on truth, justice and reparation to the victims were not being observed, and called for the full implementation of this agreement.

Indonesia (West Papua)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Government, OPM armed group, political and social opposition (secessionist, pro-autonomy, indigenous and human rights organisations), Papuan indigenous groups, Freeport mining company
Summary:	
Although Indonesia became independent from Holland in 1949, West Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) was administered for several years by the United Nations and did not formally	

become part of Indonesia until 1969, following a referendum considered fraudulent by many. Since then, a deep-rooted secessionist movement has existed in the region and an armed opposition group (OPM) has been involved in a low-intensity armed struggle. In addition to constant demands for self-determination, there are other sources of conflict in the region, such as community clashes between several indigenous groups, tension between the local population (Papuan and mostly animist or Christian) and so-called transmigrants (mostly Muslim Javanese), protests against the Freeport transnational extractive corporation, the largest in the world, or accusations of human rights violations and unjust enrichment levelled at the armed forces.

As in previous years, there continued to be **sporadic clashes between the Armed Forces and the OPM, as well as many reports on the human rights situation in Papua and frequent demonstrations claiming for the self-determination of the Papu people and to denounce the Government policies at a state and provincial level.** As for the armed dimension of the conflict, there were two significant episodes of violence. The first of these, and one with the largest coverage in recent years, occurred at the end of February in the Puncak Jaya region, when eight soldiers and four civilians were killed in two attacks claimed by the OPM. According to several sources, the group fired against a military plane that was trying to evacuate the dead soldiers. On another note, in May Radio New Zealand International picked up on the reports made by several human rights organisations and the West Papua National Coalition (KNPB is the acronym in Indonesian) on the disappearance and possible killing of 41 people by the Kopassus special forces in April in the Puncak Jaya region. According to these organisations, after several corpses were identified with signs of torture, the State security forces would have blocked access to the region where the killings would have taken place. As for the OPM, it is also important to note that during the year there was speculation on a possible internal breakaway on the convenience and feasibility of creating an independent state in Papua. One of the OPM's internal factions would be led by Daniel Kogoya, who during the year called on several leaders of the secessionist movement in exile to meet him at the Victoria military camp (one of the main historical strongholds of the group in Papua New Guinea) to strengthen the OPM. Kogoya declared to Radio Australia that he had some 200 active combatants and 7,000 more in the reserve (these figures are difficult to verify), while he recognised that his group was facing difficulties to get weapons and ammunition. However, Kogoya, who had, for some time, been the commander of the OPM in the Jayapura region, died in December in Papua New Guinea. Although the Army continued to carry out its usual counterinsurgency activities, the new governor of the province of Papua, Lukas Enembe, who was elected at some controversial elections held at the end of January, expressed his willingness to dialogue with the OPM and called on the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to discuss and agree on amending the law on special autonomy for Papua

passed in 2001. According to some sources, the Central Government is confident that the amendment this law on autonomy, which would take place in 2014 and would focus on developing the region rather than on the respect and promotion of a unique cultural or national identity of the Papu population, to reduce, channel or overcome the political conflict in West Papua.

During the year there were also many reports on the human rights situation in the region and on the actions of the Armed Forces. The UN high commissioner for human rights, Navi Pillay, expressed her concern for the continued repression of the freedom of expression and the excessive use of force in Papua and called on the Government to allow peaceful protests and to demand responsibility from those involved in the abuses. The office of the high commissioner stated it had received 26 claims for human rights violations since May 2012, including 46 cases of killings and tortures. In many of these cases there would be Police and Army personnel involved. Human Rights Watch also denounced attacks, raids, detentions and harassment on Papu civilian population by State security forces, as well as many cases of torture against people accused of being linked to pro-independence activists. Several civil society organisations denounced the existence of around 50 political prisoners in the region. In this sense, several of the political prisoners in the Abepura prison rejected an amnesty programme of the Government since they considered it was a strategy to silence their voice. On another note, many people were arrested during the different demonstrations that took place to protest against the Government policy towards the region and to claim self-determination for West Papua. Three people died, five suffered from light injuries and 20 more were arrested during the protests that happened on 1st May on the occasion of the 50th anniversary since Papua was integrated into Indonesia. In September, one of the largest demonstrations of the year took place. 100 people were arrested in eight different cities during the demonstrations called by the KNBP to put pressure on several governments (especially that of Vanuatu) so they mentioned and dealt with the political conflict in West Papua during the UN General Assembly.

Myanmar	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition (NLD opposition party), group 969

Summary:

The military junta seized power in a coup d'état in 1962 and has remained in government ever since. The military government abolished the federal system and imposed a fierce dictatorship, known as the "Burmese Way to Socialism". In 1988, the economic crisis led thousands of people to voice

their discontent in the street. These protests were put down brutally by the military regime, claiming 3,000 lives. Although the government did call elections, it never acknowledged their result, i.e. the victory of the democratic opposition, led by Aung San Suu Kyi. She was subsequently arrested and has been intermittently placed under house arrest ever since. In 2004, the government began a constitutional reform process in an attempt to offer the image of a liberalising regime. This process was discredited by the political opposition to the dictatorship. In 2007, the political opposition and several Buddhist monks led intense social protests against the military regime that were brutally put down. The general elections held in 2010 were considered fraudulent by the international community and the internal opposition.

Myanmar continued to experience a situation of internal political tension that led to some episodes of violence during the year, although at the same time the process of partial democratic reforms continued in the political sphere. **The main hotbed of tensions was the inter-community tensions, essentially between Buddhist and Muslim population.** In March, there was an outbreak of violence in the city of Meiktila, in the Mandalay region, between Buddhist and Muslim population that caused 44 deaths and forced 12,000 to be displaced, most of these Muslim. Human rights organisations also denounced that hundreds of houses were completely destroyed. After the riots in Meiktila, clashes grew and expanded to other areas in central Myanmar. Several Muslims were arrested after the Meiktila clashes and were accused of having killed a Buddhist monk, which would have sparked the clashes. The Government deployed the Armed Forces to end the violence and declared the state of emergency in several cities. Several organisations warned of the fragile situation in the country, since after the episodes of violence in 2012 in the state of Rakhine (formerly called Arakan), inter-community violence had erupted in different parts of the country. 120,000 Rohingya Muslims continued to be displaced one year after the violence in Rakhine. During the year, the xenophobic discourse of group 969, headed by the Buddhist monk Wirathu, expanded and several human rights organisations denounced that this discourse was encouraging violence against the Muslim community. Besides, criticism against the opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize Aung San Suu Kyi increased due to her misleading posture vis-à-vis the violence against the Muslim population, by equating the suffering of both communities and not condemning the persecution suffered by the Rohingya population, as well as for other crucial matters in the country's political situation such as the ethnic conflicts or the exploitation of natural resources. After the riots in March, there were new inter-community clashes at several stages during the year. In May a person died in the city of Lahsio, in the Shan state as a consequence of violence by Buddhist population against Muslim population. In June five people died in the Rakhine state during several incidents in the camps set up for people who were displaced as a consequence of the violence in 2012. At a peaceful demonstration in a centre for

displaced people the shots of the security forces killed three women. In October another of the most violent events of the year took place, also in the Rakhine state, with violence against the Muslim population in the city of Thandwe that killed seven people. Almost 100 people were arrested over this episode. These clashes coincided in time with the visit to the area of President Thein Sein, and some sources pointed out that there were members of the group 969 present.

On the political level there were also some significant events. Among the main political reforms put in place by the Government, it is worth mentioning the lifting of the prohibition to hold meetings with more than five participants, as well as the freeing of political prisoners at several stages during the year. At the end of the year, International Crisis Group stated that 44 people remained in prison for political reasons. Also, at several moments during the year there were appointments in Government of people who belonged to the opposition parties, such as the vice-minister for Hotels and Tourism. Regarding foreign affairs, it is worth referring to the improvement in the relations between the Burmese Government and the international community, especially with several Western governments and institutions. The EU lifted all sanctions against the regime with the exception of the arms embargo, in reply to the different political measures adopted since the start of the transition process. Also, President Thein Sein travelled to Europe and the USA, the first visit by a Burmese president to this country since 1966. Besides, Myanmar hosted the World Economic Forum for East Asia, which was attended by the main transnational companies in the world, promising strong investments in the country; this re-opened the debate on the true motivations of the international community in promoting the political opening of the country.

Outbreaks of violence re-emerged between the Buddhist and Muslim communities causing dozens of deaths and thousands of displaced people

Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, MILF, BIFF
Summary:	
EI The armed conflict in Mindanao stretches back to the seventies, when Nur Misuari established the MNLF to ask Manila for self-determination for the Moro people, an array of Islamised ethnic and linguistic groups that have been organised politically in independent sultanates since the 15th century. The MILF, for strategic, ideological and leadership reasons, broke away from the MNLF at the end of the seventies. While the MNLF signed a peace agreement	

in 1996 that planned for certain autonomy for the areas in Mindanao with a Muslim majority (the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao), the MILF continued with its armed struggle, even if both parties started peace conversations in 1997 facilitated by Malaysia and reached a preliminary peace agreement in October 2012 and a substantial and sustained reduction in fighting between the MILF and the Armed Forces to practically irrelevant levels that meant the armed conflict was no longer considered as such in 2012. Nevertheless, the levels in Mindanao continued to be high due to the clashes between the Government and the BIFF (an excision of the MILF that is against the peace process), and also due to the sporadic armed incidents between the MILF and other armed groups operating in the country.

The good course of peace negotiations between the Government and the MILF, and the fact they are sticking to the cease-fire agreement⁴⁰ explain the fact there have been no significant clashes between the Armed Forces and the MILF.

However, the levels of violence in Mindanao continued to be high due to the clashes between the Army and the armed opposition group BIFF (which broke away from the MILF precisely because it was opposed to the peace negotiations), due to the sporadic fighting between the MILF and the MNLF or militia groups, due to armed rivalry between internal factions of the MILF (a group with around 12,000 combatants), due to clan or family clashes (known locally as *rido*) or due to the explosion of explosive devices that are not claimed by any organization. All these violent events caused a large number of victims and the displacement of thousands of people, as well as tension and mutual accusations between the MILF and the Government at the negotiating table. As for the violent episodes carried out directly by the MILF, it is worth mentioning the clashes with the MNLF at several points in the years, especially those in May, which caused more than 10,000 people to be displaced in the North Cotabato province. Beyond issues on land, relations between the two groups continued to be very tense, especially due to the opposition within certain factions of the MNLF to the current negotiation process between the MILF and the Government, which according to the MNLF could undermine and invalidate the peace agreement signed with the Government in 1996. This tension became evident with the clear condemnation by the MILF against the participation of the MNLF in the violent episode in the Malaysian state of Sabah during the first quarter of the year, and especially with the siege of Zamboanga by the MNLF in September. As for the fighting between the MNLF and militia groups, it is worth pointing out that at the start of April eight people died and four others were injured due to a territorial dispute between MILF members and the militias serving the governor of the Maguindanao province. Also, in June, there were several clashes between the MILF and farmer defence groups in

40. See the summary on the Philippines (Mindanao – MILF) in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

the town of Tulunan, in North Cotabato province. After two months of tensions in several of the province's most fertile areas, the Army and the Police set up a joint operation to prevent further fighting in the area, which the MILF considers is within the security perimeter agreed in the 1997 cease-fire agreement. Finally, it is also relevant to mention some sporadic actions by the MILF (attacks on police stations or communities, or the kidnapping of civilians) that breach the cease-fire agreement signed with the Government and were strongly condemned and punished by the group's leadership. Also, there were clashes between the different factions of the MILF at different times during the year, normally over land issues, which killed several people and caused thousands to be displaced. This type of clashes is often difficult to distinguish from the clan or family clashes over honour and land, which in recent decades have killed hundreds of people. Also, as in previous years, the Government continued to accuse certain factions within the MILF of collaborating with other armed groups in the region such as Abu Sayyaf.

The most significant episodes of violence during the year, however, were not by the MILF, but by the BIFF, a breakaway group of the MILF due to its opposition to the peace process. This violence mainly took place in the provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato. At the beginning of July, around 15 people died and hundreds of civilians left their homes after clashes between the Armed Forces and the BIFF in the centre of Mindanao. These clashes started at the end of June after the BIFF attacked three military detachments. During the first fortnight in August, new clashes in Cotabato North caused around 10,000 people to be displaced. In the middle of September the Government declared that the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf had attacked some mainly Christian neighbourhoods in Lamitan, in the Basilan province. At the end of the month, around ten people were killed in the Midsayap region (Cotabato North province) from fighting between the Armed Forces and the BIFF, while around 2,000 families were forced to leave because of the fighting that followed for several days in the Datu Piang region, in the Maguindanao province. At the end of December, violence increased again when, according to the Government, the BIFF tried to occupy three communities in the Cotabato North province, leading to clashes that went on for several days and caused the death of 9 to 14 BIFF combatants.

Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, factions of the armed group MNLF

Summary:

Although independence enjoyed support throughout the 20th century, the political structure of the movement dates back to the 1960s, while the armed struggle began in the early 1970s at the hands of the MNLF. A large percentage of the 120,000 fatalities attributed to the conflict in Mindanao date back to the 1970s, in the middle of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. In 1976 the MILF faction splintered from the MNLF soon after the latter signed a peace agreement with the government through which Mindanao was to be granted autonomy (and not independence). Despite the agreement, the armed conflict continued until 1996, when another peace agreement with similar provisions was signed in 1976. However, since then, some MNLF factions that have not disarmed have been involved in violent incidents to demand the full implementation of the peace agreement and the release of the MNLF founder, Nur Misuari, arrested in 2001 after being accused of rebellion. Although there has been a reduction in tension since 2007 due, on the one hand, to an agreement between the parties to review and implement the 1996 peace agreement and, on the other hand, to the fact that Misuari was authorised to carry out political activities, sporadic clashes continue to take place in several regions of Mindanao. In 2012 some factions of the MNLF signalled their intention to resume armed activity if the peace agreement signed that year between the Philippine government and the MILF invalidated any of the contents of the 1996 peace agreement.

During the year there was the most serious episode of violence since the Government and the MNLF signed a peace agreement in 1996. Almost during the whole of September, **the Armed Forces and a faction of the MNLF fought in the city of Zamboanga, killing around 225 people (most of them insurgents), forcing the displacement of more than 100,000 people (from which 70,000 continued to be displaced at the end of the year) and destroying around 10,000 homes.** Hundreds were injured in the attacks, which started when several hundred MNLF combatants disembarked at the port of Zamboanga and, according to the Government, take the city and fly the flag of the Bangsamoro Republic on the city council. However, this operation was aborted by the counter-offensive by the State security forces that had been informed on the MNLF's plans in advance. Outnumbered by the Army, the MNLF insurgents took around 200 civilians hostages, most of who were rescued. Towards the middle of September, President Benigno Aquino travelled to Zamboaga to supervise the Army operations personally. When the clashes ended or dropped at the start of October, some 300 members of the MNLF had been captured or had surrendered. The Government and most of the media consider that the attack was ordered by Nur Misuari, the founder of the MNLF and the current leader of one of its factions. In August, Misuari newly denounced the marginalisation of the MNLF from the current negotiation process between the Government and the MILF and would have proclaimed himself as the president of the Bangsamoro

Republic. The MNLF attack took place the night before conversations were to start between Manila and the MILF, leading to the suspicion that the reason behind this attack was to hinder the peace negotiations. In this regard, the Minister of Justice announced at the start of October that a court had issued search and arrest warrants against four of those considered to be responsible, including Nur Misuari and Haiber Malik, the commander that personally led the assault on Zamboanga for rebellion and human rights violations. At the end of 2013 Nur Misuari's whereabouts were still unknown. The Government and the MILF, in turn, made a joint statement condemning the violence in Zamboanga, calling for those responsible to be brought to justice and reaffirming that the aim of these clashes was to interfere with the current negotiation process between Manila and the MILF. Along these lines, even some of the MNLF's factions detached themselves from the attack on Zamboanga and even condemned it.

Besides the offensive on Zamboanga, the MNLF was also involved in other violent episodes of a considerable magnitude. At the start of the year, clashes between the MNLF and Abu Sayyaf in the region of Patikul killed 21 people (eight MNLF members and 13 from Abu Sayyaf) and the displacement of hundreds of people. According to several media, clashes started during a failed attempt of the MNLF to mediate for the freeing of several Abu Sayyaf hostages. On another occasion, **the MNLF actively participated in an incident against the Malaysian security forces and hundreds of followers of Jamalul Kiram III, the descendant of the Sultan of Sulu, who disembarked in Malaysia to claim Philippine sovereignty on the state of Sabah, a territory that has been a historical source of dispute between the countries.** After several weeks of clashes where the Malaysian Government used air attacks, more than 60 of Jamalul Kiram III's followers were killed as well as 10 Malaysian soldiers, 400 fighters were arrested and thousands were forced to leave their homes. It is worth noting that 5,000 people of Philippine origin living in Sabah fled to the south of the Philippines. According to information, the MNLF had sent around one thousand combatants to Sabah to help the followers of Jamalul Kiram III, who were also claiming that sovereignty over Sabah was included in the peace conversations between the Government and the MILF. The Philippine Government disowned Jamalul Kiram III's initiative and asked him to end the fighting, but at the same time, as several human rights organisations, it criticised the way in which Kuala Lumpur had carried out the arrests, eviction and evacuation of civilians from the combat area. The MILF, in turn, stated it was not true they had not consulted with Jamalul Kiram III on the issue of Sabah when they signed the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro in October 2012. Besides this, it is also worth mentioning the clashes that broke out at several times during the year between factions of the MNLF and the MILF, very often over land issues, which killed several people. The most significant clashes happened in March in the North Cotabato province causing some 10,000 to

be displaced and the intervention of the International Monitoring Team, and international contingent that aims at ensuring the end of hostilities in the region.

Thailand	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, social and political opposition

Summary:

Since Thaksin Shinawatra's began his term in office in 2001, he had been criticised by several sectors for his authoritarian style, his campaign against drug trafficking (which claimed over 2,000 lives) and his militaristic approach to the conflict in the south. However, the socio-political crisis affecting Thailand over the last few years escalated in 2006. That year, after a case of corruption was made public, mass demonstrations took place demanding Shinawatra's resignation and in September a military junta staged a coup that forced him into exile. Despite the approval of a new constitution in a referendum held in August 2007, the new government failed to reduce the social and political polarisation taking place in the country. It was in this context that a party loyal to Thaksin Shinawatra won the elections in December 2007. However, a series of violent incidents and the mass demonstrations against the government organised by the People's Alliance for Democracy (known as the "yellow shirt movement"), prompted the resignation of two prime ministers and the arrival in power in December 2008 of Abhisit Vejjajiva, a member of the opposition to Thaksin Shinawatra. Since then, there have been periodical mass demonstrations by the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (known as the "red shirt movement", which supports the return of the former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra), demanding the resignation of the government and the holding of early elections.

Thailand reached high levels of political tension and social polarisation during the mobilisations in the last months of the year, the most intense and long ones since 2010. Even if during the year there were political protests led by both those against and those in favour of the current Government, the spiral of demonstrations and episodes of violence clearly rose after the Parliament approved a law on 1st November that, for the sake of reconciliation, planned for an amnesty for all those crimes linked to the political crisis affecting Thailand since 2006. However, the opposition and large sectors of the population consider that this law would pave the way for the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to return to the country without serving the sentence to two years in prison for corruption and abuse of power. It is worth noting that the law also fuelled protests and demonstrations by some sectors of the so-called "red shirts", the traditional allies of the current Government, who considered that the new law would allow an amnesty for the politicians involved in the violent episodes in April and May 2010, where

more than 90 people died. Both the families of those who died in 2010 and human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch were against granting a general amnesty. Although the Senate rejected this amnesty law at the beginning of November, during that month the Civil Movement for Democracy (led by Suthep Thaugsuban, the former Deputy Prime Minister from 2008 to 2011, for who two arrest warrants were issued for destroying public property and sedition) encouraged a series of protests where public buildings were occupied and the headquarters of the Armed Forces and the Government were surrounded.

Fuelled by years of demonstrations of different types and by the intransigence of the opposing parties, the polarisation in Thailand is unlikely to be reduced by the intervention of a third party

Although in the end of November thousands of people gathered in Bangkok to show their support to the Government and the Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, surmounted a vote of censure, the protests continued to call for the Government to resign, on the grounds that it had breached the Constitution, promoted corruption and nepotism, and followed the orders given by Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Prime Minister and the brother of the current leader. **At the start of December, after the mass resignation of all the members of parliament from the opposition party (the Democrat Party), Yingluck Shinawatra dissolved the Parliament and called early elections for the 2nd February 2014**, which she announced she would be running for. Although more than 40 governments, including those of the US, Russia, China and most of the EU countries, backed the holding of early elections as a way out of the political crisis in Thailand, the political opposition and organisations leading the protests were against this, and in turn called on Shinawatra to resign as the interim head of Government and for the King to appoint a new “popular council” of around 400 members to amend the electoral law and carry out several political reforms before holding elections in 2014 or 2015. Suthep Thaugsuban announced his intention to increase the mobilisations in January if the Government continued to go ahead with the plans to call elections, where the current governing party is the top favourite, according to most analysts. Faced with this situation, at the end of December the Electoral Commission called to delay the elections. In turn, and also at the end of December, the head of the Armed Forces refused to carry out a coup, as some of the opposition had demanded on several occasions. Eight people died and hundreds were injured during the demonstrations at the end of the year.

Even if the strongest demonstrations were during the last quarter of the month, there were mobilisations during all of 2013 led by the two most active social and political movements in recent years (the so-called “red shirts” and the “yellow shirts”). It is worth mentioning, for instance, a massive demonstration of around 20,000 “red shirts” in Bangkok towards the middle of May to commemorate the violent events in 2010. In January and March this group also organised several demonstrations to demand from

Government an amnesty law for the crimes committed during the violence in 2010. Besides the mobilisations by Government supporters and opposition, during the year there were important demonstrations staged by rice and rubber farmers who were demanding greater government subsidies, as well as other demonstrations by groups that were against to signing of a free trade agreement between Thailand and the EU. Especially relevant were the protests led by rubber producers, which lasted more than a month and during which more than 100 police and 10 farmers were injured. The demonstrators believed that the subsidy approved by the Government was insufficient and discriminatory compared to the subsidies granted to rice farmers. The latter managed to get a rise in the subsidies to the sector after large mobilisations during June. Some voices estimate that the alleged better treatment given to rice producers is due to the fact that most of them are concentrated in the north of the country (a region that is traditionally favourable to the governing party), while the production of rubber is concentrated mainly in the provinces of the south, the traditional stronghold of the opposition.

Thailand – Cambodia	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Territory International
Main parties:	Thailand, Cambodia

Summary:

The origin of the dispute between the two countries is the issue of sovereignty over a stretch of land measuring approximately 4.6 km² and surrounding the 11th century Preah Vihear Buddhist temple, situated on the border between Thailand and Cambodia. Following several centuries of dispute, in 1962 the International Court of Justice ruled that the temple belonged to Cambodia. However, it did not rule on the land around the temple. Thailand’s claims have been fuelled in recent decades by the fact that the temple is most easily reached from the Thai side and by its disagreement regarding the historical maps on which the ruling of the International Court of Justice was based. The disputed border region contains a large number of troops and is heavily mined. After the military tension reached its peak in the first half of 2010, bilateral relations improved considerably after the arrival in power in July 2010 of Yingluck Shinawatra, who maintained a much more fluid political relationship with the Cambodian prime minister, Hun Sen. In this context, the International Court of Justice issued an order that obliged the parties to withdraw their troops from the region under dispute and to allow the deployment of international observers to monitor the cessation of hostilities. Since then, no significant clashes have taken place and both governments have restated their intention to resolve the dispute through political and peaceful methods.

Following the dynamics of the previous year, where the tension between Thailand and Cambodia had dropped enormously, **during 2013 there were no significant episodes of violence or tension and the territorial dispute between both countries seemed to enter a phase of resolution after both countries agreed to accept a court ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) granting Cambodia sovereignty over the territory of 4.6 km² surrounding the PreahVihear temple**, which is located on the border between Thailand and Cambodia. This ruling, issued at the middle of November after the period of hearings and submission of arguments and proof documentation, also forced the Thai security corps and forces to withdraw from the area surrounding the temple. Bangkok had declared on several occasions that it was willing to accept the ruling, but the organisation Thai Patriotic Network was against the ruling. This very organisation, together with the People's Alliance for Democracy (known as the "yellow shirts") had staged several demonstrations during the first half of the year to call on the Thai Government to reject ICJ jurisdiction in solving the territorial dispute with Cambodia. The political crisis that started in Thailand at the end of the year stopped the start of bilateral conversations to implement the ICJ resolution, although several analysts consider that there would be no significant problems to do this given the close relations between both governments and the personal friendship between the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and the former Prime Minister of Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra, who is highly influential in the government led by his sister Yingluck.

During the months prior the ICJ ruling, relations between both countries regarding the territorial dispute had been friendly and cooperative. During several meetings held over the year, both parties agreed to adopt several measures to build trust, such as replacing the border troops with police, boosting cross-border cooperation for maritime security and to fight illegal activities such as drug trafficking or illegal logging, or to establish special economic zones for trade exchange and tourism. At these meetings both parties also agreed to accept the ICJ ruling and to overcome the conflict peacefully. The last elements of tension registered during the year were demonstrations staged by Thai organisations to demand its Government to adopt a stronger stance on this issue and a brief exchange of firing between the border troops at the end of December, where one Thai soldier was injured. In March, a Thai military official was seriously injured after stepping on a landmine in land that had not yet been demined, although this did not generate any tensions along the border.

The territorial dispute between Thailand and Cambodia seemed to enter a phase of resolution after both countries agreed to respect the ruling by the International Court of Justice that granted Cambodia sovereignty over the disputed border territory

Europe

a) Caucasus and Russia

Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Territory International
Main parties:	Azerbaijan Government, Government of Armenia, Government of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

Summary:

The tension between the two countries regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh region, an enclave with an Armenian majority which is formally part of Azerbaijan but which enjoys de facto independence, lies in the failure to resolve the underlying issues of the armed conflict that took place between December 1991 and 1994. This began as an internal conflict between the region's self-defence militias and the Azerbaijan security forces over the sovereignty and control of Nagorno-Karabakh and gradually escalated into an inter-state war between Azerbaijan and neighbouring Armenia. The armed conflict, which claimed 20,000 lives and forced the displacement of 200,000 people, as well as enforcing the ethnic homogenisation of the population on either side of the ceasefire line, gave way to a situation of unresolved conflict in which the central issues are the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the return of the population, and which involves sporadic violations of the ceasefire.

The political and military tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh continued, with continuous accusations of breaching the cease-fire and with no progress regarding the peace process.⁴¹ At least 20 soldiers died, a figure that is similar to last year, due to violent incidents around the cease-fire line, including shots fired by snipers. As in previous periods, the chronic tension along the borderline went hand in hand with a belligerent rhetoric by both sides. The Armenian president, Serzh Sarkisian, warned that he would continue to reinforce his Army to meet the military threat he says Azerbaijan poses. Baku in turn announced a sharp increase in its military expenditure in 2013 compared to the previous year. Azerbaijan also accused Armenia of settling Armenian population that fled the Syrian war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia denied this and pointed out that around 10,000 people had been given refuge in Armenia, but not in Nagorno-Karabakh. On many occasions during the year the co-mediators of the OSCE's Minsk Group urged the parties to refrain from actions and rhetoric that could

41. See the summary on Armenia –Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh) in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

increase the tension in the area of conflict. The violence incidents were discussed at the separate meetings of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group with each of the parties.

Armenia and Azerbaijan mutually accused each other of violating the 2013 cease-fire

Despite the climate of confrontation, the peace negotiations process remained active and in the rounds held during the year representatives from both sides were willing to find a peaceful solution. Within the framework of the dialogue, it is important to note a meeting that was held in Vienna in November between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sarkisian, the first since the one held in January 2012 in Sochi (Russia) mediated by Russia. Held under the auspices of the Minsk Group, the two presidents met with no external presence. Both agreed to meet again in the future, declared they respected their respective positions, and showed their conviction that they would find a way out of the conflict, as the US co-mediator James Warlick mentioned. On another note, in June the presidents of the three countries that conforms the co-presidency of Minsk Group (USA, France and Russia) released a joint statement where they reiterated their commitment with the peace process and regretted that the parties prioritise the advance of their own individual positions instead of searching for a negotiated solution. They called on them to be committed to the Helsinki principles, especially those regarding the refrain from using force, territorial integrity and equalitarian rights and self-determination of the peoples.

Georgia (Abkhazia)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government of Georgia, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia, Russia

Summary:

The precarious security situation in the region is due to the failure to resolve the underlying issues that led to armed conflict (1992-1994) between Abkhaz local leaders, backed by Russia, and the Georgian government, respectively defending the independence of the region and the country's territorial integrity, in the context of the break-up of the USSR. Following the war, which forced the displacement of some 200,000 Georgians, the territory of Abkhazia has functioned as a de facto state. Despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement, a negotiation process and international presence throughout these years (UN observers and Russian peacekeeping forces), the situation remained tense, fuelled by geo-strategic issues and aspects related to the balance of power in the Caucasus between Georgia and Russia. The situation escalated into an international war that began in August 2008 in South Ossetia, after which the Abkhaz forces consolidated their hold of Abkhazia and Russia formally recognised its independence. Frequent security incidents, the uncertain status of the territory, Russia's role and the cumulative impact of the two wars remain constant sources of tension.

The situation of tension remained stable, with no serious security incidents, although there was no progress regarding the international conversations to resolve the conflict. The situation of relative calm and stability was highlighted during the year by the co-chairs of the negotiation process (OSCE, EU and UN) that brings together representatives from Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia, as well as the presence of the US. However, Georgia and the co-mediators as well as representatives from other international organisations such as the NATO showed their **concern over the ongoing construction of physical obstacles, fencing and embankments by Russian troops around the borders of the two secessionist regions**, due to the negative impact on the freedom of movement and the wellbeing of the local communities. Russia, in turn, stated that the borders had to be protected and that the barbed wire would no longer be necessary once the positions were calmer. In any case, at some stages during the year, the Georgian Government pointed out that Russia's policy to fortify the border could be clarified after the winter Olympics. The event was held in the Russian city of Sochi and received threats from the Islamist insurgence in the north Caucasus, which shares the border with Abkhazia. On another note, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin held two meetings in July and August with the Abkhazian leader, Alexander Ankvab, in a context where Russia cut back its financial support to the region. Nevertheless, during the year **Russia reaffirmed its official relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, based on agreements for economic, political and military cooperation, and said recognising their independence was irrevocable.**

Among other incidents during the year Abkhazia temporarily paralysed the issuing of Abkhazian passports to the Georgian population in Abkhazia in light of the criticism from a part of some Abkhazian sectors on alleged risks of "Georgization" in the region, arguing that the Georgian population in Abkhazia was having access to Abkhazian passports without meeting the obligation imposed by Abkhazia to give up their Georgian citizenship. Also, the Abkhazian authorities denounced on several occasions during the year that Georgia had detained international freight vessels on route close to Abkhazia. The Georgian Government justified these detentions based on a breach of the Georgian laws on Abkhazian and South Ossetian territories. In a separate issue, In September, the first secretary of the Russian embassy, Dmitry Vishernev, and his wife were killed in the Abkhazian capital, Sokhumi. A Russian citizen of Chechen origin who was later arrested in the Georgian city of Batumi due to a shooting rampage was considered the suspect of the ambassador's death. In this regard, the region of Abkhazia has been the scene of unclear violent incidents in the past, on occasions with a criminal dimension, on other due to internal political disputes.

The calm situation progressed in parallel to the lack of any significant progress in the rounds of

negotiation for the dialogue process known as the Geneva International Discussions.⁴² The parties failed to reach an agreement on one of the most awaited issues, the non-use of force. At the end of the round in November, the co-chairs had pointed out the agreement between the parties to continue working towards a joint declaration on the non-use of force that could be adopted in the near future. Nevertheless, the last round of the year, in the middle of December, ended with no agreement on this point. In this regard, during the year Georgia stood firm in its position that it required Russia to have a reciprocal position on the unilateral commitment of Georgia announced in November 2010, which it demands as an additional measure to the expected common agreement between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the non-use of force. For Russia, which does not see itself as a party to the conflict, this measure is not necessary and it asks for a change in the common commitment between Georgia and the two regions. On a separate note, the joint incident prevention and response mechanism (IPRM) remained inactive, paralysed by Abkhazia due to its criticism over the head of the EU mission, Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, while the IPRM between Georgia and South Ossetia did continue to work during the year. In September, Toivo Klaar replaced Tyszkiewicz at the head of the EUMM. Nevertheless, at the end of 2013 the IPRM had not yet been reactivated. In the context of change in rhetoric and with the prospect of a possible rapprochement between Georgia and the regions that led to a change in Government in 2012, Georgia showed its willingness to discuss a possible re-opening of the railway line between Georgia and Russia through Abkhazia, although it pointed out that there were still political and technical issues that had to be clarified. In any case, Abkhazia was willing to discuss the matter. In his inaugural address, the new Georgian president, Giorgi Margvelashvili, from the Georgian Dream coalition –in power since the 2012 parliamentary elections–, who won the presidential elections in 2013 from the until then president Mikhail Saakashvili, from the United National Movement, was also conciliatory. Margvelashvili addressed his fellow “compatriots” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and called for the construction of a democratic state that guarantees the wellbeing of all citizens and the preservation of their ethnic and cultural identities. On another note, in a year commemorating the fifth anniversary of the war between Georgia and Russia, representatives from both countries held several meetings in the framework of the attempts to re-instate relations, which were severed after the war.

Georgia and international actors criticised the construction of fencing and other obstacles by Russian troops along the border between Georgia and the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Georgia (South Ossetia)

Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government of Georgia, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, Russia

Summary:

The socio-political crisis in the region is related to the failure to resolve the underlying issues that led to armed conflict between the Ossetian and Georgian forces in 1991-1992. Since then, the two states have maintained their respective stances in favour of independence from or unification with Russia and regarding the territorial integrity of Georgia, while failing to overcome the impasse in the *de facto* independent region via negotiation. In turn, the internal conflict has been fuelled by tension between Georgia and Russia –related to geo-strategic and balance of power issues in the southern region of the Caucasus–, which in 2008 escalated into a brief war that began in South Ossetia and later spilled over into Abkhazia and areas under Georgian control. Following the last war and the forced displacement of most of the Georgian population that resided in South Ossetia, the Ossetian position was strengthened. Russia recognised its independence and maintained its military presence in the region. The issue of displaced persons from the 1990s and the second war, the status of the territory and sporadic violations of the ceasefire continue to be sources of tension.

The political tension between Georgia and South Ossetia continued over the status of the latter without any serious incidents during the year.

The EU mission, the EUMM, which monitors the situation along the borderline –although without access to South Ossetia due to the veto of the South Ossetian authorities–, highlighted in its statements during the year that the situation was predominantly stable in the conflict area. However, the mission also warned on the trend of Russian soldiers stationed in South Ossetia to place physical obstacles, fencing and embankments along parts of the border, as had also happened in the Georgian region of Abkhazia.⁴³ The EUMM denounced the existence of heavy fortifications along some 50 kilometres and that part of these barriers had been placed in Georgian territory. The co-chairs of the international peace conversations, the EU, the OSCE and the UN, expressed their concern over the negative impact these measures had on the population, in terms of freedom of movement and wellbeing. Thus, they called on the parties to deal with this issue, including through the joint incident prevention and response

42. See the summary on Georgia (Abkhazia) in chapter 3 (Peace Processes).

43. See the summary on Georgia (Abkhazia) in this chapter.

mechanism (IPRM). The placing of these obstacles along the border gave rise to protests from citizens living in several municipalities during the year.

As for the Geneva International Discussions—a negotiation format bringing together representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia, under the auspices of the EU, the OSCE and the UN—, during the year there were several rounds of the two working groups on which the process is structured—one group on security issues, and another group on humanitarian issues—. However, there was no significant progress, even for the non-use of force, an issue that is especially controversial in the dialogue process. In this regard, after the November round of negotiations, the parties to the conflict had agreed to continue working on the non-use of force with the aim of adopting a joint statement in the near future. However, the year ended without an agreement on this point. However, a positive event in the relations between Georgia and South Ossetia was that the joint incident prevention and response mechanism (IPRM) remained active, which was not the case for the similar mechanism in Abkhazia, which has been paralysed since 2012. In South Ossetia, this and other **mechanisms such as the line of communication facilitated the freeing of several people detained during the year.**

In a year marking the fifth anniversary of the war between Georgia and Russia, after which Russia formally recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Russian Government reiterated that its position regarding this recognition was irrevocable. In turn, the new Georgian president, Giorgi Margvelashvili addressed his fellow “compatriots” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and called for the construction of a democratic state that guarantees the wellbeing of all citizens and the preservation of their ethnic and cultural identities. Margvelashvili, who succeeded Mikhail Saakashvili after winning the presidential elections in October, where the candidate of the Georgian Dream coalition—a political alliance that jumped from the opposition into Government after the 2012 elections—, beat the until then president and leader of the United National Movement. In turn, the relations between Georgia and Russia continued to improve, but continued to be marked by distrust and suspicions, with new meetings during the year aiming to restore diplomatic relations that were severed after the 2008 war.

Russia	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	System, Identity, Government Internal

Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, armed groups from the Northern Caucasus
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Summary:

Russia, the country with the largest surface in the world and vast natural resources—mainly gas and oil—succeeded the USSR in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet block. Since then it has gone through complex stages, including a process of economic and political reforms, privatisation and liberalisation during the first years, under Boris Yeltsin in the nineties, who strengthened the centres of corporate power; and a transition towards an authoritarian state, mainly during the stages when Vladimir Putin was the President (2000-2008 and 2012 onwards). Faced with the unconstitutionality of his third mandate, his ally Dmitry Medvedev succeeded him as President from 2008 to 2012, generating hopes for a greater democratisation, but these never became consolidated. Medvedev was appointed prime minister in 2012 after Putin became president again. From the point of view of internal affairs, since taking power, Putin strengthened the vertical political control of the institution and media and dismantled the power gained by oligarchs during Yeltsin’s period, some of who support the liberal opposition. In parallel, the restrictions on human rights and freedoms have cut back the margin for political contestation. However, in 2012 there were many mobilisations against alleged irregularities in the elections and a demand for political opening. Other axes of internal tension include the Islamist violence in the northern Caucasus—stemming from the transformation and regionalisation of the violence that affected Chechnya in the nineties war—and that also resulted in terrorist attacks and violence in other parts of Russia.

Several hotbeds of tension remained open, including attacks linked to the Islamist insurgency in the Northern Caucasus in places outside its main areas of action; and mobilisations by sectors defending human rights, in a context of ongoing repression by the authorities against the whole sector that is critical of the regime’s policies. As for the impact of the insurgency from Northern Caucasus in other areas of Russia, the Volgograd region (south) was affected by several attacks during the last quarter of the year. **Seven people died and thirty were injured in October during a suicidal attack on a bus in the city of Volgograd, the capital of the region bearing the same name and an important axis of communication in the route going from central Russia to Sochi (south), the venue of the Winter Olympics in February 2014.** According to the authorities, the attack was carried out by a woman of Dagestani origin and was planned by the insurgency in this region, including the partner of the perpetrator, Dmitry Sokolov. In November, Sokolov and other members of the insurgency died in an anti-terrorist operation in the Dagestani capital.⁴⁴ Some months earlier, the insurgency from Northern Caucasus, led by the Chechen rebel Dokku Umarov, had announced the end of a moratorium on attacks against civilians.⁴⁵ In this statement, Umarov also called on the regional

44. See the summary on Russia (Dagestan) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

45. See the summary on Russia (Chechnya) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

insurgence to stop the celebration of the Winter Olympics in 2014. **The Volgograd attack led to some incidents against the Muslim population in the city,** including an attack against a mosque as well as another attack on the home of a Muslim cleric. The Union of Muslims in the region of Volgograd also received many complaints from Muslims who had suffered reprisals. **In December there were two suicidal attacks also in Volgograd during two consecutive days that killed 36 people and injured more than 70.** The attacks included an explosion at the city's train station and a suicidal attack on a trolley bus. More than 700 people were arrested in an anti-terrorist operation set up by the Ministry of the Interior after the attacks. On a video posted on the Internet, the group Vilayat Dagestan claimed the authorship of the attacks in December. The group, which some experts say is an unknown organisation in Dagestan, declares it has ties to Ansar al-Sunna, an organisation established in Iraq in 2003 to fight the US troops and the local government. Also, three people died from the explosion of a car bomb in the city of Pyatigorsk, in the Stavropol region – integrated in the North Caucasian Federal District. This district, however, does not have the same indexes of insurgence-led violence as neighbouring entities in the District, such as Dagestan or Kabardino-Balkaria.

Several dozen people died in different attacks in the Russian city of Volgograd

As for the strategies of the Federal Administration with regards to the insurgence, **the Russian president signed a controversial law in November that changes the criminal code, increase the number of crimes that are considered acts of terrorism, opens the door to much harsher prison terms and makes the families and close friends of alleged insurgents responsible for paying the financial compensation for the damages caused.** The procedure to process this law was sped up after the attack in Volgograd. On another note, the authorities planned unprecedented measures to ensure security at the Winter Olympics, some of which entered into force months before the event. In parallel, there were calls to boycott the Olympics from several social sectors, including the Circassian population, to protest against the hosting of the Olympics in their historical territory, where during the Russian conquest in the 18th and 19th centuries almost the entire population of Circassian tribes was massacred or forced into exile.

Also, during the year **tension linked to the restrictions on human rights by the authorities continued,** including restrictions on the freedom of reunion and expression, as well as discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, affiliation, politics, gender and sexual orientation, as several local and international human rights organisations denounced. Human rights activists, LGBT people and the population from the Northern Caucasus and emigrants were subject to specific persecution by the regime, fuelling social rejection against these groups. According to several analysts, the amnesty measures ordered in 2013 were aimed more at finding an international media effect than a real change in the cause of the ongoing

policies of repressing human rights. Russia approved an amnesty law mainly for people responsible from first-time offenders, minors and women, which was then extended to cases of vandalism. Under this new law, in December two members of the music band Pussy Riot were released from prison, who had been sentenced to two years in prison accused of inciting religious hatred after they protested in front of the Moscow cathedral in 2012; and 30 activists from the NGO Greenpeace, arrested in September on the ship Arctic Sunrise who were awaiting trial were also released. Also, the magnate and opponent Mikhail Khodorovsky was also released after benefiting from a presidential pardon, after spending ten years in prison for tax evasion and fraud. **Despite these releases, analysts and NGOs warned of the serious human rights situation in Russia.**

b) South-east Europe

Bosnia & Herzegovina	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Central Government, Government of the Republika Srpska, Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, High Representative of the international community

Summary:

The former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by Bosnians, Serbs and Croats, was caught up in a war between 1992 and 1995 (during the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation) in which the country's Serbian political elite, with support from Serbia, as well as Bosniak and Croatian political figures, mobilised their respective populations and forces on the basis of ethnic issues and political plans for self determination which were mutually incompatible. The Dayton peace agreement led to the creation of a fragile state divided into two entities: the Republika Srpska (with a Serb majority and 49% of the territory); and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with a Bosniak and Croatian population and 51% of the territory), both of which enjoyed wide-ranging powers, including military power. Political tension among the nationalist elites of the three communities, and between these elites and the international bodies with the mandate of overseeing the implementation of the agreements, along with the legacy of the impact of the conflict on the population and country, remain active sources of conflict.

Political tensions grew at a state and sub-state level, with strong internal crises in the party coalitions from the different communities, new calls for the separation of the Serbian entity, and frictions between the country's leading class and actors from the international community. In the Croat-Muslim entity, the political

crisis continued between the members of the former Bosniak coalition, the SDP and the SDA, which fell apart in 2012. Since then, the new government coalition, where the Bosniak party SBBBH replaced the SDA, tried to dismiss the ministers from the SDA. The Congress passed a vote of confidence to the Government, which was blocked by the Senate and where the Constitutional Court was unable to reach a judgement due to an insufficient quorum after seats were left empty since 2008. The SDA blocked the parliamentary attempts at new appointments to the Court. The SDP accused the SDA and other parties that used to be part of the government coalition of trying a political coup by approving changes in Parliament that enabled sessions to be called also by the deputy prime minister – a post that is not held by the SDP. In this context of a strong political crisis, the SDP urged the Office of the High Representative, Valentin Inzko, to use his extraordinary powers to force a solution to the crisis. Inzko summoned the Peace Implementation Council (an international body charged with implementing the Dayton Agreement), but the Council declared in June that it would not intervene and called on local leaders to solve the crisis. Intra-community political fractures also affected the Croat and Serbian political class during the year. In November, the Bosnian Serb coalition also fell apart, with crossed accusations between the SDS and its partners from the SNSD on breaking their agreements. In turn, the two main Croat parties, the HDZ 1990 and the HDZ BiH, which are part of the government coalition on a state level, ended their alliance in December after representatives from the HDZ 1990 were pulled out of the Government in a canton by some of their members from HDZ BiH. Faced with this climate some analysts warned that the political system had been collapsing in recent years. Also, in the case of the Croat-Muslim federation, the political fragility worsened in April with the arrest of the federation's president together with 18 other officials accused of corruption. The president was released in June, although the investigation continued.

Besides the internal fractures within the different coalitions, **there continued to be disagreements between the political representatives of the three main communities.** Thus, the parties were unable to reach an agreement during the year on the implementation of the judgement for the "Sejdic and Finci" case by the European Court of Human Rights, which forces Bosnia to amend its Constitution to allow the population from minority communities to be eligible to senior Government posts, which is now reserved to members of the Bosniak, Croat and Serb communities. The implementation of this judgement was also a requirement imposed by the EU, which in punishment decided to cut the subsidies for the pre-accession instrument by 45 million Euros and divert this amount to Kosovo. Overall, the reports

The situation of political collapse and internal crisis in the Bosnian state and sub-state structures worsened, with growing citizen disaffection

by the EU and the High Representative highlighted the lack of reforms in the country and the political paralysis. During the year there continued to be internal tensions and also with the international community due to the repeated criticism from the Government of the Serb entity, the Republika Srpska, towards the administrative architecture in Bosnia. Its president Milorad Dodik, on several occasions pointed out that the existence of Bosnia only responded to the position of the international community, but not to the interests of the Serb community. Dodik pointed out that is Bosnia did not

advance towards a confederation it should be broken up and that the Republika Srpska was, in practice, a State. The High Representative was very critical with what he considered to be questioning the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. As part of the confrontational rhetoric, the Croat representative of the tri-partite presidency said in August that if Republika Srpska became independent, he and other would be willing to take up arms. The High Representative in turn warned on the actions of sub-state bodies that were questioning the competencies of the country's central institutions.

On another front, during the year there was also **instability due to citizen protests in several towns around the country** demanding the adoption of a law on ID documents that would allow newly born to have access to these documents, after the case of a baby that died and was not allowed to travel outside the country to receive care. The mobilisations went on for months and included protests in front of the State Parliament, which at one point was even blocked. Finally, the political and social crisis was deactivated in November, with the adoption of a new law, after amendments were included on matters that had generated controversy and had been the object of a challenge of unconstitutionality. Separately, the first population census was prepared since the end of the war in the nineties. The results will be announced in stages as of July 2014, although the process has already given rise to complaints over alleged irregularities. The census included questions on the place of residence, as well as ethnic identification, mother tongue and religion.

Serbia – Kosovo	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity International ⁴⁶
Main parties:	Government de Serbia, Government de Kosovo, representantes políticos y sociales de la comunidad serbia de Kosovo, UNMIK, KFOR, EULEX

46. The socio-political crisis between Kosovo and Serbia is considered "international" since although its international legal status remains unclear, Kosovo has been recognised as a State by more than a hundred of countries.

Summary:

La tensión entre Serbia y Kosovo está asociada al proceso de determinación del estatus político de la región tras el conflicto armado de 1998-1999, que enfrentó al grupo armado albanés ELK contra el Government serbio y a la OTAN contra éste último, tras años de represión del régimen de Slobodan Milosevic contra la población albanesa de la entonces provincia de Serbia en el marco de la federación yugoslava. La ofensiva de la OTAN, no autorizada por la ONU, dio paso a un protectorado Internacional. En la práctica, Kosovo quedó dividido sobre líneas étnicas, con un incremento de las hostilidades contra la comunidad serbia, cuyo aislacionismo fue a su vez potenciado desde Serbia. El estatus final del Territory y los derechos de las minorías han sido eje de tensión continua, a lo que se añaden los problemas internos de Kosovo (ej. paro, corrupción, criminalidad). El proceso de determinación del estatus final, iniciado en 2006, no logró un acuerdo entre las partes ni el respaldo del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU a la propuesta el enviado especial de la ONU. En 2008, el Parlamento de Kosovo proclamó la independencia del Territory, rechazada por la población serbia de Kosovo y por Serbia.

Significant progress was achieved in the political dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, with an historical agreement in April that included the dismantling of the parallel institutions under Serbian control in the north of Kosovo, even if there continued to be sporadic security incidents. 2013 was the scenario of an historical rapprochement between Serbia and Kosovo, an event that contributed to reduce the political tension between the two countries. As part of the dialogue facilitated by the EU, which included rounds of negotiation during the whole year, the presidencies of Serbia and Kosovo –the Serbian president Tomislav Nikolic and the Kosovan president Atifete Jahjaga– met for the first time since Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Another historical moment was the agreement signed between Serbia and Kosovo on 19th April called the “First agreement of principles governing the normalisation of relations”. The document, containing 15 points, includes the creation of an association of Serbian towns in Kosovo, with a statute and competencies of its own. The agreement was approved by the Governments of Serbia and Kosovo and by the Kosovo Parliament. This was followed by a new agreement on 22nd May on a plan to implement the April agreement, establishing the steps and timeframes. However, **the agreements were met with strong rejection across wide Serb sectors in the north of Kosovo**, who warned that there was a lack of guarantees for Serbian interests. At a gathering with over 10,000 Kosovo Serbs in April, they denounced the agreement and demanded the creation of a provincial assembly outside Kosovo. Finally, in July they announced the creation of this parallel body, made up of the members of the municipal assemblies of four municipalities of Serb majority in the north of Kosovo. This body was not recognised by Kosovo or by Serbia. There were also protests from the Kosovo Albanian political movement

Vetevendosje. At a demonstration against the signing of the April agreement 17 police officers were injured and 60 demonstrators were arrested.

