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alert 2007 !

Report on conflicts,
human rights
and peace-building

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Sumario

Alerta 2007: informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanos y construcción de paz es un estudio que anualmente realiza la Unidad de Alerta de la *Escola de Cultura de Pau* de la *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, y que sintetiza el estado del mundo al finalizar el año a partir del análisis de varios indicadores. Para hacer el informe se han utilizado 30 indicadores, agrupados en nueve grandes apartados: conflictos armados, situaciones de tensión y disputas de alto riesgo, procesos de paz, rehabilitación posbélica (acompañamiento internacional), crisis humanitarias, desarme, derechos humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, desarrollo y dimensión de género en la construcción de paz. La descripción y el análisis de lo que ha ocurrido en el mundo a lo largo del año a través de estos indicadores puede ayudarnos a conocer mejor los avances, los retrocesos y las dinámicas de diversa índole que afectan al conjunto de la humanidad. La mayoría de estos indicadores, una vez entrecruzados, pueden ayudarnos también a comprender las influencias de unos factores sobre otros. La comparación de estos datos con los de años anteriores da al informe un carácter de alerta preventiva sobre algunas tendencias generales o sobre la situación de determinados países, lo que puede resultar útil, entre otras cosas, para el rediseño de las políticas exteriores, de cooperación al desarrollo y de transferencias de armas, así como para elaborar políticas de prevención de conflictos armados y que permitan consolidar procesos de paz y de rehabilitación posbélica en el mundo.

Sumari

Alerta 2007: informe sobre conflictes, drets humans i construcció de pau és un estudi que anualment realitza la Unitat d'Alerta de l'Escola de Cultura de Pau de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, i que sintetitza l'estat del món al finalitzar l'any a partir de l'anàlisi de diversos indicadors. Per a fer l'informe s'han utilitzat 30 indicadors, agrupats en nou grans apartats: conflictes armats, situacions de tensió i disputes d'alt risc, processos de pau, rehabilitació postbèlica (acompanyament internacional), crisis humanitàries, desarmament, drets humans i Dret Internacional Humanitari, desenvolupament i dimensió de gènere en la construcció de pau. La descripció i l'anàlisi del que ha ocorregut en el món al llarg de l'any a través d'aquests indicadors, pot ajudar-nos a conèixer millor els avenços, els retrocessos i les dinàmiques de diversa índole que afecten al conjunt de la humanitat. La majoria d'aquests indicadors, una vegada entrecreuat, poden ajudar-nos també a comprendre les influències d'uns factors sobre uns altres. La comparació d'aquestes dades amb les dels anys anteriors dona a l'informe un caràcter d'alerta preventiva sobre algunes tendències generals o sobre la situació de determinats països, la qual cosa pot resultar útil, entre d'altres, per a redissenar polítiques exteriors, de cooperació al desenvolupament i de transferències d'armes, així com per a elaborar polítiques en termes de prevenció de conflictes armats i que permetin consolidar processos de pau i de rehabilitació postbèlica arreu del món.

Summary

Alert 2007: report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building is a study carried out annually by the Alert Unit at the *School of Peace Culture* at *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, providing an overview of the world situation at the end of the year on the basis of an analysis of various indicators. 30 indicators have been used in the preparation of this report, divided into nine large groups: armed conflicts, situations of tension and high risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation (international involvement), humanitarian crises, disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development and gender issues in peace-building. A description and analysis of what has happened in the world throughout this year, based on these indicators, helps to provide a greater knowledge of the advances, reverses and dynamics of various kinds that affect the whole of humanity. The majority of these indicators, once cross-referenced, can also help us to understand the influence of some factors on others. Comparing this data with the information gathered during the previous years means that the report can act as a preventive warning of certain general tendencies or a particular situation in individual countries, something that may be useful, among other things, for the rethinking of foreign policy, development cooperation and arms transfers, as well as for the development of policies aimed at preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the consolidation of peace processes and post-war rehabilitation throughout the world.

Sommaire

Alerte 2007: rapport sur les conflits, les droits de la personne et la construction de la paix est un rapport annuel réalisé par l'Unité d'Alerte de l'École de Culture de la Paix de la *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, qui synthétise l'état du monde de l'année à partir de l'analyse de plusieurs indicateurs. Pour élaborer ce rapport, 30 indicateurs, regroupés en neuf grands chapitres, ont été utilisés. À savoir, les conflits armés, les situations de tension et les disputes de haut risque, les processus de paix, la réhabilitation d'après-guerre (accompagnement international), les crises humanitaires, le désarmement, les droits de la personne et Droit International Humanitaire, le développement et la perspective de genre dans la construction de la paix. La description et l'analyse, par moyen de ces indicateurs, des événements qui se sont produits dans le monde tout au long de l'année peut nous aider à mieux connaître les progressions, les reculs, et toute autre tendance touchant l'ensemble de l'humanité. La plupart de ces indicateurs, une fois superposés, peuvent aider aussi à comprendre les interdépendances entre certains facteurs. La comparaison de ces données avec celles des années précédentes fait de ce rapport une mise en garde préventive sur certaines tendances générales ou sur la situation de certains pays. Cet instrument peut donc être utile, entre autres, à la redéfinition des politiques extérieures, de coopération au développement et de transferts d'armes, ainsi qu'à l'élaboration des politiques de prévention de conflits armés qui permettent d'assurer la consolidation de processus de paix et de réhabilitation d'après-guerre dans le monde.

