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# alert 2005 !

Report on conflicts,  
human rights  
and peace-building

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# Summary

**Alert 2005: report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building** is a study carried out annually by the Alert Unit at the *School of Peace Culture at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, providing an overview of the world situation at the end of the year on the basis of an analysis of various indicators. 37 indicators have been used in the preparation of this report, divided into 10 large groups: armed conflicts, situations of tension and high risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation (international involvement), humanitarian crises, militarisation and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development, gender issues in peace-building and conduct in relation to the international community. A description and analysis of what has happened in the world throughout this year, based on these indicators, helps to provide a greater knowledge of the advances, reverses and dynamics of various kinds that affect the whole of humanity. The majority of these indicators, once cross-referenced, can also help us to understand the influence of some factors on others. Comparing this data with the information gathered during the previous years means that the report can act as a preventive warning of certain general tendencies or a particular situation in individual countries, something that may be useful, among other things, for the rethinking of foreign policy, development cooperation and arms transfers, as well as for the development of policies aimed at preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the consolidation of peace processes and post-war rehabilitation throughout the world.

# Glossary

- ACP:** Africa, Caribbean, Pacific  
**AIG:** Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA)  
**AMIB:** African Mission in Burundi  
**APHC:** All Parties Hurriyat Conference  
**AU:** African Union  
**AUC:** *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia)  
**BICC:** Bonn International Conversion Centre  
**BONUCA:** United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic  
**BRA:** Bougainville Revolutionary Army  
**CAEMC:** Central African Economic and Monetary Community  
**CAP:** United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal Process  
**CAR:** Central African Republic  
**CASA:** *Coordinating Action on Small Arms*  
**CFA:** Ceasefire Agreement  
**CFSP:** Common Foreign and Security Policy  
**CIA:** Central Intelligence Agency  
**CIS:** Community of Independent States  
**COCOPA:** *Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación* (Commission of Harmony and Pacification)  
**CPA:** Coalition Provisional Authority  
**CPI:** Corruption Perception Index  
**CPLA:** *Cordillera People's Liberation Army*  
**CPN:** Communist Party of Nepal  
**DAC:** Development Assistance Committee  
**DDR:** Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration  
**ECHO:** European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office  
**ECOMOG:** Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group  
**ECOSOC:** United Nations Economic and Social Council  
**ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States  
**EEBC:** Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission  
**EFTA:** European Free Trade Association  
**ELN:** *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army)  
**ESCR:** Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
**ESDP:** European Security and Defense Policy  
**EU:** European Union  
**EUFOR:** European Union Forces  
**EZLN:** *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*  
**FAO:** United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation  
**FARC:** *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia)  
**FATF:** Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering  
**FDD:** *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)  
**FIFA:** *Fédération Internationale de Football Association*  
**FKM:** Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Maluku Sovereignty Front)  
**FLEC-FAC:** *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda – Forças Armadas de Cabinda* (Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front - Cabinda Armed Forces)  
**FNL:** *Forces Nationales de Libération* (National Liberation Force)  
**GAFI:** Financial Action Group  
**GAM:** *Gerakin Aceh Merdeka* (Movement for Free Aceh)  
**GDI:** Gender-Related Development Index  
**GDP:** Gross Domestic Product  
**GNP:** Gross National Product  
**GSPC:** *Salafist Group of Call and Combat* (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat)  
**HDI:** Human Development Index  
**HIPC:** Heavily Indebted Poor Countries  
**HIV-AIDS:** Human Immunodeficiency Virus - Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome  
**IAEA:** International Atomic Energy Agency  
**ICC:** International Criminal Court  
**ICD:** Inter-Congolese Dialogue  
**ICRC:** International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent  
**IDPs:** Internally Displaced Persons  
**IEMF:** Interim Emergency Multinational Force  
**IGAD:** Intergovernmental Authority on Development  
**IHL:** International Humanitarian Law  
**IISS:** International Institute for Strategic Studies  
**ILO:** International Labour Organization  
**IMF:** International Monetary Fund  
**IOM:** International Organisation for Migration  
**IRIN:** United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network  
**IRIS:** *Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques* (International and Strategic Relations Institute)  
**ISAF:** International Security Assistance Force  
**ISDR:** International Strategy for Disaster Reduction  
**JEM:** Justice and Equality Movement  
**JKLF:** Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front  
**KANU:** Kenya African National Union  
**KFOR:** Kosovo Force  
**LDC:** Least Developed Countries  
**LRA:** Lord's Resistance Army  
**LTTE:** *Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam* (Tigers for the Liberation of the Sacred Land of the Tamils)  
**LURD:** Liberians United for Reunification and Democracy  
**MDC:** Movement for Democratic Change  
**MDG:** Millennium Development Goals  
**MDJT:** *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad* (Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad)  
**MERCOSUR:** *Mercado Común del Sur*  
**MFDC:** *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (Casamance Democratic Forces Movement)  
**MILF:** Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
**MINUCI:** United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire  
**MINUGUA:** United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala  
**MINURSO:** United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara  
**MJP:** *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix*  
**MLC:** *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (Congo Liberation Movement)  
**MODEL:** Movement for Democracy in Liberia  
**MONUC:** United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo  
**MPCI:** *Mouvement Patriotique de Ivory Coast* (Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement)  
**MSF:** *Médicos sin Fronteras* (Doctors Without Borders)  
**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
**NCCT:** Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories  
**NDC:** National Democratic Congress  
**NDFB:** National Democratic Front of Bodoland  
**NEPAD:** New Economic Partnership for African Development  
**NGO:** Non-Governmental Organisation  
**NLA:** National Liberation Army  
**NLD:** National Ligue for the Democracy  
**NLFT:** National Liberation Front of Tripura



**NPA:** New People's Army  
**NPP:** New Patriotic Party  
**NRC:** Norwegian Refugee Council  
**NSCN (IM):** National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak – Muivah  
**OAS:** Organisation of American States  
**OCHA:** United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
**ODA:** Official Development Aid  
**OECD:** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
**OHR:** Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
**OIC:** Organization of the Islamic Conference  
**OPM:** *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement)  
**OSCE:** Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
**PAC:** *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil* (Civil Defence Patrols)  
**PFLP:** Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
**PIOOM :** Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations  
**PNA:** Palestinian National Authority  
**POLISARIO:** *Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia El Hamra y Río del Oro* (Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro)  
**PRIO:** Peace Research Institute, Oslo  
**RAMSI:** Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands  
**RCD-Goma:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie - Goma* (Congolesse Rally for Democracy - Goma)  
**RCD-ML:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement pour la Libération* (Congolesse Rally for Democracy - Movement of Liberation)  
**RCD-N:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National* (Congolesse Rally for Democracy - National)  
**RRI:** Reproductive Risk Index  
**RSM:** *Republik Maluku Selatan* (Republic of the South Moluccas)  
**RUF:** Revolutionary United Front  
**SADC:** South African Development Community  
**SFOR:** Stabilisation Force  
**SIPRI:** Stockholm International Peace Research Institute  
**SLMA:** Sudan's Liberation Movement/Army  
**SPLA:** Sudanese People's Liberation Army  
**TNG:** Transitional National Government  
**UAB:** *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*  
**ULFA:** United Liberation Front of Assam  
**UN:** United Nations  
**UNAIDS:** United Nations HIV-AIDS Programme  
**UNAMA:** United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan  
**UNAMSIL:** United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone  
**UNCTAD:** United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
**UNDOF:** United Nations Disengagement Observer Force  
**UNDP:** United Nations Development Programme  
**UNESCO:** United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation  
**UNFICYP:** United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus  
**UNHCHR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights  
**UNHCR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
**UNHRC:** United Nations Human Rights Commission  
**UNICEF:** United Nations Children's Fund  
**UNIDIR:** United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
**UNIFEM:** United Nations Development Fund for Women  
**UNIFIL:** United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon  
**UNIKOM:** United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission  
**UNITA:** *União para a Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)  
**UNMA:** United Nations Mission in Angola  
**UNMEE:** United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea  
**UNMIBH:** United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina  
**UNMIK:** United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo  
**UNMIL:** United Nations Mission in Liberia  
**UNMISSET:** United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor  
**UNMOGIP:** United Nations Military Observation Group in India and Pakistan  
**UNMOP:** United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka  
**UNMOVIC:** United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission  
**UNOGBIS:** United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau  
**UNOB:** United Nations Office in Burundi  
**UNOL:** United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia  
**UNOMIG:** United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia  
**UNPOB:** United Nations Political Office in Bougainville  
**UNPOS:** United Nations Political Office for Somalia  
**UNPPB:** United Nations Political and Peace Building Mission  
**UNRWA:** United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East  
**UNSCO:** United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories  
**UNTOP:** United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building  
**UNTSO:** United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation  
**US\$:** US dollars  
**USA:** United States of America  
**WB:** World Bank  
**WFP:** World Food Programme  
**WHO:** World Health Organisation  
**WTO:** World Trade Organisation  
**ZANU-PF:** Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front  
**ZFM:** Zimbabwe Freedom Movement

# Introduction

"Alert 2005: report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building" is a study carried out annually by the Alert Unit at the *School of Peace Culture at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, providing an overview of the world situation at the end of the year on the basis of an analysis of various indicators. The Alert Unit also publishes a weekly newsletter, "*Semáforo*" containing information on the current international situation. This information is compiled in turn in the quarterly publication "*Barómetro*".<sup>1</sup>

37 indicators have been used in the preparation of this "Alert 2005" report, divided into 10 large groups: armed conflicts, situations of tension and high-risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation (international involvement), humanitarian crises, militarization and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development, gender aspects in peace-building and conduct in relation to the international community. A description and analysis of what has happened in the world throughout the past year, using these indicators as a base, helps to provide greater insight into the many different advances, reverses and dynamics affecting the whole of humanity. The majority of these indicators, once cross-referenced, can also help us to understand the influence of some factors on others, as may be seen in Figure 1. Comparing this data with the information gathered during previous years means that the report can act as a preventive warning of certain general trends or particular situations in individual countries, something which is undoubtedly useful, among other things, for the rethinking of foreign policy, development cooperation and the control of arms transfers, as well as for the development of specific policies aimed at preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the consolidation of peace processes and post-war rehabilitation throughout the world.

The attention of both the media and public opinion has been highly focused throughout the past year on the events, attacks and disputes associated with the intervention in Iraq, and the failed attempts to stabilise the country. In addition, the Tsunami which claimed more than 250,000 lives across many countries at the end of the year, particularly on the continent of Asia, diverted attention away from other important events and contexts that were unfolding at the same time. "Alert 2005" attempts to restore a more global view of the events that have occurred throughout the past year.

As regards **armed conflicts** around the world, a total of 25 remained active at the end of the year, two more than in December 2003. Ten of these are in Africa and a further ten in Asia. In spite of the ending of the conflicts in Indonesia (Irian Jaya) and the south of Sudan (with the SPLA), new armed conflicts have sprung up in three contexts during the course of the year: Haiti, Nigeria (in the centre and north of the country) and Thailand, and the achievement of a peace accord in Sri Lanka remains pending. As in previous years, the essential characteristic of these armed conflicts is that they are being fought within a single state, though many of them have clear regional repercussions. As far as the nature of these conflicts is concerned, they frequently involve inter-community confrontations, struggles to gain a greater degree of autonomy, disputes over natural resources or fighting to gain or retain political power. Other factors have been clearly present during 2004, all of them regular features of the armed conflicts that have arisen over recent years, such as the numerous ceasefire violations, dissidence within armed groups, the failure of several disarmament and demobilisation programmes, electoral disputes, lack of governance and the treatment of the civilian population as a military target.

Several of these factors also played a part in the **situations of tension and high-risk disputes**, which increased from 52 in December 2003 to 58 by the end of 2004, with both Africa (up from 21 to 25) and the Middle East (up from 2 to 5) recording increases in this area. Africa is the continent that is suffering by far

1. Both the weekly newsletter *Semáforo*, and the quarterly publication *Barómetro*, can be consulted at the following web site: <<http://www.escolapau.org>>.

the highest number of situations of this type (43% of the total number as compared with Asia's 28%), though the trend is downwards. On a world level, a third of the situations analysed are currently increasing or worsening in intensity, as compared with only 13% of crisis situations a year earlier. Equally significant is the fact that 2004 saw the appearance of seven new situations of tension, four of which are in Africa.

The last year saw various **acts of terrorism** in several countries. The attacks in Madrid on 11 March and the school massacre in Beslan, South Ossetia were the ones that resulted in the greatest number of victims and had the most significant impact on the international community. Other massacres, however, like the ones carried out in Darfur (Sudan) and the Congolese refugee camp in (Burundi), have not even been referred to as acts of terrorism, in spite of the fact that their victims have largely been members of the civilian population, unarmed and defenceless, a fact that demonstrates the extreme manipulation of this phenomenon through the use of the language itself. The concern of governments to combat certain forms of terrorism and understand their nature has led to the United Nations suggesting a definition of the term, through its High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, whose final report<sup>2</sup> proposed defining terrorism as "any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purposes of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act".

The global fight to combat terrorism and the introduction of anti-terrorist legislation in many countries has, nevertheless, led to a general erosion of respect for human rights. Warnings in this regard have been issued by both international bodies and non-governmental organisations working in the area of human rights, which have indicated that under the guise of strengthening government mechanisms in the fight to combat terrorism, censorship has increased, freedom of expression has deteriorated in several democratic countries, individuals, groups and ethnic communities accused of acts of violence have been repressed or condemned as terrorists, military forces have been given judicial powers, the torture, abuse, arbitrary detention and mistreatment of those detained on terrorism charges has become widespread, the death penalty has been reintroduced in some countries, and entire communities, particularly Muslims, have been demonised and stereotyped. The uncovering of the abuses committed against Iraqi prisoners by the occupying forces has, however, sounded a warning regarding the pressing need to rethink the "war on terror", in order to avoid generating new situations that actually exacerbate the terrorist phenomenon. In this connection, the UN report mentioned above recommends that the organisation promote a new strategy based on five elements:<sup>3</sup>

- a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, by promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform; working to put an end to the occupation and addressing major political grievances; combating organised crime, reducing poverty and unemployment and stopping State collapse.
- b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, through education and the promotion of public debates.
- c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights, including the areas of law-enforcement; intelligence sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls.
- d) Building state capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations.
- e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defence.

As a balance to the increase in the number of armed conflicts and situations of tension, 2004 was a particularly interesting year as regards the evolution of **peace processes**, with a notable ten new negotiation or exploratory processes beginning during the course of the year. The end result was that by the end of December 2004 there were 30 negotiation processes underway (nine more than in December 2003), 17 of which related to armed conflicts and 13 to conflicts which were no longer in an armed phase at the end of

the year, though they remained unresolved. This data indicates, therefore, that in almost two out of every three armed conflicts, negotiation processes are currently in progress or at an exploratory stage, a percentage that has rarely been reached before and which underlines the need to strengthen peace diplomacy in support of the opening-up of dialogue.

It should also be pointed out that during the last months attempts have been made to start negotiations on two highly complex conflicts: Palestine and Uganda. The conflict in Sudan (SPLA) is no longer classified as an "armed conflict" as significant fighting did not occur throughout the year and an agreement was reached at the end of December. It is now classified as "unresolved" and awaits implementation of the forthcoming peace agreement. Cyprus has also been removed from this category, as the UN Secretary General decided in the middle of the year that his good offices were no longer required for the time being, given that his proposals had been unsuccessful. By the end of the year, excluding the three processes currently at an exploratory stage, 37% of negotiations were proceeding relatively well, 44% were encountering difficulties and 19% were going badly. "Alert 2005" for the first time includes figures showing the evolution of the peace processes currently underway in Africa and Asia, indicating the "temperature" of these processes, the habitual ups and downs that they encounter and the general trends for each continent.

As regards the countries currently in a phase of **post-war rehabilitation**, 19 countries are analysed, 10 of which are in Africa. The main problems faced by these countries are the tensions resulting from the manipulation of electoral processes, corruption and a lack of transparency (often associated with the illegal management of natural resources), and a prevailing climate of insecurity. Problems also tend to arise in relation to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, the configuration of the armed forces or their willingness to give way to political power, the lack of funds to implement rehabilitation programmes, the lack of cooperation with international justice organisations and internal disputes at a government level, among other factors that demonstrate the fragility of the majority of the countries currently passing through this phase.

The Tsunami at the end of the year has unfortunately pushed the situation of the 44 countries suffering **humanitarian crises** this year into the background. 64% of these countries are in Africa, a situation that has led to numerous calls from the UN and other organisations not to forget other catastrophes around the world, both natural and man-made. In 2004, no less than 41 countries, again mostly in Africa, endured food emergencies as a result of armed conflict, natural disaster, HIV/AIDS or marginalisation. A total of 48 countries have suffered situations that have led to massive internal displacement, and 69 countries have recorded the movement of people seeking refuge outside their own borders, though the numbers involved have fallen considerably from 2003. Before the Tsunami in December, the United Nations had made a consolidated appeal for 1,700 million dollars to help 26 million people in 25 countries, 23 of them in Africa, though it succeeded in collecting less than half of the amount requested. At that time, the priorities were Palestine, DR Congo, and particularly the Sudanese region of Darfur. This last humanitarian crisis, which began in February 2003, is a clear example of the failure to take preventive action in many contexts of humanitarian crisis, since action was not taken until April 2004, by which time the conflict had caused the displacement of 800,000 people. Similarly, if action had been taken quickly when the first signs of the plague of locusts that has devastated parts of Africa were observed, the resulting cost would have been no more than seven million dollars. As it is, the lethargy and failure to react meant that, by the end of the year, the cost of combating the plague had reached 600 million dollars, 85 times as much.

Following the disagreements between the USA and various European countries over the occupation of Iraq, several attempts were made during 2004 to rebuild transatlantic relations and promote multilateralism. Also worthy of mention is the EU's stronger role in peace-keeping missions, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan. By contrast, the **militarization and disarmament dynamics** around the world show contradictory data. Military spending rose 11% during 2003, reaching a figure of 956,000 million dollars, i.e. 2,620 million dollars a day (more than 109 million dollars an hour), of which half was due to US military spending. In addition, fifteen countries recorded a military spending figure that was more than 6% of their GDP. Russia and the USA were once again the biggest arms exporters, though Brazil and China joined them in the league table of countries selling light arms. In the area of military strategy, men-

tion should also be made of the USA's priority to convert outer space into a battlefield, the increasing privatisation of security through the engagement of mercenaries (particularly in Iraq) and the numerous alliances that the USA has made with Muslim countries in its fight to combat terrorism. On a positive note in the field of disarmament, it should be noted that since the adoption of the Treaty of Ottawa, the use of mines has fallen drastically, and funds allocated for mine clearing have increased by 80%, meaning that the number of victims has also fallen.

Both the United Nations and non-governmental bodies dedicated to the promotion and protection of **human rights** have warned that we are seeing the greatest deterioration in this area in the last fifty years, both due to the negative impact of anti-terrorist policies and as a result of the serious human rights violations occurring in many countries and the restrictions being imposed on rights of asylum and refugee status. According to these bodies, 59 countries are guilty of systematic and widespread abuses against the right to life and personal security, 108 countries practice torture, while widespread human rights violations have been recorded in 43 countries (45 in 2003). The death penalty continues to be used in many countries, with China, Iran, the USA and Vietnam responsible for 84% of all executions. On the positive side, mention should be made of the fact that the Human Rights Commission has approved the appointment of an Independent Expert on the fight to combat terrorism and human rights, and that various initiatives have emerged this year to link human rights and business, particularly as a result of the growing demand for greater transparency in the management of the resources generated by the mining industry.

As per indicators relating to **development**, and in spite of the slight advances shown in some areas, the overall situation shows the deep imbalances that still exist around the world and the continuing poverty and marginalisation suffered by a significant number of countries. Sixteen of these still show military spending in excess of the amounts spent on education and health (down from 22 last year), 32 show serious problems of governance (33 in 2003) and 54 will not meet the Millennium Development Goals set for 2015 if current trends continue. A further 19 show a lower Human Development Index score than they recorded in 1990, the worst affected being the countries of sub-Saharan Africa (basically because of the impact of AIDS) and those in Central and Eastern Europe (as a result of economic collapse during the transition from Communism). A group of 49 countries show a high index in relation to inequalities in income, which underlines the gap between the richer and poorer sections of the population in many countries around the world, as it shows how wealth is concentrated. Nine countries have foreign borrowings in excess of their GDP (12 in 2003) and 53 pay more to service their debts than they receive in Official Development Aid. On the positive side, it should be mentioned that the grant of microloans has been increasing over recent years at a rate of 25 to 30% per year.

For the first time, "Alert 2005" includes two environmental indicators to show some of the ecological aspects of development. In this connection, 26 countries showed an annual deforestation rate of more than 1% for the whole of the 1990s, with seven of them showing annual rates in excess of 3%, a problem that particularly affects sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. The report also indicates that 8 countries produce carbon dioxide emissions in excess of 10 tonnes per person, with a further 6 producing more than 15 tonnes. As regards health, it is particularly worrying that almost five million people became infected with HIV/AIDS during the course of the year, the majority of them women, and that more than three million people died as a result of the disease. International bodies calculate that by 2010 the number of children orphaned by the disease could double. This figure currently stands at 14 million children, equivalent to the combined populations of Belgium and the Netherlands, or the total population of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland together.

As readers might have noticed, many of these indicators can be given a different interpretation if taken from a gender perspective. Ten years after the Beijing summit, indicators for **gender-related issues** in peace-building show that women face a particularly serious situation in at least 35 countries, which continues to make it difficult for them and which has prevented the inclusion of a gender dimensions in these processes, including the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. During the course of the year, sexual violence has once again been used as a weapon of and exposed the failure of the current systems intended to protect against it. One innovative and optimistic aspect is that out of the 17 UN peace-

keeping operations currently in place, 10 have some form of gender assessment element. These improvements have, however, been tarnished by the uncovering of acts of sexual exploitation and abuse by both soldiers and humanitarian personnel.

As regards **conduct in international society**, it should be mentioned that only 68 countries have ratified the seven legal instruments set out in the Millennium Declaration. Around one hundred countries have still to ratify the Statute of the International Criminal Court, more than 50 have yet to ratify the Treaty of Ottawa and more than 60 have not yet signed up to the Kyoto Protocol, though the fact that Russia did so this year is to be welcomed. Nine countries, including the USA, Iran and Iraq have ratified less than half of these instruments. Turning to the protection of human rights, 28 countries have ratified less than half of the seven main instruments in this area (30 at the end of 2003), a number that includes four Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and Pakistan. On the positive side, it should be pointed out that the UN is debating several new instruments relating to the prevention of torture, the rights of indigenous peoples and protection against enforced displacement.

As regards financial transparency, the report identifies 38 tax havens, one less than last year, of which five have refused to cooperate with the OECD. A further six are identified as places where money laundering takes place (9 at the end of 2003), countries which include the Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar and Nigeria. Finally, as regards military security, 48 countries have not yet ratified one or more of the three non-proliferation agreements that currently exist (49 in 2003), and particular mention should be made of Israel, which has not ratified any of them. Israel and the USA have, furthermore, voted against the majority of UN Assembly General resolutions on disarmament issues, demonstrating the contradiction between their own demands for other countries to disarm while refusing to cooperate in the strengthening of multilateral mechanisms. A more positive development in this area is the fact that 2004 saw the beginning of the dismantling of Libya's weapons of mass destruction, along with continuing talks about the denuclearisation of DPR Korea and Iran, though these were not free from difficulties. Syria has also admitted to possessing chemical and biological weapons, which should lead to a disarmament process of these arsenals.

In December 2004, the UN Secretary General told the organisation's General Assembly that the coming years would be critical if both the United Nations and international society in general were to face up to the further globalisation of certain threats such as HIV/AIDS, nuclear proliferation, genocide and terrorism, adding that no one threat could be faced effectively if the others weren't addressed at the same time. In contrast to the short-sighted, unilateral and biased view taken by those who perceive the challenges resulting from global terrorism as the only threat, the data provided by this "Alert 2005" report shows that there are in fact multiple factors and dynamics of many different kinds that each have an adverse effect on one another. It is only by tackling situations of tension and conflict, and by going to the real heart of each problem, acting preventively, supporting multilateral instruments for disarmament and human rights, reducing the vulnerability of individual communities, encouraging their development and engaging in civilised dialogue that we will build a safer world with fewer imbalances and greater opportunities. We must further increase the existing number of international, national and civil initiatives that have already offered some success in countering poverty, exclusion, war, the destruction of the environment and other expressions of violence.

## List of indicators

### 1. CONFLICT

1. Countries engaged in armed conflict

### 2. SITUATIONS OF TENSION AND HIGH-RISK DISPUTES

1. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

### 3. PEACE PROCESSES

2. Countries engaged in peace processes or formal negotiations or in an exploratory phase

### 4. POST-WAR REHABILITATION (INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT)

4. Countries which receive international aid in terms of post-war rehabilitation

### 5. HUMANITARIAN CRISES

5. Countries facing food emergencies
6. Countries in which at least 1 person in every 1,000 is an internally displaced person
7. Countries of origin in which at least 1 person in every 1,000 is a refugee
8. Countries included in the UN's Interagency Consolidated Appeal 2004

### 6. MILITARISATION AND DISARMAMENT

9. Countries with arms embargoes from the United Nations Security Council
10. Countries with arms embargoes from regional bodies (EU and OSCE)
11. Countries with military spending in excess of 4% of GDP
12. Countries with imports of heavy conventional weapons exceeding 0.5% of GDP
13. Countries where the number of soldiers exceeds 1.5% of the population
14. Militarised countries according to the BIC3D Index

### 7. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

15. Countries with serious and systematic violations of human rights according to non-governmental sources
16. Countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to the EU
17. Countries with serious violations of human rights according to the UNCHR reports and resolutions
18. Countries that apply or maintain the death penalty
19. Countries of origin of people who have obtained asylum
20. Countries that have not ratified the 2<sup>nd</sup> Protocol of 1977 on armed conflicts between states in relation to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949
21. Countries that recruit both boys and girls for their armies and have not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict

### 8. DEVELOPMENT

22. Maximum and high priority countries in the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals, according to the UNDP
23. Countries with a Human Development Index (HDI) lower than it was in 1990 and Countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries (LDC)
24. Countries with high levels of inequality in internal income on the basis of the Gini coefficient
25. Countries whose amounts received in official development aid (ODA) exceed the 10% of the GDP.
26. Countries that spend less on public health and/or education than on military spending
27. Countries with poor governance according to the World Bank
28. Countries with a total amount of foreign debt in excess of their GNP, countries whose foreign debt repayments exceed the amounts received in official development aid and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
29. Countries with high rates of deforestation and countries with high polluting emission indices

### 9. GENDER AND PEACE-BUILDING

30. Countries with great gender inequalities, on the basis of the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)

### 10. CONDUCT IN RELATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

#### 10.1. Conduct in relation to the Millennium Declaration

31. Countries which have not ratified the main United Nations legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration

#### 10.2. Conduct in relation to the protection of human rights

32. Countries which have not ratified the main United Nations legal instruments on human rights

#### 10.3. Conduct in terms of financial transparency

33. Countries acting as tax havens
34. Countries which do not cooperate with the Financial Action Group (GAFI) on money-laundering

#### 10.4. Conduct in terms of military security


35. Countries which have not signed the non-proliferation agreements
36. Countries which have not given information to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons
37. Countries which have not given information to the UN Instrument to Report Military Expenditures

# 1. Armed conflicts

This section contains an analysis of the armed conflicts that arose or continued during 2004 (indicator no. 1). The chapter is divided into three sections: the first deals with the definition and typology of the armed conflicts currently in course, the second discusses the way they have evolved over the past year, with special emphasis on the status of each one at the end of the year, and the last section refers to some of the more notable events that occurred during 2004.

## 1.1. Armed conflicts: definition and typology

An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving groups of various kinds, such as regular or irregular military forces, guerrillas, armed opposition groups, paramilitary groups or ethnic or religious communities which, using arms and other destructive methods, claim more than 100 victims per year. This figure of 100 deaths is just an indicator and should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country. Figure 1.1 shows the sequence usually followed by armed conflicts, as summarised by the first four chapters of this report.



The armed conflicts currently being fought are characterised by the fact that most of them are internal, happening within the borders of a particular individual state. Very few are actually being fought between two states<sup>1</sup>. However, the majority of these armed conflicts involve a significant regional or international dimension and influence, due among other things to the flows of refugees that they provoke, the arms trading that results, the financial interests (such as the illegal exploitation of resources) or political interests that

1. No armed conflicts were fought between states began during 2004, since Palestine has not yet been declared an independent state, and in other cases such as Afghanistan and Iraq, although they could originally have been called inter-state conflicts, the involvement of foreign forces has subsequently been sanctioned by the governments that have been established (with greater or lesser legitimacy) following the overthrow of the original regimes.



**The armed conflicts currently being fought are characterised by the fact that most of them are internal or international dimension and influence**

there are other cases in which confrontations can arise between clans, various armed opposition groups or ethnic or religious communities. Although conventional weapons are the most commonly used in the majority of conflicts, particularly small arms (which cause 90% of the deaths in conflicts, the victims being mainly women and children), other weapons are used on many occasions, such as suicide attacks, terrorism and sexual violence. In this regard, the preparation of this report took account of attacks which, while not carried out using conventional weapons, involved the deaths of a number of people as part of a deliberate and systematic strategy of destruction.

The most common **causes** of the main armed conflicts can be arranged into the three following groups: **1)** relating to **political power** (where difficulties are observed in the handover of power, the fragility of the democratic system and, in short, the struggle for political power); **2)** relating to the dual issues of **autonomy and independence**, which involve the existence of minority groups (or in some cases, majority groups) with claims on and aspirations towards political power based on individual affirmations that have not been satisfied; and **3)** relating to **land and population** (inter-community confrontations, fighting for the control of natural resources<sup>2</sup>, conflicts resulting from regional marginalisation or the demographic colonisation of one community by another). It should be said, however, that these causes do not arise in isolation in the majority of cases but are instead inter-related.

neighbouring countries may have in the conflict, or the fact that armed opposition groups seek refuge or establish bases in neighbouring countries, or receive logistical or military support from neighbouring governments.

In the majority of these armed conflicts, the opposing parties tend to be, on the one side, the country's Government or its Armed Forces, and on the other, one or more armed opposition groups. However,

**Chart 1.1. Armed conflicts in 2004\***

Afghanistan	India (Assam)	Nepal	Sri Lanka
Algeria	India (Jammu and Kashmir)	Nigeria (central and north)	Somalia
Burundi	Indonesia (Aceh)	Nigeria (Niger Delta)	Sudan (Darfur)
Colombia	<i>Indonesia (Irian Jaya)</i>	Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)	<i>Sudan (SPLA)</i>
Côte d'Ivoire	Iraq	Philippines (MILF)	<b>Thailand</b>
DR Congo (Kivus and Ituri)	Israel-Palestine	Philippines (NPA)	Uganda
<b>Haiti</b>	Liberia	Russia (Chechnya)	

\* The conflicts shown in italics ended in during 2004, while the ones shown in bold began during the year.

At the end of 2004 there were **25 armed conflicts** around the world. The cessation of hostilities continued to hold in Sri Lanka, as did the ceasefire between the Philippine Government and the MILF armed opposition group. The steady reduction in violence and respect for the ceasefire during the course of the year in

the armed conflict in southern Sudan between the Government and the SPLA armed opposition group, together with the progress made in the peace negotiations<sup>3</sup>, have meant that this situation is no longer classified as an armed conflict. Mention should also be made of the absence of confrontations in West Papua (Irian Jaya, in Indonesia), which has meant that this is also no longer regarded as an armed conflict. However, the fact that the situation in southern Thailand has deteriorated seriously throughout the year has meant its classification as a new armed conflict. Along with Thailand, the situation has worsened in six other contexts since the beginning of 2004 (Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Sudan (Darfur), Haiti, Nepal and Iraq), and improved in four (Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria (centre and north) and Somalia), excluding

**Along with Thailand, the situation has worsened in six other contexts since the beginning of 2004 (Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Sudan (Darfur), Haiti, Nepal and Iraq)**

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2. See Appendix II.

3. See the chapter on peace processes.

the armed conflicts in Sudan (SPLA) and Indonesia (Irian Jaya), which have ceased to be classified as such. The situation has not changed notably since the beginning of the year in the remaining 14 conflicts. It should be mentioned that the only region to show positive developments in this area is sub-Saharan Africa.

## 1.2. Evolution of armed conflicts

### Africa

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed participants	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Algeria (1992-)</b>	Government, GIA, GSPC	Political and economic control (natural resources) by the army against the Islamic opposition, religious and ethnic manipulation	Stalemate
<b>Burundi (1993-)</b>	TNG, A. Rwasa's FNL	Political control by an ethnic minority and difficulties in the handover of power	Reduction
<b>Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)</b>	Government, MPCI, MJP, MPIGO	Marginalisation of certain regions, democratic fragility, political exclusion, religious manipulations	Increase
<b>DR Congo (1998-)</b>	TNG, factions of armed groups included in the TNG, Mayi-Mayi militias, armed Ituri groups, FDLR	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power and control of natural resources	Increase
<b>Liberia (1989-)</b>	TNG, LURD, MODEL, former Armed Forces of C. Taylor	Control over natural resources, ethnic manipulations and struggle for political power	Reduction
<b>Nigeria (central and north) (2003-)</b>	Government, Christian and Muslim militias	Control of natural resources and religious manipulation	Reduction
<b>Nigeria (Niger Delta) (2003-)</b>	Government, militias from the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo communities	Control of political power and natural resources, social and political exclusion	Stalemate
<b>Somalia (1988-)</b>	Various	Absence of practical democracy, struggle for regional political power, confederation v. federation	Reduction
<b>Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)</b>	Government militias, SLMA, JEM, NMRD	Regional and political marginalisation	Increase
<b>Uganda (1986-)</b>	Government, LRA	Religious messianism and regional marginalisation	Stalemate

#### a) West Africa

**Côte d'Ivoire** has seen a **reversal in its fragile peace process**. The lack of progress in the Linas-Marcoussis agreements of January 2003, caused by an **absence of political will from the parties**, has led to a deterioration in the situation and an upsurge in tensions and political violence, which was reflected over the course of the year in numerous episodes of confrontation and ceasefire violations. The disarmament and rehabilitation process was halted as a result of serious polarisation. France's role as guarantor of the peace process and ceasefire (with a presence of almost 5,000 soldiers), together with the UN peace-keeping mission (UNOCI, which has deployed 6,000 peace-keeping troops) has been seriously affected. This led to an attack by Ivorian Armed Forces on French troops, which responded by destroying Ivorian air defences, sparking off anti-French demonstrations and attacks on the civilian population that left 64 dead and more than one thousand injured. It also led to the evacuation of around 9,000 people, the majority of them French nationals.

In **Liberia**, the transitional process which began in August 2003 continued to move slowly forwards during the year. In spite of sporadic outbreaks of fighting, the completion of the deployment of 15,000 UNMIL troops, the disarmament of the different groups involved and the initiation of the return and resettlement of the displaced and refugee population as a result of improved security have all combined to offer a fragile ray of hope that the country may finally overcome the conflict that it has been suffering since 1989. A sign of this fragility is the **continuing lack of funds** to support the process, **the persisting abuses and human rights violations** and the many **ceasefire violations**, such as the outbreak of violence that occurred in Monrovia in November between the different factions of the LURD armed opposition group (which caused the death of 16 people and left more than 200 injured), the reason for the imposition of the curfew.

There are two distinct armed conflicts in **Nigeria**. In the **Niger Delta** region, the militias from the Ijaw and Itsekiri communities, which have been involved in sporadic confrontations over political and economic control of the region, both among themselves and with Government Armed Forces, as well as fighting the transnational oil companies, reached a peace agreement in October<sup>4</sup>. The militias also established a new ceasefire (the one that had been in place since June was repeatedly violated) and began a process of disarmament, which was not without its difficulties, given the persisting lack of mutual trust. The Government promised to discuss demands from the Ijaw community for greater autonomy and to improve the redistribution of the revenues earned from oil. Elsewhere, the crisis that has arisen between Christian and Muslim communities in several states in the **centre** and **north** of the country has remained at stalemate, although the armed Islamist opposition group *Al Sunna wal Jamma* (which emerged at the end of 2003) carried out several attacks against Nigerian security forces in the north of the country from September onwards. The state of emergency that had been in force in **Plateau** state (central Nigeria) since May was finally lifted in November. It had originally been introduced as the result of the confrontations between Christian and Muslim militias which had caused hundreds of deaths.

## b) Horn of Africa

The peace process relating to **Somalia**, which has been continuing in Kenya since September 2002, has seen some important advances during the year which may put an end to the situation of poor governance, violence and insecurity suffered by the country since 1988, a situation that intensified in 1991 with the fall of the dictator S. Barre. The Federal Transitional Parliament established in August chose A. Yusuf Ahmed as the country's new President. He in turn appointed a Prime Minister who has taken charge of forming a new Government for the country, which will include the main Somali warlords<sup>5</sup>. The **main challenges** facing the Government involve **restoring security** and guaranteeing **humanitarian assistance** throughout the country, given the persisting confrontations that are still occurring in different regions.

### Chart 1.2. Somalia: the long road from anarchy to governance

Over the past 14 years, Somalia has seen 13 attempted peace agreements and the formation of several governments, though all of them have been hampered by the situation of chaos and the lack of governance in the country, along with the proliferation of militias and warlords who have *de facto* control over the majority of the territory. This has meant that this most recent set of peace negotiations has had to be held in Kenya, given the lack of security. Around half a million people have died over this period, and it is estimated that there are currently 400,000 internally displaced people. The new President, A. Yusuf Ahmed, who until his appointment had been President of the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Puntland, asked the AU to establish a peace-keeping mission comprising around 20,000 members, whose main duties would be the disarmament of the 55,000 members of the country's various militias (who are holding around 2.5 million small arms), the formation of Armed Forces comprising some 30,000 troops, and support for access by humanitarian aid organisations. The new Government is made up of the country's main warlords, a fact that does not offer much hope for the reparation of human rights violations and the fight to combat the impunity of recent years, though it does guarantee a strong Government that will be able to face up to the numerous militias around the country.

4. See the chapter on peace processes.

5. *Ibid.*

In the **Darfur** region in **Sudan**, the armed conflict that began in 2003 continued to worsen as a result of the confrontations between the Government of O. al-Bashir, the pro-government *Janjaweed* militias and the SLA and JEM armed opposition groups, which have left more than 70,000 dead and led to the enforced displacement of 1.8 million people. In spite of growing pressure from the international community, the state of insecurity and serious human rights violations (sexual violence and extra-judicial executions) continued, and the Government did not begin to disarm the *Janjaweed*, despite the UN Security Council's threats that it would impose sanctions against the Sudanese regime. In December, an armed opposition group that recently split off from the JEM, the NMRD (National Movement for Reform and Development, which shares the same objectives as the SLA and the JEM) reached an agreement with the Government in Khartoum, establishing a cessation of hostilities, the release of political prisoners, the disarmament of the militias and the voluntary return of displaced people. The AU decided to establish a peace-keeping mission, and it is expected that the planned 3,320 troops will be deployed at the beginning of 2005.

### c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Burundi**, confrontations continued between the Transitional National Government and the FNL armed opposition group of A. Rwaswa, though these were limited to the province of Rural Bujumbura, an FNL stronghold that surrounds the capital. Nevertheless, the fragile transition process continued to move forwards, though there are many challenges remaining. The transition period, which should have ended in November, has been extended until April 2005, the date on which presidential elections will be held. In spite of this, it is feared that the FNL may interfere in the process, and there are a number of tensions as a result of the lack of trust between the parties. The process for the disarmament of 80,000 members of the Government Armed Forces and armed opposition groups began at the end of November, 11 months later than planned, and around 85,000 people returned to their places of origin from Tanzania over the course of the year.

#### Chart 1.3. Challenges and threats to security in Africa following the end of the Cold War

Following the collapse of the bipolar world with the fall of the Socialist system and the implosion of the USSR, various new threats to security have emerged on the continent of Africa, with others becoming yet more evident. The following are some particularly salient examples:

- The collapse of state institutions (a phenomenon known as failed States), exemplified by the situation in Liberia, DR Congo, Somalia and Sierra Leone;
- An increase in inter-community confrontations as a result of the growing rivalries between communities in order to gain control of political power, and the gradual failure of the old inter-relational standards and traditional mediation methods;
- An increase in the number of conflicts caused by the management of and control over natural resources;
- The proliferation of small arms coming from the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, as well as an increase in home-made weapons;
- The emergence of new parties who are playing an important role in different conflicts, such as mercenaries, warlords and informal militias;
- An increase in new threats to security, such as money-laundering, people-trafficking and drug-running.

Source: Funmi Olofinakin, *African Peacekeeping at the crossroads: an assessment of the continent's evolving peace and security architecture*, Conflict, Security and Development Group, International Policy Institute, King's College London, September 2004.

In **DR Congo**, various events have occurred which have placed the **peace process on the brink of collapse and increased tensions at a regional level**, in spite of efforts by the Transitional National Government (TNG). Confrontations continue throughout the country, and particular mention should be made of the rebellion against the Congolese Armed Forces in June by dissident troops loyal to L. Nkunda, who received support from Rwanda, and the massacre of 160 Tutsi refugees in the Gatumba transit camp in Burundi, which involved troops from the Burundian FNL armed opposition group, the Congolese Mayi-Mayi militias and the FDLR (Rwandan members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces and the Interahamwe militia, responsible for the genocide in Rwanda). In addition to these events, the Rwandan Armed Forces carried out military operations in November which involved pursuing the FDLR on Congolese soil, to which the

TNG responded by sending thousands of soldiers to the region and demanding that sanctions be imposed on Rwanda by the UN Security Council and that respect for the agreements already reached be enforced, threatening the renewal of hostilities between the two countries. In December there were further confrontations between rival factions within the Congolese Armed Forces (pro-government soldiers versus members of the former RCD-Goma armed opposition group, which was allied with Rwanda). MONUC, which was extended to 16,700 troops in order to fulfil its mandate (lower than the number asked for by the UN Secretary General), warned that it might intervene to guarantee the protection of the civilian population. Finally, in the Ituri region (in the northeast of the country) there was an increase in violence by armed groups against the civilian population and a rise in the number of confrontations with MONUC, while the disarmament programme failed. This situation in the east of the country caused the enforced displacement of thousands of people.

The armed conflict that has afflicted the north of **Uganda** since 1986 has gradually decreased in intensity over the course of the year, though confrontations between the LRA armed opposition group and Government Armed Forces increased in southern Sudan, where the LRA has its bases, a fact that has caused the enforced displacement of the Sudanese population into Uganda. Ugandan military operations have weakened the LRA, a fact that could have led to the group's offer of a ceasefire in the middle of November, an offer which the Government accepted, establishing a temporary region for the cessation of hostilities in the north of the country. Nevertheless, the humanitarian situation remained very serious for the 1.6 million displaced people in the region, which was classified by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, J. Egeland, as the most forgotten crisis in the world.

#### d) Maghreb and North Africa

The violence in **Algeria** persisted throughout the year as the result of the armed conflict that has affected the country since 1992, though it was limited to certain regions to the south and east of Algiers, with sporadic fighting between Government Armed Forces and the GSPC armed opposition group, the latter mounting ambushes and false highway checkpoints. Government Armed Forces announced that they would remain neutral during the elections in April, in which A. Bouteflika saw his mandate renewed. This raised the possibility of adopting a general amnesty for the members of armed groups and Armed Forces accused of serious human rights violations, with the aim of promoting peace and national reconciliation.

### América

**Table 1.2. Armed conflicts in America during 2004**

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed participants	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Colombia (1964-)</b>	Government, FARC, ELN, AUC paramilitaries	Historical political exclusion, social injustice, control of natural resources and deterioration in the conflict resulting from drug-trafficking	Stalemate
<b>Haiti (2004-)</b>	Government, pro-former President Aristide militias ( <i>chimères</i> ), rebel groups	Democratic fragility (political repression and authoritarianism), social injustice and deterioration in standards of living	Increase

The current armed conflict in **Colombia** involves fighting between Government Armed Forces and FARC guerrillas. Since the beginning of the year, the Government, with significant financial support and increased numbers of troops from the USA, has deployed around 17,000 soldiers as part of its Patriot Plan, the biggest military offensive ever organised to combat the FARC, though it has not as yet had any visible effects. Confrontations with ELN guerrillas have been very sporadic, and attentions were more focused on the possibility, as yet unspecified, of resuming the negotiation process. The paramilitaries not only failed to comply with the cessation of hostilities, they also experienced serious internal confrontations that left some of their more

well-known leaders dead. In spite of this, the demobilisation process continued, though there is no legal framework in place to dispel questions about the impunity of the process. For the first time in the history of Colombia, the Government managed to deploy police in all the 1,000 municipal areas into which the country is divided.

In **Haiti**, at the beginning of the year, President J. B. Aristide, under pressure from the USA and the advance of armed groups that had previously been his allies, resigned from power and was replaced by a government of transition. Nevertheless, insecurity and violence continued throughout the year, due to confrontations between supporters and opponents of the exiled President, an absence of any form of government and acts of looting. The UN peace-keeping mission, MINUSTAH (which in June replaced the Provisional Multinational Force sent by several countries to try and control the situation following the fall of Aristide) should be in charge of restoring security and disarming the militias, though by the end of the year it had still not completed the deployment of its 6,700 troops, and was incapable of fully complying with its mandate, due to a lack of both material and human resources. The state of insecurity in Port au Prince worsened during the last quarter of 2004, with 150 dying as the result of confrontations between the police, MINUSTAH troops and various different armed groups (especially the group known as the *chimères*).

**In Haiti, at the beginning of the year, President J. B. Aristide, under pressure from the USA and the advance of armed groups that had previously been his allies, resigned from power and was replaced by a government of transition**

## Asia and Pacific

<b>Armed conflicts (beginning-end)</b>	<b>Armed participants</b>	<b>Main causes</b>	<b>Situation compared with January 2004</b>
<b>Afghanistan (2001-)<sup>6</sup></b>	Government, USA, Taliban militias and various groups	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power and ethnic manipulations	Stalemate
<b>India (Assam) (1989-)</b>	ULFA, BJF, NDFB	Autonomy v. independence, and control of economic resources	Stalemate
<b>India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989-)</b>	JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	Autonomy v. independence and religious manipulation	Stalemate
<b>Indonesia (Aceh) (1976-)</b>	Government, GAM	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Stalemate
<b>Indonesia (Irian Jaya) (1963-)</b>	OPM/TPN	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation, demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	End of armed conflict
<b>Nepal (1996-)</b>	Government, CPN	Control of political power and democratic fragility	Increase
<b>Philippines (1969-)</b>	Government, NPA	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Stalemate
<b>Philippines (1978-)</b>	Government, MILF	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Temporary suspension of hostilities
<b>Philippines (1990-)</b>	Government, Abu Sayyaff	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Stalemate
<b>Sri Lanka (1983-)</b>	Government, LTTE	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation	Temporary suspension of hostilities
<b>Thailand (2004-)</b>	Government, Muslim community militias	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation	Increase

6. The current phase of the armed conflict in this country began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has actually been in a situation of armed conflict since 1979.

## a) South Asia

The situation in **Afghanistan** has been characterised by the continuing lack of security and confrontations between Government Armed Forces and US troops on one side and Taliban militias and some warlords on the other, as well as between the rival factions themselves. H. Karzai won the elections of 9 October<sup>7</sup>, as was expected, though these elections were preceded by an increase in levels of violence and attacks by Taliban militias intent on interfering with the process. The main challenges facing H. Karzai are guaranteeing security throughout the country, continuing the DDR programme, combating the cultivation and illicit trafficking of opium and preparing for the coming parliamentary elections in April 2005. Around 3.5 million refugees have returned to their places of origin since UNHCR began the operation for their return in 2001, though 167,000 internally displaced people remain in displacement camps as a result of the current lack of security.

The situation has been examined in two contexts of violence in **India**. As regards the state of **Jammu and Kashmir**, confrontations continued throughout the year between Government Armed Forces and Kashmiri independence groups. Nevertheless, at the end of the year, the Indian Prime Minister, M. Singh, announced a reduction in the number of troops deployed in Kashmir as a sign of the improving security situation, and talks and contacts continued between India and Pakistan and India and the independent AHPC coalition<sup>8</sup>. In the case of the state of **Assam**, several armed groups have been struggling for independence and the defence of the rights of local communities for decades. Confrontations continued throughout the year between the Indian security forces and the ULFA and NGFB armed opposition groups, though the latter have established contacts in order to try and establish a ceasefire<sup>9</sup>.

Turning to the situation in **Nepal**, attacks and fighting between Government Armed Forces and the Maoist CPN armed opposition group continued throughout the year. Since the conflict resumed in August 2003, the number of disappearances in the country has risen sharply, and the security forces have committed hundreds of extra-judicial executions, thousands of arbitrary arrests and numerous cases of torture. For its part, the CPN extended its policy of abductions and kidnappings of the civilian population, mainly students and teachers, with the aim of indoctrinating them and forcing them to receive military training, thus causing the enforced displacement of thousands of people. S. B. Deuba, whose removal in 2002 marked the beginning of the current crisis, was restored as Prime Minister after huge protests. In August, the CPN blocked access to the capital for more than a week, though both parties respected a temporary ceasefire during the last three months of the year, as a sign of their willingness to begin negotiations.

## b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

In the region of **Aceh** in **Indonesia** (in the north of the island of Sumatra), the Government began a large-scale military operation against the GAM armed opposition group, committing serious human rights violations (such as extra-judicial executions and the systematic use of torture). Since then around 2,300 members of the GAM have died as a result of the fighting. In May 2004, the Government replaced martial law with a state of emergency, considering that security conditions had greatly improved and that the military capacity of the GAM armed opposition group had been severely reduced. The state of emergency was extended in November for a further six months. The new President, General S. B. Yudhoyono, also offered an amnesty to any GAM members who agreed to lay down their weapons, though this offer was rejected. At the other end of Indonesia, the situation in **West Papua (Irian Jaya)** ceased to be classified as an armed conflict during the first three months of 2004<sup>10</sup>.

7. See the chapter on post-war rehabilitation.

8. See the chapter on peace processes.

9. Ibid.

10. See the chapter on tensions.

There are currently three different armed conflicts in the **Philippines**. As regards the **MILF** armed opposition group, the year saw sporadic violations of the ceasefire, though both parties reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process. Elsewhere, the offensive by Government Armed Forces against the **NPA** armed opposition group continued, in parallel to the continuing peace talks. Finally, the **Abu Sayyaf** armed opposition group remained active in the south of the country, and 17 alleged members of the group were condemned to death for the kidnapping of four people.

In **Thailand**, the spiral of violence that broke out at the beginning of the year in the four predominantly Muslim provinces in the south of the country resulted in the deaths of 500 people and the deployment of thousands of troops in the region, which borders Malaysia. Various human rights organisations and some Governments criticised the Thai Government's authoritarian approach and the excessive use of force by members of the State security services in their efforts to combat Muslim secessionist organisations that have been operating in the south of the country since the 1980s and have intensified their armed activities over the past year. In this connection, it should be mentioned that the deaths in October of at least 85 Muslims who were being held in military custody resulted in an alarming intensification in the number of attacks against the Buddhist community and Government interests and institutions.

## Europe and the Middle East

<b>Armed conflicts (beginning-end)</b>	<b>Armed participants</b>	<b>Main causes</b>	<b>Situation compared with January 2004</b>
<b>Iraq (2003-)</b>	Transitional Government, USA/UK-led coalition, internal and external armed opposition groups	Struggle for political power and fighting against the presence of foreign troops, access to oil reserves and US military strategy	Increased
<b>Israel-Palestine (2000, 2nd Intifada-)<sup>11</sup></b>	Israeli Government, settlement militias, PNA, armed wings of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organisations, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP, DFLP	Colonisation and control of land, religious manipulation, problems of security and political recognition	Stalemate
<b>Russian Federation (Chechnya) (1991-)</b>	Various	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate

In Europe, confrontations continued throughout the year in **Chechnya (Russia)** between Russian Armed Forces and Chechen armed opposition groups, and the conflict spread into Ingushetia. In this connection, particularly notable was the offensive carried out in the Republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan, which resulted in the deaths of the Ingusheti Interior Minister and another 50 people, and the seizure in September of 1,000 people at a school in Beslan in North Ossetia, responsibility for which was allegedly claimed by the Chechen independence leader S. Basayev. This ended in the deaths of 340 people, the majority of them children. The cause of the massacre was not established. During the August elections to replace the pro-Russian Chechen President, A. Kadirov, who died along with 30 other people in an attack, the Moscow-backed candidate, General A. Aljanov, emerged the winner. In November, the Norwegian Refugee Council accused the Government of pressurising the 115,000 Chechen refugees living in Ingushetia to return to their places of origin, in spite of the lack of security.

11. Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report only analyses the latest phase in the conflict, which began with the second Intifada in September 2000.



As regards the conflict between **Israel** and **Palestine**, the spiral of violence between armed Palestinian groups and the Israeli Armed Forces in the occupied territories increased over the course of the year. Towards the end of the year, Israel carried out its heaviest offensive since the Second Intifada began in September 2000, leading to the deaths in Gaza of more than 150 people in reprisal for the suicide attacks and home-made missiles launched from the north of the Gaza strip. This year will be remembered, however, for the deaths of several Palestinian leaders, including A. Yassin, A. Rantisi and I. El Din Sheij Jalil (the three main Hamas leaders, who were killed in extra-judicial executions committed by Israel), and most importantly Y. Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader, who founded al Fatah and had headed the PLO since 1968, became President of the PNA in 1994, leading the struggle for independence and fighting for international recognition of the Palestinian cause. His death, after two weeks of pain and much speculation as to the cause of his illness (the possibility of poisoning was suggested) opened up a new phase in the internal politics of Palestine. Presidential elections were held on 9 January, and these resulted in the election of M. Abbas as the President of the PNA, opening up the possibility of a resumption of negotiations with Israel<sup>12</sup>.

Following the invasion and occupation of **Iraq** and the overthrow of the S. Hussein regime in May 2003, the presence of weapons of mass destruction was finally discounted at the end of 2004. There has been a sustained increase in the number of acts of violence and attacks and kidnappings against the civilian population and members of the new Interim Iraqi Government (installed one year after the beginning of the occupation), its security forces and the occupying powers. During the course of the year, the USA carried out large-scale military operations, particularly in Najaf and Fallujah, in an attempt to finish off the armed dissidents who had taken control of the country's main cities. These operations led to the enforced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The legitimacy of the interim Government has not gained sufficient acceptance from the Iraqi population in general. Nevertheless, in resolution 1546, the UN Security Council legitimised the USA's process for the transfer of power in the country from 30 June, thus giving its formal acknowledgement of the interim Government led by I. Alawi and once again assuming a supporting role within the framework of the elections planned for 30 January. Elsewhere, the occupying forces failed during 2004 in their promise to guarantee security, governance and the restoration of freedom in Iraq.