As part of the agreements on political dialogue, there were some agreements in September on telecommunications and energy. In turn, Kosovo gave the go-ahead for its amnesty law, aiming to facilitate the integration of the Serb minority in Kosovo, excluding from this amnesty some crimes. Also, in September Serbia dissolved the four administrations in the north of Kosovo that were functioning with the support of Belgrade and beyond the control of Pristina, and instead established provisional municipal councils while awaiting the local elections in November. Although there were protests, this transfer of authority was peaceful, as the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon pointed out in his October report. Serbia and Kosovo also reached agreements at the meetings held from July to October on aspects relating to the local elections in Kosovo, which Serbia supported as part of the April agreement. Besides, Serbia urged the Serb population in Kosovo to participate in the elections, for which 19 political organisations in the north of Kosovo registered. Despite the rapprochement between Serbia and Kosovo there were tensions due to disagreements during the pre-electoral period that were solved within the framework of ongoing negotiations. **The elections, on 3rd November, were the first to be held in all Kosovan territory, including Serb areas**, and for this were supported by the OSCE. The elections were held in a mostly peaceful ambience, but there were several violent attacks against polling stations in the north, of a Serb majority, in the divided city of Mitrovica. Hooded men confiscated the list of voters, threw tear gas and forced the OSCE observers out. The incidents led to the annulment of the elections in Mitrovica North, where they were held again in the middle of November, with a greater police force and without any incidents, although with a very low turnout (22%), in a general context of a call to boycott the elections by the main Kosovo Serb political and social sectors. There was a second round in Mitrovica and in 20 other municipalities. The Serbian Prime Minister criticised the preparations for the elections, since he considered they did not guarantee the basic conditions for voting. His Kosovan counterpart, in turn, denounced that the attacks had been organised and called the elections a victory for the whole population. After the elections the political dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo continued, with new progress made on aspects relating to the Police, but with greater difficulties to agree on judicial aspects. The boost to the discussions between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013 also led the EU Council to give the go-ahead to start accession negotiations with Serbia and to start negotiations with Kosovo on a stabilisation and association agreement.

Despite the improvement in the political climate, **there were also incidents during the year, such as the Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian protest reactions to the April and May agreements. The security situation was generally calm, but there were occasional tensions in mixed areas.**

From January to April there was an increase in incidents with explosive devices, with up to 19 explosions during this period, most of which only caused material damage, although two children were also injured. During the year there were also several attacks on the Government office established by Kosovo in Mitrovica North, as well as shootings and explosions against targets of the Kosovo Police in the north, as well as attacks on Serb sectors in Kosovo that were more favourable to dialogue. In January there was also a wave of vandalism against Serb Orthodox cemeteries throughout Kosovo, with more than 60 graves being attacked, shortly after the removal of an Albanian monument to the Albanian guerrilla in the south of Serbia. From April to July the incidents dropped. Nevertheless, in September there was a new alarm after an attack on a EULEX convoy on its way to a border post in the north of Kosovo that killed one customs official on the mission. Two EULEX officials were injured in a different incident. Also, during the year there were several road blockades in the north. Besides, 1,726 people were still missing from the armed conflict in the end of the nineties. As for the judicial cases for war crimes, the former leader of the Albanian guerrilla, the former minister and close ally of the current Kosovan Prime Minister Fatmir Limaj and nine other accused were acquitted of war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war in September by EULEX and Kosovan magistrates.

c) Western, Central and Eastern Europe

Spain (Basque Country)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Spanish government, French government, ETA, Basque government, political parties and social organizations

Summary:

The Basque conflict refers to the disputes regarding the identity-related and self-government aspirations of a significant sector of the Basque population and to the clash of political projects, all within a plurinational and complex demographic context, mainly encompassing the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and part of Navarre, in Spain, along with part of the South of France, also historically considered part of the Basque Country. Cultural, linguistic and territorial elements, among others, have historically mobilised a broad sector of the Basque population. The conflict has been marked since the second half of the 20th century by the direct violence perpetrated by the armed group ETA, created in the 1950s during Franco's dictatorship, which demands self-determination for the Basque people and the creation of an independent state. ETA's campaign of violence has claimed 829 lives, while some sources attribute 23 deaths to the para-police.

organisation GAL, which operated in the 1980s under the sponsorship of officials of the Spanish government in its fight against ETA. Since the restoration of democracy in Spain, which paved the way for the current State of Autonomies, in which specific competences are granted to the Basque Country and Navarre, attempts to negotiate have been made in all the governments that have held power. Issues such as "the right to decide" or "sufficient consensus" have been incorporated in the debate in the 21st century. In 2011 ETA declared the definitive cessation of armed activities.

The scenario of the end of violence that was initiated after the end of armed activity that ETA announced in October 2011 continued to become consolidated, while the disagreements over the Government policy on imprisonment and the victims continued. The International Verification Commission (IVC) stated in February that, according to its interlocutors in the Basque Country, it had not observed any killings, attacks, threats or extortion. At the same time, the IVC admitted it had been unable to get the Government to take any steps forward and expressed some concern over the possible consequences of this situation of inertia, although it was mostly optimistic on future steps. At the same time, the Social Forum –a space for dialogue promoted by the citizen movement Lokarri and Bake Bidea with the participation of political parties– made a recommendation at the end of May to design and ordered and agreed process that leads to the dismantling of ETA's arms and military structures, although it did not set out any timeframe for this. The Forum was also pushing for the individual reinsertion of prisoners after acknowledging the damage caused. Also, the leader of the Abertzale left, Pernando Barrena, called on ETA prisoners in July to accept the penitentiary legality. In turn, the central Government demanded the dissolution of ETA once again, at several stages during the year. The Minister of the Interior highlighted that ETA prisoners would stop being sent far from their homes once the group is dissolved. In a statement in September, the armed group called for a "national reconciliation", but rejected the idea of disowning its "pathway of fight".

The tension rose at the end of September with the detention of 18 members of Herrera, the association of support to ETA prisoners, and the temporary closure of their headquarters and websites, as well as the blocking on their bank accounts, ordered by the Spanish National Court of Justice, which accused them of belonging to an armed group. The detainees were freed at the start of October. The Basque nationalist party PNV and the pro-independence left agreed on a protest statement, while several thousand people demonstrated to show their support to Herrera and to ETA prisoners. At that time there were already concerns in institutional and social circles regarding a possible stalemate of the process towards peace. According to the report by the Lokarri organisation's peace process Observatory, the peace process in the Basque Country was going through a period of stagnation, according to a survey conducted with 600 people. In this regard, Lokarri issued three

recommendations: that ETA should be more concrete regarding its willingness to disarm; changes to the prison policies of the Spanish Government, especially regarding the spreading of prisoners; and to step up the efforts in the Basque Parliament to advance towards an agreement on peace and co-habitation.

One of the most relevant events of the year was the binding annulment judgement from the European Court of Human Rights in October on a case of what is known as the Parot doctrine –a case law established by the Spanish Constitutional Court by which prison benefits are applied individually for each of the sentences given to prisoners instead of the maximum legal period in prison–, establishing a new case law. According to the judgement, the legal interpretation that extended the term served in prison by the ETA prisoner Inés del Río was violating the European Convention on Human Rights. A spokesperson of the ECHR explained that the judgement did not consider other cases, but established that the retroactive application of the doctrine to keep the prisoner in prison was in fact an irregular detention. The Government declared it accepted the judgement, but pointed out that this was a judgement on a specific case and not on the Parot doctrine as a whole, and that the Spanish courts would study the implementation of the ECHR jurisprudence. Several associations of victims of terrorism called a demonstration in Madrid in October to protest against the ECHR judgement, bringing thousands into the streets according to the Spanish press, and 200,000 according to the organisers of the demonstration. Thus, since the ECHR judgement and until the end of the year, more than sixty ETA prisoners were freed, pursuant to this new jurisprudence.

Another relevant event during 2013 was when the group of ETA prisoners, which brings together more than 500 people, released a statement in December that accepted the penitentiary legality and expressed its willingness for individual re-insertion. This statement also rejected violence and acknowledged the suffering and damage caused. The group was, in this way, answering the petition made by the Social Forum. This decision is in contrast to the internal discussion held by the prisoners in 2012, which concluded with a demand for an amnesty. Most of the political forces considered this statement as a step forward, except for the PP, which focused its reaction on calling this statement insufficient. The Basque Government, in the hands of the PNV, called on ETA prisoners to take concrete steps towards showing that their commitment was credible. On another side, the paper on peace drafted by the Basque Parliament remained blocked during the last quarter, due to disagreements between the political parties. In turn, the Basque Government wanted to transfer to Parliament its peace plan, which was approved in November and led to criticism from the opposition, including the PSOE, which considered this plan was insufficient. The peace plan includes what is called the “ethical baseline”, which is a minimum agreement between the political parties, and calls for a comprehensive approach on all

human rights violations, including those committed by the security forces, but with a special emphasis on the violence used by ETA. The peace plan also calls for the dissolution of the group. On another note, the main associations of ETA victims voiced their discontent with the Basque Government, and denounced that it seemed as if the victims were irrelevant for the Government and its peace plan. In the speech delivered by the Basque President, Iñigo Urkullu at the end of December going through the year, he stressed the need to take quick and firm steps towards advancing in the process to consolidate peace. Urkullu also pointed out that he had requested a meeting with the Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, to discuss matters such as the prison policy and the Basque peace plan.

United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government of the United Kingdom, local government of Northern Ireland, government of Ireland, Protestant unionist and Catholic nationalist factions

Summary:

The tensions between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland date back to the English colonisation of Ireland in the 17th century and the discriminatory practices to which the Catholic population was subjected and which continued into the 20th century when Ireland gained independence and Northern Ireland (population 60% Protestant, mostly unionists, and 40% Catholic, mainly Irish nationalists) remained within the United Kingdom. From the early 1970s the tensions escalated into a violent conflict between the IRA armed group and the British government regarding the status of Northern Ireland, in which other paramilitary groups also participated, of which some were Catholic nationalists (e.g. INLA) and others were Protestant unionists (e.g. RHC, UFF, UVF). The signing of the Good Friday peace agreement in 1998 marked the start of the end of a conflict that had claimed more than 3,600 lives since 1969 and paved the way for a power-sharing government in the region. Since then, the post-conflict era has involved many challenges, including the existence of factions of the paramilitary groups and of the IRA itself that sporadically use violence; the disaffection of part of the population in respect of the results of the peace process; and institutional difficulties, among others.

Tension linked both to demonstrations and riots by some unionist sectors continued, as well as incidents carried out by armed republican factions. The protests that started in December 2012 against the decision taken by the Belfast City Council to reduce the number of days when the British flag would fly continued into the first quarter of 2013 and the months that followed, although

with a lower intensity. **From January to the end of August 2013, 350 police agents were injured in street riots linked to protests over the flag issue. Also, 229 people were arrested** from the start of the protests to the start of April. There were clashes between demonstrators and the Police, as well as threats against politicians and journalists, and attacks on politicians' vehicles and offices. The Minister of Justice for Northern Ireland, David Ford, accused the main unionist parties of fuelling the protests. In turn, **the Police Federation for Northern Ireland accused the paramilitary group Ulster Volunteer Force of being behind the riots and demanded firm action against the group.** In August there were new protests in Belfast against a Republican march that ended in riots with attacks on the Police, including projectiles, with a balance of 56 injured police agents. This was followed by new riots against the ban on a march organised by the unionist Orange Order, which led to clashes lasting several days with more than 70 police agents injured. The Police Service of Northern Ireland announced it was recruiting one thousand additional agents.

Besides this, there continued to be tension regarding the activities of armed republican factions, with several violent incidents during the year. The Police Federation for Northern Ireland warned of a greater consolidation of dissident republican groups, a greater coordination among them and a slight turn of some republican sectors towards the dissidence. **The Police carried out operations against what is called the New IRA** –an organisation that emerged during the summer of 2012 from the merger of several dissident republican factions, such as the Real IRA, Republican Action Against Drugs, and independent units. The group claimed the death of two people in Derry and Belfast in October, accusing these people of being involved in criminal activities. In turn, the Police of Northern Ireland had warned in June that there was an increase in shootings and beatings carried out by dissident republican groups as a form of social punishment so as to gain supporters among the communities of western Belfast. The Police also warned that there were very few of these cases had been reported to the police, and said this was due to the fear among the population to report these attacks. In turn, the republican group Óglaigh Na hÉireann claimed the authorship of a car bomb that appeared in County Fermanagh in March. According to the organisation, it was planned to blow up at a hotel hosting international political leaders during the G8 summit. This same group also admitted being the authors of another attempted car bomb attack on a police station in Belfast in March. The Deputy Prime Minister and former IRA leader Martin McGuinness declared he had been warned by the police of the existence of real and active threats against his life by a dissident group based in Derry. McGuinness has stood out for calling on armed factions to abandon the armed fighting. Separately, the main railway between Belfast and Dublin was evacuated in October due to a

Clashes fuelled by unionist sectors in Northern Ireland caused several hundred injured and detained people during 2013

bomb threat. During the last months of the year there were at least 16 attacks with explosives carried out by the New IRA and other dissident groups. Also during the year there were arrests and confiscations of arms, including two mortar launchers. The National Union of Journalists expressed its concerns over the growing number of threats against journalists from paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland.

Towards the end of the year the northern Irish parties held negotiations, facilitated by the former US diplomat Richard Haass, aiming to solve some of the main hotbeds of tension, including the legacy of the conflict –3,000 of the more than 3,500 murders during decades of conflict have not yet been solved–, parades and symbols such as flags. However, the parties did not reach an agreement on the final draft presented by Haass. The Minister of Justice and leader of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, a non-confessional party, blamed the failure to reach an agreement on the unionist parties, stating that their rejection of a code of conduct for unionist parades was based on gaining electoral support rather than on reaching a political agreement. Nevertheless, local leaders and from the British Government pointed out that the negotiations had been useful to find common grounds for future discussions.

Ukraine	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, EU, Russia, USA

Summary:

Ukraine was established as an independent State in 1991, after a past linked to the Russian Empire and the USSR. Since gaining independence it has gone through periods of instability and political tension linked to internal rivalries in the control of political and economic power; the complex balance of the relations between Kiev and Euro-Atlantic institutions and Russia, in a context where Russia hopes to keep Ukraine, a country that is dependant on Russian gas, under its influence; and to other open or latent hotbeds of tension, such as identity differences or the differential nature of Crimea. This autonomous region of a Russian majority was transferred by the USSR to Ukraine in 1954 and Russia keeps its naval fleet there. As for the more recent tensions in Ukraine, it is worth mentioning the Orange Revolution in 2004, where massive protests forced the presidential elections to be repeated, which were considered fraudulent, and finally drove the pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko to power in 2005. His pro-Russian rival from the Party of the Regions, Viktor Yanukovich won the parliamentary elections in 2006, leading to a difficult political cohabitation. Instability remained in the following years, with early elections in 2007

where presidential powers were strengthened at the expense of parliamentary powers, and where the political persecution of rival political sectors increased and the economic power of the circle of people closest to Yanukovich increased. In 2013 the country witnessed the largest demonstrations since the Orange Revolution.

During 2013 a political and social crisis was triggered in Ukraine between the Government and the political and social opposition, leading to the largest demonstrations since the Orange Revolution in 2004. which generated some violent incidents.

This crisis was triggered by President Viktor Yanukovich's decision not to sign the Partnership Agreement with the EU, which planned for a free trade area conditioned by democratic reforms and the pre-requisite of legislative reforms to allow the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to leave prison and receive medical treatment. Tymoshenko had been in prison since 2011 accused of abuse of power, after a trial with no guarantees and waiting for another trial for tax evasion. In previous months, Yanukovich and his government had supported this Agreement, despite Russian pressure not to sign it, in an international context where Russia was seeking to maintain its influence in Ukraine –a country with historic ties with Moscow and dependant on Russian gas–, and promote its own project for a Customs Union and Eurasian Union. By retreating, Yanukovich triggered anti-government and pro-EU protests in the capital Kiev at the end of November, most of which were peaceful and initially led by students. The violent repression used by the security forces during one of these protests, on 30th November, which caused injuries to hundreds, fuelled larger demonstrations. Thus, **several hundreds of thousands –according to the local and international press– demonstrated in Kiev on the 1st December focusing their demands no longer on the agreement with the EU but calling for the President to step down and the Government to resign.** During the demonstrations the Government headquarters were blocked, and the city hall and a trade union building were occupied. By the end of that day there were 120 police agents and 112 demonstrators injured. Protests continued on a daily basis during December, with a high participation with tens or hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, which rapidly expanded to other cities around the country. A “resistance committee” was established by the three main opposition parties, the visible participants in the demonstrations –the Batkivshchyna or All-Ukrainian Union (fatherland) led by Tymoshenko; the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR), led by boxer Vitali Kilschko; and the ultranationalist All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda (Freedom) of Oleh Tyahnybok. At the start of December, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov warned that the protest were similar to an attempt at a coup. The EU called on all parties to contention and Russian President Vladimir Putin called the demonstrations a pogrom. The EU sent

***Ukraine experience
anti-government
protests in several
cities, in the largest
mobilisations since the
Orange Revolution in
2004***

high representatives to Ukraine, which was considered as interference by Moscow. US representatives also travelled to the country.

After previous rejections, the political opposition agreed to hold conversations with the Government on 13th November, together with former Ukrainian presidents. The main magnate and top Ukrainian fortune, Renat Akhmetov also participated and called on the Government and opposition to reach an agreement, in a context where several analyses pointed at the underlying struggle for economic power as an additional piece to the political rivalry. As conciliation measures, the Government dismissed the mayor of Kiev, the vice-head of the Security Council and the chief of the Kiev Police, but rejected the claims for the Government to leave. On the other hand, the EU suspended the negotiations in the middle of December due to the ambiguity of the Ukrainian Government, which despite announcing

in November that it would not sign the agreement, during the following weeks maintained and ambivalent position. Meanwhile, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia scheduled a meeting in Moscow and agreed on a pack of agreements that included a Russian loan of 15 billion dollars and a cut in the gas prices, sufficient according to analysts to avoid financial problems before the presidential elections planned for 2015. In turn, at the end of December the Government approved an amnesty for those arrested in the November protests. Before the year ended, the political opposition warned that protests would continue and that they would call a national strike after the winter holidays.

Middle East

a) Mashreq

Egypt	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political wing Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Armed Forces, coalition National Salvation Front (NSF), Salafist al-Nour party, Tamrod Movement, April 6 Youth Movement, Islamist coalition, Legitimacy Support Alliance

Summary:

Within the framework of the so-called “Arab revolts”, popular mobilisations in Egypt led to the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak at the beginning of 2011. During three decades, Mubarak had headed an authoritarian government characterised by the accumulation of powers around the Government National

Democratic Party, the Armed Forces and the corporate elites; as well as by an artificial political plurality, with constant allegations of fraud in the elections, harassment policies towards the opposition and the illegalisation of the main dissident movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The fall of Mubarak's regime gave way to an unstable political landscape, where the struggle between the sectors demanding for pushing towards the goals of the revolt, Islamist groups aspiring to a new position of power and the military class seeking guarantees to keep their influence and privileges in the new institutional scheme became evident. In this context, and after an interim government led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the electoral triumph of the MB in the parliamentary and presidential elections seemed to open a new stage in the country in 2012. However, the ousting of the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, when he had just been in power for one year, opened new questions on the future of the country in a context of persistent turbulence, violence and political polarisation.

The situation in Egypt was characterised by a deterioration of the levels of violence compared to the previous year, with a balance of more than one thousand deaths in 2013, as well as by persistent political turmoil, which worsened after the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi was ousted by a military coup in the middle of the year.

During the first half of the year there were continuous protests against the government led by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and, in parallel, mobilisations in support of Morsi and to denounce what was considered by many attempts at destabilising the first democratically elected president in the country. The clashes between both sides, as well as clashes between demonstrators and the security forces, led to multiple violent episodes that claimed the lives of dozens of people. January and February were the most critical months with several incidents, including those registered in the framework of the commemorations for the second anniversary since the overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak. During this time there were also clashes between the Copt minority and Muslim sectors, protests over the country's financial situation, and civil disobedience campaigns. In this climate of political and social unrest, president Morsi tried to set up a national dialogue. Some opposition groups agreed to participate after the leader of the al-Azhar mosque mediated and a warning from the Army that the political crisis was threatening to lead to the collapse of the State. Opposition to Morsi, including the main dissident platform, the National Salvation Front (NSF) stated its demand to reform the Constitution – considered pro-Islamist and approved amid controversy at the end of 2012– and the creation of a national unity government. The executive did not give into these demands and, on the contrary, it increased the number of representatives from the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the MB, appointed a larger number

of Islamist leaders as regional governors and reformed the Judiciary. In parallel, the Government was involved in an institutional struggle with the Judiciary, which was against some of the measures adopted by Morsi, including the call of parliamentary elections and the dismissal of the State general attorney. Arguing problems with the electoral law, the Constitutional Supreme Court also declared institutions such as the Shura (Upper Chamber) and the panel that had drafted the Constitution invalid. In this context, a movement of youths baptised as Tamrod (meaning “Revolt” in Arabic) set up a campaign to collect 15 million signatures – more than those obtained by the president in the elections in June 2012– to demand that Morsi resigned. The campaign gained broad support and the NSF joined the demands for early presidential elections.

The mobilisations against the Government grew in intensity on the eve of the first anniversary of Morsi taking office, on 30th June, and motivated the Armed Forces to launch an ultimatum.

The Minister of Defence, General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi gave the president 48 hours to respond to popular demands, or else, the military would impose their own roadmap. Morsi was expelled from power on 3rd July by a military coup, which led to a new transition Government with military backing, led by the head of the Constitutional Supreme Court, Adly Mansour. The interim president dissolved parliament, appointed a cabinet without Islamists and announced a transition plan based on three key points: the approval of a new Constitution; parliamentary elections and presidential elections. The bumpy end to the Islamist Government was the object of several analyses and was attributed to several factors, including errors committed by Morsi's administration –disdain towards the opposition, unwillingness to generate consensus and trusting in settling power in the Islamist majority, incapacity to respond to the population's basic claims⁴⁷ and the implementation, in practice, of a governability model that was similar to Mubarak's–⁴⁸, towards the attitudes of the opposition –lack of will to dialogue, maximalist position despite his failure in the elections, or using extra-institutional means–, and the readiness of the military class to take sides and intervene, partly motivated by their disagreement with Morsi's Government on foreign policy matters, and on how it was managing the security crisis in the Sinai.⁴⁹ The ousting of the Islamist president led to an escalation of violence in the country. The supporters of the MB started a series of demonstrations to demand the re-establishment of Morsi and confronted the security forces and the critics of the MB. **The bloodiest day was on 14th August, after a protest camp set up by Morsi's supporters in Cairo was cleared. The official balance points at least 600 people dead, mostly demonstrators but also some security agents, during the incidents.**

47. International Crisis Group, *Marching in Circles: Egypt's Dangerous Second Transition*, Middle East/North Africa Briefing no.35, August 7, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/egypt/b035-marching-in-circles-egypt-second-transition.aspx>.

48. Rabab El-Mahdi, *Egypt's 3G problem*, Expert Analysis, NOREF, August 2013, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Egypt/Publications/Egypt-s-3G-problem>.

49. See the summary on Egypt (Sinai) in this chapter.

The repression used against these demonstration motivated a condemnation of the international community –which in general terms eluded condemning the military coup– and led personalities such as the leader of the NSF and Nobel Peace Prize Mohamed el-Baradei to step away from the new Government.

Morsi's removal from power also led to an intense siege on the MB, to levels never seen since the seventies. The persecution campaign materialised during the second half of the year with the closure of the media that were considered pro-Islamist and the arrest of hundred of MB members and senior leaders, including the organisation's top leader, Mohamed Badie and Morsi himself –locked away in a secret location since he was overthrown and subjected to trial, accused of treason, spying, inciting killings, promoting terrorism and collaborating with foreign groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah. In September, **the new authorities illegalised the MB as well as its affiliated groups and ordered the organisation's funds blocked. Before the end of the year, the MB were declared a terrorist group**, after the Government considered the organisation responsible for a suicidal attack against a police station that killed 15 at the end of December. The MB denied any responsibility for the attack, which was claimed by an armed group with alleged ties to al-Qaeda based in the Sinai. During the second half of the year, the supporters of the MB continued to protest despite the adoption of exceptional measures by the interim Government, including a norm that restricts demonstrations, the violent police repression and the clashes with the security forces, which continued to cause many casualties. International human rights organisations denounced that from July to the end of the year, some 1,400 people had died due to the political violence in the country, most of them due to the excessive use of force by the security forces. Also, they warned on the deterioration of freedoms and human rights, on the increase of in measures of repression against several sectors of the political spectrum –including secular groups– and on the use of the discourses “to fight terrorism” to justify the repression.⁵⁰ Finally, it is worth mentioning the transition calendar that was delayed compared to the initial roadmap. Towards the start of December, the committee in charge of the constitutional reforms – with only two Islamists out of its 50 members– disclosed its new proposal, which was met by rejection by the MB and some secular groups due to the broad prerogatives for the military. The constitutional referendum planned for November was thus scheduled to take place in January 2014, and then there would be presidential and parliamentary elections. Despite the warnings from

The ousting of the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi after a military coup on 3rd July led to an escalation of violence that caused more than one thousand deaths in Egypt

several observers on the need for an inclusive dialogue on the future of Egypt, the MB were not taken into consideration in the transition process and **at the end of 2013 all the attempts at dialogue between the Government and the new platform of Islamist forces (the Legitimacy Support Alliance) had failed.**

Egypt (Sinai) ⁵¹	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government, System Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, security forces, armed groups based in the Sinai –including Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM)–, Israel

Summary:

The overthrow of Hosni Mubarak's regime in 2011 after three decades in power opened several questions on the impact this would have on relations between Egypt and Israel and, especially, on maintaining the security commitments taken on after the signing of the Camp David treaty in 1979 that led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai desert. Mubarak had maintained a policy of zero tolerance towards the possible emergence of armed groups on the peninsula, mainly inhabited by Bedouin population that is economically marginalised. The political turmoil in Egypt after Mubarak's fall and the haphazard transition process favoured a greater instability and violence in the Sinai. The armed groups that became active in the region initially focused their actions against Israeli interests, but gradually increased their actions against the Egyptian security forces. This trend increased after the ousting of the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi towards the middle of 2013, together with an increased capacity to carry out actions outside the Sinai by some groups on the peninsula such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis.

The situation on the Sinai Peninsula was characterised by instability and violent events that were sporadic during the first half of the year but that intensified during the second semester causing dozens of casualties.

Although it is difficult to come up with an exact toll of victims, provisional figures indicate that the number of deaths in this context would be of around one hundred people. Following the trend registered in 2011, during the first months of 2013 there were several attacks on Israeli interests. These events materialised in attacks by armed men against the police and security patrols in charge of surveilling oil pipelines supplying Israel and in fired from the Sinai on Eliat (Israel), without causing victims. There were also other actions against the Egyptian security forces, such as the kidnapping of a group of policemen by

50. Amnesty International, *Roadmap to repression: No end in sight to human rights violations*, Amnesty International, January 23, 2014, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE12/005/2014/en>.

51. In the previous Edition of the Alert! report, this case was identified as “Israel-Egypt”, but the change in the dynamics of this context has led it to be called “Egypt (Sinai)”.

armed militiamen that demanded the release of people arrested by the authorities. **The violence dynamics in the area worsened during the second semester, after the ousting of the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi** as a result of a military coup in July.⁵² One of the most serious incidents happened in August, when 25 Egyptian soldiers were killed in an attack carried out by armed men close to Rafah, on the border with Gaza. In September, the armed group based in the Sinai Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM) –with alleged links to al-Qaeda, which was created in 2011 and claimed its first action in July 2012 (an attack on an oil pipeline)– claimed authorship of an attempted murder of the Minister of the Interior, Mohamed Ibrahim. The senior official survived the attack, carried out with a car bomb, but four people died in the attack. The Egyptian military forces responded to this attack with an operation on the Sinai Peninsula that included air and land operations with thousands of soldiers. According to official data, some 30 militiamen died in the framework of the Government's operation. In October, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM) –which gained relevance in 2013– claimed an assault on the headquarters of the security for south Sinai and an attack on an intelligence building in the city of Islamiya, on the Suez Canal. In November, a suicidal attack on a bus carrying a group of soldiers in the north of Sinai killed eleven soldiers and injured dozens in an unclaimed action. **Towards the end of December, an attack on a police station in Mansoura (Nile Delta) killed 16 people. Although ABM claimed the attack, the authorities blamed the attack on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which was classified as a terrorist organisation a few days later.** At the end of 2013, several observers warned that the new Egyptian Government established after the military coup was insisting on linking the violence by ABM to the MB to justify its harassment campaign against the organisation.

According to analyses, the disagreements between Morsi's Government and the military authorities on how to manage instability in the Sinai would have been one of the factors that led to the military coup. Some military sectors had considered that the Islamist president was following a policy that was too soft on the insurgence activities on the peninsula and also disagreed with some of the measures promoted by the Government, such as turning on the mediation of tribal chiefs or questioning the religious interpretations used by extremist groups to justify the use of violence.⁵³ The military had considered Morsi's position as a signal of weakness or of conflicting interests –due to his alleged closeness with groups in the Sinai– that were affecting the defence of Egyptian security interests. This despite the fact that the Islamist president had adopted measures of force against the armed activity on the

peninsula (in 2012 after the killing of 16 soldiers close to the border with Israel, Morsi had ordered a military offensive in the area –the largest incursion in the region since the Arab-Israeli war in 1973– and ordered the closure of the tunnels connecting Egypt with Gaza). The fact that attacks on security forces increased after Morsi's ousting made it easier for the new Egyptian authorities to link the violence with the MB, in a context of harassment against the group, despite the fact that many of the actions were of unknown authorship and that there was no evidence showing the alleged links between the organisation and ABM. Other observers pointed at possible links between Palestinian militant groups and those in the Sinai. Some analysts have highlighted that the military coup had reinvigorated those groups favouring the armed path –some of which call for a Jihad to establish an Islamic emirate–, and that the context of persecution could be helping disenchanted members of the Brotherhood to join ABM, even if the MB defend a discourse that is against the violent path. **The events in 2013 prove the destabilising capacity of the groups in the Sinai and the broadening of their scope of action, with attacks outside the peninsula.** According to press reports, militants based in the region would have had access to weapons from Libya –other versions say also from Syria and Iraq– and some of their actions have been carried out by Egyptian militiamen that have returned to the country after taking part in Jihadist fighting in Syria or Iraq. Organisations like al-Qaeda –whose leader is Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri– and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) expressed their support to the Sinai militias during 2013. In this context, Israel granted authorisation –as required in the 1979 peace treaty– for the deployment of additional troops in the Sinai by the new Egyptian authorities and, according to some sources, would have also participated in some aerial offensives with unmanned planes.⁵⁴ In addition, Israeli diplomats interceded with the USA so it did not stop its financial aid to the Egyptian military. Washington suspended the delivery of military material to the Army in October, in response to the repression in the country, but continued to support security operations on the border between Israel and Egypt.

Iraq (Kurdistan)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Territory, Resources, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Turkey, Iran

52. See the summary on Egypt in this chapter.

53. Sahar Aziz, *Sinai's Role in Morsi's Ouster*, Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 20, 2013, <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/08/20/sinai-s-role-in-morsi-s-ouster/gjdw>.

54. Shashank Joshi, "Sinai attacks: Dark omen for Egypt?", BBC, August 19, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23758941>.

Summary:

Concentrated in the north of Iraq, the Kurds represent between 15% and 20% of the country's population. Since the creation of the Iraqi state, and as a result of the broken promises regarding an independent Kurd state in the region, the Kurds have found it difficult to find their place in the Iraqi state and have been subjected to severe repression. In 1992, following the establishment of a no-fly zone in the north of the country, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was created. The self-government model, which was strengthened after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, was legitimised in the federal structure enshrined in the Iraqi constitution of 2005. However, there continues to be conflict due to the fact that the KRG and the state interpret the rights and competencies of the region differently. The disagreements focus on the control of energy resources and the so-called "disputed territories", whose status remains unresolved. The conflict is also influenced by the stance of key actors in the region, such as Turkey and Iran, where Kurd minorities also reside. In the most recent period, the repercussions of the Syrian war are also affecting the Kurdish region of Iraq and the whole of the Middle East.

The tension existing between the central Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) dropped compared to the previous year, partly due to the internal political dynamics in Iraq. If in 2012 the president of the KRG, Massoud Barzani, was one of the figures leading the vote of confidence against the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in 2013 both leaders showed signs of a rapprochement. **In June, al-Maliki went on his first visit to Iraq's Kurdish region since 2010, a gesture aiming to bring positions closer with Erbil.** Several analyses highlighted at the time that it was a strategic move by the Prime Minister, who was forced to improve relations with the Kurds in a context of growing contestation from the provinces of Arab Sunni majority.⁵⁵ The start of the dialogue allowed ending two months of boycott by the Kurdish ministers in the Iraqi government to protest against the disagreement with the central Government over matters relating to taxes and budgets. Previously, Kurdish politicians in Baghdad had also supported the approval of a law to stop al-Maliki from running for a third term in office. Barzani had warned that if the conversations with Baghdad on key issues –such as the disputes over oil and the control of territories– failed, the KRG would seek new forms of relations with the central Government. As of the meeting in June, Erbil and Baghdad set up joint committees to try and overcome the differences. One month after al-Maliki's visit, Barzani travelled to Baghdad and both leaders ratified their commitment to cooperate and work together towards resolving their conflicts. This climate of collaboration did not, however, avoid situations that may have increased the tension or events that made evident the differences between the two parties. These included the decision taken by more than one thousand

Kurdish soldiers to leave the Iraqi Army and join the Kurdish security forces (Peshmerga); the decision taken by Baghdad to sign agreements to explore for oil in oil wells located in disputed areas; or the decision taken by Erbil to advance in joint oil explorations with Turkey, which led Baghdad to set a series of conditions for this exchange. Baghdad also stated its rejection to the arrival of PKK militants to the KRG territory after the agreement between Ankara and the Kurdish armed group to start peace negotiations.⁵⁶ **In parallel, there were episodes of violence, some of which in the KRG area and others in disputed territories, such as Kirkuk.** During the first half of the year there were three suicidal attacks in Kirkuk that killed three people and injured around 20. One of the attacks affected the headquarters of the Kurdish party Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and another one was on a Peshmerga checkpoint. The increase in violence due to clashes between the Arab-Sunni sectors and the Iraqi security forces in the area around Kirkuk and adjacent areas motivated troops to withdraw to Baghdad and, in turn, the deployment of Peshmerga. The Iraqi Minister of the Interior then demanded the withdrawal of the Kurdish forces from the area and reaffirmed the competencies of the central Government in these areas. During the second half of the year the impact of the war in Syria became more evident on KRG territory. In September, a suicidal attack against the headquarters of the security services in Erbil killed seven people, in an episode that is unusual in this city, which had not been targeted like this since 2007. The attack was claimed by al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), which justified its action in reply to Barzani's rapprochement to Baghdad and his willingness to support the Kurdish forces fighting Jihadist groups in Syria.⁵⁷ Previously, in light of the escalation in clashes between Kurdish militias of Syrian origin and Jihadist armed groups in Syria, Barzani had expressed his openness for the KRG to intervene. **Violence in the territories with Kurdish majority or with a high number of Kurdish people in Syria led to an increase in the number of people forcefully displaced.** Just in the two last weeks of August, some 50,000 people sought refuge in the KRG. At the end of 2013 the number of Syrian refugees in the territory was more than 200,000 people, most of them of Kurdish origin.

Israel – Syria, Lebanon	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	System, Resources, Territory International
Main parties:	Israel, Syria, Hezbollah Lebanese group and its armed wing (Islamic Resistance)

55. See the summary on Iraq in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

56. See the summary on Turkey (south-east) in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

57. See the summary on Syria in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

Summary:

The backdrop to this situation of tension is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its consequences in the region. On the one hand, the presence of thousands of Palestinian refugees who settled in Lebanon from 1948, together with the leadership of the PLO in 1979, led Israel to carry out constant attacks in southern Lebanon until it occupied the country in 1982. The founding of Hezbollah, the armed Shiite group, in the early 1980s in Lebanon, with an agenda consisting of challenging Israel and achieving the liberation of Palestine, led to a series of clashes that culminated in a major Israeli offensive in July 2006. Meanwhile, the 1967 war led to the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, which together with Syria's support of Hezbollah explains the tension between Israel and Syria. Since 2011, the outbreak of the armed conflict in Syria has had a direct impact on the dynamics of this tension and on the positions adopted by the actors involved in this conflict.

During 2013 this international tension registered an **escalation of violence that led to the death of more than 40 people due to the more offensive attitude adopted by the different actors involved in the dispute and as a consequence of the evolution of the events in the war in Syria**.⁵⁸ During the year, Israel decided to launch direct attacks on Syrian territory, in what was seen as a direct warning to the Damascus regime on the consequences of transferring weapons to the Lebanese group Hezbollah. The first Israeli aerial attack was in January, and caused two casualties, according to press reports. The attack targeted a convoy carrying arsenals to Lebanon. Damascus presented a formal complaint to the UN Observer Force deployed in the Golan Heights since 1974 and denounced a breach of the cease-fire agreement between both countries. Russia also considered this attack as a breach of the UN Charter, while Israel and the US decided not to comment on the incident. This was the first Israeli attack on a Syrian target since 2007, when it carried out an operation against a nuclear reactor developed by Damascus in an incident that was not confirmed by Israel or by Syria. **The most serious incident in 2013 happened in May, when an Israeli aerial attack on strategic targets in Syria killed 42 soldiers**, according to information appeared in the press and reported by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The bombings would have affected a research centre for the development of arms, a military camp and facilities of the Fourth Armoured Division of the Syrian Army and the Republican Guard. Other sources mention that the aim of the attack was to stop the delivery of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah, including high-precision missiles with a range of 300 km. Observers highlighted that the attack showed that Israel felt its security was being threatened and, at the same time, that Benjamin Netanyahu's Government was confident that Damascus did not have the capacity to react, since this would open a

new front in the conflict at a time when the regime's survival is at stake. In July, information emerged on a third Israeli operation that had targeted a deposit of missiles of Russian origin close to the Syrian town of Latakia. At the same time, during 2013, Israel adopted measures to heighten security along the border with Lebanon and Syria, by installing a battery of missiles (known as the Iron Dome) and declaring the state of alert in the nearby area, carrying out joint missile tests with the US in the Mediterranean after the international alert created by the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian war.

In addition, during 2013 there were several incidents that led to an exchange of shots along the Syrian-Israeli border. Some of them were attributed to the repercussions of the clashes between the Syrian rebel militias and the Syrian regime's troops, but others directly involved the Syrian and Israeli forces along the cease-fire line along the Golan Heights. Also, several rockets were launched from the south of Lebanon into Israel. In one of these actions, claimed by Hezbollah, five Israeli soldiers were injured. During the year, Hezbollah became growingly involved in the Syrian conflict, after explicitly stating its support to Bashar al-Assad's regime and deploying forces to support Damascus to fight the Syrian rebels.⁵⁹ Analysts considered that the open involvement of the Lebanese group in the war has marked a strategic turn in the organisation, which had historically focused its actions on Israel. At the same time, the results of an investigation in Bulgaria linked Hezbollah directly to an attack on a bus in the Bulgarian spa of Burgas, in July 2012, where five Israeli

tourists were killed. The group denied having any responsibility for the attack, but months later its military wing was declared a terrorist organisation by the EU. In parallel, during the year the Lebanese Government denounced that Israel was repeatedly violating its airspace. There were also incidents between soldiers of both these countries along the border, where one Israeli soldier and two Lebanese soldiers were injured. The UN Secretary General called for contention between the parties in the area, where there is a peacekeeping mission deployed (UNIFIL). It is worth pointing out that in the framework of the regional tensions arising from the armed conflict in Syria, Saudi Arabia decided to back the strengthening of the capacities of the Lebanese forces with 2.8 billion Euros. This decision was seen as an attempt by Riyadh to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces and counter Hezbollah's weight in the Lebanese scenario and, indirectly, to curb Iran's influence in the country. Shortly after the announcement was made in December, the Lebanese troops shot at Syrian planes that crossed its airspace, in the first incident of its kind since the start of the Syrian war.

58. Ibid.

59. See the summary on Lebanon in this chapter.

Lebanon	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, Hezbollah, opposition March 14 Alliance (led by Future Movement), Amal, Free Patriotic Movement, Arab Democratic Party (Alawi), Hizb ul-Tahrir, militias, Abdullah Azzam Brigades (affiliated with al-Qaeda)

Summary:

The assassination of the Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, in February 2005 sparked the so-called “Cedar Revolution” which, following mass demonstrations, forced the withdrawal of the Syrian Armed Forces (present in the country for three decades), meeting the demands of Security Council resolution 1559, promoted by the USA and France in September 2004. The stand-off between opponents of Syria’s influence (led by Hariri’s son, who blamed the Syrian regime for the assassination) and sectors more closely linked to Syria, such as Hezbollah, triggered a political, social and institutional crisis influenced by religious divisions. In a climate of persistent internal political division, the armed conflict that broke out in Syria in 2011 has led to an escalation of the tension between Lebanese political and social sectors and to an increase in violence in the country.

The war in Syria had a determining influence on the evolution of events in Lebanon, exacerbating the internal polarisation and the levels of violence. **Lebanon was affected by growing clashes between the Lebanese sectors favourable to the Damascus’ regime and those against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, due to incidents by armed actors of Syrian origin in Lebanese territory and due to the consequences of Hezbollah’s more direct involvement in the Syrian war**, including other dynamics that led to violent acts. The number of casualties rose to more than 200 people, according to informal counts based on press reports. This figure does not include casualties in Hezbollah in Syrian territory, which are thought to be dozens. Since the start of the armed conflict in the neighbour country in 2011, Hezbollah had avoided confirming its backing to Damascus and had justified the actions of some of its members in reply to the threat of external aggressions. However, during the first half of 2013 the leader of the Shiite group, Hassan Nasrallah, explicitly stated his support to the Syrian Government, in what analysts called a strategic turn with regards to the group’s historical focus in its fight against Israel. The greater involvement of Hezbollah on the pro-Syrian Government side became especially evident in the clashes against the rebel forces –including the ESL and the al-Nusra Front– in the city of al-Qusayr, which is on the border with Lebanon, in the middle of the year. In this

The armed conflict in Syria exacerbated the tensions in Lebanon between sectors supporting and against the Damascus regime, causing an increase in violence and casualties

scenario, **the Shiite group’s military wing was included in the EU’s list of terrorist organisations**, in a decision that was attributed both to its participation in the Syrian war and because it was accused of the attack in Bulgaria on Israeli tourists in the middle of 2012. The repercussions of the Syrian armed conflict in Lebanon also materialised through aerial and artillery attacks from Syria on Lebanese territory and several incidents along the border that caused an increase of refugee flows. According to estimated by the UNHCR, at the end of 2013 Lebanon had received more than 800,000 people fleeing the war in Syria. In parallel, the broader gap between Lebanese sectors supporting one and other side in Syria led to a political standstill and violent events, with clashes in several places in the country –especially in areas such as Tripoli (north) where armed fighting between adjacent neighbourhoods of Sunni and Alaouite majorities caused dozens of casualties, besides the attacks with explosives and political killings.

During the first months of the year, the most serious events were related to the wave of violence unleashed after the Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned (12 dead, in March); with incidents after a Sunni cleric was arrested followed by armed clashes (30 dead, in May), and with clashes between soldiers and Sunni militants supporting a radical cleric in Sidon (16 soldiers dead, in June). During the second half of the year the country was the scenario of the worst attacks with explosives since the end of the civil war. **In August, an attack on a Shiite neighbourhood and the stronghold of Hezbollah in Beirut killed 27 people, in an incident that was claimed by a Syrian insurgence group; one week later there was a double attack with explosives on mosques in Tripoli that caused 42 casualties.** The attack was launched against a Sunni cleric famous for his calls on the Lebanese youths to join the fight against Bashar al-Assad. The last period of the year was marked by the attack on a former minister of finance and opposition leader from the 14 March movement, accused of supporting Syria’s rebel forces. There was also an attack against the Iranian embassy in Beirut, where 26 people died. The aim of the attack was to push for Hezbollah forces to leave

Syria. This attack was claimed by a Sunni armed group with alleged ties to al-Qaeda called the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which also claimed authorship for the murder of a Hezbollah commander in December. During the year, observers also warned of growing sectarian tensions caused by the conflict. Alongside the intensification of violence, the institutional stalemate continued. The prime minister that succeeded Mikati, Tamam Salam, received backing from the entire political spectrum, but did not manage to form Government until the end of the year.

The Future Movement insisted on forming a Government without Hezbollah, while the Shiite group defended creating a unity government. The Lebanese president continued to defend a “policy of dissociation” and with his calls on the different Lebanese political sectors to

remain committed to the Baabda Declaration, which aims to ensure the Lebanon remains neutral in the regional conflicts. Nevertheless, towards the end of the year events pointed in another direction. In December came the announcement that Saudi Arabia was to grant Lebanon 2.8 billion Euros to strengthen the Army's capacity. The measure was interpreted in regional terms, as an attempt by Riyadh to counter Iran's influence in the country; Iran is the main supporter of Hezbollah. Days later, Lebanese troops shot at Syrian planes that had entered its airspace, the first incident of this type since the start of the war.

Palestine	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	PA, Fatah, armed group al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Hamas and its armed wing Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Summary:

The disagreements between the various Palestinian sectors in recent decades have mainly featured secular nationalist groups (Fatah and its armed wing al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP, DFLP) and religious groups (Hamas and its armed wing Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigade, Islamic Jihad). This confrontation is the result of a power struggle to control the Palestinian territories, which, in turn has produced different approaches in terms of relations with Israel. Having controlled Palestinian politics for many years, the Fatah movement led by Yasser Arafat and later by Mahmoud Abbas faced accusations of corruption and of failing to defend Palestinian interests in the peace process, which led to Hamas' victory in the January 2006 elections. This situation triggered a dialectical and armed struggle between the two groups for the control of political institutions and, above all, the security forces. In 2011 Hamas and Fatah announced a reconciliation agreement. However, the discrepancies between the two groups have continued, complicating the task of forming a government of national unity. Changes in the region within the framework of the Arab revolts have also had a relevant influence on the progress and setbacks in the reconciliation process, which Israel is openly against.

The year started with positive expectations on the process of reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah which, nevertheless, were truncated as of the second half of the year, when the divisions between these two Palestinian formations re-surfaced. The prospects on progressing during the first half of the year responded to a series of events that were considered promising. At the start of the year, Fatah was authorised to hold its first –and massive– demonstration in Gaza since 2007 to mark the 48th anniversary of the creation of this organisation led by the also president of the

Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. The event was a replica of the similar celebration by Hamas in the West Bank at the end of 2012, in a sign that was seen as an improvement in the relations between these two groups. In parallel, and after the respective meetings with the Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi, Abbas and the leader of Hamas in exile, Khaled Meshal, announced the re-activation of efforts to implement the reconciliation agreement signed in 2011, including the creation of a national unity government. In this context, some movements of the Palestinian leadership also gave way to positive hopes and were considered as an opportunity for rapprochement between Hamas and Fatah. On the one side, Meshal –considered to be the more moderate leader compared to the Palestinian Islamist leadership in Gaza– was re-elected as the political leader of the movement. According to diplomatic sources cited by the press, Qatar and Egypt had convinced Meshal to give up his idea of not running for a new period in the post. In addition, there was the decision by the PA's prime minister, Salam Fayyad, to give up his post –which he held since 2007– in a measure that was welcomed by Hamas. The Islamist group was one of the main critics of the prime minister, accusing him of protecting the interests of the Israeli occupation. Abbas appointed Rami Hamdallah as the interim successor, a Palestinian academic who resigned less than a month later, arguing differences with his cabinet, appointed by Fatah. The idea was the Hamdallah would be in the post only for a transitional period until the formation of a national unity government, planned for July, according to the announcement made by Hamas and Fatah. However, this did not happen, and neither did the elections, despite the tasks that had started at the beginning of the year to update the census of voters.

As of the middle of the year, the Palestinian political climate was directly determined by two events that increased the distance between these two groups. Firstly, with the ousting of Morsi from power in Egypt after a military coup. **Hamas and Fatah adopted opposed positions faced with the growing polarisation on the neighbour country and this led to crossed accusations, arrests and some episodes of confrontation between supporters of these two groups.** The AP suppressed several demonstrations of support for Morsi in the West Bank, while Hamas adopted measures against critical sectors in Gaza. The Palestinian Islamist group was accused of interfering in Egyptian internal affairs and of being involved in violent events in the country supporting the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the Sinai militias.⁶⁰ Hamas denied these accusations and, in turn, accused Fatah of inciting hostilities against Hamas in the Egyptian press and considered that the approach taken by the PA towards the new Egyptian authorities was yet another piece of evidence that it was aligned with Israel and of its lack of commitment with the principles of democracy. Hamas was especially affected by the evolution of the events in Egypt, which

60. See the summary on Egypt (Sinai) in this chapter.

led to the closure of the tunnels with the Gaza, causing the deterioration of the humanitarian and economic situation in Gaza. **A second event that contributed to the alienation between Hamas and Fatah was the decision taken by the PA to resume peace conversations with Israel, upon the request of the US, after three years of blocked dialogue.**⁶¹ When the Abbas Government gave the go-ahead to resuming negotiations just after the Islamist Government was ousted in Egypt was no coincidence, as several analysts pointed out.⁶² The ousting of Morsi from power made it possible to envisage Hamas' weakening and a lower impact of Islamist criticism on the PA, thus facilitating a great space for manoeuvring for Fatah in its relations with Israel. The Palestinian Islamist group continued to reject the conversations, arguing that, among other issues, in the past only Israel had benefited from the process. Both Meshal and the prime minister of Hamas in Gaza, Ismail Haniya, called on the PA to suspend conversations with Israel. In this context, some analysts warned that if the prospects for reconciliation between the Palestinians had appeared to be complex from the start, an agreement seemed even less likely as a consequence of the evolution of tension during 2013.