List of indicators

1. ARMED CONFLICTS

1. Countries in armed conflict

2. SITUATIONS OF TENSION AND HIGH-RISK DISPUTES

2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

3. PEACE PROCESSES

3. Countries with formal peace or negotiating processes or talks in an exploratory phase

4. POST-WAR REHABILITATION (INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT)

4. Countries that receive international aid for post-war rehabilitation

5. HUMANITARIAN CRISES

5. Countries facing food emergencies
6. Countries in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is internally displaced
7. Countries of origin in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is a refugee
8. Countries included in the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for 2006

6. MILITARIZATION AND DISARMAMENT

9. Countries whose military spending exceeds 4% of GDP
10. Countries in which military spending exceeds public spending on health and education
11. Countries with imports of conventional heavy weapons exceeding 0.5% of their GDP
12. Countries in which the number of soldiers exceeds 1.5% of the population
13. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the UN Security Council
14. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the EU and the OSCE
15. Countries with DDR programmes

7. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

16. Countries that have not ratified the United Nation's main legal instruments
17. Countries with serious and systematic human rights violations according to non-governmental sources
18. Countries giving cause for concern according to the European Union
19. Countries with serious human rights violations according to reports from the special mechanisms and resolutions adopted at the first three sessions of the UNHRC and the 60th period of sessions of the UN General Assembly's Third Committee
20. Countries that apply or retain the death penalty
21. Countries of origin of people who have obtained political asylum
22. Countries that have not ratified Additional Protocol II of 1977, dealing with inter-state armed conflicts relating to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949
23. Countries that recruit child soldiers and have not ratified the optional Protocol for the Convention on the Rights of the Child in relation to the participation of children in armed conflicts

8. DEVELOPMENT

24. Countries with a Human Development Index (HDI) lower than in 1990 and countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
25. Countries with serious internal inequalities according to the Gini coefficient
26. Countries receiving official development aid (ODA) equivalent to more than 10% of GDP
27. Countries with total external borrowings exceeding their GDP, countries that pay more to service their debt than they receive in official development aid and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
28. Countries with high rates of deforestation and countries with high levels of polluting emissions
29. Countries with poor governance according to the World Bank