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### 1.3. Important issues raised during 2004

#### a) The protection of civilians in armed conflicts

In the armed conflicts currently seen around the world, **the civilian population** has become not only **the main victim** but also the **main target for the warring factions**, who act with complete impunity. Added to this is the fact that the line between humanitarian assistance and military objectives and foreign policy has become blurred, a situation which has led to the deaths of dozens of humanitarian workers (as repeatedly denounced by a number of international organisations and NGOs). As a consequence, the treaties protecting the rights of the civilian population were at the heart of the debate during the 59<sup>th</sup> period of sessions of the UN General Assembly, and the UN Secretary General himself presented a report in which he proposed a new security system for protecting the more than 100,000 people working for the United Nations, given the steady increase in attacks against the organisation's personnel during recent years<sup>13</sup>. However, a recent study by the Brookings Institution<sup>14</sup> emphasised that up until now, the United Nations' approach to the protection of the internally displaced had been arranged on an *ad hoc* basis, individually for each specific case, rather than following a global agenda in this area, meaning that the organisation's

12. See the chapter on peace processes.

13. See UN General Assembly, *Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations*, A/59/365, 11/10/04, at <<http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/59/365&Lang=E>>.

14. See Brookings Institution, *Protect or neglect? Toward a more effective approach to the protection of Internally Displaced Persons*, 23/11/04, at <<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/bi-gen-23nov.pdf>>.

efforts had been seriously affected by an **absence of political and financial will on the part of member states**. It proposed instead that the protection of the civilian population and the prevention of displacement become the central axis of the United Nations' mandate. In this context, at the end of May the UN Secretary General presented his fourth report<sup>15</sup> to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. In his report, he tackled a series of issues for which the adoption of specific measures would be required:

#### Chart 1.4. Problems in protecting civilians in armed conflicts

- Humanitarian access is being impeded for more than 10 million people caught in a situation of armed conflict
- Attacks against humanitarian personnel have increased in many regions. The support and acceptance of local communities no longer represents a sufficient guarantee for their protection
- Armed groups have infiltrated refugee and displacement camps in order to recruit and abduct civilians for the purposes of using them as soldiers or committing abuses, a circumstance which dilutes the civilian nature of these camps; the presence of armed groups also has a destabilising effect on the region
- There has been an increase in sexual and gender-based violence in many areas, and the particular needs relating to assistance for and the protection of women and children are not being taken into account
- DDR programmes are failing, usually due to a lack of resources, but also because of problems of planning and coordination, a fact that involves a risk of a return to violence
- Conflicts and lack of security last longer due to the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms, leading to the rearmament of militias and local defence forces. The regional coordination of peace-keeping forces is therefore necessary
- It is necessary to impose sanctions and strong demands on parties in order to ensure compliance with International Law, complaints to the International Criminal Court and the rapid deployment of forces with a clear mandate, for the purposes of combating impunity
- The naming of certain armed groups as terrorist organisations has had adverse consequences on the opportunities for humanitarian negotiations
- Political interests, strategic priorities and the attention of the world's media have led to disproportionate responses to the different humanitarian emergencies

#### b) Natural resources and armed conflict: the shortage of water as the basis for conflict during the 21<sup>st</sup> century

The increasing shortage of this resource is an element that is becoming a potential focus of tension and conflict. In a recent meeting organised by the FAO in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), it was underlined that **the non-sustainable use of water, poor management, pollution and rapid population growth were combining to increase the shortage of this resource**, a fact that could lead to **a rise in the number of conflicts and food shortages**. More than two-thirds of the 60 river basins on the continent of Africa are shared by more than one country, a fact that could become the basis for potential disputes. The experts are warning that greater amounts of this resource will be needed due to the growth in the world's population, which it is estimated will reach 8,900 million people by 2050. In Africa alone, water shortages already affect 300 million people and cause the deaths of 6,000 people a year. The United Nations has stated that by 2025, one in every two people in Africa will suffer the consequences of water shortages, meaning that this resource is being increasingly seen as an asset that has strategic importance. Some of the regions that currently find themselves in the most worrying position and that require the attention of the international community are the following:

15. See UN Security Council, Report presented to the Security Council by the UN Secretary General on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, S/2004/431, 28/05/04, at <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/363/16/PDF/N0436316.pdf?OpenElement>. This report studied the plan of action on this subject, prepared by the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Coordinator of Emergency Aid, J. Egeland, *Statement of Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland at the Open Meeting of the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, 09/12/03, at <http://ochaonline.un.org/DocView.asp?DocID=98>.

## Chart 1.5. Main regions of tension and dispute as a result of water shortages

### AFRICA

- The borders of Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon all converge at **Lake Chad**, which has shrunk by 95% since the 1960s. Climate change and over-use have meant that 9 million people are now in a desperate situation as the result of a lack of water.
- 160 million people in 10 countries who share the **Nile** basin depend on the river's waters. A treaty signed between the United Kingdom and Egypt in 1929 established a ban on any operations that reduce the amount of water reaching Egypt, though Tanzania has recently talked about building an aqueduct for agricultural purposes. 1993 saw the creation of the Nile Basin Initiative, which has made certain advances, establishing agreements between some member states in respect of the joint management of potential resources.

### AMERICA

- The construction of a large reservoir using the **River Bio Bio** in **Chile** has led to the enforced displacement of thousands of members of the Mapuche community from their ancestral lands.


### ASIA

- The management and use of water from the **River Indus** has given rise to tensions between provinces in the north and south of **Pakistan**.
- In **China**, the construction of the Three Gorges reservoir on the **Yangtze** river has led to the enforced displacement of 600,000 people. It is planned to channel some of the water to feed the **Huang He** river, which irrigates China's main crop-growing region and is currently running low and highly polluted as the result of agricultural activities.
- Management of the waters of the **Mekong** river, which is shared by **Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao** and **China**, is a further cause of tension in Southeast Asia.
- The abusive use of water from the river **Ganges** has led to its gradual reduction and contamination, placing it at the centre of a dispute between **India** and **Bangladesh**.

### MIDDLE EAST

- The management of water in the Middle East (which houses 5% of the world's population and yet attempts to survive on 1% of its water resources) forms part of the dispute between **Israel** and **Palestine**, and also between **Lebanon, Israel** and **Syria**, due to competition for the scant resources from the Sea of Galilee, which in turn feeds the River Jordan, whose strategic management by Israel (along with the scarce water sources in the West Bank) has resulted in shortages for the Palestinian population.
- The drainage and irrigation schemes put in place by S. Hussein in the south of **Iraq** have led to the loss of 90% of one of the world's most important wetland areas. Management of the waters of the rivers **Tigris** and **Euphrates** have led to tensions between **Iraq, Syria** and **Turkey**, due to the construction of dams and irrigation channels.


## Armed conflicts



## 2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

The following chapter contains an analysis of the situations of tension and disputes considered to be high-risk during 2004 (indicator no. 2), even though the great majority of them have their origins in previous years. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes are understood to be contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the state, which involve alterations in the operation of the state's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and States of exception or emergency<sup>1</sup>), and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. These tensions may not occur within the geographical territory of the State in question, but we have borne in mind the extent to which the state's own interests or stability are directly affected, as well as the fact that they may involve specific attacks on the territory of another country. Finally, we have also included contexts in which a peace agreement has been signed at some time or another between opposing parties but whose implementation is experiencing serious difficulties.

**Table 2.1. Number of tensions by region in 2004 and 2003**



At the end of 2004, there were 58 areas of tension, bearing in mind that some countries were involved in several of these situations, and that more than one situation of tension may exist within a single country, as

**The number of situations of tension has increased from 52 to 58 over the last year**

is the case in India, Indonesia and Angola for example. The intensity, nature and duration of the contexts analysed varies enormously, from scenarios in which human rights and basic freedoms are violated to those that result in low level confrontations. However, the common element in all these cases is the possibility that the tensions or disputes

in question may increase in intensity and lead to armed conflict. Although the number of situations of tension has increased from 52 to 58 over the last year, it is worth pointing out on the positive side that some contexts were no longer classified as situations of tension in 2004, i.e. Afghanistan – Pakistan, India (West Bengal), The Solomon Islands and the Maldives.

1. For the purposes of this report, a state of emergency is understood to mean a situation in which constitutional order is disrupted with the restriction of certain basic freedoms. This term is used differently in different legislatures, such as, for example, State of Exception, interior disturbance, State of National Disaster, etc.

**Table 2.2. Situations of tension that worsened during 2004**

Azerbaijan	Indonesia (Moluccan Islands)	Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)
Belarus	Lebanon – Israel	Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)
Brazil (Rio de Janeiro)	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
Georgia	DR Congo – Rwanda – Burundi	Ukraine
Guinea	Mano River region (Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea)	Uzbekistan
Equatorial Guinea		

## Africa

### a) Southern Africa

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Angola</b>	Political violence, social discontent	New situation of tension
<b>Angola (Cabinda)</b>	Autonomy v. independence	Reduction
<b>Angola (Lundas) – DR Congo</b>	Policy of enforced repatriation, human rights violations	New situation of tension
<b>Comoros</b>	Struggle for political power	Reduction
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	Democratic fragility, political and economic crisis	Stalemate

There are currently 3 situations of tension in Angola, 2 of which have arisen during the course of 2004. The first one, which already existed in 2003, is in the enclave of **Cabinda**, in which the Angolan Government has been fighting the FLEC armed opposition group since 1975 over the independence of this oil-rich region (it produces 60% of the country's oil). Although there have been significant advances in the peace process<sup>2</sup>, a fact which points to an eventual resolution in the future, a number of human rights organisations, both domestic and international, have continued to denounce the abuses being committed against the civilian population by the security forces in their attempts to finish off the armed group. A second context is the diamond-producing province of **Lundas** (in the east), where the Government has, since the beginning of the year, been engaging in a policy of enforced repatriation of the immigrant population working in the diamond mines. The national authorities have themselves admitted that more than 300,000 people, the majority of them Congolese, were expelled from the country during 2004 as a result of this policy. The United Nations and some humanitarian and human rights organisations have also repeatedly denounced the serious human rights violations being committed against the expelled population by the security forces, particularly the sexual abuses being perpetrated against women and children. Finally, the end of the year saw the inclusion of the general situation that has arisen in **Angola** as a consequence of the frequent acts of political violence (mainly led by the governing MPLA and the main opposition party, UNITA), the bitter dispute between the Government and the opposition over the arrangement of a date for general elections and the establishment of an independent electoral commission, and the growing climate of frustration shown among the Angolan population as regards the status of the post-war rehabilitation process.

In **Comoros**, the holding of elections to the different autonomous parliaments in the middle of March and the federal parliament in the middle of April in a climate of transparency and normality represented a huge advance in the implementation of the agreements reached in December 2003. Subsequently, the establishment of a Federal Assembly in which the autonomous islands exert more power has led to a gradual return to institutional normality and balance between the archipelago's different institutions, ending the tensions that have affected the islands over recent years.

2. See the chapter on peace processes.

**In Zimbabwe the growing climate of tension and polarisation could degenerate into a rising tide of violence like the one that occurred in 2002**

Although the humanitarian, social and economic crisis that has affected **Zimbabwe** for several years did not show any substantial deterioration during 2004, a number of groups have continued to denounce the attitude of R. Mugabe's Government in respect of human rights, particularly after the adoption of a new law aimed at restricting the activities of NGOs in the country. In addition, the open conflict that has existed since 2002 between the governing ZANU-PF party and the main opposition MDC party has not improved in any way, in spite of the intense diplomatic activity supported by South African President T. Mbeki, and the decision of the country's courts to acquit MDC leader M. Tsvangirai, who had been facing charges of treason. The proximity of the parliamentary elections (to be held in March 2005), in which the MDC will finally take part, has led to certain sections of the civilian population raising concerns about the growing climate of tension and polarisation between supporters of the 2 sides, which could degenerate into a rising tide of violence like the one that occurred in 2002.

**b) West Africa**

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Côte d'Ivoire-Burkina Faso</b>	Diplomatic tensions	Stalemate
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)	New situation of tension
<b>Ghana (Dagbon)</b>	Community confrontation, struggle for political power	Reduction
<b>Guinea</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, impact of regional crises	Increase
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)	Stalemate
<b>Mano River region (Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea)</b>	Widespread destabilisation due to forced displacement caused by the armed conflicts in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire	Increase
<b>Nigeria</b>	Democratic fragility (political instability)	Stalemate
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	Democratic fragility, disputes over control of resources	Reduction
<b>Senegal (Casamance)</b>	Autonomy v. independence	Reduction

The fragile situation in Liberia and, in particular, the fresh upsurge in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, have increased the risk of a crisis on a regional scale in the so-called **Mano River** region, which includes Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The steady flow of weapons, combatants and mercenaries is the main reason for this context of tension, which has sounded alarm bells at the United Nations as a result of the permanent instability that the region is facing. In this connection, representatives of the 5 political and peace-keeping missions in the region (UNOGBIS, UNOCI, UNMIL, UNAMSIL and UNOWA) met on several occasions during the year, for the purposes of coordinating their efforts and offering a joint approach to this regional crisis. For his part, the UN Secretary General asked the Security Council to extend the mandate of UNOWA (the United Nations Office in West Africa, the UN mission overseeing this region) until 2007.

The tense relations between the governments of **Côte d'Ivoire** and **Burkina Faso**, which worsened following accusations from Abidjan that the Burkinese government was supporting armed Ivorian groups, gave rise to various incidents of provocation and verbal confrontation during the course of the year. The most notable occurred in July, when Burkina Faso accused Côte d'Ivoire of violating its air space with both civilian and military flights, threatening to shoot planes down if any further intrusion occurred.

Turning to **Guinea**, the year was marked by the many protests by certain groups against the policies of President L. Conté, who was re-elected in March in elections that were marked by tensions and complaints of fraud. In this connection, human rights organisations warned of the lack of democratic guarantees and freedoms throughout the country, while at the same time voicing their concerns that the spiral of violence and instability could lead to a coup d'État. Mention should be made of the worrying increase in tension in the Guinée-Forestière region (in the southeast of the country), an area that, given its proximity to Liberia

and the influx of both weapons and mercenaries, is emerging as an important focal point for the volatility and instability affecting the whole region. As a result, organisations such as the EU have called on the Conakry Government to introduce political and economic reforms in order to improve governance and democracy in the country.

In **Guinea-Bissau**, the relatively favourable course that the country had been pursuing following the coup d'état at the end of 2003, with the successful holding of parliamentary elections during March, was cut short 6 months later by the uprising by 600 soldiers who killed V. Correia Seabra, the leader of the armed forces and the person who had led the previous year's coup. This group, which was protesting against the non-payment of wages, brought about the complete restructuring of the Guinean army and attracted the attentions of the international community (particularly Portugal), which sent several missions to the country in an attempt to implement a definitive peace process. Nevertheless, the country's authorities endorsed the holding of presidential elections, planned for April 2005. At the end of the year, the UN Secretary General sought political, financial and technical support for the country, warning that the social and economic situation remained critical and underlining the danger of polarisation between the different ethnic communities in the country.

### Chart 2.1. Mano River: the African tinder box

The complex situation of conflict affecting a large part of the western section of the African continent, particularly the so-called Mano River region, has forced the United Nations and other organisations working in the region to attempt to take a broader and more global approach to a conflict which has fundamentally inter-related and common roots. The links between certain armed groups, the political exploitation of rivalries between communities, the huge presence of small arms and mercenaries and the serious human consequences that result from each upsurge in violence in the region have made it necessary to provide an immediate structured response for the whole area. Although the United Nations has established a mission charged with coordinating joint efforts in the region and arranging a series of meetings between representatives of the political and peace-keeping missions currently operating in West Africa, other bodies have warned of the lack of attention being paid to this region by the international community, underlining the danger that this situation may lead to a regional crisis of large proportions. As a result, the strengthening of these efforts and moves to increase awareness of the situations of conflict, tension and rehabilitation affecting this region are fundamental in order to prevent a scenario which would seem highly likely in the medium term.

Two situations of tension that showed highly favourable developments over the course of last year were the Senegalese region of Casamance and Dagbon in the northern part of Ghana. As regards **Casamance**, the Senegalese Government and the MFDC armed opposition group signed a peace agreement on 30 December which put an official end to 22 years of armed confrontations<sup>3</sup> that have left more than 3,500 people dead, 50,000 displaced and hundreds mutilated by anti-personnel mines. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that at least 3 factions of the armed group refused to endorse the agreement. In the region of **Dagbon**, where around 30 people died in March 2002 as a result of confrontations between the Andani and Abudu communities, the Government decided finally to lift the state of emergency and nightly curfew that had been in place since the dispute arose. The Government regarded this measure as evidence of a growing improvement in the security situation in this region.

**Equatorial Guinea** was one of the most significant areas of tension in Africa during 2004. The most important events took place in March, when dozens of people were arrested both in the country itself and in Zimbabwe in connection with an alleged coup aimed at overthrowing the regime of T. Obiang. Malabo accused the leader of the Government in exile in Spain, S. Moto, of being behind the alleged coup attempt. At the end of the year, the courts sentenced 20 people linked with these events to between 14 and 34 years in prison. These people included 5 South Africans and 6 Armenians. In addition, S. Moto and another 8 Equatorial Guineans exiled in Spain, though not present in court, were condemned to 64 and 52 years in prison respectively. Mention

**Equatorial Guinea was one of the most significant areas of tension in Africa during 2004**

3. See the chapter on peace processes.



should be made of the possible link between the coup and the son of the former British Prime Minister, M. Thatcher, who was detained by the South African authorities and may face extradition to Equatorial Guinea. Elsewhere, the parliamentary and municipal elections held in April, which ended in victory for the governing PDGE party, took place amid complaints of massive fraud from both the opposition and international observers.

Finally, **Nigeria** is the scene of various situations of conflict which combine to mean that the country as a whole is regarded as a situation of tension. This is fundamentally due to 2 elements. Firstly, there were the disturbances that arose both before and after the local elections at the end of March, which involved the security forces and civilian groups and left dozens of people dead. These elections, in which the governing PDP party won a resounding victory, took place amid accusations of fraud and with a very low voter turnout. The second factor was the important series of general strikes called by the country's unions in protest against the increase in the price of oil, particularly the strike that took place during October. These strikes were well supported and brought a large part of the country to a standstill. There is also the issue of the border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula, which the International Court of Justice resolved in Cameroon's favour in 2002. Nigeria's withdrawal from this territory has come to a standstill.

Finally, in **Sao Tome and Principe**, the tensions felt in the country during the past year as a result of the attempted coup d'État in July have gradually subsided, and no incidents or tensions were recorded during the final months of the year.

### c) Horn of Africa

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Eritrea and Ethiopia</b>	Territorial disputes	Stalemate
<b>Ethiopia (Gambella)</b>	Demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Reduction
<b>Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)</b>	Territorial disputes	Increase
<b>Sudan (SPLA)</b>	Autonomy v. independence, religious confrontation, control of resources	New situation of tension

The peace process between **Eritrea** and **Ethiopia** remained at stalemate throughout the year, something that may be a powerful source of instability in the future, though at the end of November the Ethiopian Prime Minister, M. Zenawi, announced his decision to accept the border demarcation established by the EEBC. This Border Commission handed down its decision on the demarcation of the border in April 2001, a decision that was originally accepted by both parties, though Ethiopia then rejected it in September 2003. This new Ethiopian initiative to move the peace process forward, in spite of the negative response from Eritrea, includes a further 4 points: the resolution of the dispute between both countries by peaceful means; the resolution of the fundamental causes of the conflict through dialogue; the appointment of someone to act as an official liaison; and the immediate initiation of talks with the aim of implementing the decision reached. Elsewhere, the UN Centre for the Coordination of Mines announced in November that there had been no mine explosions during the past 6 months in the Temporary Security Zone, the 25km-wide strip patrolled by UNMEE. Tensions subsided over the course of the year in the region of **Gambella**, in the east of **Ethiopia**, though there are still 51,000 internally displaced people in the area as a result of the acts of violence that left between 60 and 150 people dead in December 2003, with around 250 dying in reprisals in January 2004, following an upsurge in violence between the Anuak and Nuer communities. During the 1980s, the Government implemented programmes for the resettlement of people in the area, leading to an increase in tensions with the local population. Added to this was the discovery of oil reserves, from which the Anuak community wants a share of the profits.

In the rest of the Horn of Africa, mention should also be made of the upsurge in violence that occurred between the two regions in the north of **Somalia**, **Somaliland** and **Puntland**, as the result of a historical

dispute over the regions of Sool and Sanaag, which fall geographically within the borders of Somaliland, though the clans in the area have links with Puntland. There have been several confrontations between militias belonging to the 2 authorities since September, and the appointment of A. Yusuf Ahmed as the new President of Somalia (up until that point he had been President of the autonomous region of Puntland) led to fears of further confrontations in the future, as happened at the beginning of November.

**Mention should also be made of the upsurge in violence that occurred between the two regions in the north of Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland**

Finally, in southern **Sudan**, the armed confrontations in which the Sudanese Government and the SPLA armed opposition group had been involved since 1983 ceased to be classified as a situation of armed conflict, being instead regarded as a situation of tension. This resulted from the definitive peace agreement signed on 9 January in Kenya<sup>4</sup> and the low level of armed activity experienced by the region of the course of the year. However, mention should be made of the increase in tensions in Upper Nile state as a result of the growing presence of troops from the Sudanese army, pro-government militias and the SPLA, who have been involved in some outbreaks of violence.

#### d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Chad</b>	Struggle for political power, democratic fragility, destabilisation caused by forced displacements resulting from the conflict in Darfur	Increase
<b>Congo</b>	Political control over different ethnic groups and democratic fragility	Stalemate
<b>Central African Republic</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Stalemate
<b>DR Congo – Rwanda – Burundi</b>	Minority political control and the search for border security	Increase
<b>Uganda-Kenya (Karamoja – Turkana)</b>	Governance, regional marginalisation, inter-community confrontations over natural resources	Increase
<b>Uganda – Rwanda</b>	Control over natural resources and the search for border security	Stalemate

In **Chad**, the Sudanese pro-government *Janjaweed* militia continued to make incursions and carry out attacks against the refugee population in the east of the country, with confrontations between these militias and Chadian armed forces. The flow of refugees from Sudan contributed to the increasing tension. In relation to this situation, several sectors of the opposition and parts of the military accused I. Déby's Government of failing to implement sufficient measures to protect the Chadian population and the Zaghawa community in the east of the country, who are unhappy about the policy of neutrality in respect of Sudan, given that it is they who are suffering the consequences of the conflict in the Darfur region. In addition, the referendum on constitutional reform, which would allow President I. Déby to stand as a candidate for an unlimited number of five-year terms led to a climate of tension, both among the political opposition and among certain sectors of the armed forces. At the end of September, the armed forces carried out a military operation against the alleged perpetrators of an attempted coup d'État. New tensions arose in the south of the country between October and the beginning of November as a result of the arrival from the north of the Muslim nomad population, seeking work in the oil fields. This situation led to several deaths.

**In Chad, the Sudanese pro-government *Janjaweed* militia continued to make incursions and carry out attacks against the refugee population**

Turning to Central Africa, the situation remained unchanged throughout the year in **Congo**, though there were periodic acts of looting and abuses against the civilian population by Reverend Ntoumi's Ninja militias, as well as attacks on parts of the railway line linking Brazzaville with the port city of Pointe-Noire, lead-

4. See the chapter on peace processes.

ing to a suspension of services due to the lack of security. OCHA once again drew attention to the continuing serious humanitarian crisis in the Pool region, which forms the epicentre for the confrontations that put an end to the peace agreement of March 2003.

The situation in the **Central African Republic** was marked by a continuing lack of security in several parts of the country and by the progress seen in the transitional process, which culminated in December in the holding of a constitutional referendum, in the hope that parliamentary and presidential elections can be held in January, thus bringing the transitional phase to an end. The middle of the year saw fighting in Bangui between Government armed forces and the former mercenaries who had supported the coup d'état in which F. Bozizé seized power. At the same time there were concerns over the possible arrival of refugees from the neighbouring Sudanese region of Darfur.

Elsewhere, the tensions between **DR Congo** and **Rwanda** increased during the year as the result of the massacre of 160 Congolese members of the Tutsi community in a refugee camp in Gatumba, inside Burundi, and MONUC's evidence of the incursion into Congolese territory by Rwandan armed forces in pursuit of Rwandan armed opposition groups who had been responsible for the genocide in 1994 (former Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe militias)<sup>5</sup>. Ironically, only a week earlier, both countries had signed the Dar es Salaam Declaration, together with Uganda, in which they undertook to resolve any future disputes between them through peaceful dialogue. Finally, after a break of several months, forced upon it by the military operations against the LRA armed opposition group, the Government of **Uganda** announced that from October it would be resuming its operations to disarm the Karamojong militias in the region of **Karamoja**, in the northeast of the country, along the border with **Kenya** and Sudan. The operation will begin with a month of voluntary disarmament, following which the process will be enforced. This announcement was made in response to the increasing lack of security in the region, caused by the fighting between these militias and Government armed forces. Local leaders requested that the process be carried out simultaneously in the regions bordering the country's neighbours (Kenya and Sudan).

## Chart 2.2. Conflict prevention and early warning

### What is conflict prevention?

It is a combination of actions, policies, strategies and governmental or non-governmental institutions that are expressly aimed at containing or alleviating threats, the use of organised violence or other forms of coercion by individual States or organised groups, with the aim of resolving any political disputes that may arise either internally or between States. Preventive diplomacy, in short, consists of a series of measures aimed at preventing disputes from arising between two or more parties, or preventing existing disputes from turning into conflicts, or from preventing conflicts, if they do arise, from spreading.

### What is early warning?

This is the systematic gathering and analysis of information from areas in crisis for the purposes of anticipating an increase in the level of armed conflict, developing strategic responses and presenting the parties involved with appropriate options that are able to be implemented.

### What is the primary aim?

To act when the earliest symptoms of a conflict are seen, in order to ensure that any violence does not go beyond the point where it would be difficult to control. Early warning systems detect conflicts but do not interfere with their causes, as this is the job of the political decision-making bodies.

### What are the most frequent problems?

- Insufficient or poor knowledge of the context of the conflict
- An absence of will from the parties involved
- Indecision on the part of the international community when the time comes to act
- A lack of willingness to act if issues of national interest are not affected or there is no pressure from public opinion
- The adoption of the appropriate measures always happens late, when the consequences are already clear
- The measures adopted frequently do not affect the reasons behind the conflict, only its consequences, given that structural measures of a socio-economic or political nature are always insufficient and are often not coordinated with one another
- A lack of public interest and capacity to act on a social basis

## e) Maghreb and North Africa

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Mauritania</b>	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)	Increase

Three alleged coup attempts in **Mauritania** during the last 15 months (in June 2003 and August and September 2004), according to reports by the Government, have led to increased political tension and harassment of the opposition. More than 180 people linked with the Islamist opposition parties (particularly the PDC) have been detained since June 2003, and they remain in custody, isolated from any form of communication. Since November they have been subjected to trials that do not meet the international requirements for procedural guarantees, according to reports from a number of local and international NGOs. The detainees include the opposition leader and former President, M. K. Ould Haidalla, and his party colleagues, M. E. Ould Dedaw, J. Ould Mansour and M. O. M. Moussa, along with 20 members of the National Guard, among them its commander, S. Ould Hanena, and around twenty civilians. Mauritania accused Burkina Faso and Mali of supporting the coup attempts. The country was also affected by the most serious plague of locusts to affect the African continent since 1989, and it called for international assistance in an attempt to alleviate the situation.

## America

### a) North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Guatemala</b>	Political and historic exclusion, social injustice, breach of peace agreements, impunity and organised crime	Stalemate
<b>Mexico (Chiapas)</b>	Discrimination against indigenous peoples	Stalemate

In **Guatemala**, hundreds of thousands of former paramilitaries engaged in numerous acts of force and intimidation throughout the year in their demands for the payment of financial compensation for services offered to the State during the internal armed conflict (1960-1996), particularly after the Constitutional Court twice rejected attempts by the Government to pay this compensation, considering it illegal. An increase in agricultural disputes was also recorded throughout the country, leading to a considerable rise in the number of land occupations, enforced evictions, demonstrations by civilian organisations and confrontations between peasant groups and the State security forces, the latter leaving several dead and injured. Elsewhere, both the United Nations and the OAS, along with a number of local organisations, repeatedly denounced the wave of violence and murders affecting women and the impunity that has accompanied this phenomenon. As regards impunity, progress was made in respect of several issues, including the house arrest of former dictator E. Rios Montt, the international warrant for the arrest of former President A. Portillo, and the preventive custody order against former Vice President F. Reyes, these last 2 being accused of numerous cases of corruption between 1999 and 2004.

In **Mexico (Chiapas)**, several local and international organisations warned of an increase in the number of patrols and incursions by the country's armed forces, complaining about the growing paramilitary presence in some parts of the state, along with the precarious living conditions that still affect thousands of internally displaced people. In addition, tensions rose between the Government and the EZLN over the eventual enforced eviction of the displaced Zapatista population who have been living for a long time in the so-called biosphere of the Blue Mountains. These people, who according to the EZLN abandoned their communities as a result of harassment from the paramilitaries, have announced that they will not leave the biosphere until the Government complies with the San Andres Agreements of 1996. Finally, inter-community confrontations were recorded at different points during the year, attributed in large measure by some

organisations to the growing agricultural dispute, the coffee and maize crisis and the social and political polarisation being experienced in several parts of Chiapas.

## b) South America

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Bolivia</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Reduction
<b>Brazil (Rio de Janeiro)</b>	Exclusion, economic inequality, control of the drugs trade	Increase
<b>Ecuador</b>	Governance (widespread protests and weak government)	Stalemate
<b>Peru</b>	Governance, reactivation of Sendero Luminoso	Stalemate
<b>Venezuela</b>	Problems of governance	Reduction

### In Bolivia, following a few months of relative normality at the beginning of the year, regional demonstrations and the continuing protests of several groups

In **Bolivia**, following a few months of relative normality at the beginning of the year, regional demonstrations and the continuing protests of several groups (coca-growers, the transport sector, teachers, the medical sector, etc.) once again became widespread, and there were even rumours of a coup d'État against the non-partisan Executive of C. Mesa. Highways were once again blocked and lands occupied in protest against the Government's drugs policies and the marginalisation and exclusion suffered by many regions of the country. Nevertheless, as in the previous year, the item that caused the most controversy was the country's energy policy. In spite of the holding of a referendum, in which the majority of the population voted in favour of the State resuming a leading role in the exploitation, distribution and commercialisation of gas resources, this issue continued to cause a number of protests, and even the departments of Tarija and Santa Cruz (which contain most of the country's hydrocarbon reserves) demanded a system of autonomy for both their regions. The Government also placed the security forces on a state of emergency alert, after the capital had experienced a wave of attacks while the Congress was debating a controversial draft energy bill. Elsewhere, in respect of the territorial dispute that has been running between Bolivia and Chile for more than a century, diplomatic relations were resumed (they had been cut off in 1978), in spite of the fact that both governments maintain practically unchanged positions, while a certain amount of progress was recorded in the area of economic cooperation.

In the state of **Rio de Janeiro** (Brazil), the year was marked by an upsurge in the violence that had begun in the months of April and May. Although this increase in violence was mainly centred around the attempts by gangs from *Vidigal* to seize control of the drugs trade from gangs from *Rocinha*, the most heavily populated suburb in the Americas, this increase in violent action among different drug-trafficking gangs would seem to result from a handover from one generation to the next at the top of the main drug-trafficking faction in Rio de Janeiro, the *Comando Vermelho*, caused by the arrest by the police of various important leaders of the group.

In **Ecuador**, the indigenous Pachakutik movement was mainly responsible for the continuing mass protests against the Government's economic policies and for the demands for the resignation of the country's President, L. Gutiérrez, which reached a climax during the 34<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of the OAS held in Quito. At the same time, peasant organisations, unions, indigenous peoples and student groups led various demonstrations during the course of the year against the climate of insecurity and impunity and the violence being perpetrated on important social leaders. The political crisis in the country was also heightened when several opposition parties supported a parliamentary initiative directed at putting L. Gutiérrez on trial on several charges of corruption. Elsewhere, some human rights organisations complained about the growing climate of harassment that the Kichwa communities in the Sarayacu region were suffering at the hands of the transnational oil companies, with alleged support from Government armed forces.

In **Peru**, the crisis of governance being felt by the country and the weakness of A. Toledo's Executive was reflected in the frequent Government reshuffles, the President's historically low levels of popularity (particularly following the corruption scandals that emerged among people in his inner circle) and the constant calls by opposition parties and several sectors of society for the President's resignation and the bringing forward of elections. The situation of tension was also increased as a result of the widespread protests by peasant groups and indigenous organisations against the Government's anti-drugs policies, along with the demonstrations organised by various civilian groups (including a national strike) as a result of demands from different business sectors. The deployment of hundreds of troops in several of the country's regional departments in order to combat the many centres of regional tension and prevent road-blocks and other acts of force led to some serious confrontations. Elsewhere, the resumption of the trials of several important members of the former armed opposition group, Sendero Luminoso, reawakened the debate on the group's degree of organisation and military capacity.

In **Venezuela**, the dynamic of social polarisation and political violence that had prevailed in the country over the previous 2 years was seen to diminish, to a great extent as the result of the holding in August of a referendum on whether President H. Chavez should remain in power. The President's victory in this poll was backed up by international observers deployed in the country. Nevertheless, tensions rose once again in the second half of the year as a result of the opposition's allegations of fraud during the referendum, the approval of the controversial Social Responsibility on Radio and Television Act and the reopening of investigations into people linked with the coup d'état of April 2002. Elsewhere, it should be mentioned that diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Colombia have experienced moments of tension throughout the year, mainly due to the accusations exchanged between Caracas and Bogota about their alleged respective support for the FARC and paramilitary groups.

**In Venezuela, the dynamic of social polarisation and political violence that had prevailed in the country over the previous 2 years was seen to diminish, to a great extent as the result of the holding in August of a referendum on whether President H. Chavez should remain in power**

## Asia

### a) Southern Asia

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>India – Pakistan</b>	Territorial disputes	Reduction
<b>India (Gujarat)</b>	Religious confrontation	Stalemate
<b>India (Manipur)</b>	Democratic fragility, the fight against terrorism	New situation of tension
<b>India (Tripura)</b>	Autonomy v. independence	Reduction
<b>Pakistan</b>	Religious confrontation, the fight against terrorism	Increase
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	Autonomy v. independence	Increase

As regards **India** and **Pakistan**, 2004 was marked by a progressive reduction in tensions between the 2 countries, within the framework of a process of rapprochement and dialogue, coupled with many confidence-building measures implemented by the respective governments of both countries<sup>6</sup>.

Several states in **India** have experienced situations of tension. In the state of **Gujarat**, despite some episodes of tension and violence, the reopening of the trials of some of the people accused of being responsible for the massacres of 2002 was the most significant event of 2004. However, while these trials and the associated investigations were being reopened, complaints continued about the intimidation of some witnesses. For its part, the Government announced that it was preparing a law aimed at protecting religious

6. See the chapter on peace processes.

minorities and combating inter-community violence by pursuing the perpetrators of such acts and thus preventing any repetition of events like the 2002 massacre.

The **northeast** of the country was the area that experienced the most situations of tension. Mention should be made of the increase in the number of operations carried out by Government armed forces in this region against the many armed opposition groups operating in the various states. In the state of **Manipur**, the second half of the year was marked by mass social demonstrations against the anti-terrorist legislation in force in the state (the Armed Forces Special Powers Act). The flashpoint that set these protests off was the death of a woman at the hands of the security forces after she had been accused of belonging to an armed opposition group. Attempts at dialogue between the authorities and social groups have not borne fruit, in spite of the meetings held, and hundreds of people have been detained over the past months. In the state of **Tripura**, the situation has seen a number of positive developments over the course of the year, due mainly to the ceasefire agreed by the Government and the NLFT armed opposition group. However, this ceasefire has seen its ups and downs, and there have been various violent incidents over the course of the year. Nevertheless, during December, the armed group reiterated its desire to continue talks with the Government and pursue the possibility of including other groups, such as the ATTF, in the process.

In **Pakistan**, mention should be made of the gradual increase in tension and violence throughout the year in various different areas. On the one hand, Government armed forces and alleged members of Taliban militias linked to the al-Qaida network have continued their armed confrontations during the course of the year, resulting in the enforced displacement of hundreds of people and causing a number of deaths (some sources put the number at 400). The Government admitted having deployed 10,000 troops along the border with Afghanistan, and at the end of the year it announced that it had regained control over a large part of the territory that had until then been in the hands of these militias. Elsewhere, a number of religiously motivated attacks took place in 2004. The Sunni and Shiite communities have been both victims and perpetrators of these attacks, as well as being involved in inter-community confrontations that have left hundreds dead in several cities, particularly Sialkot, Karachi and Quetta.

This violence led the Government to approve various measures that restricted the celebration of religious activities and allowed it to detain people linked with denominational organisations.

**In Sri Lanka, the gradual increase in tensions between the Government and the LTTE armed opposition group has led to increased warnings of the growing risk that the peace process may fail**

The situation in **Sri Lanka** has been characterised by a gradual increase in tensions between the Government and the LTTE armed opposition group, which has led to increased warnings of the growing risk that the peace process may fail. Added to the increase in violence

is the failed attempt by Norway to restart the talks between the parties. It should also be added that the internal split within the LTTE has merely worsened the situation, given the accusations that the Government supported the split and the violent confrontations that have occurred between the two factions. A particularly notable event in 2004 was the victory in the elections of the party led by President C. Kumaratunga, the PA, a victory that finally ended the power sharing arrangement in the Executive<sup>7</sup>.

## b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Indonesia (Moluccan islands)</b>	Religious confrontation, demographic colonisation, autonomy v. independence	Increase
<b>Indonesia (Sulawesi)</b>	Religious confrontation, demographic colonisation	Stalemate
<b>Indonesia (West Papua/Irian Jaya)</b>	Autonomy v. independence, inter-community confrontations, demographic colonisation and control over natural resources	Reduction
<b>Philippines</b>	Democratic fragility	Stalemate

In the **Philippines**, the political violence that preceded the presidential elections in May led to the deaths of 140 people. Subsequently, during the 6 weeks while the results of the ballot were counted, various attacks were reported, along with many mass demonstrations organised by sympathisers of the opposition candidate in protest against the alleged massive fraud orchestrated by G. M. Arroyo, who had been President before the election and emerged as the winner once the votes had been counted. Elsewhere, tensions increased considerably in the region of Cordillera after the former armed opposition group, the CPLA, declared that it was ending the peace agreement reached in 1986 with the former President C. Aquino, since it considered that successive Governments had not met the undertakings set out in the agreement, particularly the ones relating to the development of autonomy for the region and control over the illegal extraction of natural resources. In spite of the fact that the Government authorised the implementation of a plan to stabilise the region, levels of both violence and drug-trafficking activities continued to rise considerably during the second half of the year.

In **Indonesia**, the holding of the first presidential elections in the country's history and the intensification of the fight against terrorism following the attack on the Australian embassy in Jakarta led to some disturbances in various parts of the country. In **Sulawesi**, inter-community fighting in Donggala province and the district of Poso left several dead and injured and led to the deployment of hundreds of police and soldiers by the Government, which stated that the proper security conditions had not yet been re-established since the end of the spiral of violence in 2002. In **West Papua/Irian Jaya**, in spite of the fact that various civilian organisations combined their efforts and implemented several peaceful initiatives to fight for self-determination for the region, the OPM armed opposition group continued to carry out sporadic attacks, while elsewhere, inter-community confrontations were reported on various occasions during the year in the region of Kwamki Lama.

In the **Moluccan Islands**, the celebration of the 54<sup>th</sup> anniversary of independence for the self-proclaimed Republic of South Moluccas by the FKM armed opposition group led to the worst outbreak of violence since the peace agreement of February 2002. Fighting between the Christian and Muslim communities left 40 dead, two hundred injured and caused the displacement of thousands of people. The Government, which in September 2003 had declared an end to the State of emergency, was once again forced to deploy hundreds of troops in order to prevent new outbreaks of violence, which could be further aggravated by the alleged arrival of members of the Laskhar Jihad organisation.

**In Moluccan Islands registered the worst outbreak of violence since the peace agreement of February 2002**

## Europe and Central Asia

### a) Central Asia and the Caucasus

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Armenia</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Stalemate
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	Inequality in the distribution of resources, democratic fragility	Increase
<b>Georgia</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, independence of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia	Increase
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	Independence of the Ferghana Valley, democratic fragility	Stalemate
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Stalemate
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	Independence of the Ferghana Valley, problems of governance	Increase

In the South Caucasus, while the level of protests and demonstrations diminished in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the situation in Georgia remained tense in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In **Armenia**, in spite of having systematically rejected the reforms proposed by the Government on the basis that they were insufficient, the Artarutiun coalition finally accepted various recommendations as a first step towards the coun-



try's democratisation. Meanwhile, there were continuing civil demonstrations in **Azerbaijan** due to the country's lack of financial resources. Trials began against the political leaders who had mobilised the opposition, and the end of the year saw border confrontations with Georgia, resulting in the death of an Azeri civilian and an increase in political cross-border tensions.

In **Georgia**, President M. Saakashvili managed to gain a certain level of stability for his government and its centralist policies with the expulsion of the Adjara leader, A. Abashidze, at the beginning of the year, a circumstance that the President then used to reform the statutes of all the autonomous regions (Abkhazia, Adjara and South Ossetia). These centralist policies resulted in an increase in political tensions in the latter two republics. The disputed presidential elections of 3 October in **Abkhazia** caused an internal crisis, eventually leading to a Government agreement between the independent opposition candidate, S. Bagapsh, and the current pro-Russian Prime Minister, R. Khadzimba, and the holding of new elections on 13 January 2005. Georgia has already announced its first contact with con S. Bagapsh with the aim of resolving the

**In South Ossetia the armed violence between Ossetians and Georgians provoked dozens of deaths and around a thousand people displaced**

conflict over the status of Abkhazia<sup>8</sup>. In the case of **South Ossetia**, the reform of the statutes led to direct confrontations with the Republic's authorities, who sought support from Russia against what they viewed as interference. This situation has resulted in an increase in the armed violence between Ossetians and Georgians, dozens of deaths and around a thousand people displaced. However, this seemed to be abating by the end of the year, thanks to the signing of various cease-

fire agreements. Nevertheless, there were numerous reports of violations of these ceasefires by both sides (Georgia continued to deploy troops in the area in spite of a demilitarization agreement). Finally, in spite of Russian reticence, the EU's Special Envoy for the South Caucasus, H. Talvitie, met Georgian Prime Minister Z. Zhvania to talk about the Ossetian conflict, and the EU plans to organise a meeting in Sofia between Z. Zhvania and the Ossetian President, E. Kokoity, though a date had still to be arranged by the end of 2004.

### Chart 2.3. Instability in the South Caucasus

The South Caucasus is a highly important strategic area for Europe and the USA, given its privileged position as a bridge between Asia and the West, as well as the presence of energy resources. Political tension increased at the end of 2003 and throughout 2004, following electoral processes in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan that had been denounced as fraudulent by regional bodies such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE. This factor triggered greater involvement by the international community in the region, particularly the USA (to the detriment of the Russian Government), and this has exposed the lack of democratic guarantees in the region, the problems of governance and the systematic violations of human rights and basic freedoms, as well as the problems of regional security (there are 3 ongoing and unresolved conflicts, two in the Georgian Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and one relating to sovereignty of the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, claimed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan) and the presence of groups linked to international terrorist networks and organised crime.

In the case of Georgia, post-electoral demonstrations led to the fall of the Government, in the so-called *Velvet Revolution*, and the installation of a new regime under the presidency of M. Saakashvili, thanks to the support of the USA. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the demonstrations by broad sections of the civilian population have not resulted in the hoped-for change of government, though they have led to the adoption of agreements favouring democracy.

The factors that led to civilian demonstrations in the South Caucasus are also found in other states in the former Soviet region, such as Belarus and Ukraine. Political opposition in the latter of these 2 countries at the end of 2004 led to the *Orange Revolution*, which also caused a change of Government and the introduction of democratic measures.

The situation in the 5 countries of Central Asia during 2004 was marked by democratic fragility, the infringement of basic freedoms, problems associated with the trafficking of drugs, weapons and people and border demarcation disputes, along with attacks perpetrated by the Hizb-ut-Tahrir Islamist armed opposition group. In **Kyrgyzstan**, the Government has intensified its campaign to control the opposition and the media. For its part, the Government of **Turkmenistan** continued to expel all opponents of its

regime from the country. The attacks in **Uzbekistan**, attributed to the Hizb-ut-Tahrir group, and the confrontations between this group and state security forces have left around 40 dead and dozens injured. The instability in the region led to the appointment by the United Nations of an Independent Expert on human rights, charged with educating the different Governments on human rights issues.

## b) Europe

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Belarus</b>	Democratic fragility (repression of political opposition)	Increase
<b>Moldova, Rep. of</b>	Democratic fragility, independence of the Dniester region	Stalemate
<b>Serbia and Montenegro</b>	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power	Stalemate
<b>Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)</b>	Autonomy v. Independence	Increase
<b>Ukraine</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Increase

The last year saw a significant increase in political tensions in the former Soviet Republics of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, particularly in this last country, leading to greater involvement of the international community in this region too. The proclamation by the Central Electoral Commission in **Belarus** that President A. Lukashenko had been victorious in the referendum held on 17 October, gaining 86% of the votes (with a 90% turnout), a victory that would allow him to stand in the 2006 elections, led to unanimous condemnation from European regional bodies such as the OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe, given the complaints of electoral fraud. The EU and the Council of Europe approved specific sanctions against the country and have announced that they will remain in place until the country begins a process of democratisation. Complaints of harassment of members of the opposition, the media and certain sectors of civilian society have also continued. Elsewhere, the political crisis that arose in **Ukraine** as a result of the invalidation of the presidential election of 31 October was resolved when the Parliament stated that the second round of the presidential election would be repeated on 26 December, announcing a reform of the system of presidential government and its replacement with a parliamentary-presidential system in 2005 (or 2006). In the new elections, in which voter turnout was recorded at more than 77%, the opposition candidate V. Yushchenko polled almost 52% of the vote, while the sitting Prime Minister, V. Yanukovich, only obtained 44%. On the last day of the year, V. Yanukovich resigned his post and finally accepted electoral defeat, after the Supreme Court had refused to uphold any of his complaints of electoral fraud. The USA and the EU played a very active role in managing the crisis, though they were criticised by Russia. However, in **Moldova**, the parties made progress in their negotiations on the future of the Transdniestrian region, which is claiming independence, thanks to the reopening of Moldovan schools in the region, whose closure at the beginning of 2004 had caused a rise in political tensions. In addition, several sectors of civilian society put forward new peace proposals at the end of the year to involve five-sided talks, including observers from the EU and the USA.

The whole of the Balkans region has experienced a situation of instability, provoked by the inter-ethnic confrontations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs at the end of March and the parliamentary elections held on 17 November in **Kosovo**, which were boycotted by the Serbian minority and in which the Albanian leader R. Haradinaj emerged victorious<sup>9</sup>. In **Serbia and Montenegro**, the Kosovo crisis has also had consequences for the Federation. Firstly, because both the Montenegrin Prime Minister and the country's President, M. Djukanovic and R. Krivokapic, announced their support for the abolition of the federation with Serbia, due to the instability of Kosovo and the consolidation that the ultra-nationalist parties were achieving in Serbia (in spite of the appointment of the moderate B. Tadic as the new President after four rounds of elections). Secondly, because the Government of Serb Prime Minister V. Kostunica called for a boycott of the Kosovo elections, announcing that he would not cooperate with the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia and that he would not negotiate with the new Kosovan leader, whom he accuses of

9. See the chapter on post-war rehabilitation.

war crimes. The UN Secretary General's new Special Representative for Kosovo and head of UNMIK, S. Jessen-Petersen, underlined the importance of improving bilateral relations in order to build peace, not only in Serbia and Montenegro but in the whole region, given the appearance of new crisis points, such as the demands for independence in Presevo and the claims made by Vojvodina.

## Middle East

Countries	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2004
<b>Iran</b>	The struggle for political power and democratic fragility	Stalemate
<b>Lebanon – Israel</b>	Territorial disputes, impact of the armed conflict between Israel and Palestine	Increase
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	The fight against terrorism, democratic fragility	Increase
<b>Syria</b>	Pressure from the USA and Israel and reactivation of the Syrian Kurd question	New situation of tension
<b>Yemen</b>	Struggle for political power	New situation of tension

In **Saudi Arabia**, the year was marked by several attacks against foreign interests, mainly linked with the USA. These were accompanied by an increase in the number of armed confrontations and anti-terrorist operations carried out by the security forces, who have detained large numbers of people. The most serious event was the seizure of 240 people associated with foreign oil companies, which resulted in the deaths of 22 people. Elsewhere, mention should be made of the announcement that municipal elections would be held for the first time in 40 years, though women would not be allowed to participate.

In **Iran**, the victory of the conservative parties in the parliamentary elections following the disqualification of 2,000 reformist candidates set the scene for a year that has been marked by the detention of journalists and anyone generally accused of reformism or the violation of various Islamic codes of conduct. Events in the country during the last 3 months of the year were notable for the negotiations relating to the uranium enrichment programme, held as the result of European diplomatic initiatives, which finally led the Iranian Executive temporarily to suspend the programme in the face of possible sanctions from the UN Security Council.

Against the background of the occupation of Iraq and the "war on international terrorism" promoted by the USA, **Syria** was repeatedly accused by the Bush administration during 2004 of harbouring members of the former Iraqi regime, hiding the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, not preventing Iraqi and Arab combatants from passing over into Iraq and not controlling the transfer of financial funds destined for armed op-

### In Syria, special mention should be made of the confrontations between the Syrian Kurd population and Syrian security forces

position groups. Following the US Congress's approval of its Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act of 2003, which involved the imposition of economic sanctions by the USA, these pressures have had implications and direct effects on a number of international and regional issues: 1) at a diplomatic level, the USA, with support from France, won approval in September for UN Security Council Resolution 1559<sup>10</sup>, which calls for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese soil. As a

gesture of its compliance, Syria pulled 3,000 of its 17,000 troops back to the Beka Valley, on the Syrian-Lebanese border; 2) in the regional dispute with Israel, after the Government of A. Sharon had strengthened its demands that any eventual return to Syrian-Israeli negotiations should begin from scratch (i.e. disregarding the agreements reached with the Labour Government of E. Barak before 2000, when the negotiations were interrupted), the United Nations Special Envoy to the Middle East, T. Roed-Larsen, announced at the end of November that the Syrian Government had proposed restarting negotiations with Israel.

10. UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1559, of 2 September 2004.

<<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/lebanon/res1559.htm>>. On the *Syria Act*, see: GERVÁS, Pedro: "Syria a la sombra del Iraq ocupado", *Arab Nation*, issue 51, Spring 2004, pp. 93-101.


On an internal level, special mention should be made of the confrontations between the Syrian Kurd population and Syrian security forces, which in March left 43 dead and led to the detention of some 300 people, who were released a few months later. Several Arab and international media organisations have related the activation of the Syrian Kurd question with destabilisation operations carried out by the Israeli secret services, working together with Iraqi Kurd elements associated with the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (PDK) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (UDK), against the background of pressure against the B. al Assad regime. Israel has continued to accuse Syria of harbouring Palestinian organisations on its soil and has threatened to attack Syrian territory once again.

In **Lebanon**, the Israeli army made several incursions into Lebanese territory, which led to cross-border confrontations between Israeli troops and members of the armed Hezbollah militias (May, November and December) over the defence of the Chebab farming region (a territory in the south of Lebanon which remains illegally occupied by Israel). At the end of the year, the USA and France decided to include the *Al-Manar* TV channel, which is linked with Hezbollah’s political wing, in their respective lists of terrorist organisations.

In **Yemen**, following intense armed confrontations during the third quarter of last year, the Government announced that it had defeated the followers of the Shiite cleric H. Al-Houthi. These confrontations arose following the breakdown of attempted negotiations with the clergy, which the Government accused of promoting sectarian violence and forming armed groups. These attempts at negotiation continued in spite of the Government’s statement that it had defeated H. Al-Houthi’s followers. More than 2,000 members of the security forces were deployed. According to some sources, at least 200 people may have died as a result of the armed violence.

Contexts no longer classified as situations of tension	Main causes
<b>Afghanistan – Pakistan</b>	Incursions from Pakistani territory by Taliban militias and the armed forces of both countries, democratic fragility, struggle for political power
<b>India (West Bengal)</b>	Struggle for political power
<b>Solomon Islands</b>	Governance, inter-community confrontations
<b>Maldives</b>	Democratic fragility

### Situations of tension and high-risk disputes




■ Situations of tension and high-risk disputes (indicator no. 2)

### 3. Peace processes

2004 was a particularly positive one in terms of progress in **peace processes (indicator no. 3)**. 10 new sets of negotiations or exploratory processes were implemented over the course of the year, as can be seen from Table 3.1. The end result is that as of the end of December 2004 there were **30 ongoing negotiation processes** (9 more than in December 2003), of which 17 related to armed conflicts and 13 to contexts which were not in an armed phase at the end of the year, though they remained unresolved. This data indicates, therefore, that in almost 2 out of every 3 armed conflicts, negotiation processes are currently in progress or at an exploratory stage, a percentage that has rarely been seen before and which underlines the need to strengthen the diplomacy of peace in support of the opening-up of dialogue.

**In almost 2 out of every 3 armed conflicts, negotiation processes are currently in progress or at an exploratory stage**

**Table 3.1. Evolution of negotiations during 2004**



It should also be pointed out that the last months of the year saw the beginnings of attempts at negotiations in 2 highly complex conflicts: Palestine and Uganda. The conflict in Sudan (SPLA) is no longer classified as “armed” as there has been no significant fighting during the course of the year, and an agreement was reached at the end of December. It is now classified as “unresolved”, and implementation of the forthcoming peace agreement is pending<sup>1</sup>. Cyprus has also been removed from this category, as the UN Secretary General decided in the middle of the year that his good offices were no longer required for the time being, given that his proposals had been unsuccessful. By the end of the year, excluding the 3 processes currently at an exploratory stage, 37% of negotiations were proceeding relatively well, 44% were encountering difficulties and 19% were going badly.

1. The contexts shown in italics in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicate conflicts which are not in an armed phase but are as yet unresolved. In this chapter, the term “unresolved conflict” refers to situations in which, while high levels of tension, threats of a military nature or armed confrontations have existed in the past, this type of confrontation is not occurring at the moment, though the parties have not yet reached a definitive peace agreement, meaning that negotiations are in progress or being explored.