The expectations for reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah were truncated due to the profound differences over the resuming of dialogue with Israel and the situation in Egypt after the military coup

Syria – Turkey	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=
Type:	Government International
Main parties:	Syria, Turkey, Syrian opposition armed groups

Summary:

Relations between Syria and Turkey had improved in recent decades following the signing of the Adana agreement in 1998, which forced the expulsion of the Kurdish armed group PKK and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, from Syrian territory. The launch of Turkey's "zero problems with our neighbours" foreign policy by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan had paved the way for the signing of commercial and border agreements by Damascus and Ankara. The waters were muddied by the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011, leading to a period of distancing between the two countries. After taking the initiative to prevent the isolation of the regime in Damascus and urging Bashar al-Assad, without success, to implement reforms in Syria, Turkey adopted an openly critical stance, publicly supporting the Syrian opposition. Turkey's position has been determined by the intense flow of Syrian refugees that it has been forced to deal with and due to the impact of the crisis on the Kurdish question. The tension has led to a series of incidents that have raised fears concerning the possible escalation of violence between the two countries.

Tension between Turkey and Syria continued to be high during 2013, with a series of incidents in relation to

the Syrian armed conflict that caused the death of dozens of people and crossed accusations between the Governments of both countries, amidst growing concerns over the complexity of the crisis on a regional level. At the start of the year NATO deployed Patriot missile batteries on the Turkish-Syrian border with the stated objective of helping Ankara to repel any eventual aerial attack from al-Assad's regime. The Turkish Government had expressed special concern over the possibility that Syria may revert to using chemical weapons. Germany, the US and the Netherlands installed anti-aircraft

batteries and deployed hundreds of soldiers in the east of Turkey, in the towns of Kharamanmaras, Gaziantep and around the Adana airport. In Parallel, there continued to be episodes of violence along the border. The most serious violent event took place in May, when a double attack with car bombs in the Turkish city of Reyhanli killed 52 people. Ankara then expressed its suspicion that the Damascus Government was behind the attack, but the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for calm and denied that his country could be pulled into an armed conflict. The Syrian authorities denied any responsibility in the attack and shed strong criticism on the Turkish Government, accusing it of providing weapons, explosives and vehicles to the Syrian rebels. Other episodes of violence during the year included the downing of a Turkish F-16 fighter jet close to the border with Syria in unclear circumstances (which led to the death of the pilot), the downing of a Syrian helicopter by two Turkish aircraft, violent incidents between Turkish forces and Syrian population seeking refuge in the country and clashes between the Turkish troops and traffickers of arms and goods. There were also several events along the borderline between Syrian rebel groups, especially between militiamen of the Kurdish group PYD and Jihadist combatants. According to partial counts based on press reports, until August around 74 Turkish citizens had died in violent incidents relating to the Syrian crisis.

The Turkish Government continued to position itself by the side of the Syrian opposition and criticised Bashar al-Assad's regime. It is also worth mentioning the approach taken on the conflict by Ankara, conditioned by several factors, including the constant flow of Syrian refugees into the country, the consequences of the Kurdish issue and the increase of Jihadist groups in the ranks of the forces opposing the Damascus regime. **According to UNHCR sources, at the end of 2013 the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey amounted to more than 565,000, although Government estimates increased this figure to 700,000.** The large number

61. See the summary on Israel-Palestine in chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).

62. Yossi Alpher, *How Middle East regional dynamics affect the Israeli- Palestinian peace process*, Expert Analysis, NOREF, December, 2013, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Israel-Palestine/Publications/How-Middle-East-regional-dynamics-affect-the-Israeli-Palestinian-peace-process>.

of refugees meant –and will continue to mean– an important financial burden for Turkey, which has taken on the costs without much international aid. This situation posed new challenges to the Turkish Government, due to the presence of rebel fighters in the refugee camps and the tensions along the Turkish border province of Hatay, with a population distribution similar to that of Syria (one third of the inhabitants are related to the Syrian Alaouite population)⁶³. As for the Kurdish issue, the course of events in Syria and the actions carried out by the Kurdish forces in the country also forced the Turkish Government to assess the impact of the situation inside Turkey and to assess how this related to Kurdish actors in Syria and Iraq.⁶⁴ Erdogan's Government observed with special attention the advance of Kurdish forces in Syrian territory –they announced an autonomous administration in areas with a Kurdish majority. Nevertheless, Ankara chose to enter into direct conversations with the PYD, the Syrian wing of the PKK. As for the advance of Jihadist groups (including those with ties to al-Qaeda) both in Syria and in Iraq, during the year, Turkish intelligence and security officials expressed a growing concern over the consequences this may have for the instability along border areas.

b) The Gulf

Bahrain	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, Iran
Summary:	
The popular uprisings that spread across countries in the Maghreb and Middle East in 2011 also had an impact on Bahrain. Ruled since the 18th century by the al-Khalifa and part of the British protectorate territories from 1861 to 1971, the country formally became a constitutional monarchy in 2002. The family in power is of Sunni faith, unlike most of the country's population, which is of Shiite faith and which denounces systematic policies of discrimination. Internal tensions, which had increased in recent years, turned into open protest from February 2011. Demands for political and social reforms were met by the government with economic incentives and offers of political dialogue, but also with the repression and persecution of government opponents. The threat to the stability of the region led to the intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which sent troops to the country. The situation in Bahrain has fuelled the confrontation between Iran and the Gulf countries (especially Saudi Arabia) and is of special concern to the USA, whose Fifth Fleet is stationed in the archipelago.	

During 2013, the situation in Bahrain continued to present regular anti-Government protests, the Government harassment on the opposition and sporadic violent events, which dropped considerably compared to the previous year. These incidents caused the death of at least five people (two policemen and three opponents) and dozens of injured. **Dissident sectors mobilised during the year, sometimes on key dates, including the second anniversary of the revolt against the regime** (in February) and the subsequent military intervention by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to support Manama's Government (in March) during the new edition of the Formula 1 race to ensure a greater international attention to the demands of the opposition (in April), or on the country's independence day (in August). Also, during the year there were also mobilisations to protests against some Government measures such as the launching of an operation to search the house of the main Shiite cleric in the country, Sheikh Issa Qassem; the death of a young man showing signs of torture after being arrested by the police; or reacting against the arrest or presentation of charges against many opposition leaders in the country, including prominent leaders from the main opposition party, al-Wefaq. The authorities tried adopting a deterrent policy against the programmed protests –with previous arrests, raids and searches– and used force to disperse mobilisations, which often led to clashes between demonstrators and security forces. In some cases, protesters turned to setting up road blockades, burnt cars and used stones against the Police. During the year there was also evidence of homemade explosive devices used mainly against the security forces, although they were also used in an attack against a Sunni mosque. This last attack was claimed by a group called the al-Ashar Brigade, which allegedly has ties with Tehran. The country's authorities accused Iran's Republican Guard of promoting the establishment of terrorist cells in the country. Thus, during the second half of the year, Manama promoted laws to deter and restrict popular mobilisations, toughened the sentences for incitement crimes and acts of terrorism, banned protests in the capital and reinstated the National Security Law, taking the country into a situation similar to a state of emergency.

The Bahrain Government was the subject of criticism from several international actors –including the UN Human Rights Council, the US and several NGOs– **for the human rights situation in the country**. Specifically, what was criticised was the continuous harassment on and imprisonment of people using their freedom of expression, the existence of prisoners of conscience, the lack of due process in trials to opponents, and torture during detention periods. During the year several legal judgements were reported that generated controversy and led to accusations of polarisation. These included,

63. International Crisis Group. *Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey*, Europe Report, no. 225, April 30, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/225-blurring-the-borders-syrian-spillover-risks-for-turkey.aspx>.

64. Refer to the summary on Turkey (southeast) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) and on Iraq (Kurdistan) in this chapter.

for instance, sentences of up to 15 years in prison for 50 Shiite activists accused of trying to overthrow the monarchy, spying for Iran and belonging to a clandestine group (referring to the 14 February Movement, mainly made up of young people with no official link to the political opposition that have been key in promoting the anti-government protests since February 2011). This internal climate had a direct impact on the prospects for national dialogue set forward by the Government, which the opposition agreed to at the start of the year. The process started somewhat haphazardly, with sessions marked by crossed accusations, disagreements and no specific agenda, with frequent interruptions due to the opposition's boycott in retaliation for some Government measures against critical sectors. Within the framework of this National Dialogue al-Wefaq demanded a greater presence of the dissident sectors, insisted on the need for the outcome of the dialogue to be ratified in a consultation to the citizens and demanded that the Crown Prince Salman al-Khalifa, who is perceived as a more moderate figure within the regime, to take part in the Dialogue. The opposition formation decided to step out of the process at the end of the year, after one of its top leaders, Khalil Marzooq, was arrested and accused of inciting terrorism, a measure that al-Wefaq considered was politically motivated. The Government officially suspended the national dialogue at the start of 2014.

The Bahrain Government was criticised due to the human rights situation in the country and the continuous harassment on dissident sectors

Iran	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, political, religious and social opposition

Summary:

Ever since taking power in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency was met with internal contestation from many sectors. Both the manner he conducted foreign policy and the outcomes of his internal policies generated growing opposition in the country. This tension is framed within a political context that is marked by the decades-long polarisation between the conservative and reformist sectors in the country, and by the key role of religious authorities and armed forces –especially the Republican Guard– in Iran's development. Internal tensions rose towards the middle of 2009 when Ahmadinejad was re-elected in elections that were reported to be fraudulent by the opposition and that fuelled the largest popular protests in the country since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The end of Ahmadinejad's two consecutive mandates and the election of the moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani in 2013 seem to have started a new stage in the country, giving rise to expectations regarding a possible decrease in the internal political tension and an eventual change in the relations between Iran and the outer world.

The political situation in Iran in 2013 was conditioned by the end of the two consecutive mandates of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president –who for legal limits could not run for a third term in office– and by the election of

his successor at the middle of the year. As in previous years, during first six months of 2013 the disputes between sectors close to Ahmadinejad and other conservative groups of power in the Judiciary and the Legislative became evident. This struggle was staged with the temporary arrest of the controversial former attorney of Tehran Saeed Morazavi, considered to be close to Ahmadinejad, who was accused of being responsible for the repression against the popular demonstrations against the re-

election of the leader in 2009. His arrest came shortly after the president denounced the Parliament's speaker, Ali Larijani and his family for alleged corruption and nepotism. Larijani was then considered one of the best-positioned figures to win the presidential elections on 14th June. In May he and seven other candidates received the go-ahead to participate in the elections from the Council of Guardians, which studied 686 applications and vetoed figures such as the former president Hashemi Rafsanjani and Esfandiar Rahim Meshaei (close to Ahmadinejad), besides rejecting the applications of 30 women who submitted their candidacies. According to several analyses, the Council only approved the applications of figures that had a close relation to the supreme leader Ali Khamenei. **The vote awarded the victory to the moderate Hassan Rouhani, in the first round, with 50.7% of votes.** According to some analysts, his candidacy was favoured by the decision of the only reformist candidate, Mohammad Reza Aref, to withdraw from the elections just days before they were held; and by the support received from the two former presidents Rafsanjani and Mohamed Khatami. Rouhani, the only cleric among the candidates, gave rise to expectations both internally and internationally, thanks to his fame of being both pragmatic and a conciliatory diplomat. A former negotiator for the Iranian nuclear programme, during his campaign Rouhani made explicit his criticism towards Ahmadinejad's Government and promised to free political prisoners, to guarantee civil rights, to recover the country's dignity and to improve its foreign relations.

Rouhani took office on the 4th of August and the change in his approach to the West had internal repercussions, causing divisions. The leader was received with protests from critical sectors upon returning from the UN Assembly in New York, while 230 of the 290 parliamentarians approved a declaration of support to his conciliatory message at the headquarters of the international organisation. Some aspects of the telephone conversation held between Rouhani and the president of the United States, Barack Obama, were called inappropriate by ayatollah Khamenei, but overall the supreme leader backed the Government's new strategy and warned

the hard-line leaders not to boycott the negotiations that led to an agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme in November. **The commander of the Republican Guard, Mohammad Ali Jafari, emerged as one of the main critics of the new Government. He considered the Obama-Rouhani dialogue a strategic error and at the end of the year he warned on the western influences in the country,** after engaging in a bitter public controversy with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif. The commander denied a statement by the diplomat on the capacity of the US to destabilize the Iranian defence system and as for the nuclear agreement, he considered Iran had given the most and received very little in exchange, although he valued that no red lines had been crossed.

On a domestic level, Rouhani adopted some measures aiming at a possible positive evolution, considering that the release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience –some 800 according to press reports– had been identified as one of the priorities for signalling a change. In September the Government freed a dozen detainees (eight women and three men), including human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh. However, this policy was played down by the Iranian leader in exile and Nobel Peace Prize Shrin Ebadi, who highlighted that other than Sotoudeh, the remaining prisoners that were released had already served their term in jail. Ebadi also warned on the persisting human rights abuses in the country, on the inability of the president to control some areas in the power apparatus and on the intensification of executions since Rouhani got to power. According to figures from the International Campaign on Human Rights in Iran, since the new president was elected in August and **until November more than 200 people had been executed, most of whom were allegedly drug traffickers and Kurdish activists. The total number of people sentenced to death during 2013 was more than 400.**⁶⁵ Some Government representatives regretted this policy, which would have generated unrest among some sectors of the civil society due to a more aggressive approximation to make it clear that the statu quo had not changed. In October, a report by the UN Special Rapporteur for Iran also determined that there were extensive human rights abuses in the country, restrictions on the freedom of expression, discrimination and abuses against minorities. Despite this, the special rapporteur was confident with the implementation of reforms and welcomed measures adopted by the new Government aimed to increase access to social networks and to reduce control measures on women.

The arrival of the moderate Hassan Rouhani to the presidency of Iran gave rise to expectations for an internal political change and a new approach to Iran's foreign relations

Iran (north-west)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, PJAK, autonomous government of Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq

Summary:

Despite the heterogeneous and multi ethnic nature of Iran, the minorities that live in the country, including the Kurds, have been subjected to centralist, homogenisation policies for decades and have condemned discrimination by the authorities of the Islamic Republic. In this context, since 1946, different political and armed groups of Kurd origin have confronted Tehran government in an attempt to obtain greater autonomy for the Kurd population, which is concentrated in the north-western provinces of the country. Groups such as the KDPI –Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran– and Komala headed this fight for decades. Since 2004, the Free Life of Kurdistan Party (PJAK) has gained a protagonist role in the conflict with Tehran. Its armed wing, the East Kurdistan Defence Forces, periodically confronts the Iranian forces, in particular members of the Revolutionary Guard.

Even if the dispute between the PJAK and the Iranian Government stopped being considered an armed conflict in 2012 with the drop in the levels of violence, this context continued to be a hotbed of tension during 2013 and several incidents caused the death of more than a dozen people. During the first half of the year, information from local human rights organisations warned on the arrests of people under political charges and accusations that they cooperated with the Kurdish armed group, in operations led by the security forces in February and March. According to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, the security forces carried out dozens of arrests, mainly in the cities of Mahabad, in the West Azerbaijan province; in Sanandaj, in the Kurdistan province; and in Paveh, in the Kermanshah province. During the second half of the year, and after months without information on violent events linked to this dispute, press media alerted on a clash between PJAK militiamen based in Iraqi Kurdistan (KRG) and Iranian military forces on the border zone of Sandharst, an area where the Kurdish population is a majority. **According to the balance provided by the Kurdish armed group, these clashes that happened at the end of August killed at least nine people, including seven Iranian soldiers and two PJAK militiamen.** In October, the Iranian press reported on the deaths of three PJAK members in armed clashes with the Revolutionary Guard in the Kurdistan province, in an attack that was in retaliation for an ambush carried out by the Kurdish group in that

65. See the summary on Iran (north-west) in this chapter.

same region that killed six soldiers. After the execution of the PJAK members who were in prison, including the leader Habibollah Golparipour, the Kurdish armed group warned the Iranian authorities that there would be retaliation actions. In a press release, the group warned that these types of situations made it more difficult to continue with the cease-fire –which has been in force since August 2011– and that therefore it would study the policies adopted by Iran on the Kurdish minority in the country. However, some analyses pointed out that beyond sporadic skirmishes, it was unlikely that the PJAK would become involved in a new armed conflict with the Iranian forces, partly because of the strategy adopted by the PKK –of which the PJAK is a branch– to focus its efforts on the struggle of Kurds in Syria and due to the lack of support to the military path from the Kurdish population in Iran due to fears of reprisals.⁶⁶ In this sense, the leaders of the PJAK were more favourable to a self-defence strategy (and not an offensive one) and a dialogue process similar to the one between the PKK and the Turkish Government.

Towards the end of the year, several international voices warned on the human rights abuses in the country and on the discrimination against minorities, including the Kurds. The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran specified that since Rouhani took office, in August, until November more than 200 people had been executed, most of them drug traffickers and Kurdish activists. Some sources of information attributed this trend to hard-line sectors in Iran, who wanted to show the world that the statu quo remained in the country, faced with the more conciliatory outer image projected by Rouhani. Although Rouhani gained a wide support from the Kurdish areas –71% of votes in Kurdistan–, some analyses pointed out a feeling of deceit after the first months of his presidency due to the fact that no Kurds had been appointed to positions of power in the local government.⁶⁷

Iran (Sistan Balochistan)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Self-government Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran), Jundallah (Soldiers of God / People's Resistance Movement), Harakat Ansar Iran, Jaish al-Adl
Summary:	
Sistan-Balochistan is an Iranian province bordering with Afghanistan and Pakistan –the Baloch population lives on	

both sides of the border– and is of Sunni majority, contrasting with the rest of the country, where the Shiite arm of Islam is predominant. The zone is characterised by high poverty levels and is the scene of smuggling routes and drug trafficking. Since 2005 the group Jundallah (Soldiers of God) has led an insurgence campaign in the region. The organisation, which also calls itself the People's Resistance Movement, was established in 2002 and denounces Tehran's sectarian persecution. Jundallah states that its aim is to defend the rights, culture and religion of the Baloch people and denies having any ties with abroad, as the Iranian Government accuses it of having with the US, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and with the al-Qaeda network. In view of the possibility of destabilization in the region, Tehran has strengthened its control mechanisms and has sentenced dozens of Jundallah militants to death. The actions of the armed group have dropped since 2010 after its leader was captured and executed, but new armed groups with a similar agenda to Jundallah's have continued to operate in the area, with sporadic clashes with the security forces.

The tension in Sistan-Balochistan escalated at the end of the year and displayed greater levels of violence than in 2012. **The different episodes were mainly between the security forces and militiamen of the armed group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), established in 2012 according to information appeared in the press.** The organisation carried out an attack with an explosive device on a road to Saravan at the end of February where several members of the Republican Guard were killed. During the second half of the year, the commander of the Republican Guard Mohamed Ali Jafari announced that his forces had managed to thwart at least 11 suicidal attacks by armed groups that had planned large-scale operations in Sistan-Balochistan. Shortly after, **in October, there was the most serious incident of the year. The clashes between combatants of Jaish al-Adl and Iranian border guards killed 14 Iranian officials** and injured five more. Other sources referred to in the press increased the number of casualties to somewhere between 17 and 20 dead. It is worth mentioning that the armed group justified its attack as retaliation for Tehran's repression against the Sunni community, and also because of Iran's participation in the Syrian war, supporting the Damascus forces.⁶⁸ In a statement, Jaish al-Adl specifically denounced the Iranian Republican Guard and accused it of committing massacres in Syria. It also reproached the Iranian authorities for executing young Baloch and Kurds.⁶⁹ Iran asked Pakistan to cooperate in closing the net on the group's militants, who would have fled to this country after fighting the security forces. The security forces would have killed for members of the insurgence in Mirjaveh, a town on the border with Pakistan.

66. See the summary on Turkey (south-east) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) and Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, "Iranian Kurdish parties prefer dialogue with government", *Al-Monitor*, January 14, 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/iranian-kurdish-parties-waning-support-exiles-pkk-turkey.html>.

67. Behdad Bordbar, "Iranian Kurds dissatisfied with Rouhani", *Al-Monitor*, December 23, 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/rouhani-disappoints-iran-kurds.html>.

68. See the summary on Syria in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).

69. See the summaries on Iran and Iran (north-west) in this chapter.

Alongside this, in retaliation for the armed action of Jaish al-Adl, Tehran ordered the execution of 16 Baloch prisoners accused of belonging to groups hostile with the Islamic republic, although they had no responsibility for the attack. The measure was denounced by human rights organisations and by the Iranian Nobel Peace Prize Shrin Ebadi. After the executions there were fresh incidents in Sistan-Baluchistan. In November, Jaish al-Adl claimed the murder of an attorney as revenge for applying the death penalty to the 16 Baloch. In December, press reports indicated that three republican guards died when an explosive device exploded on a road in the southeast of the country, in an attack that was blamed on Jaish al-Adl. In previous years the insurgence activity in Sistan-Baluchistan had mainly been carried out by the armed group Jundallah, the activities of which dropped after its leader, Abdolmalek Rigi was captured and executed in 2010. During 2012 there were sporadic armed actions claimed by the group Harakat Ansar Iran, who claim the deceased leader of Jundallah as their spiritual leader.

Tension in Sistan-Baluchistan worsened during the second half of the year after a series of clashes between the Iranian security forces and the armed group Jaish al-Adl, a fairly new group

Iran – USA, Israel ⁷⁰	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	System, Government International
Main parties:	Iran, USA, Israel

Summary:

Since the Islamic revolution in 1979 that overthrew the regime of Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi (an ally of Washington) and proclaimed Ayatollah Khomeini as the country's Supreme leader, relations between the US, Israel and Iran have been tense. The international pressure on Iran became stronger in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when the George W. Bush Administration declared Iran, together with Iraq and North Korea as the "axis of evil" and as an enemy State due to its alleged ties with terrorism. In this context, Iran's nuclear programme has been one of the issues that have generated most concern in the West, which is suspicious of its military purposes. Thus, Iran's nuclear programme has developed alongside the approval of international sanctions and threats of using force, especially by Israel. Iran's approach to the conflict during the two consecutive mandates of the ultra-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) did not contribute to ease tensions. The rise to power of the moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani, in turn, has generated high hopes of a turn in Iran's foreign relations, especially after the signing of an agreement on nuclear issues at the end of 2013.

The international tension over Iran's nuclear programme dropped during 2013 after the signature of an historical agreement in November, after more than a decade of

unfruitful negotiations, in a context that was favoured by the election of a new president in the Asian country in the middle of the year. During the first half of 2013, the conflict's dynamics were similar to those in previous years, with an exchange of warnings and meetings between Iran and international powers without results. Tehran and the P5+1 countries (USA, France, Russia, China and United Kingdom, plus Germany) resumed contacts in February at a meeting in Kazakhstan, after eight months without dialogue. The discussions on an eventual softening of the sanctions on Iran in exchange for this country stopping to enrich uranium led to a meeting of specialised teams in Istanbul and a new diplomatic meeting in April, again in Kazakhstan. The conversations ended without progress, causing the US to warn that discussion on Iran's nuclear programme could not go on forever. During the first half of the year, Washington put forward the possibility of direct discussions with Iran, but at the same time it approved new sanctions against the Islamic republic, leading the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, to reject entering into conversations under threats. The US highlighted that even though it prioritised the diplomatic path, it did not discard other options –including the use of force– to stop Iran from getting an atomic bomb. Israel also warned that Tehran was getting close to the "red line" for nuclear matters and again demanded stronger action from the international community. Iran, in turn, continued with statements on expanding its atomic plants and on the discovery of uranium reserves, while a report by the IAEA warned on the construction of new centrifuges at the Natanz plant.

The end of Ahmadinejad's mandate –he could not run for a third term after two consecutive mandates– and the election of the moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani as the country's new president opened a new phase and gave rise to hopes for change.⁷¹ **Rouhani, who has experience as a negotiator and was the mastermind of the only agreement between Iran and European powers on its nuclear programme (2003-2005) had set the objective of changing the relations between Iran and the outer world** and adopting measures against the sanctions that had severely impacted the country's economy. The president appointed his Foreign Affairs Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, as the person in charge of nuclear negotiations, which up until then had been led by Saeed Jalili, a hard-line politician. Although Ayatollah Ali Khamenei still has the last word, Rouhani, in doing so, made sure he had a greater control on the negotiations, since the minister is reports back directly to the President. At the same time, the US and Iran made statements on their willingness to end the dispute, and according to press reports, Rouhani and Barak Obama exchanged letters on the matter. The UN

70. This international socio-political crisis affects other countries that have not been mentioned, but which are involved to varying degrees.

71. See the summary on Iran in this chapter.

General Assembly meeting in New York was the scenario for new signs of rapprochement: a conciliatory speech by Rouhani where he denied that Iran harboured nuclear ambitions and expressed his willingness to reach an agreement in the timeframe of three to six months; a meeting between the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, and Zarif –the first meeting of such a high level in six years– and **a telephone conversation between Obama and Rouhani, an unprecedented gesture after three decades of bilateral hostility**. In this context, new rounds of negotiation with Iran and the P5+1 took place and ended on 24th November with an agreement (Joint Action Plan) to temporarily halt Iran's uranium enrichment activities in exchange for lifting some sanctions. This seems the first step towards a comprehensive agreement that should be negotiated during 2014.⁷² It emerged at the time that the agreement had been possible thanks to a series of secret contacts between the US and Iranian delegations, mainly held in Oman since the start of 2013 –i.e. when Ahmadinejad was still in power– which gained momentum from the moment Rouhani arrived to power. Israel, who remained very sceptical vis-à-vis the signs of distension between Washington and Tehran, called the agreement an historical mistake. In December, representatives from Iran and the P5+1 met again to discuss technical details of the agreement that was to enter into force on 20th January 2014. These contacts were affected by the announcement of possible new sanctions on Iran, promoted by the US Congress, although Obama announced that he would veto an initiative of this nature. Iranian hard-line parliamentarians, in turn, suggested significantly increasing the levels of uranium enrichment if the US were to adopt new measures to punish the country.

After over a decade of unfruitful negotiations, Iran and the international powers in the P5+1 signed an agreement on Iran's controversial nuclear programme

Saudi Arabia	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Government, Identity Internationalised internal
Main parties:	Government, social and political opposition, AQAP
Summary:	
Governed since the 18 th century by the al-Saud family and established as a state in 1932, Saudi Arabia is characterised by its religious conservatism and wealth, based on its oil reserves, and its regional power. Internally, the Sunni monarchy holds the political power and is in charge of government institutions, leaving little room for dissidence.	

Political parties are not allowed, freedom of expression is curtailed and many basic rights are restricted. The Shiite minority, concentrated in the eastern part of the country, has denounced its marginalisation and exclusion from the state's structures. The authorities have been accused of implementing repressive measures on the pretext of ensuring security in the country and in the context of anti-terrorism campaigns, the targets of which include militants of al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In the context of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, pro-reform and pro-democracy protests met with a repressive response from the government, which claimed that attempts to destabilise Saudi Arabia were being orchestrated from outside the country.

Although information on violent events that caused deaths dropped compared to the previous year, **Saudi Arabia continued to be the scenario of internal tensions linked to repression against demonstrations staged by the dissidence and to the general human rights situation in the country**. A report by Amnesty International published at the end of October denounced that Riyadh had failed to implement any of the ain recommendations it had committed to at the Human Rights Council in 2009 and warned on the persistence of practices against opposition activists such as arbitrary arrests, detentions without charges, trials with no guarantees and torture.⁷³ Human Rights Watch came up with a similar diagnosis in a report published in December.⁷⁴ According to Amnesty International, repression against the opposition has become more intense since 2011. During the first half of 2013 the two founders of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA) were sentenced to 10 and 11 years in prison accused of disobedience, questioning the integrity of civil servants and inciting public disorder, among other charges. At least seven activists were sentenced for inciting protests through social networks. There were also dozens of arrests of people participating in peaceful demonstrations calling for the freeing of their relatives, who were arrested without a prospect of standing trial. The arrest of women and minors during these protests fuelled new demonstrations calling for their release. Incidents of this type were registered in the capital and also in other places such as Buraida, in the al-Qassim province, in the centre of the country. It is worth mentioning that international reports also drew attention on the discriminatory policies of the Saudi authorities towards minority groups, including the Shiites, who mainly live in the country's Eastern Province. During the year there were several episodes related to this situation, including a shooting rampage by armed men in the

72. For further information on the evolution of the negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme over the past decade and details on the agreement of 24th November, see "Iran-USA, Israel" in the section on peace processes at the School for a Culture of Peace's Database on Conflicts and Peacebuilding, <http://escolapau.uab.es/conflictosypaz/ficha.php?idfichasubzona=188¶midioma=0>.

73. Amnistía Internacional, *Saudi Arabia, Unfulfilled Promises: Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review*, May 1, 2013, <http://amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE23/018/2013/en>.

74. Human Rights Watch, *Challenging the Red Lines, Stories of Rights Activists in Saudi Arabia*, HRW, December 18, 2013, <http://www.hrw.org/node/121373>.

Eastern Province in February, the death of two Shiites from police gunfire who were participating in a protest in the area of Qatif in June, and the arrest of 18 Shiites in March who were accused of spying –allegedly for Iran– and promoting sectarian tensions. The arrest of this group was strongly condemned by Shiite religious leaders. The human rights situation in the country was also marked by discrimination against women, who in 2013 launched a campaign to claim their right to drive that gained international notoriety. The Government, meanwhile, highlighted the approval of a norm that, for the first time, allows women to represent 20% of the Shura, which advises the Government on legislative matters. Saudi Arabia was also in the international spotlight in 2013 due to abusive situations against foreign workers in the country.⁷⁵ Clashes between the Police and migrant workers caused the death of several people, and hundreds of injured and arrests at the end of the year.

During 2013 Saudi Arabia continued to play a key role as a regional actor, positioning itself in several contexts of conflict.⁷⁶ Thus, Riyadh continued its financial and military support to the Syrian opposition and criticised the lack of international involvement in the war. Relations with the US were affected after Washington decided to withdraw its threats to intervene militarily in Syria. In this context, Saudi Arabia renounced taking up a position as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in October to protests against the lack of measures against Bashar al-Assad's regime. Riyadh also greeted the agreement between international powers and Iran over its nuclear programme with distrust.⁷⁷ Additionally, Saudi Arabia backed the military after the coup in Egypt and at the end of the year agreed to offer significant financial support to the Lebanese military forces. As for Yemen, during the first half of the year, the US press reported that the CIA had been operating from a Saudi secret base to launch attacks using unmanned aeroplanes on alleged al-Qaeda fighters. Press reports also highlighted that Riyadh had started to build a wall more than 1,800 km long to seal-off its border with Yemen, in view of the climate of instability and insecurity in its southern neighbour.

Yemen	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government Internal
Main parties:	Government, security forces, pro-Government militias, Army deserters, tribal armed groups, political and social sectors

Summary:

In recent years, Yemen has faced a climate of deep instability conditioned by the presence of a Shiite rebel force in the north (the Houthis), a secessionist movement in the south and growing al-Qaeda activity in the territory. From 2011, in a regional context of uprisings, the instability in Yemen became more acute when the population staged protests against Ali Abdullah Saleh's attempts to stay in power, after more than three decades in presidency. The peaceful protests, put down brutally by the regime, were eclipsed by growing armed confrontations between sympathisers and opponents of the regime. The clashes have mainly involved the security forces, pro and anti-governmental tribal militias and units of army deserters. Following the signing of a transition agreement in late 2011 that led to the end of Saleh's presidency, the country began a turbulent transition plenty of challenges.

Although **the internal situation in Yemen stopped being considered an armed conflict in 2012, the political landscape continued to display a climate of tension and sporadic violence, together with several hotbeds of conflict in the country.**⁷⁸ The most significant event in 2013 was the setting up of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC); a key element in the transition process that started in the country after Ali Abdullah Saleh ceased to be the country's president, as part of the agreement promoted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the UN and the USA at the end of 2011. The initiative, which was due to start in 2012 –it was delayed on several occasions– started on 18th March with the participation of 565 representatives (30% women) appointed by the Government and by a technical committee, and was attended by the UN special envoy for Yemen, Jamal Benomar. The forum – that established nine working groups– rose expectations on the possibility of dealing with conflictive issues that had generated instabilities in Yemen over past decades, but also reluctance among some sectors that saw that the dialogue was being led by the same elites from the past or due to the difficulties in reaching consensus faced with the deep ideological differences of the participants. Some Yemeni political actors opted to step out of the initiative or boycott it, including secessionist groups from the south that staged protests. The start of the process was also affected by the attempted murder of one of the al-Houthi representatives. During the process, and in tune with the opinion of analysts, President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi stressed that the alternative to dialogue would be the renewal of violence and, probably, the start of a civil war.⁷⁹

In parallel, the leader also promoted measures to re-structure the Armed Forces. Hadi ordered several relatives of former president Saleh out of their posts and

75. Human Rights Watch, *Saudi Arabia: Protect Migrant Workers' Rights*, HRW, July 2, 2013, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/01/saudi-arabia-protect-migrant-workers-rights>.

76. See the summary on Syria and Yemen (AQAP) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) and the summary on Lebanon in this chapter.

77. See the summary on Iran – USA, Israel in this chapter.

78. See the summary on Yemen (south) in this chapter and Yemen (Houthis) and Yemen (AQAP) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).

79. Nasser Arrabaye, "No alternative but success", Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 10, 2013, <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/09/10/no-alternative-but-success/gmph>.

relocated them to diplomacy posts; this included his son and commander of the Republican Guard, Ahmed Ali Saleh. The President also removed the powerful general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar from his post, the commander of the First Armed Division and the leader of the military rebellion against Saleh in 2011. In order to strengthen his grip on the military forces, Hadi also ordered senior officials appointed by Saleh out of their posts, transferred several units of the Republican Guard to other security forces and appointed followers and family members to key posts. In this context, in the months that followed there were some violent episodes linked to the security reform. Hundreds of former members of the Republican Guard demonstrated around the presidential palace to demand compensation, and this caused clashes with the Yemeni security forces with a balance of one dead and several injured. There was another attempted murder against the Prime Minister in an incident whose authorship is not clear. During the year, the Government also apologised to the population in the north, south and east of the country that were the object of military campaigns during Saleh's regime.

Internal tensions in Yemen were also visible during the NDC discussions, which happened in a turbulent way, with threats to disrupt the sessions and delays. In fact, the initiative was due to end in September, but continued to work on several issues at the end of the year. **One of the points that generated most polarisation had to do with Yemen's future political structure, since even if a consensus was reached for the implementation of a federal system, there continued to be different opinions regarding the number of regions that it would contain.** Leaders from the heterogeneous South Yemen Movement (Hiraak) participating in the dialogue stuck to their claims to break away or, at least, to implement a federal solution with two states that in the future would lead to a referendum on the political fate of the south of the country. Other sectors, including the Islamist party Islah and the former government party General People's Congress rejected this possibility. Towards the end of the year, al-Houthi, members of Hiraak and persons from the former regime boycotted some sessions. In November, the UN Security Council welcomed the progress of the Yemeni transition process, but warned against the adoption of measures going against the sectors that were threatening with causing the dialogue to go off-course and urged the parties to accelerate the process to continue with the roadmap, which includes approving a new Constitution and holding elections, initially planned for February 2014. On 23rd December, the NDC approved an agreement to promote federalism as the basis of the structure for the new unified State, with a special arrangement for the southern area. The discussion on the number of regions in the federation, however, was not agreed and it was decided that the President would establish a committee to define the matter during 2014. It is worth pointing out that, in

parallel to this, citizens continued to be affected by high levels of insecurity, poverty and malnutrition, in a context where half of the country's population depends on humanitarian aid. In this regard, some analyses warned on the threats posed by the internal political instability linked to the rapid depletion of oil hydrocarbon reserves, which constitute the basis of the national budget, corruption, and the lack of changes in the country's political economy.⁸⁰

Yemen (south)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, Resources, Territory Internal
Main parties:	Government, secessionist and pro-autonomy opposition groups of the south (including the Southern Movement/Al-Hiraak al-Janoubi)

Summary:

Yemen is the result of a problematic process of unification that in 1990 joined together the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. Since then, the balance of power has tilted northwards and President Ali Abdullah Saleh (leader of the former YAR since 1978) has held office ever since. The fragile political balance established with the creation of the new state led to the outbreak of civil war in 1994, from which the northern forces emerged victorious. The situation remains tense and in recent years demonstrations protesting against discrimination towards the south have intensified, especially concerning control over resources. There have also been clashes with the security forces. The southern protest movement is not structured around a single organisation but rather it is composed of groups with a variety of agendas, whose demands range from greater autonomy to secession, which are exerting pressure to achieve a new north-south relationship within the framework of the transition process that began in Yemen at the end of 2011.

The tension between the central Government and secessionist sectors in the south of the country evolved in a similar way than the previous year, causing some violent events that killed more than 40 people during 2013. The internal conflict became evident with constant mobilisations against the authorities in Sana'a in several cities of the country's south, with violent events registered in the context of the demonstrations and in boycott actions from some groups within the Hiraak movement during the sessions of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) that started in March within the framework of the country's transition process. **Some of the most serious violent events took place during the first months of the year, during the commemoration of the first year with Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi in power,**

80. Ginny Hill et al., *Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict*, Chatham House Report, September, 2013, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/194239>.

the successor of Ali Abdullah Saleh. The protests against Hadi's Government and in favour of independence for the south of Yemen were dispersed violently by the Police, killing at least six people, according to press reports. Separatist leaders then called for a day of civil disobedience that led to new incidents, more deaths and more injuries. In the weeks that followed there were new mobilisations to demand the freeing of those arrested during the protests, as well as road blockades, attacks on police stations and strikes affecting trade, services and transport; as well as some clashes between the Yemeni forces and separatist groups. There were also new mass mobilisations in the south on other key dates such as the 23rd anniversary of Yemen's reunification in 1990; the commemoration of the declaration of separation between north and south Yemen, in the context of the 1994 civil war; or again on the anniversary of the independence of south Yemen from the British dominion, in October. At the same time, President Hadi also engaged in conversations with leaders from the heterogeneous Hiraak platform to try and secure their participation in the NDC, which had, as one of its main objectives, to discuss the parameters for the new Constitution, including the framework for relations between the north and the south. In order to encourage the representatives from the south to participate, it was decided that half of the 565 representatives at the NDC would be from the southern region. In this context, some of the groups from the southern movement agreed to participate in the initiative, while others decided not to. Leaders such as the former president of south Yemen, Ali Salem al-Beidh, criticised the fact that the transition agreement promoted in 2011 by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the NDC was built on the assumption of Yemen's "unity". A firm defender of secession, the former president promoted holding a referendum with three options: union with the north, fitting into a federal framework or independence.

During the year, **the Police stifled the attempts by separatist sectors to boycott the NDC meeting held in cities in the south** while, in parallel, negotiations developed in a haphazard way. On several occasions, representatives from the south decided to leave the meetings to express their rejection to some issues or Government measures. The UN Security Council and the special envoy for Yemen, Jamal Benomar, warned on several occasions against the adoption of measures going against the actors trying to boycott the process. Overall, the forces from the south adopted a position in favour of secession or a federal way with two States that would, in the future, offer the possibility of holding a referendum on independence. In this regard, they rejected the proposals pointing at the creation

of a federation of six units, four in the north and two in the south, which they saw as a way of diluting the influence of the south. Even if the favoured option was a federal one, the NDC did not position itself on the number of entities that would conform the new State, a discussion that will have to be resolved in the proposal for a new Constitution planned for 2014. **Within the framework of the gestures for internal reconciliation, the Government published a statement where it apologised to the population in the south for the 1994 civil war and for the actions taken by Saleh's regime prior to the armed conflict.** This gesture was welcomed positively by sectors from the south. However, it is also relevant to note that Hadi's Government was criticised for adopting an approach that was similar to that of Saleh's regime to handle the issue of the south, using practices such as harassing activists and the press. Hadi was also denounced for trying to delegitimize the demands of the south by trying to link the incidents in the south to al-Qaeda actions in the area. Towards the end of the year, violence escalated again when the security forces killed a prominent tribal leader (from the Hadrami tribe) and his bodyguards during a military control in December. This event motivated measures of pressure from tribal sectors and from Hiraak demanding that those responsible for the murder be handed in, and sparked demonstrations in several towns as well as clashes with the security forces that left several dead. The funeral for an activist in the south who died in these clashes was the scene of the greatest violence when the security forces carried out an attack, killing 19 people, including six minors –according to information in the press– in the southern town of Daleh. Later, an attack on a military base killed eight soldiers at the end of the year, and was attributed to Hiraak, but the movement denied having participated in this action.

2.4. Alert factors for 2014

After analysing the evolution of tensions during 2013 it is possible to identify risk factors for an escalation of violence or a worsening of the situation in a series of cases. This is in contexts where, regardless of the intensity of the violence or the level of destabilisation, there are alert factors, situational or structural, that may lead to deterioration during 2014. In some of these cases there may also be simultaneous positive elements and dynamics that could contribute to an eventual improvement of the situation. In this sense, identifying alert elements can give visibility to risk factors and contexts that should be highlighted to prevent a negative evolution.

Table 2.2. Alert factors in socio-political crises for 2014

AFRICA	
Great Lakes and Central Africa	
Chad	The persistence of the authoritarian climate in the country, the attempted coup, the announcement made by the UFR that it would resume its armed fight and the continuous government reshuffling are all factors that show the possibility that the situation may deteriorate during 2014 unless a dialogue is established with the political and military opposition.
DR Congo	Despite the end of the armed conflict between the Armed Forces and the armed group M23, since it was not the outcome of an agreement but a victory of the Armed Forces generates concern on the possibility that this issue will re-emerge in the future. Also, the existence of many insurgence groups with a growing activity, such as the ADF and Bakata Katanga, which the Government has not yet approached, together with the lack of political opposition in the national dialogue celebrated in 2013, forecast an increase of instability in 2014.
DR Congo (east – ADF)	In 2013, the armed group ADF became a threat to security in the east of DR Congo, due to the escalation of actions and an expansion of their training camps. According to several analysts, it has turned into a regional threat, meaning that a military approach to the issue could lead to an increase in violence in the north of North Kivu province with devastating consequences.
DR Congo – Rwanda	Although the armed conflict between the M23 (receiving support from Rwanda and Uganda) and the Armed Forces ended with the defeat of the armed group and the signing of an agreement between the group and the Congolese Government, depending on how it is implemented and linked to other issues yet to be resolved in the conflict of the Great Lakes, especially the Rwandan insurgence group FDLR, Rwanda could be a factor of future instability.
DR Congo – Uganda	Although the armed conflict between the M23 (receiving support from Rwanda and Uganda) and the Armed Forces ended with the defeat of the armed group and the signing of an agreement between the group and the Congolese Government facilitated by Uganda, the group leaders and part of the insurgence have sought refuge in Kampala, meaning that in 2014 this issue will continue to be a hotbed of tension.
Rwanda	The regime's authoritarianism and denial of freedoms, the lack of political dialogue with the Rwandan Hutu armed group FDLR, and the volatile situation around the Great Lakes cause fear that 2014, the year commemorating the 20 th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, may experience a rise in instability in the country.
Sudan	The mass protests stemming from the increase in oil prices evolved towards demands for greater democracy in the country and were brutally repressed by the security forces. This added to the existence of an agreement between the political opposition grouped under the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), showing the seriousness of the situation that could lead to an attempt at forcing a change in Government using force.
Sudan – South Sudan	The non-binding referendum held in Abyei did not contribute to improving the relations between both countries. Despite the signing of the peace agreement between Sudan and South Sudan over the status of Abyei, the internal political instability on both countries could put an end to the negotiation process and could lead to greater instability in 2014.
Horn of Africa	
Eritrea	The regime showed signs of growing weakness since 2012, causing fear of greater instability that could bring serious consequences not only on a local level, but also in the context of the Horn of Africa. The divisions within the leadership, rumours on the deterioration of the president's health during 2012, the lack of answers from the Eritrean Army to the military incursion of the Ethiopian Army, the attempted coup in January 2013 and the defections of relevant figures from the president's closes circle are some of the issues illustrating the seriousness of the situation.
Eritrea – Ethiopia	After years when the border dispute has been at a standstill and of latent conflict in Somalia, during 2012 there were some indirect contacts between the parties that could have progressed during the year 2013, although the evolution of the internal situation in Eritrea could hamper this progress in 2014.
Ethiopia	During the year there were anti-Government mobilisations and protests, meaning there could be a re-emergence of the opposition, decimated after the 2005 elections, as became evident with the announcement of the creation of the Blue Party. However, it also led to an increase in government repression, which could intensify.
Kenya	The Islamist armed group al-Shabaab and its supporters in Kenya carried out their threat to attack Kenya for its involvement in the armed conflict in Somalia. Consequently, there could be further actions by al-Shabaab and retaliations against Somalia that could cause an increase of violence in the country.
Somaliland – Puntland	The presidential elections in Puntland led to an increase in tension if the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn region (SSC) due to the regional seats. Puntland launched an attack on Taleh in November to scare the leaders of the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Khatumo, bringing together the SSC, and this could also entail new belligerent actions.
Maghreb and North Africa	
Algeria	Political tension could increase as a consequence of the presidential elections to be held in April, which were already preceded in 2013 by growing internal debates in the power elites in a context of president Bouteflika's fragile health. Local analysts have drawn attention to the growing open –and unprecedented– dispute between sectors close to president Bouteflika and the intelligence services, one of the factors that could mark the trend of the political evolution in Algeria in 2014.
Mauritania	The threat of armed groups of a regional scope with the ability to act in Mauritania and the chronic lack of understanding between the Government and the opposition, which became evident with the collapse of the dialogue initiatives in 2013, are two factors that could continue to mark the situation in Mauritania during 2014.
Morocco	The hotbeds of contestation linked to social demands and political change in the country could continue in 2014, along with measures by the authorities to silence the more critical sectors.
Morocco – Western Sahara	Given the context of blockade in the negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, reports on human rights abuses in Western Sahara, the frustration felt in Sahrawi refugee camps and the general context of insecurity in the Sahel, an intensification of episodes of violence may not be ruled out.

Tunisia	Although towards the end of 2013 the Tunisian political actors managed to find a way out of the political crisis that started after the murder of two prominent leaders, the situation for 2014 is full of challenges. The political transition will continue to be marked by distrust among the Islamist and secular sectors, as well as by the ability of the Government of technocrats to deal with the more urgent financial and social challenges and leading the country calmly towards the elections at the end of the year. Violent actions by Salafist and Jihadist armed groups will, predictably, be one of the main concerns regarding security.
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Southern Africa

Madagascar	The escalation of actions by the “dahalo” (cattle rustlers), the increase in repression by security forces and the emergence of self-defence militias and private security forces will continue to be a hotbed of instability and could even worsen during 2014 unless dialogue and reconciliation measures are implemented in the south of the country.
Mozambique (RENAMO)	The lack of progress regarding the dialogue between the Government and RENAMO led RENAMO to pull out of the 1992 peace agreement and to a wave of attacks carried out by the latter. This situation of instability could continue during 2014 unless negotiations between the parties resume and RENAMO does not boycott the 2014 presidential elections.
Zimbabwe	Despite the constitutional reform that led to the referendum by which the new Constitution was approved, there continued to be a climate of political tension, intimidation, and violence against sectors opposing the president, Robert Mugabe, whose victory in the presidential elections means that the climate of tension and violence is likely to remain during the next year.

West Africa

Côte d'Ivoire	The strong divisions that still exist between the Government coalition and the followers of former president Laurent Gbagbo could fuel new tensions during 2014, a year when progress should be made on the work to prepare the 2015 presidential elections. The FPI's boycott at the regional and local elections in 2013 is an indicator of the existing challenges, even if the widespread lack of incidents in those elections dispels the shadows of the violent post-electoral violence in 2010-2011. Among the interlocutors consulted by UNOCI in 2013, many point at the need for electoral reforms that ensure fair, transparent and inclusive presidential elections.
Guinea	The entry into Parliament of the opposition in December 2013 has reduced the tension after a year marked by constant political disagreement and tension in the streets, with several hundred people injured. Nevertheless, the new year could witness a new increase in tension, due to the underlying political and social fractures, which should be dealt with in the framework of the transition process.
Guinea-Bissau	The transition process adopted a more inclusive nature with the inclusion of the PAIGC into the transition agreement in 2013; nevertheless, there continued to be deep divisions, together with continued interference by the Army in civil matters. All this could lead to new tensions around the 2014 elections and the post-electoral process.
Mali	Although in all likelihood during 2014 the Government's efforts will focus on stabilising the north of the country, the internal political situation will continue to be extremely fragile and will require the new authorities to dedicate efforts to promoting reforms and improve governance mechanisms. The reform of the security sector appears to be a priority task, given the struggles and signs of rebellion from military sectors.
Niger	The ability of radical armed groups of a regional scope to act in Niger's territory, as seen in 2013, will continue to be a factor challenging stability in the country. Niger may also be increasingly affected by the climate of internal political tension, given the increase in mobilisations and the animosity between sectors loyal to the president and opposition groups that question the mechanisms to appoint a national unity Government at the end of 2013.
Nigeria	The increased violence used by Ombaste, a traditional worship group linked to the Eggon ethnicity and transformed into an armed militia, could continue during 2014, generating new inter-community grievances as well as a new front of confrontation for the central Administration, in a general context of securitization, corruption and violence, including the sectarian dimension.
Nigeria (Delta Niger)	The low-intensity violent events and mobilisations by militants or former soldiers could continue during 2014 and worsen in 2015, in view of the approaching end of the amnesty programme, in a context of precariousness, lack of financial prospects and grievances towards the population of the Niger Delta.
Senegal (Casamance)	Even if the peace negotiations between the MFDC and the Government during 2013 brings hope of a scenario with less violence, the persistence of sporadic armed actions by some sectors of the MFDC and an eventual stalemate or disagreement over the negotiations could reactivate the tension.

AMERICA

North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Haiti	The polarisation and climate of protests experienced during 2013 in Haiti could worsen if finally, as the Government announced, there will be elections in 2014 after they were delayed on several occasions since 2011. The participation in these elections of Lavalas, the party of the former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, could also generate new and uncertain scenarios.
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South America


Bolivia	The holding of elections in December 2014 could cause renewed tensions between the Government –defending the possibility for president Evo Morales to run for re-election– and the opposition, which considers this option unconstitutional. The holding of these elections could also increase the confrontation between the Government and some departments controlled by the opposition, especially after in 2013, and based on a new census updating the number of inhabitants; a new re-distribution of parliamentary seats was approved for the different departments.
Peru	The commitment taken on by president Ollanta Humala to end the armed activities of Shining Path before the end of his mandate in 2016, as well as the Government's declared intention to increase its military efforts in the VRAEM region, allow foreseeing an increase in counter-insurgency activities in regions where Shining Path continues to operate.