9. GENDER AND PEACE-BUILDING

30. Countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

Glossary

- ACH:** Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
ACP: Asia, Caribbean, Pacific
ADF: Afghanistan Development Forum
AF: Government armed forces
AI: Amnesty International
AIG: Armed Islamic Group
AMIB: African Mission in Burundi
ANA: Albanian National Army
ANDS: Afghan National Development Strategy
APHC: All Parties Hurriyat Conference
APRD: *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et de la Démocratie*
AU: African Union
AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia)
BICC: Bonn International Centre for Conversion
BINUB: United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BIPP: Islamic Liberation Front of Pattani
BLA: Baluchistan Liberation Army
BONUCA: United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic
BRA: Bougainville Revolutionary Army
BRN: *Barasi Revolusi Nasional*
CAEMC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CAP: United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process
CARICOM: Caribbean Community
CAR: Central African Republic
CAVR: Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
CEDAW: Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CERF: Central Emergency Relief Fund
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
CLAVE: Latin American Coalition for the Prevention of Armed Violence
CODHES: *Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento* (Advisory Council for Human Rights and Displacement)
CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority
CPI: Corruption Perception Index
CPLA: Cordillera People's Liberation Army
CPN: Communist Party of Nepal
CPP: Communist Party of the Philippines
CVO: Civil Volunteer Organization
DAC: Development Assistance Committee
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID: Department for International Development
DIAG: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
Dollars: US dollars
DRM: Democratic Republican Movement
EAR: European Agency for Reconstruction
ECHA: Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ECHO: European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EEBC: Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission
EF: Eastern Front
ELN: *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army)
ESCR: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
EU BAM Rafah: EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah
EUFOR ALTHEA: EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUJUST LLEX: Integrated EU Mission for the Force of Law in Iraq
EUJUST THEMIS: EU Mission to reform the justice system in Georgia
EUPAT: EU Police Advisory Team in Macedonia
EUPM: EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL COPPS: EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
EUPOL – KINSHASA: EU Police Mission in Kinshasa
EUPOL Proxima: EU Police Mission in Macedonia
EUSEC RD Congo: EU Security Reform Aid Mission in DR Congo
EZLN: *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (Zapatista Army of National Liberation)
FAD'H: *Forces Armées d'Haiti* (Haiti Armed Forces)
FAO: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARC: *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FATF: Financial Action Task Force
FCD: Cabindan Forum for Dialogue
FDD: *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
FDLR: *Forces Démocratiques de Libération de Rwanda* (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
FKM: *Front Kedaulatan Maluku* (Moluccan Sovereignty Front)
FLAA: *Front de Libération d' Air et Azawak*
FLEC-FAC: *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda – Forças Armadas de Cabinda*
FLEC: *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front)
FNL: *Forces Nationales de Libération* (National Liberation Force)
FOMUC: Multinational Force in Central Africa
FUC: *Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique* (United Front for Democratic Change)
GAM: *Gerakin Aceh Merdeka* (Movement for Free Aceh)
GDI: Gender-related Development Index
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GEMAP: Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme
GIMP: Muslim Mujahideen Movement of Pattani
GPP: *Groupement Patriotique pour la Paix* (Patriotic Grouping for Peace)
GRIP: European Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security
GSPC: Salafist Group for Call and Combat
HDI: Human Development Index
HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HRW: Human Rights Watch
IANSA: International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL: International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICC: International Criminal Court
ICCR: International Criminal Court for Rwanda
ICCY: International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia
ICG: International Crisis Group
ICO: Islamic Conference Organisation
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IDA: International Development Association
IDDRS: International Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards
IDF: Iraq Development Fund
IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP: Internal Displaced Person
IEMF: Interim Emergency Multinational Force
IFM: Isatubu Freedom Movement
IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM: IGAD Mission in Somalia
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IOM: International Organisation for Migration
IRIN: United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network
IRIS: *Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques* (Institute for International and Strategic Relations)
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
ISDR: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
JKLF: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
KANU: Kenya African National Union
KFOR: NATO Kosovo force
KNU: Karen National Union
LDC: Least Developed Countries
LIPRODHOR: Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE: Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam
LURD: Liberians United for Reunification and Democracy
MASSOB: Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State Of Biafra
MDC: Movement for Democratic Change
MDJT: *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad* (Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad)
MDF: Meckauvi Defence Force
MDG: Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR: *Mercado Común del Sur* (Common Latin American Market)
MFDC: *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (Casamance Democratic Forces Movement)
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINUCI: United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MJP: *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (Movement for Justice and Peace)
MLC: *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (Congo Liberation Movement)
MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MPCI: *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement)
MPIGO: *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (Ivorian Popular Movement for the Far West)
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSF: *Médecins Sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders)
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Treaty
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCP: National Congress Party
NDC: National Democratic Congress
NDF: National Democratic Front
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NEPAD: New Economic Partnership for African Development
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation
NLA: National Liberation Army
NLD: National League for Democracy
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
NMRD: National Movement for Reform and Development
NPA: New People's Army
NPP: New Patriotic Party
NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council
NRF: National Redemption Front
NSCN (IM): National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak - Muivah
OAS: Organisation of American States
OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA: Official Development Aid
OECD: Organisation for Economic Trade and Development
OMCT: World Organisation Against Torture
ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUB: United Nations Mission in Burundi
ONUGBIS: United Nations Office in Guinea-Bissau
OPM: *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement)
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAC: *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civiles* (Civil Defence Patrols)
PAIGC: African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde
PCT: Congolese Workers' Party
PDP: People's Democratic Party
PIC: Peace Implementation Council
PIOOM: The Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations
PNA: Palestinian National Authority
PRIO: Peace Research Institute of Oslo
PULO: Pattani United Liberation Organisation
PWG: People's War Group
RAFD: Rally of Democratic Forces
RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RDL: *Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et la Liberté* (Rally for Democracy and Liberty)
RFTF: Results Focused Transnational Framework
RRI: Reproductive Risk Index
RSM: *Republik Maluku Selatan* (Republic of South Moluccas)
RUF: Revolutionary United Front
SADC: South African Development Community
SCUD: Platform for Change, National Unity and Democracy
SFOR: Stabilisation Force for Bosnia Herzegovina
SICS: Supreme Islamic Council in Somalia
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLA: Sudan Liberation Army
SPLA: Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SSDF: South Sudanese Defence Forces
TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TNG: Transitional National Government
UAB: *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* (Autonomous University of Barcelona)
UFDR : *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement*
UFDD: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development
UIC: Union of Islamic Courts
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam
UN: United Nations
UNAIDS: United Nations Programs on HIV/AIDS
UNAMA: United Nations Aid Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMIS: United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDG: United Nations Development Group
UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNEP: United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UNHCHR: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDIR: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
UNIOSIL: United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNITA: *União para a Independência Total de Angola* (Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNMA: United Nations Mission in Angola
UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH: United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMISSET: United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMPO: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOVIC: United Nations Monitoring and Verification of Inspections Commission
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOGBIS: United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOL: United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia
UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOTIL: United Nations Office in Timor-Leste
UNPOS: United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPPB: United Nations Political and Peace-Building Mission
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Middle East
UNTAET: United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste
UNTOP: United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building
UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WB: World Bank
WFP: World Food Programme
WHO: World Health Organisation
WTO: World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front

Introduction

“Alert 2007: report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building” is a study carried out annually by the Alert Unit at the School for a Culture of Peace at *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, with help and support from other programmes run by the School, providing an overview of the world situation at the end of the year on the basis of an analysis of various indicators. The Alert report also contains a summary of the information that the Alert Unit publishes in its fortnightly newsletter, “*Semáforo*”, which is in turn compiled in the quarterly publication “*Barómetro*”.¹ Other issues analysed in this report are further discussed in publications that can be consulted on the School’s web site.