**Table 3.2. State of negotiations at the end of 2004**

Going well (10)	In difficulty (12)	Going badly (5)	At an exploratory stage (3)
Angola (Cabinda)	Colombia (AUC)	DR Congo	Colombia (ELN)
Armenia-Azerbaijan	Côte d'Ivoire	Georgia (Abkhazia)	Israel - Palestine
Congo	DPR Korea - USA	Sri Lanka	Uganda (LRA)
India (DHD)	Georgia (South Ossetia)	Sudan (SLA-JEM)	
India (NDFB)	India (NSCN-IM)	Western Sahara	
India-Pakistan	India (PWG)		
Iraq (M. Al Sader)	India (ULFA)		
Senegal (Casamance)	Liberia		
Somalia	Myanmar (KNU)		
Sudan (SPLA)	Nigeria		
	Philippines (MILF)		

## Africa

On the African continent, an analysis is made of the negotiations associated with 12 situations of conflict, of which seven are armed and a further five classified as unresolved. Special mention should be made of the inclusion of three new processes: Angola (Cabinda), Nigeria (Delta) and Uganda. The progress achieved in peace negotiations has been more positive in the unresolved conflicts than it has in the armed ones, though the latter saw a significant trend towards improvement from April onwards, with the exception of the last month of the year. Nevertheless, as can be seen from the following figure, the general tone of processes across the continent of Africa reflects a certain fragility, based on the score achieved for the whole year (an average of 1.3 points out of a total of 3).

**Figure 3.1. Evolution of negotiations on the continent of Africa during 2004**



### a) Southern Africa

The conflict between the Government of **Angola** and the armed opposition groups operating in the oil-rich region of **Cabinda** entered a clear phase of détente, after the FLEC and FLEC-FAC armed opposition groups joined forces in order to hold joint talks with the Government. Since April 2002, more than 2,000 members of these groups have handed over their weapons and are now awaiting a process of reintegration.

## b) West Africa

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the situation remained unstable for almost the entire year, in spite of the signing in August of the Accra III Agreements for the implementation of political reforms and a new timetable for disarmament and demobilisation. During the last months of the year, however, there were serious confrontations with the French troops currently deployed in the country. These led to an increase in tensions and human rights violations and brought all disarmament plans to a standstill. In the middle of December however, thanks to mediation from South Africa, an agreement was reached to speed up the peace process, restart the paralysed disarmament process and activate the powers of the National Government of Transition. The Parliament also approved the naturalisation of around 70,000 people, which would allow the main opposition leader to stand in the elections. The situation in **Liberia** was marked by the delay in initiating the planned disarmament programme, due to changes in the leadership of the LURD and the confrontations between different factions within the group. Nevertheless, around 100,000 combatants have already been demobilised. The end of the year also saw the beginning of the restructuring of the armed forces after 14 years of conflict.

Of the conflicts affecting several regions in **Nigeria**, it should be mentioned that the leaders of the Ijaw and Itsekiri ethnic militias from **Delta state** agreed a ceasefire during the second quarter of 2004, in an attempt to put an end to six years of confrontations. The parties subsequently agreed to initiate a disarmament process, grant greater autonomy to the region and increase its share of the profits from oil exploitation. A Peace Conference also began in August between representatives of the Muslim and Christian communities in **Plateau state**, which led to a reduction in the confrontations seen in previous months.

Finally, as regards the dispute between the MFDC armed opposition group and the Government of **Senegal** over the region of **Casamance**, the most notable event of the year was the change in the group's leadership and its greater willingness to negotiate autonomy for the region, which led to the signing of a peace agreement at the end of the year after 22 years of fighting. The agreement provides for an end to the use of violence, an amnesty for members of the MFDC and their voluntary integration in the country's armed forces. It is planned that a Combined Committee will supervise the ceasefire.

## c) Horn of Africa

2004 will probably be remembered in history as the year in which the foundations were laid for the potential ending of two of the most problematic conflicts on the African continent, both of them in the Horn of Africa. The peace process in **Somalia**, which has been unfolding in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, has resulted in the inauguration of a new Federal Transitional Parliament, the first agreements for the demobilisation of certain militias and the introduction of a disarmament programme, the appointment of a new President and Prime Minister, a request to the AU to send a peace-keeping force to help stabilise the country and the holding in Sweden of the first donor conference. It is planned that the new Government will be able to meet in the Somali capital at the beginning of 2005.

Given the amount of time the conflict has been running and the number of deaths that have resulted, the most significant of the African peace processes is unquestionably the one relating to the **south of Sudan**, which ended with an agreement between the Government and the SPLA at the end of the year and a solemn act of celebration during the first days of January 2005, after two years of intense negotiations which began to slow down during the final months of 2004 as a result of the attention directed towards the conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur. Three protocols were signed in Kenya in May which resolved some of the issues that had traditionally created obstacles, such as the sharing of political power, the definition of the status of the three disputed regions and the administration of these regions. A donor conference is planned in Norway in 2005, and the United Nations has already prepared an extensive plan for the rehabilitation and development of this part of the country.

**The most significant of the African peace processes is unquestionably the one relating to the south of Sudan, which ended with an agreement between the Government and the SPLA at the end of the year**



**Table 3.3. Main aspects of the peace agreement reached in the south of Sudan**

Issues	Details
<b>Armed Forces</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 91,000 members of the army will withdraw from the south of the country within the next two and a half years, while the SPLA has eight months to withdraw its troops from the north.</li> <li>• The armed forces in the north and south will remain separate.</li> <li>• During the six years of autonomy, a combined force of 21,000 soldiers will be formed and deployed in some of the most disputed areas.</li> <li>• If, after these six years, the south decides not to become independent, a joint army of 39,000 soldiers will be formed.</li> </ul>
<b>Autonomy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The south will be given autonomy for six years.</li> <li>• A referendum on self-determination will be held in 2011.</li> </ul>
<b>Distribution of oil revenue</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The revenue from oil extraction will be shared in equal parts between the Khartoum administration and the authorities governing the south of the country.</li> </ul>
<b>Financial issues</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Two different currencies will be used within the framework of a dual banking system. The north will use the Sudanese pound and the south the Dinar.</li> </ul>
<b>Administration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A Government of National Unity is to be formed.</li> <li>• O. Al-Bashir will remain in the post of Head of State, while the leader of the SPLA, J. Garang, will be the new Vice President.</li> <li>• Official posts will be divided 70:30 in favour of Khartoum in the new transitional central government, and 55:45 in the areas of Abyei, Blue Nile and the Nuban Mountains.</li> </ul>
<b>Islamic law</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Islamic law (<i>Sharia</i>) will remain in the north of the country.</li> <li>• Some parts of the constitution will be reworked so that Islamic law cannot be applied to the non-Muslim population throughout the country.</li> <li>• The status of <i>Sharia</i> in the capital, Khartoum, will be decided by an elected assembly.</li> </ul>
<b>Miscellaneous</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Each territory will have its own flag, the north retaining the existing one and the south adopting a new one.</li> </ul>

Unfortunately, in contrast to events in the south of the country, confrontations have overshadowed negotiations with the JEM and the SLA in the Sudanese region of **Darfur**, in spite of the many attempts to negotiate originating from Chad, Ethiopia and Nigeria. These confrontations generally arise when the JEM and the SLA demand that the *Janjaweed* militias must first be disarmed, while the Sudanese Government on the other hand insists that the JEM and the SLA groups disarm first. A ceasefire was achieved in April, though it has been repeatedly violated in the months following.

#### **d) Great Lakes and Central Africa**

In spite of the difficulties that may be experienced in the democratisation of **Burundi**, and the doubts regarding the capacity of the Transitional National Government to lead a real process of change and proceed with the demobilisation of the many former combatants, the only negotiation process pending in the country is the one with the FNL armed opposition group, led by A. Rwaswa. Although this group announced an immediate ceasefire in April and expressed a willingness to begin negotiations, all the exploratory moves came to nothing, and the FNL was therefore named as a terrorist organisation by the Government. December saw the beginning of a disarmament and demobilisation process that will affect 55,000 combatants over the next five years. In March, a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme began in **Congo**, and although there have been accusations that some former members of the Ninja militias have turned to crime, the armed conflict can be viewed as having practically come to an end.

More complex and negative, however, is the process unfolding in the regions of Kivu and Ituri in **DR Congo**, where several armed confrontations persist. There have been several attempts by international bodies to bring peace to these regions, and these organisations have also tried to prevent the conflict from becoming regionalised, as it has in the past. In May, representatives from 7 armed opposition groups in the Ituri region signed an agreement with the Transitional National Government, providing for the disarmament of the militias and their participation in the country's transitional process. This programme has suffered con-

tinuous delays and difficulties however, which has forced MONUC to make a series of proposals aimed at bringing peace to the entire region. In June, Rwanda temporarily closed its border with DR Congo, while the AU, the EU and the USA introduced various diplomatic initiatives aimed at reducing tensions. After some months of calm, tensions were rekindled and threats made once again at the end of the year. Rwanda announced that it would carry out a military operation in the Kivu region in order to pursue Rwandan armed opposition groups operating in the area.

One optimistic note in the region is the possibility that negotiations may finally begin between the Government of **Uganda** and the LRA armed opposition group. After many offers from one side or the other, as well as the LRA's request that the Ugandan ambassador act as mediator and the Ugandan demand that any mediation be made through the former Minister who had led the first talks a decade earlier, the Government declared a temporary ceasefire in November in order to facilitate exploratory meetings between the former Minister and representatives of the guerrilla group, while the United Nations expressed its support for the possible reintegration of former LRA combatants.

## e) Maghreb

The conflict in the **Western Sahara** has remained at stalemate for yet another year with no rapprochement between the parties, in spite of the intense levels of diplomatic activity by neighbouring countries attempting to explore new possibilities. The United Nations has extended MINURSO's mandate on several occasions and has continued to offer its support for the second version of the Baker Plan, while inviting the parties to find a negotiated solution. The UN Secretary General appointed the diplomat, A. de Soto, as his new Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, following the resignation of J. Baker. Various confidence-building measures have been introduced during the course of the year, such as the release of prisoners held by the POLISARIO Front, the establishment of a system of family visits and the installation of a telephone and postal service, with mediation from UNHCR.


## America

The process in **Colombia** has been marked by some significant events during the past year. Firstly, the implementation of a disarmament and demobilisation process for a significant section of the AUC paramilitary groups led to around 4,000 troops laying down their arms during the last months of the year, with a further 10,000 expected to follow suit during 2005. This process has been assisted by the OAS, through its Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia and its verification duties. Secondly, discussions were held with a view to approving an alternative criminal system, or the Truth, Justice and Reparation Act, which involves all demobilised personnel, though this is still the subject of controversy among the country's different political and social sectors. A third event was the initiation of an exploratory process with ELN guerrillas in the middle of the year, with facilitation from Mexico, which allowed for an exchange of proposals between the Government and the guerrilla group. By the end of the year, however, no agreement had yet been achieved regarding the initiation of formal negotiations. Finally, as regards the FARC, with whom no political negotiations currently exist, it has not been possible to reach any humanitarian agreement, in spite of the numerous international and domestic moves made in this direction over the course of the year.

## Asia

On the continent of Asia, the year opened with eight negotiating process (four armed and four unarmed conflicts) and ended with a total of 11, of which six relate to armed conflicts and five to unresolved conflicts. The three new processes all relate to conflicts in India. The negotiations relating to unarmed conflicts have shown a somewhat more positive evolution than the ones relating to situations of armed conflict, though the overall trend is one of deterioration, the very high score recorded in January (an average of 2.7 out of a possible 3) falling to 1.3 by the end of the year, with a monthly average of 1.5 for the whole year.

Figure 3.2. Evolution of negotiations on the continent of Asia during 2004



### a) Southern Asia

In **India**, several of the states in which armed groups operate have succeeded in initiating or continuing peace processes. In the state of **Andra Pradesh**, a Conciliatory Committee was created to initiate negotiations between the Government and the PWG armed opposition group. The Government declared a ceasefire and the temporary withdrawal of its troops, subsequently lifting its ban on the armed group, which in October joined forces with the MCC, forming the CPI. At the end of the year, however, various violent incidents prevented the holding of a second round of negotiations. In the state of **Assam**, in January, the DHD armed group extended its ceasefire with the Government for one more year. In the middle of the year, the ULFA armed opposition group made an approach to the Government for the first time, suggesting possible peace negotiations. This group is demanding the holding of a referendum on the issue of independence, though negotiations have stalled as the group will not accept the Government's demand that it must first renounce violence.

**In India, several of the states in which armed groups operate have succeeded in initiating or continuing peace processes**

In the state of **Nagaland**, the Prime Minister of Nizoram state, who is acting as facilitator in the peace process in the region, held a meeting in Thailand with members of the NSCM (IM) armed opposition group and then with the Government, setting up a second meeting that will be attended by the Government and will permit the establishment of a one-year ceasefire. In December, the leaders of the armed group visited the capital to hold direct talks with the Government, which also agreed to extend its ceasefire with the NSCN (K) armed opposition group (a dissident faction of the NSCM (IM)) for a further year. In the state of **Orisha**, the PW armed opposition group also offered to hold peace talks with the Government. The Government subsequently annulled its classification of the group as illegal, a measure which had been in force for 9 years. The PW established a 12-point agenda for negotiations, which included the distribution of unusable land, agricultural and livestock farming development and the withdrawal of military forces. Finally, in the state of **Tripura**, the leader of the NFLT armed opposition group indicated the need for continuing political dialogue with the central Government, announcing that the ATTF armed opposition group would also participate in the search for a solution. At the end of the year, the Government signed an agreement with the NLFT (NB), a faction of the NLFT which had promised to renounce violence and hand in their weapons.

Efforts to overcome the dispute between **India** and **Pakistan** over the region of Kashmir have continued throughout the year through numerous confidence-building measures implemented by both countries, with a number of direct high-level negotiations, an increase in the number of diplomatic delegations, cooperation between the armed forces of both countries, the introduction of new transport routes, the release of prisoners, the discussion of nuclear issues, the strengthening of trade cooperation, efforts to combat drug-trafficking and the adoption of a "road map" for the resolution of the conflict, among many other measures.

Although the peace negotiations that broke down in **Nepal** in August 2003 have not been successfully restarted during the course of the year, various important events have occurred that indicate the possibility that some form of initiative may be consolidated in this respect in the medium term. During the opening months of the year, the leader of the Maoist CPN announced that he would accept a negotiated settlement to the conflict with facilitation from the United Nations. In June, the new Prime Minister indicated that he would seek a way of holding talks with the group, and the Government created a negotiating committee. The political climate hardened over the following months, in spite of the fact that in November both the Government and the CPN declared a temporary ceasefire, while the UN Secretary General reiterated his willingness to become involved in a peaceful resolution to the conflict. At the end of the year, an EU delegation visited the country with the aim of assisting the resumption of talks.

Finally, in **Sri Lanka**, the peace process has come up against numerous obstacles during the course of the year, among them the questioning of Norway's facilitation and the suggestion of India as a possible facilitator in support of the Government's interests, the President's alliance with the Marxist JVP in order to contest the elections, an important split in the LTTE, and the Government's refusal to accept the LTTE's demand to install an interim administration in the Tamil region as a starting point for any negotiations (the Government favours negotiating an overall solution). At the end of the year there was much tension and concern over the possibility that confrontations would resume, in spite of efforts by Norway and other countries to restart the negotiations. This concern was further heightened in view of the consequences that the Tsunami may have on the negotiating process.

## b) East Asia

As regards tensions between **DPR Korea** and the USA over the former country's nuclear programme, DPR Korea offered in January to freeze its programmes in exchange for financial aid and diplomatic concessions. A short time later, a new round of 6-sided talks began in Beijing (with Japan, China, the Korean Republic and Russia). These have been repeated on several occasions, resulting in a notable reduction in tension over the course of the year, in spite of the slowdown in negotiations over recent months.

## c) Southeast Asia

Of the armed groups operating in the **Philippines**, the Government is currently holding talks with two, the NPA and the MILF. In February it had a meeting in Oslo with delegates from the **NPA**, initially promising to continue negotiating with them in China or again in Oslo. Both parties approved the establishment of a joint committee charged with supervising the implementation of an agreement on human rights and International Humanitarian Law. The NPA imposed the condition that it must be taken off the US list of terrorist groups, a request that was subsequently denied by the USA. The Norwegian Government has, however, restated its willingness to restart negotiations in Norway, though the various confrontations that occurred in December have made this possibility more unlikely.

As regards the **MILF** armed opposition group, exploratory meetings have been held in Malaysia, and an initial three-point negotiating agenda was agreed: security, the rehabilitation of the conflict areas and the protection of certain ancestral territories on the island of Mindanao. In August, the MILF engaged in a campaign to inform its own members about the peace process, and reiterated its willingness to reach an agreement with the Government. A short while later, the Philippine President announced a peace plan

which involves advancing programmes for reconciliation and inter-religious dialogue, the development of regions inhabited by Muslim majorities and the creation of an Amnesty and Rehabilitation Commission.

In **Myanmar**, by contrast, in spite of the atmosphere of détente experienced during the first months of the year, and the release of thousands of prisoners in recent months, tensions remain high between the Military Junta and the country's democratic opposition. There is also continuing tension with the international community, which is demanding the release of Nobel laureate A. S. Suu Kyi. As regards the Government's negotiations with the Karen armed opposition group, the KNU, a first encounter took place in January, and the group agreed to call a provisional ceasefire. New peace talks were held in September, and the KNU leader expressed a desire to reach a definitive agreement.

## Europe and Central Asia

The dispute between **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan** over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh improved during the last months of the year following attempts by France, Turkey and the EU to overcome the stalemate in negotiations. The Foreign Ministers of both countries met in Prague to seek a solution to the conflict, declaring that the talks held had been the most productive to date. The Presidents of the 2 countries also met in Kazakhstan for the CIS summit, giving very positive assessments of their meeting and the undertakings agreed. Other positive meetings were subsequently held at Foreign Minister level.

By contrast, little progress has been made in **Georgia's** conflict with the region of **Abkhazia**, in spite of the fact that at the beginning of the year, the new Georgian President, M. Saakashvili, requested help from Moscow to resolve the conflict, while the Abkhaz party stated that it was willing to begin talks with the new Government without any preconditions. After months of stalemate, Georgia asked the EU and the OSCE to become more involved in the management of the conflict. In October, tensions increased following the presidential elections in Abkhazia, in which the opposition candidate won with a slight majority. After a series of negotiations, the opposition candidate and the current Prime Minister agreed to share power and rerun the presidential elections in January 2005, standing on a joint list.

As regards **Georgia's** conflict with the region of **South Ossetia**, the two Governments succeeded in signing a protocol in July aimed at resolving their differences by peaceful means, subsequently going on to exchange prisoners of war. Georgia asked the OSCE to supervise its border with Russia, promising to demilitarize the zone. During the last months of the year, the situation remained at a standstill, with no significant progress in the negotiations currently underway between members of the two Governments.

Although no progress has been made during the course of the year in respect of the conflict in **Chechnya** (Russian Federation), it should be mentioned that Russian President V. Putin, speaking at the beginning of a summit held in the middle of December with his German opposite number, G. Schroeder, announced that he was prepared to work with Germany and the EU to resolve this conflict.

## Middle East

Turning to the conflict in Iraq, several reports from military, political and economic sources in the USA and Europe<sup>2</sup> have revealed that the actions taken by occupying forces, the interim Government and the Iraqi security forces have failed in their strategy to stabilise the country through military means. In 2004, the USA was repeatedly forced to modify its strategy, 1) by *internationalising* the crisis (involving the international community, the G8, the United Nations and NATO in legitimising the process for the transfer of power and

2. By way of example, see Cordesman, Anthony, *The Developing Iraqi Insurgency: Status at End 2004*, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington), 22 December 2004, at <[http://www.csis.org/features/iraq\\_deviraqinsurgency.pdf](http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_deviraqinsurgency.pdf)>, and *What can the US do in Iraq?*, International Crisis Group, 22 December 2004, at <<http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3196>>.

the reconstruction of the country) and 2) by “Iraqiising” the process through the creation of a new political body (the interim Government of I. Allawi) and the creation of new security forces (Police and Army) to take charge of internal security duties. Nevertheless, the process for the transfer of power, and its key element, the electoral process of 30 January 2005, have been countered by an upsurge in the actions taken by armed groups opposed to the occupation.

The maximum priority of both the USA and the interim Government, namely the neutralisation of the armed opposition groups, has not been achieved, and neither the use of military force (particularly in the assaults on Fallujah in April and November and Najaf in July) nor the attempts to hold negotiations with the relevant sectors of the Iraqi resistance have borne any fruit. The agreement that the occupying forces reached with the armed groups operating in the city of Fallujah in April, which passed control of the city's security to Iraqi sectors opposed to the occupation in conjunction with elements from the new local security forces, ended in failure. Following the two military assaults on Fallujah, 60% of the city was once again in the hands of the insurgents at the end of 2004.

As regards the agreement by M. Al-Sader's militias (August 2004) that they would disarm in exchange for an undertaking from the interim Government that it would release the detainees it was holding, cease military operations in Najaf and offer financial compensation for any weapons handed in, its effects can be clearly measured in political terms, as M. al-Sader has agreed to participate in the political process, subjecting himself to the authority of the Iranian-born Ayatollah, A. al-Sistani. From a military point of view, however, and in spite of the fact that M. al-Sader's militias have informally demobilised, important sectors associated with armed groups of allegedly Shiite origin continue to operate against the occupying forces and the Iraqi security forces alike.

Given the failure to contain these Iraqi insurgency groups, part of the USA's strategy during 2004 included the reopening of its failed talks with leaders of the prohibited Baath party, in an attempt to negotiate an agreement that would allow it to incorporate medium- and high-level former Iraqi officers in important posts in the country's new security forces and Army. At the end of December, an article was published stating that the Pentagon was studying the possibility of sending special forces in to create death squads in Iraq, in an initiative known as “The Salvador Option”<sup>3</sup>.

The death of Y. Arafat at the end of the year forced **Israel, Palestine** and the international community to seize this event as an opportunity to initiate a new attempt to bring peace to the region, given the accumulated failure of all previous attempts. Some significant events had nevertheless occurred during the course of the year. The Israeli Prime Minister announced that he would be dismantling 17 of the 21 settlements sited in Gaza (Disengagement Plan), though it was later announced that the plan would be delayed until the end of 2005. For its part, the Diplomatic Quartet announced the creation of a mechanism for the coordination and supervision of the Road Map. In June, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade armed opposition group indicated that it was willing to consider a ceasefire if Israel met various conditions. During the course of the third quarter, Hamas agreed to take part in the forthcoming municipal elections, and details were finalised in Egypt regarding attempts to hold a further meeting with Palestinian militias and the agreement of a ceasefire. Both the Islamic Jihad and Hamas organisations announced, however, that they would not be standing in the presidential elections.

**The death of Y. Arafat at the end of the year forced Israel, Palestine and the international community to seize this event as an opportunity to initiate a new attempt to bring peace to the region**

Following Y. Arafat's death, the Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade armed groups announced a two-month ceasefire, and the Israeli Government undertook to facilitate the holding of Palestinian elections. In December, the Israeli Prime Minister and one of the candidates for the Palestinian presidency, M. Abbas,

3. Hirsh, Michel, Barry, J. and Hosenball, Mark: “ ‘The Salvador Option’: The Pentagon may put Special-Forces-led assassination or kidnapping teams in Iraq, *Newsweek*, 11 January 2005.

announced that they intended to meet, after an institutional rift of four years. Days later, with mediation from Egypt, Israeli and Palestinian representatives reached an agreement in principle to reactivate peace negotiations, to include the holding of a summit in Washington during July, hosted by the USA, Russia and the EU. Also under consideration were the calling of a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from the Palestinian occupied territories, the rebuilding of dismantled police services, the reopening of Gaza airport and a series of further measures. A meeting was also held in Norway between the donor community and the United Nations, in which both Palestinian and Israeli representatives participated officially for the first time for a whole year. The Palestinian leadership also held a meeting with the heads of the armed groups in Damascus, in order to negotiate a ceasefire in the Intifada. At the end of the year, British Prime Minister T. Blair announced preparations for a peace conference to be held in London during 2005.

## Conclusion

The kind of crises experienced in the peace processes currently underway, along with the factors that allow new talks and exploratory processes to begin, demonstrate some of the recurring patterns seen in the dynamics of conflict over recent years. An observation of these factors makes it possible to demonstrate, for example, as shown in Chart 3.1 at the end of the chapter, that **processes fail to progress or are interrupted** on many occasions as the result of problems created by the people or bodies charged with their facilitation, or due to the inability of the parties to overcome the initial level of mistrust, or due to violations of a previously declared ceasefire, or the divisions that occur within many armed groups (as well as between members of the same Government) when a peace process begins, or because of disagreements regarding the agenda to be discussed or the process to be followed in order to achieve a cessation of hostilities.

We also know which **factors generally help to improve processes**, provide an opening for new exploratory processes or generate trust between opposing parties. In this regard, it would seem that we should review the conditions under which a group can be temporarily withdrawn from the list of terrorist organisations if it has joined in the negotiation process, or strengthen diplomatic efforts to support the exploratory phase of a process, or guarantee financing for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in all their phases, or be realistic regarding the time that each side needs to negotiate (pressure to end the conflict in the south of Sudan before the end of the year could lead to a “false peace”), or broaden the range of opportunities offered by structural policies aimed at resolving multiple demands for autonomy, federalism or independence.

**We also know which factors generally help to improve processes, provide an opening for new exploratory processes or generate trust between opposing parties**

As regards attitudes towards the lists of groups classified as terrorist organisations, an examination of Table 3.4 reveals that, during 2004, Governments, countries acting as facilitators in negotiating processes and international bodies have variously made exploratory moves to open peace negotiations with more than a dozen of these groups, thus showing that on some occasions it may be possible and more effective to seek ways that will allow one to achieve a ceasefire, a cessation of hostilities and the subsequent abandonment of violence by these groups by helping them channel their demands exclusively through political action.

**Table 3.4. Dealing with organisations included in the list of terrorist groups**

Group	Country	Observations
<i>Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia</i> (United Self-defence Forces of Colombia, AUC)	Colombia	As the result of agreements signed in July 2003, around 5,000 troops had been demobilised by the end of 2004. The OAS is acting as supervisor in the process.
<i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i> (National Liberation Army, ELN)	Colombia	Exploratory talks have been held with the Colombian Government since July 2004, with facilitation from Mexico.
<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i> (Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, FARC)	Colombia	There have been contacts throughout the year aimed at reaching a Humanitarian Agreement, with facilitation from the Catholic church and Switzerland.
New People's Army (NPA)	Philippines	Holding talks with the Philippine Government. Held a meeting in Norway in February.
Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC)	India	Joined forces in October 2004 with the PWG, a group with which the Indian Government declared a ceasefire, lifting its ban on the organisation. Currently pending a second round of negotiations.
People's War (PWG)	India	The Indian Government declared a ceasefire with this group in 2004 and lifted its ban on the organisation, which in October joined forces with the MCC. Currently pending a second round of negotiations.
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	Northern Ireland	Currently in a process of disarmament, under supervision by an international commission.
Hezbollah	Lebanon	In February 2004, this group agreed an exchange of prisoners with Israel following three years of negotiations with mediation from Germany.
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)	Nepal	In November 2004, both the Government and the CPN declared a temporary ceasefire, and the UN reiterated its willingness to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	Palestine	Announced its willingness to negotiate a ceasefire in June, if Israel met certain conditions. Announced a two-month ceasefire at the end of the year.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Palestine	Decided to take part in the Palestinian presidential elections
Hamas	Palestine	Decided to take part in municipal elections in September 2004.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad	Palestine	Announced a two-month ceasefire at the end of 2004.
Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)	Rwanda	Around 1,500 former member of the Rwandan armed forces in exile in DR Congo returned to Rwanda in 2003, with a further 3,000 expected to return in 2004, under a disarmament and reintegration programme run by MONUC.
Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE)	Sri Lanka	Holding formal talks with the Government since 2002, with facilitation from Norway.
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Uganda	Initiated negotiations with the Government at the end of 2004, the latter declaring a temporary ceasefire. The UN indicated its support for the reintegration of former combatants.

The overall evolution of negotiation processes experienced some critical moments during the months of March and April 2004. Although it is very difficult to identify factors of cause and effect for processes that are so diverse and unconnected, one should not ignore the fact that several events occurred during those months in different parts of the world (the al-Qaida attacks in Madrid, a new European anti-terrorist policy, violence in Kosovo, the assassination of Palestinian leaders, Shi-ite revolts in Iraq, the attack on Fallujah, etc.) that created a general atmosphere of tension and drew diplomatic attention away from several of these peace and negotiation processes. In any case, these events demonstrate the fragility of many of these processes and the need to establish sustained strategies for support and involvement, thus shielding them from events that will have an adverse effect on the continuity of negotiations, which will always have to overcome many obstacles before achieving any results.

**It's necessary to establish sustained strategies for support and involvement, thus shielding the peace processes from events that will have an adverse effect on the continuity of negotiations, which will always have to overcome many obstacles**



### Chart 3.1. Some factors that led to crises, breakdowns or deteriorations in peace negotiations in 2004

#### Highly significant factors

- Problems of trust with the **bodies or individuals** acting as mediators
- Inability to overcome **mistrust** between the parties
- Problems of **security** in order to pursue negotiations
- **Ceasefire** violations
- Divisions and **internal disputes** within armed groups
- Disagreements over the **format of the negotiating process** or the procedures to be followed
- Differences regarding the **agenda** to be discussed or the interpretation of this agenda


#### Quite significant factors

- **Insufficient or defective exploratory phase**
- Problems with the **Armed Forces** complying with the agreements reached, or problems with their status
- Refusal to give way on **substantial issues**
- Inability to break out of the **conventional framework** and seek **new alternatives or possibilities**
- Refusal to make **structural changes**
- Disagreements over the **nature of the conflict** or the way it is to be identified
- Difficulties relating to **disarmament**, demobilisation, settlement or reintegration
- The existence of **humanitarian crises**
- The refusal by **third parties to participate**
- The presence of **third parties** or **negative support from third parties**
- Disagreements over the **distribution of political power**
- Problems within the **negotiating teams**
- **Arms trading** and rearmament
- **Drug-trafficking** or fighting over the **control of natural resources**
- **Impunity**
- **Selected assassinations**
- Government **repression**
- **A state's failure to adopt or pursue a peace policy**
- **Paramilitarism**
- **The failure to recognise** one of the parties as a valid participant
- Dealing with groups qualified as **terrorist organisations**

#### Other factors

- The massive violation of **human rights**
- The presence of **spoilers** and the failure of a particular group to maintain control over itself
- **Marginalisation of the civilian population** and unarmed groups
- **Marginalisation of regions and municipal areas** in processes occurring within states
- **External military or financial pressures**
- The presence of **new players**
- **Changes to the initial agenda**
- **Failure to comply with previous agreements**
- **Insufficient consultation**
- **A lack of financial support**
- Difficulties resulting from **simultaneous negotiations with other armed groups**
- The exploitation of **negotiations with paramilitary groups**

## Peace processes



## 4. Post-war rehabilitation and international involvement

**Post-war rehabilitation** means the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling: 1) the maintenance of security; 2) priorities of a humanitarian nature and the resettlement of refugees or displaced people; 3) physical reconstruction and the reconstruction of basic institutions; 4) the resolution of basic incompatibilities (i.e. social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); 5) reconciliation, a respect for human rights, the fight against impunity; 6) the regional dimension, along with reintegration in international forums; and 7) the empowerment of local civilian society and the construction of good governance through international involvement.

This chapter analyses the evolution of **post-war rehabilitation processes** by examining the different working categories set out above. The **19 cases** analysed are those in which a rehabilitation phase began in 1994 or later<sup>1</sup>. There is also an analysis of how international involvement is arranged, coordinated and financed during the rehabilitation phase, and the chapter concludes with a section aimed at pointing to the lessons learned and the good practices that can be applied.

The following table summarises the evolution of the various elements by which post-war rehabilitation can be measured.

	<b>SD</b>	<b>HR</b>	<b>RBIS</b>	<b>Res</b>	<b>HRIR</b>	<b>RegInt</b>	<b>CEGG</b>
Afghanistan (2001)	B	F	B	B	B	B	F
Angola (2002)	F	F	B	B	B	F	F
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996)	G	G	G	F	F	G	F
Central African Republic (2003)	B	F	B	F	F	F	G
Congo (2003)	F	F	F	B	F	F	B
Côte d'Ivoire (2003)	B	F	B	B	B	B	B
DR Congo (2003)	B	B	G	F	F	F	B
Eritrea (2000)	G	G	F	F	F	F	F
Guatemala (1996)	B	F	F	G	B	G	G
Guinea-Bissau (1999)	F	G	F	B	F	B	F
Iraq (2003)	B	B	B	B	B	F	B
Liberia (2003)	F	F	F	B	B	F	B
Macedonia, FRY(2001)	G	G	G	G	F	F	G
Papua New-Guinea (Bougainville) (2001)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
Rwanda (1994)	F	F	F	F	F	F	G
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) (1999)	G	B	F	B	B	B	F
Sierra Leone (2001)	F	G	G	F	F	F	G
Tajikistan (1997)	G	G	G	F	F	G	F
Timor-Leste (1999)	G	G	G	G	F	G	G

*Note 1.* **SD:** Security and demilitarisation; **HR:** Humanitarian and resettlement of population; **RBIS:** Physical reconstruction and reconstruction of basic institutional services; **Res:** Resolution of basic problems (social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); **HRIR:** Respect for human rights, fight against impunity and reconciliation; **RegInt:** Regional dimension and (re)integration in international forums; **CEGG:** Civil empowerment and good governance (assignment of control from international to local authorities).

*Note 2.* The date shown in brackets alongside each country is the year taken as the starting point for analysing post-war aid.

*Note 3.* **B:** Bad - serious problems of implementation, **F:** Fair - displaying some significant difficulties; **G:** Good - evolving favourably.

*Note 4.* The evolution reflected in this table does not represent the final situation.

1. The reason for choosing this date is that this was when, at the initiative of the Danish Cooperation Agency (Danida), one of the most notable attempts at analysis and self-criticism occurred from an international aid perspective in respect of the atrocities that took place in Rwanda, in which around one million people were murdered in the space of only three months (934,000 according to Government figures).

This chapter classifies the countries and territories that can be viewed as being in a phase of post-war rehabilitation into 3 groups (**indicator no. 4**). Firstly, there are those in which a cessation of hostilities has been achieved, whether as the result of a victory by one side or through mediation by third parties, with the implementation of a peace agreement that is proceeding relatively well (11). Secondly, there are those in which a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities has been achieved but is progressing badly, impeding post-war rehabilitation work (6). And finally, there are those countries or territories that are still in a state of war but are nevertheless receiving considerable international aid of a post-war nature, which in many cases is used as an incentive to facilitate the pursuit of or compliance with an agreement that will bring an end to hostilities (2).

The following table gives a breakdown of the different activities involved in the various categories of post-war rehabilitation work mentioned in the opening paragraph.

<b>Security and demilitarization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DDR programmes</li> <li>• Mine clearance</li> <li>• Weapons collection</li> <li>• Training of the army and police force</li> <li>• Protection of the population, human security</li> <li>• Protection of infrastructure and institutions</li> <li>• Reestablishment of national security institutions</li> </ul>
<b>Humanitarian work and population resettlement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programmes to support the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced people</li> <li>• Food security</li> <li>• Reconstruction of homes / temporary refuge and housing areas</li> </ul>
<b>Physical reconstruction and the rebuilding of basic institutional services</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconstruction of physical infrastructure</li> <li>• Guaranteeing public health</li> <li>• Guaranteeing an educational system</li> <li>• Social security network</li> <li>• Strategies for economic support and development</li> <li>• Job creation</li> <li>• Development of financial markets</li> <li>• Legal reform of property, employment and commercial rights</li> <li>• Support for international trade</li> <li>• Development of investment systems</li> <li>• Banking and financing system</li> </ul>
<b>Construction of good governance and participation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Process for the preparation of a Constitution</li> <li>• Transitional Government</li> <li>• Executive power</li> <li>• Legislative reinforcement</li> <li>• Local government</li> <li>• Transparency and anti-corruption measures</li> <li>• Support for electoral processes</li> <li>• Strengthening and training of political parties</li> <li>• Support from civilian society</li> <li>• Independence, transparency and plurality of the communications media</li> </ul>
<b>Respect for human rights, combating impunity and reconciliation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transitional justice (International courts, truth commissions, reparation and individual empowerment)</li> <li>• Rule of law</li> <li>• Reinforcement of the judicial system</li> <li>• Development of a legal state</li> <li>• Education in human rights</li> <li>• Support for dialogue and reconciliation bodies</li> </ul>
<b>Regional dimension and (re)integration in international forums</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opening of diplomatic missions</li> <li>• Entry to the United Nations</li> <li>• Rounds of negotiations to gain entry to international forums and other bodies</li> <li>• Entry to regional forums and bodies</li> </ul>
<b>Empowerment of civilian society</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Process for the training of associations</li> <li>• Development of social movements</li> <li>• Organisation of discussion forums</li> <li>• Social empowerment programmes</li> </ul>

## Africa

### a) West Africa

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the stalling of the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreements, despite international pressure<sup>2</sup>, made it impossible to begin the disarmament process planned for the middle of October. The leader of the Forces Nouvelles, G. Soro, made the initiation of this process conditional upon the application of the legislative reforms promised by President L. Gbagbo. At the end of December, the Parliament approved a law allowing for the naturalisation of around 70,000 people throughout the country. This decision may open the way forward to the reform of Article 35 of the Constitution, one of the main items contained in the 2003 peace agreement<sup>3</sup>. The health and education programmes started in the north and west of the country were impeded by the increasing levels of violence in these areas, which caused a large number of humanitarian personnel to be temporarily evacuated<sup>4</sup>, though the supply of basic services was guaranteed.

For its part, **Guinea-Bissau** experienced moments of instability as a result of the revolt by a section of the armed forces, who killed their former chief, V. Correia Seabra<sup>5</sup>. President H. Rosa acquiesced to the rebels' demands and appointed General T. Na Waie as the new head of the armed forces. The General in turn announced the reintegration in the army of 65 senior officers who had been expelled during the various coup d'états that had taken place in the country over recent years. These new appointments guarantee the restoration of ethnic and political balance in the armed forces, which had until then been dominated by the Balanta ethnic group, which represents more than a third of the country's 1.3 million inhabitants, according to the United Nations. The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) assisted in these military reforms. The reform of security and the strengthening of government powers were identified as the main areas where work would be required in order to achieve the successful post-war rehabilitation of the country, according to a study carried out by the UN's five political and peace-keeping missions in the region. As regards reconstruction of the country's economic infrastructure and basic social services, the necessary funds have not yet been collected. A donor conference is planned to this end during the course of 2005.

The disarmament phase of the process in **Liberia** has come to an end, and the main problem now is the lack of the funds required to implement the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants, which is calculated to involve around 100,000 troops, according to a statement by the UN's Disarmament Commission.

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The security situation improved, mainly in Monrovia, due to the presence of 15,000 UN troops, though this did not extend beyond the capital, and the regions of the country that are rich in natural resources remain under the control of former combatants from armed opposition groups, impeding economic development in this sector. As regards the electoral process, after months of stalemate, the transitional Parliament withdrew its request for a national voter registration process. The USA and the head of UNMIL, J. Klein, brought pressure in this connection, given that, according to them, the completion of an

electoral census would have delayed the holding of elections planned for October 2005, resulting in a negative effect on foreign aid for the country. The last census, completed in 1984, showed the population to number two and a half million people, and this number is now calculated at around three million. On the subject of governance, both the United Nations and NGOs present in the country complained about corruption among some members of the Transitional National Government.

2. See *Barometer 6* at <<http://www.escolapau.org/programas/barometro.htm>>.

3. See the chapter on peace processes.

4. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

5. See the chapter on situations of tension.

In **Sierra Leone**, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission presented its final report<sup>6</sup>, which set out the main recommendations to be followed by the Government in order to achieve the country's rehabilitation during 2005. The report underlined the need to strengthen the judicial system and the rule of law, reinforce the parliamentary system and the electoral process, promote a culture of human rights and improve the transparency of government actions with the aim of preventing corruption. The Government of Sierra Leone is responsible for creating a Monitoring Committee that will verify the implementation of these recommendations. During the course of the year, UNHCR concluded its repatriation programme that has seen the return of approximately 260,000 Sierra Leoneans during the past four years. UNAMSIL's mandate was extended for a further 6 months until 30 June, in order to continue handing over duties to the Executive.

## b) Horn of Africa

In **Eritrea**, post-war rehabilitation work focused primarily on the clearing of mines along the border with Ethiopia and rebuilding the infrastructure elements damaged during the armed conflict. As regards international coordination, the Eritrean Government imposed restrictions on members of UNMEE for a large part of the year, making it difficult for the organisation to fulfil its mandate. 60% of the population is in a situation of humanitarian crisis as a result of the continuing drought, a circumstance which meant that most of the projects implemented were of a humanitarian nature. Elsewhere, funds are still being collected for a 3-year integrated recovery programme (IRP), to be managed by UNHCR, UNDP and the World Bank<sup>7</sup>. This IRP will help to confront the challenges posed by post-war rehabilitation, including the reintegration of refugees from Sudan and Ethiopia along with the people who have been displaced internally.

## c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

At the end of November, the **First International Conference for the Great Lakes Region** was held in Dar es Salaam. It was hosted by the United Nations and attended by 17 Heads of State and Government. This Conference forms part of a multi-stage process which began in June 2003 and is aimed at establishing a Marshall Plan for the region through the promotion of mechanisms dealing with governance, democracy, peace, security, economic development and regional integration. The 11 nations that formed the nucleus of the Conference<sup>8</sup> signed the Dar es Salaam Declaration, the main points of which are summarised below.

Table 4.3. First International Conference for the Great Lakes Region. Dar es Salaam Declaration (19/20 November 2004)	
Main issues	Conclusions and undertakings
<b>Peace and Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Application of Non-Aggression and Common Defence Agreements</li> <li>• Establishment of a regional security framework for the prevention, management and peaceful resolution of conflicts</li> <li>• Implementation of common policies to end the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms</li> <li>• Fight to combat genocide</li> </ul>
<b>Democracy and Governance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promotion of and respect for values, principles, democratic rules of good governance and human rights</li> <li>• Effective participation by various socio-economic members of the private sector, civilian society, women and children in the consolidation of democracy and governance</li> </ul>
<b>Regional Development and Integration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction of a unified economic space to strengthen economic efficiency and eradicate poverty through sustained economic development</li> </ul>
<b>Social and Humanitarian issues</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respect for the Universal Declaration on Human Rights</li> <li>• Ratification and application of the various treaties and instruments relating to this issue</li> </ul>

6. See Overview of the Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation report, 2004, at <<http://www.ictj.org/downloads/SL.TR.C.Overview.pdf>>.

7. See Barometer 4 at <<http://www.escolapau.org/programas/barometro.htm>>.

8. Angola, Congo, Kenya, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Burundi.

Although the results obtained at this Conference may, at first glance, seem positive, a series of factors should be taken into account that reduce this optimism: on the one hand, there is the time that elapsed before it was eventually held, almost a year and a half after the initial talks held to reach a declaration of good intentions; secondly, there is the fact that the necessary mechanisms have not been established in order to verify the application of these undertakings (the current conflict between Rwanda and DR Congo<sup>9</sup> demonstrates this problem). We will have to wait until a second conference is held next year in Nairobi for these mechanisms to be defined through inter-ministerial meetings. Finally, it should be mentioned that certain military and armed opposition groups were not present, as they had not been invited by the participating countries to form part of their national delegations, even though they are some of the main protagonists of the violence afflicting this region.

Turning to a country by country analysis of the situation in the region, in **Angola**, the opposition parties withdrew from the process for the drawing up of a draft for the future Constitution, demanding that the Governing MPLA outline an electoral timetable and create a National Electoral Commission. As regards the

**In Angola the Government continued to insist on the need to hold a donor conference, a request that was opposed by several countries due to Angola's great wealth of natural resources**

process preceding the organisation of elections, UNITA denounced the country's current electoral legislation, which it believed favoured the MPLA, and threatened to boycott the process if an independent electoral body was not formed. The country's people continued to live in conditions of extreme vulnerability, dependent on humanitarian aid. Elsewhere, the Government continued to insist on the need to hold a donor conference, a request that was opposed by several countries due to Angola's great wealth of natural resources<sup>10</sup>. In order for such a conference to be held, the World Bank called on the Government of J.

E. Dos Santos to undertake a series of basic prior reforms, including improved transparency in the management of oil revenues, the signing of an agreement between Luanda and the IMF, and the preparation by the Government of a plan to combat poverty.

In **Congo**, despite the persisting lack of security and the looting carried out in the Pool region<sup>11</sup>, the United Nations believed that the introduction of a process for the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants had led to an improved security situation, and therefore allowed many displaced families to return. The main problems facing the country's population are the high levels of poverty and unemployment, and inadequate education and health services. The IMF continued to block the funds set aside for the country while it waited for the Government to demonstrate some progress in executing its anti-corruption programme, the main aim of which is to improve transparency in relation to the country's oil revenues.

There was an increase in the number of armed confrontations in **DR Congo**<sup>12</sup> which, combined with the poor performance of the TNG, may impede the holding of the elections planned for June 2005. The UN Security Council and other international bodies associated with the rehabilitation process expressed their concerns about a possible delay in the election process and called on the TNG to concentrate on the outstanding issues relating to the remodelling of the armed forces and security institutions, the preparation of a Constitution and the registration of voters. The EU announced that it would contribute one third of the budget required to organise the elections, calculated to amount to 285 million dollars.

In the **Central African Republic**, the transitional Constitution was approved by referendum, one of the necessary requirements (in addition to a review of electoral law, the law on political parties and the law on territorial groups) for holding parliamentary and presidential elections in February, thus bringing the transitional process to an end. As regards the DDR process, the Government introduced a project for the reinte-

9. See the chapter on situations of tension.

10. See School of Peace Culture, Alert Unit, "Angola, construyendo la paz. Retos y perspectivas tras dos años sin guerra", 2004, at <<http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/alerta/articulos/04articulo005.pdf>>.

11. See the chapter on situations of tension.

12. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

gration in civilian society of around 7,000 former combatants, at an approximate cost of 7 million euros, financed by the USA, the United Nations and the World Bank. These contributions cover 80% of the total cost, though financing is still required for the rehabilitation of the social and economic infrastructure of the communities that are to receive these former combatants. In this connection, the lack of basic social services, such as health and education, and the persisting lack of security in rural areas are the main problems that the Government will soon have to face. Financial support from the international community continues to be needed both for the electoral process and to meet the basic needs of the ordinary population.

In **Rwanda**, the Government introduced a commission to investigate France's role in the Rwanda genocide, in which the French Government said it was willing to cooperate. President P. Kagame has accused France of direct involvement in the 1994 genocide, following the court action and reports that appeared in France in relation to this event, in which P. Kagame was accused of participating in and directing the attack which cost the lives of the then leaders of Rwanda and Burundi, the event which sparked off the genocide. As regards freedom of the press, new media organisations opened, though there are still complaints about the Government's harassment of the independent media<sup>13</sup>, according to reports by both Amnesty International and Reporters without Borders. As regards security, the Government reached an agreement with Uganda and DR Congo under which the three countries undertook to work together on any issues that may provoke instability, and it also took part in the First International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Nevertheless, the tensions<sup>14</sup> that currently exist between the Government of P. Kagame and DR Congo would seem to belie these undertakings.

## America

In **Guatemala**, in spite of the increase in tensions<sup>15</sup>, there was some progress in the country's institutionalisation. In this connection, President O. Berger announced a plan to relaunch the 1996 peace agreements, which included the following aspects: the creation of a National Peace Agreements Commission (which will deal with both political and technical issues in order to promote knowledge and acceptance of the agreements and propose the legal reforms required in order to accomplish the many issues that remain pending); compensating the families of the more than 200,000 victims of the internal armed conflict; relaunching the Fiscal Pact; the reform of the country's institutions in order to offer civilian society more representation in moving the peace agreements forwards; the establishment of a working group to resolve the growing agricultural dispute and develop new strategies for rural development; and the strengthening of the justice system, civil security and the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples. Elsewhere, MINAGUA ended its mission after being involved in the peace and reconstruction process for the last 10 years. It was replaced by a UN High Commissioner's Office for Human Rights, which will continue its human rights monitoring duties and provide technical assistance to the Government. Finally, the Government approved the creation of its Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Bodies and Clandestine Security Apparatus (CICIACS).

## Asia and the Pacific

**Afghanistan** ended the year with the investiture of H. Karzai as President elect and the appointment of a new executive, following elections during which the international armed presence was increased in an attempt to guarantee security in the face of possible attacks from the Taliban militias. The lack of security continued to be one of the main problems affecting the country, and this must therefore be one of the central issues to be tackled by the new executive. The capital, Kabul, is the only place that enjoys relative calm,

13. See Barometer 6 at <<http://www.escolapau.org/programas/barometro.htm>>.

14. See the chapters on armed conflicts and situations of tension.

15. See the chapter on situations of tension.



**The lack of security continued to be one of the main problems affecting the country, and this must therefore be one of the central issues to be tackled by the new executive. The capital, Kabul, is the only place that enjoys relative calm, as a result of the presence of international troops**

as a result of the presence of international troops. The Taliban continue to control the south of the country, while the warlords dominate the provinces in the north, exercising a control similar to that which they enjoyed in 1994, before the appearance of the Taliban. Another problematic issue is the government's lack of presence across a large part of the country and an obsolete and practically non-existent administration, meaning that programmes need to be introduced to educate and train both current and future public officials. In addition, there is an urgent need for a strategy aimed at reducing poverty, a problem that affects 70% of the population. In this regard, drug-trafficking continued to be another area of concern for the Government,

given that it currently forms one of the main sources of ordinary income. The Government set out its desire to eradicate the production of opium over the next 10 years. Finally, a United Nations report confirmed the lack of progress in respect of human rights and social improvement<sup>16</sup>.

In neighbouring **Tajikistan**, President E. Rakhmonov strengthened his position by neutralising all his potential rivals, formerly his political allies, and by exercising complete control over the independent media, two facts which go against the targets for a plurality of political parties and the freedom of the press in post-war rehabilitation contexts. In this connection, some sectors critical of the Executive complained about the Government's manipulation of the parliamentary elections planned for 2005 which, if confirmed, could lead to electoral fraud. On the security front, apart from the accusation from President E. Rakhmonov that G. Mirzoev, former Commander of the Presidential Guard, had allegedly attempted a coup d'état, the last months of the year were notable for being relatively calm and stable. This stability led to a moderate economic recovery, as demonstrated by the agreements reached with Iran, the EU and Russia, with which a military agreement was reached to allow the deployment of Russian military forces on the border with Afghanistan.

**Timor-Leste** made huge advances in the implementation of its peace processes during the course of the year, though it still requires international involvement in relation to security, compliance with the law and the reinforcement of the public administration. The UN Secretary General decided to extend UNMISSET's mission until May 2005, a further 6 months, during which the UN mission will prepare its departure from the country and help with the empowerment of the population in the three areas mentioned above. The Executive held negotiations with the Australian Government during the year, discussing the maritime border between the two countries and the distribution of revenues from the enormous gas and oil reserves in the Timor sea. The acquisition of 90% of profits from the exploitation of these energy reserves, as requested by the Timor-Leste Government, would, to a great extent, make the country (currently considered the poorest in Asia) economically viable.

The island of **Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)** entered the final phase of post-war rehabilitation. The last three months of the year saw confirmation of the progress made throughout the year in the three working areas set out in the Peace Agreement of 2001: firstly, the disarmament process, which is on the point of completion, with the country's population aware of its necessity; secondly, the ratification of the new Constitution, which is now only awaiting approval of its fourth draft; and finally, the holding of elections, planned for the middle of 2005. The UN's mission in the country, UNOMB, continued to head the Consultative Committee for the Peace Process, concentrating its efforts on final preparations to close down the mission on the day on which the elections are held.

16. See UN Security Council and General Assembly, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, A/59/581-S/2004/925, 26/11/04, at <[http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/\\_UN%20Docs/\\_repots-SG/2004/Report%20of%20the%20SG%2012%20August%202004.pdf](http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN%20Docs/_repots-SG/2004/Report%20of%20the%20SG%2012%20August%202004.pdf)>.

## Europe

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, military forces from the EU (EUFOR) replaced forces from NATO (SFOR), taking over security duties in the country. NATO once again denied the country entry to the Organisation's Programme for Peace, due to the refusal of the authorities in the Republika Srpska to cooperate with the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia. In response, the International High Representative in the country, P. Ashdown, introduced a plan to strengthen the country's security institutions and ensure compliance with the law by the authorities in the Republika Srpska, involving the dismissal of some top officials and a series of legal reforms, among other measures. Elsewhere, progress was achieved on a series of issues, including the organisation of municipal elections during October, without international support, in which growing support for the nationalist parties was observed, the introduction of the Criminal Investigation Agency, and the initiation of a process to introduce VAT. Finally, 10 years after the Dayton Agreements were signed, economic and social problems were identified as the main issues worrying the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, meaning that the evolution of the post-war rehabilitation process will depend in great measure on the Government's response to these needs<sup>17</sup>.

**NATO once again denied the country entry to the Organisation's Programme for Peace, due to the refusal of the authorities in the Republika Srpska to cooperate with the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia**

In **FRY Macedonia**, a referendum was held on opposition to the decentralisation agreement, one of the points agreed in Ohrid, though it was eventually declared null and void as the minimum 50% participation required was not achieved. This made it possible for the process of decentralisation to go ahead, a process that involves the redrawing of inter-regional borders in the country, with the number of regions being reduced from 123 to 78 by 2008 and the decentralisation of powers in the areas of education, health and the economy. Half a million Albanians will benefit from this agreement, as their language will be officially recognised in any municipal region in which they represent more than 20% of the local population. For the OSCE mission present in the country, the objectives set out in the peace agreement have been met, and it will shortly begin to reduce its presence, according to current OSCE President, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister S. Passy. As regards governance, internal disputes in the governing coalition led to the resignation of Prime Minister H. Kostov, who was replaced in the post by Defence Minister V. Buckovski. The Government also signalled unemployment and economic improvement as the main targets on which its efforts will be concentrated during 2005.

Parliamentary elections were held in **Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro)**, though these were boycotted by the Serb minority, which demanded greater security guarantees and respect for their rights. Following the elections, R. Haradinaj, the leader of the former Albanian armed opposition group, the UCK, was elected as the new President of the Parliamentary Assembly. This caused the Serbian Government to withdraw from negotiations over the status of Kosovo, since it considered that R. Haradinaj is being investigated for alleged war crimes by the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia. UNMIK identified the process of reconciliation and the return of minorities as the main areas for concern, while the ordinary population is more worried about unemployment and the economy. The United Nations will carry out a review on whether the 4 pillars on which the international mission and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government are based actually comply with the directives set down a year ago, before beginning negotiations regarding the determination of the status of Kosovo.