ASIA	
Central Asia	
Kazakhstan	As in other Central Asian countries, there is the risk of the human rights situation to worsen, with specific impact on critical and independent voices, as well as on Muslim structures lying outside the authorised religious structures. This could lead to new hotbeds of tension in the country.
Kyrgyzstan	Preceded by an accumulation of tensions in 2013, the political tension between the Government and the opposition, with different territorial bases, could worsen in 2014 and lead to new protests and mobilisations, with the risk of low-intensity violent incidents.
Tajikistan	After a year in which the political opposition was harassed, especially the authorised Islamist opposition, for 2014 and the years to follow there may be an increase of political and social fractures in the former Soviet republic. Adding to this are the long-lasting struggles between the Government and alternative sites of power in some of the country's areas, a situation that stems from the war in the nineties.
Uzbekistan	The stable situation that has been predominant in Uzbekistan is marked by the omnipresence of the regime and its security structures and repressive policies against the opposition and independent sectors, reducing the margin for open confrontation. This, however, perpetuates factors of social grievance and discontent, which could cause instability in the future.
Eastern Asia	
China (East Turkestan)	The substantial increase planned for the 2014 budget to combat so-called terrorist groups in Xinjiang shows Beijing's intention to increase its military and police presence in the region while it also increases the chances of attacks and bombings. In this regard, in 2013 the Uyghur secessionist movement showed its capacity to increase the number and fatality of its armed actions.
China (Tibet)	The fact that the profile of those practicing self-immolation by fire to protest against Beijing is becoming diversified –at first almost all were Buddhist monks– could lead to the police and military presence of China to expand beyond the monasteries (and the neighbour villages) and the measures of punishment from the Chinese authorities targeted other groups.
Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea	The continuity, and even increase, in regular joint military exercises with the US (and sporadically with other countries such as Japan and the UK) by South Korea are perceived by North Korea as a constant threat; this country usually responds with a bellicose rhetoric and sometimes by displaying its military force. The strengthening of the military alliance between South Korea and the US sealed in 2013 also holds out the prospect of political and military confrontation in the region.
Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea, USA and other countries	Rumours on a new underground nuclear test by North Korea and the possible re-activation of the Yongbyon facilities to try and produce the plutonium that is necessary to produce nuclear weapons could lead to new disagreements between Pyongyang and the international community and hamper the resumption of multilateral conversations on the de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.
South Asia	
Bangladesh	The electoral victory of the governing party Awami League after elections that were marked by generalised violence and the boycott by the opposition could lead to an increase in political violence and the consolidation of authoritarianism in Government. Also, if the work of the International Crimes Tribunal continues to be politicised there could be a new wave of violence by Jamaat-e-Islami.
India (Nagaland)	The lack of substantial progress in the negotiations between the Indian Government and the NSCN-IM, the pressure in neighbour states such as Manipur against the measures to grant greater recognition to the Naga population in these states and the violence between factions could lead to the stagnation of the peace process and the increase in violence.
India – Pakistan	The persistent violations of the cease-fire agreement and the lack of genuine commitment from the Armed Forces of both countries regarding the agreement could lead to an increase in tensions between the Governments. Also, the diplomacy channels for dialogue could be cut off, endangering the peace process, and this could lead to an increase in violence along the border.
Nepal	The lack of political will to reach the consensus that is required for the final draft of the new Constitution to overcome partisan division and the barriers to implement other aspects of the peace process such as the creation of a committee for truth could lead the process to stagnation and to growing tension between the different political forces, endangering the country's governability.
Pakistan	The new Pakistani Government will have to face hugely important challenges such as the constant and growing impact of sectarian violence, large-scale violence in the city of Karachi, or the corruption in the political elites and the Army's interference in the governing of the country.
Sri Lanka	The Government's authoritarianism, the lack of political will to start a decentralisation process, the rejection to conduct a genuine process to investigate human rights violations during the armed conflict and after it ended, the militarisation of the north and east of the country, the control over the State's institutions are all factors that could lead to an increase in social and political tension and, eventually, to an increase in violence.
Southeast Asia	
Indonesia (Aceh)	The holding of parliamentary elections in April 2014 is likely to cause, as has already happened in the past, an increase in violent incidents and in tension between the central Government and the Partai Aceh, founded by the armed opposition group GAM, ruling in the Aceh province. Equally, the holding of these elections could also lead to the mobilisation of groups that support the division of Aceh and the creation of two new provinces.
Indonesia (West Papua)	As in the case of Aceh, the holding of elections usually caused greater levels of conflict. Also, in 2014 the 2001 Law on special autonomy is planned to be reformed, aiming to become one of the Government's main tools to reduce the conflict in Papua. The chances that this reform may focus on financial and development matters, leaving aside cultural and identity issues, may cause new hotbeds of tension in the region.
Myanmar	Inter-community violence, especially between the Buddhist and Muslim communities, could increase unless the grievances are dealt with and if the impunity of those responsible of inciting violence continues. In parallel, the transition process may be washed away unless more profound measures on democratization are adopted instead of just emphasising economic liberalisation.

Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)	The proximity of a peace agreement between the Government and the MNLF could fuel armed actions by the group's factions that are against the end of the conflict in Mindanao such as the BIFF, which in recent years have shown a significant bellicose capacity. If eventually the signing of a peace agreement did materialise, the adoption of new responsibilities on security issues by the MNLF and the start of a process to demobilise and disarm the group could also lead to the alienation of some of its combatants.
Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)	The possibility that an eventual signing of a peace agreement in 2014 between the Government and the MILF may empty of all political content the 1996 agreement between Manila and the MNLF and the negotiations held by parties during the last years to fully implement this agreement, pushing some factions within the MNLF to carry out new episodes of violence. Equally, the state persecution against the MNLF factions that participated in the siege on Zamboanga in September 2013 could lead these factions to set up a tactical alliance with other groups operating in the region.
Thailand	The refusal by the opposition and the organisations leading the massive protests to participate in the early elections called by the Prime Minister as a mechanism to end the protests, signal an increase in the crisis during 2014. On another note, the solution proposed by the opposition –the establishment of a non-elected council of people to carry out a series of structural reforms before holding elections– doesn't seem acceptable for the Government or for a part of the international community.
Thailand – Cambodia	The social, political and governability crisis affecting Thailand since more than a decade ago, which worsened in 2013, as well as the actions of Thai nationalist groups demanding for the Government not to recognise the authority of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the resolution of the dispute between both countries could have negative effects on the final resolution of the conflict and on the implementation of the ICJ judgement from 2013 awarding sovereignty over the disputed territory to Cambodia.
EUROPE AND THE CAUCASUS	
Caucasus and Russia	
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	The “armed peace” that characterises the conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh, affected by periodic breaches of the cease-fire agreement and a regional context marked by an arms race and a fragile peace process could lead to a rise in political and military tension together with some miscalculations or unintended escalation of the usual low-intensity incidents.
Georgia (Abkhazia)	The placing of obstacles along the administrative border between Abkhazia and Georgia by Russian troops could further deteriorate the damaged relations between both regimes, as well as between the populations on either side, perpetuating in time and unresolved conflict situation.
Georgia (South Ossetia)	Although South Ossetia and Georgia still keep the incident prevention and response mechanism alive, the relations between both administrations continue to be marked by distrust and confrontation, with no appearance of progressing on the conflict's matters of substance, such as the status or situation of the displaced population, which could perpetuate in time the situation of abandonment and the impossibility to return for the population affected by the war in the nineties and that in 2008.
Russia	The Islamist violence affecting the north of the Caucasus and other areas of Russia responds to complex causes for which the strategy of securitisation and collective punishment and the general context of islamophobia and racism and the high corruption could be counterproductive and fuel new violence, even in Russian cities.
Southeast Europe	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	The profound political crisis affecting the sub-state entities and the Bosnian State itself could cause an increase in the alienation of a sector of population that is affected by the consequences of the political paralysis, the financial crisis and the high levels of corruption, which could turn into a driver of social discontent.
Serbia – Kosovo	The strong boost to the process to normalise the relations between Serbia and Kosovo is in contrast to the major political and social rejection by the Serb population in the north of Kosovo, despite the calls made by Serbia to this population to join the process underway. This unrest and rejection could remain as a driver of inter-community and political tension in the new regional scenario, calling into question the achievements between Serbia and Kosovo.
Western, Central and Eastern Europe	
Spain (Basque Country)	The differences between the political and social actors on the prison policy, disarmament, victims and reconciliation could cause the hotbeds of tension, divisions and grievances that are difficult to change to extend in time, in the absence of social and political consensus on the new stage in the Basque Country.
Ukraine	The political crisis in Ukraine has its roots in elements that stretch far beyond the Government's refusal to sign the partnership agreement with the EU, including strong internal divisions and struggles for political and financial power, as well as external struggles competing for a preferential position on the east of this country with more than 45 million inhabitants and which is essential for the flow of energy resources to Europe. That is why the tensions in 2013 could extend well into 2014 unless political agreements are reached on how to manage the crisis and unless the political cohabitation is normalised.
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	The trend of increased riots allegedly encouraged by unionist sectors, in a context where there is a lack of dividends from peace and the financial crisis, as well as a lack of political agreement on the strategies against the protests could continue in the future, with new violent incidents.
MIDDLE EAST	
Mashreq	
Egypt	The crisis in Egypt, which escalated significantly in 2013 after the ousting of president Morsi, could worsen in 2014. The political polarisation may grow if the new authorities continue to disregard the relevance of the Islamist forces and marginalise wide sectors of the country from the institutional construction process. The difficulties to set up a dialogue, the policies of harassment against the Islamist forces and other critical sectors and the difficulties to channel demands down the political path may pave the way for a rise of sectors that are in favour of using violence. The electoral campaign for the presidential and parliamentary elections and the subsequent rise of general Abdul Fattah al-Sisi to the presidency could further exacerbate the division unless measures are adopted to favour dialogue, inclusion and reconciliation.

Egypt (Sinai)	The trend observed in 2013 regarding the greater intensity of violent events in the Sinai and the ability of armed groups based in the region to carry out actions outside the peninsula could worsen during 2014. Access by these groups to more sophisticated weapons could lead to an escalation of their attacks and clashes with the security forces. The Jihadist militias operating in the areas could be encouraged by the climate of regional instability and could grow as a consequence of the persecution against Islamist sectors by the Egyptian Government. The failure of the experience to access power along the political path of the Muslim Brotherhood could favour the alienation of sectors that rejected the armed fight and bring them closer to militant groups such as those in the Sinai.
Iraq (Kurdistan)	The signs of rapprochement between the KRG authorities and the central Government during 2013 –as a result of the strategic political calculations by the parties– could called into question in 2014 if the debate on the disputed territories and the control over oil resources re-emerges, especially if Erbil continues to advance in the implementation of energy cooperation agreements with Turkey, leaving out Baghdad. The situation of tension may also be determined by how the armed conflict in Iraq evolves, especially by the repercussions in Iraqi Kurdistan of the crisis in the province of Anbar, and the evolution if the war in Syria.
Israel – Syria – Lebanon	During 2014 this international conflict may register a similar evolution to the previous year, given the deterioration of the armed conflict in Syria, the growing involvement of armed actors from the region in the war and the different violent incidents carried out by the parties in dispute, including actions that go beyond the incidents along borders.
Lebanon	The evolution of the situation in Lebanon will continue to be closely linked to how the war in Syria evolves and may be increasingly affected by the widening of divisions between political actors, sectarian hostility, the consequences of Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian conflict and the episodes of reprisals against the Shiite militia by radical Sunni groups; these dynamics already led to a significant increase in the levels of violence registered during 2013.
Palestine	The negative evolution of the process of inter-Palestinian reconciliation during the second half of 2013, especially after Mohamed Morsi was ousted in Egypt and the decision taken by the PA to resume conversations with Israel could continue in 2014. The situation of isolation and weakness of Hamas in a context marked by the defenestration of its former regional patrons and a PA that is frustrated over the lack of results from the negotiations with the Israeli Government could lead to a deeper leadership and representativeness crisis in the Palestinian society.
Syria – Turkey	Predictably, relations between Syria and Turkey in 2014 will continue to be affected by the warfare context, the repercussions on border areas and the flow of refugees, arms and combatants in border areas, which already caused violent episodes in 2013. From Ankara's perspective, the evolution of the situation in areas of Kurdish majority in the north of Syria will continue to be relevant for its strategic calculations vis-à-vis the PKK.
The Gulf	
Bahrain	In 2014 the situation in Bahrain followed a similar pattern as last year, taking into account the failure of the dialogue initiatives between the Government and the opposition, the authorities' harassment on critical sections and the willingness of the dissidence to continue contesting the regime, with some groups even resorting to violent actions.
Iran	After the change in cycle started in the country with the election of Hassan Rouhani as the new president, the domestic situation will continue to be marked by a mixture of prospects for change among reformist sectors and the distrust of the regime's tough wing sectors, who are suspicious of some of the leader's policies, especially regarding relations between Iran and the outer world. Reports on the large number of executions in 2013 and on persistent human rights abuses show some of the challenges that remain open in the country.
Iran (north-west)	Despite its sporadic nature, the persistence of violent episodes between PJAK militiamen and members of the Revolutionary Guard confirmed that the dispute continued to be a hotbed of tension in 2013 in Iran's northwestern parts. During 2014 the continuation or increase in this type of episodes, an eventual lack of change in the discriminatory policies towards minorities (including the Kurds) by the new Government and the continuation of executions of Kurdish prisoners could lead to an escalation of violence in the area.
Iran (Sistan Balochistan)	In 2013, the armed actions by a new armed group in Sistan-Baluchistan confirmed the persistence of hotbeds of contestation in the region, despite the partial dismantlement of other groups that had led the insurgency in the area such as Jundallah. It cannot be ruled out that, in 2014, Jaish al-Adl may continue to launch attacks on Iranian security forces, in a context of persisting discrimination against the Sunni minority and in view of the way Tehran has responded to the re-activation of armed episodes in the area.
Iran – USA, Israel	Despite the expectations generated by the agreement reached between Iran and the P5+1 powers at the end of the year, the evolution of this international conflict in 2014 will largely depend on the ability to overcome obstacles during the substantive discussions on Iran's nuclear programme. Maintaining a climate that is conducive to dialogue will also be conditioned by the success or failure of the tough wing sectors, both in Iran and in the US, who may try boycotting this dialogue. The climate of regional upheaval, especially the evolution of the Syrian crisis, will be crucial and may affect the progress of these conversations.
Saudi Arabia	Tension in the country will continue to be determined by the restrictions imposed on human rights in the country, as well as the policies of harassment on the dissidence and sectors that are critical about the authorities. Riyadh will predictably continue with its hard-line policy against any sign of contestation in the areas of Shiite majority and will continue to be involved in regional conflicts in the framework of its struggle for power and influence with Iran.
Yemen	The evolution of the transition process, especially the adoption of a new Constitution, the definition of a new political structure in the country within a federal framework and the eventual call for elections will be the key moments to assess whether the main Yemeni actors are able to conduct their disputes and discussions along the way of institutional dialogue, or instead the internal tension leads to a new escalation of political violence.
Yemen (south)	Considering the evolution of this conflict in 2013, with regular violent events and a systematic boycott of the National Dialogue Conference by some of the sectors from the south that support independence, the situation in 2014 is likely to continue being unstable and prone to violent events. The rejection by key actors from the south of Yemen's configuration as a federal State with six regions may be one of the key elements that will spark new mobilisations and confrontation with the security forces in the country's southern areas.

Map 3.1. Peace processes



3. Peace processes

- Three conflicts ended with peace agreements: the one involving the JEM-Bashar in Sudan and two in India (involving the UPPK and a faction of the KCP-MC).
- At the end of the year, the government of South Sudan and the military loyal to the vice president agreed to meet in Ethiopia to begin peace talks.
- In DR Congo, following the defeat of the armed group M23, it was agreed that fighters not guilty of war crimes could join the army or the police.
- In Colombia negotiations continued with the FARC and the groundwork was laid for the start of talks with the ELN guerrilla group.
- A process of political dialogue began in Myanmar with the Union National Federal Council (UNFC), a platform that includes most of the country's insurgent movements.
- In the Philippines several rounds of negotiations were held with the MILF and the third of the four annexes to the provisional peace agreement reached in 2012 was signed.
- The leader of the armed Kurdish group PKK called for a ceasefire in Turkey and for the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkish territory. However, the retreat of the Kurdish guerrilla group came to a halt in September.
- The US secretary of state, John Kerry, made several visits to Israel and Palestine to push for a new negotiation process.

This chapter provides an analysis of 52 contexts of negotiation, 47 of which have dedicated sections and five of which are mentioned together at the end, whether due to a lack of sufficient information or because they are cases of surrender with a demobilisation agreement. Three groups laid down their weapons on reaching a peace agreement with their respective governments.

Table 3.1. Status of the negotiations at the end of 2013

Good (15)	In difficulties (17)	Bad (5)	At an exploratory stage (7)	Resolved (3)
Mali (MIA) India (ULFA-PTF, URF, KCP-Lamphel, KYKL-MDF, KCP-Pakhanglakpa, KCP-N, KNLF, KRF, NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCN-IM), Philippines (MILF) Serbia-Kosovo Yemen	Mali (MNLA) Senegal (MFDC) Sudan (SPLM-N) South Sudan (Machar faction) Colombia (FARC) Afghanistan (Taliban) India (ULFA-I, NDFB-P) India-Pakistan (Kashmir) Myanmar (UNFC) Thailand (BRN) Moldavia (Transnistria) Turkey (PKK) Armenia- Azerbaijan (Nagorno- Karabakh) Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) Israel-Palestine	Sudan-South Sudan Morocco-Western Sahara Philippines (MNLF) Philippines (NPA) Cyprus	RCA (LRA) Pakistan (Taliban) Ethiopia (ONLF) Colombia (ELN) India (NDFB-R) Thailand (PULO) Syria	Sudan (JEM-Bashar) India (KCP-MC faction and UPPK)

28.8% of the analysed negotiations went well, most of them related to India, 32.7% experienced difficulties and 9.6% went badly.

3.1. Peace processes: definitions and types

Negotiation is understood as the process through which two or more parties involved in a dispute (whether

countries or internal actors within a country) are willing to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to seek a satisfactory solution to their demands. This negotiation may be direct or with the mediation of third parties. Formal negotiations tend to have a prior or exploratory phase that enables the framework of the future

negotiations to be defined (format, place, conditions, guarantees, etc.). **Peace process** is understood as the consolidation of a negotiation process, once the agenda points, procedures to be followed, timeline and facilitators have been defined. As such, negotiation constitutes one of the stages of a peace process.

Ceasefire is understood as the military decision to cease all combat or use of arms for a specified period, while **cessation of hostilities** encompasses not only a ceasefire but also a commitment not to carry out kidnappings, harass civilians or make threats, etc.

Depending on the final goals that are sought or the dynamics pursued during the various negotiation stages, most peace processes can be placed in one of the five **categories or models** listed below, although there may occasionally be processes that combine two categories:

- a) Demobilisation and reinsertion
- b) Political, military or economic power-sharing
- c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for withdrawal, peace for recognition of rights, etc.)
- d) Trust-building measures
- e) Self-government formulas or “intermediate political structures”

The process model is usually linked to the type of demands put forward and to the actors’ ability to exert pressure or make demands (level of military, political and social symmetry), although other influential factors include mentoring and facilitation, the level of exhaustion of those involved, the support that they receive and other less rational factors more closely related to leaders’ pathologies, world views or historical momentum. On a handful of occasions, especially in drawn-out processes, the initial classification (a, for example) may become inappropriate if demands are later increased. In such cases the process must then be placed in a more complex category. It is also important to recall that not all the processes or their prior phases of exploration, talks and negotiation are carried out with sincerity, since they frequently form part of the war strategy itself, whether to gain time, internationalise the dispute and raise its profile, or rearm, among other motives.

Last of all, it should be pointed out that what is commonly referred to as a “peace process” is in fact a “process to put an end to violence and the armed struggle”. The signing of a cessation of hostilities and the subsequent signing of a peace agreement is no more than the start of the real “peace process”, linked to a stage called “post-war rehabilitation”, which is always difficult but during which decisions will really be taken and policies will be implemented that, if successful, will enable other forms of violence (structural and cultural) to be overcome. This is when it becomes appropriate to refer to the “achievement of peace”. However, this yearbook provides an analysis of the efforts made in the initial stages of this long process, without which it would not be possible to achieve the final goal.

3.2. Progress of negotiations

AFRICA

a) West Africa

In **Mali**, the year was characterised by the start of a **French military intervention with the assistance of African troops, through which control of the north of the country was partially regained from Islamist armed groups**. In this context, a faction calling itself the **Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA)** broke away from the armed group Ansar Dine and announced that it rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism, and that it was willing to enter talks. Alghabas Ag Intalla was the representative of Ansar Dine during the mediation attempts and contacts that took place between the Malian government and the group in Burkina Faso in 2012.

During the second quarter, **the Malian government and Tuareg armed group MNLA signed a peace agreement** that facilitated the holding of elections in the country at the end of July, following a series of contacts and the launch of reconciliation initiatives. At the start of the period, the discussions focused on the setting up of a Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission, led by the former defence minister, Mohamed Salia Sokona. According to press reports, **MNLA leaders underwent training in negotiation techniques in Italy, funded by Switzerland**. After two weeks of negotiations in Ougadougou, mediated by the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, and by EU and UN delegates, an agreement was reached that included an immediate ceasefire between the parties, permitted the return of Malian troops to Kidal and facilitated the holding of elections, which were held on schedule in August and which were won by Ibrahim Boubakar Keita in the second round. The agreement also set out the deployment of military forces in the region of Kidal and the withdrawal of MNLA militants to their bases in the surrounding area. However, following violent incidents between Malian soldiers and Tuareg fighters in September, **the MNLA and two other Tuareg groups announced that they were pulling out of the peace process**, claiming that the authorities had not honoured their commitments, one of which was the release of prisoners. Nevertheless, in early October **three rebel groups, including the MNLA, returned to the negotiating table** and called for disarmament, the return of fighters to cantonment centres and the release of prisoners. Meanwhile, the EU agreed to provide 615 million euros for peacebuilding and socio-economic support in Mali.

In the case of **Senegal**, over the course of the year progress was made in talks between the two factions of the MFDC, the armed group that operates in the Casamance region, with the mediation of the Community of Sant’Egidio, and between the leaders of these factions and the members of the government of **Senegal**. The US was involved in these contacts. The

leader of one of the factions of the MFDC, **Salif Sadio, met in secret with the Senegalese president, Macky Sall, in Dakar on 22nd February.** The meeting was organised very discretely by the former mayor of Ziguinchor and director of the mediation group for lasting peace in Casamance, Robert Sagna. The president of Gambia, Yaya Jammeh, also played an important role. In April the Community of Sant'Egidio confirmed that there was no international warrant of arrest for the leader of the MFDC. This confirmation served to facilitate a climate of trust between the government and the MFDC in order to negotiate in Rome, since this was one of the preconditions stipulated by the pro-independence movement. Another noteworthy event in 2013 was the September meeting **between the leader of the MFDC, César Badiate, and Robert Sagna in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau.** The US diplomat James Bullington also took part in the talks concerning the peace process. In early November a second meeting was held in Rome between the Community of Sant'Egidio and the Salif Sadio faction of the MFDC.

b) Horn of Africa

Over the course of the year it proved impossible to open a peace process with the ONLF, which operates in the region of **Ogaden (Ethiopia).** At the end of the year the executive committee of the ONLF held its plenary session in Istanbul (Turkey). In July it held meetings with Western diplomats to discuss political and human rights issues. The **ONLF expressed its wish to resolve the conflict through dialogue.** In August a report by the International Crisis Group recommended that Kenya act as guarantor and that technical support be channelled through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In October the ONLF met in Nairobi with members of the Ogaden community. A former US ambassador to Ethiopia stated at the end of that month that US policy was to promote a peace process and stabilise the region.

Important developments that took place in **Somalia** in 2013 included the process for the **formation of the state of Jubaland,** which created tension between the federal government, which aims to monitor the process, and the leaders and authorities of the region, which aim to implement the process without interference from the Somalian government. **Negotiations** took place in July between the **federal government and the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland,** in which the Turkish government played an important role. Turkey hosted and facilitated these talks for the second time since April. The federal construction of the state of Somalia received the backing of regional entities and governments since it involved the creation of a national entity with power shared between the federated states and the government, with a public administration more in touch with citizens and respecting majority and minority clans. On 28th August the federal government and the local militias of Jubaland reached an agreement

by virtue of which Sheikh Ahmed Madobe was recognised as interim leader of Jubaland for the next two years, following months of tension and sporadic clashes.

Over the course of the year **negotiations progressed with the factions of the JEM and the LJM** in the region of **Darfur (Sudan),** although serious clashes took place over the control of mineral resources and their commercial exploitation. **The negotiations between a faction of the JEM led by Mohamed Bashar (JEM-Bashar) and the Sudanese government continued in Doha (Qatar)** throughout the first quarter. A schedule of negotiations was agreed in January, while in early February a ceasefire was signed and talks began on issues such as power and wealth sharing, the compensation and return of internally displaced persons and refugees, justice and reconciliation, and final security provisions on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). At the end of March some agreements were signed and the process concluded with an official ceremony in Doha on 6th April. However, when the delegation of JEM-Bashar was making its way back to Darfur through Chad, it was attacked by members of the JEM faction led by Jibril Ibrahim. Mohamed Bashar, his deputy Suleiman Arko and five other members of the delegation were killed. Since then, the JEM (Bashar) has been led by Abdel Karim "Dabajo". In October, **the Sudanese government and the faction of the JEM (Bashar) led by "Dabajo" signed an agreement for the implementation of the peace agreement.** According to the spokesman of the aforementioned faction, Ali-El-Wafi, the key issues identified for the negotiations were security, power sharing and the future of refugees. "Dabajo" returned to Khartoum in mid-November and was received by the Sudanese authorities. In November, several armed groups that had still not signed any peace agreement met in the Ethiopian capital under the mediation of UNAMID (having held talks in Tanzania in August) in order to discuss the humanitarian situation and the possibility of beginning peace talks. For these groups the democratisation of the country and the drawing up of a new constitution were necessary measures.

The leader of the coalition Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), Tijani El Sissi, who signed the DDPD in 2011, said that Khartoum was delaying the implementation of the security agreements and was not fulfilling its obligation to incorporate members of the LJM in the civil service. In November **they signed a security agreement** by virtue of which between 2,000 and 3,000 members of the LJM will join the army and the police force. The agreement was signed with the intermediation of UNAMID.

In respect of the dispute between Sudan and the armed group Sudan People Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in the region of **South Kordofan and Blue Nile,** in June the SPLM-N once again called on the government to negotiate the access of humanitarian personnel in South Kordofan and Blue Nile in order to carry out a polio vaccination campaign. However, the

government stated that a political agreement had to be reached before negotiating humanitarian issues. At the end of November, **the negotiator of the SPLM-N stated that the group was not opposed to resuming talks in December in Ethiopia, with the mediation of the AU.** Another development worth highlighting is the work carried out by certain community mediation associations, such as the Justice Confidence Centres (JCC) or the Joint Conflict Programme (JCPR).

In March, the governments of **Sudan and South Sudan** agreed to implement the agreement signed in September 2012 through which a ten-kilometre demilitarised zone was created on each side of the border, and through which South Sudan could resume the export of its oil through Sudanese pipelines. **The peace talks between the two countries led to an agreement in April.** In June **the two countries accepted the mediation of the AU** in order to resolve their disputes. In October, the presidents of Sudan and South Sudan, Omar al-Bashir and Salva Kiir, respectively, held a meeting in Juba to discuss the status of the region of Abyei. Meanwhile, the AU announced that it would send a mission to Abyei on 5th and 6th November to mediate in the negotiations aimed at determining the status of the region, reducing tension and preventing any unilateral action from being carried out.

Serious clashes broke out in South Sudan in December between supporters of the president, Salva Kiir, and those loyal to the former vice president, Riek Machar. The former accused the latter of preparing a coup d'état against him. Thousands were killed in the space of a few days and the conflict began to spill over into other regions. The presidents of four neighbouring countries (Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda) initiated contacts in order to be able to mediate. At the end of the year, the two parties in conflict **sent delegates to Ethiopia to initiate negotiations.**

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

The peace agreement reached in early January in the Central African Republic (CAR) was not respected by the parties and the conflict flared up again. The rebels accused the president, François Bozizé, of failing to fulfil the agreements and threatened to take up arms once again. At the end of March it carried out its threat in the form of an **offensive on the capital, Bangui, forcing the CAR president to flee** with his family and seek refuge in DR Congo. In August, the rebel leader, Michel Djotodia, became the country's new president and Nicolas Tiangaye was reappointed as prime minister. He in turn appointed a new government made up of 34 ministers of various political leanings, in line with the Libreville agreement: nine from the rebel forces, eight from the former opposition, a former collaborator of Bozizé and the remaining ministers from civil society. At the end of the year, the situation grew more acute with **clashes taking place between self-defence units**

and militias from the Séléka group. Faced with this situation, **France stepped up its military presence in the CAR** in order to bring the situation under control and force the withdrawal of Séléka. In January 2014, Djotodia was forced to leave the country.

In November, **the government of the CAR stated that it was involved in talks with the leader of the Ugandan armed group LRA, Joseph Kony, with the goal of achieving his surrender.** Government sources indicated that Kony was in CAR and that he was demanding security guarantees before giving himself up. Kony, leader of the LRA, was being sought by the International Criminal Court, which accused him of committing war crimes. The US offered a five million dollar reward for information leading to his arrest.

As far as DR Congo is concerned, at the end of February, 11 countries signed a peace agreement in Addis Abeba in order to stabilise the east of DR Congo and the Great Lakes region. The signatories agreed not to intervene in any conflicts that took place in neighbouring countries and to refrain from supporting rebel groups, especially relevant in the case of Rwanda, accused of providing the M23 rebellion with military support. The peace negotiations between the Congolese government and the M23 group resumed in Kampala in September due to the military pressure of the UN Intervention Brigade and the Congolese armed forces, along with the diplomatic pressure of the countries in the region. In October the peace process between the Congolese government and the M23 armed group was once again suspended despite international pressure and the progress made towards achieving a final agreement. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the DR Congo, Martin Kobler, stated that the M23 was about to disappear as a threat following the capture of five towns controlled by the armed group, including Rumangabo, where it had a large military training base. On 5th November, **the M23 capitulated following a large-scale military offensive by the army with the support of the UN Intervention Brigade**, created specifically to support the country's armed forces and combat the M23, beyond the mandate of the MONUSCO. Both the United Nations and Uganda were committed to a negotiated outcome to the conflict. A political agreement to end the conflict was supposed to be signed by the respective delegations of the government and the rebel forces. However, following the military victory, Kinshasa refused to sign the agreement, preferring to call it a "declaration" that made it possible to resolve the issues of cantonment, disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration of M23 fighters. **A ceremony for the destruction of weapons of former fighters** was held in Goma on 20th November. It is estimated that between 1,500 and 3,000 former rebel fighters of various groups could join the security forces. **Some armed groups (such as the APCLS, Nyatura militias) demobilised as a result of the dismantling of the M23**, some of them unconditionally. According to the UN, the Kampala talks reached a satisfactory official conclusion on 12th December. **The government and the**

M23 each signed a declaration separately that reflected the consensus reached during the peace negotiations. Kinshasa rejected a general amnesty, stating that amnesties would have to be negotiated on an individual basis. Fighters who were not guilty of war crimes will be offered the possibility of joining the army or the police.

d) Maghreb

No formal negotiations took place in 2013 between **Morocco and the POLISARIO Front** over the future of Western Sahara. During the first week of April, Ban Ki-moon pointed out that **the climate of instability and insecurity in the Sahel region made finding a solution to the dispute over Western Sahara** increasingly urgent. He strongly urged the parties to begin genuine talks and highlighted the ever-pressing need for independent, impartial, comprehensive and sustained monitoring of the human rights situations in both Western Sahara and the refugee camps controlled by the POLISARIO Front in Tindouf, in the south of Algeria. **The US proposed extending the mandate of MINURSO to include human rights monitoring.** However, this initiative was fiercely opposed by Morocco, which began intense lobbying to block it. In April there were signs pointing to a **possible rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria.** Despite talks breaking down on the key issues of the conflict, representatives of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front met again at the Geneva headquarters of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The UN Special Envoy for the Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, was also in attendance. The meeting, which also aimed to build trust between the two sides, produced an agreement for a new series of visits in 2014 and for the holding of cultural seminars.

The Colombian government and the FARC announced in Havana 15-point agreement on political participation

and pain” had been caused by its forces. **The Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, proposed a peace referendum** to be voted on by Colombians in March or May 2014, coinciding with the elections, in order to decide whether they wanted a negotiated outcome to the conflict or a continuation of the armed struggle. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court (ICC) sent a letter to the Constitutional Court in which it stated that excessively lenient sentencing or pardons for certain crimes as part of any agreements reached with the FARC would activate the jurisdiction of the ICC in Colombia. Victims expressed the need to shed light on what had occurred during the armed conflict, requesting the creation of a truth commission, a demand also made by the FARC. In October, pressure was placed on the FARC delegation to step up the pace of the negotiations amid fears that there would not be enough time to sign a final agreement before the electoral period. In November, President Santos approved a change in the format of the negotiations with the FARC, enabling longer rounds of talks and shorter breaks. It seemed that **at the end of the negotiations the government was prepared to allow the creation of special peace constituencies in the chamber of representatives, not in order to guarantee seats for FARC leaders but rather to ensure that inhabitants of areas where the conflict was at its most intense could stand at the elections,** and that social movements, victims’ organisations or human rights organisations in these regions could compete democratically with political parties. In December, **the government and the FARC announced in Havana the 15-point agreement on political participation.**

Talks began in November on the third point on the agenda, illegal crops. The head of the FARC delegation in the Havana negotiations, “Iván Márquez”, called for the legalisation of drug consumption. He proposed legalising the sale of coca leaf but not cocaine. The technical commissions of both sides worked separately on the issue of illegal crops and subsequently handed their reports over to their respective negotiating teams to discuss in the talks. In December the FARC declared a truce (ceasefire and ending of hostilities) between 15th December and 15th January. The declaration was made after the negotiators of the government and the FARC met behind closed doors to analyse the tension created by an attack perpetrated by the FARC.

As regards the **ELN**, it seems that exploratory talks were held at the end of 2012, although without any concrete results. A senior official from Germany acted as a contact between the two parties. One obstacle to future talks was the ELN’s demand for the participation of civil society in any such talks, to which the government was opposed. The ELN stated that its agenda would be the one mandated by the communities present at the events held in recent years. The ELN considered it urgent to establish a great national peace movement capable of drawing together popular and social organisations,

LATIN AMERICA

Negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla organisation continued throughout the year and in December the conditions were established for the start of exploratory talks with the ELN guerrilla group. In early February, following six rounds of talks in Havana, **the Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla group reached an agreement on several aspects of the agricultural issue (the first point on the agenda),** which generated trust between the two sides and willingness to address the second point, political participation, on which **discussions began in October.** One of the sticking points was the FARC’s proposal to create a constituent assembly, as a way to achieve a peace treaty and a new social contract. However the government delegation was completely opposed to this initiative. In August, **and for the first time since talks began in Havana, the FARC acknowledged its share of responsibility for the thousands of deaths caused by the armed conflict.** The FARC leaders stated that “cruelty

parties and other groups. At the end of June 2013 the supreme commanders of the FARC and the ELN made public a declaration for peace. This joint declaration was interpreted as a wish on the part of the FARC to open parallel negotiations with the ELN, which President Santos stated would be possible once the ELN had released a Canadian that it had kidnapped. The ELN did indeed release the hostage. At the end of September, Norway offered impartial mediators for talks with the ELN. Meanwhile, the central command of the ELN considered that the issues on the negotiating table should include the main economic, political and social problems that caused social and armed conflict. Nevertheless, in October **the ELN reiterated its intention to begin negotiating with the government and appointed a five-person delegation for exploratory talks.** In November, the ELN accepted the challenge to negotiate without a bilateral ceasefire.

ASIA

a) South Asia

In **Afghanistan**, the process underwent a serious crisis. The Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, travelled to Qatar at the end of March with the goal of meeting representatives of the Qatari regime at the end of March to explore the possibility of holding talks with Taliban groups, according to media reports. In June, **the Taliban insurgency was able to open an office in Qatar**, following years of negotiations, and the US announced that it would start talks immediately with the Taliban to initiate the process to resolve the conflict. **The Taliban insurgency stated that it supported a political outcome to the Afghan conflict and that it aimed to establish good relations with the neighbouring countries.** The opening of the Taliban office in Qatar in June, under the Taliban flag and the name Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (symbol and name used when the Taliban ruled the country), generated unrest and drew strong criticism from the Afghan government, which reacted by suspending talks with the US on its presence beyond 2014 and on the bilateral security agreement. The Taliban flag was finally lowered and the aforementioned name was removed from the office. In September **the Pakistani government released the Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar**, one of the four founders of the Taliban movement in 1994. According to representatives of the Afghan government, this leader was in favour of a political and negotiated solution to the conflict (despite the small amount of room for manoeuvre available to the government, which indicated that it would not reform the constitution) and, as such, it was thought that his release might facilitate the process. In October, the governments of **Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed that a delegation of the High Council for Peace (the body entrusted with leading the peace talks with the Taliban insurgency) would meet with the released Taliban leader Mullah Baradar in Pakistan.** Meanwhile, the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, repeated his offer to enter

into talks with the Taliban insurgency and stated that the interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, would be in charge of the discussions.

There were reports that the peace talks taking place in the **state of Assam in India** between the armed group ULFA-PTF (faction of the ULFA in favour of negotiations) and the central government were making good progress. In the third quarter, the government agreed to confer the status of “scheduled tribe” on five ethnic groups (Moran, Motok, Chutia, Koch-Rajbongshi and Tai-Ahom), in line with the demands of the ULFA. Also in the Indian state of Assam, the talks with NDFB (Progressive), the faction of the NDFB in favour of negotiations, which had been ongoing for seven years, ran into serious difficulties in the first quarter and stalled. Meanwhile, **preliminary talks continued between the government and Ranjan Daimary, leader of the Bodo group NDFB (R), held in prison in Guwahati.** Daimary was released on bail in June in order to facilitate his participation in negotiations with the government.

Progress was made on several fronts in the first few months of the year in the Indian state of **Manipur**. **The central government, the government of Manipur and three insurgent groups signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding in mid-February, which involved the suspension of operations. The three groups were the URF, KCP-Lamphel and the KYKL-MDF.** In April, **seven commands of the KCP-MC laid down their weapons.** This faction, along with the factions KCP-Lamphel and KCP-Pakhanglakpa, declared their intention to start peace talks with the central and state governments. One month later, the **government of Manipur, the government of India and the insurgent group UPPK signed a peace agreement.** In the third quarter, **the state government signed memorandums of understanding with three armed opposition groups: KCP-N, KNLF and KRP.** The memorandums obligated the rebel organisations to lay down their arms and begin peace talks. In the Indian state of **Nagaland**, **the NSCN-K and the government jointly agreed a one-year extension to the ceasefire agreement that was scheduled to end on 28th April. The ceasefire agreement between the NSCN-KK and the government was also renewed for a further year.** The central government put pressure on the government of Manipur to change its intransigent stance regarding the peace process in Nagaland, according to media reports.

In respect of relations between **India and Pakistan** concerning the region of Kashmir, the year was characterised by attempts to step up the trust-building measures that had been implemented in recent years, overcoming moments of tension and conflict along the Line of Control (the de facto border between the two countries). In the second quarter, the coming to power of the new Pakistani government led by Nawaz Sharif generated new expectations. In his electoral programme, Sharif had pledged to relaunch the peace process between India and Pakistan. After taking office, Sharif stated that relations with neighbouring countries

were one of his government's immediate foreign policy priorities. According to Sharif, without peace in the region Pakistan could not achieve successful growth and development. As part of the new road map, **the new leader stated that Pakistan aspired to achieve a gradual normalisation of relations with India and to resolve pending issues, including the conflict over Kashmir.** Meanwhile, the moderate faction of Hurriyat, led by Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, proposed holding an Indian-Pakistani summit on both sides of the border, with leaders representing the local population, in order to work towards resolving the conflict. Mirwaiz emphasised the fact that the solution to the conflict had to be political and not merely through economic or infrastructure investments, in reference to the visit scheduled for the end of June by the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh in order to open the Qazigund-Banihal rail link in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. **Senior Indian and Pakistani officials met for the first time in 14 years with the goal of directly negotiating the situation in Kashmir,** a region disputed by the two countries.

The new Pakistani leader stated that he aspired to achieve a gradual normalisation of relations with India and to resolve pending issues, including the conflict over Kashmir

b) Southeast Asia

Over the course of the year fresh impetus was given to talks between the government and armed groups in Myanmar, including the only group with which no ceasefire agreement had yet been reached, the KIO, with a continuation of the informal talks that began in 2012. Following escalating violence between the army and the KIO in the state of Kachin, the government announced a unilateral ceasefire on 18th January around the city of Laiza (the main city in this state) aimed at paving the way for political talks with the KIO. The ceasefire came into force the following day, although the continuing violence rendered it somewhat ineffective. In turn, the parliament passed a motion calling for a ceasefire and talks in order to bring 18 months of clashes to an end. Talks finally went ahead between the central government and KIO in February in the Chinese city of Ruili with the active involvement of China, which acted as mediator according to some reports or as coordinator and witness, according to others. These talks addressed issues such as establishing a communication channel between the parties, reducing tension and inviting observers and witnesses to attend subsequent rounds of talks. This round of talks led to the **start of a process of political dialogue with the Union National Federal Council (UNFC), an umbrella platform for several insurgent groups,** such as the KIO, KNU, KNPP, SSPP, NMSP, ANC and PNLO, among others. The government and the UNFC met at the end of February to discuss political objectives, the framework for political dialogue and schedules.

At the end of May the **government and the KIO reached a seven-point agreement** in a meeting held in Myitkyina

(capital of the state of Kachin), which addressed the historical demands of the KIO, such as the need to separate powers, the establishment of a conflict monitoring and verification mechanism and the start of talks on political issues. The UN Special Envoy to Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar, also took part in this new round of talks. Meanwhile, **progress was also made in talks with the RCSS (and its armed group SSA),** an insurgent group with which ceasefire agreements had been reached in 2011 and 2012. In July, the UNFC proposed the participation of the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi as mediator (or at least as observer) in the peace talks taking place between the government and the council. One of the main obstacles to progress in the peace process was the fact that the government aimed to achieve a national ceasefire agreement before addressing the political demands of the various armed groups, while the UNFC considered that the talks regarding a ceasefire and those concerning the political causes of the conflict should be held at the same time. In August, the government and the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) announced the start of a truce, which was seen as the first step towards starting talks that could bring 25 years of conflict to an end. The agreement will enable the opening of four contact offices in Myanmar.

It is worth highlighting that the conference on trust-building measures held in September was attended by over 300 representatives of ethnic groups, political parties and the government. In November, the government and the main ethnic armed opposition groups agreed to sign a comprehensive ceasefire agreement for the entire country, to establish a framework for political talks and to hold the said talks. This occurred following a previous meeting between the armed opposition groups in which **17 of the 18 armed organisations taking part stated their commitment to the full ceasefire agreement on the condition that political talks took place.** However, the signing of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement was postponed on several occasions and by the end of the year had still not taken place. In December the armed forces of Myanmar launched a **new assault on positions of the armed opposition group KIA** in the south of the state of Kachin, using heavy weapons and causing the forced displacement of the area's civilian population. The attacks, which began on 24th December, lasted for several days. Sources of the armed group warned that the resumption of clashes **endangered the continuity of peace negotiations,** since it was a deliberate attack by the armed forces.

In respect of the **Philippines,** the MILF declared that huge progress had been made on each of the four annexes of the agreement reached in 2012. The agreement reached concerning the annex on power sharing was practically comprehensive, while several issues remained pending in respect of the annex on wealth sharing and the annex on normalisation. As far as so-called "normalisation"

was concerned, the new chair of the government peace panel, Professor Miriam Coronel-Ferrer (who replaced Marvic Leonen, now of the Supreme Court), declared that the disarmament of fighters would be gradual process. The leader of the MILF, Ebrahim Murad, stated that the said process would only begin under the government of the new Bangsamoro entity and also warned that it should include the government militias that operate in the Bangsamoro territory. Meanwhile, the MILF declared that it had already chosen the eight members of the MILF delegation that will form part of the transition commission. The remaining seven members of the commission are chosen by the government.

The MILF announced its intention to remain a Muslim organisation but also to form a political party in order to stand at the 2016 elections, once the new Bangsamoro entity had replaced the present Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. An important development in 2013 was the launch by the United Nations and the World Bank of a three-year programme to provide technical assistance during the transition process in Mindanao, in particular for the drawing up of the new Bangsamoro Basic Law and in terms of supporting the transition commission and the negotiation panels of the government and the MILF. In December **the government and the MILF signed a power sharing agreement**. This was the **third of the four annexes accompanying the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro signed at the end of 2012**. As such, the annex on normalisation was the only agreement that remained pending in order to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement. This annex includes, among other issues, the demobilisation of the MILF, the creation of a police force for Bangsamoro, the withdrawal of the armed forces from some regions, the eradication of criminal groups and the creation of transitional justice mechanisms. In the joint statement released at the end of the round of negotiations, the two sides pledged to reach an agreement on the last annex by January 2014. They succeeded in meeting this deadline.

Meanwhile, the MNLF announced the resumption of negotiations with the government for the full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement in the first week of July or the last week of August, in Yogyakarta (Indonesia). The talks, which had remained stalled since the MILF abandoned the negotiations in early February, resumed soon after the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (which facilitated the 1996 agreement) urged the Philippine government to synchronise and harmonise the contents of the negotiations with the MNLF and those of the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro signed in 2012 between Manila and the MILF. **Manila had already indicated to Indonesia on several occasions that it intended to complete its review of the 1996 peace process and begin the implementation of the various agreements that have been reached since the start of the said process**

in 2007. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process announced that it had made contact with the leaders of the various factions of the MNLF in order to urge them not to participate in the clashes in Zamboanga. In October the Justice minister stated that an arrest warrant had been issued against four people accused of rebellion and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law as a result of their alleged involvement in the clashes that took place over a period of three weeks in the city of Zamboanga, in Mindanao. One of the four people was Nur Misuari, founder of the MNLF and leader of one of its factions.

No substantial progress was made in the negotiations with the NPA group in the Philippines in 2013. In the second quarter, the peace process remained stalled after the government declared that it had ended official negotiations with the NDF, which had been suspended since February 2011. The so-called special track agreed by both sides in order to attempt to kick-start negotiations had also been at a standstill since early 2013. The government accused the NDF of having sabotaged both the official negotiations and the so-called special track due to its lack of political will and its imposition of preconditions for dialogue, while the NDF considered that the failure of the negotiations was mainly due to the government's breach of some of the agreements signed in recent years, in particular the Hague Joint Declaration and the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees. **The NDF announced its intention to continue its armed struggle until the end of Benigno Aquino's term in office and until the political conditions were right for a new process of dialogue**, although it also made declarations at other times indicating its willingness to resume talks under certain conditions. In September the head of the government's negotiation panel, Alex Padilla, expressed his willingness to resume the negotiation process if the NDF showed signs of good will and sincerity, as well as having a clear negotiation schedule for bringing the violence to an end and making a peace agreement possible. **Padilla also underlined the need for a new negotiation framework in order to resume talks**. Later on in the year, **Padilla stated that he was willing to recommend the release of some NDF advisers, but always in accordance with the country's laws**.

Over the course of the year, the most important development in the peace process in **southern Thailand** was the government's rapprochement with the armed opposition group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and with the PULO. **In March, the government and the BRN began exploratory peace talks facilitated by the government of Malaysia**. In early August, the BRN released a video to announce that it was suspending its participation in the peace talks since it considered that the government was not addressing any of its demands. The government of Malaysia, which was facilitating the peace talks, declared that the two sides

had agreed to cease violent incidents during Ramadan, until 18th August approximately. In early September, the BRN (through the Malaysian facilitator) provided the government with its list of demands, which included the release of all the alleged insurgents that were detained, the acknowledgement that the BRN represents the rights of the Pattani Malay people, the acceptance of the Malaysian government as the facilitator of talks, the incorporation as observers of the OIC, the ASEAN or some NGOs, and the acceptance that the Pattani Malay possessed rights over the territory of Pattani. According to media reports that appeared in September, two other armed opposition groups, the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) and the Barisan Islam Pembebasan Pattani (BIPP) (called BNPP until 2007), had stated their wish to join the peace talks. **The government announced its intention to resume talks with the armed opposition group BRN in November, after postponing peace talks indefinitely in mid-October.**

EUROPE

a) Southeast Europe

In Cyprus no progress was made over the course of the year in attempts to resolve the conflict. Following months of stalemate in the peace process, in the second quarter some of the groundwork was laid for the resumption of talks. **The Greek Cypriot president, Nicos Anastasiades, and the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Derviş Eroğlu, met at a dinner arranged by the UN Special Envoy to Cyprus, Alexander Downer, on 30th May.** Meanwhile, in mid-July the Turkish-Cypriot president, Derviş Eroğlu, stated that the talks that might be relaunched at the end of the year were the last opportunity to achieve a solution. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, met with the Greek Cypriot president, Nicos Anastasiades, at the end of September, coinciding with the UN General Assembly. In their meeting they tackled issues related to the progress achieved in laying the groundwork for the resumption of talks. Meanwhile, Ban Ki-moon praised Anastasiades for his role in the handling of the island's economic and financial crisis.