30 indicators have been used in the preparation of this “Alert 2007” report, divided into eight large groups: armed conflicts, situations of tension and high-risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation (international involvement), humanitarian crises, disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, and gender aspects in peace-building. A description and analysis of what has happened in the world throughout the past year, using these indicators as a base, helps to provide greater insight into the advances and reverses experienced and the different dynamics that generally affect the whole of humanity. The majority of these indicators, once cross-referenced, can also help us to understand the influence of some factors on others. Comparing this data with the information gathered during previous years means that this report can act as a preventive warning of general trends or particular situations in individual countries, something which is undoubtedly useful, among other things, for the rethinking of foreign policy, development cooperation and the control of arms transfers, as well as for the development of specific policies aimed at preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the consolidation of peace processes and post-war rehabilitation throughout the world.

As can be observed from the conclusions set out at the end of this annual report, some of the quantitative data relating to the unchanged number of armed conflicts, the increase in the number of peace processes and the greater numbers of people currently in the process of being demobilised may give the impression that conditions around the world have improved over the last year. A detailed qualitative analysis of all the indicators, however, leads to a less optimistic (or, at least, more critical) reading of some of the trends that have emerged in recent years, such as the enormous difficulties involved in the rehabilitation and rebuilding of structural elements in countries that have recently endured armed conflicts, the overwhelming nature of humanitarian crises like the one currently affecting the region of Darfur (Sudan), the neglect of contexts in which the general population is in danger because their basic needs are not being attended to, the increased military spending on an international scale, the threats to the global human rights system as a result of anti-terrorist strategies and the limited attention being paid to the gender dimension in a whole range of issues relating to peace-building. In short, there are too many omissions in areas that are vital to development and the future well-being of ordinary people, society in general and the generations to come.

The concentration of several armed conflicts in one particular part of the world, which involves fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Palestine and Lebanon and tensions in both Syria and Iran, has not only focused public opinion on that particular region and drawn attention away from other issues, it has also highlighted the complete futility of certain militaristic and reductionist approaches to foreign policy, which far from alleviating situations of tension have exacerbated and spread them. As 2007 began, questions were at least being asked in respect of the wisdom of interventionist strategies, many aspects of anti-terrorist policy and the limitations of unilateral foreign policies that do not make proper provisions for their consequences, even in the short term. Conflict prevention therefore remains an important issue until such a time as debate on prevention and the way it is to be practically applied can be resolved and a way is found to make both regional and global assessments of the problems involved.

1. Both the fortnightly newsletter *Semáforo*, and the quarterly publication *Barómetro*, can be consulted at <<http://www.escolapau.org>>.

Despite this bleak overview, which in short merely confirms a number of trends that were first seen some years ago, some more positive and hopeful signs can be seen in the conclusion of several armed conflicts, an increase in the number of negotiating initiatives seen around the world, a greater ability among civilian groups to deal with problems of various kinds, a greater worldwide awareness of the delicate environmental situation and the introduction of new instruments for the protection of human rights. There are, therefore, reasons to be both optimistic and pessimistic, but not in every field. Whatever the current situation, with every year that passes we learn a little more about what is happening and the underlying causes, and increase our respect for the measures that need to be taken in order to overcome the problems we face and strengthen policies that will lead to a more equal world in which fewer communities find themselves excluded or at risk. The foundations have been laid during the last ten years for changes which should shortly become apparent, thanks to the new opportunities for communication between people and the conviction that we must ensure protection for those who suffer as the result of our own decisions, along with those who remain unprotected from natural phenomena which, it must be said, are in part the result of policies that ignore or disregard the limits of our natural world and its capacity to heal itself.

Just a few short years ago we began the 21st century with optimistic projects and laudable aims, and yet we run the risk of allowing the first decade to pass without having taken advantage of the opportunities on offer and without having achieved the things we should have achieved. This 2007 Report is full of warnings and analyses of mistaken policies, but it also contains many instances of intelligent and bold ideas, changes of direction and humanistic behaviour. 2015 will be the year in which we will have to make an overall examination of our willingness to mend our ways and at the same time innovate, partly because that is when we will see whether we have been able to achieve the minimum targets set out in the Millennium Development Goals. We repeatedly pointed out in last year's Report that these goals were perfectly attainable. We should now add that they must be seen as an obligation. We are morally bound to change the destructive dynamics described in this Report and analyse the ways in which they can be countered. Here at the School for a Culture of Peace we sum it up by reiterating the need for "peace-building" at all levels (political, economic, technological, cultural, social and environmental) and in all quarters of the globe, without exception. We also believe that the paradigmatic change that we require should not just be some speculative thesis that looks good in an introduction to an annual report, it must be a necessity for our own survival and that of future generations. Although we entirely share the sentiment, we are not satisfied merely with the motto that "we can build another world", because we firmly believe that "it is essential that we build such a world in the short term". The basic key to achieving this can be found among the indicators listed in this Report: acting promptly to ensure that tensions do not boil over into armed conflict, encouraging negotiations, working intelligently with countries that are emerging from armed conflict, preventing corruption and poor governance from getting in the way of an adequate response to humanitarian crises, promoting disarmament and demilitarisation, refining human rights instruments, improving governance, protecting the environment and supporting the empowerment of women at all levels of human action, among many other things.