## Middle East

In **Iraq**, the continuing armed conflict<sup>18</sup> impeded the introduction of most of the post-war rehabilitation projects and led to the exit from the country of the main humanitarian aid organisations. The last quarter of

17. See European Stability Initiative, "Post-Industrial society and the authoritarian temptation", October 2004, at <[http://www.esi-web.org/pdf/esi\\_document\\_id\\_63.pdf](http://www.esi-web.org/pdf/esi_document_id_63.pdf)>.

18. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

**In Iraq, the continuing armed conflict impeded the introduction of most of the post-war rehabilitation projects and led to the exit from the country of the main humanitarian aid organisations**

2004 saw the holding of the Sharm el Sheik Conference on Iraq, which was hosted in Egypt by the USA and provided regional and international legitimacy for the process governing the transfer of power in Iraq, supported by the Bush Administration. The Conference was attended by members of the current interim Government, around twenty Foreign Ministers from Arab countries and the G8, UN chiefs, and top officials from the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. Representatives of the Iraqi opposition were not invited. In preparation for the January elections in the country, more than 80 lists were regis-

tered with the Electoral Commission, adding up to a total of 5,000 candidates, all competing for 275 seats on the transitional National Assembly, which will be responsible for drawing up the country's new Constitution. The Grand Ayatollah of Iranian origin, A. al Sistani, with support from M. al Sader, backed the list presented by the Alliance for a United Iraq, which put forward 228 candidates. The Islamic Party, backed by the Sunnis, presented 275 candidates, in spite of having demanded that the elections be delayed. However, a campaign to boycott the elections is being supported by various sections of Iraqi society, and this has been joined by a large number of political groups opposed to the occupation.

#### **Chart 4.1. Some consequences of the war and occupation in Iraq**

- The infant mortality rate has risen in comparison with the years preceding the invasion, in spite of the effects of the embargo<sup>19</sup>. In September 2004, Iraqi hospital sources put the figure at 100 children under the age of 5 dying each day.
- 27% of Iraqis live on less than two dollars a day, and at least 60% of the work force is unemployed.
- The government system of food provision has been partially dismantled.
- 75% of US public money destined for Iraq has not brought any direct benefit to the Iraqi people<sup>20</sup>.
- The funds approved by the US Congress and destined for the reconstruction of Iraq are being diverted for military purposes, particularly the training of new Iraqi security forces and private security bodies.
- Of the 18,400 million dollars approved by the US Congress in 2003, only 29 million dollars has been used.
- According to reports issued in June and September 2004 by the International Supervisory and Assessment Board for Iraq<sup>21</sup>, the UN body that evaluates the Iraq Development Fund (IDF), the Provisional Occupation Authority's management of the 20,000 million dollars allocated to the IDF from 2003 to June 2004, and particularly the funds coming from the sale of Iraqi oil, shows negative results.
- In January 2005, the Bush Administration published its decision to abandon the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, ordering the withdrawal of the US investigating team in Iraq.

To close this chapter, the following Chart indicates a series of factors that are influencing the progress of post-war rehabilitation processes:

19. See Carol Bellami, Executive Director of UNICEF, "Official Statement: Bellami speaks out for children in Iraq", 2004, at <[http://www.unicef.org/media/media\\_24233.html](http://www.unicef.org/media/media_24233.html)>. UNICEF, The state of the world's children 2005: Childhood under threat, 2005, at <[http://www.unicef.org/sowc05/english/sowc05\\_chapters.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/sowc05/english/sowc05_chapters.pdf)>.

20. See Barton, F. and Crocker, B. (ed.): "Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq's reconstruction". Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 8 September 2004, at <[http://www.csis.org/features/0409\\_progressperil.pdf](http://www.csis.org/features/0409_progressperil.pdf)>.

21. See the report of September 2004 at <<http://www.iamb.info/auditrep/CashReceipt101204.pdf>>.

## Chart 4.2. Some problems identified in the development of post-war rehabilitation during 2004

### Lack of involvement from the international community

#### In terms of the provision of financial resources:

In Liberia's DDR process, the phase covering the handover of weapons and the demobilisation of combatants has ended, while the next phase for the reintegration of these combatants has not yet received the funds required for its completion. Of the 541 million dollars promised at the Donor Conference in February, Liberia has, to date, received less than a third.

#### In terms of the provision of military forces and their capacity to act:

In Afghanistan, the lack of security in the country has meant that international troops are stationed mainly in the capital, Kabul, leaving the rest of the country in the hands of the warlords and the Taliban militias.

### Difficulties inherent in post-war contexts

#### The presence of leaders or factions opposed to a peace agreement:

In Côte d'Ivoire, the two factions responsible for the peace agreement are systematically rejecting it, justifying their actions by stating that the other party is not complying with what was agreed and thus creating a situation of deadlock.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the authorities in the Republika Srpska are systematically avoiding cooperation with the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, thus impeding any advance in the peace process, as well as any possibility of being allowed to participate in regional and international bodies, as is the case with the NATO Programme for Peace.

#### Neighbouring states or factions wishing to destabilise the country:

In West Africa, control of the flow of refugees between Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, along with border surveillance and its influence on DDR programmes are among the elements influencing the evolution of post-war rehabilitation processes in the countries forming this region.

#### Existence of natural resources:

In Iraq, control over oil resources has been the basis for the majority of the armed conflicts that have taken place within the country, and this issue continues to cause conflict.


In Angola, oil, which in part served to finance the conflict for 26 years, continues to be one of the main obstacles to the country's reconstruction, mainly due to government corruption in managing the revenues earned from this resource<sup>22</sup>.

The potential solution to these problems depends in great measure on two fundamental factors: on the one hand, the **desire and capacity of third countries to become involved**, and on the other, the **empowerment of civilian society**, the main beneficiary and protagonist in the process.

As regards the **desire and capacity of third countries to become involved**, 4 main elements should be mentioned. Firstly, the measures that these countries are willing to and capable of implementing or promoting, such as parallel diplomacy, intervention by the United Nations, good offices, etc. Secondly, a willingness to deploy military troops on the ground, with the capacity to enforce. Thirdly, the amount of money that they are willing to invest. And finally, the amount of time that they can continue to maintain the undertakings they assume. In this regard, the degree to which third parties become involved in a rehabilitation process will depend in many instances on what the success or failure of this process will mean for them if they decide to become involved, as was seen, for example, in the case of Somalia and the US intervention. In order to offset the absence of some of these elements, it would therefore be advisable to develop a system aimed at passing on the lessons and good practices learned. As regards the **empowerment of civilian society**, it should be remembered that the ordinary people are the ones who are ultimately responsible for the proper evolution and sustainability of the rehabilitation process. This is demonstrated, for example, by the disarmament processes in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) and some areas of Sierra Leone<sup>23</sup>, the success of which lies in the fact that the people are aware of the benefits of a society without weapons. It is therefore necessary to encourage the involvement and empowerment of civilian society in the rehabilitation process, as an element that is essential to its success.

22. See op. cit.

23. See Barometer 6 at <<http://www.escolapau.org/programas/barometro.htm>>.

**Post-war rehabilitation international involvement**

■ Countries in  
post-war  
rehabilitation phase  
(indicator no. 4)


## 5. Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action

This chapter contains an analysis of the situation relating to contexts of humanitarian crisis and humanitarian action. The first part deals with the definition of the term “humanitarian crisis” and analyses the indicators that help to identify which countries have undergone a situation of crisis during 2004. The second part examines the evolution of each of the contexts of humanitarian crisis on a region by region basis. The third and final part reviews certain aspects of practices relating to humanitarian action, along with some of the more important events and reports of the past year.

### 5.1. Humanitarian crises: definition and indicators

The term “humanitarian crisis”<sup>1</sup> is understood to mean any situation in which there is an exceptional and widespread threat to human life, health or subsistence. Such crises tend to occur in situations of poverty, fragile government and scarcity of food, in which a natural disaster or armed conflict lead to the appearance of a food crisis, disease and the enforced displacement of the population, either within or outside the country, along with an important mobilisation of international resources in the form of aid.

Since the end of the Cold War, a certain type of humanitarian crisis known as a “complex emergency” has proliferated. Such phenomena, also known as **complex political emergencies**, are man-made situations in which victims are created due to the effect of armed conflict, displacements and famines, combined with the weakening or total collapse of economic and state structures, with the potential occurrence of a natural catastrophe. Emergencies are different from crises because they last over long periods of time, they have fundamentally political origins and give rise to more serious humanitarian consequences. Although some of the contexts analysed in this report fall within the definition of complex emergencies, there are others that do not meet all the requirements, so we have opted for a broader concept that covers all the scenarios analysed below.



Source: The authors.

This section uses **4 indicators which help to identify the countries that faced a situation of humanitarian crisis during 2004**. Firstly, the reports published periodically by the FAO indicate that there were 41 countries in which a **food emergency** occurred during the course of 2004 (**indicator no. 5**). Of this total, 32 experienced a very serious and continued shortage of food. More than half of these contexts, 25 to be precise, were in Africa, while the remainder were in Asia (7 countries), Central America and the Caribbean

1. The expression “humanitarian crisis or emergency” is not correct from a grammatical point of view, as the correct term is “humanitarian crisis”. However, this is a term that has been coined and is now habitually used in the literature dealing with this subject.

(5), Europe and Central Asia (3) and the Middle East (1). By contrast, the FAO indicated 38 countries in this category in 2003, 17 of them in a serious situation.

Secondly, an analysis is made of the evolution of **internal displacements (indicator no. 6)**, i.e. displacements that occurred within the borders of a single country. In this regard, reports issued by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) indicate that 48 countries reported internally displaced people during the past year, and it should be borne in mind that such displacements affected at least one in every hundred people in 29 of these. Cyprus, Sudan and Liberia, where more than 10% of the population is classified as being internally displaced, were the countries with the highest figures. Looking at the situation by region, Africa was once again the worst affected (19 countries with internal displacements), though the areas of Europe and Central Asia and the Asian continent, with 11 and 9 countries respectively, were also seriously affected. The fact that the NRC's reports pointed to 50 countries in 2003 (two more than in 2004) would indicate that some resettlement programmes were completed during the year, bringing this situation to an end.

Thirdly, UNHCR calculates the number of **refugees (indicator no. 7)**. In this regard, the UN agency indicated that this phenomenon was seen in 69 countries, bearing in mind that in a quarter of these (16) the refugee population exceeded 1% of the total population. However, it should be pointed out that the total number of people for whom UNHCR is responsible (not only refugees but also the internally displaced, asylum seekers and others) had fallen from almost 20.8 million people in 2003 to 17.1 million people by the beginning of 2004 (the last figure available), a reduction of 18%. Afghanistan, Sudan and Burundi continued to be the countries generating the most refugees. In comparison with the previous year, it should be mentioned that the number of countries in which there are refugees increased, rising from 59 to 69 countries in total.

**Table. 5.1. Main countries of origin for the refugee population**

Origin	Beginning of 2003	Beginning of 2004	Year-on-year change
<b>Afghanistan</b>	2,510,300	2,136,000	-14.9%
<b>Sudan</b>	508,200	606,200	19.3%
<b>Burundi</b>	574,700	531,600	-7.5%
<b>DR Congo</b>	424,900	453,600	6.7%
<b>Palestine</b>	428,800	427,800	-0.2%
<b>Somalia</b>	432,200	402,200	-6.9%
<b>Iraq</b>	422,100	368,400	-12.7%
<b>Vietnam</b>	373,700	363,200	-2.8%
<b>Liberia</b>	275,600	353,300	28.2%
<b>Angola</b>	429,400	323,600	-24.6%


Source: UNHCR

Finally, the fourth indicator used is the **Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) (Indicator no. 8)**, through which the United Nations seeks funds for the humanitarian crisis situations that it considers most serious or that require more international aid. The CAP for 2005 called for around 1,700 million dollars, to bring assistance to 26 million people in 25 different countries, 23 of which are in Africa<sup>2</sup> (See Graph 5.1.). This figure is in contrast with the most recent amounts called for by the UN, given that it asked for around 3,000 million dollars for 2004 (29 countries) and the figure reached 5,200 million in 2003 (30 countries, though it should be remembered that during this year the crisis in Iraq accounted for more than half the amount

2. This report does not take account of the so-called Flash Appeals, calls made by the United Nations within the framework of the CAP after the original call and intended to be used in emergency contexts, usually resulting from natural causes. In this connection, the United Nations made a total of 9 Flash Appeals during 2004 (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Philippines, Grenada, Haiti (2), Iran, Kenya and Madagascar), amounting to an approximate total of half a million dollars, in addition to the initial call made by the organisation. As regards the 2005 CAP, up to the beginning of January, the UN had issued one Flash Appeal, linked with the crisis that unfolded in the Indian Ocean as a result of the earthquake and tsunamis. The amount called for was 977 million dollars.

asked for), the total having been 4,375 million dollars in 2002 (31 countries)<sup>3</sup>. This important fall in the amount is due principally to the fact that the United Nations considers that some contexts of crisis that have seen a certain amount of improvement in relation to previous years (as is the case in the countries of southern Africa) do not need to be included in the CAP. In this regard, the humanitarian crises in the Palestinian occupied territories, DR Congo and Chad (this last one resulting above all from the crisis afflicting the region of Darfur in the west of Sudan) are the areas in which the organisation wants donor countries to concentrate their most strenuous financial efforts during 2005<sup>4</sup>.

**The CAP for 2005 called for around 1,700 million dollars, to bring assistance to 26 million people in 25 different countries**



Source: United Nations

(\*) Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone;

(\*\*) Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda.

Bearing in mind these 4 indicators, and weighing up the impact that each of them has had in different contexts<sup>5</sup>, **44 countries are regarded as having suffered a humanitarian crisis during 2004**, 7 more than the year before. This considerable increase is explained fundamentally by the inclusion of the countries most affected by the plague of locusts in the Sahel region (Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Senegal), and by the inclusion of Bangladesh and the Maldives on the continent of Asia as a consequence of the impact of flooding and the earthquake and tsunami respectively. In addition, the crisis taking place in Georgia has broadened to encompass the whole of the Caucasus region, which has led to the inclusion of Armenia and Azerbaijan. For its part, Tajikistan is the only country from the previous year which has ceased to be regarded as a situation of humanitarian crisis, thanks to the favourable evolution of the rehabilitation process.

**Tajikistan is the only country from the previous year which has ceased to be regarded as a situation of humanitarian crisis, thanks to the favourable evolution of the rehabilitation process**

3. It should be pointed out that appeals from previous years were subject to reviews that may have increased the amount initially requested.

4. The second section of this chapter contains an analysis of the financing trends among donor countries, both within the framework of the CAP and in relation to overall humanitarian assistance.

5. The criteria used were, firstly, that 3 or 4 of the indicators considered come together in a single country, and secondly, that one of these indicators has significant repercussions on its own in generating a situation of humanitarian crisis. By way of example, we could point to the case of Colombia, where millions of people have been displaced within the country, or the food crisis being suffered by some countries in the southern part of Africa. In spite of the fact that the impact of the earthquake and tsunamis is not registered in any of the indicators, it is considered appropriate to include this as one of the causes of the crises affecting Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that not all humanitarian crises are of the same intensity, nor do they result in the same level of effect.



## 5.2. Evolution of humanitarian crisis situations<sup>6</sup>

Africa remains the area in which most of the humanitarian crises in the world are concentrated (64% of all such crises). This results from the continuation of a large number of armed conflicts, the impact of natural disasters (mainly drought), HIV/AIDS, and the way in which the international community has generally forgotten the continent. The population of Asia (16% of all crises) has continued to fall victim, above all, to natural disasters and enforced displacement. The regions of Europe and Central Asia (11%), America and the Caribbean (5%) and the Middle East (5%) complete the map of humanitarian crises during 2004.

As regards their evolution, some contexts have experienced a notable **improvement as compared with the previous year**, as is the case in **Angola** and **Zambia** in southern Africa, **Rwanda** in the Great Lakes region and **Kosovo** (Serbia and Montenegro) in Europe. However, 2004 also witnessed a **deterioration** in some crisis situations (**Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Haiti, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka** and **Palestine**, in the main), and the appearance of some new contexts, such as the region of **Darfur** (Sudan), which as happened with Iraq during 2003, has increasingly hogged the attention of the international community. These contexts are each summarised in turn below.

**Chart 5.1. Regional overview of the most important humanitarian crises during 2004**

### **AFRICA:**

- **Darfur (Sudan):** almost 2 million people were displaced and around 70,000 died as a result of violence and disease, a situation that led the United Nations to classify it as "the worst humanitarian crisis in the world".
- **Sahel:** the impact of the growing and persisting plague of locusts destroyed a large proportion of the crops in several countries in this region.

### **AMERICA:**

- **Haiti:** the social and economic crisis that has affected the country for decades was further worsened by the heavy floods during the months of May and September, which left more than 5,400 dead and tens of thousands affected.

### **ASIA AND THE PACIFIC:**

- **Southern Asia (tsunami):** the earthquake and tsunamis that hit this region at the end of December caused more than 165,000 deaths and left more than 5 million people affected.
- **Afghanistan:** the serious problems of insecurity suffered by humanitarian personnel throughout the year resulted in the withdrawal of some humanitarian organisations at various points.

### **EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA:**

- **Russia (Chechnya):** a number of international bodies denounced the precarious situation in which the displaced Chechen population and refugees are living, along with the pressure being brought to bear by the Russian and Ingushetian authorities to force these people to return.

### **MIDDLE EAST:**

- **PNA:** the Israeli Government's policy of attacks and systematic controls, along with the ongoing construction of the wall along the West Bank caused a further worsening of the situation for the Palestinian population.

## Africa

### a) Southern Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis
Angola	Return and resettlement process
Lesotho	Drought, HIV/AIDS
Madagascar	Natural disasters, HIV/AIDS
Malawi	Drought, HIV/AIDS
Mozambique	Drought, HIV/AIDS
Swaziland	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political crisis
Zambia	Drought, HIV/AIDS
Zimbabwe	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political and economic crisis

Although around one million people were still dependent upon humanitarian aid, the humanitarian situation in **Angola** has shown considerable improvement over the past year. As regards the return process, UNHCR confirmed that around 50,000 Angolan refugees had returned to their places of origin, though the agency had originally estimated that this figure could reach 90,000 people. The massive presence of anti-personnel mines, the lack of funds, the slow pace of infrastructure reconstruction and the absence of basic services have impeded the process. Since 2002, around 280,000 refugees have returned to Angola, 93,000 of which have done so under the supervision of UNHCR. At the other end of the region, in addition to the effects of the drought being suffered by the southern part of **Madagascar**, cyclone Gafilo swept through the country during March, leaving 230 dead and affecting more than 800,000 people, making this the most devastating period in the country for the last 20 years.

The food crisis affecting many of the remaining countries in the region, the result of both the drought and HIV/AIDS, evolved differently depending on the country. Whilst **Zambia** and, to a lesser extent, **Mozambique** experienced an improvement, **Lesotho and Swaziland** declared states of emergency due to a deterioration in the crises in their countries. The case of Swaziland is especially alarming if one also bears in mind that almost 40% of the population is infected with HIV/AIDS (the highest rate in the world, according to the United Nations), 70% of people live in extreme poverty and the internal political situation shows a great degree of instability. In **Malawi**, the late rains and their reduced quantity resulted in a further reduction in food production and resulted in the urgent supply of aid. Finally, in **Zimbabwe**, the Government continued to indicate that the country had seen a general improvement in its situation, in spite of the fact that humanitarian organisations warned of the continued worsening of the emergency and denounced Harare's action to prohibit the United Nations from making its own assessment to measure the real extent of the crisis.

## b) West Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Guinea</b>	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements and internal political crisis
<b>Liberia</b>	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements
<b>Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Senegal)</b>	Plague of locusts
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements

The fresh outbreak of violence in **Côte d'Ivoire**, where humanitarian organisations warned of an imminent risk that the number of deaths would rise, has reawakened concerns about the threat of a regional humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions. In this connection, the United Nations has warned that the resumption of this crisis could distract attention from the situations unfolding in Liberia, Sierra Leone or **Guinea**. In actual fact, the situation in **Liberia** has become relatively stable, which has allowed for the introduction of a process for the return and resettlement of half a million internally displaced people and around 350,000 refugees. Nevertheless, the continuing lack of funds reported by the organisations overseeing these duties and the lack of security still affecting many parts of the country are the main difficulties being encountered in this process. On a positive note, it should be mentioned that the programme for the repatriation of around 280,000 Sierra Leonean refugees was finally completed, the majority of them returning with help from UNHCR.

**The fresh outbreak of violence in Côte d'Ivoire has reawakened concerns about the threat of a regional humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions**

One of the central issues of the last year was the plague of locusts that affected a number of countries in the **Sahel** region, particularly **Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Senegal**, along with other countries across Africa and even into the Middle East. This plague, regarded as the most devastating in the last 15 years, destroyed a large percentage of the crops in the 4 countries mentioned and awakened fears that this could spark off a serious food crisis. However, in spite of the constant warnings that had been sounded since the beginning of the year, the response from the international community was both late and insufficient.

## Chart 5.2. Sahel: chronicle of a forewarned plague

According to some African leaders, when the possibility of a plague of locusts was first detected in the Spring of 2004, only 7 million dollars would have been required to deal with the insect, while by the end of the year some sources were indicating that the amount required could be as much as 600 million dollars. In addition, the risk of further plagues and their spread to other parts of the world demonstrates the cyclical nature of a catastrophe that seems far from over. During December, within the framework of the Desert Locust Control Committee, the FAO launched a campaign aimed at coordinating the efforts of all the parties involved in this area, based on three objectives: 1) protecting crops in the Maghreb and the Sahel regions for summer 2005; 2) studying the lessons learned during the recent campaign; and 3) discussing future actions that can be taken to control the insect. However, the management of this crisis demonstrates several issues that should be borne in mind. Firstly, the importance of the international community responding in time, both to the systems that warn of future disasters and to the appeals made by agencies on the ground. Secondly, the need to tackle the root causes that make certain countries more vulnerable to catastrophes of this kind, which in turn generally endanger the lives of millions of people.

### c) Horn of Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis
<b>Eritrea</b>	Drought, volume of enforced displacements, return process, border conflict
<b>Ethiopia</b>	Drought, volume of enforced displacements, border conflict
<b>Somalia</b>	Drought, volume of refugees, armed conflict
<b>Sudan</b>	Drought, volume of enforced displacements, armed conflict

The persisting drought and the lack of both food and funds were the main reasons why 10 million people continued to depend solely on humanitarian aid in both **Eritrea** and **Ethiopia**. Particularly worrying in the latter case is the situation faced by people living in the Somali region (in the east of the country), where the rise in levels of malnutrition and the main health indicators threaten the status of one and a half million people. Elsewhere, UNHCR announced the completion of a programme to repatriate the tens of thousands of Eritrean refugees who had been living in Sudan. As regards **Somalia**, the United Nations warned of a worsening food crisis in certain parts of the country, also due to drought, and called for increased international aid for the more than 70,000 people who were dependent on humanitarian assistance.

However, the humanitarian crisis situation that most occupied international attention during the course of last year was Darfur, in the east of **Sudan**. The violent situation seen in the region since the beginning of 2003 has led to the displacement of 1.8 million people, 200,000 of whom have fled as refugees to neighbouring Chad. An increase in epidemics, a lack of food, the constant lack of access by humanitarian organisations to the people affected and the widespread climate of insecurity and vulnerability combined to cause death rates to rise. This led the UN Secretary General to classify Darfur as the worst humanitarian crisis of the present time. Although both humanitarian and ceasefire agreements were reached during the final months of 2004, the general situation has not seen any improvement, and there remains the fear that a situation of famine could develop. In addition, the murder of several humanitarian workers at the end of the year led to a significant withdrawal by many humanitarian organisations. Elsewhere, the 200,000 Sudanese refugees who are living in Chad under the supervision of UNHCR have also continued to suffer attacks from pro-government militias, leading to a situation of tension and a deterioration in living conditions for the local community. Finally, it should be pointed out that the peace agreement signed in relation to the south of the country at the beginning of 2005<sup>7</sup> opens the way for the return of more than 4 million internally displaced people and half a million refugees.

### Chart 5.3. Darfur: the failure of prevention and the “CNN effect”

Although the crisis in Darfur exploded in February 2003<sup>8</sup>, it wasn't until 14 months later, at the beginning of April 2004, that this region (of a size similar to France) began to reach the eyes and ears of the international community, above all after the UN Secretary General compared the crisis to the genocide in Rwanda, an event that had occurred ten years previously. By that time, more than 800,000 people had already been displaced as a result of the fighting and attacks, and there was verifiable evidence that the civilian population was not only the main victim of the conflict but had also become the deliberate target of the warring factions. Since then, the attention paid to Darfur by both the media and diplomatic circles has resulted in a massive inflow of resources, bearing in mind that a Donor Conference for the region was held in Geneva in June, and that the United Nations requested 1,500 million dollars in November in order to finance a programme for humanitarian aid, protection, rehabilitation and development throughout the entire country, in what has become known as the “Working Plan for 2005”. In addition, the so-called “CNN effect” in Darfur has awakened concerns among humanitarian organisations regarding way that this crisis may divert attention and aid from other conflicts which remain forgotten and overlooked, as Darfur once was.

#### d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis
<b>Burundi</b>	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Central African Republic</b>	Armed internal disputes, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Congo</b>	Armed internal disputes
<b>DR Congo</b>	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements
<b>Kenya</b>	Drought
<b>Rwanda</b>	Volume of enforced displacements, impact of armed conflicts in the region
<b>Tanzania</b>	Drought, volume of refugees
<b>Uganda</b>	Drought, volume of enforced displacements, armed conflict

The constant fighting continued to cause the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in some parts of **Burundi** and **DR Congo** throughout the year. In addition, humanitarian organisations had to interrupt the supply of aid on several occasions as a result of attacks on humanitarian personnel and difficulty of access, particularly in the region of Kivu (DR Congo). Some 85,000 Burundians were able to return to their country from Tanzania, the majority helped by UNHCR. In **Congo**, humanitarian organisations issued warnings about the situation affecting the civilian population in the Pool region, where thousands of people remain displaced.

In **Kenya**, the Government and the United Nations made an urgent call for assistance in combating the food crisis affecting almost three and a half million people. The serious drought affecting the country, classified by the Kenyan authorities as a “national disaster”, is the main reason. The lack of rain in **Tanzania** and **Rwanda** also threatened the situation of tens of thousands of people, while the persisting political instability in the **Central African Republic** threatens to worsen the current context of crisis, according to organisations on the ground in the country.

For its part, **Uganda** has become one of the most dramatic and yet most forgotten scenarios in the world. The systematic and deliberate attacks by the LRA armed opposition group against the civilian population and camps for the internally displaced in the north of the country have led to the trebling of the number of displaced people over the last two years, bringing the current number to 1.6 million. Living conditions in these camps (lack of access to basic services and humanitarian aid, overcrowding and frequent human rights violations) led to complaints from a number of organisations throughout the course of the year.

**Uganda has become one of the most dramatic and yet most forgotten scenarios in the world**

8. See the Alert Unit press release, “*Darfur precisa una intervención internacional urgente*” (Darfur needs urgent international intervention), May 2004, at <<http://www.escolapau.org/img/prensa/04prensa027.pdf>>.

## America

Country	Causes of the crisis
<b>Colombia</b>	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Haiti</b>	Drought, internal armed disputes, political and economic crisis

There are two contexts in which humanitarian crises are unfolding in Latin America and the Caribbean: **Colombia** and **Haiti**. In the former, the status of 2.5 million internally displaced people generated by the armed conflict up to the present time continues to be the main cause for concern. In this connection, reports that the ordinary population is emerging as the main target of the armed parties, the high rates of malnutrition among children and complaints by local organisations regarding the humanitarian repercussions of the “policy for democratic security” implemented by A. Uribe’s Government have led to the worsening of a situation that was described by the Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, J. Egeland, as the most dramatic humanitarian catastrophe in the western hemisphere.

Elsewhere, the outbreak of violence in **Haiti** at the beginning of the year caused an intensification of the humanitarian crisis in the country. Although the security situation gradually improved during the following months, the civilian population endured a complete absence of protection, lacking access to any form of aid or basic services and enduring violations of humanitarian principles perpetrated by the different armed groups. In addition, the heavy floods which arrived in May and September devastated some parts of the country even further, leaving more than 5,400 people dead and hundreds of thousands affected. Faced with this complex situation, the United Nations made several financial appeals and called on all the parties involved to coordinate and systematise their efforts.

## Asia and the Pacific

Country	Causes of the crisis
<b>Afghanistan</b>	Drought, armed conflict, return process
<b>Bangladesh</b>	Floods
<b>DPR Korea</b>	Economic, food and health crises
<b>Indonesia</b>	Tsunami, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements
<b>Maldives</b>	Tsunami
<b>Myanmar</b>	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	Natural disasters, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements

In **Afghanistan**, the overall situation throughout the past year was marked by the persistent lack of security endured by humanitarian personnel, a situation that led to the deaths of several humanitarian workers in July and the decision by several organisations to withdraw from the country. This situation of widespread insecurity, combined with the severe shortage of food and the powerful effects of the drought placed more than 6 million people in a precarious situation. For its part, UNHCR has managed to complete the return of half a million Afghan refugees, which means that more than three quarters of the 4.6 refugees who fled the country as a result of decades of armed conflict have now returned to their places of origin since 2002.

In **Bangladesh**, the effects of the floods, the worst since 1998, left more than 760 dead and around 30 million affected. The United Nations also complained about the insufficient response by the international community in respect of this crisis, warning of the risk that one million children may suffer from severe malnutrition. In **Myanmar**, special mention should be made of the delicate situation in which more than half a million internally displaced people find themselves, mainly in the east of the country. In this regard, some organisations complained about the vulnerability of this group as a result of the systemic blocking of aid by the country’s authorities, as well as the human rights violations being committed by the army. Elsewhere, in **DPR Korea**, the food crisis being suffered by thousands of people was further affected by problems in financing humanitarian programmes and by the attitude of the Pyong-Pyang Government, which threatened to cut off aid on several occasions.

However, the main context of crisis on the Asian continent was the one caused at the end of the year by the historic earthquake and subsequent tsunamis that swept across several countries in the region. **Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives**, India, Thailand, Myanmar and Bangladesh in Asia and Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya and the Seychelles in Africa were the countries affected by this catastrophe which had claimed more than 165,000 lives by the beginning of 2005. The repercussions of this disaster are discussed below, with a look at the countries in which the greatest impact was felt<sup>9</sup>.

### Chart 5.4. The impact of the earthquake and tsunamis on southern Asia

On 26 December 2004, a tremor measuring 9 on the Richter scale, with its epicentre on the Indonesian island of Sumatra, caused 165,000 deaths and left 500,000 injured, thousands of people missing, more than a million displaced and around 5 million affected. Indonesia (120,229 dead), Sri Lanka (30,920), India (10,714), Thailand (5,303), Somalia (150), the Maldives (83), Malaysia (68), Myanmar (59), Tanzania (10), Seychelles (3), Bangladesh (2) and Kenya (1) were the countries affected by this catastrophe<sup>10</sup>. Furthermore, more than 7,000 foreign tourists also lost their lives or remain missing. Germany, Sweden, Italy, Austria, Norway, Finland, Belgium and the United Kingdom are some of the European countries that suffered most losses. The tremor, the most serious recorded in the world for 40 years and the fifth strongest in a century, caused gigantic waves in the seas surrounding the whole of southern Asia (a phenomenon known as a tsunami). These sometimes reached 10 metres in height and wiped out entire towns.

#### Which countries have borne the heaviest impact?

Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives were unquestionably the countries most affected by the catastrophe. In **Indonesia**, particularly the region of Aceh and the northwestern part of the country, the United Nations estimated that, in addition to the many deaths and the 700,000 people who had been displaced, around one million people required emergency aid and a further two million would require long-term assistance. In **Sri Lanka**, a country which had already suffered from the effects of flooding throughout the year, half of the country's districts were seriously affected and more than 400,000 people were displaced as a result of the tragedy. In the **Maldives**, the tsunami flooded almost all the country's 300 islands and affected all its 300,000 inhabitants, a third of whom found themselves in a situation of extreme severity. The catastrophe has also had severe repercussions in the remaining countries (especially the southwest of India, where some 650,000 people were displaced, as well as the south of Thailand and the northeast of Somalia). Nevertheless, humanitarian organisations believe that the medium- and long-term consequences will be fewer here than in the first group of countries.

#### What was the international response?

The magnitude of the catastrophe and the fear that the death toll might rise as the result of epidemics provoked a rapid and massive reaction from the international community. Hundreds of **humanitarian organisations** and United Nations agencies moved into all the countries affected in an attempt to deal with the complex situation. Although access by these organisations to the affected population slowly improved, the isolation of some areas, the massive devastation of infrastructure and the existence of armed conflicts or situations of tension (in the cases of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, India, Thailand, Myanmar and Somalia) complicated the necessary aid work. In addition, some organisations also reported several problems in coordinating with the armies of the countries affected, even going so far as to complain about the attitude of certain Governments that had impeded the supply of aid, as was the case in Sri Lanka.

The response of donor countries, though branded as very slow in some individual cases, has also been unprecedented, and more than 4,000 million dollars has been promised since the tragedy began to unfold. In addition, representatives from 25 countries met in Jakarta (Indonesia), at this country's request, in an attempt to coordinate their efforts in what has already been classified as the largest humanitarian operation in history. The meeting also served to confirm the United Nations as the sole coordinating body for aid, through the creation of an Operational Control Centre, headquartered in New York. For his part, the UN Secretary General asked that aid be delivered quickly and effectively, calling on the international community to make a long-term commitment to the region (it is estimated that the reconstruction of some of the devastated areas will take 10 years). He also announced the appointment of M. Wahlstrom as Special Humanitarian Aid Coordinator in the countries affected by the tsunami. The United Nations also asked for a further 1,000 million dollars through the CAP (*Indian Ocean UN Flash Appeal*), 70% of which was covered by January. However, in spite of this massive funding contribution, the Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, J. Egeland, warned that other existing but **forgotten crises** could be affected by the diversion of aid to this catastrophe.

9. Although Indonesia and Sri Lanka were already classified as situations of humanitarian crisis (due to the presence of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people in both countries, and the impact of both drought and flooding at various times during the year in the case of Sri Lanka), this report has also included the Maldives as a new crisis situation, due to the magnitude of the disaster's impact and its importance in the short, medium and long term. In spite of the fact that in the other countries affected by the tsunami the human and physical consequences have been extraordinary, it is considered that this phenomenon has not led to a situation of humanitarian crisis (in the cases of India, Thailand and the Seychelles) nor has it contributed to any worsening of the situation already suffered in other situations of crisis (Bangladesh, Myanmar, Somalia, Tanzania and Kenya), either because its impact was highly localised or because it is considered that its repercussion will be overcome in the medium term.

10. Provisional data provided by the United Nations on 25 January 2005.

### Can a catastrophe of this magnitude be prevented?

Although it is impossible to prevent an earthquake, preventing the impact of tsunamis or other specific catastrophes depends to a great extent on the existence of **early warning systems**, the response to the catastrophe in question from the relevant authorities and the degree of vulnerability that an individual country displays to this type of phenomenon. The right conditions would appear not to have existed in the countries of southern Asia, a fact which led to the high number of deaths. In this connection, delegates at the Jakarta Conference underlined the need for the urgent establishment of an early warning system against tsunamis that would help ensure a more rapid reaction to this kind of phenomenon and reduce the risk to human life.

## Europe and Central Asia

Country	Causes of the crisis
<b>Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)</b>	Political and economic crisis, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Russia (Chechnya)*</b>	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)</b>	Volume of internally displaced people, internal civil disputes

\*Neighbouring republics (Dagestan, North Ossetia and Ingushetia)

In the volatile **Caucasus** region, particular mention should be made of the situation in **Azerbaijan**, where the WFP has been forced to cut off its aid to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people due to a lack of funds. The same agency also launched an emergency operation in the northwest of **Georgia** at the end of the year, in an attempt to help 200,000 people affected by the flooding that had destroyed 70% of the harvest. The Georgian Government, with help from UNHCR, also began to register the country's more than 250,000 internally displaced people.

**Table 5.2. Main problems faced by Humanitarian organisations during 2004**

Problems	Consequences	Contexts
<b>Lack of security and vulnerability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Attacks on humanitarian personnel</li><li>• Withdrawal of organisations</li><li>• Increase in the vulnerability of the population affected by the crisis</li><li>• Looting of aid</li></ul>	Afghanistan, Burundi, Chechnya, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Sudan
<b>Lack of access to victims</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Increase in the vulnerability of the civilian population</li><li>• Enforced displacement</li><li>• Increased risk to humanitarian personnel</li></ul>	Afghanistan, Angola, Haiti, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe
<b>Lack of funds and resources</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Suspension of humanitarian aid</li><li>• Deterioration and continued overlooking of the crisis</li><li>• Increase in appeals and donor fatigue</li></ul>	Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Caucasus, Côte d'Ivoire, DPR Korea, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Palestine, Uganda

As far as **Chechnya** is concerned, a number of international bodies complained on several occasions throughout the year about the precarious situation still faced by Chechen refugees and the country's displaced population, and the pressure being brought to bear by Russia and Ingushetia to try and force their return. UNHCR also reiterated that the security conditions required for its personnel to return to Ingushetia were not yet in place, due to the constant climate of violence. Finally, in the autonomous region of **Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro)**, the United Nations decided to close down most of its operations in the country, due to the substantial improvement in the humanitarian crisis.

## Middle East

Country	Causes of the crisis
<b>Iraq</b>	Armed conflict, drought
<b>Palestine</b>	Humanitarian isolation of the population, armed conflict

The lack of security caused by the endless fighting between Iraqi armed opposition groups and US and British occupying forces greatly affected the work being done by humanitarian personnel in a large part of

**Iraq.** In this connection, some humanitarian organisations decided to withdraw from the country as they could not guarantee the safety of their own personnel. Thus, the disruption of basic services and disease continued to cause serious problems for some sections of the population. In addition, the attack on the city of Fallujah by the US army in November resulted in further complaints from humanitarian organisations stationed in the city, which cited the indiscriminate killing of civilians and an aggravation of the humanitarian crisis. Having previously suspended its activities as a result of the lack of security, UNHCR eventually decided to resume the process of repatriation from Iran during the month of September.


**The attack on the city of Fallujah by the US army in November resulted an aggravation of the humanitarian crisis**

Finally, the crisis affecting millions of people in **Palestine** was considerably worsened as a result of the hardening of Israeli Government policy (based on the blockading of the territories, the destruction of property and the expansion of settlements) and the steady construction of the wall along the West Bank. Representatives from the United Nations, various other organisations and around 70 countries decided to meet in Geneva during July to tackle the issue of the 4 million Palestinian refugees and restate their commitment to these people. However, UNRWA, the United Nations agency that provides aid to Palestinian refugees, was also forced to suspend its activities half way through the year as a result of a lack of funds.

### 5.3. Review of humanitarian action<sup>11</sup> during 2004

#### a) The financing of humanitarian appeals: an analysis of the CAP for 2004

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the international community as a whole has increased both the attention and the amount of resources that it directs towards humanitarian work, though this upward trend slowed around the middle of the decade. It recovered at the beginning of the new millennium, though it would now appear to have fallen once again. A good way of demonstrating this dynamic is to track the contributions made by donors following the most recent humanitarian appeals from the United Nations. Graph 5.2 shows how the CAP for 2004 collected only 52% of the amount originally requested, a figure well below the 66% collected in 2003 and similar to the 55% collected in 2002, the 47% in 2001 and the 55% in 2000. This decline is also reflected in the contributions made outside the CAP framework, given that the total amount of humanitarian aid provided during 2004 was the lowest for the last five years, amounting to a total of 3,300 million dollars, as compared with 6,600 million in 2003 and 3,900 million in 2002.



Source: United Nations

As regards the financing given for each appeal, the significant difference in these amounts should be noted, given that some have received more than 80% of the amount requested, as was the case in West Africa and Chad, while others, however, barely raised 10%, as happened in relation to Zimbabwe. The most heav-

11. "Humanitarian action" is understood to mean the combination of activities aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering in situations of humanitarian crisis. These activities are guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian action also includes the protection of civilians and the provision of basic aid.



ily financed parts of the 2004 CAP were those relating to food, security and coordination, while the least supported were those relating to the rebuilding of infrastructure, education and health. A further feature of this dynamic is that the countries which responded with the most resources, bearing in mind the size of their economies, were once again the countries of Scandinavia (Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland), along with Ireland, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, while the countries that contributed least were Japan, Spain, New Zealand, the United Arab Emirates, Germany and the USA. Finally the 2004 CAP also indicated the need for the early financing of crises as a way of preventing their intensification and deterioration. However, the contributions made during the first three months following the appeal for 2004 (January to March) only represented 12% of the total, while 16% was collected between April and June and 26% between July and October.

### Chart 5.5. The politicisation of aid and the debate over good practices

The domination of the Iraq crisis during the past year demonstrated a dynamic that has become gradually more established over recent years: donor countries provide more money for those contexts in which they have a domestic political and/or economic interest, instead of basing their actions strictly on need. This politicisation of humanitarian aid, which is in direct conflict with respect for International Humanitarian Law, has been increasingly denounced by a number of organisations that deal with this issue. Although there is as yet no binding instrument that regulates this area, representatives from around twenty countries, the United Nations, the EU, the ICRC and other organisations met in Ottawa (Canada) last October, as they had done in Stockholm (Sweden) in 2003, in order to strengthen the so-called Good Humanitarian Donation Practices initiative. This proposal, which is aimed at improving donor behaviour when they come to establish their policy for financing humanitarian action, is based on a number of agreements, such as preventing certain contexts from eclipsing all other scenarios, promoting regular assessments of the humanitarian response, including donor action, guaranteeing the accuracy, promptness and transparency of the reports published and holding back the increasing bilateralisation of aid.

## b) International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

**The disasters that have occurred in poor countries during the last decade resulted in 12 times the number of victims recorded in industrialised countries**

The example of Haiti shows that some countries are more liable to suffer catastrophes, and that such events have much greater human consequences<sup>12</sup>. In this connection, we should ask whether this is the result of fate or misfortune, or whether, on the contrary, there are much deeper, structural causes. The ICRC's annual report on disasters<sup>13</sup> reveals that the disasters that have occurred in poor countries

during the last decade resulted in 12 times the number of victims recorded in industrialised countries, showing a probable link between poverty and an increased vulnerability to disasters.

### Table 5.2. Consequences of natural disasters during the last decade (1994-2003)

- There were 5,677 disasters which caused 673,070 deaths and affected a further 2,580 million people, and which led to financial losses valued at around 691,000 million dollars. During the previous decade, 1,021,605 people died and a further 1,630 million were affected.
- The most destructive phenomena were: drought/famine (48%), flooding (16%), earthquakes (16%), storms (10%), extreme temperatures (8%), others (2%).
- Disasters occurring in industrialised countries caused an average of 51 deaths per disaster, while in poor countries this figure rises to 589.


Source: ICRC and United Nations

The UN's International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) is aimed at strengthening the ability of local communities to withstand disasters, on the basis of **four objectives**: 1) increasing public **awareness** of the link between poverty and vulnerability to disaster; 2) obtaining **commitments** from the public authorities to implement policies and actions relating to disaster reduction; 3) encouraging inter-disciplinary and inter-sector **collaboration**, including the extension of risk-reduction networks; and 4) improving scientific **knowledge** in the area of disaster reduction.

12. See Appendix V on the natural disasters that occurred during 2004.

13. ICRC, *World Disasters Report 2004*, at <[www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2004](http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2004)>.

## Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action



## 6. Militarization and disarmament

This chapter contains an analysis of issues relating to military security. This analysis is based on the monitoring of the **international agenda** pursued by the main parties on issues relating to military security (particularly the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the EU), with special attention paid to the imposition of **arms embargoes** (see the map at the end of the chapter), either by the UN Security Council (indicator no. 9), or by regional organisations such as the EU or the OSCE (indicator no. 10). A second section refers to the **arms cycle**, showing the level of militarization for different countries on the basis of the following indicators: **military spending** (indicator no. 11), **imports of major conventional weapons as a percentage of GDP** (indicator no. 12), **number of soldiers as a percentage of total population** (indicator no. 13), and the **BIC3D index** (indicator no. 14). Finally, there is a study of the most notable **military cooperation** programmes, the problem of the **proliferation of small arms** and aspects relating to **détente and disarmament**.

### a) The international agenda

The international picture during 2004 has continued to be dominated by the dynamics observed among the western nations. **European-Atlantic relations** were marked by efforts to re-establish unity following the disputes of 2003. This division, due principally to differences between the domestic political priorities of the USA, based on unilateralism and preventive strikes, and the differing reactions of the majority of the European powers and Russia, which were focused on re-establishing a more multilateralist and conciliatory stance, was more visible as a consequence of the war in Iraq.

These efforts at conciliation were brought to the fore at the **NATO Summit** in Istanbul, at which the European nations agreed to support the training of future Iraqi troops and the USA dropped its proposal that NATO should take over responsibility for the reconstruction process. In spite of these efforts to heal the divisions between the two positions, the US Administration continued to apply its national security policy, without allowing the events in Iraq to alter its doctrines, though a slight change of diplomatic course could be seen as the country attempted to seek more international and multilateral support by acting in accordance with international legislation.

The armed conflict in Iraq also intensified these internal differences within the **EU**, generating uncertainty as regards future common undertakings. In spite of this, several initiatives have been introduced with a view to building an individual leadership and strategic position aimed at implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as dealing with aspects of Defence. Several steps have been taken in this area during the course of the year. Firstly, the EU has taken charge of some peace-keeping missions, with an important presence and leading role in the missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (with the MTF taking over from SFOR, a mission run by NATO) and Afghanistan (the Eurocorps military force has taken over from the ISAF).

Secondly, internal progress has also been made towards greater **integration in the areas of security and defence**, as demonstrated by the creation of a position, currently held by G. de Vries from the Netherlands, to coordinate the fight against terrorism and the work being done by the different intelligence agencies of the EU member states, along with the support given to the European Defence Agency. Special mention should also be made of the creation of rapid reaction forces, which will be operational by 2007. These will not concentrate exclusively on the military approach, as they will also include contributions from health and human development experts, among others.

However, the most important issue for the EU during the past year was unquestionably the **expansion process**. The inclusion of 10 new countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) has provoked a certain level of mistrust on the part of Russia in the area of security and defence, due to the possibility that this may increase its isolation, given the addi-

tional process for the expansion of NATO (with the formal admission of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia). In this connection, mention should also be made to the modification of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the agreement established between the countries of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1999 and aimed at limiting the movement of conventional weapons and troops within European territory.

## b) Arms embargoes

At the end of 2004, a total of **20 arms embargoes** were in force (see Table 6.1). For the countries of the EU, arms embargoes have a twofold implication, since as well as being binding on member states, these arrangements are also included under Criterion One of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, adopted in 1998.

Comparing these indicators with the others used throughout this report shows how countries subject to arms embargoes are also those that display the largest number of alert signals in the final indicator table. As a general rule, countries subject to embargo are the scene of political tensions or armed conflicts, and they also suffer humanitarian crises, meaning that they represent highly deteriorated contexts. It is therefore a good idea to take preventive measures to try and stop further weapons entering these areas, thus reducing the risk of destabilisation. On occasion, embargoes are not imposed on Governments but instead on the armed opposition groups operating inside a country or neighbouring countries.

This report does not differentiate between compulsory and voluntary embargoes, because the mere adoption of an embargo is sufficient to denote a worrying situation in a particular country. Nevertheless, voluntary embargoes represent a particular difficulty, since there is no reason for them to be explicitly lifted or reviewed, which makes it difficult to ascertain the date on which the embargo in question ceases to be operative.

**Table 6.1. Countries and armed groups embargoed during 2004**

Al-Qaida	Burundi (*)	Liberia	Sudan
Taliban groups (Afghanistan)	China	Myanmar	Tanzania (*)
Armenia	Congo, DR(*)	Rwanda (*)	Uganda (*)
Azerbaijan	Côte d'Ivoire	RUF and other groups (Sierra Leone)	Yemen
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Iraq <sup>1</sup>	Somalia	Zimbabwe

(\*) Arms embargoes imposed on non-governmental forces from Rwanda, and on Burundi, DR Congo, Tanzania and Uganda, in the event that weapons could be used in Rwanda.

Among the embargoes currently in place, particular mention should be made of the one imposed on **Côte d'Ivoire** by the **United Nations**, following the increased violence that occurred from November. The EU decided to lift its embargo on **Libya**, in place since 1986, in order to offer an opportunity to strengthen relations with the country, though the lifting of sanctions exposed the existence of illegal networks for the trafficking of products and technology that could be used for the development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

Another area of interest was **China**, as several European countries (led by France) are pressing for the lifting of sanctions against the country since they believe that this arms embargo (which dates back to 1989, following the events in Tiananmen Square) should be lifted. This issue has divided the member states of the EU, in spite of the fact that the European Parliament has come out against the lifting of the embargo on China since it considers that the country is still guilty of human rights violations.

1. In the case of Iraq, under UN Security Council resolution 1483, arms transfers will be authorised when the so-called Authority requests them, allowing the new Government to receive military material and training under international supervision.


## c) The arms cycle

According to SIPRI, **world military spending** amounted to 956 billion dollars during 2003, representing an increase of 11% in real terms over 2002 (which in turn had registered a 6.5% increase). It can be stated that, as a consequence of the policies resulting from the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, the increase in military spending has accelerated by 18% in real terms over the last two years, though it should be noted that this upward trend had already been seen before the attacks. In addition, according to the forecast by the United Nations Group of Government Experts, military spending in 2004 is expected to amount to around 1 trillion dollars. 75% of this figure is accounted for by the world's richest countries, even though they only represent 16% of the world's population.

The **USA** is responsible for almost half of all military spending in the world. Apart from the USA's regular military budget, supplementary amounts have been added to cover military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to some anti-terrorist activities. If these extraordinary budget allocations are excluded, military spending would continue to show an increase, though much less significantly, as for 2003 the amount of this increase would be 4% rather than the 11% actually shown.

In any case, this budgetary increase by the USA has caused other world powers also to increase their military spending (though in a more contained fashion), both to remain in line with the USA's increased spending and as a result of the changed perception regarding threats or technological and industrial development. The fact is that the 7 main military powers all increased their military spending over the period from 1999 to 2003. **Russia** has pursued a line that is very similar to that of the USA, **India** and **Japan** have increased their military budgets in line with the rise in their GDP, as has **China**, except for 2002 and 2003 when the increase was higher. **France** and the **United Kingdom** had been reducing their military budgets, though this trend has recently changed and spending is gradually rising once again. The country displaying a different approach in this area is **Brazil**, which in contrast to other medium-sized powers is exploiting its world influence by pursuing a "soft power" model, improving its trade relations and reallocating resources towards social and economic development.

**Graph 6.1. Distribution of world military spending in 2003**  
(figures in thousands of millions of dollars)



\*Total for all the countries that form part of NATO: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

\*\*Estimate of al-Qaida's budget made by various research centres.

Source: The authors, based on: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

As regards an analysis of **military spending against GDP** for each country (indicator no. 11), we should mention that this has been calculated on the basis of data provided by the two most recognised institutions offering worldwide statistics in this area: SIPRI and IISS. However, the figures from the two centres display certain differences, due principally to the fact that they use two different methodologies and also to the criteria employed by governments when indicating their levels of military spending, a factor that is further exacerbated by the secrecy and concealment that characterises many of the activities associated with military affairs. Following these statistics, we have opted in this report to indicate those countries which, according to one or the other of the sources mentioned above, show military spending in excess of 4% of their GDP. This is the case in 37 countries, which include 17 cases in which it should be noted that military spending exceeds 6% of GDP, as indicated in the following table:

**Table 6.2. Countries with high levels of military spending (above 6% of GDP)**

Armenia	Jordan	Myanmar	Vietnam
Brunei Darussalam	Korea, DPR	Oman	Yemen
Burundi	Kuwait	Qatar	
Eritrea	Liberia	Saudi Arabia	
Israel	Maldives	Syria	

Viewed regionally, as can be seen in Table 6.3, the regions in which military spending has most increased are the Middle East, Southeast Asia, North Africa and North and South America, continuing the trend from the previous year and coinciding with the areas in which the majority of armed conflicts are concentrated.

The great majority of military powers have already announced significant increases in their military budgets for the coming years, though economically such budgetary increases would not appear to be sustainable. An example is the case of the USA, where increased military spending has contributed substantially to the creation of a historic budget deficit in the country (521 billion dollars). Both the USA and the other main military powers are engaging in a process for the reduction and realignment of their forces in order to save on

**Table 6.3. Estimated military spending by region (1993-2002)**

(Figures are shown in thousands of millions of dollars at constant 2000 prices)

Region	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	% 1993-2003
<b>Africa</b>	<b>(9.2)</b>	<b>(8.7)</b>	<b>(8.4)</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>11.3</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>+24</b>
North	(4.1)	(3.9)	(4.0)	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.7	4.8	5.4	5.5	+35
Sub-Saharan	5.1	4.8	4.4	4.4	4.8	5.6	5.7	(5.8)	5.9	(5.9)	+15
<b>America</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>328</b>	<b>329</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>323</b>	<b>334</b>	<b>339</b>	<b>376</b>	<b>451</b>	<b>+24</b>
North	344	324	306	304	298	299	310	313	350	426	+24
Central	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.3	-5
South	17.6	20.2	18.4	21.2	20.2	20.1	20.7	22.6	22.9	21.8	+24
<b>Asia and Oceania</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>+25</b>
Central Asia	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	(0.4)	0.5	—	(0.5)	—	—	—
East Asia	101	103	107	107	105	105	110	115	121	125	+24
Southern Asia	12.0	12.6	12.8	13.4	13.5	14.6	15.2	15.8	15.9	16.9	+41
Oceania	7.3	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.4	7.7	7.7	8.0	8.3	8.5	+17
<b>Europe</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>195</b>	<b>-2</b>
Eastern and Central	26.4	20.6	19.3	20.1	17.5	18.3	20.0	21.5	22.2	24.5	-8
Western	174	166	166	166	167	170	171	170	172	171	-2
<b>Middle East</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>48.1</b>	<b>51.9</b>	<b>50.3</b>	<b>58.0</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>63.8</b>	<b>70.0</b>	<b>+48</b>
<b>World Total</b>	<b>742</b>	<b>709</b>	<b>693</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>693</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>727</b>	<b>743</b>	<b>792</b>	<b>879</b>	<b>+18</b>
<b>Change %</b>		<b>-4.4</b>	<b>-2.2</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>-0.8</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>11.0</b>	

Source: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, Appendix 10A, Table 10A.1 and Table 10A.3.