Progress was made in the dialogue process between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013, with several rounds of talks taking place (facilitated by the EU) that contributed to improving diplomatic relations between the two sides and to achieving historic results. One step towards the improvement of relations was the **meeting held in early February between the Serbian president, Tomislav Nikolic, and his Kosovan counterpart, Atifete Jahjaga, the first meeting between the two leaders since Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.** The meeting was declared a success by both presidents, who pledged to continue with the process of dialogue. This was followed by the **fifth round of talks between the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo, in which the two sides agreed to work towards overcoming the problem of the parallel institutions of the Serbian areas**

of Kosovo, as well as towards the establishment of an association of municipalities with a Serb majority, although they disagreed over the interpretation of what had been agreed. Further progress was made in the second quarter in the dialogue process with the achievement of a key agreement in April for the normalisation of relations, including the **resolution of the situation of the Serb areas of Kosovo.** This 15-point agreement, signed in May and entitled "First agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations", included the creation of an association of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo, with its own status and competencies. **The May agreement established the road map to be followed for the implementation of the normalisation of relations and encompassed several areas: legislative changes, association of Serb municipalities, police, courts and elections.** Meanwhile, and following several previous disputes, Serbia and Kosovo also agreed solutions for several disagreements over the holding of local elections in Kosovo on 3rd November, the first elections to be held under the control of Kosovo in the areas with a Serb majority in Kosovo. As such, the symbols of Kosovo were not placed on the voting ballots. In the 19th round of negotiations facilitated by the EU and held in early December, the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo, Ivica Dacic and Hashim Thaci, reached an **agreement on the key aspects of the police in the areas with a Serb majority in Kosovo.** The two sides agreed that a person of Serb origin would be placed in charge of the police force in the northern zone of Kosovo. Furthermore, Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian officers will be incorporated proportionally. However, the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo **did not achieve an agreement in the following round, on 13th December, regarding the judiciary in the north of Kosovo.**

The difficulties in the negotiation process between **Moldova** and the region of Transdniestria were complicated even further by the political crisis in Moldova, where the government resigned following the vote of no confidence passed in parliament, presented by the opposition communist party (which previously held power) following allegations of government corruption. Moldova and Transdniestria took part in a new round of the negotiation process, held at the end of May in Odessa (Ukraine) in 5+2 format. The special representative of the OSCE, Andrii Deshchytsia, called the talks "frank but constructive" and urged the sides to keep up regular bilateral meetings at all levels in the period leading up to the next round of 5+2 talks, scheduled for mid-June in Vienna. The OSCE welcomed the meeting of the Moldovan and Transdniestrian chief negotiators Eugen Carpov and Nina Shtanski, who met at the headquarters of the OSCE mission in Moldova at the end of May. **In early June the president of Transdniestria approved a decree that unilaterally delimited the borders of the secessionist region, incorporating territory currently under Moldovan jurisdiction, which added tension in the context of talks.** At the end of July a joint action plan was agreed for the conservation of

natural resources. Meanwhile, the prime minister of Moldova, Iure Leanca, and the leader of Transdniestria, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, met in the capital of Transdniestria, Tiraspol, on 23rd September. In this meeting the two leaders signed an agreement to postpone the decision on the **resumption of the rail freight service through Transdniestria**. Meanwhile, in a new round of the 5+2 talks in early October, the two sides agreed to discuss in detail issues related to freedom of movement. As such, **the importance of simplifying administrative obstacles to the freedom of movement of people between the two territories was once again underlined**, with the goal of improving the welfare of the communities and increasing trust between them.

As regards the rapprochement between the **Turkish** government and the Kurdish guerrilla organisation PKK, for the first time in many years **the two sides reached a series of agreements (with the direct involvement of the PKK leader, A. Öcalan) in a long process of mutual concessions, paving the way for future progress**. The government appeared to acknowledge Öcalan as a key actor in the peace process. Communication between Öcalan and his bases was carried out through visits by Kurdish delegations authorised by the government. In a message considered historic and transmitted through the BDP, **Öcalan called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkish soil**. During the second quarter, the government worked on the **creation of a committee of wise people to contribute to the peace process. The PKK began its withdrawal on 8th May**, with the arrival of the first group of fighters in the Kurdish region of Iraq in mid-May, without incident. The PKK leader, Murat Karayilan, had warned that they would defend themselves by violent means if attacked by the Turkish army. Karayilan stated that the PKK was withdrawing from Turkey unconditionally, but insisted that the democratisation process following the withdrawal of the guerrilla forces should include steps such as reforms to the law on political parties, the electoral threshold, the anti-terrorism law, the abolition of paramilitary units (“village guards”) and the release of those detained in the legal process against the KCK (Kurdish organisation that includes the PKK). The withdrawal of PKK forces was criticised by the central Iraqi government. **The dialogue process between the Turkish government and the PKK was negatively affected between July and August by mutual accusations that the other side was not taking sufficient steps**, which led to significant setbacks and Kurdish declarations in September regarding the suspension of its withdrawal. On 30th September, the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, presented the democratisation plan, which included opening the debate on the electoral threshold (after which the current restrictions might be upheld, lowered from 10% to 5% or removed altogether); giving the green light for education in Kurdish in private schools (not public ones); authorising the use of Kurdish and other languages other than Turkish in

political propaganda; and lifting the restrictions on place names in languages other than Turkish, among other measures. Other changes were also announced, affecting broader political and social dynamics in Turkey beyond the Kurdish issue. At the end of October, Cemil Bayik, co-president of the KCK (the umbrella body that encompasses the organisations of the Kurdish nationalist movement) stated that **the dialogue process between the government and the most senior leader of the KCK/PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, had ended**. He blamed the Turkish government for the breakdown in talks, accusing it of failing to provide solutions for Kurdish demands. Meanwhile, the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the president of the Kurdish region of Iraq, Massoud Barzani, visited Diyarbakir, symbolic Kurdish capital of Turkey, where they underlined the need to commit to the peace process. Sectors of the Kurdish movement were critical of this visit, considering it an electoral stunt given the upcoming series of elections in Turkey and the regional tension between the PKK and Barzani’s KDP.

Öcalan called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkish soil

b) Caucasus

No significant progress was made in the negotiation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh in the first few months of the year. The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (the international mediation body) met on several occasions during the third quarter with the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Edward Nalbandian and Elmar Mammadyarov, respectively. In one of these meetings, in early July, **the two foreign ministers underlined their commitment to the objectives set forth in the June meetings to reduce tension between the two sides and create the conditions for arranging a meeting at the highest level at the end of 2013. The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev, met in mid-November in Vienna**, through the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group. This was the first meeting held between the presidents since January 2012, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict having reached a stalemate in recent years.

No real progress was made in 2013 in the negotiation process between Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia, with external facilitation, known as the Geneva talks. Heading the Georgian delegation in the process, the country’s deputy foreign minister stated that the respective positions of the parties on the non-use of force remained unchanged. The period from April to June was marked by Abkhazia’s refusal to participate in the regular meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), a stance it has maintained since April 2012 and whose revocation was dependent on the departure of the head of the EU mission, who it considered *persona non grata*. In the third quarter, Georgia and Russia expressed their willingness to normalise relations, although **Russia insisted that its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South**

Ossetia was irrevocable. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, met the Abkhaz leader, Alexander Ankvab, at the end of September, Russia having reduced somewhat its economic support of the region. Meanwhile, **Georgia restated its willingness to promote a policy for the regions based on re-establishing contacts among the population, repairing bridges between communities and conducting public diplomacy**, as key elements for progressing towards a political resolution of the two conflicts. In respect of the region of **South Ossetia**, the situation remained largely unchanged in the Geneva negotiation process, which brought together Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia, with the facilitation of the OSCE, the EU and the UN. In the round of Geneva talks held at the end of March, the working group on security issues reviewed and welcomed the IPRM's catalogue of good practices on freedom of movement, distributed by the mediators. Meanwhile, in the working group devoted to humanitarian issues, the representatives of the various delegations exchanged views on matters such as disappearances and the possibility of enabling those affected by the conflict to visit the other side of the border. Another highlighted issue was the need to stipulate procedures for tackling medical emergencies, and the importance of conserving cultural heritage was also underlined. **The government of South Ossetia stated in the third quarter that the policy of the new Georgian government was not very different from that of previous governments.**

MIDDLE EAST

Regarding the conflict between **Israel and Palestine**, the January elections in Israel ushered in a new government, headed once again by the Likud leader, Benjamin Netanyahu. The former foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, of the Hatnuah party, was one of the few politicians who during the election campaign highlighted the need to unblock the talks with the Palestinians. The first quarter of 2013 was also marked by the **first visit of the US president, Barack Obama, to Israel and the West Bank. President Obama did not offer a peace plan or any specific initiative for the resumption of negotiations between the two sides** but rather urged the Palestinians and Israelis to give dialogue another chance, stating his support for a two-state solution. During the second quarter the US secretary of state, **John Kerry, continued his round of visits to the region, holding a series of meetings with the leaders of Israel, Palestine and other countries in the area with the goal of kick-starting peace talks.** Meanwhile, the Arab League altered one aspect of its peace proposal for the Middle East (known as the Arab Initiative, first proposed in 2002), embracing the principle of territorial exchanges with Israel in the definition of the borders of the new Palestinian state. Kerry welcomed the approach of the Arab League, while the Israeli negotiator and justice minister, Tzipi Livni, stated that this rapprochement brought the possibility of negotiations a step closer. During the third quarter,

following three years of stalled peace negotiations, **Israeli and Palestinian delegates resumed direct talks with US mediation.** Tzipi Livni and the leader of the Palestinian negotiation team, Saeb Erekat, agreed a framework for negotiation following a meeting with the US mediators in Washington at the end of July. A nine-month term was set for the talks. The US secretary of state declared that a viable two-state solution was the only way of settling the dispute and appointed **Martin Indyk as the US special envoy to the talks.** In November, the US secretary of state, John Kerry, visited the region again in an attempt to help bolster the peace talks between Israel and Palestine, whose delegations met 20 times in the space of three months. A few days later, the Palestinian negotiators resigned in protest at Israel's continuous colonisation. The Palestinian president refused to accept the resignation.

As regards the conflict in **Syria**, several failed attempts were made over the course of the year to get the parties to sit around the negotiation table, at least in order to achieve a ceasefire. The year began with an **offer by the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, in early January to hold a national dialogue and a constitutional referendum in order to end the crisis.** However, the leader struck a defiant tone, accusing his adversaries of terrorism and attributing the crisis in the country to a plot instigated from abroad. In mid-February, a meeting of the leadership of the **Syrian National Coalition concluded that the basic parameters for negotiations with the regime required al-Assad and the government's entire military and security leadership to step down**, since they could not form part of a political solution to the conflict. While the debate was being held on the possibility of holding a meeting in Geneva, **the former Syrian opposition leader Moaz al-Khatib presented a proposal for a negotiated outcome to the conflict.** Following a series of negotiations between Russia and the US over the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government, the two parties agreed the text of a resolution that was passed in September by the UN Security Council (the body's first resolution on the Syrian crisis), demanding the **destruction of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal by mid-2014.** The possibility of using measures of force against Syria in the event of a breach of its commitments was mentioned but was subject to the passing of a new resolution.

In this context, there were new **calls to hold the repeatedly delayed Geneva conference (Geneva 2) in order to search for a solution to the crisis. It was finally held in January 2014.** The United Nations and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, insisted on the need for the parties to refrain from imposing preconditions for talks. Following a new change in leadership, the main opposition group in exile, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) stated that it was willing to attend the conference if the objective was to establish a transitional government with full executive powers. However, rebel organisations in Syria

insisted on their refusal to negotiate with the Damascus regime. Meanwhile, the various groups that represent the Kurdish population in Syria were also divided over how to take part in the conference, whether as part of the Syrian opposition or with an independent delegation. One of the goals of the Geneva conference was to address the **implementation of the agreement reached by several countries in the Swiss city in June 2012**. It was expected that the five members of the UN Security Council (China, Russia, the US, France and the UK) would attend the meeting, although Brahimi stated that it was also important for other key countries to take part, including Iran, which did not attend the previous meeting in Geneva and which in the end was not invited to the January meeting.

3.3. Other attempts at negotiation not included in the previous section

The section deals with some specific developments on which there is currently insufficient information to justify the allocation of a dedicated formal peace process or negotiation section.

The prime minister of the Tibetan government in exile, Lobsang Sangay, urged the Chinese government to resume the peace talks that were interrupted in 2010. Nine rounds of negotiations were held between 2002 and 2010 but Beijing unilaterally ended talks over the political situation in Tibet, taking the view that the Dalai Lama was actively encouraging the frequent outbreaks of violence that were taking place. Lobsang Sangay expressed his willingness to resume talks at any time and in any place, declaring that his government's approach was the so-called middle way, which consisted of **renouncing the independence of Tibet in exchange for real autonomy** for the regions historically inhabited by the Tibetan population. In this respect, the prime minister pointed out that in the nine rounds of negotiation that have taken place, his government had already offered Beijing a proposal for the establishment of an autonomous region in Tibet that would be fully compatible with the Chinese constitution.

The position of the government in exile was to renounce the independence of Tibet in exchange for real autonomy


In respect of **Nepal**, seven years into the peace process between the Maoist armed group of the communist party of Nepal and the government, on 13th April the special commission entrusted with the monitoring, training and integration of approximately 1,400 former Maoist fighters in the country's army declared that its work was concluded and elections were held to set up a new constituent assembly.

In **Nigeria**, a senior commander of Boko Haram (BH), thought to be the number two in command of the armed group, declared a unilateral ceasefire in January. The announcement was viewed with scepticism by some sectors in Nigeria due to confusion over whether Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdulazeez was speaking on behalf of the organisation or whether he represented a rival faction willing to negotiate with the government. Meanwhile, the Sultan of Sokoto, the main Nigerian Muslim leader, proposed an amnesty for BH, as had occurred in the Niger Delta, in order to help eradicate the violence. However, the country's president, **Goodluck Jonathan, said that this was impossible since his government did not know who the members of BH were or what their demands were.**

In **Pakistan**, the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, offered to **carry out peace negotiations with the Taliban insurgency**. The invitation was made during a conference arranged by the government in which leaders of the country's main political parties took part, including those sympathetic to the insurgency, and in which Sharif stated that the negotiations should be the first priority. **The Taliban insurgency welcomed the invitation** and it was reported that the leaders of the Taliban armed opposition group TTP met in secret to evaluate the government's proposal. Nevertheless, when the Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud was killed on 1st November in a US drone attack the negotiations scheduled to begin the next day were called off. Some experts highlighted the extensive **fragmentation of the Taliban insurgency** since 2009 following the death of its leader Baitullah Mehsud in a drone attack, claiming that there could be as many as 100 insurgent organisations. The Pakistani government has outlawed 60 armed groups.

In **Yemen**, the Conference of National Dialogue (CND) continued the work that it began on 18th March. The various committees continued to tackle some of the key issues for the future of the country, including the electoral system or the future structure of the state. Meanwhile, the demands of the Houthis focused on the need to compensate the victims of the conflicts in the north of the country and on the release of political prisoners. Within the framework of the transition process, the Yemeni government issued a statement in which it asked for the forgiveness of the population affected by the policies of the previous regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, including the incidents that led to the 1994 civil war and the military campaigns against the Houthi rebels since 2004. It should be pointed out that the CND was supposed to complete its work by 18th September but that the deadline was extended to early 2014.

Map 4.1. Gender Inequalities



4. The gender dimension in peacebuilding

- 75 countries suffered serious gender inequalities, 42 of which stood out in particular, mainly concentrated in Africa and Asia. 72% of the armed conflicts for which data on gender equality was available took place in contexts with serious gender inequalities.
- In 2012, the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war in situations of armed conflict and tension was reported in Syria, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Egypt and Myanmar, among others.
- The UN Security Council approved Resolution 2106 on preventing sexual violence in conflict and Resolution 2122 on women and peacebuilding in order to strengthen the existing international instruments for these issues, placing more emphasis on women's leadership.
- Women's organisations in Colombia and Syria called for a greater role in peace processes in those countries, and in Colombia two women joined the government delegation to negotiate with the FARC.
- In Colombia, the first international truth commission on the conflict's impact on women was formed, which presented its report *Women's truth: victims of armed conflict in Colombia*.
- The Arms Trade Treaty approved in April included a clause on the gender impact of arms sales.

This chapter provides an analysis of the various initiatives being implemented in peacebuilding processes from a gender perspective by the United Nations and by other local and international organisations and movements.¹ An analysis through this perspective makes it possible to highlight the specific impacts of armed conflict on men and women, as well as the extent to which and the way in which they participate in peacebuilding, in particular the contributions being made by women in this respect. The chapter is structured into three main sections: the first assesses the global gender inequality situation through an analysis of the Gender Inequality Index; the second section analyses the gender dimension in the impact of armed conflicts and socio-political crises; and the final section is devoted to peacebuilding from a gender perspective. A map is included at the start of each chapter that highlights the countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender Inequality Index.

4.1. Gender inequalities

The **Gender Inequality Index (GII)**² reflects women's disadvantage in relation to the situation of men by analysing three dimensions: reproductive health (maternal mortality rate and adolescent fertility rate³), empowerment (women and men with at least secondary education and the share of parliamentary seats held by each sex), and the labour market (participation rate of women and men in the workforce). The GII shows the loss in human development due to inequality when comparing the achievements of women and men in the said dimensions. It ranges from zero, where there is a situation of full equality between men and women, to one, when one gender presents the worst performance possible in all the measured dimensions. The importance of this index lies in the fact that it does not merely break down information according to sex but rather analyses this information on the basis of the relations of inequality established between men and women. In other words, it is a gender-sensitive index.⁴

1. As an analytical category, gender makes it clear that inequalities between men and women are the product of social norms rather than a result of nature, and sets out to underline this social and cultural construction to distinguish it from the biological differences of the sexes. The gender perspective aims to highlight the social construction of sexual difference and the sexual division of work and power. It also attempts to show that the differences between men and women are a social construction resulting from unequal power relations that have been historically established in the patriarchal system. The goal of gender as an analytical category is to demonstrate the historical and situated nature of sexual differences.
2. UNDP, "Gender Inequality Index", *Human Development Report 2011. Sustainability and equality: A better future for all* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
3. The reproductive health indicators used in the GII do not have equivalent indicators for men, which means that in this dimension, the reproductive health of girls and women is compared with what should be social objectives, i.e. for there to be no maternal deaths or adolescent pregnancies. UNDP, "Gender Inequality Index", *Human Development Report 2011. Sustainability and equality: A better future for all* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
4. While statistics broken down according to sex provide factual information on the situation regarding women, a gender-sensitive indicator provides direct evidence of women's status in respect of a certain standard or reference group, in this case men. Susan Schmeidl and Eugenia Piza-Lopez. *Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action*, International Alert and Swiss Peace Foundation, 2002, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D2489588422D1A37C1256C3000383049-fewer-gender-jun02.pdf>.

Table 4.1. Countries with serious gender inequalities

Countries with a GII of between 0.4 and 0.5		
Belize	Georgia	Namibia
Bhutan	Guyana	Nepal
Bolivia	Honduras	Nicaragua
Botswana	Indonesia	Paraguay
Brazil	Iran	Philippines
Burundi	Jamaica	Rwanda
Cambodia	Jordan	Sri Lanka
Colombia	Laos	South Africa
Ecuador	Lebanon	Surinam
El Salvador	Morocco	Tonga
Gabon	Myanmar	Venezuela
Countries with a GII above 0.5		
Afghanistan	Guatemala	Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh	Haiti	Qatar
Benin	India	Saudi Arabia
Burkina Faso	Iraq	Senegal
Cameroon	Kenya	Sierra Leone
Central African Republic	Lesotho	Syria
Congo	Liberia	Sudan
Côte d'Ivoire	Malawi	Swaziland
Djibouti	Mali	Tanzania
Dominican Republic	Mauritania	Togo
DR Congo	Mozambique	Uganda
Egypt	Niger	Yemen
Gambia	Panama	Zambia
Ghana	Pakistan	Zimbabwe

The GII ranges from 0, which would indicate a situation of full equality, to 1, which would indicate the greatest inequality possible. The rating of 0.4 has been taken as a reference, since 0.46 is the global average.

The countries are listed in alphabetical order.

Countries with one or more active armed conflicts are listed in **bold** while countries that experienced one or more active socio-political crises in 2013, according to the definitions of Escola de Cultura de Pau, appear in *cursive*.

Source: Own work based on the GII 2012

According to the GII, **the situation of women was serious in 75 countries⁵ and especially serious in 42 of them, mostly concentrated in Africa and Asia.⁶** The analysis obtained by cross-referencing the data of this indicator with those of countries in a situation of armed conflict reveals that 14 of the 75 countries with a serious situation of gender inequality were embroiled in one or several armed conflicts in 2013. It must be pointed out that for five of the countries with one or more armed conflicts, there are no data available on gender equality (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia and South Sudan). This means that 21 of the 35 armed conflicts active over the course of 2013 occurred in countries where there were serious gender inequalities and that six of these conflicts occurred in countries for which there are no available data in this regard.⁷ As such, 72% of the armed conflicts for which data are available on gender equality took place in contexts with serious gender inequalities. Gender equality figures remained below the threshold of seriousness established in this report in only six of the countries in which one or more armed conflicts were taking place (Algeria, Israel, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and Libya).

This situation would seem to coincide with the theory put forward by some authors that gender inequality in a country increases the likelihood of internal armed conflict taking place there.⁸ Furthermore, in 39 of the countries with serious inequalities, there were one or more socio-political crises. This means that at least 56 of the 99 active socio-political crises in 2013 occurred in countries where serious gender inequalities exist, accounting for 68% of socio-political crises for which data are available.

4.2. The impact of violence and conflicts from a gender perspective

This section focuses on the gender dimension in the cycle of conflict, particularly regarding violence against women. Armed conflicts and socio-political crises are phenomena with a significant gender dimension. A gender-based analysis dismantles the traditional view of armed conflicts as neutral situations and questions the belief that the origins of armed conflict are independent of the gender power structures in place in certain societies. From this perspective, serious doubts are also raised about statements that attempt to generalise the consequences of conflict without taking the gender dimension and gender inequalities into account.

a) Sexual violence as a weapon of war

In 2013, sexual violence as a weapon of war continued to be one of the main items on the international women, peace and security agenda. First, its use was reported in many armed conflicts and socio-political crises active throughout the year, with a serious impact for the victims, who were mainly female civilians. Second, different institutional initiatives arose to increase the visibility of this serious human rights violation and attempt to reduce its impact and the impunity associated with it.

In March, **the UN Secretary-General presented his report on sexual violence in armed conflict** in accordance with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1960 (2010). His report collected information on cases of sexual violence that took place in 2012, as detailed in table 4.2.

Throughout the year, many cases of sexual violence were reported in different places affected by armed conflict or socio-political crises, or which were in a post-war situation.

One of the most serious situations of the year was experienced in **Syria**. The Euro Mediterranean Human

5. This data refers to 2012, which is the most recent year for which data is available.

6. The author of this study is responsible for this classification, not the UNDP. All the countries with ratings of between 0.4 and 0.5 are considered to be in a serious situation in terms of gender equality. Especially serious situations receive ratings of over 0.5.

7. The armed conflict in Central Africa (LRA) is taking place in DR Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan.

8. Mary Caprioli, "Gender equality and state aggression: the impact of domestic gender equality on state first use of force," *International Interactions* 29, no. 3 (2003): pp. 195-214.

Table 4.2. Sexual violence in contexts of armed conflict⁹

Conflictos armados	
Afghanistan	Cases of kidnapping, assault, rape and sexual abuse of women and children occurred in areas under the armed opposition's control, particularly by the Taliban insurgency and the Afghan police. The impunity and absence of the state in much of the country fostered sexual violence and victim blaming.
Central African Republic	The various forces of the rebel coalition Séléka perpetrated sexual violence against the civilian population in areas under its control. There were also reports of girls being forced to marry members of the armed groups. These girls were not released, despite the implementation of programmes to reintegrate minors linked to the armed groups. The ceasefire agreement of January 2013 called for an immediate halt to sexual violence. The report identifies the following armed groups as responsible: 1. Lord's Resistance Army 2. Séléka (composed of factions of the Patriotic Convention for Salvation of Kodro, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace in Central Africa, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity and the Democratic Front of the Central African People)
Colombia	Indigenous and Afro-Colombian women suffered sexual violence as the hands of the FARC and other illegal groups that appeared after paramilitary forces demobilised. Cases of sexual violence perpetrated against men and women by members of the Colombian Army were also reported.
Côte d'Ivoire	Sexual violence was fostered by the slowness of the militia disarmament process and the proliferation of arms in the western part of the country and in Abidjan. Women belonging to non-indigenous communities suffered particularly from this violence. The report identifies the following armed groups as responsible: 1. Armed groups: a) Old militia groups including the Patriotic Alliance of the Wé, the Front for the Liberation of the Great West, the Ivorian Movement for the Liberation of the West of Côte d'Ivoire and the Patriotic Resistance Union of the Great West b) Former Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles c) Former Defence and Security Forces 2. Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire
DR Congo	Armed groups continued to practice sexual violence to obtain control of areas with abundant natural resources and in retaliation for support given to other armed organisations or for belonging to a particular ethnicity. The report identifies the following armed groups as responsible: 1. Armed Forces of DR Congo (FARDC) and the Congolese National Police 2. Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) 3. Mai-Mai Lumumba 4. Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri 5. Congolese Defence Forces 6. M23 7. Raia Mutomboki 8. Allied Democratic Forces in a coalition with the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, the LRA, Nyatura and other Mai-Mai militias The United Nations documented 764 cases of sexual violence: in 280 the victims were minors and in 23 they were men or boys.
Mali	Reports of sexual violence increased. The groups responsible for sexual violence included the MNLA, Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJAO. The United Nations documented 211 cases of sexual violence used to forcibly displace the population. Women of the Bella community were particularly targeted. The report identifies the following armed groups as responsible: 1. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 2. Ansar Dine 3. National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) 4. Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Myanmar	The Burmese Armed Forces continued to commit acts of sexual violence in Kachin State. There were also reports of the use of sexual violence in intercommunity clashes in Rakhine State, but they could not be independently verified because the government blocked access to the area.
Somalia	The United Nations found more than 1,700 cases of rape in and around Mogadishu, in a third of which the victims were children. The perpetrators included members of both armed groups and security forces. Impunity remains widespread and the violence goes unreported.
South Sudan	Numerous incidents of sexual violence occurred as part of intercommunity violence between the Lou Nuer and Murle peoples in the state of Jonglei. Women and girls were kidnapped and forced into sexual slavery. Sexual violence was also reportedly committed by soldiers of the SPLA.
Sudan (Darfur)	Displaced women and girls were the main victims of sexual violence in the camps where they live. Kidnappings for sexual purposes and sexual slavery were committed. The African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur received 121 reports of sexual violence.
Syria	Sexual violence was one of the main reasons for the forced displacement of thousands of women and girls. Two clear settings of sexual violence were reported: during house searches and at checkpoints after the advance of the government and government militias, and rape and torture in detention centres. There were also reports of the abduction and rape of women and girls by armed opposition groups. The report identifies the following armed groups as responsible: Syrian government forces, including the Syrian Armed Forces, the Syrian intelligence services and the Shabiha militia.

9. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, *Sexual violence in Conflict. Report of the Secretary General, A/67/792-S/2013/149*, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/149.

Rights Network (EMHRN) reported that since the beginning of the armed conflict in March 2011, 6,000 women had been victims of sexual violence, mainly during government raids, at checkpoints and in detention centres.¹⁰ Sexual violence has led to the displacement of thousands of people fleeing the terror sown among the civilian population. In addition to sexual violence, thousands of women have been killed as a result of the fighting and have been the victims of massacre and execution. The EMHRN also reported other serious human rights violations, such as the use of women as human shields, arbitrary detention, torture, kidnapping and the denial of access to medical care. Furthermore, the UN's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic also reported that the government had committed serious human rights violations, including sexual violence, which was being used to terrorise and punish women, men and minors considered opponents of the government.

Various United Nations representatives denounced that sexual violence was being used in the armed conflict in the **Central African Republic** and that boys and girls were suffering to a particular degree. More than one million people were forcibly displaced as a consequence of this serious crisis and one of the main reasons for the displacement was the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.

In **Somalia**, the human rights organisation Amnesty International reported that sexual violence was a constant threat for displaced women and that fear and stigmatisation kept this type of violence from being reported. According to figures provided by the United Nations, during 2012 at least 1,700 women were raped in camps for internally displaced people, 70% of which were committed by government soldiers.

In **Myanmar**, despite the various peace negotiations ongoing with armed opposition groups, the organisation Free Burma Rangers reported that the Burmese Armed Forces continued to commit serious human rights violations, including sexual violence against women of the Kachin ethnic group.

In **Egypt**, complaints of the use of sexual violence against women participating in anti-government protests continued. Moreover, various studies revealed important data. The Thomson Reuters Foundations said that Egypt was the Arab country with the worst situation for women's rights. A United Nations study on sexual harassment in the country revealed that 99.3% of women (based on a sampling

of 2,000 women from rural and urban environments participating in the study) had suffered some kind of sexual harassment, with the most frequent places for it being the street, public transport, beaches and markets. A report by the Minority Rights Group indicated that in Sri Lanka, the militarisation of the northern and eastern parts of the country after the end of the armed conflict in 2009 and the impunity enjoyed by members of the Sri Lankan Army deployed in these areas have created serious situations of insecurity for women, a scenario in which the abuses committed during the war persist, such as rape and other forms of sexual aggression.¹¹ According to the study, Tamil and Muslim women are experiencing conditions of greater insecurity than they did during the years of armed conflict. Other organisations like Human Rights Watch also denounced the persistence of sexual violence against women after the end of the armed conflict, as well as against Tamil men in detention centres.¹²

Thousands of women have been victims of sexual violence in Syria since the beginning of the armed conflict

In **Cambodia**, some organisations held hearings in which the victims of sexual violence during the Khmer Rouge regime gave their testimony. These hearings were especially important because the genocide and war crimes tribunal established in Cambodia and backed by the UN ruled out trying crimes of extramarital sexual violence committed during the period, referring to the Khmer Rouge's policy that prohibited sexual relations outside of marriage and to the fact that said relations and rape were both punishable by death, which presumably would have protected women from sexual violence. However, women's organisations said that the punishment was also meted out to the victims, which inhibited them from reporting incidents at the time. Therefore, the Khmer Rouge's policy did not prevent sexual violence and in fact served to prevent victims from reporting the perpetrators for fear of the death penalty.

b) Response to sexual violence used as a weapon of war

In June, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2106 on sexual violence in conflict for the purpose of facilitating the implementation and enforcement of other instruments already dealing with the issue. The resolution addresses different subjects such as the need for member states to add the full range of sexual offences to their legislation and highlights the work of the International Criminal Court in the struggle against impunity. Significantly, the resolution recognises the

10. Sema Nasar, *Violence against Women, Bleeding Wound in the Syrian Conflict*, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, November 2013, <http://www.euromedrights.org/eng/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Doc-report-VAW-Syria.pdf>.

11. Minority Rights Group, *Living with insecurity: Marginalization and sexual violence against women in north and east Sri Lanka*, Minority Rights Group, October 2013, <http://www.minorityrights.org/121119/reports/living-with-insecurity-marginalization-and-sexual-violence-against-women-in-north-and-east-sri-lanka.html>.

12. Human Rights Watch, *"We Will Teach You a Lesson" Sexual Violence against Tamils by Sri Lankan Security Forces*, HRW, February 2013, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/02/26/we-will-teach-you-lesson>.

important role that women's economic, political and social participation and empowerment play in the struggle against this form of violence. Furthermore, it repeats the need for sexual violence to be included in the definition of acts prohibited under ceasefire agreements and excluded from amnesty provisions and urges the targeted imposition of sanctions on people responsible for ordering or committing acts of sexual violence. According to the analysis of this resolution by organisations such as Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), both the collection of information on sexual violence and the punishment of perpetrators must focus on the victims so they cannot be adversely affected by those processes. Moreover, WILPF said that greater recognition is required for the role that women's organisations and civil society in general can play in the fight against this kind of violence and in preventing its use in armed conflicts.

Various armed opposition groups signed the Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination created by Geneva Call in 2012 so that armed organisations could express their commitment to international standards and prevent and prohibit sexual violence in the armed conflicts in which they are active.¹² By late 2013, the groups that had joined the Deed of Commitment since its inception included the KNU/KNLA in Myanmar, the ZRO in India and five groups in Iran (PDKI, KPIK, KPK, Komalah-CPI and KDP-Iran). Other groups with which Geneva Call is working to attain their commitment include the CNF/CNA in Myanmar, the MILF and CPP/NPA in the Philippines, the PJAK in Iran, the HPG/PKK in Turkey and the ELN and FARC in Colombia. In addition to ending the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, the adoption of this commitment also involves promoting the participation of women at all

Gender violence was very high in areas affected by armed conflict and socio-political crises

levels of decision-making and not just in spheres considered specific to women.

c) Gender violence in contexts of socio-political crises or armed conflict

High rates of gender violence were reported throughout the year in areas affected by armed conflict or socio-political crises, as was the case in the region of West Papua in Indonesia, Madagascar, Pakistan and Chechnya, in Russia. In West Papua, the National Commission on Violence against Women said that more than 1,300 cases of gender violence were reported in this province for every 10,000 women in 2012. The year before, in 2011, the Asian Human Rights Commission had reported that indigenous women suffered high rates

of gender violence in the home and were barely protected by the police or government authorities. In Madagascar, even though there are no statistics on the prevalence of gender violence, a study conducted in three cities, Antananarivo, Diego and Tulear, indicated that 30% of women had suffered gender violence in the home some time in their lives. This situation is made worse by the lack of shelters for female victims of this kind of violence in the country and by

the fact that to report their husbands, women have to present a medical certificate that is too expensive for most of the population of the country.

In Pakistan, different organisations such as Sahil and War Against Rape denounced the high prevalence of sexual violence against minors. According to these organisations, nearly 4,000 minors were victims of sexual violence in 2012, although this could be a low estimate, given the enormous challenges involved in monitoring this type of violence. Close to half these cases of abuse were committed by people in the victims' immediate environment.

Box 4.1. Why do some men commit gender violence?

Though most acts of violence in the world are committed by men, especially ones categorised as gender or sexual violence, the focus is very frequently on the victims, which are mostly women. However, different spheres and especially feminist organisations have stressed the need to give greater visibility to the fact that the perpetrators are men and to the importance of normalised violence against women in the construction of hegemonic masculinities.

In 2013, a group of United Nations agencies (UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women and United Nations Volunteers) published a multi-country study on men and violence in Asia. The main aims of the study were to provide a better understanding of the different forms of violence against women, evaluate men's experiences of violence, such as violence against other men, and how it is related to the perpetration of violence against women, what factors of identity are associated with the use of different forms of violence by men against women and finally the promotion of policies and programmes to prevent violence against women created from the collection of evidence. The study was based on a survey in which more than 10,000 men and 3,000 women from six countries took part (Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea). The respondents came from different rural and urban environments and their ages ranged from 18 to 49.

13. Geneva Call, *Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination*, <http://www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/>.

The study's conclusions reveal that men's use of violence against their sentimental companions was generalised throughout the region with figures varying from 26% of men in rural Indonesia that had used physical and/or sexual violence against their partners to 80% of men in Papua New Guinea. Also, about one in every four men that participated in the study admitted to having raped a woman or girl sometime in their lives. The study also revealed that the rape of sentimental companions is much more frequent than the rape of other women. Among the motivations that the men gave to explain rape, an allusion to a feeling of sexual entitlement stood out. Between 70% and 80% of the men surveyed said they have a right to sex regardless of the consent of the other person. In global terms, other organisations like the WHO provide other important figures, such as those indicating that 38% of all murders of women worldwide are committed by their partners or that around 35% of women have suffered physical or sexual violence from their partners or sexual violence from other people.¹⁴

The United Nations study says that the individual causes that lead men to commit violence, such as for example the desire to demonstrate domination over women, a lack of power in other spheres or their own experience of abuse, especially in childhood, must be situated in a broad social context of gender inequalities and imbalances of power between men and women, as well as the prevalence of certain masculinities that justify domination and aggression and extol heterosexuality as a dominant identity and the ability to practice violence.

Understanding the reasons for practicing violence against women from the standpoint of the aggressors is essential to stopping this kind of violence and avoiding victim blaming, which undoubtedly requires structural changes in spheres as diverse as culture, politics and the economy. Moreover, alongside the demand that men that practice violence be held individually responsible, changes must be promoted from different levels of power, given that on many occasions, the situation of male perpetrators is one of exclusion in other social spheres and a limited capacity to lead or carry out profound social transformations.

The women of the Russian Republic of Chechnya continued to face severe discrimination, a phenomenon aggravated under the government of President Ramzan Kadirov, in power since 2007. Svetlana Gannushkina, a Russian human rights activist and member of the Russian NGO Memorial, denounced Kadirov's role in the imposition of alleged Chechen traditions that in reality never existed before and constitute serious violations of the human rights of women, such as honour killings. Russian and international activists and NGOs have repeatedly denounced the totalitarian regime imposed by Kadirov and the serious abuses of security forces under his command. July marked four years since the murder of activist and human rights defender Natalia Estemirova, who was kidnapped from her home in the Chechen capital of Grozny in July 2009 and was found dead in the neighbouring Republic of Ingushetia. In this regard, the climate of impunity promoted by Russian and Chechen authorities continued to cover abuse, including when committed against women.

d) Participation of women in armed conflict

With respect to the impact of armed conflict from a gender perspective and to the active participation of women in armed conflicts, it is noteworthy that in **Turkey, the large active presence of women in the Kurdish nationalist movement, including the PKK guerrilla forces**, was demonstrated once again in events related to the Kurdish issue in 2013. The Kurdish armed group counts many women among its

ranks serving in different roles, including guerrilla fighters. Some estimates say that a third of the PKK's combatants are women. Thus, Kurdish female guerrilla fighters participated in the withdrawal of the PKK's forces from Turkey to northern Iraq. The withdrawal was part of the dialogue between Turkey and the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, which began in late 2012. The withdrawal began in May with a group of Kurdish fighters composed of nine men and six women. However, the withdrawal was halted in September due to deep divisions and mutual accusations between the Turkish government and the armed group.

Another significant development related to the PKK was the change in the structure of leadership by introducing a male and female co-leadership at the highest political and military level, though still below Abdullah Öcalan, who remained the top leader of the Kurdistan Communities Union (the KCK, a political and military superstructure that includes the PKK and other legal and illegal Kurdish movement organisations linked to Öcalan). Thus, in July it emerged that at Öcalan's request, the armed movement accepted the introduction of a female co-president of the KCK's Executive Council. Murat Karayilan was replaced by Cemil Bayik and Bese Hozat became female co-chair of the group's highest executive structure below Öcalan. In statements made throughout the year, Hozat said that the PKK was a women's party, which meant that the PKK defended equality between men and women and women's liberation. Meanwhile, the specific women's structures linked to the PKK carried out discussions on

14. WHO, Department of Reproductive Health and Research, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, South African Medical Research Council, *Global and regional estimates of violence against women. Prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and non-partner sexual violence*, WHO, 2013, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85239/1/9789241564625_eng.pdf?ua=1.

the situation of women and their role in the construction of a democratic system, as they themselves reported.

Furthermore, the murder of three female Kurdish activists in Paris in January 2013 had a great impact with respect to the conflict over the Kurdish issue. The victims were a co-founder of the PKK, Sakine Cansız; a representative of the Kurdish National Congress (KNC), Fidan Doğan; and a Kurdish youth movement activist, Leyla Şaylemez. Kurdish political and social organisations in Turkey accused the government of being behind the murders, and at the end of the year information emerged that allegedly linked the perpetrator to the Turkish security forces.

In Syria, various reports indicated that women's participation in combat grew on both sides of the conflict. Recognising the challenge in providing accurate figures for a context as complex and turbulent as Syria, the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated that in 2013, at least 5,000 women were involved in combat and military logistics operations, many of them in battalions composed exclusively of women, known as *muqatilat* in Arabic. Local activists attribute the phenomenon to a reaction to the evolution of the conflict, and especially to some episodes of serious violence, such as the massacre perpetrated by government forces in Homs in May 2012, in which 34 women and 49 children were killed. This episode may have led to the formation of groups of female combatants such as the Daughters of al-Walid Brigade, which is mainly aimed at training women for self-defence.

Other analyses suggest that the creation of brigades of women is also part of a psychological battle between the warring parties. Thus, the government's creation of a female paramilitary force between late 2012 and early 2013, named the Lionesses of National Defence and linked to the pro-government National Defence Force militia, was imitated by rebel formations. In addition to the reasons for creating these brigades, press reports called attention to some of these groups, such as the Our Mother Aisha Brigade, which is linked to the Free Syrian Army and named after one of the wives of the Prophet Muhammad that is revered in Sunni Islam, but criticised among the Shia; the Ikhlas Battalion, which forms part of the Ghuraba al-Sham Brigade operating in Aleppo; and the Khawla bint al Azwar Brigade, named in honour of a female combatant of the time of the Prophet Muhammad, which initially focused on tending to people's wounds, but has also begun training in the use of arms and combat techniques. The greatest amount and significance of female fighters is in the Kurdish militias in Syria, which have taken control of some areas in the north of the country, where an autonomous regime is being established. According to estimates, women make up a third of the YPG militias (armed wing of the PYD group, a branch of the PKK in Syria). Reports

by the German broadcaster Deutsche Welle claimed that women account for 35% of the organisation's 45,000 fighters, a figure which, if confirmed, would be significantly higher than the total number of women involved militarily in the armed conflict in Syria. Women forming part of the Kurdish militias have reportedly been involved in clashes with armed opposition jihadist groups such as the al-Nusra Front, which is linked to al-Qaeda and rejects the use of women in combat.

In general, the information available indicates that female members of armed units in Syria perform tasks related to logistics, rearguard support and checkpoint control, and are sometimes seen in combat. Some press reports have also identified women acting as snipers.

4.3. Peacebuilding from a gender perspective

This section analyses some of the most noteworthy initiatives that have been implemented to bring a gender perspective to the different spheres of peacebuilding.

a) Resolution 1325

In October, the **UN Secretary-General presented his annual report on women, peace and security** to the UN Security Council, in compliance with the provisions of Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council of 2000.¹⁵ As in earlier years, the report monitored the implementation of this resolution based on the evaluation of different indicators. Some of the most significant data collected in the report included the fact that there were women in all United Nations mediation support teams participating in the 12 official negotiation processes and that three of the 10 peace agreements signed in 2012 contained references to the women, peace and security agenda. 15% of all peacekeeping, political and peacebuilding missions were led by women and 60% of peacekeeping missions had gender advisors. It is also worth pointing out that 88 complaints were made regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by civilian and military personnel in these missions in 2012 (the year evaluated in the report). Another significant figure indicated that 25% of the people participating in United Nations disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes were women. In the domain of transitional justice, two of the four truth and reconciliation commissions active from 2012 to 2013 (Brazil, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Mali) had internal mechanisms for integrating a gender perspective. Those countries were Brazil and Kenya.

Within the scope of the recommendations to improve implementation of the resolution in the future, the

15. UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security*, 2 October 2012, <http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/2012/732>.

report stresses the need to sign, ratify and apply the Arms Trade Treaty and to approve and apply national laws and policies that link arms control to the prevention of violence against women and girls. Another important recommendation is to involve the women, peace and security programme in discussions to form this new agenda for development that will take place starting in 2015. Furthermore, regarding peace processes specifically, the UN Secretary-General urged regional organisations that carry out mediation tasks to increase the involvement of regional leaders on this issue. Finally, the Secretary-General recommended that an independent worldwide study be created in 2015 to apply Resolution 1325 that covers examples of good practices, shortcomings and the challenges still facing its implementation, as well as action priorities and trends that may be emerging.

Alongside the presentation of the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council held its annual discussion on women, peace and security, which focused on the issue of women, the rule of law and transitional justice in situations affected by conflict. Some of the most important subjects raised by civil society representatives during the discussion included the need for peace agreements to not include amnesties for crimes committed against women and greater guarantees for women's participation in post-war elections, both as voters and as candidates. The importance of paying attention to an entire range of women's human rights violations was also stressed. This point was of particular importance, since in recent years the women, peace and security agenda has been focused to a large extent on the issue of sexual violence as a weapon of war, which has reduced the visibility of other dimensions of it. Women's organisations have criticised the fact that the over-representation of this topic in international discussions has helped to entrench the image of women as passive victims in armed conflicts and has pushed enormously important issues such as female ability and leadership in peacebuilding into the background.

The UN Security Council also approved Resolution 2122, whose main objective is to improve implementation of Resolution 1325 based on the acknowledgment that the Security Council must "pay more attention to female leadership and participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding". For the first time, the working group of NGOs on women, peace and security highlighted the importance of addressing the root causes of armed conflict and threats to the security of women and girls through integrated approaches to sustainable peace that embrace policy, security, development, human rights (which covers gender equity), the rule of law and justice issues, a global focus that has been defended by women's organisations. An important point in the resolution was the call for a high-level comprehensive examination in 2015 that would be international, regional and national in scope and would evaluate the progress achieved in implementing Resolution 1325, address obstacles and constraints to the same and renew commitments. The resolution also expresses the Security Council's concern

that if a significant change does not occur in the implementation of Resolution 1325, women and their views will remain under-represented in preventing and resolving conflicts and in protecting and building peace. This important acknowledgment aligns with the position of many women's and civil society organisations that have pointed out that progress made since Resolution 1325 was approved in the year 2000 has basically been formal but not substantive in nature. In addition, some trends that go against the spirit in which the resolution was promoted and adopted were detected: a highly militaristic focus in its implementation, a view of women as victims without recognising their leadership in transforming conflicts and an excessive emphasis on issues such as sexual violence, which sidelines more comprehensive approaches.

In another development, the government of **Kosovo finalised its action plan to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325**. It was expected to be adopted by the government in 2014 and was created by the Agency on Gender Equality with the support of UN Women and the OHCHR. In turn, the action plan is the outcome of the pressure and mobilisation of the local women's movement, which has called for steps in this direction for years according to the Kosovo Women's Network, a platform created in 2000 that includes women's organisations from all the ethnic communities in Kosovo. The action plan urges the promotion and implementation of Resolution 1325 in Kosovo; the coordination of joint actions between institutions, civil society and other groups interested in the resolution's implementation; the integration of the gender dimension into the security sector; and the sharing of experience with other countries regarding implementation of Resolution 1325; among other aspects. The action plan also commits the government of Kosovo to fund 51% of the costs for implementing it.

Meanwhile, the Vice President of Kosovo, Edita Tahiri, participated in an international conference entitled "Global assessment of achievements and challenges in the implementation of Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council" organised by UN Women in November 2013. Participating as a spokesperson for the platform Regional Women's Lobby for Peace, Security and Justice in Southeast Europe (RWLSEE), Tahiri highlighted the process to empower the women of Kosovo and the region as a whole in the post-war period.

b) The gender dimension in peace negotiations

Important **peace processes in countries like the Philippines and Colombia** were conducted in 2013. In other contexts such as Syria, there were also diplomatic efforts to start peace negotiations.

Throughout the year, the government of the **Philippines** held negotiations with the MILF armed opposition group. Women's role in this process has been described

as significant by many observers, since women have occupied leadership positions in the negotiating teams, such as the government negotiating delegation led by Miriam Coronel Ferrer and the presidential advisor for the peace process, Teresita Quintos Deles, as well as various technical groups and other agencies.¹⁶ In December, a power sharing agreement was reached that envisaged including women in the new government structures in Mindanao, in addition to other groups like indigenous ones and Christian colonies. In another one of the agreements signed during the year, related to the generation and sharing of wealth, it was established that at least 5% of the funds for development received by the Bangsamoro authorities must be earmarked for women's development plans.

In the peace negotiations between the government of **Colombia** and the FARC guerrillas, some interesting events occurred throughout the year. First, in November the parties signed a 15-point agreement in political representation. The last of the points agreed on established that the entire content of the agreement would be implemented with a "gender focus and ensuring women's participation". After the agreement was signed, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced that two women had joined the government negotiating team: Nigeria Rentería, the senior advisor for women's equity, and María Paulina Riveros, the human rights director at the Ministry of the Interior. Santos said that one of Rentería's roles would be to establish a channel of communication with women's organisations to gather their contributions to the peace process. Organisations such as Ruta Pacifica de las Mujeres welcomed the appointments and said that they provided an opportunity for the voices of female victims of the armed conflict to be heard in the negotiations and urged giving women's organisations a role in the peace agreements. They also asked that a hearing of women be held in Havana, where the peace negotiations are taking place.

Regarding the peace negotiations to put an end to the armed conflict in **Syria**, different women's organisations such as the Syrian Women's Forum for Peace, Syrian Women's League and Syrian Women's Network, in addition to female members of Syrian civil society organisations, enjoined the parties in conflict and the United Nations to guarantee the involvement of women and civil society representatives in the peace talks planned for January 2014 in Geneva. Their main demand was the establishment of a third party independent of those waging the war (the Syrian government and the armed opposition) in which women and civil society organisations could be represented to guarantee their inclusion in the process, as well as to prevent agreements from being reached that do not take the gender dimension and situation of Syrian women into account. Organisations such as WILPF charged United Nations mediator Lakhdar

Brahimi with a lack of sensitivity and desire to change the dynamics of the negotiations to guarantee the inclusion of a women's perspective. Brahimi said that it should be a Syrian process and not an international process with Syrian participation, and that he would consult with the negotiating parties about women's participation. However, governments such as that of the United Kingdom were in favour of these proposals in addition to others such as the inclusion of women in negotiating delegations and the appointment of gender advisors to lend support during the peace talks.

Syrian women demanded a significant presence of women in the peace talks

In **DR Congo**, a group of women from North Kivu, the epicentre of the armed conflict, demanded to participate in the peace negotiations between the Congolese government, Uganda and the armed opposition group M23, saying that women have been excluded from the negotiations despite the serious impact that the armed conflict has had on them. Members of the

organisation Congo Women Artisans of Peace alluded to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 to demand their participation and said that the involvement of women coming from Kinshasa in the government's and armed group's delegations was not representative of the experience of female victims of the armed conflict.

In March, a group of women from **Sudan and South Sudan**, the Coalition of Women Leaders from Sudan and South Sudan, created a document that highlighted the shared priorities in the process to implement the peace agreements between both countries and made an appeal to the parties involved. Prominent among their demands was one to guarantee that women account for 25% of the members of the different committees created to implement the peace agreements or that a working group be created with an advisory capacity for women. The women also insisted that the terms of reference of all bodies responsible for implementation reflect the needs of women living in areas in which application of the agreements would have an effect. They also pointed to the importance of approaching community security from a gender perspective by raising awareness among and training both national and international security forces. Furthermore, they demanded that the status of Abyei be solved soon and that three agreements viewed as vital be implemented as quickly as possible: agreements on security, border issues and the status of citizens of the other state.

c) Civil society initiatives

Throughout the year, alongside the formal peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC, the women's organisations of the country carried out many initiatives to demand the involvement of women in formal spaces of negotiation and to convey their demands for peace agreements to the

16. See "The peace process in Mindanao: inclusivity and a gender perspective" in Chapter 5 (Opportunities for Peace).

negotiating teams. Prominent among these initiatives was Colombia's National Summit of Women and Peace, which was held in October and enjoyed the participation of 400 women from all over the country at an event announced by different organisations¹⁷ that received support from the United Nations. Some of the conclusions agreed on by all the participants included the provision of full support for the peace process together with the requirement that the parties cannot abandon the talks until a peace agreement is reached that is not conditioned by the electoral calendar; the demand for female presence and participation in all stages of the peace process, including negotiations, under the slogan "Women do not want to be subject to agreements, but subjects that make agreements"; and the requirement that the negotiating agenda include the needs, interests and consequences of armed conflict on women, especially the issue of violence against women.¹⁸ Other issues that formed a central part of the debate included constant calls for the demilitarisation of the country and a decrease in military spending, the search for truth and clarification of what happened during the decades of armed conflict and the streamlined integration of a gender perspective in all public policies.

Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres presented the report *Women's truth: victims of armed conflict in Colombia*, which was conducted by the Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission and gathered the testimony of 1,000 female victims of the armed conflict. This is the first experience of a truth commission consisting of women and covered the impact that the armed conflict has had on Colombian women, as well as women's different strategies to cope with and respond to violence.¹⁹ The report takes stock of the different types of violence suffered by women, especially forced displacement and sexual violence, as well as other serious human rights violations committed by different parties involved in the armed conflict.

Other significant initiatives included the call for a national demonstration in Bogota in November under the slogan "Peace and democracy works with women!" and the publication of an ethical pact for country at peace carried out by the Women, Peace and Security Collective for Reflection and Action.

The National Women's Dialogue was held in Myanmar with the participation of 300 Burmese women and activists from other countries to discuss women's role in peacebuilding in the country and in the political transition currently underway. One of the main subjects was the requirement that women participate directly in the peace negotiations, overcoming the

refusal of both the government and armed opposition groups to allow their involvement.

In the region of Casamance, in Senegal, the Platform of Women for Peace in Casamance (Plateforme des Femmes pour la Paix en Casamance, PFPC) appealed to both the government and the armed opposition in September to ensure that humanitarian demining tasks could be resumed after the abduction of 12 people accused of performing them. The armed opposition pointed out that the demining work could not be carried out until there was peace in the region. The PFPC and other peace organisations in the region staged a protest march to demand unconditional demining. Meanwhile, the regional organisation Femmes Africa Solidarité visited the Casamance region to promote dialogue among female leaders from all over Senegal and other countries in the area, as well as to promote their participation in several peace negotiations in Casamance.

d) International agenda

The Arms Trade Treaty was adopted by most countries in April, but a full consensus was not possible due to the opposition of the governments of Iran, North Korea and Syria. Different organisations defending the rights of women praised the fact that the treaty included a **clause related to gender violence, which forces exporters to consider whether the sale of arms, munitions, parts or components may be used to commit or facilitate acts of gender violence or violence against women and children.** The inclusion of this clause received the support of 102 countries and even though the demand of the organisations that campaigned for its addition was not taken up in full,¹⁹ they considered it an important step since the signatory countries are not authorised to transfer arms when there is a significant risk of gender violence. The organisations that promoted the inclusion of a gender perspective in the treaty also advocated for the addition of more references in the preamble and other changes in the body of the text that would have led more explicitly to the prohibition of arms trade when there is a risk of gender violence. They also criticised references to "women and children", which unified both groups in a way that insinuates women's inherent vulnerability without suggesting their agency and capacity for social participation. The approved preamble states that the vast majority of the people affected by armed conflicts and violence are civilians, particularly women and children. UN Women spoke out along the same lines, stressing how important it is that the arms trade is not a means for aggravating the alarming levels of violence against women that exist worldwide and asserting that women are not solely victims of armed violence, but are also active peacemakers and decision-makers.

17. Casa de la Mujer, Ruta Pacífica, National Network of Women, Mujeres por la paz, the Women, Peace and Security Collective for Reflection and Action, the Resolution 1325 Monitoring Group, the National Conference of Afro-Colombian Organisations (CNOA), the Initiative of Colombian Women for Peace (IMP) and the National Association of Rural, Black and Indigenous Women of Colombia (ANMUCIC).

18. You may view the summary documents with the proposals of the summit at the following link: <http://www.aecid.org.co/?idcategoria=2607>

19. See "The Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission, a feminist approach to peacebuilding and recovering memory" in Chapter 5 (Opportunities for Peace). You may view the commission's report at <http://www.rutapacifica.org.co/documentos.html>.


20. Control Arms Campaign, IANSA, WILPF, Amnesty International.

5. Opportunities for Peace in 2014

Based on the 2013 study on conflicts and peacebuilding, in this chapter the Autonomous University of Barcelona's Escola de Cultura de Pau highlights seven contexts that could provide opportunities for peace in 2014. These are places where there is or has been a situation of armed conflict or socio-political crisis and where a series of factors have come together that could lead to a positive change. The opportunities identified include the historic agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme and prospects for positive developments in negotiations in 2014; the encouraging feminist approach to peacebuilding and memory taken by the Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission, an initiative of the organisation Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres; the prominent presence of women in the successful peace process in Mindanao and the important role they have played in its various phases, which finally saw an end of the armed conflict; the diplomatic internationalisation of the situation in the Indonesian region of West Papua as an example of how to reverse the invisibility of a forgotten conflict; the positive progress made in the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013, aimed at the pragmatic normalisation of relations between both administrations; the important role played by the European Court of Human Rights as the only—though limited—mechanism for justice available to the Chechen population; and the window of opportunity offered by the defeat of the armed group M23 to achieve peace in the Great Lakes region.

All these opportunities for peace require the effort and genuine commitment of the actors involved and, where needed, the support of international stakeholders so that the positive synergies and factors already found can contribute to peacebuilding. In this sense, the Escola de Cultura de Pau's analysis aims to offer a realistic view of these scenarios, identifying the positive features that nurture the expectations for change, as well as stating the difficulties that exist and that could be obstacles against their materialisation as peace opportunities.

Map 5.1. Opportunities for peace in 2014



5.1. Iran and nuclear talks: an opportunity beyond the atomic dispute

At three o'clock in the morning on 24 November 2013, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Iran and the group of international powers known as the G5+1 (USA, United Kingdom, Russia and China, plus Germany) signed a commitment without precedents in the last decade. After many rounds of frustrated negotiations, an agreement was reached on the Iranian nuclear programme, one of the main lines of tension between Teheran and several Western countries due to suspicions that the Islamic Republic is trying to develop nuclear weapons despite Teheran's insistence that its atomic ambitions are only for peaceful purposes. Unimaginable just a few years ago, the so-called Joint Plan of Action was welcomed and even described as a historical milestone, though it is only a first step towards defining a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue. The substantial and most complex subjects must be negotiated over the course of 2014. The possibility that this opportunity for peace bears fruit will depend on the maintenance of some of the dynamics that enabled the parties to reach the agreement in November and on the ability to overcome obstacles that go beyond the technical issues of the Iranian atomic programme. Thus, positive developments would depend on factors such as the consolidation of a diplomatic atmosphere that overcomes the deep-seated mistrust between the parties, the ability of the leaders committed to dialogue to prevail over external and internal detractors and the impact of the climate of regional instability in the Middle East over the course of the talks. The benefits of a successful outcome, as well as the risks of failure, would have echoes far beyond the nuclear debate.

Various factors made the November agreement possible, including the coming together of leaders willing to seek a solution to the dispute in both Iran and the USA, the main partner in the negotiations. After years of open hostility towards the West under the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani assumed the presidency with a conciliatory speech and decided to adopt measures to help the country emerge from its isolation and soften the severe and mostly economic consequences of the international sanctions imposed for its nuclear activities. This new approach led to rapprochement with the West, and especially with Washington, culminating in a telephone conversation between Rouhani and Barack Obama last October in the first contact of its kind between the presidents of both countries in three decades. This gesture between historical adversaries would have been impossible to imagine under the previous administration of George W. Bush, who had described Iran as part of the "Axis

of Evil" along with Iraq and North Korea. According to press reports, Rouhani's rise to power may have facilitated secret contacts between US and Iranian delegates that began months before and paved the way to signing the agreement in November between Iran and the G5+1, only four months after the change in the Iranian presidency.

Overall, the Joint Plan of Action established a partial—and reversible—lifting of the international sanctions against Iran in exchange for Teheran's suspension of some essential aspects of its nuclear programme, including advanced uranium enrichment processes (near 20%) that could rapidly reach levels used for manufacturing bombs. The purpose of the agreement is to give the negotiating teams of Iran and the G5+1 time to reach a comprehensive agreement within six months, a period that may be extended if the parties agree. The deadline is 20 July, given that the agreement began to be implemented in early 2014 under the supervision of the IAEA. Therefore, time is short to address extremely complex technical issues, especially when taking into account the developments that have occurred in the Iranian nuclear programme over the last decade. If in 2003 Iran had around 160 centrifuges to enrich uranium, in 2013 it had more than 18,000 (of which 10,000 were operational, with varying degrees of sophistication) at several nuclear facilities, in addition

Positive developments in talks on the Iranian nuclear programme will depend on factors such as the consolidation of a diplomatic atmosphere that overcomes the deep-seated mistrust between the parties

to a heavy water reactor in Arak. UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian issue adopted between 2006 and 2010 had demanded that Iran totally suspend its nuclear activities. Yet Iran, which considers maintaining its atomic programme to be an issue of national dignity, asserts that one of its main red lines requires recognition of its right to enrich uranium on its territory. If the parties concede this point to Iran (after the November agreement, Washington and Teheran interpreted the outcome differently), discussions will likely focus on the number and quality of centrifuges and the type of international monitoring mechanisms to guarantee the peaceful nature of these activities. In the meantime, they must continue to respect the terms of the November agreement to avoid derailing the process.

Faced with this challenge, a favourable diplomatic climate is crucial. Keeping the political will to negotiate alive is not an easy task considering that it involves overcoming the inertia of a decade of fruitless contact marked by suspicion, mistrust, maximalist approaches and an unwillingness to take the other party's concerns into account.¹ Thus, Rouhani raises expectations with his speech on his commitment to nuclear talks, his

1. Richard Dalton, "Iran nuclear negotiations: lessons from 10 years of failures", *The Guardian*, October 8, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/oct/08/iran-nuclear-negotiations-lessons-failures>.

experience as a negotiator on the Iranian nuclear issue (he was the architect of an agreement with European powers in 2003-2005 that led to Iran's voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment) and his willingness to maintain control over the negotiations (he appointed the Foreign Minister the highest-ranking official responsible for the issue, who reports directly to him). However, the complexities of the Iranian regime must be taken into account, as well as its different centres of power and the fact that the person that holds the last word in foreign policy is the Supreme Leader of Iran, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The disparate approach to the issue during the presidencies of Ahmadinejad and his predecessor, the reformist Mohamed Khatami, shows that the role of the president is not irrelevant.² However, this does not mean that Rouhani's strategy will fail to encounter internal resistance. From his distant and somewhat sceptical position, Ayatollah Khamenei has asked the most radical groups to give the new government a chance, but Rouhani has still faced criticism from various sectors, including figures as powerful as the chief of the Republican Guard, which could potentially thwart the process.

The Obama administration has also faced resistance due to its willingness to negotiate with Iran. The US President has had to manoeuvre and threaten to use a veto if Congress approves new sanctions against Iran, which some conservatives support and which would derail the talks. Washington has bet a lot of political capital on its Iran strategy and does not have much room to manoeuvre in terms of negotiation deadlines, since once the 2016 presidential election campaign begins, Obama will begin to suffer "lame duck" syndrome. Obama's government must also deal with the great distrust that has arisen by starting negotiations with Iran in the United States' two traditional allies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Israeli government has called Rouhani a "wolf in sheep's clothing", has described the Joint Plan of Action as a "historic mistake", has tried to increase pressure to maintain sanctions and has not withdrawn its threat to adopt measures to stop the development of Iran's atomic programme by force. Although a potential unilateral Israeli strike does not seem probable in the near future, unlike in 2012, when rising tensions multiplied rumours about the possibility, it cannot be entirely ruled out. In 1981, the Israeli government attacked a nuclear reactor in Osirak, Iraq, and in 2007 it bombed similar facilities in Syria, confirming its intention to prevent the emergence of any other nuclear power in the region. Israel, which unlike Iran has not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, maintains a

An agreement on the atomic issue could favour Iran's reintegration into the international scene and help Teheran to play a stabilising role in the region

policy of nuclear "ambiguity", without acknowledging or denying its possession of these kinds of weapons.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has been urging the USA to act to halt the Iranian atomic programme for years, as revealed in one of the cables leaked by Wikileaks in 2010, in which King Abdullah asked Washington to attack Iranian nuclear facilities to "cut off the serpent's head". The Saudi position is conditioned by its historical regional rivalry with the Islamic Republic and its fear of change in the power and security structure of the Middle East in a context of turmoil because of the war in Syria, which has intensified the confrontation between Riyadh and Teheran, as well as sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shia. Syria has become the scene of a proxy war between both regional powers, with Teheran as the main backer of the regime of Bashar Assad, to whom it gives political, financial and military support, and Riyadh actively aiding the forces of the Syrian opposition. In this complex scenario, it will be difficult to extricate negotiations with Iran from the nuclear dispute among the regional powers, despite the United States' attempts to maintain separate agendas.

Predictably, the talks on the Iranian nuclear programme will not be the way to solve all the differences between Iran and the Western powers. However, the importance

of keeping a line of dialogue open and of the impact that resolving the nuclear dispute could have in geopolitical terms cannot be ignored. A potential agreement that would ensure Iran's right to limited uranium enrichment, restricted to civilian and peaceful purposes and under effective international supervision, could deactivate the threat of the proliferation of atomic weapons in the Middle East, at least with respect to Iran. Over the long term, it should also encourage discussions on global nuclear disarmament. Likewise, an agreement on the atomic issue could favour the normalisation of relations

between Iran and several Western countries and reintegrate Teheran into international circles and its environment, with implications for economic and energy flows and the region's security architecture. In fact, in 2013, the new Iranian government already showed signs of wanting to improve its relationships with some of the Gulf monarchies and Rouhani came out in favour of "constructive engagement" with neighbouring Arab countries.³

In addition, different analysts have speculated that Iran could play a role in the stabilisation of many regional conflicts given its shared history and/or ability to influence scenarios of conflict such as in Afghanistan,

2. International Crisis Group, *Great Expectations: Iran's New President and the Nuclear Talks*, Middle East Briefing no.36, August 13, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/b036-great-expectations-iran-s-new-president-and-the-nuclear-talks.aspx>.
3. The New York Times, "Iran's Charm Offensive", *The New York Times*, January 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/opinion/irans-charm-offensive.html?_r=0.

Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. This means acknowledging the important role that Iran plays as a regional actor and its potential to provide solutions. For example, any future agreement with Damascus without the consent of the Iranian regime is inconceivable, which is why it was a mistake to not involve it in the Geneva II peace talks held in early 2014. Some analysts have said that the need to avoid any further internationalisation and chaos in the conflict in Syria was a factor favouring the rapprochement between Iran and the United States in 2013. The urgency of preventing any further deterioration of the crisis in Syria and curbing the proliferation of radical armed Sunni groups close to al-Qaeda may be a cause for common concern that fosters future agreements. However, with regard to Iran, it must

be borne in mind that Rouhani may have more room to manoeuvre in discussions on the nuclear issue than in decisions on the war in Syria, where some parts of the Iranian regime are highly involved.

In brief, the signing of the agreement between Iran and the G5+1 and the shift in relations between Washington and Teheran has opened the door to positive changes as long as the political willingness to continue along the path of dialogue is maintained. There is no doubt that the prospects are complex and that the road ahead will be bumpy. And though the benefits may seem uncertain, the risks of failure are obvious and disturbing, given the context of turmoil and instability in the Middle East.

3. The New York Times, "Iran's Charm Offensive", *The New York Times*, January 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/opinion/irans-charm-offensive.html?_r=0.

5.2. The Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission, a feminist approach to peacebuilding and recovering memory

Truth commissions have become an important tool for peacebuilding in countries that have experienced prolonged situations of armed conflict or generalised political violence. Investigating acts of violence and human rights violations, as well as attributing responsibility for the same, are important steps for any country that aims to move forward in peacebuilding efforts, but without paying the cost of forgetting and impunity. The year 2013 was decisive for peacebuilding in Colombia, since the government and one of the main guerrilla groups active in the country for decades, the FARC, participated in hopeful peace negotiations that were still active at the end of the year. In a country where civil society has led countless initiatives to underpin the various formal peace processes that have taken place and to promote peacebuilding in all social spheres, one of the most important women's groups in the country, the Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres, exerted essential efforts for peacebuilding that will be sustainable in the future.

In December, this organisation presented the report *Women's truth: victims of armed conflict in Colombia* written by the Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission established by Ruta Pacífica.⁴ The report collects the testimony of one thousand women that have suffered the consequences of armed conflict and analyses the impact of the conflict in terms of physical, psychological and sexual violence suffered and of the consequences that the violations of their human rights in the context of the armed conflict have had for their lives. The report relates the impacts on health, on the relations between men and women, on sexuality, on motherhood and on family relationships and documents displacement, murders, extrajudicial killings, massacres and forced disappearances, as well as different cases of collective violence in which women were particularly affected. It also provides data on the responsibility of the different parties directly involved in the armed conflict for the various human rights violations. Moreover, it incorporates the different coping strategies that women have undertaken to continue with their lives amidst the violence, especially organisation-based processes that have enabled them to claim their rights as victims. Finally, it documents women's demands in terms of reparation and justice despite the awareness that the harm suffered by the victims is irreparable.

This report is extremely important for various reasons. First, it is the first time that a truth commission has

been established in Colombia by civil society. Both the work of the Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission in collecting testimonies from victims of the armed conflict and the drafting of the report were performed independently and without support from the Colombian government, but it could also be used as an example for a future Colombian Truth Commission, whose establishment is considered increasingly necessary and feasible by broad sectors of Colombian society. Undoubtedly, any commission established in the future will build on other international examples from recent decades, but having an example from the same country is an asset of enormous importance.

Second, it is worth noting what a historical milestone it is to have a truth commission specifically covering the armed conflict's impact on women. This is the first commission with these features. Since the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created in South Africa in 1995, which was a watershed in the history of transitional justice, the inclusion of a gender perspective and the voice of women in stories about the past has been a constant goal. Some commissions created since then have partially incorporated this perspective, creating specific spaces for including women's experiences, collecting their testimonies and incorporating specific issues directly related to the gender dimension of violence, such as the commissions in Sierra Leone, Peru and East Timor. While previously there had been cases of recovering historical memory featuring civil society activists, such as the Historical Memory Report (REMHI) in Guatemala, this is the first time that the process has been promoted, led and carried out by women's organisations. Therefore, the importance that it originates in a social movement is coupled with the fact that it is a women's movement. All the people providing and collecting testimony were women.

However, the Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission is not exclusively dedicated to investigating and giving visibility to the experience of female victims of armed conflict in Colombia, but also methodologically incorporates different new aspects that are highly significant for peacebuilding from a gender perspective. The research was conducted from a feminist perspective, adopting the principles of the methodology that views knowledge as always situational, takes women's experience as a source of this knowledge that emerges from a relational process in an acknowledged context of

The Colombian Women's Truth and Memory Commission is the first international commission led and promoted by women to recover the memory of female victims

4 . Comisión de Verdad and Memoria de Mujeres Colombianas, *La verdad de las mujeres. Víctimas del conflicto armado en Colombia* (Bogotá: Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres, 2013).

interdependence and seeks to transform and improve the conditions of women's lives.⁵

Third, the commission's work emphasised giving visibility to women's complex experience of war. The 1,000 women that gave their testimony are victims of this armed conflict, but as the report indicates, this is not a static, determinative and crippling identity. Indeed, the ability to respond to this violence must also be shown. The report also seeks to create a social space where women may look for individual and collective ways to escape violence, since it is a process of support and not just a collection of complaints about human rights violations. The report exhaustively documents women's experience of war in different parts of the country, as well the experience of the different ethnic and social groups that make up Colombian society, exposing the various types of violence perpetrated against women by all armed groups involved in the conflict to account for how normal it has become.

The idea that violence lies on a continuum, the main assumption of the report, shows that violence against women in the context of armed conflict cannot be viewed separately from violence against women in contexts of "peace". Based on this concept, the report discusses physical, psychological and sexual violence against women and secondary experiences of victimisation based on the harm caused to family members of female victims or people close to them. Thus, women speak of forced displacement, torture ,

the disappearance of families, extrajudicial executions, sexual violence and house raids, as well as serious individual and collective human rights violations. However, the report also discusses ways that women have dealt with violence and overcome traumatic experiences in order to show that they are not passive victims of violence because their experience of armed conflict also includes the ability to respond to it. Therefore, the report states that women's experience of armed conflict is multifaceted in nature and includes experiences of violence and victimisation as well as ways to cope with these situations and telling only one of these stories would leave out an important part of the history of Colombian women.

The creation of this truth commission and the report on Colombian women's experience of armed conflict is a milestone in the peacebuilding process underway in Colombia and is an enormously important contribution that should be valued as such by the armed groups involved in the conflict, and especially by those engaged in peace negotiations in Havana. In the long term, the sustainability of peace in Colombia will largely depend on the ability to create inclusive processes that cement various peacebuilding efforts. Therefore, the inclusion of women is a *sine qua non* condition for genuine peacebuilding in Colombia. Furthermore, beyond the Colombian context, it may become a benchmark for other peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts based on the important contributions that this commission has brought to achieve full participation for women.

5. Sandra Harding, "Is There a Feminist Method?" in *Feminism and Methodology*, ed. Sandra Harding (Bloomington/ Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987); Sandra Harding, *Ciencia y feminismo* (Ediciones Morata, 1996).

5.3. The peace process in Mindanao: inclusivity and a gender perspective

The peace process that has taken place in recent years between the Philippine government and the armed opposition group MILF has been one of the most successful negotiating efforts of late. Both parties signed different agreements to put an end to an armed conflict in 2012 that has lasted decades while establishing the framework for peacebuilding in the Mindanao region. The success of this process is due to many reasons (negotiations accompanied by a drop in violence in the region, international support and the parties' ability to learn from earlier experiences, among other issues),⁶ but there is a specific aspect of the negotiations and of the entire process that deserves to be studied at length, since it may provide important lessons for other contexts that try to leave armed violence behind. One of the features that appeared most in the peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF guerrillas has been the prominent presence of women in the process and the important role they have played in the different stages that finally led to ending the armed conflict.

In 2000, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, which gave the impetus for what was later known as the women, peace and security agenda, one of the most important aspects of which was women's participation in peacebuilding processes, and specifically in peace negotiations. Nearly 15 years after the resolution was passed, the results are mixed and especially women's groups have levelled criticism at the adoption of the agenda by certain international institutions for moving away from its initial aims to support women's participation in peacebuilding and include a gender perspective in it. However, it is also true that it has been useful for certain initiatives and has strengthened the peacebuilding efforts of women in contexts of conflict.

In the Philippines, the peace process that resulted in the parties signing different agreements in 2012 and 2013 is the outcome of various negotiation efforts since the 1970s in the region of Mindanao, when the first meetings were held between the government and the MNLF and the first peace agreements were signed. It was not until the 1980s that women became involved in the negotiations, with the participation of then-President Corazon Aquino, who tried to reactivate the process.⁷ During the 1990s, women's participation was restricted to the negotiators' wives during the meetings held by the parties, but with no direct involvement in peace talks, and it was not until 1997 that a woman

from the Moro community, Emily Marohombsar, was able to participate directly as part of the government negotiating team. Starting in the 2000s, more women joined the negotiations with different roles and tasks, thereby expanding their ability to influence the agenda of the negotiations. Various women successively formed part of the government team, and a woman led it in the final stage of negotiations, Miriam Coronel Ferrer. In 2010, two women joined the MILF's negotiating team as advisors. Though they were not formal members of the negotiating team, they did participate in it occasionally. It is worth noting that in addition to the women that have participated in the negotiating teams, the post of Presidential Advisor for the Peace Process has been occupied at different times by Teresita Quintos-Deles. Female participation in the accompaniment and facilitation work performed by the international community in the peace process has been reduced, with only one woman in the International Contact Group, Emma Leslie.

Alongside women's participation in formal negotiations, it is worth mentioning the very important role played by civil society and women's organisations that have supported and promoted different peace initiatives throughout the negotiations, helping to sustain the process.

Another significant initiative linked to the peace process was the establishment in 2009 of a mechanism to protect the civilian population in order to monitor compliance with the ceasefire, especially regarding the impact of the violence on the civilian population. In this context, a contingent composed entirely of women was created so they could always be on equal footing with men, thereby guaranteeing that they would not be relegated to the background. The establishment of this contingent led to an increase in complaints by local women and gave greater visibility to the needs of the displaced population and of the human rights violations suffered by the civilian population.

Moreover, in addition to the issue of women's participation in formal negotiations and other areas, it is interesting to note that their involvement has had a concrete impact on the peace agreements reached. These agreements dealt with some topics of great importance for any peace process. For example, the agreement reached in December on sharing power established that women will be included in the new government structures in Mindanao, as well as members of other groups like indigenous people and Christian colonists. The agreements on generating and sharing

The role of women in the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF has been enormously important in a process marked by inclusiveness

6. See Escola de Cultura de Pau, "The signing of a peace agreement between the government of the Philippines and the MILF in Mindanao", *Alert 2013! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*; Barcelona: Icaria, 2013.

7. Carolyn O. Arguillas, "The women in the Bangsamoro peace process: history, herstory", *MindaNews*, January 28, 2014.

wealth determined that at least 5% of the development funds received by the Bangsamoro authorities must be aimed at development plans for women. Thus, issues as important as women's involvement in institutions or economic development have been considered from a gender perspective in these agreements. Different studies have stressed how important it is for peace agreements to not be gender neutral and for them to explicitly include agreements to that effect.⁸

Yet despite this progress, it is important to highlight that it is still partial and has yet to be reflected in concrete improvements in the lives of women affected by armed conflict and in the reduction of inequality between men and women. It is important to remember that despite the progress made for equality in the Philippines in

recent years, the country still suffers from significant inequalities between men and women, as demonstrated for example by the fact that it ranks 77th out of 186 countries on the Gender Inequality Index with a value 0.418, with full equality represented by 0 and total inequality by 1.

Thus, the process to resolve the armed conflict between the Philippine government and the armed opposition group MILF is an important example that must be viewed as proof of how it is possible to create relevant and meaningful opportunities for women to participate in negotiating processes and how their involvement leads to the inclusion of a gender perspective in the specific agreements achieved within these processes.

8. Cate Buchanan, Adam Cooper, Cody Griggers, Lira Low, Rita Manchanda, Rebecca Peters and Antonia Potter Prentice, *From clause to effect: including women's rights and gender in peace agreements*, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, December, 2012, http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/24ClausereportwebFINAL.pdf.

5.4. West Papua: the diplomatic internationalisation of a forgotten conflict

In 2013, the intense diplomatic activity undertaken by organisations that advocate self-determination for the Indonesian region of West Papua and protest the precarious human rights situation there won some of their most important victories in recent years. It has not only brought greater media and political visibility to the conflict in West Papua, and therefore increased pressure on the Indonesian government to channel or resolve it, but may also serve as an example or model for organisations in other countries that suffer from a prolonged situation of violence and repression and that cannot pressure the government to sit down at the negotiating table even through armed struggle. To a certain degree, what the diplomatic efforts of some Papuan organisations have achieved stands in contrast to most of the international community's indifference to and even rejection of the armed insurgency led by the OPM for more than 40 years.

The first important event that occurred in 2013 was the Melanesian Spearhead Group's (MSG) invitation to the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCCL), an umbrella organisation that brings together various groups that fight for self-determination for West Papua, to attend the summit held in Nouméa in June 2013. In the summit's final joint statement, the MSG (an intergovernmental organisation founded in 1983 that unites the Melanesian-majority countries of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front, representing the Kanak people of the French colonial territory of New Caledonia), expressed its support for the inalienable right to self-determination for the people of West Papua, voiced concern about the human rights situation in the region and urged all its members to address the issue bilaterally with Indonesia. Furthermore, it promised to decide quickly on the WPNCCL's application to join the MSG to represent the people of West Papua. The application had been backed by some of the member states of the group and by a letter sent to the secretariat of the MSG by 98 organisations in West Papua and various countries. The MSG promised to decide upon full membership for the WPNCCL after visiting West Papua and learning about the situation there firsthand. The government of Indonesia, which has observer status in the MSG, extended an invitation to the foreign ministries of the countries of the MSG to visit the region, but did not specify the date or format.

The second important event in terms of the internationalisation of the conflict in West Papua was the speech given by the Prime Minister of Vanuatu

during the UN General Assembly that was held in September. In his speech, Moana Kalosil Carcasses urged the appointment of a UN special representative to investigate alleged human rights violations in the region, deplored that the international community has ignored the plight of the hundreds of thousands of people that he said have been brutally killed and tortured in the West Papua for so long and asserted that the people of West Papua have been victimised during the decades of the geopolitical Cold War, by being ignored by the United Nations and by the abundant natural resources present in the region. Thus, Moana Kalosil Carcasses said that the time had come for the UN to rectify its historical mistakes, a clear allusion to support for holding a referendum on self-determination in 1969 that was carried out fraudulently—according to some analysts—and allowed Indonesia to annex West Papua after the Netherlands decolonised the archipelago.

Something else that gave a certain visibility to the conflict in West Papua was the public launch of the All Party Parliamentary Group for West Papua, an organisation that brings together various British parliamentary parties and openly supports self-determination for West Papua. Along the same lines, it is worth noting that some political and civil society organisations in Australia and New Zealand stepped up pressure on their respective governments to address the political and human rights situation in West Papua bilaterally with Indonesia or in multilateral forums. In September, three ships sailed from the Australian city of Cairns to West Papua with the intention of internationally condemning the human

The diplomatic internationalisation pursued by the Papuan nationalist movement may be raised up as a model for other organisations active in places with conflicts ignored by the international community

rights situation in the region, thereby gaining some media visibility. Moreover, two leaders from West Papua were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for their work to ensure rights for the Papuan people. Finally, it is worth mentioning the publication of two reports on the human rights situation in West Papua that had some international resonance. The first report, issued by the Asian Human Rights Commission, focused on the period from 1977 to 1978 and stated that more than 4,000 people were killed in the Indonesian military occupation and that another 10,000 people died due to torture, starvation or illness. In the second report, the United Nations'

High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, denounced the excessive use of force by Indonesian law enforcement bodies for staging demonstrations.

Despite the great international echo that some of these events achieved, there are some factors that could hinder

the effectiveness of the diplomatic activity of the Papuan nationalist movement worldwide. The first is Indonesia's enormous geopolitical and economic importance in the region and in the world, which undoubtedly gives it the support of some regional powers (like China and India) and also provides it with some ability to influence decisions made in countries potentially sensitive to the Papuan cause. In addition to press reports that Jakarta has bribed officials and leaders of the countries of the MSG, a good example of Indonesia's influence in the region is the absence of the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, the largest country in the MSG and of the Pacific, at the MSG summit in Nouméa because he was making a state visit to Indonesia where he signed various bilateral cooperation agreements on economic, energy and security issues. According to some sources, in exchange for not openly supporting the cause of the WPNCL, Indonesia will back its neighbour's efforts to join ASEAN and host the APEC summit in 2018. Furthermore, the government of Papua New Guinea not only seeks a solid trading partner in Indonesia, but also a certain level of political stability along their long shared border. In recent decades, incursions by the OPM (and the establishment of more stable camps) in Papua New Guinean territory have been common. Moreover, for more than 20 years, 8,000 refugees from West Papua have been living in camps managed by the UNHCR. As such, the influence that Indonesia has over countries like Papua New Guinea and Fiji (whose government maintains close military cooperation with Indonesia) causes some countries in the region to openly recognise the territorial integrity of Indonesia and its sovereignty over West Papua. As for Australia and New Zealand, two countries with parties and organisations that advocate self-determination for West Papua and exert considerable pressure on their governments in this regard, Indonesia has always known how to value the importance of fighting against Islamist organisations and illegal immigration, two issues of special concern for them.

Another factor impeding the diplomatic activity of Papuan organisations is a certain division in the nationalist movement. This is clearly reflected in the fact that two organisations supporting the representativeness and legitimacy of the Papuan people, the WPNCL and the Federal Republic of West Papua, have applied to join the MSG. While the former organisation has its headquarters in Vanuatu (which gives it direct access to the government, the staunchest defender of Melanesian unity and solidarity and of self-determination for West Papua), the main members of the latter have been imprisoned for unilaterally proclaiming independence for West Papua in 2011. Similarly, there is also a rift in the insurgent movement between those that advocate independence for the region and those that question the viability and appropriateness of secession, focusing their activity on improving the welfare and self-government of the region. However, as in other cases, the international community tends to demand a certain unity in the political action and agenda of organisations that claim to represent the same group and fight for a common aim.

The third factor that could counter international support for the self-determination of West Papua or the improvement of the human rights situation is the potential approval of a new autonomy law for West Papua much better than the one passed in 2001, which most analysts and even the political powers in Indonesia have called a failure. The draft of the aforementioned law, which is being negotiated between the central government and the governors of both provinces of West Papua, focuses on economic growth, improving governance and public services, and on the possibility of giving both provinces limited powers and responsibilities in foreign policy (such as the ability to maintain close relations with neighbouring countries and even to represent Indonesia in multilateral Pacific forums. While approval of this law could lead to an improvement in the levels of welfare and self-government of the population of West Papua, many analysts maintain that the new law will not only be insufficient to resolve the conflict gripping the region for more than 50 years, but its adoption is mainly linked to the legislative elections in April 2014 and the presidential election in July 2014. Thus, it is worth mentioning that some Papuan organisations are clearly opposed to this new law and focus their efforts on starting direct talks between the parties with the intervention of a third international party or on repeating the 1969 referendum on self-determination.

Despite all these factors, it seems indisputable that the increased political visibility of the conflict in West Papua due to the various aforementioned events of 2013 could make it easier to begin managing the dispute differently than how Jakarta has done over the last few decades, highly centred on the militarisation of the region, on repressing and creating divisions in the separatist movement and on refusing to recognise Papuan and Melanesian identity and the Papuan people's right to self-determination. Despite the rift within the MSG regarding the issue of West Papua and the little weight the MSG has in the international arena, the mere possibility that the WPNCL may be allowed to join it or the fact that it may have clearly entered the political agenda of the organisation is already a historic milestone. There are cases in which an intergovernmental organisation's international recognition of an organisation representing a national group has had positive effects. In the 1970s, for example, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation's recognition of the Moro National Liberation Front as the legitimate representative of the Moro people in the southern Philippines assisted the negotiated resolution to the conflict and the signing of a peace agreement in 1996. In a more recent example closer to the case of West Papua, the French government authorised granting full membership to the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front as the representative of the Kanak people of New Caledonia. While the organisation has still not achieved independence for the region, membership in the MSG guarantees greater support and legitimacy for its demands of decolonisation. Likewise, the WPNCL's potential entry in the MSG could strengthen a two-fold Papuan nationalist political

strategy as an alternative to keeping up the OPM's armed struggle. This strategy calls for repeating the 1969 referendum on self-determination and views West Papua as a non-autonomous territory or one that has yet to be decolonised, which would automatically bring the United Nations' Special Committee on Decolonisation into play. In any case, beyond the positive repercussions that resolving the conflict in West Papua could have, the diplomatic internationalisation pursued by the Papuan

nationalist movement may be raised up as a model for other organisations active in places with conflicts forgotten or ignored by the international community and also shows that international political and diplomatic activity is probably much more effective for achieving political aims than armed struggle, especially in situations where, as in West Papua, it is evident that the insurgency is unable to defeat the government or even force it to start a negotiated end to the conflict.

5.5. Serbia and Kosovo, from antagonism to the pragmatic normalisation of relations

Just over five years since Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence and 15 years since the end of the war (1998-1999), the authorities of Serbia and Kosovo are engaged in a substantive dialogue that in 2013 included unprecedented measures of rapprochement and is aimed at normalising relations between the two governments. After a long post-war period as a self-governing entity under international supervision while still part of Serbia, Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 generated many questions about options to resolve the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo over the disputed status of this small region of just 1.8 million people (92% Albanian) that both Serbs and Kosovars have historically considered the cradle of their origins. Despite the argument over the issue of Kosovo's status, the dialogue begun in 2011 produced very significant results in 2013 that could be built upon in 2014. The factors that make the new historical context an opportunity for rapprochement include the format of the talks and the interrelated opportunities for Serbia and Kosovo to have greater links with the EU; increasingly pragmatic and flexible political leaders; a regional climate aimed at leaving behind the antagonism of the 1990s war; massive international support for the independence of Kosovo combined with good international relations with Serbia; and a lack of desire to actively thwart the new process among the great powers opposed to Kosovo's independence, like Russia, which defends its interests in the region by other means, including energy agreements. In sum, there is a local, regional and international atmosphere of opportunity that favours the definitive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. However, there are still many difficulties and challenges, including the rejection of the process by the Serbian population of Kosovo.

The EU-facilitated talks emerged as one of the main drivers in the rapprochement between Serbia and Kosovo. The talks began in March 2011 and focused on technical issues, many of which had repercussions in people's daily lives on both sides of the border, especially the Albanian and Serbian populations of Kosovo. Thus, in the first half of 2011, agreements were reached on less sensitive matters such as the recognition of academic qualifications, commercial relations, the civil registry and the freedom of movement, among others. The process began in October 2012 with political talks at the highest level, including regular meetings between the Serbian and Kosovar prime ministers facilitated by the EU. Paradoxically, the new talks were held with a new Serbian leadership in the nationalist tradition that won the legislative and presidential elections in May 2012. Thus, Serbian nationalist Ivica Dacic, a former ally of Slobodan Milosevic, became the prime minister of a coalition government that replaced the previous coalition government led by the pro-EU Democratic

Party. Despite the change and the EU's supposed preferences for the more clearly pro-European block, the new Serbian government expressed a favourable attitude to the talks from the start. Thus, the leadership factor has been important in both Serbia and Kosovo, while their positions of greater pragmatism and flexibility have made it easier for the talks to go on and for overcoming the complications and misunderstandings that emerged in this recent phase. The peoples of Serbia and Kosovo mostly showed flexibility, though protests were also staged by Kosovar Serb groups and Albanian Kosovar groups opposed to what they considered to be concessions made to the other party.

As part of these talks, in the closing months of 2012 and in 2013, the format combined high-level meetings with technical dialogue between the working groups. Meanwhile, in late 2012, the EU set greater rapprochement between Serbia and Kosovo as a condition for normalising their respective relations with the EU. Despite the enormous challenges and divisions still separating the elite and general populations of Serbia and Kosovo, highly significant progress was made in this rapprochement in 2012 and 2013 as part of the high-level talks. Prominent in 2013 were the historic meeting between the presidents of Serbia and Kosovo, the first since Kosovo declared independence; the 15-point First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations reached in April; the dissolution of the parallel administrations in northern Kosovo that operated with Belgrade's support and beyond Pristina's control; and the holding of local elections throughout Kosovo, including in Serb-majority areas, in addition to other steps. In turn, the impetus given to the political dialogue in 2013 led to the Council of Europe's authorisation to start negotiations for Serbia's accession to the EU and negotiations with Kosovo for a stabilisation and association agreement with the EU. Both were planned to begin in 2014 and to strengthen incentives to continue the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo.

The EU-facilitated process is joined by other factors that reinforce the context of opportunity. One of them is the regional atmosphere, in which the countries of former Yugoslavia are mostly looking ahead and trying to prevent residual antagonisms and issues of the recent wartime past from jeopardising their future prospects. Thus, their relations are currently cooperative, including Croatia's entry into the EU in 2013. Without neglecting the people's calls for transitional justice, current priorities include issues such as unemployment and corruption, which are common in both countries. This socio-economic and political climate makes it easier to prioritise pragmatism above the perpetuation of old antagonisms, such as in the normalisation of relations Serbia and Kosovo.

Meanwhile, the situation of Kosovo as a country whose independence is internationally recognised on a massive scale has become an undeniable reality and puts it in a different position than other territories whose status is in dispute. By the close of 2013, the independence of Kosovo had been formally recognised by 107 member states of the UN, including 23 EU countries. In 2012, the International Steering Group for Kosovo, in which 25 countries participated to advise and supervise Kosovo's process to achieve independence, decided to end its work and the mandate of the international civilian representative because it thought that the necessary conditions for that had been achieved, which was interpreted as approval for full sovereignty for Kosovo. In 2010, the International Court of Justice had ruled that the declaration was not in violation of international law, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 or Kosovo's provisional constitutional framework. Serbia has upheld its clear opposition to the independent status of Kosovo, but at the same time it has also been committed to the dialogue, making it easier to reach agreements with Kosovo and at least partially implementing matters agreed by both sides. The green light for Serbia to negotiate its adhesion to the EU gives the highest level of support for the position of pragmatism and flexibility that the country has demonstrated. Russia, the great international power vehemently opposed to Kosovo's declaration of independence, remains against it, but is not hindering the talks. Instead, it is defending its geostrategic interests in the Balkans through means such as commercial and energy agreements in the area.

The EU-facilitated talks and the pragmatism of the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo have become key factors in the process to normalise their relations

All this may lead one to believe that future formulas are possible to resolve the conflict over the status of Kosovo once and for all or to make the dispute irrelevant in a future context of fully normalised relations.

Despite the confluence of local, regional and international atmospheres conducive to the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the process still faces many challenges. Among them is the seemingly overwhelming rejection of the Serb population of Kosovo and its subordination to Pristina's ultimate political control. The boycott and various violent incidents that took place during the 2013 local elections in Kosovo, as well as other minor episodes in recent years, were expressions of this rejection. Serbia has tried to rechannel these misgivings, calling for Serbian Kosovar participation in local elections in Kosovo, among other means, though without much success. In any case, achieving co-existence and reconciliation between the Serb and Albanian communities of Kosovo will be a complicated and long-term process that will require specific effort. In any case, this lack of reconciliation might not lead to blockage of the general process, given the specific prospects for decentralisation planned for these areas and Belgrade's commitment to dialogue with Kosovo. Other obstacles include the degree of future implementation of the agreements that are reached over time and the final resolution of the status of Kosovo. Even so, opportunity exists and the parties are willing to take advantage of it to the utmost, with great doses of pragmatism and realism.

5.6. The European Court of Human Rights and Chechnya: though limited, the only recourse to justice

Chechnya, a small republic with a population of just one million belonging to the Russian Federation in the turbulent northern Caucasus, is building a legacy of two decades of armed violence of various levels of intensity and systematic human rights violations. The first war (1994-1996) between local and federal forces over the status of the region, which declared independence after the fall of the USSR, was followed by an even bloodier and more complex second war that broke out in 1999, involved serious human rights abuses against the civilian population and left a body count of tens of thousands of people. Throughout this period, the Chechen civilian population has suffered constant human rights violations at the hands of armed groups and recurrently so from forces linked to the federal and local authorities. Extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, illegal arrests, mistreatment and abductions are some of the abuses condemned by local and international organisations. For Chechnya, the scene of widespread impunity supported by Chechen and Russian institutions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has become the last and indeed only way to achieve justice for the victims of abuse. The ECtHR is an opportunity to seek international protection in the total absence of effective local mechanisms of justice regarding the abuses committed in Chechnya, as well as to demand accountability from Russia and to obtain certain levels of compensation. The expansion of the law in 2013, the first time that Chechen security forces were held responsible for abuse, widens the prospects of the ECtHR as a mechanism for enforcing human rights in Chechnya. However, there are many factors limiting this opportunity, including Russian obstacles to implementing the rulings.

The history of the ECtHR's work in Chechnya has actively focused on protecting human rights there. The ECtHR is an international legal body that enforces human rights in states that have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights by addressing individual or state requests. Its rulings are binding for the states that have signed it. Russia ratified it in 1998, so its compliance is mandatory. In practice, the challenges involved in accessing and achieving justice in Russia for human rights abuses in Chechnya, a problem set in a context of severe restrictions on human rights all over the country and shortcomings in the legal system, according to complaints by local and international human rights organisations for years, has made the ECtHR the leading mechanism regarding the issue of human rights in Chechnya. Starting with the ECtHR's

first ruling on Chechnya in 2005-2011, it has issued 107 sentences holding Russia responsible for serious human rights abuses in the region, according to Human Rights Watch.⁹ Most of the verdicts were related to operations of Russian forces during the Second Chechen War. Furthermore, according to Human Rights Watch, more than one hundred cases of human rights abuse in other areas of the northern Caucasus were still awaiting decisions from the ECtHR. According to figures collected by Caucasian Knot, from January to November 2013, the ECtHR ruled on 14 cases related to Chechnya and Ingushetia. Some organisations estimate that hundreds of requests could have been submitted and are waiting to be addressed.¹⁰ In October 2013, the ECtHR issued various public rulings, including a sentence that addressed 10 joint requests by Chechen citizens regarding the disappearance of 13 family members between 2000 and 2005. The verdict forced Russia to compensate the victims with 1.06 million euros.¹¹

In turn, progress was made with respect to identifying responsibility. In 2013, the ECtHR blamed the local Chechen police force for the first time in a case presented before it by the family of a victim kidnapped in 2009 by Chechen security forces that has been missing ever since. Thus, not just Russian but Chechen authorities were directly accused of being responsible for abuse in a clear challenge to the impunity and totalitarianism of the regime of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, in power since 2007. Russia transferred responsibility for anti-terrorist operations to local Chechen forces under Kadyrov's control in 2003, when he was a local political figure. With the ECtHR's ruling as a precedent, it is possible that in coming years the court will also be able to serve as a mechanism to prosecute and monitor abuses committed by Chechen forces under Kadyrov's mandate and in periods after the Second Chechen War.

Overall, the rulings blaming Russia, and probably increasingly the Chechen regime, legitimise the voices and complaints of victims, survivors and human rights organisations and activists in Chechnya and Russia, which are usually persecuted locally and federally and in some times killed, like in the case of the activist Natalia Estemirova, murdered in 2009. This legitimacy is also supported because it is granted by a prestigious international body that enforces the European Convention on Human Rights. The rulings on Russia and Chechnya have also become indisputable evidence of the need to pursue the issue of human rights in Russia in international players' agendas of bilateral

9. Human Rights Watch, *Making Justice Count in Chechnya. Implementation of European Court of Human Rights Rulings against Russia*, HRW, November, 2011. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2011_Russia_ECHRIImplementation.pdf.

10. Caucasian Knot, "This year ECtHR has announced 14 decisions on complaints lodged by residents of Chechnya and Ingushetia", *Caucasian Knot*, November 9, 2013, <http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/26324/>.

11. Caucasian Knot, "ECtHR obliges Russian government to pay out over million euros to relatives of missing people in Chechnya and Ingushetia", *Caucasian Knot*, October 14, 2013, <http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/26053/?print=true>

and multilateral relations with the country, despite the difficulties this entails.

In terms of implementing the rulings, the results are currently mixed, with various significant shortcomings. For one thing, Russia did pay financial compensation to the victims as dictated by the ECtHR. The compensation cannot restore the damage caused, as the victims have always maintained, but it is a part of reparations and accountability and provides some material support to a population also punished by the impact of prolonged violence on their means of livelihood. However, financial compensation is only a small part of reparation measures. In this sense, there have been voices questioning the ECtHR's reductionist behaviour in limiting reparation to financial compensation, rejecting requests for non-financial reparations for victims.¹²

However, in contrast to effectively paying the compensation, Russia has not implemented the rest of the measures individually, nor the general measures required by the ECtHR's rulings, according to Human Rights Watch.

In addition to cash compensation, the individual measures include required steps such as impartial investigations into the allegations in each specific case in order to identify and try the perpetrators. The ECtHR is not a penal court and cannot sentence the perpetrators, but it can oblige Russia to investigate and prosecute the respective cases of abuse presented before it. Russia has used various strategies to make the legal processes drag on and has not formally accused virtually any perpetrator of abuse. The general measures refer to the obligation to implement measures aimed at eliminating

the root causes of the human rights violations. In this regard, the restructuring and expansion of investigative bodies in Russia has not produced improvements for the time being, nor has Russia adopted more general measures. At the same time, Russia's ability to get away with less than full compliance with the rulings creates a sense of powerlessness among the victims. Monitoring implementation of the verdicts by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers allows it to point out the inadequacy of the measures, but without the ability to impose change.

Given the situation of forgotten conflict and the new totalitarianism experienced in Chechnya and the absolute impunity enjoyed by Chechen and Russian security forces, the ECtHR provides victims with a chance to gain access to justice that has had mixed results recent years, but that despite its shortcomings continues to be a path of hope for the many victims of the serious human rights abuses committed over the last two decades. Though still far from a mechanism for fair reparations, at least it is a body holding Russia ultimately responsible for hundreds of cases of human rights violations, which gives meaning to the victims' tireless and dangerous struggle in the search for justice. Thus, it is hoped that in 2014, new cases of the many awaiting the ECtHR's opinion will be resolved, while the opportunity remains open for international

players, including political and economic partners of Russia and international organisations like the Council of Europe, to pressure Russia to fully comply with the verdicts, whose implementation would improve the human rights situation in the northern Caucasus region.

Despite its many limitations, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a path of hope and the only way to gain access to justice for the Chechen people, who have survived twenty years of serious human rights violations

12. Kirill Koroteev, "Legal Remedies for Human Rights Violations in the Armed Conflict in Chechnya: The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights in Context", *Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies* 1, no.2 (2010).

5.7. The defeat of the armed group M23, a new opportunity for peace in the Great Lakes region

The situation in eastern DR Congo in recent years has been characterised by a succession of cycles of instability and violence as a result of the persistence of unresolved local dynamics and unfulfilled peace agreements, the destabilising role played by Rwanda in the Great Lakes and the permissiveness of the international community. Moreover, there are other structural legacies linked to economic, ethnic, agricultural, demographic and other issues that challenge the region's long-term stability. However, last year different trends were observed that could begin to lay the foundation for building a future of peace: progress in terms of security and in transparency in exploiting natural resources.