I would like to end by offering my sincere thanks to all the people and institutions that support us in our work and make it possible for us to bring you this Report, particularly the *Agència Catalana de Cooperació al Desenvolupament* (the Catalan Government's Agency for Development Cooperation) and the AECI (the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation), who have offered us the opportunity to observe world dynamics, make our analyses and present our proposals.

Vicenç Fisas
Director of the School for a Culture of Peace

1. Armed conflicts


- The number of armed conflicts remained at 21, levelling out after successive falls in recent years.
- The Horn of Africa and Central Africa were the most volatile regions, with the spread of the armed conflict in Darfur affecting neighbouring Central African Republic and Chad, while the Ethiopian government launched an offensive in support of the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia which led to the defeat of the Islamic Courts.
- The Burundian government reached an agreement with A. Rwsa's FNL as a first step in ending the armed conflict which began in 1993.
- The ceasefire between the Sinhalese government and Tamil guerrillas in Sri Lanka broke down, leading to a heavy escalation in violence in the country.

This section contains an analysis of the armed conflicts being fought around the world during 2006 (indicator no. 1). The chapter is divided into four sections: the first offers a definition and classification of the different armed conflicts currently in course, the second discusses the way they have evolved over the past year, with special emphasis on the status of each one at the end of the year, the third contains a closer analysis of other aspects relating to this issue and the fourth gives a map showing the countries involved in some kind of armed conflict during 2006.

1.1. Armed conflicts: definition and classification

An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving armed groups of regular or irregular forces of various kinds which, in an organised way and using arms and other destructive methods, claim more than 100 victims per year. This classification of an armed conflict based on the number of victims should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. This definition does not include situations arising from other forms of violence such as ordinary criminal acts. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country. The existence of a temporary cessation of hostilities in a particular context does not necessarily mean the end of an armed conflict. To this one should add the issue of terrorism, which has led to a new interpretation of international relations and the deligitimisation and simplification of the discourses put forward by armed opposition groups that use violence to achieve specific

Figure 1.1. Conflict phases



political objectives. This chapter does not deal with conflicts that have not yet entered an armed stage, even though the dispute from which hostilities originally sprang remains unresolved, as these contexts are analysed in chapter 3 of this report (Peace Processes) from the perspective of the way in which peace negotiations to resolve the conflict in question are progressing. Figure 1.1 shows the sequence usually followed by armed conflicts, as summarised by the first four chapters of this report.

The armed conflicts currently being fought are characterised by the fact that most of them are **internal**, i.e. happening within the borders of a particular individual state. Very few are actually being fought between two states. However, the majority of these armed conflicts involve a significant regional or international dimension and influence, due among other things to the flood of refugees that they provoke, the arms trading that results, the financial interests (such as the legal or illegal exploitation of resources) or political interests that neighbouring countries may have in the conflict, or the fact that armed opposition groups seek refuge or establish bases in neighbouring countries and receive logistical or military support from neighbouring governments. In some cases, neighbouring governments or international coalitions even become directly involved in the fighting.

The terms **regular and irregular forces** are understood to refer to the combination of **warring factions** participating in a particular armed conflict, which will generally involve a government or its armed forces fighting one or more armed opposition groups. However, there are other cases in which confrontations can arise between clans, guerrillas, warlords, opposing armed groups or ethnic or religious communities.¹ Although conventional weapons are the most commonly used in the majority of conflicts, particularly small arms (which cause 90% of the deaths in conflicts, the victims being mainly women and children), other weapons are used on many occasions, such as suicide attacks, terrorism and sexual violence.²

The most common **causes** of the main armed conflicts can be arranged into the following groups: **1)** disputes relating to **political power** (where difficulties are observed in the handover of power, the fragility of the democratic system and, in short, the struggle for political power); **2)** disputes relating to the dual issues of **autonomy and independence**, which involve the existence of minority groups (or in some cases, majority groups) with claims on and aspirations towards political power based on individual affirmations that have not been satisfied; and **3)** disputes relating to **resources, land and population** (inter-community confrontations, fighting for the control of natural resources, conflicts resulting from regional marginalisation or the demographic colonisation of one community by another). In the majority of cases, however, these causes do not arise in isolation but are instead inter-related.

1.2. Evolution of armed conflicts

At the end of 2006, there were **21 armed conflicts** around the world, **the same number as in 2005, marking a break in the recent downward trend in the number of armed conflicts**, as shown in Figure 1.2. On the one hand, the cessation of hostilities between the government of the Philippines and the

At the end of 2006, there were 21 armed conflicts around the world.


MILF armed opposition group remained in place, while, on the other, the ceasefire that had been in place in Sri Lanka since 2002 finally broke down, leading to a rising tide of violence. In addition, the expansion of the armed conflict in Darfur, combined with conflictive movements inside neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic led to both these

latter countries experiencing spiralling levels of violence with the most serious of consequences. This negative scenario was further added to by Israel's invasion of Lebanon, which led to a war lasting 33 days in all. On a more positive note, a peace agreement was signed between the Burundian government and A. Rwas'a's FNL, bringing an end to an armed conflict which had started in 1993, while the government of Nepal reached

1. School of Peace Culture, Alert 2006, *Report on Armed Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building*, Icaria, Barcelona, 2006, p. 27. See Table 1.3., at <<http://www.escolapau.org>>.