The figures shown in brackets indicated that the published data is estimated.

**The great majority of military powers have already announced significant increases in their military budgets for the reduction and realignment of their forces and thus offer the possibility of making the large amount of investment required for the development of new technologies and new arms programmes**

their military budgets and thus offer the possibility of making the large amount of investment required for the development of new technologies and new arms programmes.

The great majority of military powers have already announced significant increases in their military budgets for the coming years, though economically such budgetary increases would not appear to be sustainable. An example is the case of the USA, where increased military spending has contributed substantially to the creation of a historic budget deficit in the country (521 billion dollars). Both the USA and the other main military powers are engaging in a process for the reduction and realignment of their forces in order to save on their military budgets and thus offer the possibility of making the large amount of investment required for the development of new technologies and new arms programmes.

The **Research and Development (R&D)** of new military products and technologies is the most expensive part of the whole arms cycle. The new military scenarios confronting the large military powers have revealed the importance of issues relating to military technology. There is currently a new procedure for the development of military technology, in which the frail barrier between the civilian and military sectors has been broken down in certain areas, particularly communications and information technology. This is causing what many analysts are calling a revolution in military affairs, rather than a gradual evolution, since instead of traditional R&D one would now have to talk about S&T (Science and Technology). This innovation in military S&T involves much more ambitious long-term collaborative programmes in basic and applied research areas, in order to support future military capacity.

The **USA** has invested a great deal in military technological innovation, at least, since the Second World War. Its most ambitious project at present is the one presented by the Pentagon in its report entitled "US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan", in which it states that its main military priority is to turn outer space into an extra-terrestrial battlefield through the development of dozens of new military projects (from anti-satellite lasers to terrestrial attacks launched from space). This new doctrine can also be explained by the USA's search for greater self-sufficiency, given the difficulties that it has encountered when seeking to form strong alliances with other countries, whether in terms of direct intervention on the battlefield or as regards logistical support or the opening of air space. As a basis for analysis, we should point to the characteristics of the new armed conflicts that are emerging today, which are of a more internal nature. It is not the large defence items but small arms, with their low production costs, that proliferate most in these areas of conflict.

In **Europe**, on the other hand, the Common Security and Defence Policy does not cover the aspect of military S&T, both as a result of the lack of clear objectives in this area and due to the competition between the various member states and their mutual mistrust as they try to maintain a certain amount of sovereignty and protect their local know-how in such matters.

**Arms production** continued to be dominated by the EU, Russia and the USA. During the last year there were three important developments in this area: a significant increase in sales, the continued consolidation of the industry and a change in the dynamics relating to growth and restructuring. The desire to adapt the capacity of the arms industry and the requirements of new military scenarios (in which the areas of technology, electronics and communications element have taken on extreme importance, as mentioned earlier) have meant that many traditional businesses working in the arms sector have had to acquire companies from these other sectors. At a time when the line between military security and internal, national and international security is becoming increasingly blurred, the gap between military and civilian production is also gradually being eroded.

The increase in the sales of defence products has, of course, had an influence on the **increase in arms exports**, a phenomenon that has also been seen since the end of 2001. **Russia** and the **USA** are still the main international suppliers, the main importers being **China** and **India** (Russian products) and **Taiwan**,

**Egypt, the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Japan** (products from the USA). In spite of the fact that Russia has been the main exporter of weapons in the world over recent years, several domestic factors, such as currency devaluations and the sale of old arsenals mean that it will not be able to sustain this leading position for a great deal of time.

**Table 6.4. Main exporters and importers of arms during 2003**

(Figures are shown in thousands of millions of dollars at constant 1990 prices)

Exporters	Value	Importers	Value
Russia	6,980	India	3,621
USA	4,385	China	2,548
France	1,753	Greece	1,957
Germany	1,549	Pakistan	611
Canada	556	United Kingdom	555
United Kingdom	525	Turkey	504
China	404	Egypt	504
Italy	277	Saudi Arabia	487
Netherlands	268	Korea, Rep.	299
Ukraine	234	Taiwan	179

Source: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

According to the data provided by the indicator on **imports of major conventional weapons as a proportion of GDP** (indicator no. 12), there are 9 countries in which arms purchases exceed 0.5% of GDP, and in five of these countries the figure rises above 1% (Eritrea, Greece, Jordan, Pakistan and United Arab Emirates). In spite of the fact that it is not currently possible to calculate the total cost of military acquisitions made within an individual state, the indicator does provide a warning of potential arms races at a regional level. Mention should be made of the case of Greece, a country which had already maintained a high level of military spending for many years and has now acquired a lot of security and defence equipment as a result of its hosting of the Olympic Games in Athens, a fact which explains its presence in this list.

As regards the **number of soldiers as a percentage of total population** in an individual country (indicator no. 13), there has been a clear reduction on a world scale, following the trend that has been observed for some years now, the result of the policy in many countries to employ a fully professional army. Nevertheless, the proportion of soldiers as a percentage of total population still exceeds 1.5% in 10 cases. Another element that is contributing substantially to this reduction in regular military forces is the increase in the privatisation of the military sector. Contexts such as Iraq have given a much clearer indication of the extent to which private security companies, businesses with multi-million turnovers, have taken over the duties normally performed by regular forces.

### Chart 6.1. Soldiers of fortune: the case of Iraq

**What are mercenaries?** A *mercenary* is a combatant who takes part in foreign armed conflicts on the basis of personal financial gain. These people may be employed by *private military companies*, corporate organisations that offer their clients a wide range of military services, or by *private security companies*, in which case they provide security services for the protection of individuals or installations.

**Where do they come from?** In spite of the fact that this is a commercial phenomenon that has been seen throughout history, its recent proliferation resulted from the national liberation movements that arose during the post-colonial period in Africa. The practice was prohibited in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Protocol of 1977, on armed conflicts within states, appended to the Geneva Convention of 1949. In spite of this, since the end of the Cold War, and with questionable legality, various armed forces such as those of the USA and the United Kingdom have continued to encourage sub-contracting arrangements in order to rationalise their operations and reduce their defence budgets, realigning their troop numbers in favour of an improved weapons capacity. Their legal status is currently very vague and needs to be reviewed and clarified at an international level.



**What is happening in Iraq?** The most current model for this phenomenon can be found in Iraq, where duties are being privatised in order to guarantee the security of installations like oil pipelines and army training centres. This work has brought together between 20,000 and 30,000 people in the country, though the legitimacy of their status is questionable, since they have been recorded as being present during armed confrontations (between 30 and 50 of them have died in violent actions) and they are viewed as “objective parties” when they act as mediators in arms deals in the name of individual Governments or opposition forces. However, it should be remembered that situations like this are also occurring in other contexts, such as Afghanistan.

During the last 10 years, in the case of the USA alone, security companies have been sub-contracted at a cost of 300,000 million dollars, the main beneficiaries of these contracts being private security companies employed in Iraq, such as *Control Risks*, *Dyn-Corp*, *Erynis Iraq Ltd.*, *Kellog Brown and Root (KBR)*, *Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI)* and *Vinnell Corp.*

Finally, the **BIC3D militarization index** prepared annually by the BICC (indicator no. 14), indicates that 59 countries are engaged in militarization processes, and in 18 of these the level of militarization is classified as very serious. In 5 of these cases (Armenia, Burundi, Eritrea, Myanmar and Qatar), this coincides with extremely high levels of military spending (more than 6% of GDP), a circumstance which should be a cause for concern. The BIC3D index is calculated by combining four sets of figures: military spending, weapons reserves, armed forces personnel and personnel employed in military production, and it is therefore a suitable indicator to demonstrate a country’s militarization or demilitarization as a whole, and the general trend shown<sup>2</sup>.

## d) Military cooperation

Turning to the **different programmes for military cooperation**, the **USA** has implemented a series of new strategies which are mainly aimed at seeking alliances with Muslim countries, in order to combat Islamic terrorism by offering special status, like the grant of the status of foreign NATO ally to countries like Kuwait, Morocco and Pakistan, so that it can transfer more military material to these countries. Elsewhere, with regard to **cooperation in the fight to combat terrorism**, it has formed alliances with intelligence services with a view to controlling cross-border terrorism in Africa and between ASEAN member states.

**Table 6.5. Main agreements for military cooperation to combat terrorism**

China - Pakistan	Inclusion of the fight to combat drug-trafficking.
China - Russia	Plans to carry out their first bilateral exercises in 2005.
Colombia - USA	Approval by the USA of the financing for a plan to combat terrorism and drug-trafficking in Colombia to a value of 577 million dollars.
EU - Pakistan	Inclusion of agreements on conventional weapons and the fight to combat drug-trafficking.
Germany - Russia	Joint position in respect of the United Nations, the G8, the relationship between Russia and NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
Pakistan - United Kingdom	Agreement to strengthen co-operation.
Pakistan - Russia	Co-operation between intelligence services.
Pakistan - Tajikistan	Search for greater stability in the region.
Saudi Arabia - USA	Announcement of a campaign to repress organisations allegedly linked with al-Qaida.
USA - Bangladesh	The terms of the agreement compel the Bangladeshi authorities to protect US installations and citizens.
USA - India	Inclusion of clauses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime security.
USA - EU	Agreement to cooperate in the areas of security and surveillance at ports and airports.

2. Figures in this index vary between +100% and -100% and are interpreted on the basis of the percentage change between the average since the end of the Cold War and the BIC3D index for the year. Positive results indicate a process of demilitarization while negative figures indicate increased militarization.

## e) Proliferation of small arms

Turning to the **proliferation of small arms**, the United Nations established a Group of Government Experts on the Tracking of Small Arms and Light weapons. The Working Group to Identify and Trace Illicit Small Arms also held its first session, aiming to create an international instrument that would be compulsory and binding. It should be remembered that the second Biennial Meeting for the Review of the United Nations' Programme of Action on Small Arms (2001) is to be held during 2005.

Special mention should also be made of the signing of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons by African countries from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region. This Protocol will oblige signatories to take specific action in order to reduce the number of small arms in circulation in their countries. Some of these measures will involve the adoption of laws that will make it illegal to manufacture, trade and possess arms.

Elsewhere, the fourth **Small Arms Survey yearbook** drew attention to the link between the impact of arms exports and the violation of human rights, and the contribution that weapons make to violence and criminality on an international scale. The study pointed to Brazil, China, Russia and the USA as the main exporters of small arms. Finally, the yearbook also warned that very few countries are implementing strict controls on arms trading.

As regards **weapon collection initiatives**, the case that has shown the way has been the programme in **Brazil**, the results of which have exceeded initial expectations and led the Government to take a number of initiatives, such as increasing both the budget assigned to the programme and the period during which weapons may be handed over, and extending the number of places where weapons can be handed in around the country. A referendum is to be held in October 2005 on the possibility of withdrawing the right to carry arms throughout the whole of the country.

Finally, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva (Switzerland) published a **special report on the impact of the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms on the civilian population**. The report also deals with the challenges that must be faced by humanitarian agencies in respect of this phenomenon in emergency situations, calling on them to incorporate this issue in their agendas on the basis of the following recommendations:

### Chart 6.2. Areas in which humanitarian organisations can act in respect of small arms

#### **Health impacts:**

- Paying attention to the impact that armed violence can have on health, supporting the creation of legal instruments that allow for the tracking of firearms.

#### **Refugees and internally displaced people:**

- Including the security and protection of refugees and internally displaced people, monitoring the presence of armed elements in settlement camps and promoting regional cooperation to reduce arms-trafficking.

#### **Child soldiers:**

- Participating in mechanisms to supervise all armed groups, promoting the creation of weapons-free zones around schools and identifying the needs of child combatants in DDR programmes.

#### **Gender perspective:**

- Supporting and implementing programmes that promote alternatives to male-based thinking, including women in early warning mechanisms, encouraging them to act as defenders of peace, extending DDR programmes to include women, who are often forgotten in such programmes.

#### **Humanitarian personnel:**

- Facilitating and guaranteeing all the information relating to the safety of humanitarian personnel.

**Proliferation of small arms:**

- Supporting DDR programmes wherever possible: logistical support, psychological support (including women and children), guaranteeing that weapons handovers include procedures to ensure the safety of the weapons collected and examining the factors that lead to the possession of weapons in each context.

**Misuse of guns:**

- Informing states of instances where weapons are being misused, supporting the inclusion of clauses relating to the possession of weapons by civilians in instruments governing small arms and proposing updates and improvements in clauses relating to the possession of weapons by civilians.

**Controlling supply:**

- Calling on states to increase the level of debate regarding mediation in arms-trafficking, calling on Governments to create a Protocol on firearms and supporting the international *Arms Control* campaign.

Source: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue: *Putting guns in their place. A resource pack for two years of action by humanitarian agencies*, October 2004.

## f) Détente and disarmament

This sub-section refers to events during the past year that have contributed positively to a reduction in military tension. On a multilateral level, mention should be made of the review process for the **Ottawa Treaty on the Prohibition of Landmines**, which took place in Nairobi (Kenya) in November and December 2004 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of this Treaty's implementation. The aim of the review process was to analyse how the Treaty was working and identify any modifications that might be required. From the point of view of the various NGOs and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), and in particular the assessment made in the report *Landmine Monitor 2004*, the outlook is relatively optimistic: since the Ottawa Treaty was adopted, the use of landmines has fallen drastically, financing for both victims and mine-clearance operations has increased by 80% (mines have been cleared from land totalling 1,100 km<sup>2</sup>) and the number of new victims is gradually falling. Nevertheless, there is still much to do, given that several military powers have not yet signed the Treaty (the USA has recently announced that it will not be signing, as it was to have done by 2006). Above all, there are still products that do not fall within the classification of mines, though their effects are extremely similar, as is the case with cluster bombs.

**Although many DDR programmes were introduced during the first months of the year financial difficulties, a lack of political will and an absence of trust led to widely varying results**

Another important initiative in the area of détente and disarmament are the **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes** for former combatants in post-war contexts. A certain slowdown was experienced in these programmes during 2004.

Although many DDR programmes were introduced during the first months of the year, as time went on, financial difficulties, a lack of political will and an absence of trust led to widely varying results being achieved in the various contexts involved<sup>3</sup>.

Finally, particular mention should be made of the support received by the **international "Control Arms" campaign**, an initiative led by Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam for the creation of an International Treaty on Arms Trading that will be legally binding. This proposal has received the blessing of around thirty countries, including some which are important arms manufacturers and exporters, such as Brazil, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Working sessions between these governments will begin at a summit to be held in Tanzania in February 2005.

By way of **conclusion**, a number of points should be mentioned. Firstly, as regards the **international agenda**, we should view as positive the moves towards a multilateralist strategy, aimed at avoiding the uni-


3. See Appendix VI

4. More information at <<http://www.controlarms.org>>.

lateralist position and support for preventive strikes represented by the USA. As regards these moves, associated with the policy governing **arms embargoes** on certain countries by the different international bodies involved in this area, it remains to be seen whether they have arisen strictly from an interpretation of the actual situation in the countries affected or whether they are due to attempts to improve bilateral relations in order to benefit trade arrangements.

Turning to the **arms cycle**, the increase in world military spending is once again to be regretted. The level of spending has now reached almost 1 trillion dollars, with great emphasis on military R&D, which should be seen in the context of the actual characteristics of current armed conflicts, in which it is not just a question of having more effective weapons (as the USA argues) but also a matter of the response that should be offered in these contexts, such as looking at health issues, one of the bases for the EU's proposal for human security intervention forces. Finally, it should not be forgotten that **small arms** are a fundamental element in these new conflicts. Efforts to curb their proliferation continue, and this work must be pursued in every possible way: improving legislation, weapons collection and destruction programmes and DDR processes, among others.

Militarization and disarmament



- Embargoed governments
- Non-governmental actors
- \* Not attributed to any country on the case of Al-Qaeda
- Countries with high military spending
- Countries where the number of soldiers exceeds 2% of the population
- Countries with imports of heavy conventional weapons exceeding 1% of GDP

## 7. Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

This section contains an analysis of the situation relating to Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The **first part** relates to the violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms reported by non-governmental human rights organisations (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and other international or inter-governmental organisations (the EU and the United Nations, with special emphasis, in the latter case, on the 60<sup>th</sup> period of sessions of the UN Human Rights Commission). The **second part** contains an analysis of issues relating to international law in situations of armed conflict and the use of child-soldiers. The issue of respect for the international instruments offering protection for human rights is assessed in detail in part 1, which deals with conduct in relation to the international community (indicators 31 and 32).

### 7.1. Human rights (indicators 15 to 19)

Human rights are the inherent rights and freedoms of all people. These rights are universal, inalienable and indivisible, and are generally divided into the following three categories: a) civil and political rights; b) economic, social and cultural rights; and c) rights linked with solidarity and peace. The 5 indicators forming this section refer specifically to civil and political rights, while economic, social and cultural rights will be dealt with later, in section 8 on Development. This section<sup>1</sup> reflects the complaints made about human rights abuses committed by government agencies.

**Table 7.1. Types of human rights and their violation by governmental agencies**

Civil and political rights	Examples of abuse by governmental agencies and the international law that forbids such violations <sup>2</sup>
<b>The right to life</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Genocide</b>, covered by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</li> <li>- <b>Extra-judicial executions and summary disappearances</b>, covered by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.</li> <li>- <b>Death Penalty</b>, covered by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</li> </ul>
<b>The right to personal integrity</b>	- <b>Torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment and sexual violence</b> , covered in the Convention against Torture
<b>The right not to be arbitrarily detained or punished</b>	- <b>Arbitrary detentions and legal proceedings without guarantees</b> , covered in both cases by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
<b>The right not to be discriminated against and not to suffer a diminishment of one's rights and freedoms as the result of belonging to one of these groups</b>	<p><b>Groups discriminated against:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Defenders of human rights</b>, covered in the Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individual Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.</li> <li>- <b>Women</b>, covered by the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women</li> <li>- <b>Children</b>, covered by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols to this Convention</li> <li>- <b>Minority groups and indigenous peoples</b>, covered by the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination</li> <li>- <b>Refugees, IDPs and asylum-seekers</b>, covered by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the two Protocols to the Four Geneva Conventions</li> </ul>
<b>Fundamental freedoms</b>	- <b>Expression, Association, Conscience, Thought and Religion, and Participation</b> , all covered in the Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

1. Based on Criterion no. 2 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

2. The basic protection of these rights is set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Indicators 15 to 17 refer to the situation regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries or territories examined, while indicators 18 and 19 refer to the application of the death penalty and the grant of asylum status. Only human rights violations committed by the State or by government agencies have been taken into account.<sup>3</sup>

## a) Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Government experts and NGOs have complained that we are seeing the worst situation in the field of the promotion and protection of human rights on an international scale for the last 50 years<sup>4</sup>. Complaints have

**Government experts and NGOs have complained that we are seeing the worst situation in the field of the promotion and protection of human rights on an international scale for the last 50 years**

continued to be centred around the impact on human rights of recent anti-terrorist measures, policies and legislation, and the serious violations of international human rights law and the laws concerning refuge and asylum and International Humanitarian Law in Darfur (Sudan) and Iraq. In addition, the NGOs Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have pointed to the USA and its war on terrorism as being greatly responsible for this deterioration.

**Table 7.2. What human rights violations are being caused by anti-terrorist policies and measures?**

Typology	Policies / measures adopted
<b>Torture and mistreatment</b>	- The suppression of basic guarantees to prevent torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and measures to prevent violations of the right to life, with the introduction in many regimes of the death penalty following a moratorium period.
<b>Arbitrary detentions</b>	- Administrative detention without recourse to the courts. - Prolonged or secret detentions and detention in solitary confinement. - The adoption of measures that restrict the right to a fair trial with the proper guarantees.
<b>Infringement of basic freedoms</b>	- The adoption of undefined criminal terms in relation to "terrorism" and "from terrorist organisations", which permit the infringement of the principle of legality and the criminalisation of legitimate acts in the exercise of basic freedoms. - The denial of the right to associate freely and some labour rights. - The control and closure of media organisations that are critical of government actions.
<b>Denial of asylum status</b>	- The transfer, return, extradition, refused entry or expulsion of people who run the risk of torture, contrary to the <i>non-refoulement</i> principle.

According to the situation described in the **Amnesty International 2004 report** (referring to events that occurred in 2003) **and the bulletins from both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch** during 2004<sup>5</sup> (indicator no. 15), serious human rights violations have been recorded, with the following results: a) systematic and widespread abuses relating to the right to life and personal security as a result of the actions or omissions of the State are recorded in 59 countries; b) torture and ill-treatment are recorded in

3. This report appeals for State responsibility, meaning that the majority of the sources used for its indicators refer to violations committed by governments. The abuses perpetrated by other agents, such as armed opposition groups, are not considered, because international law only regulates the behaviour of States.

4. For more information, see Amnesty International's *Annual Report 2004* at <<http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/index-eng>>.

5. For information on reports of human rights violations by these bodies during 2004, see *Semáforo de Derechos Humanos* at <<http://www.escolapau.org>>.

108 countries; and c) serious infringements of fundamental freedoms are recorded in 94 countries, the most affected groups being defenders of human rights (in 31 cases) and people working in the communications media. These abuses continue to be committed against a background of impunity.

### Chart 7.1. Characteristics of human rights violations by region, according to the NGOs Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch

#### **Africa:**

the situation in the region is characterised by the widespread presence of armed conflicts, the repression of political opposition, the persecution of human rights defenders, violence against women and limited access to justice by the most marginalised sectors of society. The illegal trade in resources and weapons, impunity in respect of human rights violations and the passivity of Governments has deprived the majority of people on the continent of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

#### **America:**

the fight to combat corruption, the defence of the rights of indigenous peoples, and the fight against impunity and poverty have marked the agenda of organisations on the American continent.

#### **Asia and the Pacific:**

the fight against international terrorism has clearly restricted human rights in this part of the world. Poverty and discrimination continue to dominate the lives of millions of people, with a particular effect on women and indigenous people. The protection of human rights remained inadequate throughout the region and abuses have increased in many countries as a result of the upsurge of violence in many armed conflicts.

#### **Europe and Central Asia:**

governments continue to use the fight against international terrorism to suppress human rights, adopting regressive measures that have led to attacks against refugees and asylum seekers and restrictions on the freedom of expression and opinion. Xenophobic and racist behaviour has also increased across the continent.

#### **Middle East and North Africa:**

the human rights situation in the region has been marked by the armed conflicts in Iraq and the Middle East. In spite of promised reforms, many Governments continued to commit serious human rights violations, such as arbitrary detention for political reasons, harassment of people as a result of their sexual orientation, failure to provide procedural guarantees and discrimination against women and people belonging to minority groups.

The second indicator (no. 16) refers to the countries listed in the *European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2004*, issued by the **Council of Europe**<sup>6</sup>. This report, the sixth of its kind, offers a view of all the policies adopted by the EU in the area of human rights, both from the point of view of the member states and from the perspective of the EU's relations with third parties in different international forums, such as the United Nations' Human Rights Commission.

In this regard, the Irish and Dutch rotating presidencies made statements regarding the human rights situation in 41 countries, mainly in Asia and the Middle East, pointing to positive developments and improvements in 5 of these (Armenia, Georgia (Adjara), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey), and expressing their concern regarding the abuses being committed in the remainder. The report's final conclusion deplores the fact that due to the world situation more significant progress has not been made in the promotion and protection of human rights, both within the EU and on an international level.

6. Council of Europe, *European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2004*, Brussels, 13 September 2004. For more information, see <<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ENHR2004.pdf>>.



## Chart 7.2. Human rights situation in Council of Europe member states during 2003<sup>7</sup>

- Introduction of anti-terrorist policies in Belgium, France, Germany, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom, without the proper guarantees relating to basic freedoms.
- Increasingly restrictive policies on the grant of asylum and refugee status.
- Increase in racism, intolerance, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.
- Infringement of the freedom of expression and control of the media in Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.
- Violation of the right to associate in Turkey and Ukraine.
- Systematic use of torture in Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine, and its widespread use in Russia.
- Violation of religious freedom, principally in Belgium, France, Georgia, Greece and Ukraine.

Finally, the third indicator in this section relating to human rights violations (no. 17), is based on the reports presented to the **60<sup>th</sup> period of sessions of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC)** by Independent Experts, Special Representatives and Rapporteurs working at country level, as well as on the Presidential Resolutions and Declarations adopted.

During the **60<sup>th</sup> period of sessions of the Human Rights Commission** (Geneva, from 15 March to 23 April 2004)<sup>8</sup>, the human rights situation was condemned **in 4 countries** (Burundi, DR Congo, Somalia and the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967), while **concern was expressed** over the situation in **9 others** (Liberia, Cambodia, Chad, Sudan, Cuba, DPR Korea, Myanmar, Belarus and Turkmenistan). The case of Cuba is particularly remarkable as, for the first time, a number of American states supported a resolution, proposed by the Government of Honduras, that made particular reference to the issue of basic freedoms in the country. A presidential statement was also issued in relation to the behaviour of other countries in respect of human rights issues, such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Haiti, Nepal and Timor-Leste.

**Table 7.3. Country-by-country list of resolutions adopted during the UNHRC's 60<sup>th</sup> period of sessions**

AFRICA (7)	
<b>Burundi</b> Resolution 2004/82 of 21/04/04 Adopted without a vote	<b>Condemned</b> all the violations of human rights and International Humanitarian Law, particularly violence against women and widespread impunity, and the illegal sale and distribution of arms, which has a negative effect on peace and regional security.
<b>Chad</b> Resolution 2004/84 of 21/04/04 Adopted without a vote	<b>Expressed the greatest concern</b> over the inter-community violence caused by ethnic tension and exacerbated by the participation of former combatants and paramilitaries, dependence on the executive legal system, the poor conditions in prisons, the culture of impunity and the absence of a consolidated structure for the protection and promotion of human rights. Established a mandate for an <b>Independent Expert</b> .
<b>DR Congo</b> Resolution 2004/84 of 21/04/04 Adopted without a vote	<b>Condemned</b> the human rights violations committed against the civilian population during the armed conflict, particularly in the east of the country, the massacres carried out in Ituri, the cases of extra-judicial executions, summary disappearances, torture, arbitrary detentions, widespread harassment and lack of procedural guarantees. Also condemned the widespread sexual violence against women and children, the systematic impunity, the illegal exploitation of resources and the relationship between all these acts and the perpetuation of the armed conflict.
<b>Liberia</b> Resolution 2004/83 of 21/04/04 Adopted without a vote	<b>Expressed the greatest concern</b> over the existence of paramilitary groups, the serious violations of human rights and International Humanitarian Law still being committed against the civilian population, particularly women and children, the current lack of security in the country and the delays in implementing the DDR programmes begun by the United Nations.
<b>Sierra Leone</b> Resolution 2004/86 of 21/04/04 Adopted without a vote	<b>Welcomed</b> the beginning of trials at the Special Court for Sierra Leone dealing with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and the presentation by Parliament of a draft bill for the creation of a national human rights commission.

7. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *IHF Annual Report on Human Rights Violations*, 2004. For more information, see <[http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc\\_summary.php?sec\\_id=&d\\_id=3888&print=1](http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=&d_id=3888&print=1)>.

8. All these documents can be consulted via our web site at <<http://www.escolapau.org>>.

<p><b>Somalia</b> Resolution 2004/80 of 21/04/04 Adopted without a vote</p>	<p><b>Condemned</b> the continuing serious abuses being committed by all parties, the perpetuation of fighting, the systematic infringement of human rights and International Humanitarian Law (particularly against displaced minorities, vulnerable groups, children, women, etc.), the recruitment of child soldiers and other forms of child exploitation, and all acts of violence.</p>
<p><b>Sudan</b> Resolution 2004/128 of 23/04/04 Adopted by 50 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions</p>	<p><b>Expressed concern</b> over the escalation of human rights violations in the Darfur region as a result of the armed conflict. Established a mandate for an <b>Independent Expert</b> in the country for one year, charged with improving cooperation between the Government and the High Commissioner's Office.</p>
<b>AMERICA (1)</b>	
<p><b>Cuba</b> Resolution 2004/11 of 15/04/04 Adopted by 22 votes to 21 with 10 abstentions</p>	<p><b>Expressed concern</b> and stated that the Cuban Government should reject and abolish all laws and measures that violate basic rights and freedoms, deploring the events that had occurred in this connection over the past year, such as the sentencing of various dissident politicians.</p>
<b>ASIA (3)</b>	
<p><b>Cambodia</b> Resolution 2004/79 of 21/04/04 Adopted without a vote</p>	<p><b>Expressed concern</b> over the continuing violations of human rights in the country, including the use of torture, indefinite detention, practices relating to the lack of reform of the land ownership system, the harassment of civil and political activists and problems relating to the absence of the rule of law, impunity and corruption. However, it recognised certain improvements in the human rights situation as compared with previous years.</p>
<p><b>DPR Korea</b> Resolution 2004/13 of 15/04/04 Adopted by 29 votes to 8, with 16 abstentions</p>	<p><b>Expressed the greatest concern</b> over the humanitarian situation in the country, particularly the situation facing children, due to systematic and widespread human rights violations (torture and ill-treatment, public executions, the application of the death penalty for political reasons, forced labour, etc.), discrimination and the ill-treatment of people who have tried to request asylum and refuge status in other countries, the restriction of all basic freedoms, sexual violence against women (rape, trafficking, forced marriages, infanticide, etc.) and the fact that the Government has not cooperated with the United Nations in the investigation of these complaints. <b>Established</b> a mandate for a <b>Special Rapporteur</b>.</p>
<p><b>Myanmar</b> Resolution 2004/61 of 21/04/04 Adopted without a vote</p>	<p><b>Expressed the greatest concern</b> over the systematic human rights violations that continue to occur in the country (against civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights), the house arrest of the leader of the opposition LND party, A. S. Suu Kyi, the use of child soldiers and the situation facing displaced people.</p>
<b>EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA (2)</b>	
<p><b>Belarus</b> Resolution 2004/14 of 15/04/04 Adopted by 23 votes to 13, with 17 abstentions</p>	<p><b>Expressed concern</b> at reports of the Government's involvement in the summary disappearance of three political opponents, the absence of transparency during the elections of March 2003, the cases of arbitrary detention, the persecution and harassment of any opposition to the regime (unions, journalists, politicians, human rights activists, etc.), the restrictions on religious organisations and the lack of cooperation with bodies supervising the human rights situation. <b>Established</b> a mandate for a <b>Special Rapporteur</b>.</p>
<p><b>Turkmenistan</b> Resolution 2004/12 of 21/04/04 Adopted by 25 votes to 11, with 17 abstentions</p>	<p><b>Expressed concern</b> over the continuing persecution and harassment of all political opposition, arbitrary detentions on the grounds of opinion, expression and association, control over the media, the infringement of religious freedom, discrimination against Russian and Uzbek ethnic minorities and the terrible conditions in detention centres and prisons.</p>
<b>MIDDLE EAST (1)</b>	
<p><b>Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967</b> Resolution 2004/10 of 15/04/04 Adopted by 31 votes to 7 with 15 abstentions</p>	<p><b>Condemned</b> the human rights violations committed by Israel in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, the war begun by the Israeli army against Palestinian people and towns, particularly since October 2000, the practice of extra-judicial executions by the Israeli army against individual Palestinians, the establishment of Israeli settler colonies in Palestinian territory, the use of torture in detention centres in which Palestinians are held, the mass murder of civilians (including women and children) at Palestinian refugee camps, the infringement of freedom of movement among the Palestinian population, the destruction of infrastructure and the construction of the separating wall between Israel and Palestine, along with the consequences that this will have on the living conditions of ordinary Palestinians.</p>

### The Commission also appointed 8 new experts on human rights, 2 in relation to particular issues and 6 in relation to individual countries

Rapporteurs whose mandates ran until 2004. In the case of Sudan it should be mentioned that in spite of the fact that the Rapporteur's mandate was cancelled in 2003, the situation in Darfur has made this new appointment necessary one year later.

### An Independent Expert on the fight against terrorism and human rights is appointed by consensus

The other two appointments on **specific issues** are a Special Rapporteur on people-trafficking, charged with protecting the rights of women and children caught up in illegal networks, along with the potential victims of these networks, and an **Independent Expert on the fight against terrorism and human rights**, appointed by consensus as the result of an initiative by the Mexican Government. This is particularly important given the current international agenda, which is driven by the anti-terrorist agenda and related policies, and the impact of this agenda on human rights. The mandate of this Expert will include helping individual countries to make their anti-terrorist legislation compatible with their obligations in terms of human rights, International Humanitarian Law and the rights of refuge and asylum.

In a period of sessions chaired by the representative of the Australian Government (a fact that led to complaints from numerous human rights NGOs, given that this was the second year running that the Commission had been chaired by a country that they considered had not met its international obligations in this regard<sup>9</sup>), **it is to be regretted that no resolutions were adopted** on the situation in other countries, such as **Russia** (in relation to the situation in Chechnya), **China** or **Zimbabwe**, countries on which it is very difficult to achieve a condemnatory solution by consensus, given the politicisation of the Human Rights Commission. The lack of support to the "Rules for the responsibility of transnational companies in the sphere of human rights" is also to be regretted.

As agreed in Resolution 2003/16 of 13 August 2003, the UN Sub-Commission for the promotion and protection of human rights submitted a set of "**Rules for the responsibility of transnational companies and other commercial businesses in the sphere of human rights**" for adoption by the Commission. In this connection, it is regrettable that the Commission adopted a decision in respect of this issue (2004/116), without putting it to a vote, asking the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare another report on current initiatives for the responsibility of transnational companies in relation to human rights for the next period of sessions. In practice, this means that the Commission has brought the process for the adoption of a resolution to a standstill. One should add that this represents a warning to the Sub-Commission, given its intention to carry out monitoring duties in this regard. The Task Force charged with preparing the Rules will, however, continue in its attempts to establish possible mechanisms for the implementation of these Rules, along with assisting the approach to the question of the rights of indigenous peoples. Against a background of criticism of the voluntary nature of Global Compact<sup>10</sup> and its lack of monitoring and verification mechanisms, it is particularly notable that this initiative has finally led to a proposal that is progressively binding on businesses and also includes independent mechanisms for monitoring and complaint.

9. The Australian Government has been denounced for its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, particularly unaccompanied minors. The 59<sup>th</sup> period of sessions was chaired by Libya.

10. In 1999, the current UN Secretary General, K. Annan, launched this initiative (which calls on the business community voluntarily to respect a series of principles, divided into 9 different categories and inspired by existing international instruments) at the Davos World Economic Forum. For more information, see <<http://www.unglobalcompact.org>>.

## b) Other aspects worthy of special attention (indicators 18 and 19)

This section will deal specifically with the application of the death penalty and the issues relating to the granting of asylum status. Also included is an assessment of the main initiatives for the promotion of responsibility among businesses in relation to the area of human rights.

The existence and application of the **death penalty** (indicator no. 18) represents the denial of the most fundamental right: the right to life. In this regard, it should be mentioned that the death penalty remained on the statute books in almost half the countries in the world in 2004, in spite of the call for an international moratorium on executions and the existence of two instruments prohibiting the practice<sup>11</sup>. With the abolition of the death penalty in Samoa and Bhutan during 2004, 80 countries have now abolished this punishment for all crimes, a figure which for the first time exceeds the number of countries that retain it (78).

**80 countries have now abolished this punishment for all crimes, a figure which for the first time exceeds the number of countries that retain it (78)**

During the course of 2003, at least 1,146 people were executed in 28 countries, and at least 2,756 were condemned to death in 63 countries. These figures only include the cases that Amnesty International knows about. The real figures are without doubt much higher. They indicate a fall in the number of executions from 2002 (1,526 people in 31 countries), but confirm the systematic use of the death penalty in certain parts of the world.

As in previous years, the great majority of executions carried out in the world as a whole occurred in a small number of countries. During 2003, 84% of all known executions took place in China, Iran, the USA and Vietnam. According to the limited and incomplete data available to Amnesty International at the end of the year, at least 726 people were executed in China, though it is believed that the real figure is much higher. In March 2004, a senior representative of the executive in China remarked that around 10,000 people were executed every year in the country. At least 108 people were executed in Iran, while 65 were put to death in the USA and Vietnam confirmed 64 executions. Executions of minors were only recorded in China and the USA during 2003.

In its annual period of sessions in Geneva, the United Nations Human Rights Commission reiterated its call for the suspension of all executions throughout the world and demanded that the number of crimes for which this penalty could be imposed be gradually limited. In Europe, where only Belarus and Uzbekistan retain the death penalty, a new treaty came into force that provides for the total abolition of the death penalty without exception, Protocol no. 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms.

This report has also considered the question of the **grant of asylum** (indicator no. 19). The grant of such status, though on occasion subject to restrictions of a national or international nature, implies recognition by the host Government of the fact that the safety and freedom of the applicant is under threat in his or her country of origin. It therefore represents government recognition of some human rights violation in the country of origin and persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or the expression of political opinions, as set out in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. During 2003, a total of 807,000 asylum applications were made in 141 countries, more than 500,000 of them in Europe. This led to 75 of these countries granting asylum to more than 100 people each, with an overall total of 132,000 being granted this status. The majority of people who have been granted asylum originally come from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, particularly from contexts in which the enforced migration of these applicants results from a combination of armed conflict and human rights violations.

11. The Second Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Protocol no. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the latter permits the application of the death penalty in time of war or when there is imminent danger of war).

Analysing the data for 2002, and some of the data available for 2003<sup>12</sup>, UNHCR indicated that the number of applicants in industrialised countries (36 countries in Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan) fell by 22% during the first 9 months of 2004, dropping to 271,100 from 349,600 for the same period during the previous year. The countries in which most applications are made are France, the United Kingdom, the USA, Germany and Austria, and the countries of origin from which most applicants come from Russia (mainly Chechens), followed by Serbia and Montenegro, China, Turkey and Nigeria. This fall in applications has combined with the adoption of more restrictive measures on the grant of asylum status in the industrialised countries.

### Chart 7.3. The new refuge and asylum policy in Europe<sup>13</sup>

During 2004, the EU reviewed its policy on refuge and asylum, since in spite of the fact that all the organisation's member states have signed the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, each country has applied the Convention in a different way.

**Aim:** The European Commission has proposed improvements to the way that individual member states receive and take in refugees and displaced people, and the way in which they cooperate with other countries, both as regards the countries of origin of asylum seekers and the countries they are in transit.

#### Proposed measures:

- Improve the administrative procedures in order to discourage unreliable applications
- Work together to combat international people-trafficking networks
- Define a standard for asylum status and subsidiary protection
- Establish a common procedure for the grant and withdrawal of asylum status and a temporary protection system

#### Criticisms of the reforms:

Various human rights NGOs and UNHCR have denounced these reforms, stating that: a) the provisions relating to who may be regarded as a refugee and who is worthy of subsidiary forms of protection (used, among other things, for the victims of war) are restrictive and violate the 1951 Convention; b) the definition of a safe third country is vague (a fact that could lead to a person being returned to a country in which that person may be subjected to serious human rights violations); and c) applicants are denied the right to remain in the EU while their appeals are being heard.

Based on an assessment of these five indicators (numbers 15 to 19), a list has been prepared that indicates those countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This also takes into account the two indicators relating to International Humanitarian Law, as discussed below, and this report thus concludes that such violations occurred in **43** countries during 2004.

**Table 7.4. Countries with serious human rights violations**

Afghanistan	DPR Korea	Iran	Nigeria	Sudan
Algeria	Côte d'Ivoire	Iraq	Pakistan	Thailand
Bangladesh	Cuba	Israel	Palestine	Turkmenistan
Belarus	Equatorial Guinea	Jamaica	Peru	Uganda
Burundi	Ethiopia	Lebanon	Philippines	Uzbekistan
Cambodia	Guatemala	Liberia	Russia	Vietnam
China	Haiti	Mexico	Saudi Arabia	Zimbabwe
Colombia	India	Myanmar	Somalia	
DR Congo	Indonesia	Nepal	Sri Lanka	

12. This data refers to the number of applications for asylum, but not to the number accepted.

13. Directive 2004/83/CE, by which minimum regulations were established in relation to requirements for the recognition and status of foreign nationals, expatriated refugees or people needing other forms of international protection, along with the form of protection to be granted, was published in the EU's Official Journal ((30.9.2004 L 304/12). The main aim of the Directive is to ensure that member states apply common criteria in order to identify those who really need international protection and to ensure that a minimum level of benefits is available for these people in all member states. The limit for the implementation of the Directive is 10 October 2006.

Finally, before moving on to the section dealing with International Humanitarian Law, we will here make special mention of some of the main debates that arose during 2004 in the area of **corporate responsibility in relation to human rights**. It was considered appropriate to refer to this issue in this particular section since the responsibility of companies for certain human rights violations does not exonerate Governments from protecting their citizens from such abuses<sup>14</sup>. In this report, it is understood that the impact of companies on human rights transcends employment rights, and one should take account of their effect both on civil and political rights and on the rights of the second and third generations<sup>15</sup>.

Against a background of growing interest in this issue, at both national and international level<sup>16</sup>, various initiatives emerged during the course of 2004 aimed at promoting human rights in the business arena. Among these, special mention should be made of the growing demand for greater **transparency in the management of resources** generated by the mining industry, as a basic guarantee for the right to development, along with the weak undertaking from the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation to include human rights and corporate responsibility as part of its lending policy, within the framework of the Mining Industry Review.

#### Chart 7.4. Business and human rights: the Spanish case

In the Spanish corporate environment, 2004 saw the adoption of some measures by certain transnational companies, due mainly to the requirement to comply with the human rights criteria set out in various management indices and the rules governing accountability (*Dow Jones Sustainability, FTSE4GOOD, GRI Directives*), in spite of the fact that, in general terms, there is a prevailing perception that their actual impact on human rights is slight. Mention should also be made of the creation of a Corporate Social Responsibility Sub-Commission in the Congress of Deputies, which will hold debates during 2005 on what form the public policy model for corporate social responsibility and human rights in the business arena should take. In addition, the Spanish Government proposed to debate this issue in its Social Dialogue Committee, which comprises companies, unions and government authorities, but excludes NGOs. In this regard, the two sides of the debate have become polarised between those who support a compulsory law for businesses and those who defend corporate social responsibility based on voluntary measures introduced by the companies themselves.

## 7.2. International Humanitarian Law<sup>17</sup> (indicators 20 and 21)

Finally, this section contains an analysis of two indicators relating to International Humanitarian Law (IHL). IHL is understood to refer to a group of international regulations intended for application in areas engaged in both international and domestic armed conflicts. The aim is to protect people who may become the victims of acts of war (whether they are actual combatants or not) and to restrict the means and methods of war used. IHL regulations have both moral and political force (giving rise to international responsibility), and their incorporation in a country's internal legislation involves legal responsibilities that affect all governments as signatories to the different Conventions and Protocols<sup>18</sup>.

IHL was born in 1864 with the 1<sup>st</sup> Geneva Convention. At that time it represented a series of rules aimed at regulating hostilities between states.<sup>19</sup> This first document continued to evolve until it resulted in the Four

14. In this regard, several working documents by the UN Human Rights Commission and Sub-Commission have, along with some Security Council Resolutions, established a close relationship between human rights abuses and the activities of certain companies.

15. For more information on the role of companies in armed conflicts, see *Barometer* 5.

16. During October, the UN Deputy Secretary General, L. Fréchette, called on the private sector to become more actively involved in the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals relating to the reduction of hunger and poverty.

17. To follow the progress of the International Criminal Courts, see the quarterly publication *Barometer*.

18. IHL only applies in the event of armed conflict. It does not cover situations involving tension and internal disturbance, such as isolated acts of violence. It is only applicable when a conflict has broken out and it applies equally to all parties.

19. There are texts that date from as far back as 1108 regulating the treatment of prisoners of war and the sick, but these involve specific proposals that were generally bilateral and so did not represent a framework for international application.

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the additional Protocol on the protection of victims in international armed conflicts (Protocol I) of 1979. All of these texts refer to conflicts in which at least two states are in conflict.<sup>20</sup> Of all the United Nations member states, only Nauru is not a party to the Four Geneva Conventions, while the 1<sup>st</sup> Protocol has been signed by 162 countries. In any case, the fact that armed conflicts are increasingly occurring within a single state and not between states (see chapter 1 on armed conflicts), coupled with the fact that civilian population is the group that suffers most (see chapter 5 on humanitarian crises), enduring serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms<sup>21</sup>, has meant that IHL has had to continue to develop in order to adapt to new circumstances. This new type of armed conflict has also reawakened the debate on the recognition of non-state bodies and armed opposition groups involved in these conflicts, and the responsibilities that apply to them.

For this reason, the first indicator taken into account when preparing this section was constructed on the basis of the number of ratifications of the **Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions** of 12 August 1949, **relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts** (Protocol II, 1979)<sup>22</sup> (indicator no. 20). By 2003, this 2<sup>nd</sup> protocol had been ratified by a total of 157 states.

However, although IHL is essentially contained in the four Geneva Conventions, supplemented by the two additional Protocols I and II, there are other legal instruments whose fulfilment has clear consequences for the application of IHL itself. This is the case, for example, with the regulations prohibiting the use of certain weapons or military tactics, such as the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines or the International Criminal Court (see indicator no. 31), and this even extends to laws protecting certain categories of people or goods. These last regulations have been particularly borne in mind in the preparation of this section, specifically the legal provisions relating to children and their participation in armed conflicts.

Indeed, the 4<sup>th</sup> Geneva Convention and the two additional Protocols I and II make specific provisions in favour of particular protection for children. This was further supplemented by the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 (see indicator no. 31) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on participation in armed conflicts (2000). This Optional Protocol considers a child-soldier to be any «person under the age of 18 who voluntarily or forcibly joins the Armed Forces or armed opposition groups and participates directly in combat».<sup>23</sup> Signatory States undertake to impose criminal sanctions on such practices. The Optional Protocol came into force on 12 February 2002 and has been ratified by 87 countries.

The second and final indicator examined in this sub-section indicates those **countries in which Government armed forces or other armed groups recruit children as soldiers** (indicator no. 21). The NGO *Coalition to stop the use of child-soldiers* and the UN Secretary General have presented annual reports on this issue to the UN Security Council since November 2001, the date on which the first resolution on children and armed conflicts was adopted.

It was recorded in 2004 that the Governments of at least 10 countries were continuing to recruit and use children in front-line combat, mainly in Africa (Burundi, DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Uganda and Sudan), and Myanmar, and among the US soldiers present in Iraq. In other cases, it is the armed

20. Geneva Convention (I) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; Geneva Convention (II) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; Geneva Convention (III) relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, and Geneva Convention (IV) relating to the protection of civilians in times of war.

21. In contrast to IHL, many of the provisions relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms may be suspended in a situation of internal armed conflict.

22. Non-international armed conflicts are understood to be those in which the regular armed forces are in conflict with armed opposition groups, or armed groups are fighting with each other, within the boundaries of an individual state. In these cases, a more restricted series of regulations applies, in particular the provisions of article 3, which are common to all four Geneva Conventions and the second additional protocol. Article 3 regulated armed conflicts within states until the publication of Protocol II.

23. See Articles 2 and 4 of the Optional Protocol of 2000. Until the adoption of this Protocol, a child was considered to be a boy or girl of 15 or under (including in the International Criminal Court).

paramilitaries or the militias linked with certain Governments who are recruiting children, as is the case in Colombia and Zimbabwe. Some Governments, such as those of Israel, Indonesia and Nepal, use children as informants, spies and collaborators in conflicts. The armed opposition groups in Afghanistan, Chechnya (Russia), India, Lao and Yemen use children to fight Government armed forces or defend land or natural resources in a particular region<sup>24</sup>.

**It was recorded in 2004 that the Governments of at least 10 countries were continuing to recruit and use children in front-line combat, mainly in Africa**

### Chart 7.5. The child-soldier problem


More than half a million children under the age of eighteen are being recruited in around twenty countries around the world, either by the Government's own armed forces or by non-governmental armed groups. Some 300,000 of these children take part in armed confrontations or carry out logistical duties (acting as spies, messengers, carriers, slaves, etc.) in the various ongoing armed conflicts, particularly in Africa, where it is estimated that there are more than 100,000 child soldiers. These boys and girls also endure serious human rights violations, such as sexual abuse, mistreatment and kidnapping.

Between 2001 and 2004, children under the age of 18 played a direct role in the hostilities in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Guinea, India, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Indonesia, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

By way of **conclusion**, and taking all of the foregoing indicators into account, it should be said that the protection and promotion of human rights has continued to present difficulties during 2004, both for the world's international bodies and for the different NGOs, given the systematic violations of human rights and International Humanitarian Law seen in Darfur (Sudan), the rising violence and serious abuses in Iraq and the atmosphere of confrontation between regional blocs that prevailed during the 60<sup>th</sup> period of sessions of the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Nevertheless, the fact that the number of countries abolishing the death penalty has for the first time risen above the number that retain it, and the appointment of an Independent Expert on terrorism and human rights are key elements that could result in more effective protection for human rights over the coming years.

24. For more information, see <<http://www.child-soldiers.org/resources/global-reports>>.





## 8. Development

This chapter adopts the definition set out in a declaration approved by the UN General Assembly in 1986, which defines development as “the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom”.<sup>1</sup> This chapter is divided into two sub-sections. The first contains an analysis of 8 indicators, which can in turn be divided into two groups: those relating to poor government practices in respect of social development and governance (indicators 26 and 27), and those that provide evidence of conditions of vulnerability, economic dependence, inequality and impoverishment (indicators 22 to 25 and 28 and 29). The second section tackles some of the most important issues on the development agenda during the last year.

### 8.1. Poor government practices in respect of social development and governance

As regards **public spending priorities** (indicator no. 26), there are 16 countries whose military spending is higher than the amounts spent on education and health, while another 26 countries devote more resources to military-related issues than to one of the other two items. The slight improvement over the previous year can to a great extent be attributed to the absence of data for some of the countries mentioned in last year’s report. This data may show that spending on health and education is very low, or that military spending is too high, but it is nevertheless clear that the basic rights of the people are regarded as secondary to issues of defence and militarization in too many countries. This also indicates a strictly militarist approach to security, which completely ignores the new paradigms for human security popularised more than ten years ago by the UNDP<sup>2</sup>, focusing on the satisfaction of the basic daily needs of the general population. Finally, it should be pointed out that only 3 of the 16 countries in the table shown below (Burundi, Israel and Sri Lanka) are currently involved in an armed conflict.

**Table 8.1. Countries spending more on military items than on education and health**

Angola	(3.7%)	Eritrea	(23.5%)	Jordan	(8.4%)	Rwanda	(3.3%)
Burundi	(7.6%)	Ethiopia	(5.2%)	Lebanon	(4.7%)	Syria	(6.9%)
Cambodia	(2.7%)	Guinea	(2.9%)	Oman	(12.3%)	Sri Lanka	(3.1%)
Ecuador	(2.8%)	Israel	(9.2%)	Pakistan	(4.7%)	Turkey	(4.9%)

Note: The figure in brackets shows the percentage of each country’s GDP devoted to military spending.

In addition, the World Bank identifies 23 countries with poor **governance**<sup>3</sup> and a further 9 (basically African) with very poor governance (indicator no. 27). Governance, an idea which is difficult to quantify and for which there is as yet no consensus as regards its theoretical definition, is increasingly being viewed as significant in any sustainable development process. In this regard, it should be mentioned that aid agen-

1. The Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986 claims the right to an individual development process in which all human rights and basic freedoms can be fully enjoyed, but not economic development when it is accompanied by growing inequalities and an increasing concentration of wealth. This approach not only recognises development as an ongoing process, it also requires individual states to pursue specific policies, as it is they that “have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies” to this end. The substance of the right to development is examined in the 5 reports by the Independent Expert on the right to development, A. Sengupta: E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2, A/55/306, E/CN.4/2001/WG.18/2, E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2 and E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/6.

2. See UNDP, *Human Development Report, 1994*.

3. Governance is assessed by the World Bank on the basis of six variables: the control of corruption, accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, the effectiveness of government, the rule of law and procedural guarantees.

cies and international organisations such as NGOs are increasingly taking note of good governance when forming their development policies, as they believe that this goes some way to guaranteeing the transparent and effective management of aid.


## 8.2. Vulnerability and dependence

As regards the second group of indicators, it should be borne in mind that, although it is the individual States themselves that must implement development policies, conditions of vulnerability, economic dependence and impoverishment are not only explained on internal grounds. Indeed, the structures and rules of the global economy, together with the development policies of international organisations, also play a fundamental role in this regard.

As regards the **Millennium Development Goals** (Goals), the UNDP identified 27 maximum priority countries<sup>4</sup> and several high priority countries<sup>5</sup> (indicator no. 22). Although this information should be seen in the light of the still incipient statistics and methodology<sup>6</sup> available to the UNDP when assessing the progress made in respect of the Goals, all of these countries will probably not make the Goals on the planned date unless current trends are drastically reversed. It should be emphasised that 38 of the 59 high or maximum priority countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa

**38 of the 59 high or maximum priority countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa**

**Graph 8.1. The Millennium Development Goals<sup>7</sup>**



Source: The authors

4. Countries with high levels of human poverty which are also at a standstill or even regressing in terms of compliance with the Goals.

5. Countries with medium levels of human poverty that have nevertheless shown no progress or a deterioration in their compliance with the Goals, or countries with extreme human poverty that have shown advances in respect of the Goals.

6. There are several dozen countries for which there is no reliable data in this regard, while some countries do not appear in the list but are nevertheless experiencing enormous difficulties in making advances in relation to some specific Goals and therefore also require the attention and assistance of the international community.

7. For further information on the United Nations strategy regarding the Goals, see <<http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/>>, <<http://www.undp.org/mdg/campaign.html>> and <<http://www.millenniumcampaign.org/>>.

ran Africa, and that some of these countries have the common characteristics of being landlocked, having small economies which are essentially agricultural and a long way from the international markets, and suffering from armed conflicts and high rates of HIV/AIDS. As a result of this worrying data, the United Nations drew up a series of instruments (see Graph 8.1) with the threefold aim of improving awareness of the contents of the Goals and providing incentives for their achievement, coordinating the efforts of the different parties involved (civilian society, government bodies, NGOs, universities, businesses, international bodies etc.) and offering governments specialist assistance in their work towards the Goals.

Intrinsically associated with these difficulties in progressing towards the Goals are countries that are experiencing reverses in their **Human Development Index**<sup>8</sup> (HDI) or countries included in the Least Developed Countries (LDC) list (indicator no. 23). During the 1990s, human development stagnated and an unprecedented reverse set in, demonstrated by the fact that 20 countries currently have a Human Development Index which is lower than it was in 1990. This contrasts with the steady growth that had been seen in the HDI over previous decades, and the natural and empirical tendency of countries to show improvement in respect of the three HDI elements. Thus, for example, during the 1980s (regarded as a lost decade in some parts of the world), only 3 countries (DR Congo, Rwanda and Zambia) actually showed a reverse in the Index. The fall in HDI is concentrated mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa (above all, due to the spread of HIV/AIDS), Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the CIS (due to the collapse of their economies at the beginning of the 1990s, though they have experienced substantial improvements in various development aspects since the middle of the decade). Similarly, although the percentage of the world population living below the poverty line fell during the 1990s, poverty levels increased in 46 countries and the number of people suffering from hunger increased in another 25.