With regard to security, the first factor that was decisive in calming the situation was the signing in February 2013 of a peace agreement in Addis Ababa to stabilise eastern DR Congo and the Great Lakes region. Eleven countries pledged not to intervene in conflicts taking place in neighbouring countries and support rebel groups, which opened the door to the intervention of a UN brigade with an offensive mandate to battle armed groups, especially the 23 March movement (M23). This new UN unit, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), is the product of many high-level conversations held regionally in late 2012 and is composed of around 3,000 soldiers from Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa under the command of the MONUSCO. Approved in March, it was not until July that the FIB began to carry out military operations alongside the Congolese Armed Forces to neutralise the M23, named for the failure to implement the latest peace agreement in March 2009. This insurgent group, which began its activity in 2012 and even held Goma in November 2012, received support from Rwanda, was defeated in November 2013 and sought refuge in Uganda. However, in December 2013 the Congolese government and the defeated M23 signed the Nairobi Declaration, which established a political agreement between the Congolese government, the M23, the regional organisation SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). Meanwhile, different armed groups announced their intention to demobilise following the breakup of the M23. To a large extent, the speed and effectiveness with which the Congolese government and its international partners implement a viable disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) strategy for the combatants will determine any progress towards achieving a more stable atmosphere. The process to implement the UN Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for Congo and the Region (also known as the PSC Framework) will determine the success of efforts to promote real DDR by the

Military pressure on the M23 and threats to other armed groups have helped to dissuade other insurgencies from continuing their illegal activities

government and its international partners. In 2014, the Congolese Parliament is expected to pass an Amnesty Law that will pardon crimes of insurrection and war between 18 February 2006 and 20 December 2013, but people who committed war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide will still be prosecuted. The current DDR strategy, known as DDR III (because of previous DDR processes), is designed to include 11,785 former combatants belonging to around fifty armed groups, including 1,800 M23 fighters, and costs around 100 million USD, which will be provided by multilateral and bilateral donors, the MONUSCO and the Congolese government.

In addition to the FIB, the UN Security Council also approved sending drones to monitor the situation, despite the reservations of Russia, China and Rwanda. Thus, according to some analysts, a combination of more robust peacekeeping forces, the expansion of their mandate and technological progress dissuaded the armed groups from continuing their activities. Following the defeat of the M23, around 8,000 combatants surrendered between November 2013 and mid-January 2014, making implementation of the DDR crucial. The government replaced the previous national DDR commission, CONADER, which was facing serious accusations of corruption, with the Executive Unit of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (UEPN-DDR), which will be supervised by the President and Prime Minister and the ministers of Justice, the Interior, Defence and Information, and which will be joined by a wide array of players such as the MONUSCO, the UN and its donor agencies, national and international NGOs, civil society groups and private sector representatives. The wide range of stakeholders may contribute to greater transparency in the UEPN-DDR's activities, but its operations have not yet been stipulated.

Meanwhile, there have been noticeable changes in international legislation regarding the exploitation of natural resources coming from areas affected by armed conflict. In 2013, the European Commission began to collect data and consult with different public and private parties to create a legal framework to regulate the exploitation of natural resources coming from areas in conflict, especially DR Congo. The aim is to make it difficult for armed groups in areas affected by violence to fund their activities by exploiting minerals. The focus of the issue lies on the companies involved in the 3TG sector (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold). Legislation passed by the US in 2010, which requires its companies to review the origin of minerals coming

from DR Congo and neighbouring countries, has started to lead to change, as occurred in September 2013 when 60 European organisations stressed the need for related European legislation based on the due diligence standards of the UN and the OECD, as the US had done with the Dodd-Frank Act. The EU is expected to submit its proposal in the first quarter of 2014. With more than 400 importers, the EU is one of the main markets for 3TG minerals, which are essential for manufacturing all kinds of high-tech devices due to their conductivity and resistance. If the EU takes steps similar to those adopted by the US to force its companies to meet certain standards, pressure on the mining sector, with the exception of China, will start to become decisive.

Yet despite this positive news, which must still be implemented in practice, there is a long history of unfulfilled peace agreements in DR Congo that prompt concern over how the situation may develop. Like in 2007, the 2009 agreement aimed at integrating what was then the armed group CNDP (part of whose members form part of the current M23) failed. Integration was not effective in military terms due to the CNDP's parallel command structures, unpaid salaries and mistrust between the parties, among other issues, or in political terms owing to the creation of parallel administrations in the Masisi region, the limited representation of the CNDP party among the MPs of the provincial assembly and the results of the fraudulent legislative elections in November 2011, which were cancelled in Masisi.


Furthermore, there are other challenges that must be addressed to achieve a lasting peace in DR Congo. First, in local terms, a framework is required to regulate land ownership, since corruption, abuse and politicians'

manipulation of this issue are at the root of many local conflicts. Second, the dispute related to the Rwandan Hutu armed group FDLR is still awaiting resolution. Some of the FDLR's members were responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and its existence serves as an argument for Rwanda to continue interfering in Congolese domestic affairs, such as by persecuting the FDLR, promoting the existence of rebellions like the CNDP and later the M23, aimed at eliminating the FDLR and enforcing previous peace agreements, and benefitting from the illegal exploitation of natural resources from DR Congo (whether through direct participation or by serving as the exit point for those resources). As a result, a change in the strategy towards the FDLR is needed, because the military strategy has failed once again. It is imperative to launch a political dialogue between Rwanda and the FDLR and the rest of the Rwandan political and military opposition on the condition that they abandon armed struggle and are offered guarantees to return to Rwanda and that the freedom of expression is promoted in order to achieve full reconciliation with the different political players and lay the foundations for overcoming the Rwandan genocide of 1994, twenty years after the tragedy. The third challenge involves the role of the international community in exploiting natural resources: if it is not mandatory to comply with the legislation that the EU aims to implement in 2014 to promote international mechanisms of transparency and control to halt the illegal funding of local players that decisively helps to perpetuate conflict, as in the US, the efforts being made in Europe may be worthless. Many challenges remain, but there are also various windows of opportunity to start to influence the future of this country and of the region and break the circle of widespread violence that has marked its history.

6. Risk Scenarios for 2014

Based on the analysis of the different contexts of conflict and socio-political crisis in 2013, in this chapter the Escola de Cultura de Pau identifies eight scenarios whose conditions could worsen or turn into points of even more serious instability and violence in 2014. The warning factors for 2014 include the challenge of increasing forced displacement of populations worldwide, at their worst level since the 1990s; the devastating toll of a decade of war in Iraq, a country that is already facing rising turmoil; the internationalisation and radicalisation of the conflict in Syria and its destabilising regional impact; the notable aggravation of the situation in Eritrea, whose implosion could have unforeseeable consequences; the political crisis that has been gripping Thailand for the last decade and could get worse in the future; the consequences of the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the power game in East Asia; the increase of violence in the Chinese province of Xinjiang; and, finally, the difficulty in maintaining dialogue between Turkey and the Kurdish armed group PKK amidst the internal crisis in Turkey and regional instability in the Middle East.

Map 6.1. Risk scenarios for 2014



6.1. Global challenge: forced displacement of population at the worst level since the 1990s

Armed conflicts, situations of widespread violence and human rights abuses forcibly displace hundreds of thousands of people every year. Many abandon their homes and settle in other regions within their home countries (internal displacement), while others cross borders in search of protection (refuge). With the exception of specific years when a slight decrease in this phenomenon was noted, the general trend over the last decade points to a steady increase in population displacements caused by violence. The latest figures worldwide for 2012, released by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in mid-2013, confirmed this pattern and sent out a warning:

the statistics for forced displacement had reached the worst level since the 1990s.¹ By late 2012, a total of 45.2 million people had been displaced (15.4 million refugees; 28.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs); and nearly one million asylum seekers), the highest numbers since 1994, when 47 million displaced people were reported. These numbers are equally alarming if the focus is put not on the cumulative total number of people in this situation, but on those that were forced to abandon their homes due to violence for the first time. According to data collected by the UNHCR, in 2012 7.6 million people were displaced as a result of conflicts and persecution. Of them, 1.1 million became refugees (the largest number of new refugees since 1999), while another 6.5 million were displaced internally within their home countries, the second-highest figure of the last decade. Or, as the UNHCR has illustrated, in 2012 an average of 23,000 people had to leave their homes due to violence each day.

The worsening situation of forced displacement, reaching levels similar to those observed in the 1990s—a time marked in the collective memory by severe humanitarian crises stemming from the wars in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, among other places—was partially linked in 2012 to the specific impacts of some conflicts that have greatly destabilising effects, mainly in Africa and the Middle East. These conflicts include the one affecting DR Congo, the one that began in northern Mali in early 2012, the hostilities in the border area between Sudan and South Sudan—which caused more than one million people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries during the year—and the war in Syria. The deterioration of some of these conflicts and the emergence of new crises in 2013

By late 2012, a total of 45.2 million people had been forcibly displaced, the highest number since 1994. On average, during 2012 around 23,000 people had to leave their homes per day due to situations of violence

leads to the prediction that these figures will continue to grow, reinforcing the negative trend in the global development of forcibly displaced populations. To do so, one only needs to take account of the situation in some contexts like that of the Central African Republic, where the chaos arising from the forcible seizure of power in March 2013 caused massive internal displacement (more than 400,000 people) and made more than 220,000 people seek refuge in countries such as Chad, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo and DR Congo. In the latter country, the persistence of conflict continued to force thousands of people to flee their homes, raising the total number of IDPs there

to 2.6 million, according to statistics gathered by the UNHCR until mid-2013. In the Sudanese region of Darfur, the resumption of intercommunity clashes caused new displacements of 300,000 people in the first few months of 2013.

To these cases must be added the extremely serious situation in Syria, where figures on forced displacement increased exponentially in 2013 due to the brutal dynamics of violence. While there were 3.5 million IDPs at the start of 2013, by the end of the year this number had soared to 6.5 million.² The refugee population ranged from 1.8 to 2.3 million

people, most of whom sought refuge in neighbouring countries. As a result, Lebanon's population increased by 10% due to the influx of refugees since the armed conflict began in 2011 and Jordan has a refugee camp that has become equivalent to the fifth-largest city in the country in demographic terms. The war has also forced many people that once took refuge in Syria in the past to return to their home countries, such as Iraq. In late 2013, Iraq became a new focus of forced displacement caused by violent clashes in Anbar province. According to statistics released in early 2014, the conflict in this area, bordering with Syria, caused the flight of nearly 300,000 people in less than a month, the highest displacement figure since the worst stage of the war in Iraq (2006-08). Predictably, these data indicated that the Middle East will continue to be the centre of attention in 2014 due to the humanitarian crises stemming from the violent conflicts. In its report in the global internal displacement situation in 2012, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) warned that the crisis in Syria had already increased IDPs in the region fivefold, though sub-Saharan Africa continued

1. UNHCR, *Displacement, The New 21st Century Challenge: UNHCR Global Trends 2012*, June, 2013, http://unhcr.org/globaltrends/june2013/UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V08_web.pdf.
2. UNHCR, *A Year in Review: 2013*, UNHCR Syria, January 31, 2014, <http://www.unhcr.org/52eb7a7a9.html>.

to be where the greatest levels of internal displacement were concentrated throughout the world.³

Behind these figures lie heartrending personal stories that reflect suffering on a grand scale because of the inability of their home countries and the international community to halt the dynamics of violence. People forced to flee conflict, persecution and abuse are exposed to many violent situations. Sometimes they fall victim to human trafficking networks, are assaulted or suffer serious and even fatal accidents in their attempts to get away, as demonstrated in the sinking of boats full of people in the Mediterranean and other maritime routes for immigrants and refugees in Asia.⁴ Refugees and IDPs also run risks linked to sexual violence, forced recruitment (including of children), deliberate attacks related to the dynamics of the conflict or racist attitudes towards their group, as well as the deterioration of their living conditions due to overcrowding, a lack of shelter in suitable conditions, food security, a lack of access to healthcare and education and an absence of opportunities to work in the host areas or countries. Faced with situations of this nature, various international organisations have continued to warn of the particularly vulnerable situation of women and children, who make up nearly half of the refugee population (46% in 2012).

The deterioration of some armed conflicts and the emergence of new crises in 2013 leads to the prediction that the negative trend in the global development of forcibly displaced populations will continue to grow

Predictably, these global levels of forced displacement, as well as the gap between the resources available and the needs of refugees and IDPs, will continue to present a major challenge for local and international humanitarian organisations, for the authorities in the host regions and countries and for the civilian population, which often becomes the first and main source of support for people in need of shelter and refuge (in eastern DR Congo, for example, more than two-thirds of all displaced people stay with relatives). Thus, it is also worth noting that developing countries are the ones mainly shouldering the burden of this phenomenon.

In the last decade, developing countries took in between 70% and 80% of all refugees around the world. This figure makes it even clearer that the richest and most powerful countries have a responsibility to become more effectively involved in responding to the displacement crisis around the world, including by implementing less restrictive asylum and reception policies. Regarding the displacement crisis caused by the conflict in Syria, so nearby and covered by the media, for example, the EU's response has been marginal: only 10 of the 27 EU countries have offered to accept a total of only 12,000 refugees, accounting for 0.5% of those who have abandoned the country, according to an Amnesty International report issued in late 2013.⁵ This illustrates the magnitude of the challenges ahead and the need to remember the importance of a phenomenon that often remains invisible.

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3. IDMC, 2013. *Global Overview 2012. People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence*, April, 2013, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/C57425138CEAE4D0C1257B9B002DC64F/\\$file/activity-report-2012.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/C57425138CEAE4D0C1257B9B002DC64F/$file/activity-report-2012.pdf).
 4. UNHCR, *UNHCR Report to the UN General Assembly, Period 1 January 2012 – 30 June 2013*, August 14, 2013, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&comid=3b4f07fd4&cid=49aea93a20&scid=49aea93a16&keywords=UNHCR%20Annual%20Reports%20General%20Assembly>.
 5. Amnesty International, *An International Failure: The Syrian Refugee Crisis*, AI Briefing, December 13, 2013, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT34/001/2013/en/8a376b76-d031-48a6-9588-ed9aee651d52/act340012013en.pdf>.

6.2. Iraq: Devastating toll of a decade of war amidst growing turmoil

On 20 March 2003, a coalition led by the USA and the UK began the invasion of Iraq under the argument, which proved false, that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed weapons of mass destruction. Even though the US President at the time, George W. Bush, rushed to declare "mission accomplished" one month and a half later, violence has continued to rend the country with catastrophic consequences and recent accounts indicate that the situation could worsen over the course of 2014. The statistics disclosed on the tenth anniversary of the war left little room for doubt about the impact of the conflict: between March 2003 and March 2013, more than 174,000 people were killed, of which an astonishing majority were civilians (from 112,017 to 122,438).⁶ In addition to tens of thousands of injured people, the war caused the forced displacement of millions of people within and outside the country. In 2013, this figure rose to 2.7 million, although in 2007, one of the worst years of the conflict, it reached almost five million (half of them IDPs and the other half refugees that mostly fled to neighbouring countries). The invasion has been considered one of the worst foreign policy disasters since the Vietnam War, with destabilising effects for the region and a negative impact on the world order and on international law, considering that the coalition resorted to the use of force without the authorisation of the UN Security Council.⁷ The international intervention did not turn Iraq into the model democracy that the Bush administration predicted would serve as an example for the Middle East, nor did the USA ensure the acquisition of an incontestable ally to defend its interests in the region, since the Iraqi government, led by Shia politician Nouri al-Maliki since 2006, has fallen within Iran's orbit of influence.

Between March 2003 and March 2013, more than 174,000 people lost their lives due to the conflict in Iraq, most of them civilians

Ten years later, an assessment from the standpoint of the Iraqi population is also complex. While it is possible to identify some progress, such as a reduction in the levels of poverty (after the international sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein's regime were lifted, the country experienced economic growth) and better access to water (even though a quarter of the Iraqi population only has potable water for two hours per day), there are other, worrisome indicators in the country.⁸ These include problems in restoring the healthcare and education systems, high levels of corruption (similar to those during the era of Saddam Hussein) and continuous human rights abuses and violations, including torture

and the extensive use of the death penalty in a context of institutional fragility partially affected by a divide-and-conquer strategy pursued by the al-Maliki government, which has atomised and fragmented political forces. However, the most alarming trend is the persistent violence affecting the country, which worsened significantly in 2013.

The dramatic regularity of violent incidents intensified last year until reaching levels not seen since 2008. The tolls kept by the UN mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and Iraq Body Count (IBC) indicate that between 8,000 and 10,000 civilians lost their lives in 2013, confirming a pattern of rising violence since 2011 (the year that US troops withdrew from the country). While 300 serious security incidents were reported in 2011, 1,200 were reported in 2013.⁹ This trend has raised fears that the conflict in Iraq is worsening and headed for levels as harrowing as those recorded between 2006 and 2007, when 6,000 serious security incidents were reported each month and the number of fatalities due to the violence ranged from 20,000 to 30,000 people per year. Concern about a potential resurgence of the dynamics of civil war with a strong sectarian component, such as that experienced in 2006-08, has been gaining strength in 2014, partially because of the growing sense of marginalisation of the Sunni Arab community in the country and because of a regional context characterised by rising intercommunity tensions as a result of the war in Syria.

The Sunni populace's feeling of exclusion and injustice has been emphasised since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, when the political system promoted by the international coalition was built according to a sectarian logic: given that the Sunni community—treated as a homogeneous group despite its diversity and complexities—had dominated under the former regime, it was assumed that the transition would require a transfer of power in favour of Shia and Kurds.¹⁰ Although the domestic political landscape is complex and does not necessarily respond to sectarian dynamics (some important Shia groups oppose al-Maliki and there are Sunni groups that cooperate with the government), there is a widespread perception that the repression against the Shia majority during the Hussein era has been replaced by Shia repression against the Sunni minority.¹¹ In recent years, al-Maliki's policies on allocating economic

6. Iraq Body Count, "The War in Iraq: 10 years and counting: analysis of deaths in a decade of violence", Press Release, March 19, 2013, <https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/ten-years/>.

7. Richard Falk, "Lessons to be learnt from the Iraq War", *al-Jazeera*, March 14, 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/2013361029140182.html>.

8. IRIN, "Iraq 10 Years On: The Humanitarian Legacy", March, 2013, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/97897/iraq-ten-years-on-the-humanitarian-impact>.

9. Michael Knights, "Iraq's never-ending security crisis", *BBC*, October 3, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24370037>.

10. International Crisis Group, *Make or Break: Iraq's Sunnis and the State*, Middle East Report no. 144, August 14, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/mena/make-or-break-iraq-s-sunnis-and-the-state.aspx>.

11. John Burns, "A Decade Later, Stability Eludes Iraq", *The New York Times*, March 19, 2013, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/a-decade-later-stability-eludes-iraq/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.

resources, positions of power, representation in law enforcement and the implementation of anti-terrorism laws, as well as the marginalisation of prominent Sunni politicians, including former Vice President Tareq el-Hashemi and former Minister of Finance Rafi al-Issawi, have done nothing but exacerbate the rifts.

Against this backdrop, throughout 2013, the Iraqi provinces where the Sunni population is most concentrated showed a more contentious attitude and mobilised en masse to protest government policies they consider discriminatory and persecutory. The government's crackdown on these peaceful demonstrations and the lack of consistent and unified leadership among the Sunni opposition encouraged the more radical stances of proponents of violence and empowered armed groups, including some linked to al-Qaeda, which tried to present themselves as defenders of the Sunni cause and accused al-Maliki of colluding with the Damascus-Teheran axis. Thus, after years of decline and fostered by the instability in Syria, al-Qaeda gained renewed strength in Iraq. Alongside this development, some Shia militias were seen to reactivate in 2013 that participated in clashes with rival groups and perpetrated attacks against the Sunni civilian population and holy sites in retaliation for continuous attacks against Shia.¹²

The severe situation in Iraq deteriorated even further in late 2013. The government's decision to dismantle a Sunni protest camp in Anbar province, the largest in Iraq, which shares borders with Syria, triggered a significant escalation of violence that also showed the growing interconnection to the armed conflict in the neighbouring country. The confrontation primarily pitted the Iraqi security forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria, which changed its name to ISIS in April to express the expansion of its ambitions into Syrian territory and its aim to create an Islamic emirate straddling the border. ISIS gained ground and seized control of cities such as Ramadi and Fallujah. In early 2014, al-Maliki's government attempted to deal with the al-Qaeda crisis in Anbar by launching a military offensive with the support of the USA, which promised to speed up the delivery of

weapons, including Hellfire missiles and drones. The conflict made tens of thousands of people abandon their homes in the greatest wave of forced displacement in the country in the last six years.¹³ Meanwhile, al-Maliki tried to restore cooperation with Sunni tribal militias to combat al-Qaeda (a strategy employed by the USA in 2008), though it encountered mistrust and/or instrumental alliances. Some militias agreed to cooperate with Baghdad, but only because of an interest to expel al-Qaeda from the area due to the negative experience when the extremist network controlled it and not to be considered an ally of the government, which they continue to distrust.

Thus, the new year was ushered in full of challenges for Iraq that go far beyond security issues. While Baghdad has settled on a military solution to this recent crisis, an approach of this nature alone will not resolve a conflict rooted in the Sunni community's feeling of alienation and its perception that it is politically marginalised. A long-term solution requires responding to the legitimate demands and grievances of the Sunni community and integrating them into an inclusive political process, as well as making progress in the process of national reconciliation. In any case, it must be borne in mind that this is not the only focal area of conflict and tension in the country and that infighting transcends sectarian issues. As some analysts have emphasised, the conflict in Anbar also reveals a dispute between the centralising policies of the Iraqi government and some provinces, including some with Shia majorities, that seek greater powers and responsibilities and even a formula of autonomy similar to what is enjoyed in the Kurdish region in northern Iraq (which has also locked horns with the central government).¹⁴ The prospects for escaping from the many dynamics of the conflict in Iraq are not encouraging, considering that parliamentary elections will be held in 2014, in which al-Maliki aspires to a third term, which could exacerbate violence, favour political polarisation and lead to institutional paralysis, like in the past, and greater interconnection between the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, in a volatile context of increasingly porous and unstable borders.¹⁵

2014 emerges as a complicated year for Iraq, bearing in mind the escalation of violence in 2013, the political polarisation linked to the parliamentary elections and the growing interconnection to the conflict in Syria

12. International Crisis Group, op.cit.

13. UNHCR, "Continuing fighting in central Iraq leaves 140,000 forcibly displaced", UNHCR, January 24, 2014, <http://www.unhcr.org/52e274d19.html>.

14. Marina Ottaway, "Anbar violence goes beyond sectarian conflict", BBC, January 4, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25598698>.

15. Louise Harbour, "Next Year's Wars", *Foreign Policy*, December 30, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/30/next_year_s_wars.

6.3. Internationalisation and radicalisation of the conflict in Syria and its destabilising regional impact

Towards the end of 2011, it became clear that the situation in Syria had changed. The mass peaceful protests against the regime were increasingly being eclipsed by frequent clashes between government forces and opposition groups that decided to respond to the crackdowns through force of arms. Since then, the conflict has not only undergone a significant upsurge in violence, but has also taken on enormous complexity that makes it increasingly difficult to resolve. The many factors that explain the conflict's growing complexity include the rise of sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shia, Syria's transformation into the scene of a proxy war among regional powers (a dispute that has become an "existential" issue for the mutually antagonistic governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran and that has also confronted Saudi Arabia with Qatar, allies but also competitors in supporting different Syrian rebel groups) and the profoundly destabilising effects of the war in regional terms, which have become particularly evident in an uptick in conflict in Lebanon and Iraq. Other factors include the proliferation and fragmentation of the armed groups involved and the growth of radical, extremist and jihadist groups throughout 2013. Together, these factors have made it even more difficult for the international community to deal with the crisis, characterised from the start by diplomatic standstill due to the dramatic consequences of the war.

Since the conflict began, Bashar Assad has tried to attribute the opposition's activity to the intervention of foreign forces and terrorist groups. This false argument aims to discredit the dissidents' demands, but many now consider it a self-fulfilling prophecy at least regarding outside support for the armed rebel groups and the growing presence of foreign combatants in the country. According to some analyses, the armed conflict in Syria has inspired the largest mobilisation of foreign fighters since the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s.¹⁶ Although estimates about this phenomenon are partial and difficult to corroborate, studies indicate that from 2011 to the end of 2013, around 11,000 foreigners joined forces opposing the Assad regime. These foreigners came from 74 countries, most of them in the Arab World (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Lebanon, Libya) and in Western Europe (France, UK, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands), although militia fighters have also been identified as coming from the Balkans, countries of the

former Soviet bloc, Somalia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Among other reasons, the presence of foreign fighters intensified last year because of the growing perception among Sunni groups that the conflict is part of a sectarian struggle that transcends the boundaries of Syria and urges them to fight against any Shia advance. Along these lines, the expanded foreign presence also reflects greater participation of regional armed groups in the conflict in support of the Assad regime, including Shia militias coming from Iraq, Iranian forces and members of the Lebanese Shia Hezbollah militia, which were openly involved in battles with rebel forces in 2013. This dynamic had other cross-border repercussions, such as the increased activity of radical Sunni groups in Lebanon, including the al-Qaeda-linked Abdullah al-Azzam Brigades, which carried out attacks against Iranian interests and Hezbollah strongholds.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that foreign fighters only account for 10% of the anti-Assad forces. According to various estimates, in late 2013 the forces of the opposition had around 100,000 fighters forming part of more than 1,000 armed groups, many of them small, local in scope and with different agendas and means of support. While initially the main armed opposition group in Syria was the Free Syrian Army (FSA), this force, which has not demonstrated high levels of coordination in the field or effective unified leadership, despite the creation of the Supreme Military Council in late 2012, has gradually been displaced by other armed groups, especially Islamist and Salafist ones with various levels of radicalisation. According to international defence consultancy firm IHS Jane, nearly half of the rebels are hardline Islamists (30,000 to 35,000) or jihadists fighting in factions close to al-Qaeda (nearly 10,000), while another 30,000 are moderate Islamists, putting secular militias in the minority.¹⁷

In November 2013, seven of the main Islamist groups operating in the country united to create the Islamic Front, considered the largest alliance of opposition forces in Syria since the conflict began. According to some estimates, it is made up of 45,000 troops expressly aimed at toppling Assad and setting up an Islamic state. Analysts have warned that the link among these seven Sunni groups –Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya (Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the

16. Aaron Zeilin, "Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise Among Western Europeans", *ICSR Insight*, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), December 17, 2013, <http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/>.

17. Ben Farmer and Ruth Sherlock, "Syria: nearly half rebel fighters are jihadists or hardline Islamists, says IHS Jane's report", *The Telegraph*, September 15, 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10311007/Syria-nearly-half-rebel-fighters-are-jihadists-or-hardline-Islamists-says-IHS-Janes-report.html>.

Levant), Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), Suqour al-Sham (Falcons of Syria), Liwa al-Tawhid (Unity Brigade), Liwa al-Haqq (Truth Brigade), Kata'ib Ansar al-Sham (Levant Support Brigade) and the Kurdish Islamic Front— is not entirely clear, since some of them are Salafists (of different strains), while others are not. The Islamic Front not only operates outside the Free Syrian Army, but it is generally suspicious of Western support and does not want to be perceived as aligned with their interests. Although many reports suggest that Riyadh is its main supporter, other data indicate that on the individual level, some of these organisations receive support from Qatar, Kuwait and private parties in the Persian Gulf.¹⁸

The FSA's position has also been overshadowed by the growing prominence of another armed group, the al-Nusra Front. Composed of between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters, according to various estimates, this armed group has been considered a branch of al-Qaeda in the country ever since its leader, Abu Mohamed al-Julani, declared loyalty to the leader of the international network, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Included on the US' list of terrorist organisations, the al-Nusra Front has presented itself as an organisation that seeks to defend the Sunni cause and establish an Islamic state. When its activity started in early 2012, it attracted attention by carrying out various suicide attacks against government targets, but over time it has become more systematically involved in combat and has won control over some territory, particularly in the north. In these areas, the al-Nusra Front has clashed with the FSA and other armed groups such as YPG Kurdish militias linked to the PKK, which throughout 2013 asserted their control over Kurdish-majority areas in northern Syria. The internecine conflict among armed rebel groups has not been limited to a dispute between secular and moderate groups on one side and Islamist and radical groups on the other. Some power struggles have also broken out within organisations allegedly linked to al-Qaeda in the country.

In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, announced the expansion of its objectives and operations in Syria through a merger of the al-Nusra Front and the creation of al-Qaeda in Iraq and “al-Sham” (Greater Syria or the Levant), better known by the acronym ISIS (Islamic State in Syria). However, the leaders of al-Nusra Front denied this claim and said they were directly affiliated with al-Qaeda. Since then, both groups have continued to operate alongside each other in Syria, with the al-Nusra Front acting more like a “local” organisation because most of the foreign fighters that had joined its ranks have decided to join ISIS.¹⁹

This organisation consists of about 12,000 combatants, half of which are fighting in Syria. Especially starting in the second quarter of 2013, ISIS forcefully penetrated areas in the north and east of the country, seizing control of towns in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Raqqqa.

In areas under its control, ISIS has deployed strategies of indoctrination, co-opting the population by imposing a harsh and radical interpretation of Islam with many prohibitions, the seclusion of women to private spaces and brutal forms of punishment, such as decapitations. ISIS advanced positions in areas that had been mostly under the control of rebel forces and launched a persecution campaign against any sign of resistance or opposition to its designs. Thus, it has carried out killings and attacks against the Shia and Alawite civilian population, leaders and groups linked to the FSA and Kurdish militias, but also against Sunni Arab Islamist groups. The killing by ISIS of a prominent leader of

In an atmosphere of great fragmentation among the armed groups of Syria, Islamist, Salafist and jihadist groups have gained a growing role on the opposing side

an armed Islamist group was one of the factors that fuelled clashes between this organisation and several rebel groups in late 2013. The al-Nusra Front tried to position itself as a mediator in battles between ISIS and other armed opposition groups some locations, but in others it clashed with the group of Iraqi origin, which in late 2013 also intensified its offensive against Iraqi government forces in Baghdad. In this context, ISIS was perceived by other rebel groups of Syria as a threat, more interested in consolidating its control over territory and imposing its version of the sharia than in fighting the Assad regime. The organisation has been accused of distorting the aims of the rebellion and of weakening the opposing band at a crucial stage of the armed conflict, which has also led to rumours that ISIS is serving Assad's interests. Furthermore, an alleged statement issued by al-Qaeda claimed that it split with ISIS in early 2014, making it even more difficult to situate the different armed parties to the conflict on the map. According to some analyses, even al-Qaeda's central leadership thinks that the brutality of ISIS is counter-productive.²⁰

In this intricate situation, what seems clear is that the armed groups on the ground are having more and more trouble identifying who is friend and who is foe in an atmosphere of violence and radicalisation that will most likely continue to affect the civilian population in 2014. This phenomenon has not only made increasingly radical groups seem “moderate” to others with even more extreme positions, as is the case with ISIS and the al-Nusra Front, but has also caused segments of the population in some areas to begin to mourn the loss of Bashar Assad. Compared to the jihadist threat,

18. Rania Abouzeid, *Syria's uprising within an uprising*, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), January 16, 2014, http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_syrias_uprising_within_an_uprising238.

19. Christoph Reuter, “Jihadist Group Expands Rapidly in Syria”, *Spiegel Online*, December 18, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/isis-shadowy-jihadist-group-expands-rapidly-in-syria-a-939561.html>.

20. The Economist, “Syria's civil war: Will the jihadists overreach?”, *The Economist*, October 12, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21587845-extremist-group-ruffling-feathers-including-those-its-islamist>.

the Syrian President and his regime have also started to be viewed as a lesser evil in some Western political circles; even some former US diplomats have argued that the leader must inevitably be part of the solution as a key element in the fight against extremist groups.²¹ However, other observers believe that no possibility of a solution involving Assad is viable, given the many crimes committed by government forces during the conflict and the predictable opposition of countries such as Saudi Arabia to any exit negotiated with the Syrian regime.²² In a scenario in which any prediction about the future seems risky, perhaps one of the most

likely is that concern about the jihadist threat, which the USA, Russia and China share in common and has taken on an uneven position in the conflict, may help to close the distance between the stances taken by international stakeholders to influence how the conflict develops. More than the war's terrible consequences on the civilian population, this convergence of interests shared by the great powers regarding the need to stop the rise of the jihadists, with all its destabilising consequences regionally and internationally, may provide an incentive for finding a political solution to the crisis.

21. Robert Worth and Eric Schmitt, "Jihadist Groups Gain in Turmoil Across Middle East", *The New York Times*, December 3, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/world/middleeast/jihadist-groups-gain-in-turmoil-across-middle-east.html>.

22. Paul Adams, "Syria crisis: time to rethink a future with Assad?", *BBC*, December 13, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25362244>.

6.4. Eritrea facing a possible implosion of the state with unforeseeable consequences

The authoritarian regime of the sole party that has ruled Eritrea since 1993, headed by President Isaias Afwerki, has shown signs of weakness and growing domestic discontent in recent years, and especially since 2012. Different issues raise concerns about an outbreak of violence that could have serious consequences not only locally ahead of the upcoming political transition, but also throughout the Horn of Africa regionally. The growing split within the leadership in power; rumours of the President's deteriorating health throughout 2013, which demonstrated that there was no succession plan after Afwerki; the Eritrean Army's inaction regarding the Ethiopian Army's incursion to pursue an armed group, which demonstrated the weakness of the once powerful military; the attempted coup d'état in January 2013 and the defection of important figures and politicians from President Afwerki's power circle and core reveal the seriousness of the situation.

In recent years, a growing rift has emerged in the President's circle. The central role played by Afwerki since leading the fight for independence in Ethiopia 30 years before, and then as the new President of an independent Eritrea since 1993, led to the gradual centralisation of power starting in the mid-1990s. The President kept the country in a permanent state of war, which turned the Eritrean Army into the central institution in the country. As noted by the International Crisis Group, President Afwerki has nullified the different institutions, checks and balances in the government, fostered rivalry among them and built a patronage system converging on him. The promises of democracy made after winning independence from Ethiopia, such as the creation of a Constitution, introducing a multi-party political system and calling elections in the country, remained unfulfilled. Although a draft of a Constitution was written in 1997, it was never implemented. The war with Ethiopia (1998-2000) helped to stall the reforms and to justify the concentration of power and the ongoing state of war. The unresolved delimitation of the border with Ethiopia after the Algiers Agreement of 2000 acted as a stimulus to maintain this situation and the international community's bias in favour of Ethiopian interests helped to strengthen the government's position. Demands for democratic reform (expressed in documents such as the Berlin Manifesto in 2000 and the letter of the G-15) were silenced and repressed.

Meanwhile, the country developed one of the most militarised societies in the world, where the population's military service is mandatory and indefinite, considered a prolongation of its contribution to the struggle for national liberation. To guarantee loyalty and shield

himself from criticism, the President and his circle have created a patronage network to "purchase" top military officers, which have become the arbiters of power in the country and have built their own loyalty networks that have given them independence from the central government. These generals are currently divided into two groups: those loyal to the President and his sceptics, who have lost confidence in Afwerki. The latter are aware of the decline of the Army and that it would be impossible to defend against Ethiopian aggression, as occurred in March and May 2012, when certain military sectors were unable to act. Faced with rumours that the military has promoted consultations with Afwerki aimed at leading the country to a negotiated transition of power and to avoiding becoming a failed state, Afwerki responded by forcing the resignation of critics in high positions and by creating new armed militias to project him from certain sectors of the Army.

Rumours have surfaced periodically that Afwerki is in poor health. He was not seen in public from 28 March to 27 April 2012, which led to a new wave of rumours, given his constant presence on the official television network, Eri-TV. On 27 April, Afwerki appeared on Eri-TV for an interview in an attempt to dispel these rumours. Afwerki's lengthy absence, previous speculation about this state of his health and the Ministry of Information's denial that his health had deteriorated (or even that he had died, according to some sources) gave greater urgency to the rumour. According to these reports, Afwerki had been transferred to Qatar for urgent treatment of a liver disease. The Eritrean Ministry of Information accused the CIA of masterminding the defamation campaign. Afwerki's alleged disease set off a climate of concern within the Army and the President's circle, given the lack of a plan to manage a transition without him.

Another factor that demonstrates this mounting tension was the mutiny that took place in January and was suppressed by the authorities. On 21 January 2013, around one hundred soldiers occupied the Ministry of Information and broadcasted a message on the official television channel that called for implementing the Constitution of 1997 and releasing the prisoners of conscience in the country. They later surrendered to the authorities, which launched an investigation and waves of arrests in February. At first there was speculation that it had been an attempted coup d'état. According to analysts, the action taken by the government after that does show the extent of the situation. On 5 February, the Minister of Information banned the Eritrean population from discussing the mutiny and protests on the al-Jazeera network, which was subsequently closed. Days later, President Afwerki made a speech saying there was

There is an atmosphere of concern about a possible outbreak of violence in Eritrea that could have serious consequences not only locally, but in the Horn of Africa regionally

no reason for concern. However, in order to limit the possibility of a revolt arising within the military, Afwerki triggered the militarisation of society by creating militias as counterweights to the Army, known by the name Hzbawi Serawit, or People's Army, which in practice involves indefinite military service.

Finally, in July 2013 the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group also revealed the emergence of cracks in Eritrea's security institutions, as demonstrated by the January uprising and high-level defections in the civilian and military branches of the government, like for example two pilots that fled with the presidential plane and requested asylum in Saudi Arabia in October, the defection of Minister of Information Ali Abdu—close to Afwerki—in November, who has gone missing, and the defection of the national football team in Uganda in December during an international competition. The cracks seem to be particularly acute among a clique

The Eritrean President and his circle have created a patronage network to ensure loyalty across the country

of senior military officers and those that manage the clandestine paramilitary, financial and intelligence forces controlled by the President. Added to this is the fact that thousands of people have fled the country in recent years, amounting to between 2,000 and 3,000 per month in 2013, as well as the isolation the country has experienced vis-à-vis the international community in recent years due to its support for the armed Somali group al-Shabaab and different armed opposition groups aspiring to achieve political change through force. Eritrea's relationship with al-Shabaab may improve or worsen depending on internal circumstances in Eritrea, which have an effect on the development of al-Shabaab's activity in Somalia. Given all these issues, including the many cultural, linguistic, ethnic, economic, political and religious divisions that form part of the idiosyncrasy of the country, a collapse of the state with dangerous consequences cannot be ruled out.

6.5. Thailand: a decade of protests and an uncertain future

In 2013 Thailand saw the most important protests in recent years due to their massive size, duration in time and political impact, which included the dissolution of Parliament, the resignation of the government and a call for early elections. While no violent incidents of great intensity were reported in 2013 (by the close of the year, eight people had died and several hundred had been injured), there are some factors giving reason to believe that the political crisis that shook Thailand in 2013 may not only drag on in the near and mid-term, but also provoke greater levels of violence and even a coup d'état.

Historically, the Thai Armed Forces have played a preponderant role in the country due to their influence and their interference in political affairs. Since 1932, there have been 18 successful or failed coup d'états, the most recent in 2006 against former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the most influential political figure of the last decade and around which the current social and political crisis largely revolves. Though the senior military leadership has rejected any pressure to carry out another coup so far, some analysts think that the refusals have not always been firm enough to rule out military intervention in the near future. The same analysts think that one of the opposition's main strategies is to maintain high and sustained levels of protest, running the risk of violence and suffering enough economic damage to the country to reach an unsustainable situation and thereby force a new coup d'état. It has normally been thought that the senior circle and most of the Armed Forces are more favourable to the opposition and the protestors than to the current government, as demonstrated by the coup d'état against Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 and the subsequent establishment of military governments. However, the fact that some sectors of the Army were close to the positions of the so-called "red shirts" (traditional sympathisers of Thaksin Shinawatra) promoted some people to warn of division in the military, generalised violence or even civil war if the Armed Forces do not carry out a new coup d'état.

A second factor that adds uncertainty to the current crisis is the enormous social and political polarisation present in the country. This polarisation has been strengthened and increased over nearly a decade of massive and sustained protests in which both parties have insistently resorted to social mobilisation paralysing the main cities and the economy and even sporadic, low-intensity violence as a strategy for achieving their political aims. With the passing of time, this social mobilisation strategy, which has often led to the occupation of key infrastructure or public buildings of great symbolic importance, like

Parliament and the seat of government, has become internalised in the political culture of the country and is now one of the main mechanisms used by certain elites to reach their political aims. It is certain that the ongoing social protests in the last ten years have ended up politicising sectors that had traditionally been excluded or isolated from the system. However, it must be borne in mind that the vast majority of the protests reported in Thailand over the course of the last decade have not been motivated by sectorial demands or the claim of social, economic or labour rights, but by support for or rejection of the various governments that have held power during that time. However, the continued calls for protest have often led to the erosion, if not replacement, of conventional mechanisms of democratic participation and representation, weakened the coordination of interests among opposing parties and boosted the risk of direct clashes between supporters and opponents of the government, especially when simultaneous protests by rival sides physically coincide in the capital.

The possibility of finding points of convergence and mechanisms to resolve the crisis or reduce the tension is clearly endangered by the obstinacy of the parties involved and their refusal to make the slightest concession in their stances and demands. Their bloody-mindedness can be explained by the fact that both leaders of the two opposing groups in the crisis have criminal cases pending, which lowers incentives for compromise and bolsters the strategy of total victory and complete defeat of their adversary as the only way to end the conflict. In 2008, Thaksin Shinawatra was sentenced in absentia to two years in prison for corruption and abuse of power, while the current leader of the protests, Suthep Thaugsuban, is accused of sedition and other charges, which would mean severe punishment. In addition, he still must stand trial for his alleged responsibility when serving as Deputy Prime Minister (2008-2011) for the death of more than 90 people during the protests in April and May 2010. Both Thaksin Shinawatra and Suthep Thaugsuban, in addition to Abhisit Vejjajiva (former Prime Minister and leader of the main opposition party, the Democrat Party) probably think that offering any compromise in their positions or sharing any power with their rivals would entail serious personal cost.

Still, fuelled by years of demonstrations of different types and by the intransigence of the opposing parties, this polarisation is unlikely to be reduced by the intervention of a third party to mediate or arbitrate between the two blocs' positions. The King, the figure who should certainly be filling this role because he is widely respected by the population at large, is very old and in poor health. Besides, his tacit or explicit

La situación de polarización, alimentada por años de movilizaciones de distinto signo y por la intransigencia de las partes en conflicto, no tiene visos de reducirse por la intervención de una tercera parte

support for the coup d'état against Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 surely makes him partial in the eyes of the current government. Two other institutions that could play a role in intermediation, the United Nations and ASEAN, are both less prepared to facilitate dialogue because of the Thai government's traditional reluctance to allow interference in its internal affairs. Both institutions have expressed their concern about the situation gripping Thailand, but have not played an active role so far. Meanwhile, one of the foundational principles of ASEAN is scrupulous respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of its member states.

In addition to the causes and political dynamics behind the current polarisation of Thai society, no solution to the crisis seems very promising based on both sides' proposals. Faced with the magnitude and persistence of the protests and the mass resignation of the MPs of the main opposition party, in December Yingluck Shinawatra dissolved Parliament and called early elections for 2 February 2014. However, Suthep Thaugsuban and the Democrat Party are opposed to the elections, proposing the resignation of Shinawatra as interim Prime Minister and the formation of an unelected "people's council" that will carry out the necessary reforms, also election-based, for a year or a year and a half, to put an end to what they call the "Thaksin regime". Publicly, the reasons they have given for rejecting the elections include alleged electoral regularities committed by the government, but most analysts agree that in reality, the opposition has little conviction about its chances to prevail in the elections. In fact, the last election won by the Democrat Party was in 1992, while the groups led formally or de facto by Thaksin Shinawatra have won every election since 2001, including his victory in the last elections in 2011. Most analysts think there can be no solution to the political crisis outside or at the expense of conventional mechanisms of democratic representation, like holding elections and forming solid and stable parliamentary majorities. This undermines the opposition's plan to establish an unelected representative council in charge of undertaking a series of structural reforms to overcome or reverse the current political system.

In addition to the factors explaining why Thailand may become one of the most volatile and unstable places in southeast Asia, it is also worth noting that the crisis of governance affecting the country may have a clearly negative effect on two scenarios that, in time, have an enormous potential for conflict. The first is the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over the sovereignty of the land around a 12th-century Hindu temple located in a border area. Although this dispute seems to be on the path to a peaceful resolution through the diplomatic intervention of ASEAN in recent years, the harmonious political relations between the Thai and Cambodian governments and especially the recent ruling by the International Court of Justice in favour of Cambodia, which forces Thailand to withdraw its state security

forces from the region in question, it is clear that some groups opposing the government of Yingluck Shinawatra could take advantage of this dispute to try to undermine the government. In fact, some Thai nationalist and government opposition groups have staged some demonstrations to demand that Bangkok adopt a more belligerent position in that regard and have declared that they will not abide by the International Court of Justice's decision and will stage new protests. The second scenario of conflict that could adversely affect the political crisis and institutional paralysis in Thailand is the negotiating process begun in 2013 between the government and part of the insurgency operating in the southern Muslim-majority provinces bordering Malaysia. Despite the fact that the armed conflict in southern Thailand has become one of the most lethal in the region in recent years, the constant social demonstrations and political crises in the country over the last decade have made it harder to manage and relegated it to the background. As previous governments have done, Yingluck Shinawatra declared at the start of her term that resolving the armed conflict in the south would be one of her priorities, but both government action and the various rounds of negotiations that have taken place to some extent have suffered at the expense of and been dragged along by the social and political crisis between supporters and opponents of the government.

Therefore, the current crisis of governance in Thailand carries a double risk. On one hand, it could provoke more violence, whether through direct clashes between government opponents and supporters, clashes between protestors and state security forces, the fear of a coup d'état or the possibility that some lines of fragmentation in Thai society (ideological, class-based, regional or of whatever type) shift to the Armed Forces and cause friction or even outbreaks of violence within the Army. The second risk facing the Thai crisis has to do with regional destabilisation. Beyond Thailand's value from the geostrategic point of view (oil fields in the Gulf of Thailand, military alliances in a region as sensitive as the South China Sea), the current political situation in Thailand may have effects on some neighbouring countries, such as Cambodia and Malaysia. The erosion of conventional mechanisms to articulate and coordinate interests (Parliament, elections) in favour of strategies of continuous civic mobilisation and confrontation, the narrow margin that some institutions that could reconcile positions seem destined to play (such as the King, ASEAN and the United Nations), the hardening of postures and the parties' little apparent predisposition to formulate demands acceptable to their adversary make Thailand a volatile and unstable scenario where a negotiated political resolution in the short term hardly seems likely.

6.6. Increasing violence in the Chinese province of Xinjiang

The rise in the frequency, intensity and sophistication of armed attacks in Xinjiang (also known as East Turkestan) during 2013 has led Beijing to acknowledge, among other things, that the Uyghur insurgency is the most real and immediate threat to national security and has prompted the government to double its budget to fight terrorism and boosted its law enforcement and military presence in the province. While Uyghur organisations in exile have denounced a notable uptick in levels of repression and human rights violations in Xinjiang, the future situation of instability in the region may enhance Xinjiang's strategic importance for China's national security, energy supply and economic development, the growing international media exposure that some recent episodes of violence have received, the great geostrategic complexity of bordering Central Asian regions and the consequences that the gradual withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may have for the region in general and for Xinjiang in particular.

The intensification of violence in Xinjiang during 2013 confirms an upward trend in the amount of episodes of violence that have been observed for several years. Beyond the number of violent incidents, one of the aspects that most concerns Beijing is the growing media coverage that some of them have received. In October 2013, for example, the largest media outlets worldwide reported an attack carried out in Tiananmen Square (the political and symbolic centre of China) by people of Uyghur origin. Furthermore, government sources said that armed Uyghur organisations are increasingly willing and able to carry out attacks in various places in China, and not just in Xinjiang. The greater media exposure of acts of violence in Xinjiang may attract greater interest in the conflict from the international community and foster some initiatives that may have an impact on improving the human rights situation, but may also lead to a more aggressive government response to avoid or silence demonstrations or acts of protest. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that so far the Chinese government has responded forcefully to criticism and complaints made by some governments (like the USA) and human rights organisations.

The possibility that the Chinese government may decide to militarise the region and conflict even more is surely closely linked to Xinjiang's strategic importance for China in both economic and national security terms. Regarding the first point, the Xinjiang region is key for China's energy sufficiency, and therefore for its economic development in the decades to come.²³ At present, Xinjiang is the third-largest petrol-producing province

in China and it is estimated that only a small part of the reserves it holds has been discovered. The Xinjiang region is also the main producer of gas (approximately one third of national production) and one of the major sources of coal and wind energy. Also in terms of energy supply, Xinjiang is an essential region for China, since it is where the main oil and gas pipelines import petrol from Central Asia and the Middle East, China's two main sources of energy. It must be noted that China is currently the second-largest importer of petrol worldwide and one of the countries with the greatest dependence on oil. The alternative to the gas and oil pipelines crossing Xinjiang would be maritime transport of energy, which increases the time, cost and risk of incidents, given that geostrategically sensitive areas would have to be navigated such as the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, one of the main spots for international piracy.

The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan could produce a security vacuum that some Islamist organisations could exploit to extend their operations into Xinjiang

In terms of national security, the fact that Xinjiang shares a border with various Central Asian countries is geostrategically relevant, due both to the influence that China desires and may wield in Central Asia in coming decades and to the dynamics that could shift to China from some neighbouring countries that have been affected by armed conflicts with enormous potential to destabilise the region in recent decades, like Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some analysts think that Xinjiang could emerge as an obstacle to the entry of potentially destabilising organisations and ideologies into China, but it could just as well serve as a gateway to the same. The increase of violence in Xinjiang has fuelled the debate over the fighting ability of the main armed organisation, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), its links to foreign groups and even the infiltration on foreign combatants into Chinese territory. In 2013, Beijing denounced the infiltration into Xinjiang of groups coming from Syria and the presence of Uyghur fighters in the war in Syria, where they battle against the Damascus government. Moreover, in recent years it has insisted on various occasions that the ETIM has links to the IMU, a movement founded in the early 1990s that was initially active in Uzbekistan, but with time extended its field of action to other parts of Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The government and some media outlets take a relation between the ETIM and Taliban militias for granted and refer to the group as the local branch of al-Qaeda, supporting such assumptions with reports of the prolonged detention of 22 Uyghurs at Guantanamo and intelligence indicating that Uyghur combatants are receiving military training in Afghanistan. Even though the leadership of the ETIM has denied such links in the past, the Chinese government

23. International Crisis Group, *China's Central Asia Problem*, Asia Report no. 244, February 27, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/244-chinas-central-asia-problem.aspx>.

has stressed the connection between Uyghur separatism and transnational Islamic extremism and has been able to tie its anti-insurgency operations against Uyghur separatist organisations to the so-called global war on terror, thereby obtaining some international support.