2. In preparing this chapter, account was taken of incidents which were not perpetrated using conventional forces but which nevertheless led to the deaths of a number of people through the use of a deliberate and systematic process of destruction.

Figure 1.2. Number of armed conflicts and their regional distribution between 1990 and 2005



Source: Harbom, L. and Wallensteen, P., *SIPRI Yearbook 2006, "Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts 1990-2005"*, Uppsala, 2006.

an agreement with the Maoist CPN group following King Gyanendra's renunciation of direct rule from the palace.

Chart 1.1. Armed conflicts in 2006*

Africa	Algeria, <i>Burundi</i> , Chad, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo (Kivus and Ituri), Nigeria (Niger Delta), Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), Uganda
America	Colombia
Asia	Afghanistan, India (Assam), India (Jammu and Kashmir), <i>Nepal</i> , Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), Philippines (MILF), Philippines (NPA), Sri Lanka, Thailand
Europe	Russia (Chechnya)
Middle East	Iraq, Israel-Palestine, <i>Lebanon</i> ³

* The conflicts that ended during 2006 are shown in italics.

As regards evolution, 11 of these conflicts experienced a deterioration as compared with the beginning of 2006, particularly within the triangle formed by Chad, the Central African Republic and Sudan (Darfur), along with Somalia in Africa, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka in Asia and Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon in the Middle East. The situation improved slightly in Uganda (with the establishment of a cessation of hostilities), DR Congo and India (Jammu and Kashmir). Mention should also be made of the fact that the ceasefire continued to hold between the government of the Philippines and the MILF. Finally, there was no particular change

Table 1.1. Regional distribution of armed conflicts, 2001-2006

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Africa	12	12	10	10	8	9
America	1	1	1	2	1	1
Asia	12	12	10	10	9	8
Europe	1	1	1	1	1	1
Middle East	1	1	2	2	2	2
Total	27	27	24	25	21	21

Source: Alert 2002-2007, *Report on Armed Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building*, Icaria, Barcelona, 2002-2007.

3. As we have already mentioned, an armed conflict broke out in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion, though by the end of the year this was no longer classified as an armed conflict and was thus, like Burundi and Nepal, not included when counting the number of armed conflicts underway at the end of 2006.

in five contexts of conflict during the course of the year. As far as regional figures go, Asia saw the least change, while the number of conflicts in Africa rose in absolute terms over the last twelve months, with new outbreaks of violence in Chad and the Central African Republic.

Africa

At the end of 2006 there were **nine conflicts** underway in Africa, and while the armed conflict in Burundi was finally brought to an end (following a peace agreement between A. Rwasa's FNL and the government), two new conflicts broke out in the Central African Republic and Chad, and it remains to be seen how the situation in the south of Sudan will develop following the return to violence at the end of November.

The main developments seen during 2006 were the end of the transitional phase in DR Congo and the serious regional crisis which emerged in Chad and the Central African Republic as a result of the influence of the situation in Darfur.

The main causes for conflict were the same as had been noted in previous years: the struggle for political power (democratic fragility which often results from the legacy of the colonial and post-colonial periods) and disputes over the control of natural resources, two issues which are themselves inter-related. A large number of these involve a **significant regional dimension**, and there is a **multiplicity of armed groups** involved in the evolution of these conflicts. The main developments seen during 2006 were, on the one hand, the end of the transitional phase in DR Congo, which culminated in the

holding of elections (the first since the country's independence) and the formation of a new government led by J. Kabila, and, on the other, the serious regional crisis which emerged in Chad and the Central African Republic as a result of the influence of the situation in Darfur.

Table 1.2. Armed conflicts in Africa during 2006

Armed conflicts (beginning)	Main armed participants ⁴	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Algeria (1992)	Government, GIA, GSPC	Political and economic control (natural resources) by the army against the Islamic opposition, religious and ethnic confrontation	Stalemate
Burundi (1993)	Government, A. Rwasa's FNL	Political control by an ethnic minority and difficulties in the handover of power	End of armed conflict
Chad (2006)	Government, FUC, SCUD	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power	Deterioration
Côte d'Ivoire (2002)	Government, <i>Forces Nouvelles</i> , pro-government militias	Marginalisation of certain regions, democratic fragility, political exclusion	Stalemate
Nigeria (Niger Delta) (2003)	Government, militias from the Ijaw, Itsekere and Urhobo communities, private armies, MEND, MOSOP	Control of political power and natural resources, social and political exclusion	Deterioration
Central African Republic (2006)	Government, APRD and UFRD, various militias	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power	Deterioration
DR Congo (1998)	TNG, factions of armed groups included in the TNG, Mayi-Mayi militias, armed Ituri groups, FDLR	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power and control of natural resources	Improvement
Somalia (1988)	GFT, SICS, Ethiopia, non-aligned warlords and militias	Absence of practical democracy, struggle for regional political power, confederation v. federation	Deterioration
Sudan (Darfur) (2003)	Government, pro-government militias, SLA-Minawi, SLA-AI-Nour, SLA-Qassem Haj, JEM, NMRD, NRF	Regional and political marginalisation	Deterioration
Uganda (1986)	Government, LRA	Messianic religion and regional marginalisation	Cessation of hostilities