**Table 8.2. Countries with a Human Development Index that is lower than it was in 1990**

Bahamas	DR Congo	Namibia	Tajikistan
Belize	Côte d'Ivoire	Central African Republic	Ukraine
Botswana	Kazakhstan	South Africa	Zambia
Cameroon	Lesotho	Swaziland	Zimbabwe
Congo	Moldova	Tanzania	

Elsewhere, special attention should be paid to the 49 countries that ECOSOC has included in its list of **LDCs** (updated every three years) on the basis of three variables.<sup>9</sup> Some of the main characteristics of LDCs, which are mainly concentrated in Africa and Asia, are the poverty experienced throughout the whole of society and the fact that they depend greatly on the export of primary products (particularly minerals), income from which has fallen hugely over the last twenty years. In spite of the fact that the Action Programme for LDCs includes the aim of increasing Official Development Aid (ODA)<sup>10</sup> to LDCs to 0.15% of GDP and reducing by half the number of people living in extreme conditions of poverty (less than 1 dollar a day) by 2015, a report by UNCTAD<sup>11</sup> warns that this proportion has doubled during the last thirty years and that, since 1971, the number of LDCs has doubled from 25 to 49 countries at present.

8. A compound index that measures progress on the basis of three fundamental elements in human development: a long a healthy life (life expectancy), learning (adult literacy rate and gross school numbers) and a decent standard of living (GDP per capita).

9. Low income (GDP per capita), low human resources (standard of living index based on life expectancy, calories per capita, schooling and literacy) and low level of economic diversification (index based on several macro-economic indicators).

10. Financial assistance given by governments to impoverished countries and channelled through bilateral or multilateral agreements, which should have the main objective of promoting economic growth and social welfare in developing countries, a minimum of 25% being in the form of donations.

11. See UNCTAD, *Escaping the Poverty Trap*, 2002, at <<http://www.unctad.org>>.

The indicator showing **inequalities in internal income** (indicator no. 24), which is calculated on the basis of the Gini coefficient<sup>12</sup>, indicates that 49 countries have high levels of inequality (above 40), while another 6 have very high levels (above 60). It is currently considered that the distribution of income is one of the most important elements in development, since it allows one to measure the extent to which the whole of society is benefiting from economic growth. Furthermore, high rates of inequality encourage instability and social exclusion and provoke various forms of violent demonstrations. Regardless of the different methodologies used to calculate inequality, the gap between the richest and poorest sections of the population on a world level continues to increase, while wealth is becoming more and more concentrated. Inequality in Latin America continues at extremely high levels, while regions such as Southern and Eastern Europe and the countries of the CIS have seen it grow to very high levels.

The percentage of Official Development Aid (ODA) received as a proportion of total GDP is one of the main indicators used to measure the degree of **economic dependence** in a country (indicator no. 25). 9 countries have been identified as receiving ODA equivalent to more than 20% of their GDP, while this proportion

**High levels of ODA as a proportion of GDP can provoke that an individual State could become accustomed to delegating services which are intrinsically its own responsibility**

is above 10% in another 20 countries. Note that 22 of the 29 countries mentioned are in Africa. Going beyond the positive impact that international cooperation could be expected to have, high levels of ODA as a proportion of GDP could point to 3 worrying aspects. The first is that an individual State could become accustomed to delegating services which are intrinsically its own responsibility to international cooperative efforts. Secondly, the growing politicisation of ODA could lead to excessive conditions being placed on the identification

of development priorities and strategies. Thirdly, a country could encounter serious financial problems if the donor community were to decide to make a sudden change in its criteria for allocating funds or the countries to which such aid is to be given.

The indicator relating to **foreign debt** (indicator no. 28) identifies 9 countries with levels of foreign debt in excess of their GDP, and a further 53 that pay more to service their debt<sup>13</sup> than they receive in ODA. Both of these items demonstrate the difficulties encountered by governments in financing other priorities relating to the country's development, and this also highlights the fact that on many occasions there is a net transfer of resources from impoverished countries to industrialised ones. The indicator also lists the 38 countries included in the list of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), once of the main instruments currently used by the international community when dealing with this issue.

### Chart 8.1 Some observations regarding foreign debt

Certain conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of this data and the phenomenon of foreign debt in general. Firstly, one can conclude that **the repayment of foreign debt and the amounts paid to service that debt remain unsustainable**, mortgaging the capacity of many countries to develop. Since the appearance of the debt crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, **both the level of debt and the amounts paid to service it have continually increased**, either as a result of increases in interest rates or due to requests for further credit, which is then to a great extent used to repay earlier borrowings. The majority of countries have more than repaid the amount of the initial debt and have to continue diverting resources in order to meet their payment obligations. In addition, it should be borne in mind that on many occasions, **debt service payments have led to the indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources**, as the export of such resources is one of the few ways in which countries can obtain sufficient amounts of foreign currency to pay off their debts.

Secondly, it can be seen that **foreign debt is managed** fundamentally on the basis of **financial and political criteria, and not on the basis of social development**, i.e. without any active policy for writing down this debt and converting it into investments in social development in a way that can be coordinated with all the other issues involved in development cooperation. In this regard, for example, it would seem appropriate to recall the agreement reached at the 14<sup>th</sup> Latin America Summit held in Novem-

12. The Gini Coefficient measures the level of inequality between income or consumption in an individual country. The value 0 represents perfect equality and 100 total inequality.

13. Repayment of capital and interest.

ber to promote programmes in which debt is exchanged for educational projects. Furthermore, conditioned aid still represents a very high percentage of the total amount of ODA on offer, and the undertaking to assign 20% of bilateral ODA to basic social projects is still far from being fulfilled.

Thirdly, this data shows that the **HIPC Initiative** for debt reduction, promoted by the IMF and the WB since 1996, **has not had the impact that was hoped for**, according to reports from these bodies themselves. Until now, there has been **little progress** and a number of difficulties have been reported in relation to the countries involved. Thus, for example, the sharp fall in the price of certain products and in demand for raw materials has affected exports from poor countries and altered the forecasts regarding their capacity to make payments. It is currently estimated that the 27 countries which have so far benefited from the HIPC Initiative will receive programmes to write off debts totalling 5,400 million dollars, according to the WB. Furthermore, another 11 countries currently at the so-called "pre-decision point" may benefit from these programmes when they overcome some of the problems identified by the WB and the IMF, such as the existence of armed conflicts, social and political tension and problems of governance, or systematic delays in their debt repayments.

**Deforestation and the emission of pollutants** are the two environmental issues covered by indicator no. 29. 26 countries have been identified whose annual deforestation rates during the 1990s were greater than 1%, and this percentage rose to above 3% in a further 7. Note that the great majority of the countries identified are in sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and Southeast Asia, all of them regions that fall between the two tropics. On a world level, deforestation fell to 9.5 million hectares per year, representing a reduction of approximately 20% in respect of the most recent data update carried out by the FAO<sup>14</sup>.

Deforestation (principally caused by urban development, the transformation of forests into land for agriculture and livestock farming, the activities of the mining, oil and timber industries, fires, or the construction of infrastructure such as roads, dams, oil and gas pipelines) has a significant effect in 4 ways. Firstly, because it both illustrates and exacerbates levels of poverty within a country, increasing demographic pressure on natural resources. This can also lead to various forms of social instability and can even result in increased levels of violence. Secondly, because it leads to soil erosion and thus increases a country's vulnerability to natural disaster, as was seen in Haiti throughout 2004<sup>15</sup>. Thirdly, because it alters the ecological balance and does enormous damage to a country's biodiversity. Although forests only occupy 14% of the planet's surface, they contain 60% of the world's animal and plants species. Fourthly, because it often reflects a government's scant respect for the ancestral land of indigenous peoples. The fact that such people are forced to move to more wooded areas leads in many cases to the total deforestation of these areas. Finally, it should be pointed out that the responsibility for a country's appearance in the list is not the exclusive domain of the governments involved, as it is often the transnational companies engaged in extracting raw materials that cause a country's deforestation.

**Deforestation both illustrates and exacerbates levels of poverty within a country, increasing demographic pressure on natural resources**

As regards the emission of pollutants, 8 countries emit levels of carbon dioxide in excess of 10 tonnes per capita, and this figure rises to more than 15 tonnes in a further 6. The majority of these are highly industrialised countries or nations in which the hydrocarbon sector represents a large percentage of the economy. It is a well known fact that polluting emissions not only have an adverse effect on the global warming of the planet and the acceleration of climate change, they are also closely connected with deforestation. The industrialised countries emit some 2,200 million tonnes of carbon dioxide every year as a result of the burning of fossil fuels. It is also estimated that one hectare of tropical forest can neutralise around 10 tonnes of this gas. In this regard it should be remembered that the industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol have undertaken to reduce their emissions by more than 5% (calculated on 1990 levels) between 2008 and 2012.

14. See FAO, *State of the World's Forests 2003*, at <[http://www.fao.org/documents/show\\_cdr.asp?url\\_file=/docrep/005/y7581e/y7581e00.htm](http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/005/y7581e/y7581e00.htm)>.

15. See the chapter on humanitarian crises.

## 8.3. The development agenda during 2004

### a) Population and development

To mark the tenth anniversary of the **International Conference on Population and Development** (Cairo, 1994), UNFPA carried out a series of acts throughout the world to **revitalise the Action Programme** which resulted from the Cairo summit and which is planned to end in 2014. Among the UNFPA initiatives in this regard are the regional conferences on this issue, intended to assess the achievements made and to mobilise new resources for the coming 10 years, the review of the programme by the Population and Development Commission, and the publication of a report<sup>16</sup> which discusses the links between population, poverty and the environment, migration and urban planning, gender equality and the empowerment of women, reproductive health and family planning, maternal health, the prevention of HIV/AIDS and the special needs of young people and people living in emergency situations.

**Table 8.3. The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD)**

<b>ICPD</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Some 180 countries and more than 11,000 people took part in the Conference.</li><li>• A 20-year Action Programme was approved. In 1999 (ICPD + 5) its implementation was reviewed and new measures were adopted in order to continue with its application.</li></ul>
<b>AIMS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To develop a strategy that explicitly demonstrates the links between population and development.</li><li>• To concentrate more on satisfying the needs of human beings (particularly women) than on the establishment of demographic objectives.</li></ul>
<b>GOALS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To permit universal access to reproductive health services, including family planning, by 2015.</li><li>• To ensure universal primary education by 2015 and attempt to eliminate the difference between the numbers of boys and girls obtaining primary and secondary education.</li><li>• To reduce infant mortality to under 35 in one thousand live births, and to less than 45 in one thousand for children under 5 years old, by 2015.</li><li>• To reduce the number of women dying in childbirth to half the 1990 figure by the year 2000, and by half again by 2015.</li><li>• To raise life expectancy to 75 or more by 2015.</li></ul>

In its report, UNFPA records that significant progress has been made in this area over the past 10 years, and that the great majority of governments have included issues relating to population as part of their domestic development policies, though it also warns that **the shortage of funds seriously threatens the viability of the Action Plan over the coming decade**. In recent years scarcely half of the 6,100 million dollars that countries had promised each year up to 2005 has been collected. This lack of funds is causing serious problems in areas such as **family planning** services (350 million couples have no access to such services), **death in childbirth** (529,000 women die every year as a result of complications during pregnancy and childbirth, mainly from causes that can be prevented), the **prevention of HIV/AIDS** and **population control**. As regards this last issue, it should be remembered that by 2050, the 50 poorest countries in the world will have seen their populations triple to more than 1,700 million people.

Among the report's positive points, mention should be made of the significant **increase** in the use of **contraceptive methods** (up from 55% to 61% in the last decade), the proliferation of **legislation** protecting the **rights of women and children**, the adoption of **national** strategies to deal with **HIV/AIDS** in three quarters of the world's countries and the attention paid to population variables by many governments when developing their poverty reduction strategies.

**Table 8.4. Current population and estimates for 2050, by region**  
(millions of people)

Region	2004	2050
Africa	885	1,941
Sub-Saharan Africa	733	1,701
Asia	3,875	5,385
China	1,300	1,476
India	1,087	1,628
Latin America/Caribbean	549	778
North America	326	457
Europe	728	668
Oceania	33	47
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,396</b>	<b>9,276</b>


**Table 8.5. The 10 most populated countries in the world now and in 2050**  
(millions of people)

2004		2050	
Country	Pop.	Country	Pop.
1 China	1,300	1 India	1,628
2 India	1,087	2 China	1,437
3 USA	294	3 USA	420
4 Indonesia	219	4 Indonesia	308
5 Brazil	179	5 Nigeria	307
6 Pakistan	159	6 Pakistan	295
7 Russia	144	7 Bangladesh	280
8 Bangladesh	141	8 Brazil	221
9 Nigeria	137	9 DR Congo	181
10 Japan	128	10 Ethiopia	173

Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2004 World Population Data Sheet.

Another of the issues that appears in the study and which worries UNFPA is the progressive **ageing of the population** in many regions of the world, a phenomenon that is found principally in **industrialised countries** and which brings with it a series of medium-term socio-economic alterations. Perhaps the most evident of these, as reflected in the case of Europe, is the fall in population, though the matter of most concern to Governments is undoubtedly the **viability of social security systems**, which were originally planned for demographic pyramid shapes in which the working population vastly exceeded the number of senior citizens.

**Graph 8.2. Ageing trends by region (percentage of people over the age of 65)**



Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2004 World Population Data Sheet.



## b) International Year of Rice and International Year of Microcredit<sup>17</sup>

As part of the programme of activities for the International Year of Rice (declared by the UN General Assembly), an **International Conference on Rice** was organised in Rome, under the auspices of the FAO. In addition, during November the Japanese cities of Tokyo and Tsukuba hosted the **World Rice Research Conference**. The aim of these conferences and the International Year of Rice itself was to present and discuss proposals on how to use the sustainable production of rice to **guarantee food safety** for a number of regions throughout the world. The International Conference also stressed the fact that the introduction of new techniques and technologies in rice production would allow **issues relating to agriculture, sustainable development, food safety, the preservation of biodiversity** (there are a large number of genetic resources in rice fields) **and poverty relief to be tackled simultaneously**. One of the reasons that caused 2004 to be named International Year of Rice was the pursuit of the first of the Millennium Development Goals, which consists of reducing hunger and poverty by half by 2015. Several studies have also demonstrated that an increase in productivity in the rice-growing sector could contribute to the substantial eradication of malnutrition throughout the world.

However, various organisations have warned that the sector has encountered several **problems** over recent years. Although rice has historically been one of the most protected agricultural products, the structural adjustment programmes introduced since the 1980s and the WTO Agriculture Agreement of 1994 have led to the rapid liberalisation of this sector. This has brought a notable increase in the global rice trade, more competition in the market place and a **fall in prices**, which has mainly benefited consumers while leaving millions of small producers in a precarious situation.

### Chart 8.2. Some data on rice

- Rice forms the basic food for more than half of the world's population, and it is cultivated in 113 countries on all continents except Antarctica. It currently provides 20% of food energy worldwide, putting it ahead of wheat (19%) and maize (5%). In some parts of Asia, rice accounts for more than 60% of all food energy.
- The rice sector employs almost 1,000 million people in poor countries and is one of the main sources of foreign currency for many of these countries.
- More than half of the 840 million people who suffer from chronic malnutrition live in areas in which subsistence depends mainly on rice production, particularly in Asia and Africa.
- Approximately 80% of the world's rice is grown by small farmers. It is estimated that by 2030 demand will have increased by almost 40%.

The United Nations also announced that 2005 would be the **International Year of Microcredit**, underlining the fact that access by the poorest social sectors to financial services could be **one of the best strategies for achieving the Millennium Development Goals** and combating extreme poverty. At the present time, 90% of the people who live below the poverty line and work for themselves (more than 1,000 million people) have no access to financial services. In the last 5 years, **microcredits have grown at an annual rate of between 25% and 30%**, and they have also expanded geographically, with the initiative showing its greatest successes in Latin America and Southern Asia. In addition, the high rate of repayment of these credits (97%) and the impact that they frequently produce is causing increased interest among many NGOs and even some of the world's largest commercial banks. The United Nations believes that access to so-called microfinancing, which began in the mid-1970s, provides an incentive for the traditionally vulnerable and excluded sectors to enter the production chain and market place, it being mainly women

who manage the majority of the credits offered. The International Year of Microcredit plans, among other things, to arrange strategic associations between NGOs, governments and the private sector.

### Chart 8.3. The debate about microcredits

After being around for more than 30 years, microcredits have suddenly taken off in some parts of the world and have been adopted as an essential tool by a large number of NGOs, development agencies and international bodies. However, there are also **many people who criticise microfinancing** and who **question** both the **causes and the consequences** of its rapid expansion, along with its **potential** as a tool for development.

These critics indicate that the gradual introduction of microfinancing is not explained purely by its impact on the eradication of poverty but also by the desire of some institutions to **bring millions of people into the financial system and create new market segments**. In addition, by their very nature, microcredits help to **increase** the already wide-reaching **informal economy** that affects the great majority of the poorest countries, and they do not therefore resolve fundamental human development issues such as access to basic services. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is **debate** as to whether microfinances have any **real impact on the structural causes of poverty or simply alleviate its most obvious and extreme symptoms**. In this regard, it is perhaps worth considering one of the examples included in a recent study by the World Bank. In Bangladesh, a country that has been one of the pioneers in this area, 48% of homes with access to microcredits managed to rise above the poverty line, though it still remains one of the poorest countries in the world.

### c) Poverty and malnutrition

Both of these issues were tackled in a particularly significant way at two international events which were attended by a large number of delegates and which placed the emphasis on achieving the Millennium Development Goals in respect of these issues. The first of these events was the **World Conference on Poverty Reduction** (sponsored by the WB and the Chinese Government), at which representatives from around 120 countries gathered to discuss and examine more than 100 practical and successful cases in which poverty is being combated. The conference set out the Shanghai Agenda, which deals with ways of **superseding the economic models** that were applied in various places around the world in the **1990s**.

### Chart 8.4. From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus?


The World Bank has praised the **Chinese model for poverty reduction** on numerous occasions. The figure of 600 million people living in extreme poverty was reduced to 200 million by 2003 by following this model. China, which has become one of the World Bank's main clients, achieved an annual economic growth figure of 9% during the 1990s, although various sources around the world have warned that **such high rates of growth do not guarantee balanced and sustainable development over the coming decades**.

The **"Beijing Consensus"**, a phrase coined in academic and civil circles and not very popular among national governments, **combines the liberalisation of trade and finances with strong state leadership**, thus allowing public intervention to correct any malfunction in market forces, while the **"Washington Consensus"** (which to a great extent governed the actions of the IMF and the WB during the 1990s) advocates a model based on the free market, commercial openness, privatisation and decentralisation, along with the supposed greater efficiency of private business over state-run enterprises.

The other event of international importance was the summit in New York, sponsored by the so-called Quintet against Poverty (the Presidents of Brazil, France, Chile and Spain and the UN Secretary General), at which the industrialised nations were called on to greatly increase their ODA, as had been promised at the Monterrey Development Financing Summit in 2000. At this New York summit, held only days before the opening of the 59<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly, representatives from more than 100 Governments approved the **"Declaration on action against hunger and poverty"**. This document, which is expected to be ratified shortly by dozens of countries, includes various initiatives aimed at collecting the additional 50,000 million dollars a year that are estimated to be required in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Among its proposals, some of which will be binding and others not, are the creation of a tax on arms trad-

ing and financial transactions, measures to combat tax evasion and tax havens, donations via financial transactions made by credit card and the strengthening of so-called ethical funds or socially responsible investments. Some countries, such as the USA, have expressed their opposition to some of these measures.

**Graph 8.4. Malnutrition and extreme poverty in the world (millions of people)**



Source: The authors, based on UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 2004.

#### d) HIV/AIDS

During the month of July, around 17,000 people joined many heads of state and government at the **15<sup>th</sup> International Conference on HIV/AIDS** in Bangkok, the largest event held in relation to this issue to date. The Conference debated strategies to combat what is now considered one of the worst pandemics in human history, given that more than 20 million people have died since the disease first appeared at the beginning of the 1980s.

**Table 8.6. HIV/AIDS at the end of 2004 (thousands of people)**

Region	Total number of people infected	New infections during 2004	Deaths during 2004
Sub-Saharan Africa	25,400	3,100	2,300
North Africa and the Middle East	540	92	28
South and Southeast Asia	7,100	890	490
East Asia	1,100	290	51
Latin America	1,700	240	95
Caribbean	440	53	36
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	1,400	210	60
Western and Central Europe	610	21	6,5
North America	1,000	44	16
Oceania	35	5	0.7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>34,900</b>	<b>4,900</b>	<b>3,100</b>

Source: UNAIDS.

During 2004, both UNAIDS and the WHO published reports<sup>18</sup> that warned that, in spite of the **notable advances in the fight against the pandemic, rates of infections are not only higher than they have been in recent years**, they are also **expanding geographically**. As a result, some analysts fear that we have as yet only seen the tip of the iceberg, and that the dramatic effects currently being seen in sub-Saharan Africa may move to other areas of the world, such as the former Soviet Union (which has one of the highest rates of new infections) and Asia, which by 2010 will probably have passed sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the total number of people infected.

Among the positive aspects mentioned in these reports is the **considerable increase in resources** allocated to the fight against HIV/AIDS (this amount has trebled, rising from 2,100 million dollars in 2001 to 6,100 million dollars in 2004), the substantial improvement in **access to basic services** relating to both prevention and attention, **better education and information** on the disease in many poor countries and the example of cases such as Senegal, Thailand and Uganda. These countries, which show rates of infection that are much lower than their neighbours or countries with similar levels of development, demonstrate that low levels of public intervention can have an enormously positive impact on the prevention of new infection.

In spite of these developments, the United Nations has indicated that the **efforts** made to date are **disproportionately insufficient** given the enormity of the challenges that will be encountered during the coming decades. It is estimated, for example, that if serious measures are not urgently taken, **the number of children orphaned as a result of the disease** (currently 14 million) **could double by 2010**. It is also estimated that only 440,000 of the 5 or 6 million people who need them currently have access to anti-retroviral treatments. In this connection, mention should be made of the "3 by 5" initiative, which involves supplying this treatment to three million people by the end of 2005.

### Chart 8.5. The feminisation of HIV/AIDS

Although HIV/AIDS has traditionally had a greater impact among the male population, women now constitute almost half the number infected throughout the world, and in some regions of Africa they are 30% more likely to be HIV positive than men. In addition, **new infections are affecting women much more than men**.

However, the feminisation of the pandemic goes much further than just the infection and mortality figures, producing an impact on the day-to-day lives of many women. Recent studies show that only 57% of infected Tanzanian women receive the understanding and support offered to their partners, while in Uganda, one in every four widows is stripped of her property after the death of her husband. The fact that, in many cases, it is the women in whom the virus is first detected means that they are **accused of spreading the disease to other members of the family**, and this increases the **risk** that they will suffer **"physical violence, expulsion from the home or social ostracism"**<sup>19</sup>


In addition, in the countries most affected it is the women who overwhelmingly have to bear the consequences of HIV/AIDS. In sub-Saharan Africa, 90% of the care activities relating to the pandemic are offered in the home. Even more difficult is the position of those women who, in addition to taking responsibility for domestic duties and the extra burden of care that results from HIV/AIDS, also have to earn money and provide food for their families. Thus, it is often the case that women "are forced to have sexual relations in return for food or basic products"<sup>20</sup>, which in turn increases the risk of contracting the virus and suffering social discrimination.

Given this **increased vulnerability of women**, which is not only **biological** but **also social, economic and educational**, the United Nations has indicated the **need to go beyond the traditional strategies for prevention** (like the so-called ABC method, an acronym for "abstinence, be faithful and use condoms") and **promote gender equality policies**, focusing, among other issues, on access to rights of property and succession, basic education and the employment market.

18. See WHO, *World Health Report 2004: changing history*, at <<http://www.who.int/whr/2004/en/index/html>> and UNAIDS, *Aids Epidemic Update*, December 2004 at <<http://www.unaids.org/wad2004/report.html>>.

19. UNAIDS, *2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic*, p. 41 at <<http://www.unaids.org>>.

20. UNAIDS, *Ibid.*, p. 46.



## 9. Gender issues in peace-building

This chapter contains an analysis of the different initiatives being implemented by the United Nations and various international organisations and movements in relation to peace-building as seen from a **gender perspective**<sup>1</sup>. Viewing events from this perspective allows us to see the different impact that armed conflicts have on both women and men, as well as the extent to which both women and men participate in peace-building and the actual contribution offered by women in these processes. The chapter is divided into two main sub-sections: the first contains a review of the world situation as regards gender inequality, based on an analysis of the relevant indicators, while the second analyses the main issues on the international agenda in relation to peace-building from a gender perspective during 2004.

### 9.1. Gender inequality

Indicator number 30 is the **Gender-related Development Index (GDI)**, which reflects the differences between men and women in three basic aspects of human development: life expectancy, income per capita and literacy and numeracy. The importance of this indicator lies in the fact that it is not simply restricted to breaking down the relevant information by gender but also involves assessing the information on the basis of the inequalities that are thus established between men and women, making it an indicator that is gender-sensitive<sup>2</sup>. Although the GDI does not deal with the many facets of gender equality, it does however indicate that the **situation for women is particularly serious in 35 countries**, of which 30 are in Africa. It should be stressed that these include 10 situations of armed conflict. Not all countries in a situation of armed conflict show serious gender inequalities, though a significant number do, which demonstrates how the impact of these situations of armed violence represents an obstacle (if not a reverse) to the improvement of living conditions and development for women.

**Table 9.1. Countries displaying serious gender inequality**

Bangladesh	Congo	Haiti	Mozambique	Sudan
Benin	Côte d'Ivoire	Kenya	Nepal	Tanzania
Burkina Faso	DR Congo	Lesotho	Niger	Togo
Burundi	Eritrea	Madagascar	Nigeria	Uganda
Cameroon	Ethiopia	Malawi	Pakistan	Yemen
Central African Republic	Gambia	Mali	Rwanda	Zambia
Chad	Guinea-Bissau	Mauritania	Senegal	Zimbabwe

Armed conflicts have a clear impact on the aspects covered by the DIG, as demonstrated by the low levels of schooling for girls and young women in the areas affected by these conflicts, and the enormous difficul-

1. The gender perspective, according to N. Vázquez, a Mexican feminist and researcher into the impact of war on women, is a *conceptual operational instrument that makes it possible to see what is really happening from a new perspective which transcends the biological explanation of what is different between the sexes, concentrating on the identification of cultural, historical and social factors, among other things, that differentiate men from women and generate conditions and positions of inequality between them, thus allowing us to intervene effectively in order to change these unequal positions*. The definition offered by the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women indicates that *gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with the fact of being a man or a woman, and the relationships between men and women, boys and girls, as well as the relationships among women and relationships among men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and learned during the socialisation process. They are specific to both context and time and can change. Gender determines what is expected, permitted and appreciated in both women and men in a given context [...]*.

2. While the statistics broken down by gender provide factual information on the situation faced by women, a gender-sensitive indicator offers direct evidence of the status of women in relation to a particular standard or reference group, in this case, men. Schmeidl, S. and Piza-Lopez, E., *Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action*, International Alert at <<http://www.international-alert.org/women/publications/EWGEN.PDF>>.

ties encountered in gaining access to health services, as well as the lack of health services aimed specifically at women, such as those relating to reproductive health.

## 9.2. The gender agenda and peace-building during 2004

Peace-building from a gender perspective and with the participation of women has formed part of the international agenda throughout 2004, both in organisations like the United Nations and other inter-governmental bodies, and in different initiatives promoted by civilian organisations. Some of the central themes for 2004 are analysed in more detail in this section.

### a) Women, peace and security (Resolution 1325)

In 2000, the UN Security Council approved resolution 1325<sup>3</sup> on Women, Peace and Security, which called on the UN Secretary General to present a report in 2004, reviewing the application of the resolution during the intervening period.

#### Cuadro 9.1. Security Council Resolution 1325

**Resolution 1325** was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council in October 2000, and it called for:

- the participation of women in peace processes.
- training on gender issues in peace-keeping operations.
- the protection of women and young girls and respect for their rights.
- the inclusion of the mainstreaming of the gender perspective by the UN, both in its reports and in the implementation of its systems relating to conflicts, peace and security.

The resolution stated that the civilian population, mainly women and the children in their charge, are the main victims of armed conflicts, and it recognised the fundamental role that they play in peace-building. Four years after its approval, the Resolution is regarded as a fundamental instrument for promoting and recognising the participation of women in peace-building.

The report presented by the UN Secretary General<sup>4</sup> in October contains a review of the different areas covered by Resolution 1325, underlining the achievements made and setting out the challenges that remain, along with the failures recorded in some areas. The report also contains a series of recommendations on future actions to be taken in order to reinforce the process for the effective implementation of this resolution. In general terms, the Secretary General reported a number of advances, particularly in relation to international recognition of the impact that armed conflicts have on women, and also on the important contribution that women make at different levels of the peace-building process. The report stressed that the areas in which the most important improvements have been seen are in the humanitarian arena and in peace-keeping. The Secretary General also reviewed the different actions taken by various United Nations departments, as well as by some member states.

Prior to the presentation of the Secretary General's report, the implementation of this Resolution had already been reviewed during the course of the year at the 48<sup>th</sup> period of sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women, which discussed *equal participation by women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and post-conflict peace-building*<sup>5</sup>. Likewise, during 2002 and 2003, the UN Security Council had already discussed the issue and made a review of the process for the Resolution's implementation.

3. See <<http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/21/PDF/N0072021.pdf?OpenElement>>.

4. See <<http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/534/17/PDF/N0453417.pdf?OpenElement>>.

5. See *Barometer 4* <<http://www.escolapau.org/programas/barometro04.htm>>.

**Table 9.2. Secretary General’s report on women, peace and security**

Thematic area	Advances and challenges
Inter-governmental processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The UN Security Council (SC) has established gender mandates in some peace-keeping missions.</li> <li>• The SC has undertaken to ensure that its missions take gender considerations into account.</li> <li>• The General Assembly condemned the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.</li> <li>• The Commission on the Status of Women examined the participation of women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.</li> </ul>
Conflict prevention and early warning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The gender perspective has not been taken into account in early warning systems, nor has the experience of women been considered in conflict prevention.</li> <li>• UNIFEM is working on early warning systems from a gender perspective.</li> </ul>
Peace processes and negotiations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In spite of the unofficial contributions made by women in peace processes, there are still obstacles preventing their participation on a formal level.</li> </ul>
Peace-keeping operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This is the area in which the greatest advances have been made, through the incorporation of the gender dimension in the mandates of new missions and the creation of Gender Advisers.</li> </ul>
Humanitarian response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is necessary to strengthen the gender perspective in the consolidated appeals process.</li> <li>• Although advances have been made in respect of humanitarian aid and protection, a number of shortfalls remain.</li> <li>• The majority of United Nations bodies have developed working strategies relating to gender.</li> </ul>
Post-conflict reconstruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women should provide the framework for support programmes directed towards countries emerging from armed conflict.</li> </ul>
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DDR programmes do not cover women who form part of armed groups as non-combatants. It is necessary to ensure the participation of women in all aspects of these programmes.</li> </ul>
Prevention of gender violence in armed conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The international community has failed to prevent this type of violence.</li> <li>• Prevention must be combined with an end to impunity.</li> <li>• More pressure is required on the parties in a conflict in order to end all human rights violations against women.</li> </ul>
Improving application of Resolution 1325 (2000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is necessary to increase the level of representation by women in the procedural and decision-making arenas relating to peace and security.</li> <li>• Exploitation and sexual abuse by humanitarian and peace-keeping personnel must be prevented.</li> <li>• Reports by the SC must always include a gender perspective.</li> </ul>

For its part, the NGO Task Force on Women, Peace and Security presented an alternative report reviewing the process for the implementation of Resolution 1325, making a series of recommendations to member states and United Nations bodies. Among these recommendations were:

- Increased support for the numerous civil initiatives regarding the use and awareness of the Resolution.
- Greater knowledge and awareness of the importance of the Resolution among the people affected and through peace-keeping missions.
- Establishment by the UN Security Council of a Task Force to ensure the integration of this Resolution in the work of the Council.
- Increase in the *partnerships* between United Nations institutions and local women-based organisations.
- Resident Coordinators, Envoys and Special Representatives should guide transitional Governments to ensure that they incorporate the Resolution’s principles in any new post-war legislation.

The process relating to Resolution 1325 has been characterised by the huge involvement of a number of women’s organisations calling for its application, as they see it as an effective working tool for the full



involvement of women in the peace-building process. Proof of this is that the Secretary General's own report included an acknowledgement of this work on the ground, which has raised awareness of the content of the Resolution in a number of conflict and post-war contexts and called for its incorporation in peace agreements. Indeed, this Resolution originally arose in response to demands from a number of organisations that were calling on the United Nations to establish a legal framework that would permit such participation by and recognition of women. However, it should be pointed out that four years on from its approval, and bearing in mind the Beijing Platform for Action<sup>6</sup>, the challenges that remain continue to be, to a great extent, those encountered at the outset, given that progress has been seen more on a formal than a practical basis. This demonstrates that the work required from this perspective remains a priority in the decision-making arena, and that this work still lacks the sufficient resources.

## b) The gender perspective in peace agreements

A particularly important issue is the subject of the inclusion of the recommendations set out in Resolution 1325<sup>7</sup> in the **peace agreements** signed since the Resolution was approved in 2000. As the Secretary General points out in his report, it is still difficult for women to participate and for the gender perspective to be included in official peace processes. This fact is confirmed from a review and analysis of the majority of peace processes signed since the Resolution was approved, given that the references to issues affecting women or gender relationships are practically non-existent.

**It is still difficult for women to participate and for the gender perspective to be included in official peace processes.**

As one can see, half of the agreements examined have not in any way included the needs of women, nor have they been drawn up from a gender perspective. As regards the remaining cases, it should be pointed out that in the case of **Afghanistan**<sup>8</sup>, the pressure for women to be granted full legal rights as civilians (particularly when one bears in mind the atrocities to which they were subjected under the Taliban regime) did not refer solely to the defence of their human rights, but

**Table 9.3. Peace agreements and the gender perspective**

Country (Agreement)	Date signed	Gender content
Eritrea-Ethiopia. (Algiers Agreement)	December 2000	No reference included.
Bougainville. (Port Moresby Agreements)	August 2001	No reference included.
Afghanistan. (Bonn Agreements)	December 2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• These agreements contain a stated intention to establish a gender-sensitive government and signal the importance of participation by women in the interim administration.</li> <li>• They refer to the interim President as both "he" and "she".</li> <li>• They will ensure that a significant number of women participate in the emergency Loya Jirga.</li> <li>• Two women signed the agreements as participants in the talks.</li> </ul>

6. The Platform gives shape to the international undertaking to achieve the goals of equality, development and peace for women throughout the world, and represents the consolidation of the undertakings made during the United Nations Decade of Women, 1976-1985. The Platform forms an international agenda for the empowerment of women.

7. Resolution 1325 "encourages the Secretary General to execute his strategic action plan (A/49/587) calling for increased participation by women in the adoption of decisions and conflict resolution and peace processes, and calling on all those who take part in the negotiation and adoption of peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective [...]".

8. In spite of the existence of a peace agreement, Afghanistan is still regarded as being in a state of war, given the intensity of the armed confrontations and violence that affect the country. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

Angola (Understanding Memorandum)	April 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refers to the assistance that must be given to the families of combatants of Understanding)</li> </ul>
Côte (Linan-Marcoussis Agreement)	January 2003	No reference included. d'Ivoire.
Liberia. (Accra Agreement)	August 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Governance Reform Commission must include women among its members and the National Electoral Commission will comprise both men and women.</li> <li>• Members of women's organisations will take part in the National Transitional Legislative Assembly.</li> <li>• The Transitional Government will pay particular attention to the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups of victims from the armed conflict, including women.</li> <li>• The Transitional Government will ensure that the needs and potential of the victims of the war are taken into account and that there will be gender equality in duties relating to rehabilitation programmes</li> </ul>

also formed part of the debate that led to the military attack led by the USA and its allies. The fact that three years on from the agreements, the status of women in the country has not seen any substantial improvement shows, firstly, that this did not represent one of the priorities in the country's rehabilitation, and secondly that the mere inclusion of gender issues in the text of an agreement does not guarantee that such issues will direct the subsequent process unless there is both willingness and commitment. Furthermore, in the cases of both Liberia and Afghanistan, in spite of the fact that consideration was given to participation by women in the political institutions that arose from the agreements, there has been no explicit recognition of the contribution that women in both countries have made in the pursuit of peace. In Afghanistan this took the form of active opposition to fundamentalism, while in Liberia women took part in the network of regional women's peace organisations, calling on the international communities and the warring factions to bring hostilities to an end.

### c) Beijing+10 Process

2005 marks the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Beijing Summit and the approval of the Beijing Platform for Action. During the 49<sup>th</sup> period of sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women, the application of the Platform<sup>9</sup> by individual states will be reviewed, and a whole series of preparatory processes is currently being completed to this end, coordinated by the Division for the Advancement of Women and the various regional Economic and Social Commissions. In addition, NGOs and women's movements are engaging in a parallel process to discuss and evaluate the achievements of the past 10 years, and assessing whether another World Conference of women should be held.

One of the issues regarded as decisive and an area of special concern in respect of the Platform is that of the **consequences of armed and other forms of conflict on women, including those living under foreign occupation**, in which, on the basis that peace is inextricably linked to both equality between women and men and development, a series of strategic objectives was established to minimise the effect of such conflicts on women, while at the same time strengthening the power of women to prevent and resolve conflicts, along with their capacity to contribute to the peace culture.

9. See *Barometer 6* at <<http://www.escolapau.org/programas/barometro06.htm>>.

**Table 9.4. Strategic objectives in the Area of Special Concern “Women and armed conflicts”**

- Increase participation by women in the solution of conflicts at a decision-making level and protect women living in situations of armed or other kinds of conflict, or under foreign occupation.
- Reduce excessive military spending and limit the availability of weapons.
- Promote non-violent forms of conflict resolution and reduce the incidence of human rights violations in situations of conflict.
- Encourage contributions by women in achieving a culture of peace.
- Offer protection, assistance and empowerment to women refugees, other displaced women who require international protection and women who are internally displaced.
- Promote assistance for women in settlement camps.

The United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) has drawn up a document<sup>10</sup> that reviews the implementation of objectives relating to this issue.

**The defence of women’s rights has become an argument that is now being used to justify certain forms of military intervention.**

**These arguments help to perpetuate the stereotypical view of women as victims and entirely distort the objectives of the Platform for Action**

As the document itself sets out, in line with the statements made by the Secretary General in his report on Women, Peace and Security, despite some significant advances like Resolution 1325, a huge number of challenges remain. On the one hand, new issues have arisen over the past 10 years, such as the importance of including the gender perspective in early warning systems, reflections on new forms of masculinity and gender relations<sup>11</sup>, and the inclusion of the gender perspective in post-war rehabilitation processes, among other issues. In addition, the defence of women’s rights has become an argument that is now being used to justify certain forms of military intervention, as was the case in Afghanistan. These arguments help to perpetuate the stereotypical view of women as victims and entirely distort the objectives of the Platform for Action. Finally, the document shows that

the low levels of participation by women in peace negotiations and decision-making processes continue, in great measure, as a result of sexist attitudes towards power.

**Table 9.2. Early warning from a gender perspective**

The increasing visibility and acknowledgement of the different impact that armed conflicts have on women and men, along with the ever increasing use of forms of gender violence as a weapon of war have highlighted the need to improve the early warning tools by incorporating a gender perspective. This process of **engendering early warning** will, on the one hand, allow account to be taken of warning situations that had previously been ignored and that relate principally to instability at a social level, and on the other, serve to ensure that discrimination does not continue through into a post-war context and the specific needs of both men and women will be taken into account when the responses to these situations of crisis are designed. The gender perspective can be included in all stages of the early warning process, i.e. during the **collection of information**, using gender-sensitive indicators and taking the information provided by women’s organisations into account, during the **analysis and evaluation** process, since the gender perspective can provide a more in-depth picture of certain political and social structures that are more likely to lead to situations of conflict, the **formulation of potential scenarios and responses**, through the creation of recommendations directed towards the micro and community levels, rather than focusing on political solutions at a macro level, thus permitting new gender relationships to be established, and finally, in the process of **communication with decision-making centres**, passing on warnings to the institutions and organisations responsible for gender mainstreaming in the process of policy design.

10. See <<http://www.un-instraw.org/en/images/stories/Beijing/womenandarmedconflict.pdf>>.

11. The 48<sup>th</sup> period of sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women discussed *the role of men and boys in the pursuit of gender equality*. See *Barometer 4* at <<http://www.escolapau.org/programas/barometro04.htm>>.

In this connection, the UN Secretary General's October 2004 report on "Women, Peace and Security" also underlined the need to enhance participation by women in early warning systems, and he called on the UN Security Council to pay more attention to the gender perspective in its conflict-prevention work. The Secretary General also stressed the contribution that women were making in the prevention of violence and early warnings relating to situations of tension. However, he also stated that [...] *the knowledge and experience of women is underused in the prevention of violent conflicts, and gender perspectives have not been taken into account in early warning exercises and the creation of response options*. It is therefore necessary to assess the importance of this approach when improvement early warning systems.

Source: *Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action*.

It should also be pointed out that the Millennium Development Goals<sup>12</sup> have also become an instrument for the application of the Beijing Platform for Action, in that they include some of the goals set out in the Platform, particularly in relation to the fight against the feminisation of poverty, the elimination of discrimination in education, the empowerment of women, the improvement of access to healthcare and the active participation of women in sustainable development, among other issues.

#### d) Peace-keeping operations

One of the most significant issues on the agenda relating to gender and peace during 2004 was the inclusion of this aspect in peace-keeping operations. As mentioned earlier, this has also been one of the areas in which the greatest number of advances has been recorded. Of the 17 peace-keeping operations currently in operation, 10 included some form of gender assessment component by November 2004, either in the person of a Gender Adviser, or through an institutional gender unit with its own staff. These figures represent an improvement as compared with the year 2000, when only two Gender Advisers were employed by peace-keeping missions. In addition, these advisers were present in contexts in which their participation took on particular relevance, given the seriousness of the impact that these armed conflicts had had on women: Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Timor-Leste<sup>13</sup>. Elsewhere, the Good Practices in Peace-Keeping Unit has published a Gender Resource Package with the aim of managing and offering training to the people who form part of these operations.

Nevertheless, these improvements have been tarnished by the disclosure in some missions of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by humanitarian and peace-keeping personnel, highlighting the long journey that remains before the gender perspective moves from good practice manuals to become part of the day-to-day duties of the people responsible for operations and their staff. The Secretary General's mandate to combat these abuses is extremely clear: zero tolerance. In addition to the investigations currently underway (which particularly involve personnel from MONUC in DR Congo), some of the measures being adopted to combat these abusive practices include the creation of compulsory codes of conduct for any personnel who form part of these missions. The most recent is ONUB, the United Nations Mission in Burundi, set up with a preventive element in order to prevent any repeat of the situation that occurred in the mission in the neighbouring country, though complaints had begun to be heard about sexual abuses by ONUB personnel by the end of the year.

12. See the chapter on development.

13. UNAMA (Afghanistan) and UNAMIS (Sudan) are not peace-keeping operations in the strict sense of the term, but rather political and peace-building missions.

### Chart 9.3. The gender perspective in MINUSTAH

The peace-keeping mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, has pioneered the inclusion of the gender perspective as an integral part of all the phases of the peace-keeping process. The key role in this gender-based work is played by the Gender Adviser, Nadine Puechguirbal, who has been part of the mission since its design phase. The Adviser's role is to promote, facilitate, support and supervise the inclusion of the gender perspective in peace-keeping missions. In relation to the mission's mandate, the UN Secretary General's report on Haiti in April 2004 recommended that the gender perspective be included in all the mission's policies, programmes and activities, and Security Council Resolution 1542 (2004), by which MINUSTAH was established, included Resolution 1325 and made references to the status and participation of women in various areas, such as demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, participation in elections, the protection of the human rights of women and access to humanitarian aid.

This is the first time that the figure of a Gender Adviser has been present since the beginning of a mission, and this should facilitate the inclusion of this perspective in all the mission's different areas. The initial aim is to work closely with all the mission's components in order to guarantee gender mainstreaming and the involvement of local women's organisations in the mission's work. The presence of the Gender Adviser has served to reactivate the Gender Task Force, with representatives from the different UN Agencies in the country. However, the low levels of participation by women in the mission illustrates the long road still ahead before the requirements set out in Resolution 1325 are met.

#### e) Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of women combatants

Throughout the course of 2004, several women's organisations, along with the United Nations itself, have commented on the participation of women in DDR programmes and the need to improve access to these programmes by women who have taken part in armed conflicts as members of the armed groups or Government armed forces involved. The restrictive perception of what makes a combatant have until now left many women unable to benefit from these programmes, thus impeding their reintegration into civilian life following the end of hostilities. This aggravates levels of poverty, exclusion and sexual exploitation and reinforces the stigmatisation suffered in many societies by women who have been caught up in armed conflicts, not as members of the civilian population but as members of the opposing factions.

The general perception of a combatant is that of a young man with a gun. This view ignores all those people, mainly women and children, who have carried out other duties, such as logistics and support duties for the armed combatants and, of course, all the women who are forced to act as sexual slaves, both by armed opposition groups and by certain regular armed forces. For this reason, UNIFEM recommends a definition that will allow the criteria for inclusion in DDR programmes to be sufficiently broad to include all the women and young girls associated with the opposing forces, regardless of whether they possess any weapons or not. It is also necessary to bear in mind that although some women may have joined armed groups as result of their own free choice, on many occasions their participation is forced upon them through their abduction.

#### Women are largely excluded from the DDR processes

The fact that it can be seen that women are largely excluded from these DDR processes should lead to these recommendations being taken into account when designing DDR programmes, as well as to the redesign of any current programme in which it has been demonstrated that women are being excluded as beneficiaries. This should not only relate to their participation on equal terms with combatants,

but also to the inclusion of their specific needs (including their protection against sexual violence) and the needs of the children in their charge, when it comes to the design of resettlement, reintegration and arms handover programmes, as set out in Resolution 1325 (2000).

A more active mandate, along with a greater awareness of gender issues and increased participation by women in peace-keeping operations should mean that the demobilisation of women will represent a transformation in gender relationships in societies undergoing post-war rehabilitation processes, rather than the maintenance of the *status quo*, which up until now has resulted, among other things, in the high levels of gender violence seen in many of these contexts, along with reverses in certain advances achieved by women during the period of armed conflict in terms of their independence and their participation in areas relating

to production and decision-making, among other aspects.

## f) Sexual violence as a weapon of war

Sexual violence is one of the most widespread weapons of war used in current armed conflicts. Reports denouncing this fact were made repeatedly throughout the course of the last year, the most significant being those that recounted its widespread use in the region of Darfur, Sudan<sup>14</sup> and in DR Congo. These reports have merely served to demonstrate the failure of the systems that are supposed to protect the civilian population and particularly women and children against certain types of atrocity, such as sexual violence. The camps housing refugees and displaced people, who are on many occasions at the mercy of armed groups, are frequently the scene of this type of abuse. This was acknowledged by the Secretary General in his report on women, peace and security, mentioned above<sup>15</sup>. The use of sexual violence, which is clearly a result of the line of thinking pursued in contemporary armed conflicts, is not solely directed towards the denigration of women and girls but also intended to humiliate and create rifts within the entire community viewed as the enemy.

Furthermore, the fact that this violence against women extends beyond the end of armed hostilities, as illustrated by the high levels of gender-based violence in post-war rehabilitation contexts, means that efforts must be redoubled in order to work with and help the survivors of such violence and to end the impunity with which crimes of sexual violence against women are normally committed when armed conflicts end. This impunity is facilitating the use of sexual violence by the armed parties involved.

One of the many effects of sexual violence in situations of conflict is that it has become another factor in the spreading of the HIV/AIDS pandemic among the civilian population, particularly women. As UNAIDS has pointed out, members of the military are among the groups most affected by the disease<sup>16</sup>, which along with certain abusive sexual practices and the extreme vulnerability of women in the face of those who are either practising violence against them or supplying food aid, means that the pandemic is spreading in certain areas of armed conflict.

In addition, Amnesty International has complained that the restrictions being placed by some countries on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women is weakening this Convention as an effective way of protecting women from violence. These restrictions, which have been imposed by some countries in the Middle East and North Africa, are rendering the Convention meaningless as a tool for protection. This situation is occurring in spite of the fact that the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action reiterated that it was necessary to ensure that any restrictions that individual states might impose should not affect the central content and essence of the Convention.

In her annual report, the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its causes and consequences underlined the fact that, although the issue of violence against women has gained a public audience in recent years, and the importance of its eradication in order to strengthen the human rights of women has been acknowledged, this type of violence has at the same time been undergoing a process of normalisation and depoliticisation. The Rapporteur indicated that the use of neutral terms to describe some forms of violence, the cutting of funding allocated to women's programmes using the excuse of gender mainstreaming (thus debasing this concept) and the adoption of conciliatory measures in order to deal with violence against women were some of the factors that illustrated this depoliticisation.

14. See Barometers 5 and 6 at <<http://www.escloapau.org/programas/barometro05.htm>>.

15. The report mentions sexual and gender-based violence in Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo and Darfur.

16. UNAIDS mentioned that sexually transmitted diseases affect the military between two and five times more than the civilian population in times of peace, and this risk could be fifty times greater during periods of armed conflict.


## Cuadro 9.4. Gender Mainstreaming

Gender Mainstreaming, as defined by the United Nations, is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that both women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.

Source: ECOSOC *Agreed Conclusions*, 1997/2.

By way of **conclusion**, it is worth pointing out that 2004 saw the initiation or continuation of various processes relating to the assessment and evaluation of the achievements achieved in women's peace work, along with a review of the instruments created over the last decade, processes which will see their culmination in 2005. Ten years after the milestone marked by the 4<sup>th</sup> World Conference of Women in Beijing, many of the challenges raised at that conference remain to be overcome (greater involvement by women in decision-making bodies, the end of violence against women, participation in all peace process phases, among other issues), though new instruments have emerged from the active work being done by women at all social levels, such as Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and the Millennium Development Goals. Nevertheless, this legitimacy has not been accompanied by a willingness to place the contributions and needs of women at the heart of the debate and the political agenda for peace-building.

It is perhaps time to suggest the need to hold another world women's summit that might offer the political stimulus required so that all the efforts of the last decade, along with all those tasks that remain pending, can receive the recognition and support they require.





## 10. Behaviour in relation to international society

This final section contains an analysis of indicators 31 to 37, which refer to the Millennium Declaration, the protection of human rights, financial transparency and military security. In spite of the fact that some of these issues are analysed in more detail in other parts of the report, we want above all to comment here on the **level of commitment and compliance in respect of certain international treaties and regulations, in order to evaluate the conduct of individual States in relation to the international community**<sup>1</sup>. In this regard, in 2002 the UN Secretary General underlined the importance of multilateralism and urged member States to respect and contribute to the legal framework developed by the international community since the end of the Second World War. Subsequently, in 2003, he established a high level panel to assess the current threats to peace and international security and to formulate a series of recommendations, which are summarised in the following Chart. This section is divided into 4 sub-sections, each of which refers to one of the four areas mentioned above.

### Chart 10.1. United Nations reform

December 2004 saw publication of a report entitled ***A more secure world: our shared responsibility***<sup>2</sup>, by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges And Change (the Panel), which had been created a year earlier by the UN Secretary General. The aim of this report is to provide a broad and collective view of the challenges faced by the international community at the present time, and to put forward a series of recommendations to deal with these challenges and threats and suggest the reforms that can be implemented within the UN in order to help it deal more effectively with these issues. The report sets out a new vision of collective security and suggests more than 100 recommendations and tools, with a view to generating a debate that will guide the UN and its Security Council in facing up to the challenges and dangers currently encountered in the international sphere. The majority of these recommendations are not new, but they do represent a summary of all the debates engaged in during recent years.

The report sets out **six categories of threat** that should form the focus of our attention and concern over the coming decades. These are: 1) wars between States; 2) violence within States, including armed conflicts, human rights abuses and genocide; 3) poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; 4) nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological (NBC) weapons; 5) terrorism; and 6) transnational organised crime. In order to counter these threats, the Panel suggests a series of preventive policies based on combating poverty, ensuring biological security and creating an effective global defence against bio-terrorism and infectious diseases, improving powers of mediation and diplomacy in order to prevent armed conflicts between States, strengthening international treaties and control mechanisms in order to prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons, establishing new responses to international terrorism that respect human rights and the rule of law, and fighting organised crime. Within this framework, the report also presents a **clear definition of terrorism** with the ultimate aim of directing member States towards the creation of a convention against terrorism. However, the Panel states that where prevention fails, military means must be used to combat these threats, with authority from the Security Council, setting out ways in which it can act more proactively, mainly when individual States themselves fail in their duty to protect their own civilian populations, maintain peace or complete processes of post-war rehabilitation.

Finally, the Panel sets out the measures that ought to be taken in order to revitalise the UN's own institutions, principally the **reform of the Security Council**. For this it suggests two alternatives: either electing six new permanent members without the right of veto plus three non-permanent members, thus bringing the number of States on the Council to 24, or adding a single new state to the group of non-permanent members, bringing this group to 11, among which would be eight non-permanent seats with extendable four-year mandates. The first option is a response to the aspirations of the so-called "group of four" (Germany, Japan, India and Brazil) who want to join the Security Council with all the rights inherent in membership, i.e. with the power of veto, though they might renounce this in order to gain a permanent seat. Two permanent seats would remain for representation from Africa, and the countries most likely to compete for these would be Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt (although in 1997 the AU suggested the possibility of having two permanent seats that would be assigned by rotation). Among the countries that oppose the creation of more permanent seats are Spain, Mexico, Pakistan and Italy, although the debate is not so much centred around correcting the Council's operation but is instead more about how the balance of power is distributed within its ranks.

1. The EU's own Code of Conduct on arms exports indicates the need to comply with international obligations and undertakings (see criteria 1, 6 and 7 of the Code, Appendix IX of this report).

2. See High Level Panel on threats, challenges and change, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*, A/59/565 de 02/12/04 <<http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf>>.