Indeed, the support given to Beijing in its fight against Uyghur separatism by some Central Asian republics, whether through bilateral relations or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, is especially important for the Chinese government, not only because it facilitates issues such as extradition treaties, but because in this way Beijing neutralises any potential support for the Uyghur cause in certain countries due to cultural, linguistic and historical affinities they share with various Turkic peoples in the region. It must be recalled that the Uyghur community has historically had cultural ties with other Turkic-speaking peoples and its identity has had a certain transnational component. From Beijing's perspective, this would make the Uyghur community especially receptive to pan-Turkism promoted by some Central Asian republics and particularly resistant to assimilation policies promoted by the Chinese government in recent decades. In any case, despite the transnational dimension of Uyghur identity, the ETIM's possible links to foreign organisations and its alleged closeness to radical Islamism, several analysts have said that the Chinese government has tended to exaggerate the Uyghur secessionist threat. At least so far, the ETIM has never been able to establish itself as a serious threat to the Chinese government or to uphold a major insurgent struggle due to the lack of international support and the few human and material resources available to them.

The final factor that could motivate an increase in tension in Xinjiang is the supposed security vacuum in the region that could be triggered by the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. According to some analysts, there are organisations that could take

advantage of the new scene developing in Afghanistan to boost their presence in the region, with some Central Asian countries already beginning negotiations with Russia and China to somehow replace the role that has so far been played by the USA. According to some reports, the outcomes of the new situation will include rapprochement between the Chinese and Afghan governments (the latter of which enjoys observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), the maintenance of good relations with Pakistan and even a tacit agreement with some Taliban militias by which Beijing would extend some political recognition to the insurgency in exchange for not conducting armed action in Xinjiang or increasing their cooperation with the ETIM or other armed Uyghur organisations. However, despite the Chinese government's efforts to manage the conflict in Xinjiang in multilateral forums, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, as well as bilaterally with specific key players, some analysts think that some Islamist organisations could take advantage of the new scenario created by the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and extend their activity into Xinjiang.

Even though Uyghur separatism has been active in Xinjiang in recent decades, not until relatively recently did it capture the attention of the media or the international community. Under the cover of the global war on terror, Beijing was able to justify its counter-insurgency policies in Xinjiang, silence human rights abuses reported by Uyghur organisations and obtain support from great powers and neighbouring countries in its anti-terrorist efforts. Yet in recent years, and especially in 2013, both the increase and greater visibility of Uyghur armed separatist action has led to more repression and militarisation in Xinjiang. The great strategic importance of the province in terms of energy supply, economic development and national security indicate that the Chinese government will put all means at its disposal to avoid any sign of instability in the region.

The rise of violence in Xinjiang has led Beijing to view the Uyghur insurgency as the most real and immediate threat to national security, double its budget for the fight against terrorism and increase the military and police presence in the province

6.7. The dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the struggle for power in East Asia

The dispute between China and Japan²⁴ over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (in Japanese and Chinese, respectively) and over the delimitation of their respective exclusive economic zones and aerial defence identification zones in the East China Sea was marked by several misunderstandings and unilateral actions in 2013.²⁵ These events significantly raised bilateral and regional tension around a historical dispute that had been managed relatively peacefully since the 1970s, when China and Japan resumed diplomatic relations and the USA, which had administered the islands since 1945, ceded sovereignty over them to Japan. According to many analysts, this territorial dispute could not only lead to an incident or military conflict between both countries, but also holds enormous potential to strategically destabilise the highly sensitive region where many other sovereignty disputes exist between both states. The main factors behind the risk that the conflict could escalate and become destabilising include the great geostrategic sensitivity of both the islands and the East China Sea and the conflicting short- and mid-term national interests in the region of China and Japan, two countries with strained and complex bilateral relations that make it hard to establish mechanisms for communicating, cooperating and resolving incidents.

The most immediate risk is that a military naval or aerial incident, whether unintentional or deliberate, could trigger violence in the region with uncertain consequences.²⁶ The fact that the exclusive economic zones and aerial defence identification zones claimed by both countries overlap has significantly increased the presence of ships and planes patrolling the area in dispute, and thus the risk of military incidents. The deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the naval collision in September 2010 and the Japanese government's purchase of three of the disputed islands from a private individual in September 2012, among other issues, led to failure in mechanisms of direct communication and action protocols, thus hampering the ability to understand and interpret the actions and intentions of the other party. The two aforementioned episodes not only set off big diplomatic crises, but also clearly undermined the way that the dispute had been handled since the 1970s. For decades, there was a tacit agreement between both governments to delay resolution of the conflict (the

decision on the sovereignty of the islands) and maintain the status quo (management of the islands by Japan with their sovereignty disputed) based on discreet and informal bilateral diplomacy, non-aggressive and non-provocative policies and cordial relations at the highest political level. Thus, in recent years substantial progress had been made to obtain some mechanisms of direct communication, joint management and exploitation of the resources of the disputed area and consideration of the East China Sea as a region of "peace, cooperation and friendship" without that involving a waiver of their claims regarding the substance of the dispute. However, the conversations and agreements made were aborted by the naval incident in 2010 and by demonstrations by groups in China that claimed that the government was making too many concessions.

The current crisis is part of the stormy historical relations that China and Japan have maintained since the early 20th century. The Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and the events of the Second World War have fuelled animosity between both countries in recent decades. The fact that the Japanese government has not apologised officially for the atrocities committed during the invasion, as well as the visits made by various politicians to a temple where some Japanese war criminals are buried, has boosted anti-Japanese sentiment, which is quite widespread among large sectors of the population and has traditionally been fostered by the approach taken in history textbooks and statements issued from government circles or media controlled by Beijing. Thus, as seen in the many demonstrations reported

in various cities of China after the Japanese government purchased three of the islands from a private individual in September 2012 and the Japanese Prime Minister visited the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013, the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands possesses high symbolic and historical value for many Chinese people and often provides added pressure for the Chinese government to act more firmly and belligerently in the dispute with Japan.

In addition to the obvious deterioration of relations between China and Japan due to historical issues and the aforementioned recent diplomatic crises, another factor that enhances the destabilising potential of the dispute is the geostrategic context where it occurs. Some of the most important variables include

The territorial dispute between China and Japan might not only lead to a military incident or conflict between both countries, but also holds enormous potential to strategically destabilise the highly sensitive region

24. Taiwan also has claims of sovereignty to the islands, but has not yet participated directly in the escalation of political and military tension in the region.

25. See summary on China-Japan in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

26. International Crisis Group, *Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks*, Asia Report no. 245, April 8, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/245-dangerous-waters-china-japan-relations-on-the-rocks.aspx>.

the geostrategic, economic and symbolic value of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the existence of other territorial disputes in the region, the fact that Taiwan also claims sovereignty over the islands, the role that the United States could play in the region and Japan and China's short- and mid-term strategies to increase their influence in East Asia. Regarding the first aspect, in the late 1970s, a UN report on hydrographic and seismic surveys indicated that the region could hold huge oil reserves, perhaps comparable to those in the Persian Gulf. At around the same time, a Japanese government report showed similar findings. According to US intelligence, the governments of China and Taiwan only began to show interest in the islands after the reports were released. From a geostrategic standpoint, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are key to guaranteeing the freedom of navigation in the region, gaining access to the Pacific Ocean beyond the first island chain uniting the southern Korean peninsula with the Philippines and controlling military activities carried out by Japan and the United States in the Okinawa Prefecture.

The fact that Japan and China are engaged in various territorial disputes with different countries in the region makes them both feel pressured to demonstrate diplomatic and military strength in managing them. According to sources of both governments, making concessions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would send the wrong message to other countries in the region and set a dangerous precedent. Thus, some analysts have suggested the possibility that China is publicly exaggerating its interests in the islands to bring Japan and the USA to the negotiating table and reach a tacit agreement by which Beijing would cease its calls to alter the status quo of the last 40 years on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in exchange for Japanese support (and US neutrality) in its bilateral disputes with countries like Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines in the South China Sea. In such a hypothetical scenario, China's economic, political and military power would cause its interests to prevail over those of its neighbours in the South China Sea, which according to some reports has more oil reserves than the East China Sea and is likely Beijing's main mid-term strategic goal.

Another factor adding geostrategic complexity and military uncertainty is the USA's possible involvement in the dispute by virtue of the mutual defence agreements it maintains with various countries in the region—and especially Japan, since 1960. As such, a potential incident affecting Japanese territory could require Washington to intervene and trigger a crisis between the USA and China, two countries that in recent years have expressed in words and deeds their intention to increase their influence in East Asia. Some analysts think that one of the aims of Beijing's recent activity is to try to gauge the strength of Japan and the USA's political and military relations and to guess how far Washington would be able to go to fulfil the obligations of the bilateral agreement. Other analysts and some influential voices in Beijing think that the USA is using the current crisis

between Japan and China to boost its presence in Asia and contain Chinese expansion after a few years when its involvement in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Syria made it difficult for the Obama administration to give East Asia the importance it had previously declared. From this point of view, the current dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is only one of many fronts in the rivalry between China and the USA for hegemony in the region and the world. Furthermore, Taiwan also has territorial claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and in recent years has sponsored or authorised the navigation of fishing boats or visit of activists to the region.

Probably one of the most determining factors when assessing the possible evolution of the crisis and the prospects for a diplomatic solution to it is China and Japan's short- and mid-term strategies to protect and increase their influence in the region. Both countries have been accused on various occasions of basing their strategies of regional assertion and expansion on militarism and nationalism. Japan recently adopted a new national security strategy that includes the most military spending in two decades, the elimination of some legal and constitutional restrictions in matters of defence introduced at the end of the Second World War (such as restrictions on the use of troops abroad), the strengthening of defence relations with the USA and military cooperation with countries that also have territorial disputes with China, increased air and maritime surveillance and improved rapid response ability to defend the territory, water and airspace of the country. One of the objectives of the new national security strategy is to counter Chinese expansion in the region and the nuclear threat of North Korea, but China and several other countries in the region (especially South Korea and others involved in territorial disputes with Japan) have expressed their concern about this new strategy and about some gestures made by the Japanese government, such as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.

As for China, some analysts think that the growing strength of its geopolitical and economic position in the world order predicts a more aggressive strategy for expanding its influence in East Asia. Regarding its dispute with Japan, the purchase of the islands by the Tokyo government provided China with an ideal opportunity to put in practice what is called "reactive assertiveness", a strategy it has employed on previous occasions with the Philippines and Vietnam and consists of a unilateral and supposedly provocative action made by the other party that not only justifies a proper response, but also a strategy to change the status quo that would otherwise seem unfair or inconvenient. In the specific case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Beijing reacted by declaring its condemnation, cancelling visits and meetings, instigating protests and trade boycotts among the Chinese population and boosting naval exercises in the region. Certainly the most important event was the establishment of baselines (where the territorial waters are delimited)

around the islands. According to some analysts, the purpose was to formalise and raise the political profile of China's claims and achieve overlapping de facto control of the waters surrounding the islands. Thus, Beijing felt entitled to increase the patrolling of its ships in the area to protect its jurisdiction in the region and began to view any entry of Japanese vessels into the area as an intrusion upon Chinese territory and a violation of its national sovereignty. Thus, some analysts said that Beijing has ruled out settling the dispute through international arbitration like the International Court of Justice, because it is aware that its claims to the islands have less support in international law than those of Japan or because it thinks it stands a better chance of achieving its geostrategic aims by flexing its economic military and political muscle.

In summary, the current dispute between China and Japan might not only lead to a military incident, but a growing instability in the region that entails a mounting sense of insecurity and an arms race in East Asia. Thus, ASEAN has already started to reflect certain division in military and diplomatic alliances between countries of the region that maintain solid political and economic relations with China and those involved in territorial disputes with it, which are likely to form a strategic front with Japan. Despite the strong trade and economic ties between China and Japan, the current prospects for channelling the crisis diplomatically are undermined by the erosion of the mechanisms of communication and traditional channels for resolving disputes and by both governments' aspirations to consolidate and boost their influence in the region.

6.8. Turkey-PKK talks: internal Turkish crisis and regional instability

The resumption of talks in late 2012 between Turkey and the armed Kurdish group PKK generated great expectations among much of the Kurdish population in Turkey. The Kurds, the country's largest ethnic minority (15-20% of the total population) have historically been subject to discrimination in all spheres. Since 1984, the armed Kurdish group PKK has waged war against Turkey, initially demanding independence for Kurdistan, then in the 1990s autonomy and rights within Turkey, leaving a toll of 40,000 fatalities. The resumption of peace talks in 2012 and 2013, following the breakdown in the Oslo Dialogue in 2011, represented a new attempt at a resolution through direct dialogue between the Turkish security services (MIT) and the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, imprisoned since 1999. However, various internal and regional factors are casting great uncertainty on the dialogue's prospects for the immediate future and raise warnings about the risk of missing another opportunity for a solution, meaning the perpetuation of a conflict already fuelled by mistrust between both parties, the legacy of trauma and the availability of material and human resources to continue the war. The most salient factors in the current crisis are the fragility of the dialogue process and the chronic antagonism between the parties, the internal crisis in Turkey and the electoral calendar and the regional context, where the branch of the PKK in Syria is developing self-government in the middle of a war.

The electoral cycle in Turkey, the internal crisis between the government and the Hizmet movement and regional factors brought added uncertainty to peace talks with the PKK

Internally, ever since the dialogue resumed, there have been voices warning of the fragility of the process. The dialogue is structured with regular discussions between government sectors (mainly the MIT) and Öcalan. The pro-Kurdish party BDP also participates by making periodic visits to Öcalan, in order to liaise between Öcalan and the political and military leadership of the PKK. Some voices have warned about the risks of a process without sufficient levels of trust between the parties, the lack of a clear road map, fragile channels of communication (e.g., indirect communication between Öcalan and the leaders of the PKK; tension with the government over the composition of the BDP delegations), unilateralism and a lack of substantive consultation and uncertainty about the commitments, among other issues. Thus, despite the progress made in the first half of the year (e.g., the PKK's unilateral ceasefire and start of withdrawal of its forces from Turkey to northern Iraq, in particular), the mutual accusations of breaches of commitment and a lack of response to demands raised tensions and brought the process to a

standstill, with the threat of breaking down completely. Among other consequences, the PKK halted the withdrawal of its forces. Thus, the methodological fragility of the process collided with deep-seated and confrontational stances and attitudes: mistrust, grievances and misgivings about demands that are still taboo (e.g., public education in the mother tongue, autonomy) and governmental ambiguity.

There are also important temporal factors helping to deepen the current phase of stagnation. Prominent domestically are the Turkish elections of 2014-2015 and the crisis in the Turkish government. The country will hold local elections in March 2014, presidential elections in August and parliamentary ones in 2015. As in earlier times, the proximity of the electoral cycle speeds up peace initiatives underway and hardens the parties' respective positions. In this pre-electoral context comes the latest package of democratising

reforms announced in 2013, which the Kurdish nationalist movement considers completely insufficient and lacking sufficient consultation with the affected parties. In turn, the joint visit of the President of the Regional Government of Kurdistan (Iraq), Massoud Barzani, and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in November 2013 to the symbolic Kurdish capital in Turkey, Diyarbakir, was questioned by the BDP for resembling an election stunt, even though both leaders called a solution to the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and Erdogan

visited the local city council for the first time, which is governed by the BDP. The ruling party (AKP) and the BDP (and the new formation linked to the BDP, the HDP) are competing for votes in southeastern Turkey, where the Kurdish vote is more open, though it does give strong support to the Kurdish nationalist movement. Also domestically, the political feud that has broken out between the AKP and the religiously inspired movement Hizmet, led by Muslim cleric Fetullah Gülen, may also affect the dialogue process. The power struggle between both escalated more directly after a corruption scandal was uncovered in December, allegedly by Hizmet. According to analysts and the local press, the movement has a large number of sympathisers in the police and the legal sector. With regard to the Kurdish issue, some analysts say that the AKP is more likely to negotiate with the PKK than Hizmet, which prioritises destroying the armed group.²⁷ Thus, the struggle between the AKP and Hizmet could still influence the new political scenario resulting from the electoral cycle—and by extension talks with the PKK—in an uncertain way.

27. Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, "Turkey's power struggle affects Kurdish issue", *Al-Monitor*, January 9, 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/kurdish-turkey-gulen-power-struggle.html>.

From a regional perspective, the Kurdish issue in Turkey has also been influenced by the war in Syria and the events occurring in Kurdish areas there. Indeed, a group considered to be a local branch of the PKK, the PYD, has begun developing self-government in Kurdish areas— isolated enclaves in northern Syria—while its militia, the YPG, became increasingly embroiled in the dynamics of war in the country in 2012 and 2013, clashing with various armed groups, including the jihadist al-Nusra Front and ISIS. For Turkey, the emergence of autonomous Kurdish areas increases pressure on its own Kurdish issue, which is also characterised by demands for decentralisation and self-government. Besides, the fact that the new autonomous regions are under the direct (or indirect) control of what has historically been Turkey's main enemy, the PKK, brings uncertainty and a greater level of mistrust to relations between Turkey and the PKK. Still, Turkey has maintained open channels of dialogue with the PYD. For the PKK, ensuring the survival of this new experience of autonomy in Syria has become a subject of great importance in its regional agenda, as is presenting the PYD as an internationally legitimate player. Thus, it views Turkey's alignment with Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzani with suspicion, as Barzani is the main promoter of the PYD's rival in Syria, the KNC. A coalition of 16 Syrian Kurdish parties, most with a limited social base, the KNC contrasts with the large-party aspects that the PYD has acquired. The PKK and Barzani's party, the KDP, are competing for Kurdish leadership of the region, while Turkey and

the KDP have developed close political and especially economic relations in recent years, leaving their previous antagonism behind. Therefore, the regional factor has been driving tension and greater mistrust between Turkey and the PKK.

The tension experienced in the second half of the year led to a rise in rhetoric. Some analysts indicated that the PKK's ceasefire could be kept in force throughout the election period to provide support for the Kurdish nationalist movement, while others stressed the risks of a possible breakdown in the ceasefire. In any case, the hardening of positions predictable during elections could create pressure for greater demonstrations of force and potentially mean risks of future incidents if the dialogue process does not move forward. On the other hand, the mechanisms of communication were still active at the end of 2013 and various factors that had contributed to resuming the dialogue were still in force, such as acceptance of the dialogue and democratisation reforms as the way to resolve the conflict; acceptance that the Kurdish population has suffered historical discrimination; and shared fatigue regarding violence, which facilitates rapprochement in ceasefire periods. In brief, efforts must be redoubled to support local stakeholders and call for the appropriate steps to maintain a climate favourable for dialogue and a negotiated solution to the conflict in order to prevent current risks and stagnation from escalating into violence and greater antagonism.

Annex I. International missions in 2013

UN peace missions (15 PKO, 1 PO/PKO, 13 PO and PBO)¹

Country (start-end of armed conflict) ²	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission ³
AFRICA		
Central Africa	UNOCA (PO), United Nations Regional Office in Central Africa, S/2010/457 (2011)	March 2011
West Africa	UNOWA (PO), United Nations Office in West Africa, S/2001/1128 and S/2001/1129 (2002)	November 2001
Burundi (1993-2006) (2011-)	BNUB ⁴ (PO), United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, S/RES/1959 (2011)	January 2011
Central African Rep. (1996-2000) (2002-2003) (2006-)	BINUCA (PBO), ⁵ United Nations Integrated Office in the Central African Republic, S/PRST/2009/5 (2009)	January 2010
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2007) (2011)	UNOCI ⁶ (PKO), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, S/RES/1528 (2004)	April 2004
DR Congo (1998-)	MONUSCO ⁷ (PKO), United Nations Stabilization Mission in DR Congo, S/RES/1925 (2010)	July 2010
Guinea Bissau (1998-1999)	UNIOGBIS ⁸ (PBO), United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau, S/RES/1876 (2010)	January 2010
Liberia (1989-2005)	UNMIL (PKO), United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/RES/1509	September 2003
Libya (2011-)	UNSMIL (PO), United Nations Support Mission in Libya, S/RES/2009 (2011)	September 2011
Mali (north) (2012-)	MINUSMA (PKO), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali S/RES/2100 (2013)	April 2013
Morocco – Western Sahara (1975-1991)	MINURSO (PKO), United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, S/RES/690 (1991)	September 1991
Sierra Leone (1991-2001)	UNIPSIL ⁹ (PBO), United Nations Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone, S/RES/1829	October 2008
<i>Somalia (1988-)</i>	<i>UNPOS¹⁰ (PO), United Nations Political Office in Somalia, S/RES/954</i>	<i>April 1995 – May 2013</i>
Somalia (1988-)	UNSOM (PO), United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, S/RES/2102 (2013)	June 2013
South Sudan (2009-)	UNMISS (PKO) ¹¹ , United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, S/RES/1996 (2011)	July 2011

1. Peace-Keeping Operation (PKO), Political Office Mission (PO) and Peace-Building Operation (PBO). The figures given are based on ongoing UN missions during 2013 and therefore do not include representatives, envoys or special advisers, or personal envoys that are not associated to a specific mission. The political mission UNAMA (Afghanistan) is led and backed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, for which reason it is counted as a PO/PKO hybrid mission.
2. The start and end dates of conflicts are based on the data in Chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts). In cases of ended armed conflicts, which are therefore not included in Chapter 1, dates are those accepted by the academic community. This annex lists the dates of armed conflicts in which the mandate is clearly linked to the armed conflict, although it is possible that there have been previous cycles of violence.
3. In italics, the missions closed in 2013. The UNMIT mission in Timor-Leste came to an end on 31 December 2012 and therefore it is not used to calculate the total balance of missions during the year.
4. It replaces the BINUB political operations from 1st January 2011, which in turn had replaced the ONUB peacekeeping mission in January 2007. This was preceded by the AU mission (AMIB) which was integrated into the ONUB in June 2004.
5. It replaces BONUCA, created in February 2000, which in turn had replaced the MINURCA peacekeeping mission (1998-2000) (PKO), which was established after the armed conflict started in 1996. In a parallel way, the MINURCAT peacekeeping mission, present in the east of Chad and the northeast of the Central African Republic, culminated its withdrawal in December 2010.
6. There was previously a UN political mission (MINUCI, S/RES/1479) from May 2003, which included the 1,300 soldiers from ECOWAS (ECOMICI, ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire) to April 2004, supported by 4,000 French soldiers (Operation Licorne).
7. It replaces the UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo, MONUC, which had been present in the country since November 1999.
8. It replaces UNIOGBIS, which had been present in the country since March 1999.
9. Previously in Sierra Leone there were the following missions: UNOMSIL (1998-1999) (PKO), UNAMSIL (1999-2005) (PKO), UNIOSIL (2006-2008) (PBO).
10. Previously in Somalia there were the following missions: UNOSOM I (1992-1993), UNITAF (1992-1993, USA with mandate from the UN Security Council), UNOSOM II (1993-1995) (PKO). S/RES/954 established the closure of UNOSOM II and stated that the UN would continue observing events in Somalia through a Political Office based in Kenya. Until May 2013 UNPOS has been the mission responsible for the UN activities in Somalia.
11. The UNMIS mandate culminated on 9th July after the interim period established by the Sudanese government and the SPLM in the overall Peace Agreement reached on 9th January 2005 had come to an end. Nevertheless, the UN Security Council determined that the situation in South Sudan continued to be a threat for peace and security in the region, and decided to set up UNMISS for an initial period of one year, starting its task on 9th July. The functions of the political mission UNAMIS (set up in 2004) were transferred to UNMISS under S/RES/1590 of March 2005.

Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	UNAMID ¹² (PKO), United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur, S/RES/1769 (2007)	July 2007
Sudan – South Sudan	UNISFA (PKO), United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, S/RES/1990 (2011)	June 2011
AMERICA		
Haiti (2004-2005)	MINUSTAH (PKO), United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, S/RES/1542 (2004)	June 2004
ASIA		
Central Asia	UNRCCA (PO), United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia, S/2007/279 (2007)	December 2007
Afghanistan ¹³ (2001-)	UNAMA (PO/PKO), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, S/RES/1401 (2002), S/RES/1662 (2006), S/RES/1746 (2007)	March 2002
India – Pakistan (1947-48) ¹⁴	UNMOGIP ¹⁵ (PKO), United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, S/RES/91 (1951)	January 1949
<i>Timor-Leste (1975-1999)</i>	<i>UNMIT (PKO), United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, S/RES/1704</i>	<i>August 2006 – December 2012</i>
EUROPE		
Cyprus (1963-1964)	UNFICYP (PKO), United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, S/RES/186 (1964)	March 1964
Serbia – Kosovo (1998-1999)	UNMIK (PKO), United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/RES/1244 (1999)	June 1999
MIDDLE EAST		
Middle East (1948-)	UNTSO (PKO), United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, S/RES/50 (1948)	June 1948
Iraq (2003-)	UNAMI (PO), United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, S/RES/1546 (2004)	August 2003
Israel – Palestine (1948-) ¹⁶	UNSCO ¹⁷ (PO), United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East	June 1994
Israel – Syria (Golan Heights) (1967, 1973) ¹⁸	UNDOF (PKO), United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, S/RES/350 (1974)	June 1974
Israel – Lebanon (1978, 1982, 2006) ¹⁹	UNIFIL (PKO), United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, S/RES/425 -SRES/426 (1978) S/RES/1701 (2006)	March 1978
Lebanon	UNSCOL (PO), Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, S/2008/236 and S/2008/237 (2008)	February 2007

OSCE MISSIONS (16 missions)²⁰

CENTRAL ASIA		
Kazakhstan	OSCE Centre in Astana, PC.DEC/797, 21/06/07, previously OSCE centre in Almaty (PC.DEC/243, 23/07/98)	July 1998
Kyrgyzstan	OSCE Centre in Bishek, PC.DEC/245, 23/07/98	January 1999

12. The AU mission, AMIS, set up in 2004, has been integrated in the new joint mission UNAMID. It is a hybrid mission of the AU and the UN, with a single command.
13. The current phase of the armed conflict suffered by the country began with the attacks by the US and United Kingdom in October 2001, although the country has been in armed conflict since 1979.
14. On three occasions (1947-1948, 1965, 1971) the two countries have clashed, both claiming sovereignty over the Kashmir region, divided between India, Pakistan and China. Since 1989, the conflict has moved into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
15. UNIPOM (1965-1966) (PKO).
16. Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report analyses only the last phase of the conflict, which corresponds to the 2nd Intifada, which began in September 2000.
17. Previously, UNEF I (1956-1967) (PKO) and UNEF II (1973-1979) (PKO).
18. This lists the dates for which the mandate of the mission is clearly linked to the conflict, although there have been previous cycles of violence between the parties.
19. The annex provides the dates for which the mandate of the mission is clearly linked to the conflict, although there have been previous cycles of violence between the parties. In this case, the forces of Israel and Lebanon fought in the war of 1948, but the UNIFIL mission was not established until after the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978. Its mandate has been changing according to new cycles of violence that have occurred, especially because of the second invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006.
20. The number of missions excludes special representatives not associated with OSCE missions, centres or projects.

Tajikistan (1992-1997)	OSCE office in Tajikistan, PC.DEC/852, 19/06/08, ²¹ previously OSCE centre in Dushanbe (1994)	February 1994
Turkmenistan	OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, PC.DEC/244, 23/07/98	January 1999
Uzbekistan	OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan, PC.DEC/734, 30/06/06	July 2006
EASTERN EUROPE AND CAUCASUS		
Armenia	OSCE Office in Yerevan, PC.DEC/314, 22/07/99	February 2000
Azerbaijan	OSCE Project Coordinator in Baku, PC.DEC/1092, 26/07/13, previously OSCE Office in Baku, PC.DEC/318, 16/11/99	July 2000
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (1991-1994)	Personal Representative of Chairman-in-office on the Conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, CIO 10/08/95	August 1995
Moldova, Rep. (Transnistria) (1992)	OSCE Mission to Moldova CSO DEC, 04/02/93	April 1993
Ukraine	OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, ²² PC.DEC/295 01/06/99, and Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and OSCE, 13/07/99	July 1999
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE		
Albania	OSCE Presence in Albania, PC.DEC/ 160, 27/03/97; updated by PC.DEC/588, 18/12/03	April 1997
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, MC/5/DEC 18/12/95	December 1995
Macedonia, FYR (2001)	OSCE Mission to Skopje, 15-CSO/Journal No. 2, Annex 1, 14/08/92; PC. DEC/457, 21/12/01; PC.DEC/977, 16/12/10	September 1992
Montenegro	OSCE Mission to Montenegro, PC.DEC/732, 29/06/06 ²³	June 2006
Serbia	OSCE Mission to Serbia, PC.DEC/733, 29/06/06 ²⁴	June 2006
Serbia – Kosovo (1998-1999)	OMIK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo), PC.DEC/305, 01/07/99	July 1999

NATO Missions (five missions)²⁵

Europe – Mediterranean Sea	Operation Active Endeavour	October 2001
Horn of Africa	Operation Ocean Shield, Atlantic North Council 17/08/09 ²⁶	August 2009
Afghanistan (2001-)	ISAF, S/RES/1386 20/12/01 ²⁷	August 2003
Serbia – Kosovo (1998-1999)	KFOR, S/RES/1244 10/06/99 and Military – Technical Accord between NATO, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia	June 1999
Somalia (1998-)	NATO assistance to AMISOM ²⁸	June 2007

21. The OSCE deployed in February 1994 the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan, which was renamed as the OSCE Centre in Dushanbe in October 2002. Finally, in June 2008 the OSCE Permanent Council changed the name and mandate for its presence in the country, and established the OSCE Office in Tajikistan. Its new mandate includes activities to assist the country in developing strategies to address threats to its security and stability, conflict prevention and crisis management, among others. However, there is no reference to the armed conflict that the country experienced between 1992 and 1997.

22. It replaced the OSCE Mission in Ukraine (1994-1999) devoted to managing the crisis in Crimea.

23. It was established as a result of the independence of Montenegro from Serbia in June 2006.

24. The OSCE mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, PC/DEC 401, 11/01/01, became OmiSaM (OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro), PC.DEC 533, 13/02/03, and, finally, became the OSCE Mission in Serbia in 2006.

25. NTIM-I completed its mandate in December 2011, so it does not take it into account for the final number of missions in 2012.

26. The Ocean Shield Operation replaced two previous operations to combat piracy activities: Allied Provider Operation (October – December 2008) and Allied Protector Operation (March – June 2009).

27. The UN Security Council Resolution authorised the ISAF deployment for the first time. Successive resolutions renewed its mandate. NATO assumed the mission leadership in August 2003.

28. NATO has carried out other interventions to support the EU, including the operation to assist the AU mission to Sudan (AMIS), started in 2005 and ended in 2007. NATO has also offered support to the hybrid mission in the Sudanese region of Darfur (UNAMID).

EU operations (17 missions)²⁹

EUROPE AND ASIA		
Afghanistan (2001-) ³⁰	EUPOL AFGHANISTAN, EU Police Mission for Afghanistan, Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP	June 2007
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUFOR ALTHEA ³¹ , EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP	December 2004
Georgia – Russia (2008)	EUMM, EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP and 2008/759/CFSP	October 2008
Kosovo (1998-1999)	EULEX KOSOVO, EU Mission for the Rule of Law in Kosovo, Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP	December 2008
Moldova – Ukraine	EUBAM, EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, Council Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP	November 2005
AFRICA		
Horn of Africa	EUCAP NESTOR, European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa, Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP	July 2012
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUPOL DR CONGO, EU Police Mission in DR Congo, Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP	July 2007
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUSEC DR Congo, Security Sector Aid and Reform Mission in DR Congo, Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP	June 2005
Libya (2011-)	EUBAM Libya, EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya, Council Joint Action 2013/3223/CFSP	May 2013
Mali (north) (2012)	EUTM, EU Training Mission in Mali, Council Conclusion, 17/01/13	January 2013
Niger	EUCAP SAHEL Niger, Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP	August 2012
Somalia (1988-)	EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA, S/RES/1816 (2008), S/RES/1838 (2008), Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP and 2008/851/CFSP	December 2008
Somalia (1988-)	EUTM Somalia, EU military mission to contribute to the building up and strengthening of the Somali National Armed Forces, 2010/96/CFSP	April 2010
South Sudan (2009)	EUAVSEC South Sudan, European Union Aviation Security CSDP Mission in South Sudan, Council Decision 2012/312/CFSP, 18/06/12	October 2012
MIDDLE EAST		
Iraq (2003-)	EUJUST LEX/Iraq, Integrated EU Mission for the Rule of Law in Iraq, Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP	July 2005 – December 2013
Israel – Palestine (1948-) ³²	EUBAM Rafah, Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point, Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP	November 2005
Israel – Palestine (1948-) ³³	EUPOL COPPS, ³⁴ EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP	January 2006

OAS (three missions)³⁵

Belize and Guatemala	OAS General Secretariat's Office in the Adjacency Zone (OAS/AZ Office), CP/ RES.836	September 2005
Colombia (1964-)	OAS Mission to support the peace process in Colombia (OAS/MAPP), CP/ RES/859	February 2004

29. Although the mission in Mali begins its term in 2013, it is taken into account for the count for 2012. The total number of missions excludes special representatives that are not associated to a concrete EU mission. In the first days of 2013 the EU had 10 special representatives in Central Asia, Southern Caucasus, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, African Union, Horn of Africa, the Southern Mediterranean region, Sudan–South Sudan and the Middle East. The UE mission in South Sudan ended in January 2014.

30. The current phase of the armed conflict suffered by the country began with the attacks by the USA and United Kingdom in October 2001, although the country has been involved in armed conflict since 1979.

31. The UN Security Council (S/RES/1551 of 09/07/04) authorised the EUFOR ALTHEA operation as the legal successor to the SFOR, the previous operation headed by NATO. EUFOR ALTHEA has the mandate to implement the Dayton Agreement.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. This mission emerged from the previous work of the EU Coordination Office to assist the Palestinian Police (EU COPPS), established in April 2005.

35. OAS Peace FUND, SPA Secretariat for Political Affairs, Department of Democratic Sustainability and Special Missions, <http://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/PeaceMissions/PeaceMissionsMap.html>.

Colombia (1964-) and Ecuador	OAS Good Offices mission in Equator and Colombia, RC.25/Res.1/08 Corr.2	March 2008
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ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) (two missions)

Guinea Bissau	ECOMIB, ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau, April 2012	May 2012
<i>Mali (north) (2012)</i>	<i>AFISMA, International Mission for Mali Assistance, S/RES/2085 of UN Security Council, 20/12/12</i>	<i>January 2013 – July 2013</i>

AU (three missions)

Central Africa (LRA) (1986-)	RCI/LRA, Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA, Peace and Security Council Decision, 22/11/11	March 2012
Central African Republic (1996-2000), (2002-2003), (2006-)	MISCA, International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA, ³⁶ for its French acronym), PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCCLXXXV of the AU Peace and Security Council, 23/07/13	July 2013
Somalia (1988-)	AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), S/RES/1744	March 2007

Operations by Russia and the Community of Independent States (CIS) (one mission)

Moldova (Transnistria) (1992)	Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (Bilateral, 21/07/92)	July 1992
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ECCAS (one mission)

<i>Central African Republic (1996-2000) (2002-2003) (2006-)</i>	<i>MICOPAX³⁷, Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic</i>	<i>July 2008 – July 2013</i>
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Other operations (six missions)

Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	Operation Licorne (France) S/RES/1464	February 2003
Egypt (Sinai) – Israel	Multinational Force and Observers (Protocol to the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel 26/03/1979)	April 1982
Israel – Palestine (1948-)	TIPH 2 (Temporary International Presence in Hebron)	February 1997
Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep. of (1950-53)	NSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) Armistice Agreement	July 1953
Solomon Islands	RAMSI, Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (Biketawa Declaration) S/RES/1690	July 2003
<i>Timor-Leste (1975-1999)</i>	<i>ISF (PKO) (Australia) S/RES/1690</i>	<i>May 2006 – March 2013</i>

Source: Prepared by the authors and updated in December 2013 with information from the websites of the different regional and international organizations as well as with information from the Réseau de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix (ROP) and SIPRI.

36. Troops from the ECCAS mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) became part of MISCA.

37. MICOPAX replaced the Multinational Force (FOMUC) of CEMAC regional organisation. Since July 2013 it became part of MISCA (the AU mission in the Central African Republic).

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Glossary

- ABM:** Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
- ADF-NALU:** Allied Defence Forces - National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
- ADSC:** All Darfur Stakeholders Conference
- AFISMA:** African-led International Support Mission to Mali
- AKP:** Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
- AKR:** New Kosovo Alliance
- ALBA:** Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America)
- ALP:** Arakan Liberation Party
- AMISOM:** African Union Mission in Somalia
- APCLS:** Alliance de Patriots pour un Congo Libre et Souverain
- APHC:** All Parties Hurriyat Conference
- APRD:** Armée Populaire pour la Réstauration de la République et de la Démocratie (Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy)
- AQAP:** Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula
- AQIM:** Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
- ARMM:** Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
- ARS:** Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
- ASEAN:** Association of Southeast Asian Nations
- ASWJ:** Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a
- ATLF:** All Terai Liberation Front
- ATMM:** Akhil Tarai Mukti Morcha
- ATTF:** All Tripura Tiger Force
- AU:** African Union
- BDP:** Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
- BH:** Boko Haram
- BIFF:** Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
- BIFM:** Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement
- BINUCA:** United Nations Integrated Office in the Central African Republic
- BLA:** Baluch Liberation Army
- BLF:** Baluch Liberation Front
- BLT:** Baloch Liberation Tigers
- BNUB:** United Nations Office in Burundi
- BRA:** Balochistan Republican Army
- CAP:** Consolidated Appeal Process
- CARICOM:** Caribbean Community
- CEMAC:** Monetary and Economic Community of Central Africa
- CIA:** Central Intelligence Agency
- CHD:** Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
- CNDD-FDD:** Congrès National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
- CNDP:** Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for People's Defence)
- CNF:** Chin National Front
- CPA:** Comprehensive Peace Agreement
- CPI-M:** Communist Party of India-Maoist
- CPJP:** Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace)
- CPN-UML:** Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist)
- DDR:** Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
- DHD:** Dima Halim daogah
- DHD (J):** Dima Halim Daogah, Black Widow faction
- DHD (Nunisa):** Dima Halim Daogah (Nunisa faction)
- DKBA:** Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
- DMLEK:** Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunama
- DPA:** Darfur Peace Agreement
- EA:** Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity)
- ECCAS:** Economic Community of Central African States
- ECOMIB:** ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau
- ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States
- EDA:** Eritrean Democratic Alliance
- EEBC:** Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
- EFDM:** Eritrean Federal Democratic Movement
- EIC:** Eritrean Islamic Congress
- EIPJD:** Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development
- ELF:** Eritrean Liberation Front
- ELN:** Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)
- ENSF:** Eritrean National Salvation Front
- EPC:** Eritrean People's Congress
- EPDF:** Eritrean People's Democratic Front
- EPP:** Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (Paraguayan Popular Army)
- EPPF:** Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front
- EPRDF:** Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
- ETA:** Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom)
- ETIM:** East Turkestan Islamic Movement
- ETLO:** East Turkestan Liberation Organization
- EU:** European Union
- EUAVSEC SOUTH SUDAN:** EU Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan
- EUBAM:** EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
- EUBAM LIBYA:** EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya
- EUBAM Rafah:** European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah
- EUCAP NESTOR:** EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity-Building in the Horn of Africa
- EUCAP SAHEL NIGER:** EU CSDP Mission in Niger
- EU NAVFOR SOMALIA:** European Union Naval Force in Somalia – Operation Atalanta
- EUFOR ALTHEA:** European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EUJUST LEX:** EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
- EULEX KOSOVO:** EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
- EUMM:** EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia
- EUPOL AFGHANISTAN:** EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
- EUPOL COPPS:** EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
- EUPOL RD CONGO:** EU Police Mission in DR Congo
- EUSEC RD CONGO:** EU Security Sector Reform Mission in DR Congo
- EUTM Mali:** EU Training Mission in Mali
- EUTM SOMALIA:** EU Somalia Training Mission
- FAO:** Food and Agriculture Organization
- FARC:** Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FDLR: Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)

FDPC: Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (Central African People's Democratic Front)

FEWS NET: USAID Net of Famine Early Warning System

FFR: Front des Forces de Redressement (Front of Forces for Recovery)

FIS: Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front)

FJL: Freedom and Justice Party

FLEC-FAC: Frente de Liberação do Enclave de Cabinda (Cabinda Enclave's Liberation Front)

FNL: Forces Nationales de Libération (National Liberation Forces)

FOMUC: Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (CEMAC Multinational Forces in Central African Republic)

FPI: Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian Popular Front)

FPR: Front Populaire pour le Rédrèssement (Popular Front for Recovery)

FRF: *Forces Republicanes et Federalistas (Republican and Federalist Forces)*

FRODEBU: Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (*Burundi Democratic Front*)

FRUD: *Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et la Démocratie (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy)*

FSA: Free Syrian Army

FTG: Federal Transition Government

FUC: Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique (United Front for Democratic Change)

FUDD: Frente Unido para la Democracia y Contra la Dictadura (United Front for Democracy and Against Dictatorship)

FURCA: Force de l'Union en République Centrafricaine (Union Force in the Central African Republic)

GAM: Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)

GEI: Gender Equity Index

GIA: Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group)

GIE: Gender Inequality Index

GSPC: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)

HAK: Armenian National Congress

HDZ: Croatian Democratic Union

HDZ 1990: Croatian Democratic Union - 1990

HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

HPG: Humanitarian Policy Group

HRC: Human Rights Council

HRW: Human Rights Watch

HUM: Harkat-ul-Mujahideen

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IBC: Iraq Body Count

ICC: International Criminal Court

ICG: International Crisis Group

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

ICR/LRA: Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA

ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY: International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia

ICU: Islamic Courts Union

IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IDP: Internally Displaced Person

IFLO: Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IHL: International Humanitarian Law

IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies

IMU: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

INLA: Irish National Liberation Army

IOM: International Organization for Migrations

IRA: Irish Republican Army

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

ISF: International Stabilisation Force

ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

JEM: Justice and Equality Movement

JKLF: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

JTMM: Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (People's Terai Liberation Front)

KANU: Kenya African National Union

KCK: Koma Civakên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Communities Union)

KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party

KFOR: NATO Mission in Kosovo

KIA: Kachin Independence Army

KIO: Kachin Independence Organization

KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army

KLNLF: Karbi Longri National Liberation Front

KNA: Kuki Liberation Army

KNF: Kuki National Front

KNPP: Karen National Progressive Party

KNU: Kayin National Union

KNU/KNLA: Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army

KPF: Karen Peace Force

KPLT: Karbi People's Liberation Tiger

KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government

KYKL: Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (Organization to Save the Revolutionary Movement in Manipur)

LeT: Lashkar-e-Toiba

LJM: Liberation and Justice Movement

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

M23: March 23 Movement

MAP-OAS: OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

MDC: Movement for Democratic Change

MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MFDC: Mouvement de las Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance)

MIB OAS: Good Offices Mission in Ecuador and Colombia

MICOPAX: Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en République Centrafricaine (CEEAC Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic)

MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MINURCA: United Nations Mission in Central African Republic

MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad

MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti.

MISCA: African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic

MISMA: International Mission of Support in Mali
MIT: Turkish National Intelligence Organisation
MJLC: Mouvement des Jeunes Libérateurs Centrafricains (Central African Young Liberators Movement)
MLC: Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo)
MMT: Madhesi Mukti Tigers
MNLA: Mouvement National pour la Libération de L'Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)
MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front
MONUC: United Nations Mission in DR Congo
MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MOVEDEF: Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales (Amnesty and Fundamental Rights Movement)
MPRF: Madhesi People's Rights Forum
MQM: Muttahida Qaumi Movement (United National Movement)
MRC: Mombasa Republican Council
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctor's Without Borders)
MUJAO: Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
MVK: Madhesi Virus Killers
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC: Nepali Congress Party
NCP: National Congress Party
NDF: National Democratic Front
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NDPVF: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NDV: Niger Delta Vigilante
NGO: Non Governmental Organization
NLD: National League for Democracy
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
NMSP: New Mon State Party
NNC: Naga National Council
NNSC: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NPA: New People's Army
NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah
NSCN-K: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
NTC: National Transitional Council of Lybia
OAS: Organization of American States
OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDM: Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement
OIC: Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OLF: Oromo Liberation Front
OMIK: OSCE Mission in Kosovo
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPC: Oromo People's Congress
OPM: Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization)
OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OXFAM: Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PALU: Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (Unified Lumumbist Party)
PARECO : Patriotes Résistants Congolais (Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance)
PCP : Partido Comunista de Perú (Communist Party of Peru)
PDLF: Palestinian Democratic Liberation Front
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PJAK: Party of Free Life of Kurdistan
PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker's Party)
PLA: People's Liberation Army
PNA: Palestinian National Authority

POLISARIO Front: Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro
PPP: Pakistan People's Party
PPRD: Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy)
PREPAK: People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
PREPAK Pro: People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak Progressive
PYD: Democratic Union Party
RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RENAMO: Mozambican National Resistance
RFC: Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement (Coalition of Forces for Change)
RPF: Revolutionary Patriotic Front
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSADO: Red See Afar Democratic Organization
RTF: Regional Task Force
SADC: Southern Africa Development Community
SADR: Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
SAF: Sudanese Armed Forces
SCUD: *Socle* pour le Changement, l'Unité Nationale et la Démocratie (Platform for Change, National Unity and Democracy)
SSA-S: Shan State Army-South
SSC: Sool, Saanag and Cayn
SFOR: NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLA: Sudan Liberation Army
SLA-Nur: Sudan Liberation Army-Nur
SLDF: Sabao Land Defence Forces
SNNPR: Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region
SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM: Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-N: Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North
SSA-S: Shan State Army-South
SSDM/A: South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army
SSLA: South Sudan Liberation Army
SSNPLO: Shan State Nationalities People's Liberation Organization
TAK: Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons)
TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TIPH: Temporary International Presence in Hebron
TMLP: Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party
TPLF: Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
TTP: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UAD: Union pour l'Alternance Démocratique (Union for Democratic Changeover)
UCPN-M: Unified Communist Party of Nepal
UFDD: *Union des Forces pour la Démocratie* et le Développement (Union of Forces for Democracy and Development)
UFDG: Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (Democratic Forces Union of Guinea)
UFDR: Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (Union of Democratic Forces Coalition)
UFF: Ulster Freedom Fighters
UFR: Union des Forces de la Résistance (United Resistance Forces)
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam
UN: United Nations
UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI: United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq

UNAMID: United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNEF: United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCHR: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF: United Nations International Children's Fund
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOGBIS: United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNIPSIL: United Nations Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone
UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITAF: Unified Task Force
UNLF: United National Liberation Front
UNMIK: United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCA: United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOGBIS: United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOWA: United Nations Office in West Africa
UNPOS: United Nations Political Office in Somalia

UNRCCA: United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO: United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East
UNSCOL: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon
UNSMIL: United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNSOM: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
UPDS: United People's Democratic Solidarity
UPPK: United People's Party of Kangleipak
UPRONA: Union pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress)
USA: United States of America
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
UVF: Ulster Volunteer Force
UWSA: United Wa State Army
VRAE: Valley between Rivers Apurimac and Ene
WB: World Bank
WILPF: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
WFP: World Food Programme
WPNLC: West Papua National Coalition for Liberation
WTO: World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZUF: Zeliangrong United Front

Escola de Cultura de Pau

The Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace, hereinafter ECP) is an academic peace research institution located at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. It was created in 1999 and it is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who is also the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

The fields of action of the Escola de Cultura de Pau are:

- Research. Its main areas of research include armed conflicts and socio-political crises, peace processes, human rights and transitional justice, the gender dimension in conflict and peacebuilding, and peace education.
- Second track diplomacy. The ECP promotes dialogue and conflict-transformation through second track initiatives, including facilitation tasks with armed actors.
- Consultancy services. The ECP carries out a variety of consultancy services for national and international institutions.
- Teaching and training. ECP staff gives lectures in postgraduate and graduate courses in several universities, including its own Graduate Diploma on Culture of Peace at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. It also provides training sessions on specific issues, including conflict sensitivity and peace education.
- Advocacy and awareness-raising. Initiatives include activities addressed to the Spanish and Catalan society, including contributions to the media.


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Alert 2014! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding is a yearbook which analyzes the state of the world in connection with conflicts and peacebuilding based on four areas of analysis: armed conflicts, socio-political crises, peace processes and the gender dimension on peacebuilding. Focusing on these areas, *Alert 2014!* offers an overview of the world's state of affairs and reveals possible trends and dynamics related to the characteristics and evolution of those areas. The comparison of the data with figures from previous years means the report can act as an early warning tool regarding general trends or situations in specific countries. This can be useful, among other things, to devise foreign policy, development cooperation and arms transfer policies, as well as policies to prevent armed conflicts and consolidate peace processes and post-war recovery.



Whilst, as peace mediation practitioners we appreciate that each individual case is unique, as professionals we benefit from understanding the big trends and issues in the field of peace making. Not only does this give us material for our own reflection, but also it allows us to see how these trends can be taken in account for our practice. My colleagues and I use it to inform our teaching and training of mediators, when producing briefing notes, and for assessing regional dynamics and conducting conflict analysis. In the field of Conflict Resolution, we need reliable facts. *Alert 2014!* hits the spot of providing us with concise information, outlining key dynamics, and pointing the finger at some hard realities that influence peace making. I recommend it to all mediators as a yearly 'must read'.

Antje Herrberg
Senior mediation expert and Chief Executive Officer,
MediatEUR - The European Forum for International
Mediation and Dialogue

Alert 2014 is a very well documented and clearly structured report on the state of conflicts in the world. The abstract provides a concise overview on the increase or decrease of violence in the most relevant conflict areas. It also includes peace processes and a focus on human rights. Everyone interested in a quick overview on the state of "peace and conflict" should have a look at it.

Laurent Goetschel
Director of Swisspeace and Professor of Political Science at
the University of Basel

Work to promote peace and peacebuilding requires rigorous analytical tools. Whether to denounce the ravages of armed conflict or to influence new security policies to improve conflict prevention and transformation, we need reliable data with well-defined trends and developments. Only in this way, and based on proper assessment, may we aspire to better formulas. Among the regular analytical reports issued by various peace research centres around the world, the Escola de Cultura de Pau's *Alert!* is already a classic. Its analysis of the dynamics of conflicts and the development of peace processes, as well as its look at opportunities and risks, makes it essential reading for anyone involved in peace work.

Jordi Armadans
Director of FundiPau (Fundació per la Pau)

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