a) West Africa

Although some positive advances were seen in the political situation and the peace process in **Côte d'Ivoire** during the first months of 2006, the second part of the year was marked by a deterioration in relations between Prime Minister C. K. Banny and President L. Gbagbo, along with persisting incidents of violence in a number of parts of the country, all of which gave rise to a **potentially explosive situation**. At the request of the AU, in October the UN Security Council approved the **extension of the transitional period for a further 12 months, re-establishing the balance of power between the two leaders** so that C.K. Banny could govern independently, gain authority over the security forces and resolve a number of disputes on issues such as the disarmament programme, the voter-identification process, the dismantling of militias, the re-establishment of state authority throughout the whole country and the implementation of electoral reforms.⁵ This decision was rejected from the sectors who support L. Gbagbo on the grounds that it was anti-constitutional. Although there were no significant violations of the ceasefire between government armed forces and the *Forces Nouvelles* opposition coalition, acts of violence against the civilian population were reported in many parts of the country, particularly the south and the capital, Abidjan (most of them led by militias loyal to L. Gbagbo, such as *Jeunes Patriotes* and *Groupe Patriotique pour la Paix*), as well as fighting in areas in the west of the country close to Liberia and in Guiglo.

Nigeria is immersed in a political crisis which is further exacerbated by the persistent violence reported in the **Niger Delta** region.⁶ This situation worsened at the end of the year with the announcement that elections would be held in April 2007, news that was greeted with a number of acts of political violence that can be expected to increase as election day gets nearer. In this connection, 2006 saw an **increase in pressure from the military on armed groups and civilians accused of supporting the insurgency in the Delta region**, leading to an escalation in levels of violence. Attacks on police stations continued, along with kidnappings and the occupation of oil platforms by armed groups, mainly the MEND, who are seeking greater control by the local authorities over the income obtained from oil revenues, together with increased transparency in the use of the profits obtained from this resource. Reports by the United Nations and the ICG⁷ recognised the claims of these armed groups as legitimate, though they condemned the methods they were using in their attempts to realise these ambitions.

b) Horn of Africa

At the end of 2006, **Somalia** was facing a **fresh outbreak in violence that could have serious consequences for the entire region**. This latest upsurge resulted from a number of changes that occurred during the course of the year and reopened the wounds caused by an episode in the country's recent history, the disastrous US-led international intervention at the beginning of the 1990s. The year began with deadlock within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), due to the division between those who were in favour of a move to Mogadishu and those who supported setting up in Jowhar. The middle of the year saw serious fighting between a US-financed alliance of warlords in Mogadishu and the Union of Islamic Courts (which would subsequently change its name to the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (SICS), though it continued to be referred to by its original name). Some of these warlords were also members of the TFG. The fighting ended in victory for the SICS, which subsequently extended its control over the whole of the centre and south of the country, re-establishing security, implementing Sharia law in the areas under its control and establishing itself as a growing threat to the TFG, which in turn was showing itself to be increasingly fragile (with the area under its control reduced to the city of Baidoa and its surroundings), fragmented and openly supported by Ethiopia. There were unsuccessful contacts between the TFG and the SICS to prevent a confrontation, while at the same time the SICS militias continued to make territorial advances and Ethiopia and

At the end of 2006, Somalia was facing a fresh outbreak in violence that could have serious consequences for the entire region.

5. See the chapter on post-war rehabilitation.

6. See the chapter on tensions.

7. International Crisis Group, *Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment*, Africa Report no. 119, 25/10/06, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/west_africa/119_nigerias_faltering_federal_experiment.pdf>.

other countries in the region became more involved, supplying weapons to both sides in violation of an embargo that had been in place since 1992.⁸ This climate of increasing tension was further worsened during the course of the year by the debate over the establishment of a regional peace-keeping mission, which the SICCS rejected with the threat of a holy war against any potential occupiers, a situation which sprung from the US proposal to the UN Security Council that this mission be created at the end of November, along with the Ethiopian offensive in December in support of the TFG, the force of which resulted in rapid defeat for the Islamic Court militias and the retaking of Mogadishu. Added to this was the openly admitted military intervention from the USA, in pursuit of those supposedly responsible for attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

Turning to the Sudanese region of **Darfur**, the situation of violence and humanitarian disaster continued to worsen as the year went on (around 300,000 dead since the disaster first unfolded in 2003, 220,000 people living as refugees in Chad, more than four million people depending on humanitarian aid), taking on regional proportions as its influence extended to the Central African Republic, having already had an effect on Chad. The year was marked by repeated **violations of the ceasefire reached between the government and some of the groups that signed the (as yet unimplemented) peace agreement** reached in the middle of the year, and by fighting between different factions of the SLA, all of which led to a general deterioration in the situation. The government of **O. Al-Bashir also reiterated its refusal to allow the deployment of a UN peace-keeping mission** in the area to replace the AU's mission, which is unable to control the situation. Such a mission, which should number around 20,000 troops, can only be deployed in the area with the blessing of the Sudanese government, a decision backed by China in the UN Security Council, and this is impeding the international community's efforts to put an end to the serious human rights violations that are taking place. At the end of the year, Sudan was still postponing a decision on this issue, using strategies such as partially accepting a hybrid solution involving both the AU and the UN and then subsequently rejecting it. For their part, both the USA and the United Kingdom threatened to apply fresh sanctions from the beginning of 2007 if this latest proposal was not accepted. At the same time, the AU extended its mission's mandate in the country for a further six months to June 2007.