## 10.1. Behaviour in relation to the Millennium Declaration

The United Nations Millennium Declaration was adopted at the Millennium Summit (New York, September 2000) by 189 countries. This declaration defined a global agenda based on the values, themes and goals that should guide the actions of the United Nations and its member States throughout the coming years. The Declaration brings together some of the ideas that have themselves been the subject of world conferences (particularly those that took place during the 1990s)<sup>3</sup> and it includes 25 multilateral treaties that combine the organisation's main principals. These 25 treaties are in turn selected from among the more than 500 legal instruments created since the United Nations was originally founded. The Millennium Declaration sets out principals and regulations that are not binding on individual countries, though all the treaties from which it is formed are legally binding.

This report has considered 7 of the 25 treaties that make up the **Millennium Declaration** (indicator no 31). The following table indicates the countries that had signed and ratified these 7 treaties by 31 December 2004.

**Table 10.1. Countries that had signed and ratified the main legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration by the end of 2004**

Legal instrument	S	R	R (2004)
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)	139 <sup>4</sup>	93	Burkina Faso
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction, or the Ottawa Treaty (1997) <sup>5</sup>	152	144	Estonia, Ethiopia, Papua New Guinea
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change (1997)	84	132	Indonesia, Israel, Liechtenstein, Niger, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Macedonia, Togo, Ukraine, Yemen
Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity (1992)	168	188	Thailand
Convention to Combat Desertification (1994)	115	190	-
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (1979)	98	177	Kiribati, Swaziland
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)	140	192	-

Notes: S: Signed; R: Ratified; R (2003): Ratified during 2003. As regards ratification, the United Nations provides other legal mechanisms with the same legal validity as ratification which do not require the prior signing of the legal instrument. These are acceptance, approval, accession and succession. For this reason, the number of signatures is sometimes greater than the number of ratifications. In these tables, ratification includes all the other mechanisms.

**Table 10.2. Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the 7 main international legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration**

Brunei Darussalam (2)	Iraq (2)	Tonga (3)
DPR Korea (3)	Oman (3)	United Arab Emirates (2)
Iran (3)	Somalia (1)	USA (1)

Note: The number in brackets indicates the number of instruments ratified.

The number of ratifications during the past year (19) has been considerably fewer than the 43 seen in 2003 and the 117 recorded in 2002. At the same time, however, the number of countries that have signed all the legal instruments discussed in this section rose from 61 to 68. As in previous years, in spite of the fact

3. In particular the World Summit for Children (New York, 1990), the World Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), The World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995) and the World Food Summit (Rome, 1996)

4. The USA and Israel withdrew their signatures in 2002.

5. For more information on the most recent modifications of the text, see the chapter on militarization and disarmament.

that the first three instruments indicated in Table 10.1 (the Rome Statute, the Ottawa Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol) are the ones that saw the greatest number of ratifications during the course of the year, they remain the ones that have received the lowest number of ratifications overall. Specifically, the Kyoto Protocol was ratified by 12 countries this year, 4 of these ratifications occurring during the 10<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Buenos Aires.

As regards individual countries, particular mention should be made of Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, as this brings the total level of polluting emissions above the 55% required in order for the Protocol to come into force in February 2005. In spite of the fact that the group of ratifying countries now represent

### Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol will allow for enforcement in February 2005

61% of all emissions, the United Nations has continued to call repeatedly on the USA to ratify this instrument, as it is the world's largest polluter. Elsewhere, Ethiopia's ratification of the Ottawa Treaty is to be welcomed, given that it is the country with the largest number of mines following its conflict with Eritrea. Finally, the USA and Somalia remain for the third year running the only countries that have ratified

only one of the 7 treaties mentioned in this section. In the case of Somalia, the absence of a single recognised authority in the country may be influencing its conduct on an international level. However, this situation could now change as a result of the recent formation of a Government and National Transitional Parliament. As far as the USA is concerned, the Bush Administration, which last year withdrew the country's signature to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, reneged on the promise to ratify the Ottawa Treaty, made some years ago by President W. Clinton.

## 10.2. Behaviour in relation to the protection of human rights

Following the Second World War and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1951, a series of legal instruments has been constructed for the protection of human rights on both an international and a regional scale.<sup>6</sup>

In this connection, indicator no. 32 is created on the basis of the **main human rights treaties** that are legally binding on the States which have signed them. This indicator comprises the two Covenants that regulate human rights and fundamental freedoms generically (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of 1966), along with 4 Conventions that refer to more specific subjects, such as genocide, refugee status, racial discrimination and torture and other cruel treatment. It was also deemed appropriate to include an analysis of the International Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and their Families (in force since 2003), since it is an instrument that responds to some of the new challenges faced in the protection and promotion of human rights on an international level. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur on the rights of migrants, G. Rodriguez Pizarro, believes that such people are living in difficult situations that generally include exploitation, xenophobia, racism and even illegal detention as a result of their irregular status. These 7 conventions, which are complemented by the two conventions on human rights included in indicator no. 31 (relating to the rights of women and children) form the mainstay for the protection of human rights within the United Nations.

The following table indicates the countries that had signed and ratified these six legal instruments by 31 December 2004.

6. This internationalisation of the system for the protection of human rights during the 20<sup>th</sup> century places an emphasis on the responsibility of individual States when it comes to guaranteeing their protection and promotion under international monitoring. Subsequently, as a reflection of the current approach to human rights, more than 170 countries ratified the universality, indivisibility and inter-dependence of human rights at the International Conference in Vienna in 1993.

**Table 10.3. Countries that had signed and ratified the main legal instruments for the protection of human rights by the end of 2004**

Legal instrument	S	R	R (2004)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	67	154	Liberia, Mauritania, Swaziland
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)	66	151	Liberia, Mauritania, Swaziland
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)	41	136	Comoros
Convention on the Status of Refugee (1951)	19	142	-
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)	84	170	Comoros
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)	74	139	Liberia, Maldives, Swaziland, Syria
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	24	27	Libya, Timor-Leste, Turkey

Note: S: Signed; R: Ratified; R (2004): Ratified during 2004.

Of the 28 countries shown in the following table, 19 are States that are either very small (Andorra, Singapore) or islands and archipelagos. It is worrying that 11 countries have not ratified a single instrument and a further 9 have only ratified one. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that 16 new ratifications occurred during 2004<sup>7</sup>, including those made by Liberia, a country that has been in the process of transition since August 2003.

**Table 10.4. Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the seven main UN legal instruments on human rights**

Andorra (0)	Indonesia (2)	Niue (NZ) (0)	Santa Lucia (1)
Bhutan (0)	Kiribati (0)	Oman (1)	Sao Tome and Principe (2)
Brunei Darussalam (0)	Malaysia (1)	Pakistan (2)	Singapore (1)
Cook Islands (NZ) (0)	Marshall Islands (0)	Palau (0)	Tonga (2)
Comoros (0)	Micronesia (0)	Qatar (2)	Tuvalu (1)
Granada (2)	Myanmar (1)	Saint Kitts and Nevis (1)	United Arab Emirates (1)
Guinea-Bissau (2)	Nauru (0)	Samoa (1)	Vanuatu (0)

Note: The number in brackets indicates the number of instruments ratified.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the United Nations continued to adopt new legal instruments for the protection and promotion of human rights, in response to the new challenges faced in safeguarding human rights on a world scale. More specifically, several instruments are currently being discussed, such as the optional protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples and the draft for a binding regulatory instrument for protection against enforced disappearances.

7. Although this figure is well below that of the number of new ratifications under indicator no. 31, it is worth pointing out that the legal instruments contained in indicator no. 32 are much older than those that make up the Millennium Declaration, and this has an unquestionable effect on the number of new ratifications.

## 10.3. Behaviour in terms of financial transparency

This section contains an analysis of the behaviour of States and territories in respect of financial activities and transparency. Two indicators serve to illustrate this behaviour: one relating to tax havens (indicator no.

**The absence of an international framework for the monitoring of financial activities has highlighted the difficulties involved in controlling the financing of armed groups or organised crime in general**

33) and another listing the countries that are not cooperating with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (indicator no. 34) in its pursuit of money laundering. This aspect has taken on greater importance over recent years following the request by the USA to freeze any funds suspected of being used to finance the activities of those responsible for the attacks of 11 September 2001, though the absence of an international framework for the monitoring of financial activities has highlighted the difficulties involved in controlling the financing of armed groups or organised crime in general.

As regards the situation in 2004, 38 States or territories were classified as **tax havens**<sup>8</sup>, of which 5 were non-cooperative because they have not adopted OECD directives on harmful fiscal practices (see Table 10.5). The remaining 33 have undertaken to implement these directives. Although the adoption of OECD directives does not mean that they cease to be considered as tax havens, it does indicate a greater willingness to cooperate with the international community. As a result, although it should be mentioned on the positive side that of the 35 non-cooperating States or territories listed in the 2000 report<sup>9</sup>, only 5 now remain, it should nevertheless be pointed out that no country adopted the directives during 2004. In other words, the pace at which the criteria have been adopted has slowed to a halt, thus continuing the trend seen since 2002, when 21 countries undertook to cooperate. However, it should be pointed out that the restriction of the recommendations and directives during 2001 meant that many States and territories disappeared from the list of non-cooperating tax havens at that time.

According to the task force for United Nations reform, between 0.5 and 1.5 trillion dollars was laundered during 2000, and in spite of the enormity of these amounts and their importance in terms of encouraging organised crime, many countries did not regulate money laundering. In addition, the indiscriminate application of banking secrecy and the rapid growth in the number of tax havens continue to present serious obstacles to the search for a solution to this problem. As a result, the task force suggested the possibility of the UN Security Council approving an international convention on money laundering that would deal with these issues.

**Table 10.5. Tax havens**

Anguilla (UK)	Cyprus	Man, Isle of (UK)	Samoa
<b>Andorra</b>	Dominica	<b>Marshall Islands</b>	San Marino
Antigua and Barbuda	Dutch Antilles	Mauritius	Santa Lucia
Aruba (Netherlands)	Gibraltar (UK)	<b>Monaco</b>	Seychelles
Bahamas	Granada	Montserrat (UK)	Turks and Caicos (UK)
Bahrain	Guernsey (UK)	Nauru	Vanuatu
Belize	Jersey (UK)	Niue (NZ)	Virgin Islands (USA)
Bermuda (UK)	<b>Liberia</b>	Panama	Virgin Islands (UK)
Caiman Islands (UK)	<b>Liechtenstein</b>	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	
Cook, Islands (NZ)	Malta	St. Kitts and Nevis	

Note: the countries shown in bold are tax havens that do not cooperate with the OECD.

8. The OECD considers that a state or territory is a tax haven when it meets the following four requirements: a) there is no tax on capital or such a tax is not enforced; b) there is no effective exchange of information between different jurisdictions and between financial institutions; c) there is no transparency on the part of the judiciary, and d) there is no monitoring of financial operations.

9. OECD, *Towards Global Tax Co-operation, Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting and Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices*, Paris, 2000.

Furthermore, the mere existence of a tax haven, quite apart from the difficulties that it raises in terms of combating organised crime and money laundering, implies a reduction in individual state income from taxes from the highest earners, who are the main people who are able to gain access to this form of fiscal exemption, a circumstance that hinders efforts at wealth redistribution by countries from which funds are removed.

For its part, the FATF<sup>10</sup> indicates 6 States or territories that are not adequately following its recommendations for the prevention, detection and punishment of **money-laundering** (indicator no. 34). It should be pointed out that, in contrast to the list of tax havens, three States were removed from the FATF's list in 2004, Egypt, Guatemala and Ukraine, though the organisation will continue to monitor developments in relation to the implementation of its recommendations by these countries. In addition, in October 2004 the FATF withdrew its counter-measures against Nauru and Myanmar, as a result of the advances made by both countries, though they have not been removed from the list of countries that do not cooperate with it in respect of money laundering.

**Table 10.6. Countries that do not cooperate with the FATF in respect of money laundering**

Cook Islands	Myanmar	Nigeria
Indonesia	Nauru	Philippines

Particular mention should be made of a new FATF initiative that is especially important in the fight to combat the financing of terrorist activities, which the organisation established at a meeting held in Paris between 20 and 22 October and which further complements its initiatives of recent years. This new initiative, Special Recommendation 9, consists of requiring countries to implement measures to detect the cross-border movement of cash and financial instruments used to finance terrorist groups or for money laundering purposes, along with measures to confiscate such funds. It also calls for the strengthening of systems for the exchange of information between countries in relation to the illegal movement of money for terrorist financing and money laundering.

Finally, mention should be made of the slow progress recorded as regards the collection of signatures and ratifications for the United Nations Convention against Corruption, unveiled at the Conference against Corruption held in Merida (Mexico) in December 2003<sup>11</sup>. Only 28 countries signed this convention during 2004, bringing the total number to 113, and only 13 have ratified it, leaving it a long way from the 30 ratifications necessary for it to come into force.

## 10.4. Behaviour in terms of military security

Three indicators have been taken into account in the preparation of this sub-section, and these refer to different international instruments on questions of military security: the ratification of the main agreements on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (indicator no. 35) and participation in the UN's Register of Conventional Weapons and its Military Expenditure Report (indicators 36 and 37). The issue that has given rise to most expectations as regards international behaviour in terms of military security has been the question of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and this section will therefore include a brief review of the events that occurred during the course of the year.

10. The FATF was created by the G-7 in 1989 and includes 29 States and territories, together with the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Although it works closely with the OECD, it does not form part of this organisation, and its aim, based on a list of 40 recommendations, is the development and coordination of government efforts to combat money-laundering.

11. This is the first legally binding agreement on this issue, and is intended to combat the corrupt transactions which each year cost around a billion dollars. The Convention was drawn up on the basis that corruption goes beyond mere criminal behaviour, as it mortgages the future and impoverishes many countries, as well as depriving their citizens of good governance. The Convention contains measures relating to prevention, the pursuit of criminal activities, international cooperation and the recovery of wealth.

As regards the **agreements on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**, the position at the end of 2004 was that 48 countries had not ratified some of the three main treaties, i.e. the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, 14 countries had not ratified 2 of the 3 agreements. Particular mention should be made of the case of **Israel**, which is the only country that has still not ratified any of the 3 agreements, a fact which is becoming one of the main priorities on the agenda for the control of weapons of mass destruction, as mentioned below.

The other two indicators show the degree of transparency in the transfer of weapons and military spending and, to a certain extent, they indicate the level of political will to promote measures to encourage trust. At the last count, 138 countries had not provided information for the **United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons**, while 121 had not offered information for the **Military Expenditure Report**. These figures show in both cases that, in spite of the fact that both registers are voluntary and should therefore serve to point up any bad practices, few countries are accustomed to providing information on military matters.

## Weapons of mass destruction

**Libya's** voluntary dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction programme at the beginning of the year exposed the existence of an important illegal trade in military technology. Both the UN Secretary General and the Director General of the IAEA, M. El Baradei, have repeatedly insisted on the need to implement more effective controls in order to slow down the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. According to M. El Baradei himself, the global threat posed by the existence of these illegal networks makes it necessary to redesign the current monitoring and non-proliferation regulations as they are not strict enough, and additional authority is required in order to oversee compliance with existing undertakings.

International attention was focused mainly on 3 contexts: the threats by **DPR Korea** to develop nuclear weapons and two situations in the **Middle East**. The first of these involved suspicions that **Iran** was enriching uranium for military purposes, even though the country has always maintained that its enriched uranium was destined for peaceful energy uses, and eventually ended by dismantling its programme. Finally,

**The IAEA has announced that it will organise a conference in the Middle East during the course of 2005, with the ultimate aim of declaring this region a weapons of mass destruction-free zone**

after it had been shown that **Iraq** did not possess weapons of mass destruction, all attention was focused on **Israel**. The IAEA has announced that it will organise a conference in the Middle East during the course of 2005, with the ultimate aim of declaring this region a weapons of mass destruction-free zone. As part of this debate, **Syria** has for the first time acknowledged that it possesses chemical and biological weapons, though it claims that it will only destroy its arsenal when Israel dismantles its nuclear programme. The Israeli authorities

have never admitted that the country has a nuclear programme for military ends. However, when pressed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it has always made its signature conditional on recognition of its status as the only nuclear power in the region, a fact which is interpreted as a *de facto* admission that it possesses nuclear weapons. In the case of Iran, following protracted negotiations with the EU, the country agreed to halt its uranium enrichment programme in exchange for the transfer of nuclear technology for purely civilian uses. Mention should also be made of the summit meetings between **India** and **Pakistan** to discuss their nuclear programmes and establish a telephone hotline for nuclear issues, such as the carrying out of nuclear tests, thus offering a way out of any moments of crisis.

As part of this fight to control the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the leaders of the **G-8** countries adopted a plan of action to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, providing for the strengthening of measures against nuclear proliferation and establishing their wish to prohibit the exportation of equipment for the generation of nuclear energy to those countries that have not signed the IAEA's Additional Protocol (a decision that does not have the support of European countries).

The EU has also set out a common strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, based on the principles and broad lines adopted in June 2003. This strategy includes a series of practical projects and programmes, along with a budgetary provision for the application and monitoring of various international agreements, with a half-yearly review process with guaranteed high-level political involvement in order to ensure that this issue is properly addressed.

However, the most important initiative in this regard was the consolidation of the so-called Proliferation Security Initiative, created by the USA. This initiative is mainly directed at the interception of ships, planes and vehicles suspected of carrying products or technology that can be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction. Although the legal basis for this project has given rise to controversy, 16 countries have already signed up to the initiative<sup>12</sup>.

However, all of these efforts are in sharp contrast to the behaviour of many of the individual countries involved, led by the USA, which voted against many of the initiatives on disarmament and weapons control brought before the UN General Assembly, as can be seen in the following table:

**Table 10.7. Countries that voted against resolutions at the 59<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly on issues of disarmament and international security \***

Resolution	Total votes	Votes against	DPR Korea	Egypt	France	India	Iran	Israel	Latvia	Marshall I.	Micronesia	Pakistan	Palau	Poland	United Kingdom	USA
IAEA report	124	1	●													
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	124	1														●
Missiles	178	2		●			●									
Importance of achieving universal compliance with the NPT	184	3				●							●			●
Towards a world free of nuclear weapons	181	6			●			●	●				●		●	●
Control of biological weapons	183	2											●			●
Treaty for the reduction of fissile material	183	2											●			●
Disarmament under strict and effective international control	179	5			●								●	●	●	●
Middle East and South Asia as nuclear weapon-free zones	169	4				●						●	●			●
Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	184	5						●		●	●		●			●
Control of conventional weapons at a regional and sub-regional level	180	1				●										
Relationship between development and disarmament	184	2											●			●
Observation of environmental regulations in the drafts and agreements on disarmament and weapons control	180	2											●			●
TOTAL (13)			1	1	2	3	1	2	1	1	1	1	9	1	2	10

\*This table shows resolutions that were approved with more than two-thirds of countries voting in favour, along with the countries that voted against at least two of these resolutions.

12. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, the UK and the USA.



Conduct in relation to international society



■ Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the 7 main international legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration

■ Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the 7 main UN legal instruments on human rights

▨ Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the 7 main international legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration and fewer than half of the 7 main UN legal instruments on human rights

■ Tax havens that do not cooperate with the OECD

■ Countries that do not cooperate with the FATF in respect of money-laundering

## Appendix I. Table of countries and indicators and description of indicators

The following table has been prepared on the basis of a group of 37 indicators. The table shows data for the 191 member states of the United Nations plus a further 18 states and territories and is provided on the basis of these indicators, arranged into eight categories relating to armed conflicts and high risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, humanitarian crises, militarization and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development and conduct as regards the international community. Thus, it is possible to make several different readings of the same table, observing how a country behaves on the basis of an individual indicator or looking at the global situation for each of the countries in terms of development, for example. To make it easier to read, the reader can consult the list of indicators shown at the beginning of the report.

As may be observed, various symbols are included in the table. The majority of indicators differentiate between what are considered “serious situations” (indicated with a white dot) and “very serious situations” (indicated with a black dot). In the case of indicators relating to human rights, other symbols have also been used (square, triangle and black diamond) to indicate situations also considered to be “very serious”<sup>1</sup>. Numerical data is also provided with the symbol on some occasions, since it is considered that in these cases the figure provides information that is of interest. In addition, there are four cases in which the indicator has another meaning, a circumstance that has been indicated in a distinctive way. The first symbol refers to peace processes or official negotiations reached by the end of the year and are marked with the initials NP. Secondly, countries in conflict exploring negotiations at the end of the year are marked with the initials EX. Both instances are meant to give visibility to situations that require special attention on the part of the international community. Thirdly, Least Developed Countries are marked with the initials LDC in order to emphasise their internationally recognised position of vulnerability and recall the commitment to prioritise strategies for the reduction of poverty in these countries. Finally, initials HIPC in English refer to countries classified as Highly Indebted Poor Countries. Lastly, and given the fact that the information sources used in the report do not always include data from every country, a dash (-) has been used to point out countries where information is lacking and, where used with indicators relating to conduct in respect of the international community, to point out countries or territories that do not have the capacity to ratify international treaties as they are not part of the United Nations.

1. See description of indicators (Appendix I).

# Description of indicators

## 1. Armed conflicts

### 1. Countries engaged in armed conflict

SOURCE: The authors' own monitoring of the international situation, based on information prepared by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving groups of various kinds, such as regular or irregular military forces, guerrillas, armed opposition groups, paramilitary groups or ethnic or religious communities which, using arms and other destructive methods, claims more than 100 victims per year. This figure of 100 deaths is just an indicator and should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country.

- Armed conflict

## 2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

### 2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

SOURCE: The authors' own monitoring of the international situation, based on information prepared by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

Situations of tension and high-risk dispute are understood to be contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the state, which involve alterations in the operation of the state's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and States of Emergency<sup>1</sup>), and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. In these areas there is a strong possibility that a situation of armed conflict will occur within a short time. These tensions may not occur within the geographical territory of the state in question, but we have borne in mind the extent to which the state's own interests or stability are directly affected, as well as the fact that they may involve specific attacks on the territory of another country. Finally, we have also included contexts in which a peace agreement has been signed at some time or another between opposing parties but which are experiencing serious difficulties in implementing them.

- ▲ Situations of heightened tension and high-risk disputes

## 3. Peace processes

### 3. Countries engaging in peace processes or formal negotiations or in exploratory phase

SOURCE: The authors' own monitoring of the international situation, based on information prepared by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

It is considered that a **peace process** exists when the parts that participate in a armed conflict have reached an agreement to follow a negotiation, that allows to find a pacific resolution to the conflict

1. For the purposes of this report, a state of emergency is understood to mean a situation in which constitutional order is disrupted with a restriction on certain basic freedoms. This term is used differently in the different legislatures, such as, for example: State of Exception, interior disturbance, State of National Disaster, etc.

and to regulate or to solve the basic mutual incompatibility that they had. The process can be named in several forms, but in all the cases the dialogue has become serious, with or without aid of a third part. The existence of a negotiation process is independent if it is developed in a positive or negative way, aspect that is analyzed in the section of peace processes. It is considered that a process or a negotiation is in **exploratory phase** when the parts are in a stage of rough estimate and previous consultations, without they have reached a definitive agreement to initiate the negotiation. It also includes the cases of interrupted or failed peace processes in the past, that try to be relaunched again.

**NP** Countries engaged in peace processes or formal negotiations at the end of the year

**EX** Countries with negotiations in an exploratory phase at the end of the year

## 4. Post-war rehabilitation (international involvement)

### 4. Countries that relieve international post-war aid

SOURCE: The authors' own monitoring of the international situation, based on information prepared by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

**Post-war rehabilitation** means the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling: 1) the maintenance of security, 2) priorities of a humanitarian nature and the resettlement of refugees or displaced people; 3) physical reconstruction and the reconstruction of basic institutions; 4) the resolution of basic incompatibilities (i.e. social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); 5) reconciliation, a respect for human rights, the fight against impunity; 6) the regional dimension, along with reintegration in international forums; and 7) the empowerment of local civilian society and the construction of good governance through international involvement. The starting point of the analysis in terms of international involvement answers to three given situations: the signing of a peace accord or a ceasefire between all the actors involve in the armed conflict, a clear victory by one of the parties in the conflict, or the a clear victory by one of the parties in the conflict forced by an international intervention. The analysis includes those cases in which the post-war phase is considered to have begun after 1994 (Rwanda genocide).

- Countries or territories that have arrived to the end of hostilities or the signature of peace agreement, as the result of a clear victory by one of the parties or through the mediation of a third party and in which post-war rehabilitation (PWR) is progressing reasonably well.
- Countries or territories, in spite of the existence of a peace agreement, this agreement was not fulfilled, thus impeding post-war rehabilitation work.
- Countries or territories analysed are those which, while still in a war phase, are receiving a considerable level of international aid that can be classified as post-war, this aid being frequently used as an incentive to facilitate the pursuit of an agreement that will lead to an end to hostilities.

## 5. Humanitarian crises

### 5. Countries facing food emergencies.

SOURCE: FAO, *Food crops and shortages* <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/J2969e/J2969e00.pdf>

The alerts put out by the FAO indicate countries facing food emergencies, whether due to drought, flooding, civil disturbance, the displacement of the population, economic problems or sanctions. Countries are considered to have food emergencies when face (or faced during the year) unfavourable prospects for the coming harvest and/or there is an uncovered food supply shortage

which requires (or required during the year) exceptional foreign aid. Countries are considered to have serious food emergencies when they suffer chronic bad harvests and food shortage.

- Serious food emergency
- Food emergency

**6. Countries in which at least 1 person in every 1,000 is internal displaced people**

SOURCES: Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), *World IDP map by the global IDP project en Internal Displacement Unit*

<[http://www.idpproject.org/images/website\\_maps/IDP\\_worldmap.gif](http://www.idpproject.org/images/website_maps/IDP_worldmap.gif)> (November 2004) and United Nations Populations Division for the total number of inhabitants in 2004 <<http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm>>.

This indicator shows the number of internal displaced people as a percentage of the total population of the country, and the figures correspond to the absolute number of people who were displaced, as updated in November 2004. In the cases where the sources offer two figures it has been made the average.

- Situation considered very serious: at least 1 person in every 100 is internally displaced.
- Situation considered serious: at least 1 person in every 1,000 is internally displaced or, without getting this percentage, at least 5,000 persons are internally displaced

**7. Countries of origin in which at least 1 person in every 1,000 is a refugee.**

SOURCES: UNHCR, *2003 Global Refugee Trends. Overview of refugee populations, new arrivals, durable solutions, asylum-seekers and other persons of concern to UNHCR*, June 2004,

<<http://www.unhcr.ch>> and the United Nations Population Division for the total number of inhabitants in 2004 <<http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm>>.

This indicator shows the number of refugees as a percentage of the total population of the country of origin. The figures correspond to the absolute number of people who were refugees during 2003.

- Situation considered very serious: at least 1 person in every 100 is a refugee.
- Situation considered serious: at least 1 person in every 1,000 is a refugee or, if this percentage is not reached, at least 5,000 are refugees.

**8. Countries included in the United Nations Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 2005**

SOURCE: CAP 2005 <<http://ochaonline.un.org/cap2005/index.htm>>.

The Humanitarian Appeal 2005 is a product of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), a United Nations-led mechanism. The Consolidated Appeals were created a decade ago by the United Nations General Assembly to ensure strategic and coordinated humanitarian responses to humanitarian crises. In all targeted countries, aid channelled through the Consolidated Appeal helps fight inequality and injustice. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) manages the CAP. The fact that a country or a region is included in the appeal represents international recognition of a crisis situation.

- Countries included in the Humanitarian Appeal 2004.

## 6. Militarisation and disarmament

**9. Countries with arms embargoes from the United Nations Security Council**

SOURCE: Resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, <<http://www.un.org/documents/>>.

The fact that the United Nations Security Council has imposed or recommended an arms embargo is recognised to be an acknowledgement of an exceptional situation in the country affected. As a result, and under the terms of this study, no differentiation is made between binding and voluntary embargoes. The voluntary embargoes of the United Nations take the form of non-binding “calls” or “emergencies” in relation to the supply of arms. The date on which a voluntary embargo from the United Nations ends is difficult to establish, because there is generally no formal expiry date and its lifting is not announced.

- Embargoed countries. *Armenia* (S/RES/853 of 29/07/93); *Azerbaijan* (S/RES/853 of 29/07/93); *Côte d’Ivoire* (S/RES/1572 of 15/11/04); *Iraq* (S/RES/661 of 06/08/90); *Liberia* (S/RES/1343 of 07/03/01); *Somalia* (S/RES/733 of 23/01/92); *Yemen* (S/RES/924 de 01/06/94).
- Sanctions imposed on armed opposition groups. In the case of Afghanistan, this is a sanction imposed on the Taliban, which remains in force in spite of the change in the country’s situation (S/RES/1333 of 19/12/00); Sierra Leone (S/RES/1299 of 19/05/00, except for UNAMSIL forces and the government of Sierra Leone, provided that arms are used within its borders); Rwanda (S/RES/1011 de 16/08/95), where restrictions are placed on the transfer of arms, though the embargo is lifted at certain points of entry, and the embargo is maintained for *non-governmental forces* operating in the country, as it is for Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the event that arms may be used in Rwanda.

#### 10. Countries with arms embargoes from regional bodies (EU and OSCE)

SOURCES: European Union, <<http://www.ue.eu.int>>, and Committee of Senior Officials, Journal No. 2, Annex 1, Seventh Committee on Senior Officials meeting, Prague, 27-28 February 1992

- By the **EU** (from the most binding to the least binding: Regulations (R), Common Positions (CP) and Declarations (D): *Bosnia Herzegovina* (CP 96/184/PESC of 13/03/96, confirmed in CP 98/240/PESC of 19/03/98; except for the transfer of light arms to the police from 19/07/99); *China* (Declaration of 27/06/89); *Democratic Republic of Congo* (Declaration 33/93 of 07/04/93); *Iraq* (Declaration 56/90 of 04/08/90); *Myanmar* (Declaration of 29/07/91 confirmed by CP 96/635/PESC of 28/10/96); *Sudan* (CP 94/165/PESC of 16/03/94); *Zimbabwe* (R no. 310/2002 of 18/02/02).  
By the **OSCE**: *Armenia* (28/02/92), *Azerbaijan* (28/02/92).
- Sanctions imposed on armed opposition groups. In the case of Afghanistan, this refers to deliveries to territories run by the Taliban (CP 2001/771/PESC of 05/11/01); in the case of Sierra Leone this relates to sanctions imposed on the *armed opposition forces* operating in the country (CP 98/409/PESC of 29/06/98).

#### 11. Countries with military spending in excess of 4% of GDP

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*; IISS, *The Military Balance 2003-2004*, and the World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2003*.

Military spending is considered to include the Defence Ministry budget plus all items of a military nature spread throughout other ministries. Given that, on many occasions, a complete calculation is not made, information from various sources has been used in order to obtain a more reliable result. The economic situation in some places, particularly if they are subject to fluctuations in the exchange rate, represents an added difficulty when converting the calculated amount into US\$.

- Very serious situation: military spending in excess of 6% of GDP.
- Serious situation: military spending between 4% and 6% of GDP

#### 12. Countries with imports of heavy conventional weapons exceeding 0.5% of GDP

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, and the World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2004*.

The calculation of this indicator was based on imports relating to the six categories of conventional heavy weapons usually used by SIPRI: warplanes, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar and surveillance systems, missiles and warships. Other types of weapons, i.e. conventional light weapons and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) have not been included because there are no statistical sources available. The figures indicate the percentage of conventional heavy weapons imports against GDP.

- Very serious situation: major conventional weapons imports in excess of 1% of GDP.
- Serious situation: major conventional weapons imports between 0.5% and 1% of GDP.

### 13. Countries where the number of soldiers exceeds 1.5% of the population

SOURCES: IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* UNDP, *Human Development Report 2004*.

This definition only includes members of the official Armed Forces. Armed opposition groups and paramilitary forces have been excluded due to the difficulties involved in estimating their number in a large number of cases. The figures indicate the number of soldiers as a percentage of the whole population.

- Very serious situation: number of soldiers in excess of 2% of population.
- Serious situation: number of soldiers between 1.5% and 2% of population.

### 14. Militarised countries according to the BIC3D Index

SOURCE: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, *Conversion Survey 2004*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2004.

The BIC3D is calculated by combining four sets of data: military spending, arms reserves, armed forces personnel and people employed in arms production. Values in the BIC3D index vary between +100% and -100%, and they are interpreted on the basis of the difference between the current BIC3D figure and the average since the end of the Cold War. A positive value indicates a process of demilitarisation while a negative one indicates militarisation.

- In a highly significant process of militarisation: BIC3D index equal to or exceeding -30.
- In a process of militarisation: BIC3D index between -1 and -29.

## 7. Human rights and international humanitarian law

### 15. Countries with serious and systematic violations of human rights according to non-governmental sources

SOURCES: Amnesty International, *Report 2004*, <<http://www.amnesty.org>>; and the authors' own monitoring of the current international situation (the classification of each country is the responsibility of the authors of this study, not Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, who do not make classifications in this regard).

Very serious violations of human rights are considered to be those systematic abuses that relate to the right to life and personal safety and are originated by the actions or omissions of the state, particularly cases of extra-judicial execution, forced disappearance, death in custody, torture, arbitrary detention and general impunity. Serious violations of human rights are considered to be the frequent occurrence of the abuses mentioned above, along with abuses that threaten personal, political and civil rights, particularly courts without the minimum procedural guarantees or the existence of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, based on the methodology used by the PIOOM (in Schmid, Alex P.; Jongman, Albert J. (eds.), *Monitoring Human Rights Violations*, Centre for the Study of Social Conflicts, Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, Leiden, 1992).

- Situation considered very serious in terms of violations of human rights.

- Situation considered serious in terms of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

## 16. Countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to the EU

SOURCE: Council of the European Union, *European Union annual report on human rights 2004*, Brussels, 13 October 2004 <<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ENHR2004.pdf>>.

This indicator refers to countries which, given their human rights situation, gave rise to concern for the Council of Europe during the period between 1 July 2003 and 30 June 2004. The EU made declarations relating to the human rights situation in different parts of the world at the Third Commission in the 58<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly and at the 60<sup>th</sup> session of the Human Rights Commission.

- Situation considered very serious in terms of violations of human rights.
- Situation considered serious in terms of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

## 17. Countries with serious violations of human rights according to the reports and resolutions of the UNCHR

SOURCE: UNHCHR <<http://www.unhcr.ch>>.

This indicator refers to extra-conventional mechanisms and to Special Procedures established by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Commission has established the mandates of Rapporteurs, Special Representatives, Independent Experts and Special Representatives to the UN Secretary General to examine, investigate and make public the human rights situation in specific areas of the world. The work of these experts is then examined at the yearly session of the Commission at (in this case, at the 60<sup>th</sup> session that took place in Geneva in March and April 2004). Some of the experts are also present at the UN General Assembly.

The following countries are presently either under the mandate of a human rights expert, have been included in a report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights or a resolution, decision or presidential statement has been passed on by the UN Commission on Human Rights. Presidential statements on the human rights situation in particular countries have also been included as this is a political agreement which is not put to the vote and is therefore the only means to reach an agreement to condemn certain countries.

### ● Special Representative or Special Rapporteur's reports condemning, and the UN Commission on Human Rights' condemnation or concern.

**Africa: Burundi** (E/CN.4/2004/35, « Technical cooperation and advisory services in Burundi» see E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7 page 52); **DR Congo** (E/CN.4/2004/34; « Situation of Human rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo » see E/CN.4/2004/84/L.117Add7 page 61); **Liberia** (E/CN.4/2004/113, « Technical cooperation and advisory services in Liberia» see E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7 page 58); **Cambodia** (E/CN.4/2003/114, « Situation of human rights in Cambodia» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/79); **Somalia** (E/CN.4/2004/56, « Situation of human rights in Somalia» see E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7). **America: Cuba** (E/CN.4/2004/32, « Situation of human rights in Cuba» see E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.2 page 15). **Asia: Cambodia** (E/CN.4/2004/105, « Technical cooperation and advisory services in Cambodia » see E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add7 page 34); **Myanmar** (E/CN.4/2004/33, « Situation of human rights in Myanmar» see E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.6 page 4); **Middle East: Palestinian occupied Territories by Israel since 1967** (E/CN.4/2004/6, « Situation of human rights in occupied Palestine» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/3; «Question of the violations of human rights in the occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine» see E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.2 page 21)

### ■ Special Representative or Rapporteur's reports condemning of expressing concern without a resolution from the Commission on Human Rights.



**America: Haiti** (E/CN.4/2004/108, « Situation of human rights in Haiti». Presidential Statement E/CN.4/2004/L.10/Add.1 para. 44); **Middle East: Iraq** (E/CN.4/2004/36, « Situation of human rights in Iraq»). The report has been included but does not reflect the country's present human rights situation but the situation previous to Saddam Hussein's removal.

▲ **Resolution condemning or expressing concern about countries without a previous report by a Rapporteur or Special representative.**

**Africa: Chad** (E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7 page 68 « Technical cooperation and advisory services in Chad»; **Sudan** (E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.8 page 9, («Situation of human rights in Sudan»). Although this is a decision it has been included as a matter of interest. **Asia: DPR Korea** (E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.2 page 21 «Situation of human rights in DPR Korea»); **Europe and Central Asia: Belarus** (E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.2 page 27 «Situation of human rights in Belarus» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/14); **Turkmenistan** (E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.2 page 18 «Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan»).

► **Presidential Statements on a particular country by the UN Commission on Human Rights.**

**Africa: Sierra Leone:** («Technical cooperation and situation of human rights in Sierra Leone» see E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.1 page 20); **America: Colombia** («Situation of human rights in Colombia» see E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7 page); **Asia: Afghanistan** («Technical cooperation and situation of human rights in Afghanistan» see E/CN.4/2004/L.10/Add.1 para 41). The case of Afghanistan has been included despite the presidential statement admits certain advances have been made in the country.; **Nepal** («Technical cooperation and situation of human rights in Nepal» see E/CN.4/2004/L.10/Add.1 para. 45). The case of Nepal has been included although a previous UNHCHR report has not been produced. **Timor-Leste** («Technical cooperation and situation of human rights in Timor-Leste» see E/CN.4/2004/L.10/Add.1 para. 46).

## 18. Countries that apply or maintain the death penalty

SOURCE: Amnesty International, *Report 2004*; <[http://www.a-i.es/temas/pmuerde/pm\\_hechos.htm](http://www.a-i.es/temas/pmuerde/pm_hechos.htm)>.

This indicator refers to countries in which executions have taken place and/or death sentences have been approved, along with those that retain the death penalty on their statute books, it being specified whether they are **retentionist** (countries in which the death penalty is retained for common offences), **abolitionist in practice** (countries that retain the death penalty for common offences but in which there has been no execution in the last 10 years, and countries that have undertaken not to apply the death penalty) and **abolitionist for common offences** (countries that retain the death penalty for exceptional offences, i.e. under military law or in the context of armed conflict). The figures relate to the number of executions confirmed by Amnesty International during 2003.

- Retentionist countries in which executions **have taken place and death sentences have been approved**. (28 countries. These include Botswana, DPR Korea, Mongolia and Zimbabwe, countries in which executions were carried out but no death sentences were approved in 2003).
- Countries that are retentionist and abolitionist in practice, though **death sentences** have been approved. (33 retentionist countries, 2 abolitionist for ordinary crimes: Armenia and Mexico; and 5 de facto abolitionist countries: Algeria, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka). Samoa is also included as an execution was carried out in 2003. The country abolished the death penalty in 2004.
- Countries that retain the **death penalty on their statute books** but did not carry out any executions in 2003. Retentionist, 19 countries: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Barbados, Comoros, Dominica, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Oman, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone and Syria; countries that are abolitionist in practice, 21 countries: Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Congo, Gambia, Granada, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Nauru, CAR, Russian Federation, Senegal, Surinam, Togo, Tonga and Tunisia. Abolitionist for com-

mon offences: 13 countries: Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cook Island, El Salvador, Fiji, Greece, Israel, Latvia, Peru and Turkey.

#### 19. Countries of origin of people who have obtained asylum

SOURCE: UNHCR, 2003 *UNHCR population statistics (provisional)*. *Asylum and refugee status determination*, <<http://www.unhcr.ch>> (on august of 2004).

The indicator gathers provisional data on asylum granting. Asylum, which is sometimes restricted for national or international reasons, implies the acknowledgment of the recipient country that the applicant's security and freedom are threatened in his/her country of origin. Thus, it represents governmental recognition of human rights violations in the actual country of origin. The figures indicate grants of asylum status during 2003 that number more than one hundred.

- Have given rise to more than one thousand grants of asylum status.
- Have given rise to between one hundred and one thousand grants of asylum status.

#### 20. Countries that have not ratified the 2<sup>nd</sup> Protocol of 1977 on armed conflicts between states in relation to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949

SOURCES: ICRC <<http://www.icrc.org>> (on 31 December of 2004) and UNHCR <<http://www.unhcr.ch>>.

The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (the first Convention deals with the treatment of the wounded in war, the Second with shipwreck, the Third with prisoners of war and the Fourth with the protection of civilians in times of occupation) and the 1<sup>st</sup> Protocol of 1977 legislate for and regulate armed conflicts between states. This indicator relates to failure to ratify the 2<sup>nd</sup> Protocol, given that the majority of armed conflicts are currently taking place within a single state.

- Countries that have not ratified the 2<sup>nd</sup> Protocol.

#### 21. Countries that recruit both boys and girls for their armies and have not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts

SOURCES: Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers, *Child Soldiers Global Report 2004*, London, 2004, in <<http://www.child-soldiers.org/resources/global-reports>>.

Child-soldier has been defined in its most restrictive sense, i.e. any person younger than 18 who either voluntarily or forcibly forms part of the official Armed Forces and participates directly in combat.

- Countries that have ratified the protocol in which the official armed forces and armed opposition groups include child soldiers.
- Countries that have not ratified the protocol in which the official armed forces and armed opposition groups include child soldiers (includes Eritrea and Guinea-Bissau, though there is only evidence that the official armed forces use child-soldiers).
- Countries in which armed opposition groups include child-soldiers.

## 8. Development

#### 22. Maximum and high priority countries in the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals, according to the UNDP

SOURCE: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2003*.

Maximum priority Countries are those with high levels of human poverty which are also at a standstill or even regressing in terms of compliance with the Goals. High priority Countries are those: a) with medium levels of human poverty that have nevertheless shown no progress or a deterioration in their compliance with the Goals, or b) with extreme human poverty that have shown advances in respect of the Goals. In any case, all of these countries will fail to meet the Goals on the planned date if current trends are not drastically reversed.

- Maximum priority countries
- High priority countries

**23. Countries with a Human Development Index lower than it was in 1990 and Countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries (LDC)**

SOURCE: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2004* and United Nations, <<http://www.unctad.org/lpcs>>.

UNDP annually produces a compound index that measures progress on the basis of three fundamental elements in human development: a long and a healthy life (life expectancy), learning (adult literacy rate and gross school numbers) and a decent standard of living (GDP per capita). Taking into account the natural and empirical tendency of countries to show improvement in respect of the three HDI elements, the fall of HDI to lower levels than in 1990 demonstrates the difficulties of some governments to guarantee the main dimensions of human development. On the other hand, every three years, ECOSOC updates the list of countries classified as Least Developed Countries (LDC) on the basis of three variables: low income (GNP per capita), low level of human resources (low standard of living based on life expectancy, calories per capita, schooling and literacy) and a low level of economic diversification (an index based on several macroeconomic indicators). 49 countries currently belong to the LDC group.

- Countries with a Human Development Index lower than it was in 1990.
- LDC** Countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries.

**24. Countries with high levels of inequality in internal income on the basis of the Gini coefficient**

SOURCE: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 2004 (data refers to the most recent year available).

The Gini Coefficient measures the level of inequality between income or consumption in an individual country. The value 0 represents perfect equality and 100 total inequality.

- Countries with a Gini coefficient above 60.
- Countries with a Gini coefficient above 40.

**25. Countries whose amounts received in official development aid (ODA) exceed the 10% of the GDP**

SOURCE: World Bank, <[http://econ.worldbank.org/files/30042\\_select.pdf](http://econ.worldbank.org/files/30042_select.pdf)>.

The percentage of Official Development Aid (ODA) received as a proportion of the GDP is one of the main indicators used to measure the degree of **economic dependence** in a country. Firstly, because the State could become accustomed to delegating services which are intrinsically its own responsibility to international cooperative efforts, and secondly, because the growing politicisation of ODA could lead to excessive conditions being placed on the identification of development priorities and strategies.

- ODA received exceeds 20% of the GDP.
- ODA received exceeds 10% of the GDP.

**26. Countries that spend less on public health and/or education than on military spending**

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (the data on military spending against GDP refer to 2002, or where this is found, the most recent year available); PNUD, *Human Development Report 2004* (the data on public health spending are against GDP and refers to 2001; the data for public education spending are against GNP refers to the most recently available figure between 1999 and 2001).

The fact that public spending on health and/or education is less than military spending indicates a country's budgetary priorities, considering militarisation to be more important than satisfying the basic needs of the population through the financing of public services.

- Public spending on health and education is less than military spending.
- Public spending on either health or education is less than military spending.

**27. Countries with poor governance according to the World Bank.**

SOURCE: World Bank, *GRICS II: Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot* at <<http://info.worldbank.org/beeeps/kkz/worldmap.asp#map>> (data of 2002).

This aggregated governance indicator from the World Bank calculates the median value of six components relating to governance. These are the presentation of accounts, political stability and the absence of violence, governmental effectiveness, procedural guarantees, the rule of law and the control of corruption.

- Very poor governance.
- Poor governance.

**28. Countries with a total amount of foreign debt in excess of their GNP, countries whose foreign debt repayments exceed the amounts received in official development aid and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)**

SOURCE: World Bank, *Global Development Finance 2003* in <<http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gdf2002/>>, *World Development Indicators 2004* and <<http://www.worldbank.org/hipc>> (data of 2000).  
Development Assistance Committee of OCDE in <<http://www.oecd.org>>.

This indicator aims to show some issues on the grade of foreign indebtedness of any country. Firstly, the fact that debt exceeds GNP in a country demonstrates the inability of the country to repay this debt and their difficulties in financing other priorities relating to the country's development. Secondly, there are many countries that pay more to service their debt than they receive in ODA, which highlights the fact that on many occasions there is a net transfer of resources from impoverished countries to industrialised ones. Finally, this indicator shows those countries belonging to HIPC, approved by the World Bank and the IMF in 1996. The initiative's aim is to reduce debt (multilateral, bilateral and private) in 41 countries within a period of six years, until it has reached a level that allows repayment. Then, it is the first debt reduction plan that allows the debtor to cancel its loans without endangering its economic growth and without once again accumulating backlogs in the payment of debt in the future.

- Countries with a total amount of foreign debt in excess of their GNP.
- Countries whose foreign debt repayments exceed the amounts received in official development aid.
- ▲ Countries with an external debt higher than their PNB and whose repayments exceed the amounts received in official development aid.

**HIPC** Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.

**29. Countries with high rates of deforestation and countries with high polluting emission indices**

SOURCE: World Development Indicators, 2004.

This indicator refers to those countries with a high rate of average deforestation between 1990 and 2000 and those countries with carbon dioxide emissions superior to 10 metric ton by person. The deforestation not only reflects the environmental degradation of the country, but also bears narrow relation to other questions, like poverty, demographic pressure on the demographic resources or vulnerability in front of natural disasters. On the other hand, the high polluting emission indices by person illustrate the little respect by the environmental situation of the planet and denote unsustainable models of economic growth.

- Countries with an annual average in the rate of deforestation superior to 3%, between 1990 and 2000.
- Countries with an annual average in the rate of deforestation superior to 1%, between 1990 and 2000 .
- ▲ Countries with carbon dioxide emissions superior to 15 metric ton per capita.
- △ Countries with carbon dioxide emissions superior to 10 metric ton per capita.

## 9. Gender and peace-building

### 30. Countries with great gender inequalities, on the basis of the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)

SOURCE: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2004*

GDI reflects the difference between men and women on the basis of three fundamental aspects of human development: life expectancy, income per capita and levels of literacy and schooling. The countries marked are those with a total value below 0.500, which is considered as 'low' by the UNDP in terms of Human development.

- Countries with a GDI below 0,500.

## 10. Conduct in respect of the international community

### 10.1. Conduct in relation to the Millennium Declaration

#### 31. Countries which have not ratified the main United Nations legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration

SOURCE: United Nations, <<http://untreaty.un.org/English/millennium/law/index.html>> (on 31/12/04); Social Watch, *Report 2004. Miedos y miserias. Obstáculos a la seguridad humana*. <<http://www.socialwatch.org>>.

This indicator shows how states have behaved in respect of the 25 legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration. These seven treaties are considered to be of vital importance in international legislation, and the institution *Social Watch* therefore monitors all the signings and ratifications made in relation to them. The indicator was prepared on the basis of the total number of ratifications of these international legal instruments, which are as follows:

- The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998).
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction, or the Ottawa Treaty (1997).
- The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change (1997).
- The Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity (1992).
- The Convention to Combat Desertification (1994).
- The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (1979).
- The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).

- Has ratified fewer than half of these instruments: between 0 and 3.
- Has ratified half or more of these instruments, but not all of them: between 4 and 6.

## 10.2. Conduct in relation to the protection of Human Rights

### 32. Countries which have not ratified the main United Nations legal instruments on human rights

SOURCE: UNHCHR, <<http://www.unhchr.ch>> (on 31/12/04).

This indicator has been calculated on the basis of the sum total of ratifications of the 6 main legal instruments put forward by the United Nations. These instruments are:

- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).
- Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
- Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatments and Punishments (1984).
- International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966).
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).
- Convention on the Status of Refugee (1951).
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

- Has ratified less than three instruments: between 0 and 2.
- Has ratified three instruments: 3.

## 10.3. Conduct in terms of financial transparency

### 33. Countries acting as tax havens

SOURCE: OECD, *Tax Heaven update*, (on december 2004)

<[http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en\\_2649\\_33745\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_37427,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_33745_1_1_1_1_37427,00.html)>.

In 1998, the OECD created the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, which established Guidelines for Dealing with Harmful Preferential Regimes in OECD Member Countries. There are four determining factors for qualification as a tax haven: a) a tax on capital does not exist or is not applied; b) there is no effective exchange of information between different jurisdictions and between financial institutions; c) there is no transparency on the part of the judiciary; and d) there is no monitoring of financial operations.

- Tax havens that have not adopted the directives.
- Tax havens that have undertaken to adopt the directives.

### 34. Countries which do not cooperate with the Financial Action Group (GAFI) on money-laundering

SOURCE: GAFI, (on december 2004)

<[http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en\\_2649\\_37453\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_37453,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_37453_1_1_1_1_37453,00.html)>.

GAFI, established by the G-7 in 1989, has unified criteria at an international level for the prevention, detection and punishment of money-laundering, based on 40 recommendations and publishes an annual report on countries and territories unwilling to cooperate with these recommendations (Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, NCCT).

- Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories.

## 10.4. Conduct in terms of military security

### 35. Countries which have not signed the non-proliferation agreements

SOURCE: United Nations

Criterion 1 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports makes special mention of international conduct in relation to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

- Countries that have not ratified 2 or more of these agreements.
- Countries that have not ratified any of these agreements.

### 36. Countries which have not given information to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons.

SOURCE: UN Register of Conventional Weapons (A/59/193, 30 July 2004) <[http:// http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/register.html](http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/register.html)>.

Pursuant to the terms of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, the UN Secretary General established the Register of Conventional Weapons in 1992, under which all member states are invited to give information each year regarding their imports and exports of conventional weapons in the seven categories set out in the Register (combat tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aeroplanes, attack helicopters, warships and missiles and missile launchers). Although offering such information is a voluntary act, it indicates the willingness of each of the member states in terms of their level of transparency.

- Has not provided information to the Register of Conventional Weapons in 2004.

### 37. Countries which have not given information to the UN Instrument to Report Military Expenditures

SOURCE: UN Instrument to Report Military Expenditures (A/59/192, 30 July 2004) <<http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/milex.html>>.

In resolution 56/14 of 29/11/01, the General Assembly called on member states to inform the Secretary general each year of their military spending, in accordance with the model recommended in resolution 35/142 B of 12/12/80. Although offering such information is a voluntary act, it indicates the willingness of each of the member states in terms of their level of transparency.

- Has not provided information to the Report Military Expenditures in 2004.

Country	Conflicts and peace-building				Humanitarian crises				Military and disarmament				Human rights and International Humanitarian Law				Development				Gender issues in peace-building				Behaviour in relation to international society													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	
Afghanistan	●			■	●	○	●		○	○	-			○	○	▶	○	○	●	■	●	●	●	LDC				●										
Albania						○	○							○	○		○	○	○	○																		
Algeria	●					●	○				○	○	○	○	○	○	■	○	○							○												
Andorra														-					●																			
Angola		▲	NP	○	●	●	●			○				○	○			●	●					LDC			●											
Anguilla (UK)																																						
Antigua and Barbuda																	●																					
Argentina														○	○	○	○	○	○																			
Armenia		▲	NP		○	○	○		●	●	●		●	○	○	○	■	○	○																			
Aruba (Netherlands)																																						
Australia																																						
Austria																																						
Azerbaijan		▲	NP		●	●	●		●	●				○	○			○	○																			
Bahamas																																						
Bahrain											○	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○																			
Bangladesh					○	○	○					○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○					LDC			○											
Barbados																																						
Belarus		▲					○			○				●	●	▲	○	○	○								○											
Belgium																																						
Belize													○	○	○	○	○	○	○																			
Benin																																						
Bermudas (UK)																																						
Bhutan																																						
Bolivia		▲																																				
Bosnia and Herzegovina				○	●	●	●		●	●				○	○	○	○	○	○																			
Botswana										○																												













Country	Conflicts and peace-building			Humanitarian crises			Militaryisation and disarmament			Human rights and International Humanitarian Law			Development			Gender issues in peace-building			Behaviour in relation to international society																			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	
Rwanda	▲			○			○	●	○	○	○			●	○				●	2,993																		
Saint Kitts and Nevis						-	○	75,270										○													○	●	○			○		
Saint Lucia																		■															○			○		
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines																		○	○	128											○	○	○			○		
Samoa																		■															○			○		
San Marino																															○	○	○			○		
Sao Tome and Principe		▲																													○	○	○			○		
Saudi Arabia		▲									●			○	○														▲		○	○	○			○		
Senegal		▲	NP			○	○	8,352	●					○	○			○													○	○	○			○		
Serbia and Montenegro		▲		●	○	●	●	296,612	○	○																					○	○	○			○		
Seychelles																															○	○	○			○		
Sierra Leone		▲		○	●		●	70,570	○	○	○						▶	○											○		○	○	○			○		
Singapore											○	●	●	1,7	○			○													○	○	○			○		
Slovakia																																						
Slovenia														○	○																							
Salomon Islands																																						
Somalia	●	▲	NP		●	●	●	402,152	●	●	●						●	●											○		○	○	○			○		
South Africa																																						
Spain																																						
Sri Lanka	●	▲	NP		○	●	○	121,988						●	○			■											○		○	○	○			○		
Sudan	●	▲	NP		●	●	●	606,179	●	●	●			●	○		▲	●											○		○	○	○			○		
Suriname														○	○																○	○	○			○		
Swaziland					●									○	○			■													○	○	○			○		
Sweden																																						
Switzerland																																						
Syrian Arab Republic		▲				●	○	20,270		●	●	●	●	1,8	○	○	○	○											▲		○	○	○			○		







## Appendix II. Alert in oil production countries due to conflict/tension, human rights, human development, governance and /or militarisation

Countries and ranking	World reserves (%) and estimated remaining exploitation period (years)	Armed conflict and/or tension 2004 indicators no. 1 and no. 2 (1)	Human Rights 2004 indicator no. 15 (2)	HDI (medium or low) 2002 (3)	Millennium goals 2004 indicator no. 22 (4)	Poor Governance 2002 indicator no. 27 (5)	Militarisation indicator no. 11 (6)
1. Saudi Arabia	22,9% (73,3)	▲	●	77 (-4)			●
2. Iran	11,4% (92,9)	▲	●	101(+5)			●
3. Iraq	10,0% (+100)	●	●	Sd	●	●	
4. U.A.E.	8,5% (+100)						
5. Kuwait	8,4% (+100)						●
14. Qatar	1,3% (45,5)						●
22. Oman	0,5% (18,5)			74(+5)	○		●
33. Syria	0,2% (10,5)			106(+4)			●
44. Yemen	0,1% (4,2)	▲		149(-1)	○	○	●
<b>Overall Middle East</b>	<b>63,3% (88,1)</b>	<b>4/9</b>	<b>3/9</b>		<b>3/9</b>	<b>2/9</b>	<b>7/9</b>
6. Venezuela	6,8% (71,5)	▲		68(+1)	○	○	
10. USA	2,7% (11,3)	●					
12. Canada	1,5% (15,5)						
13. Mexico	1,4% (11,6)	▲	●				
17. Brasil	0,9% (18,7)	▲		72(-7)			
23. Ecuador	0,4% (29,6)	▲		100(-3)			
29. Argentina	0,3% (11,0)						
30. Trinid. & Tob.	0,2% (31,1)						
34. Peru	0,1%(28,4)	▲		82(+3)			
43. Colombia	0,1% (7,3)	●	●	73(-9)			●
<b>Overall America</b>	<b>14,4%(***)</b>	<b>7/10</b>	<b>2/10</b>		<b>1/10</b>	<b>1/10</b>	<b>1/10</b>
7. Russian Fed.	6,0% (22,2)	●	●	57(+6)			●
16. Norway	0,9% (8,5)						
18. Kazakhstan	0,8% (22,3)			78(-2)	○		
20. Azerbaijan	0,6% (61,2)	▲	●	91(-2)		○	
26. United Kingdom	0,4% (5,4)	●					
35. Romania	0,1% (20,6)			69(+3)			
36. Italy	0,1% (19,0)						
39. Uzbekistan	0,1% (9,8)	▲	●	107(-6)		○	●
40. Denmark	0,1% (9,5)						
48. Turkmenistan	0,05% (7,1)	▲	●	86(+1)		●	
<b>Overall Europe and Central Asia</b>	<b>9,2% (17,1)</b>	<b>5/10</b>	<b>4/10</b>		<b>1/10</b>	<b>3/10</b>	<b>2/10</b>

Countries and ranking	World reserves (%) and estimated remaining exploitation period (years)	Armed conflict and/or tension 2004 indicators no. 1 and no. 2 (1)	Human Rights 2004 indicator no. 15 (2)	HDI (medium or low) 2002 (3)	Millennium goals 2004 indicator no. 22 (4)	Poor Governance 2002 indicator no. 27 (5)	Militarisation indicator no. 11 (6)
8. Libya	3,1% (66,3)			58(+3)		○	●
9. Nigeria	3,0% (43,1)	●●▲	●	151(+1)	●	○	
15. Argelia	1,0% (16,7)	●	●	108(-1)			
19. Angola	0,8% (27,5)	▲▲▲	●	166(-2)	●	●	●
28. Egypt	0,3% (13,2)			120(=)			●
31. Gabon	0,2% (27,0)			122(-4)	○		
37. Congo	0,1% (17,1)	▲		144(-4)	●	○	
42. Sudan	0,1% (7,5)	●▲	●	139(-1) <sup>1</sup>	○	●	
46. Tunisia	0,05% (20,8)			92(-1)			
47. Cameroon	0,05% (9,0)			141(+1)	●	○	
49. Chad	900**	▲		167(-2)	○	○	
50. E. Guinea	Nd	▲	●	109(+7)	○		
51. S.Tome & P.	3000-8000**	▲		123(-1)	○		
<b>Overall Africa</b>	<b>8,9% (33,2)</b>	<b>8/13</b>	<b>5/13</b>		<b>9/13</b>	<b>7/13</b>	<b>3/13</b>
11. China	2,1% (19,1)		●	94(+10)			
21. India	0,5% (19,3)	●●▲▲▲▲	●	127(=)			
24. Australia	0,4% (19,3)						
25. Indonesia	0,4% (10,3)	●▲▲▲	●	111(+1)		○	
27. Malasia	0,3% (12,5)			59(-1)			
32. Vietnam	0,2% (18,4)		●	112(-3)			●
38. Brunei	0,1% (14,1)						●
41. Thailand	0,1% (8,7)	●	●	76(-2)			
45. Papua N.G.	0,05% (22,5)			133(-1)	●		
<b>Overall Asia and Pacific</b>	<b>4,2% (16,6)</b>	<b>3/9</b>	<b>5/9</b>		<b>1/9</b>	<b>1/9</b>	<b>2/9</b>
<b>Overall</b>	<b>100% (41,0)</b>	<b>27/51</b>	<b>19/51</b>		<b>15/51</b>	<b>14/51</b>	<b>15/51</b>

● (1) Countries with an armed conflict (2) Countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, (4) Top priority countries in the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals, (5) Countries with very poor governance, (6) Countries with military spending in excess of 4% of GDP.

▲ (1) (1) Situations of tension and high-risk dispute.

○ (4) High priority countries in the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals, (5) Countries with poor governance.

(3) HDI ranking. In addition, in brackets, the difference between DI 2001 (see + for positives advances and – for setbacks)

Nd = No data available

\* Estimation for 2003. \*\* Estimated reserves in millions of barrels.\*\*\* The estimated period for America is 12.2 years for North America and 41.5 years for Central and South America

This table also shows that **oil production can be at the heart of numerous current armed conflicts and situations of tension, and that the income generated from oil production does not always revert in the improvement of the population's living conditions.** In this sense, 28 out of the 51 main oil-production countries have an scenario of armed conflicts and tensions, and in most cases control of this resource and bad redistribution of the benefits is one of the main reasons for the dispute. Iraq is the most outstanding case. In addition, serious violations of human rights are perpetrated in almost half of the cases. The situation has also worsen in 19 out of the 37 countries that have registered a low HDI in 2002 in relation to the previous year.

Own calculation as per *BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2004.*

## Appendix III. Multilateral peace missions

At the end of 2004 the UN was running **16 peace-keeping missions** and **12 political and peace-building missions** throughout the world, more than half of them in Africa. The peace-keeping missions involve around 64,000 troops while the political and peace-building missions account for some 2,000. The cost of these missions amounts to approximately **4,000 million dollars**<sup>1</sup>, a figure that represents **0.25% of world military spending** (which totalled almost a billion dollars in 2004) and is much lower than the 120,000 million dollars that the various ongoing armed conflicts around the world cost every year. The UN is facing a number of political, logistical, financial, recruitment and security problems as a result of the imminent creation or expansion of certain missions, which will reach a level that is unprecedented in the organisation's history if regional and international moves are to continue, in order to bring an end to some of the long-running armed conflicts on the African continent such as those in Sudan and Somalia. However, in practical terms, less than 10% of the troops belonging to the Armed Forces of the different individual states can currently be actively deployed in order to form part of a peace-keeping mission at any given time, as few countries have the logistical capacity and means of transport required in order to move and supply the available troops, and more importantly, these troops do not have the minimum levels of training necessary in respect of human rights and other issues relating to peace-building. Countries should therefore commit themselves to transforming their current forces into contingents that are suitable for peace operations. It is a matter for concern that the current members of peace-keeping missions, which are formed mainly by military personnel, undertake civilian duties that are normally the responsibility of humanitarian organisations, creating confusion between the military and civilian spheres. It should also be stated that these missions include very small civilian components, which thus reduces their established mandates to purely military areas.

However, during recent years, regional parties and organisations or *ad hoc* coalitions of states have become involved in the maintenance and enforcement of peace, and while they should not replace the UN in these duties, they can provide an **important underpinning of the multilateralism and collective security represented by the UN**, though this organisation has its own singular capacity to offer an integrated multidimensional response (in spite of all the criticisms voiced and the defects exposed in many of the interventions made in its peace-keeping and peace-building duties to date). However, regional parties can provide the military capacity required in order to enforce peace, given their greater proximity to the historical, religious, ethnic, social, economic and political factors involved in current armed conflicts, though the UN must actively support these organisations in the planning, financing and logistics of the operations in question. In this regard, the **AU** hopes to establish a rapid reaction force of 15,000 troops by 2010, comprising 5 regional brigades and an early warning system that will indicate the presence of a potential crisis. As a result, the members of the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** agreed to the creation of rapid reaction forces comprising 6,500 troops, which will be able to take action in conflicts in less than 30 days after they have begun. At the same time, 13 countries in the **East of Africa**<sup>2</sup> agreed to create a permanent brigade of 4,500 troops, 1,000 police and civilian personnel (the Eastern African Standby Brigade) that will carry out peace-keeping operations under the African Union flag. For its part, the **EU** also announced this year that it would create a Rapid Reaction Force for Human Security, comprising 15,000 people, which would include not only soldiers but also police, medical staff, legal experts and specialists in human development, given that previous peace-keeping and peace-building missions have always viewed security in military terms and ignored other, multidimensional and essential aspects of security.

1. The budget for 2004-2005 is 2,650 million dollars, excluding the approximate cost of the three missions established during recent months (UNOCI in Côte D'Ivoire, MINUSTAH in Haiti and ONUB in Burundi).

2. Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

## UN Peace Missions

Country (beginning-end of conflict)	Presence, type of mission <sup>3</sup> (resolution mandate)	Date beginning mission	Soldiers/ Military Observers/ police	Special Representative/ Head of Mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) and Special Adviser (SA)
<b>AFRICA</b>				
African continent				SA on Africa, Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria), SA for Special Assignments in Africa, Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)
West African Region	UNOWA, SR Office (PO) from 03/02 to 31/12/03			SR Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)
Great Lakes Region	SR Office (PO) from 19/12/97			SR Ibrahima Fall (Senegal)
Burundi (1993-)	UNOB <sup>4</sup> (PKO) S/RES/1545	June 2004	5,291/187/82 (5,330/200/120)	SR C. McAskie (Canada)
Congo, DR (1998-)	MONUC (PKO) S/RES/1279	Nov. 1999	10,848/567/155 (16,700/.../475)	SR William Lacy Swing (USA)
Côte d'Ivoire(2002-)	UNOCI <sup>5</sup> (PKO) S/RES/1528	April 2004	6,208 (5,842/153/213) (6,240) (5,690/200/350)	SR Albert Tévoédjrè (Benin)
Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998-2000)	UNMEE (PKO) S/RES/1312	July 2000	4,071 (3,857/214/...) (4,200) (3,980/220/...)	SR Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana) y SE Lloyd Axworthy (Canada)
Guinea Bissau (1998-1999)	UNOGBIS (PBO) S/RES/1216	March 1999	.../2/1	SR Joao Bernardo Honwana (Mozambique)
Liberia (1989-)	UNMIL (PKO) S/RES/1509	Oct. 2003	8,387/107/312	SR Jacques Paul Klein (USA)
Morocco-Western Sahara* (1975-)	MINURSO (PKO) S/RES/690	Sept. 1991	27/195/2	SR Álvaro de Soto (Peru)
Central African R. (1996-2000) (2002-2003)	BONUCA <sup>6</sup> (PBO) S/RES/1271	Febr. 2000	11/62	SR Lamine Sissé (Senegal)
Sierra Leone (1991-2001)	UNAMSIL <sup>7</sup> (PKO) S/RES/1270	Oct. 1999	11,278/269/130	SR Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago (Tanzania)
Somalia (1988-)	UNPOS <sup>8</sup> (PO) S/RES/954	Abril 1995		SR Winston A. Tubman (Liberia)
Sudan (1983-)	UNAMIS (PO) S/RES/1547	June 2004	25/.../...	SR Jan Pronk (Netherlands)
<b>AMERICA</b>				
Latinoamerican Region				SA Diego Cordovez (Ecuador)
Colombia (1964-)				SA James LeMoyne (USA)
Guatemala (1962-1996)	MINUGUA (PBO) A/RES/48/267- 31/12/04 (closed)	Oct. 1994		SR Tom Koenings (Germany)
Guyana-Venezuela				SR on the Border Controversy between both countries, Oliver Jackman (Barbados)
Haiti (2004-)	MINUSTAH (PKO) S/RES/1542 (6,700/.../1,622)	June 2004	4,790/.../1,270	SR Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile)

3. Peace-keeping Operation (PKO), Political Operation (PO) and Peace-Building Operation (PBO).

4. Previously AU mission (AMIB) integrated in the ONUB.

5. Previously UN political mission (MINUCI, S/RES/1479) from May 2003. One thousand Armed Forces from the ECOWAS were integrated in the mission, supported by 4.000 French soldiers (Licorne Operation).

6. MINURCA (1998-2000) (PKO).

7. UNOMSIL (1998-1999) (PKO).

8. UNOSOM I (1992-1993) UNITAF (1992-1993, USA with a Security Council mandate) UNOSOM II (1993-1995) (PKO). S/RES/954 Resolution closed UNOSOM II and established that UN would observe the events in Somalia through a Political Office based in Kenya.

UN Peace Missions					
Country (beginning-end of conflict)	Presence, type of mission <sup>3</sup> (resolution mandate)	Date beginning mission	Soldiers/ Military Observers/ police	Special Representative/ Head of Mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) and Special Adviser (SA)	
<b>ASIA</b>					
Afghanistan <sup>9</sup> (2002-)	UNAMA <sup>10</sup> (PO) S/RES/1401	March 2002	.../10/8	SR Jean Arnault (France)	
Bougainville-Papua New Guinea (1975-1997)	UNOMB <sup>11</sup> (PO)	Jan. 2004		Head of the PO, Tor Stenbock (Norway)	
India-Pakistan*(1946-)	UNMOGIP <sup>12</sup> (PKO) S/RES/91	Jan. 1949	.../44/...	Head of the Mission, Guido Palmieri (Italy)	
Myanmar				SE Razzali Ismail (Malaysia)	
Tajikistan (1992-1997)	UNTOP (PO)	June 2000	.../.../1	SR Vladimir Sotirov (Bulgaria)	
Timor-Leste (1975-1999)	UNMISSET <sup>13</sup> (PKO) S/RES/1410	May 2002	.../.../466	SR Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan)	
<b>EUROPE</b>					
European continent				SA Jean-Bernard Merimee (France)	
Cyprus*(1974-)	UNFICYP (PKO) S/RES/186	March 1964	1,226/.../45	SR Zbigniew Wlosowicz (Poland)	
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of-Greece				Personal Envoy for the talks between both countries, Matthew Nimetz (USA)	
Georgia (Abkhazia)* (1992-1993)	UNOMIG (PKO) S/RES/849 S/RES/858	August 1993	.../122/11	SR Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland)	
Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro) (1998-1999)	UNMIK (PKO) S/RES/1244	June 1999	.../37/3,616	SR Soren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark)	
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>					
Iraq (2003-)	UNAMI (PO) S/RES/1500	August 2003	.../3/...	SR Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan)	
Israel-Palestine <sup>14</sup> (1948-)	UNSCO <sup>15</sup> (PO)	May 1948		SA for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative to the PLO and the PNA, pending of appointment	
Israel-Syria (Golan Heights) (1967, 1973)	UNDOF(PKO)	June 1974	1,041/.../...	Head of Mission Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal)	
Israel-Lebanon (1967,1982-2000)	UNIFIL (PKO) S/RES/425 SRES/426	March 1978	2,001/.../...	SR Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)	
Middle East (1948-)	UNTSO(PKO) S/RES/50	June 1948	.../153/...	SE Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)	
<b>Multinational Operations authorized by the UN</b>					
Iraq (2003-)	Multinational Force in Iraq (USA-United Kingdom) S/RES/1511	Oct. 2003	156.654/.../24		

9. The armed conflict the country is presently going through was sparked off by the attack of the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, although the country has suffered an armed conflict since 1979.

10. Although it is a political mission, it is directed and supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

11. UNPOB (1998-2004) (PO).

12. UNIPOM (1965-1966) (PKO).

13. UNTAET (1999-2002) (PKO).

14. Despite the armed conflict having broken in 1948, the report only analyses the last stage of the conflict which corresponds to the II Intifada started in September 2000.

15. UNEF I (1956-1967) (PKO) UNEF II (1973-1979) (PKO).

## OSCE Missions<sup>16</sup>

Country (beginning-end of conflict)	Presence, type of mission <sup>3</sup> (resolution mandate)	Date beginning mission	Soldiers/ Military Observers/ police	Special Representative/ Head of Mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) and Special Adviser (SA)
Central Asia				Personal Envoy for Central Asia of the OSCE Chairman, Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)
Albania	OSCE Presence in Albania, PC/DEC 160, 27/03/97	April 1997	.../36/...	Ambassador Pavel Vacek (Czech Republic)
Armenia	OSCE Office in Yerevan, PC/DEC 314, 22/07/99	Febr. 2000		Ambassador Vladimir Pryakhin (Russian Fed.)
Azerbaijan	OSCE Mission in Baku, PC/DEC 318, 16/11/99	July 2000		Ambassador Maurizio Pavesi (Italy)
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (1991-1994)	The Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference	Aug. 1995	.../6/...	Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland)
Belarus	OSCE Office in Minsk, PC/DEC 526, 30/12/02	Jan 2003		Ambassador Eberhard Heyken (Germany)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	OSCE Mission to B and H, MC/5/ DEC 18/12/95	Dec. 1995	.../143/...	Ambassador Douglas Davidson (USA)
Croatia (1991-1995)	OSCE Mission to Croatia PC/DEC 112, 18/04/96	July 1996	.../67/...	Ambassador Peter Semneby (Sweden)
Georgia (1992-1993)	OSCE Mission in Georgia CSO 06/11/92	Dec. 1992	.../169/...	Ambassador Roy Stephen Reeve (UK)
Kazakhstan	OSCE Centre in Almaty (PC/DEC 243, 23/07/98)	Jan. 1999		Ambassador Ivar Kristian Vikki (Norway)
Kyrgyzstan	OSCE Centre in Bishek, PC/DEC 245, 23/07/98	Jan. 1999		Ambassador Markus Mueller (Switzerland)
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of	OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, CSO 18/09/92	Sept. 1992	.../139/60	Ambassador Carlos Pais (Portugal)
Moldova, Rep.	OSCE Mission in Moldova CSO 04/02/93	Febr. 1993	.../10/...	Ambassador William H. Hill (USA)
Serbia and Montenegro	OmiSaM (OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro), PC/DEC 401, 11/01/01	March 2001	.../37/14	Ambassador Maurizio Massari (Italy)
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	OMiK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo) PC/DEC 305, 01/07/99	July 1999	.../279/...	Ambassador Pascal Fieschi (France)
Tajikistan	OSCE Centre in Dushanbe, Min. Council, 01/12/93	Febr. 1994	.../16/...	Ambassador Yves Bargain (France)
Turkmenistan	OSCE Centre in Ashgabad (PC/DEC 244, 23/07/98)	January 1999		Ambassador Paraschiva Badescu (Romania)
Ukraine	The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine <sup>17</sup> , PC/DEC 295 01/06/99	June 1999		Ambassador David R. Nicholas (USA)
Uzbekistan	OSCE Centre in Tashkent, PC/DEC 397, 14/12/00 <sup>18</sup>	1995		Pending

16. Deployment numbers correspond to 2003.

17. Replaced the OSCE Mission in Ukraine (1994-1999), for crisis management in Crimea.

18. Formerly Liaison Office in Central Asia, PC/DEC 28 of 16/03/95.

## NATO Missions

Country (beginning-end of conflict)	Presence, type of mission <sup>3</sup> (resolution mandate)	Date beginning mission	Soldiers/ Military Observers/ police	Special Representative/ Head of Mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) and Special Adviser (SA)
Afghanistan (2002-)	ISAF S/RES/1386	Dec. 2001	5.500/.../...	
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	SFOR S/RES/1088	Dec. 1996	11.900/.../...	
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of	Allied Harmony NAC 29/11/02	Dec. 2002	375/.../...	
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	KFOR S/RES/1244	June 1999	18,500/.../...	

## EU Operations

Albania, Serbia and Montenegro	EUMM Brioni Agreement	July 1991	.../110/...	
Bosnia y Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Joint Action 2002/210/PESC	Jan. 2003	.../.../493	
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of	EU POL Proxima Joint Action 2003/681/PESC	Dec. 2003	.../.../50	

## Russian Operations and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Georgia (South Ossetia)	South Ossetia Joint Force (Bilateral, 24/06/92)	July 1992	.../1,200/40	
Georgia (Abkhazia)	CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia (CIS, 15/10/94)	June 1994	2,283/.../...	
Moldova, Rep. (Transdnierster)	Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (Bilateral, 21/07/92)	July 1992	1,381/10/...	

## CEMAC

Central African Republic (Oct. 2002-March 2003)	CEMAC's Multinational Force in Central African Republic, Libreville Summit, 02/10/02	Dec. 2002	380/.../...	
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## AU

Burundi (1993-)	AMIB (AU, 03/02/2003), integrated the ONUB in June 2004	April 2003-June 2004	2,634/42/...	AU Representative, M. Bah (Guinea)
Somalia (1988-)	UA Mission foreseen for 2005			
Sudan (Darfur) 2003-)	AMIS (African Mission in Sudan)		1,000 (out of 3,000) / number of police and civilian personnel to be determined	
Sudan (SPLA) 1983-2004)	UA Mission pending deployment for 2005			

## Another operations

Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep.	NSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) Armistice Agreement	July 1953	.../11/...	
Solomon Islands	RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission Salomon Islands (Biketawa Declaration)	July 2003	760/108/297	
Israel-Palestine	TPIH 2 (Temporary International Presence in Hebron)	January 1997	.../21/...	
Egypt (Sinai)	Multinational Force and Observers (Protocol to Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, 26/03/1979)	April 1982	.../1,685/...	

\*Situations that remained unsolved during 2004 (see peace processes section). India-Pakistan are analyzed from the perspective of the peace process.

## Appendix IV. Security Council Resolutions

Country	No.	Date	Content
DR Congo	1522	15-01	On the restructuring of the Armed Forces
Western Sahara	1523	30-01	Extends MINURSO's mandate for a further three months
Georgia	1524	30-01	Calls on the parties to reach agreement over the status of Abkhazia and extends UNOMIG's mandate for a further six months
Middle East	1525	30-01	Extends UNIFIL's mandate for a further six months
—	1526	30-01	Establishes a team to provide support for the Counter-Terrorism Committee for a period of eighteen months
Côte d'Ivoire	1527	04-02	Extends MINUCI's mandate to the end of the month, and calls for the preparation of a possible deployment to carry out peace-keeping duties
Côte d'Ivoire	1528	27-02	Establishes UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) for a period of one year with 6,240 troops, with a mandate to oversee the ceasefire, DDR, protection of the civilian population, support for humanitarian aid, the peace process and human rights issues
Haiti	1529	29-02	Authorises the immediate deployment of a Provisional Multinational Force for a maximum of three months, and declares its willingness to establish a UN stabilisation and monitoring force
—	1530	11-03	On cooperation following the terrorist attack in Madrid
Eritrea and Ethiopia	1531	12-03	Extends UNMEE's mandate for a further six months
Liberia	1532	12-03	Freezes the funds and assets of former President Charles Taylor and his family
DR Congo	1533	12-03	Calls on States to take steps to prevent the supply of weapons to all armed groups operating in the regions of North and South Kivu and Ituri
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda	1534	26-03	Reaffirms the need to bring the people accused by the International Courts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to trial
—	1535	26-03	Strengthens and reorganises the Counter-Terrorism Committee
Afghanistan	1536	26-03	Extends UNAMA's mandate for a year
Sierra Leone	1537	30-03	Extended UNAMSIL's mandate for a period of six months
Iraq	1538	21-04	Appointed an independent group to investigate accusations of fraud in the oil for food programme
—	1539	22-04	On the situation of children in armed conflicts
—	1540	28-04	Adopted measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
Western Sahara	1541	29-04	Reaffirmed its support for the Peace Plan for free determination by the people of Western Sahara and extended MINURSO's mandate until the end of October
Haiti	1542	30-04	Decided to establish the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for an initial period of six months, and called for the authority of the Multinational Interim Force to be handed over to MINUSTAH
Timor-Leste	1543	14-05	Extended UNMISSET's mandate for a period of six months, reduced its size and reviewed its duties
Palestine	1544	19-05	Called on Israel to respect the obligations imposed by International Humanitarian Law, and particularly underlined its obligation not to proceed with the demolition of homes in violation of IHL
Burundi	1545	21-05	Authorised the deployment of a peace-keeping operation to be known as ONUB, for an initial period of six months from 1 June 2004
Iraq	1546	08-06	Approved the formation of a provisional sovereign Government of Iraq, which will assume full responsibility on 30 June 2004
Sudan	1547	11-06	Established an advance United Nations group and a special political mission aimed at preparing the way for the international supervision set out in the Naivasha agreements on security measures. Declared the Council's willingness to consider the establishment of a United Nations mission in support of peace, and called for an end to the fighting in Darfur and Upper Nile
Cyprus	1548	11-06	Extended the mandate of UNFICYP until the middle of December
Liberia	1549	17-06	Decided to re-establish the Group of Experts to assess the sanctions placed on timber and diamonds



Country	No.	Date	Content
Middle East	1550	29-06	Extended the UNDOF's mandate for six months
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1551	09-07	Authorised member States to cooperate with the EU mission that would be replacing SFOR from December 2004
DR Congo	1552	27-07	Extended the embargo on the supply of arms for a year
Lebanon	1553	29-07	Extended the mandate of UNIFIL for six months
Georgia	1554	29-07	Extended the mandate of UNOMIG for six months
DR Congo	1555	29-07	Extended the mandate of MONUC for two months
Sudan	1556	30-07	Extended the special political mission for three months, called on the Government of Sudan to comply with its undertakings and called for a resumption of peace talks in Darfur
Iraq	1557	12-08	Extended the mandate of UNAMI for one year
Somalia	1558	17-08	Established the supervisory group overseeing the arms embargo for another six months
Lebanon	1559	02-09	Called on all foreign troops to withdraw from Lebanon and for all militias to be dissolved
Eritrea - Ethiopia	1560	14-09	Extended the mandate of UNMEE for six months
Liberia	1561	17-09	Extended the mandate of UNMIL for one year
Sierra Leone	1562	17-09	Extended the mandate of UNAMSIL until the end of June 2005 and agreed new duties for the Mission
Afghanistan	1563	17-09	Extended the authorisation granted to the International Security Assistance Force for one year
Sudan	1564	18-09	Declared that the Government of Sudan had not complied with its obligations, repeated its call for the Government to end the impunity that prevailed in Darfur and asked the Secretary General to establish an international commission to investigate the reports of human rights violations.
DR Congo	1565	01-10	Extended the mandate of MONUC for six months and modified its duties
---	1566	08-10	On the threats to international peace and security caused by acts of terrorism
Former Yugoslavia	1567	14-10	On the International Court for the former Yugoslavia
Cyprus	1568	22-10	Extended the mandate of UNFICYP until 15 June
---	1569	26-10	Decided to hold Security Council sessions in Nairobi
Western Sahara	1570	28-10	Extended the mandate of MINURSO for six months
---	1571	04-11	On the date to fill a vacant position at the International Court of Justice
Côte d'Ivoire	1572	15-11	Established an arms embargo for a period of thirteen months and established a Security Council Committee charged with overseeing various measures
Timor-Leste	1573	16-11	Extended the mandate of UNMISET for six months
Sudan	1574	10-11	The Secretary General's reports on the peace process in southern Sudan and the crisis in the Darfur region
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1575	22-11	Authorised the establishment of a multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR) for one year, as the legal successor to SFOR
Haiti	1576	29-11	Extended the mandate of MINUSTAH for six months
Burundi	1577	01-12	Extended the mandate of ONUB for six months
Middle East	1578	15-12	Extended the mandate of UNDOF for six months
Liberia	1579	21-12	Partially lifted the measures imposed in Resolution 1521
Guinea-Bissau	1580	22-12	Extended the mandate of UNOGBIS for one year and reviewed its duties

## Reports to the Security Council by the Secretary General

No.	Date	Content
S/2004/3	06-01	On the United Nations mission in <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>
S/2004/26	14-01	On the situation in <b>Abkhazia (Georgia)</b>
S/2004/39	19-10	On the situation in <b>Western Sahara</b>
S/2004/50	20-01	On the United Nations Provisional Force in <b>Lebanon</b>
S/2004/52	20-01	On the Security Council Mission in <b>Central Africa</b>
S/2004/71	26-01	On the United Nations Provisional Administration Mission in <b>Kosovo</b>
S/2004/115	12-02	On the situation in <b>Somalia</b>
S/2004/117	13-02	On the United Nations Support Mission in <b>East Timor</b>
S/2004/180	05-03	On <b>Ethiopia and Eritrea</b>
S/2004/200	12-03	On the measures to combat sub-regional and cross-border problems in <b>West Africa</b>
S/2004/210	16-03	On <b>Burundi</b>
S/2004/228	19-03	On the United Nations Mission in <b>Sierra Leone</b>
S/2004/229	22-03	On the United Nations Mission in <b>Liberia</b>
S/2004/230	19-03	On the situation in <b>Afghanistan</b> and its consequences for international peace and security
S/2004/272	01-04	On the situation in <b>Liberia</b>
S/2004/300	16-04	On the situation in <b>Haiti</b>
S/2004/301	16-04	On Resolution 1284
S/2004/302	16-04	On the situation in <b>Cyprus</b>
S/2004/315	20-04	On the situation in <b>Abkhazia (Georgia)</b>
S/2004/325	23-04	On the situation in <b>Western Sahara</b>
S/2004/333	29-04	On the United Nations Support Mission in <b>East Timor</b>
S/2004/348	30-04	On the United Nations Provisional Administration Mission in <b>Kosovo</b>
S/2004/427	26-05	On the United Nations Operation in <b>Cyprus</b>
S/2004/428	26-05	On the situation in <b>Liberia</b>
S/2004/430	26-05	On the United Nations Mission in <b>Liberia</b>
S/2004/431	28-05	On the protection of civilians in armed conflicts
S/2004/437	28-05	On the goodwill mission in <b>Cyprus</b>
S/2004/443	02-06	On the United Nations Operation in <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>
S/2004/453	03-06	On the situation in <b>Sudan</b>
S/2004/536	06-07	On the United Nations mission in <b>Sierra Leone</b>
S/2004/543	07-07	On the situation in <b>Ethiopia and Eritrea</b>
S/2004/570	14-07	On the situation in <b>Abkhazia (Georgia)</b>
S/2004/572	21-07	On the provisional United Nations force in <b>Lebanon</b>
S/2004/613	30-07	On the United Nations Provisional Administration Mission in <b>Kosovo</b>
S/2004/616	03-08	On the state of law and transitional justice in societies that have suffered or are suffering conflicts
S/2004/625	05-08	On the reform of institutions in <b>Iraq</b>
S/2004/634	12-08	On the situation in <b>Afghanistan</b>
S/2004/645	12-08	On the repatriation of <b>Kuwaiti</b> nationals
S/2004/650	16-08	On the United Nations Mission in <b>DR Congo</b>
S/2004/669	13-08	On the United Nations Support Mission in <b>East Timor</b>
S/2004/682	25-08	On the United Nations Operation in <b>Burundi</b>
S/2004/697	27-08	On the United Nations Operation in <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>
S/2004/698	30-08	On the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in <b>Haiti</b>
S/2004/703	30-08	On the situation in <b>Sudan</b>
S/2004/708	02-09	On the situation in <b>Ethiopia and Eritrea</b>
S/2004/710	03-09	On the situation in <b>Iraq</b>
S/2004/724	09-09	On the United Nations Mission in <b>Sierra Leone</b>
S/2004/725	10-09	On the United Nations Mission in <b>Liberia</b>
S/2004/756	24-09	On the United Nations operation in <b>Cyprus</b>
S/2004/763	28-09	On the situation in <b>Sudan</b>
S/2004/771	29-09	On the United Nations Observer Mission in <b>Bougainville</b>
S/2004/777	01-10	On the situation in the <b>Middle East</b>
S/2004/787	04-10	On the situation in <b>Sudan</b>

No.	Date	Content
S/2004/804	08-10	On the situation in <b>Somalia</b>
S/2004/814	13-10	On women, peace and security
S/2004/822	18-10	On the situation in <b>Abkhazia (Georgia)</b>
S/2004/827	20-10	On the situation in <b>Western Sahara</b>
S/2004/881	02-11	On the situation in <b>Sudan</b>
S/2004/888	09-11	On the United Nations Support Mission in <b>East Timor</b>
S/2004/902	15-11	On the United Nations Operation in <b>Burundi</b>
S/2004/907	17-11	On the United Nations Provisional Administration Mission in <b>Kosovo</b>
S/2004/908	18-11	On the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in <b>Haiti</b>
S/2004/909	29-11	On the peaceful settlement of the <b>Palestinian</b> question
S/2004/925	26-11	On the situation in el <b>Afghanistan</b>
S/2004/947	03-12	On the situation in <b>Sudan</b>
S/2004/948	07-12	On et United Nations Separation Observer Force
S/2004/959	08-12	On the situation in <b>Iraq</b>
S/2004/961	08-12	On Resolution 1284
S/2004/962	09-12	On the United Nations Mission in <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>
S/2004/965	10-12	On the United Nations mission in <b>Sierra Leone</b>
S/2004/969	15-12	On the situation in <b>Guinea-Bissau</b>
S/2004/972	17-12	On the United Nations mission in <b>Liberia</b>
S/2004/973	16-12	On the situation in <b>Ethiopia and Eritrea</b>
S/2004/1012	23-12	On the situation in the <b>Central African Republic</b>
S/2004/1034	31-12	On the United Nations mission in <b>DR Congo</b>

## Appendix V. Natural disasters occurred during 2004

Type	Countries affected (date)
<b>Cyclone</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Niue/Samoa (January)</li> <li>• Vanuatu (February)</li> <li>• Madagascar (February and March)</li> </ul>
<b>Landslide</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kyrgyzstan (April)</li> <li>• Nepal (July)</li> </ul>
<b>Explosion</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DPR Korea (April)</li> <li>• Paraguay (August)</li> </ul>
<b>Hurricane</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cuba (August and September)</li> <li>• Caribbean (September)</li> <li>• Jamaica (September)</li> <li>• Eslovaquia (November)</li> </ul>
<b>Flooding</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bolivia (January)</li> <li>• Peru (February)</li> <li>• Bosnia y Herzegovina (April)</li> <li>• Namibia (April)</li> <li>• Dominican Republic (May)</li> <li>• Haiti (May)</li> <li>• Zambia (May)</li> <li>• Macedonia (June)</li> <li>• Afghanistan (July)</li> <li>• Bangladesh (July)</li> <li>• India (July)</li> <li>• Nepal (July)</li> <li>• Nicaragua (July)</li> <li>• Tajikistan (July)</li> <li>• Panama (December)</li> <li>• Philippines (December)</li> </ul>
<b>Locust plague</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• West Africa (September)</li> </ul>
<b>Drought</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peru (February)</li> <li>• Kenya (August)</li> <li>• Afghanistan (September)</li> <li>• Bolivia (November)</li> </ul>
<b>Extreme temperature</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peru (July)</li> </ul>
<b>Earthquakes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Morocco (February)</li> <li>• Pakistan (February)</li> <li>• Indonesia (February and November)</li> <li>• Japan (October)</li> <li>• South Asia (December)</li> </ul>
<b>Typhoon</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Micronesia (April)</li> </ul>
<b>Storm</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Myanmar (May)</li> </ul>
<b>Tropical storms</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dominican Republic (September)</li> <li>• Haiti (September)</li> </ul>

Source: United Nations

## Appendix VI. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DDR)

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes of former combatants are presently proliferating particularly in Africa. These processes are usually a guarantee for a post-war rehabilitation context to become more stable and, amongst other aspects, facilitate the unification of security forces.

As indicated in the attached chart, the programmes introduce data on the number of forces to be demobilized and reintegrated, the costs involved and the organizations to finance and carry out the programmes. The role of international organizations is quite broad with regard to both the undertaking and the financing of the programmes although financing usually only covers the first stages, has a time limit and specific objectives, whereas there is a lack of resources for reintegration of former combatants. Finally, the large number of child-soldiers is something to be regretted and requires a different approach to the problem.

Main data on the present DDR programs							
Present programs	Effectives	Composition	Total cost USD M.	Child soldiers	Executor organisms	Date Begg.	Financiering
Afghanistan	100.000	Militias	40	8,000	UNAMA ISAF	10-03	WB, ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, Japan
Angola	138.000	105.000 UNITA 33.000 AAFF	145 100 reintegr	16,000	Government	5-02	WB
Angola (Cabinda)	2.000	FLEC	-	600	Government	4-02	WB
Burundi	80.000	35.000 militias 45.000 AAFF	36	7,500	ONUB	11-04	WB, ILO UNICEF, Japan
Cambodia	30.000	AAFF	18.4	-	CDAF	8-01	WB, WFP, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden
Colombia	15.000	AUC	(150) <sup>1</sup>	2,000	OAS Government	11-03	OAS, Colombia USA, Sweden
Congo	3.800	Ninja militias	5	2,000	Government	8-04	WB
Côte d'Ivoire	30.000	12.000 militias 26.000 AAFF	50	3,000	UNICEF, EU, ONUCI	10-04	WB, France, Japan
Eritrea	200.000	AAFF	200	-	Government UNMEE	4-02	WB
Guinea	2.000	AAFF	-	2,000	UNICEF	-	WB
Guinea-Bissau	11.300	AAFF	-	300	UNICEF	-	WB
Haiti	(20.000)	"chimères" militias	-	-	MINUSTAH	-	-
Liberia	(95.000)	LURD, MODEL and former AAFF	50	15,000	UNMIL	12-03 <sup>2</sup>	UNDP, EU, EEUU, Japan
Central African Republic	7.500	Militias and former AAFF	13	-	BONUCA, UNDP	2-04	WB, UNDP, EEUU
DR Congo	150.000	Former AAFF and various militias	(10.5 Ituri) 100	6,000 (Ituri) 30,000 en total	MONUC UNDP, OIT, UNICEF	-	WB, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, South Africa and UK

1. As per the first statements by the Colombian Government.
2. With interruptions between December 2003 and April 2004

<b>Present programs</b>	<b>Effectives</b>	<b>Composition</b>	<b>Total cost USD M.</b>	<b>Child soldiers</b>	<b>Executor organisms</b>	<b>Date Begg.</b>	<b>Financiering</b>
Rwanda	45.000	Former AAFF and militias	14.4	2,000	Government	03	WB
Senegal	2.000	MFDC	-	-	-	9-04	-
Sierra Leone	72.500	RUF AAFF	36.5	7,000	UNICEF, UNAMSIL	11-00	WB UNICEF
Somalia	(80.000)	Various militias	-	-	AU, UNDP, UNICEF	(05)	AU, EU, UNDP, Italy and UK
Sudan	(30.000)	SPLA	-	17,000	IGAD, UNICEF	(05)	WB, Norway
<b>Recent ended programs</b>	<b>Effectives</b>	<b>Composition</b>	<b>Total cost USD M.</b>	<b>Child soldiers</b>	<b>Executor organisms</b>	<b>Date Begg.</b>	<b>Financiering</b>
Djibouti	3.000	AAFF	2.7	-	IGAD	12-00	EU, France
Ethiopia	150.000	AAFF	170.6	-	UNMEE	8-01	WB

## Appendix VII. Visits made or scheduled by the United Nations Special Rapporteurs in 2004

Country	Visits undertaken (date)	Visits agreed with the Government but not yet undertaken	Visits requested but not yet been responded to by the government since 1998
<b>AFRICA</b>			
Algeria			-SR on Torture -SR on violence against women -SR on extrajudicial executions -SR on freedom of expression
Angola	-SRep on human rights defenders (14-26/08/04)		-SR on freedom of expression
Burkina Faso		-SR on the rights of migrants	
Chad			-SRep on human rights defenders
Côte d'Ivoire	-SR on racism (09-20/02/04) -SR on freedom of expression (28/01/04-05/02/04)		-SRep on IDP -SR on the question of the use of mercenaries
DR Congo		-SRep on IDP (postponed) -SRep on human rights defenders -SR on violence against women	
Equatorial Guinea			-SR on torture -SRep on human rights defenders
Eritrea			-SR on freedom of expression -SR on the right to food
Ethiopia	-SR on the right to food (16-27/02/04)		-SR on freedom of expression
Kenya	-SR on adequate housing (08-22/02/04)	-SR on the independence of the judiciary	-SRep on human rights defenders
Liberia			-SR on freedom of expression -SR on extrajudicial executions -SRep on IDP
Malawi			-SR on the right to food
Mali		-SRep on human rights defenders	-SR on the rights of migrants
Mozambique			-SRep on human rights defenders -IE on structural adjustment policies and foreign debt
Nigeria	-SR on independence of the judiciary (July-August/04) -SR on freedom of religion (25/11/04)	-SR on extrajudicial executions -SR on violence against women	-SRep on human rights defenders
Senegal		-SRep on human rights defenders	-SR on freedom of religion
Sierra Leone		-SR on extrajudicial executions	-SRep on IDP -SR on the question of the use of mercenaries
South-Africa		-SR on the right to food	
Sudan	-SR on extrajudicial executions (02-12/06/04) -SRep on IDP (24-31/07/04) -SR on violence against women (28/09/04-02/10/04)	-SR on freedom of expression	
Swazilandia			-SR on freedom of expression
Togo			-SRep on human rights defenders
Uganda		-SR on the right to development	
Zambia			-SRep on human rights defenders
Zimbabwe			-SRep on human rights defenders -SRep on the independence of the judiciary -SR on freedom of expression

Country	Visits undertaken (date)	Visits agreed with the Government but not yet undertaken	Visits requested but not yet been responded to by the government since 1998
<b>AMERICA</b>			
Bolivia			-SR on torture
Brasil	-SR on the independence of the judiciary (13-22/10/04) -SR on extrajudicial executions (11/02/04) -SR on adequate housing (30/05/04-13/06/04)		
Canada	-SR on indigenous peoples (24/05/04-04/06/04)	-SR on the right to health	
Colombia	-SR on freedom of expression (22-29/02/04) -SR on indigenous peoples (07-17/03/04)		- SRep on IDP
Cuba			-SR on Cuba -SR on freedom of expression -SR on the independence of the judiciary -SR on the right to food
USA		-SR on the question of the use of mercenaries	
El Salvador	-SR on violence against women (02-07/02/04)		
Guatemala	-SR on violence against women (09-14/02/04) -SR on racism (28/06/04-12/07/04)	-SR on the right to food	
Haiti	-SR on extrajudicial executions (22/01/04) -IE on Haiti (02-11/04/04)	-SR on the right to food	
Honduras	-SR on racism (28/06/04-12/07/04)	-SR on freedom of expression	
Mexico		-SR on violence against women -SRep on human rights defenders	
Nicaragua	-SR on racism (28/06/04-12/07/04)		
Paraguay	-SR on the independence of the judiciary (October-November/04) -SR on the sale of minors (23/02/04-05/03/04)		
Peru	-SR on the human rights of migrants (20-30/09/04) -SR on the right to health (07-15/06/04)		-SR on the right to food
Venezuela		-SRep on human rights defenders	-SR on freedom of expression
<b>ASIA - PACIFIC</b>			
Afghanistan	-IE on Afghanistan (22/08/04)	-SR on violence against women	-SRep on IDP
Bangladesh			-SR on freedom of expression
Bhutan			- SRep on human rights defenders
Cambodia	-SRep on Cambodia (07-14/11/04)		
China		-SR on torture (visit postponed) -SR on freedom of religion	-SR on freedom of expression
DPR Korea			-SR on freedom of expression -SR on freedom of religion -SR on the right to food
India			-SR on torture -SRep on human rights defenders -Joint SR on the independence of the judiciary and SR on extrajudicial executions -SR on the right to food



Country	Visits undertaken (date)	Visits agreed with the Government but not yet undertaken	Visits requested but not yet been responded to by the government since 1998
Indonesia		-IE on structural adjustments policies and foreign debt	-SR on freedom of religion -SR on freedom of expression -SR on torture -SRep on human rights defenders
Malaysia			-SRep on human rights defenders
Mongolia	-SR on the right to food (14-24/08/04)		
Myanmar			-SRep on IDP -SR on the right to food
Nepal		-SR on torture	-SRep on human rights defenders -SR on freedom of expression
Pakistan			-Joint SR on the independence of the judiciary and on extrajudicial executions
Philippines			-SR on adequate housing
Singapore			-SRep on human rights defenders
Sri Lanka			-SR on the independence of the judiciary
Viet Nam			-SR on freedom of expression -IE on structural adjustment policies and foreign debt
<b>EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA</b>			
Albania			-SRep on human rights defenders
Azerbaijan			-SR on freedom of expression
Belarus			-SR on Belarus -SR on freedom of expression -SRep on human rights defenders
Belgium		-SR on the human rights of migrants	
Georgia		-SR on torture	-SR on the right to education
Spain			-SR on freedom of expression
Italy	-SR on freedom of expression (20-29/10/04) -SR on the human rights of migrants (07- 18/06/04)		
Kazakhstan	-SR on the independence of the judiciary (09-19/06/04)		
Kyrgyzstan	-IE on structural adjustment policies and foreign debt (07-16/06/04)	-SR on the independence of the judiciary	
Rumania	-SR on the right to health (23-27/08/04) -SR on the sale of minors (01-10/09/04)		
Russia		-SR on violence against women	-SR on torture (mission to Chechnya) -SR on freedom of religion -SR on freedom of expression
Tajikistan		-SR on the independence of the judiciary	
Turkmenistan			-SR on torture -SRep on human rights defenders -SR on freedom of religion -SR on freedom of expression -SRep on IDP -SR on extrajudicial executions
Turkey	-SR on the effects of toxic waste (10-19/03/04) -RpE on human rights defenders (10-21/10/04)	-SR on violence against women	-SR on the right to health -SR on the independence of the judiciary

Country	Visits undertaken (date)	Visits agreed with the Government but not yet undertaken	Visits requested but not yet been responded to by the government since 1998
Ukraine		-SR on the effects of toxic waste -SR on freedom of expression	
Uzbekistan		-SRep on human rights defenders -SR on the independence of the judiciary	
<b>NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST</b>			
Egypt			-SR on the independence of the judiciary -SRep on human rights defenders -SR on torture
Iran	-SR on the human rights of migrants (22-29/02/04)	-SR on violence against women -SR on adequate housing	-SR on extrajudicial executions
Israel			-SR on torture -SR on freedom of religion -SR on violence against women -SRep on IDP
Palestine	-SR on violence against women (13-18/06/04)		
Tunisia			-SR on torture -SR on the independence of the judiciary -SRep on human rights defenders

Note: SR: Special Rapporteur

SRep: Special Representative

IE: Independent Expert

Rp: Personal Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Source: A study by the School for a Culture of Peace based on information from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Country visits* see <<http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/visits.htm>> as of 25/10/04.

## Appendix VIII. The Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals

At the Millennium Summit held in New York in September 2000, 189 states adopted the Millennium Declaration, which summarised the great global challenges and lines for its agenda in a series of legal instruments. Of these, the seven main instruments have been considered, along with the eight Millennium Development Goals, whose target year is 2015.

### **GOAL 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger**

**Target 1:** halve the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day

**Target 2:** halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

### **GOAL 2: Achieve universal primary education**

**Target 3:** ensure that children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

### **GOAL 3: Promote gender equality and empower women**

**Target 4:** eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education

### **GOAL 4: Reduce child mortality**

**Target 5:** reduce by two-thirds the under-5 mortality rate

### **GOAL 5: Improve maternal health**

**Target 6:** reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio

### **GOAL 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases**

**Target 7:** halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

**Target 8:** halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

### **GOAL 7: Ensure environmental sustainability**

**Target 9:** integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the losses of environmental resources

**Target 10:** halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to drinking water

**Target 11:** achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

### **GOAL 8: Build a global partnership for development**

**Target 12:** develop a rule-based, non-discriminatory trading and financial system

**Target 13:** address the special needs of the LDC

**Target 14:** address the special needs of land-locked countries and small island developing states

**Target 15:** deal comprehensively with debt problems through national and international measures

**Target 16:** provide youth with decent and productive work

**Target 17:** provide access to essential drugs in developing countries

**Target 18:** make available the benefits of new information and communications technologies

Sources: United Nations, <<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals>>; World Bank <<http://www.developmentgoals.org/>>.

# Appendix IX. European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports

Approved by the Council of the European Union on 25 May 1998.  
The Council of the European Union,

BUILDING on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992,

RECOGNISING the special responsibility of arms exporting states,

DETERMINED to set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency,

DETERMINED to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or contribute to regional instability,

WISHING within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports,

NOTING complementary measures taken by the EU against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms,

ACKNOWLEDGING the wish of EU Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort,

RECOGNISING that states have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter, have adopted the following Code of Conduct and operative provisions:

## CRITERION ONE

**Respect for the international commitments of EU member states, in particular the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations**

An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia:

- a) the international obligations of member states and their commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes
- b) the international obligations of member states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- c) their commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement;
- d) their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel land mine.

## CRITERION TWO

**The respect of human rights in the country of final destination**

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States will:

- a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.
- b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU;

For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with operative paragraph 1 of this Code, the nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes.

Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

### **CRITERION THREE**

#### **The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts**

Member States will not allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

### **CRITERION FOUR**

#### **Preservation of regional peace, security and stability**

Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.

When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into account inter alia:

- a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
- b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
- c) whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;
- d) the need not to affect regional stability adversely in any significant way.

### **CRITERION FIVE**

#### **The national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries**

Member States will take into account:

- a) the potential effect of the proposed export on their defence and security interests and those of friends, allies and other member states, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;

- b) the risk of use of the goods concerned against their forces or those of friends, allies or other member states;
- c) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

## CRITERION SIX

### **The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law**

Member States will take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to:

- a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
- b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;
- c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One.

## CRITERION SEVEN

### **The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions**

In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered:

- a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity;
- b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;
- c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls;
- d) the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist organisations (anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context).

## CRITERION EIGHT

### **The compatibility of arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments**

Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.

## Operative provisions

1. Each EU Member State **will assess** export licence applications for military equipment made to it **on a case-by-case basis** against the provisions of the Code of Conduct.
2. This Code will not infringe on the right of Member States to **operate more restrictive national policies**.

3. EU Member States **will circulate through diplomatic channels details of licences refused** in accordance with the Code of Conduct for military equipment together with an explanation of why the licence has been refused. The details to be notified are set out in the form of a draft pro-forma at Annex A. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it will first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it will notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning.

The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any item of military equipment will remain at the **national discretion of each Member State**. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the member state has refused to authorise the actual sale or physical export of the item of military equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order.

4. EU Member States will **keep such denials and consultations confidential** and not to use them for commercial advantage.

5. EU Member States will work for the **early adoption of a common list** of military equipment covered by the Code, based on similar national and international lists. Until then, the Code will operate on the basis of national control lists incorporating where appropriate elements from relevant international lists.

6. **The criteria in this Code** and the consultation procedure provided for by paragraph 3 of the operative provisions **will also apply to dual-use goods** as specified in Annex 1 of Council Decision 94/942/CFSP as amended, where there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country.

7. In order to maximise the efficiency of this Code, EU Member States will work within the framework of the CFSP to **reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence** in the field of conventional arms exports.

8. Each EU Member State will circulate to other EU Partners in confidence an **annual report** on its defence exports and on its implementation of the Code. These reports will be discussed at an annual meeting held within the framework of the CFSP. The meeting will also review the operation of the Code, identify any improvements which need to be made and submit to the Council a consolidated report, based on contributions from Member States.

9. EU Member States will, as appropriate, **assess** jointly through the CFSP framework **the situation of potential or actual recipients** of arms exports from EU Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of the Code of Conduct.

10. It is recognised that Member States, where appropriate, may also **take into account the effect of proposed exports** on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the above criteria.

11. EU Member States will use their best endeavours **to encourage other arms exporting states to subscribe to the principles of this Code of Conduct**.

12. This Code of Conduct and the operative provisions will replace any previous elaboration of the 1991 and 1992 Common Criteria.

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# The School of Peace Culture at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

The School of Peace Culture (*Escola de Cultura de Pau*) was created in 1999, with the aim of organising different academic and research activities related to peace culture, the prevention and transformation of conflicts, disarmament and the promotion of human rights.

The School is essentially financed by the Government of Catalonia, through its Department for Universities, Research and Information Society, and through its Catalan Agency for Cooperation to Development. It also receives support from other departments of the Catalan Government, as well as from local councils, foundations and other institutions. The School is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

The main activities of the School of Peace Culture are as follows:

- Diploma course in Peace Culture (230-hour post-graduate course with 70 places).
- Optional subjects "Peace culture and conflict management" and "Educating for peace and in conflicts".
- Initiatives for awareness and intervention in conflicts, to facilitate dialogue between the parties involved.
- Colombia Programme for raising awareness of peace initiatives undertaken in this country.
- Human Rights Programme does a follow-up of the international situation in terms of human rights and particularly of the issues that are currently on the world's agenda, such as the impact of terrorism on the full enjoyment of all rights and social corporative responsibility.
- Peace Education Programme. The team aims to promote and develop the values and capacity of Peace Education.
- Disarmament and Human Security Programme works on various issues related to disarmament with a special emphasis on micro-disarmament and arms exports control, and tries to move away from the idea of military security on the part of the states to more human aspects.
- Alert Unit Programme on Conflicts, Peace and Human Rights. This programme carries out a daily monitoring of the international situation in terms of armed conflicts, tensions, humanitarian crises, development and gender with a view to produce the annual report 'Alert', as well as weekly and quarterly reports
- Peace Processes Programme works on the follow-up and analysis of countries under a peace process or formal negotiations and of countries where exploring negotiations are in progress.
- Post-War Rehabilitation Programme works on the follow-up and analysis of humanitarian aid in terms of peace building in both a war and a post-war context.

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