The crisis situation affecting the **Central African Republic** since the middle of 2005 **got steadily worse during 2006**, originally because of the criminal actions of the government of F. Bozizé aimed at concealing the magnitude of the problem. The country was therefore affected by three separate elements. Firstly, there is the *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et de la Démocratie* (APRD), the armed group which has been active in the populous centre and north of the country during recent years and is led by a former member of the armed forces, B. N'Djadder. The APRD states that it does not have any support from foreign elements, nor is it linked to the country's former President A.F. Patassé. Secondly, there is the upsurge in fighting in the sparsely populated northeast of the country, where since October a coalition of groups fighting under the banner of the *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR) has led an armed uprising against the government of F. Bozizé in protest against its policy of exclusion, accusing him of running the government along ethnic lines. The UFDR has in turn been accused of links with the deposed President A.F. Patassé. This coalition has succeeded in gaining control over a number of cities in the north, and has expressed a willingness to begin peace negotiations in order to arrive at a new power-sharing arrangement. Finally, there was an upsurge in violence in the west of the country along the border with Cameroon, with many incidents of looting and attacks on the civilian population. Given this situation, which has already led to the enforced displacement of more than 220,000 people within the country, 45,000 refugees to the south of Chad and a further 30,000 to neighbouring Cameroon, the regional organisation CEMAC said that it would be willing to support the Government and increase the contingent of 350 soldiers that make up its regional peace-keeping mission (FOMUC). **France has also given both logistical and military support to the government** and was even involved in fighting with the UFDR, arguing that it acted legitimately in self defence.

8. Carta de fecha 21 de noviembre de 2006 dirigida al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Presidente del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 751 (1992), por la que adjunta el informe definitivo del Grupo de supervisión para Somalia, S/2006/913, de 22/11/06, <<http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/comitesanciones/751/SomaliaSelSp.htm>>.

Chart 1.2. The triangle formed by the Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan

Since the armed conflict broke out in Darfur in February 2003, **the situation along the three-sided border formed by these three countries has continued to deteriorate** as the result of a number of issues. The humanitarian crisis that arose as a result of the wave of refugees and began to extend towards eastern Chad merely served to highlight the many structural problems affecting various African governments of which this region offers a clear example. Some of these can also be extrapolated to the situation in Sudan itself. Particular mention should be made of the **minimal attempts by the Chadian and Central African governments to guarantee security and humanitarian assistance in the region, the serious governance problems, the proliferation of bands and militias and the fragile control exercised by the authorities in both countries**, which only continue to survive through the use of appointments based on ethnic and family ties, particularly in the case of Chad. Here, the discovery of oil has only served to weaken the already fragile state of I. Déby's government, in spite of support for a more transparent international involvement in the management of the revenues obtained from its exploitation. The Chadian executive is being challenged by a number of political and armed opposition groups as a result of their political exclusion and the absence of mechanisms that would allow them to participate in a political system designed by a leader whose family clan has gradually swallowed up all opposition. In the case of the Central African Republic, the successful coup d'état against President A. F. Patassé and the various electoral processes that have been subsequently held in order to legitimise the coup leader, F. Bozizé, have not been accompanied by any real process of reconciliation or structural change that might put an end to the social and economic difficulties that this country has suffered since independence.

At the same time, **Chad** was forced to declare a six-month state of emergency in November in the face of **increased violence in the east** of the country. The rising number of attacks by militias from Darfur was accompanied by an increase in the activities of armed opposition groups active in the east throughout the year and attempts by the government to resolve the situation by military means, while an initiative calling for National Dialogue was boycotted by the two main opposition forces, the CPDC and the FAR, because the offer of talks did not extend to all political and military movements. A number of different militias spread chaos in the east of the country (which has been left unprotected since the Chadian army was moved to the capital, which suffered a large-scale attack in April and was threatened with another at the end of the year), attacking dozens of towns and villages, while Chadian armed opposition groups supported by Sudan looted the border town of Abéché. This town had acted as the distribution and coordination centre for humanitarian aid to Sudanese refugee camps and the more than 90,000 Chadians who had been displaced as a result of the violence. Given this situation, the humanitarian agencies withdrew all their non-essential personnel and moved their general headquarters to Cameroon. For its part, the **United Nations sent a fact-finding mission to the region to discuss options for the deployment** of a monitoring mission or a **peace-keeping mission** along the border, a proposal welcomed by both Chad and the Central African Republic.

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Burundi**, in spite of the signing in September of a **definitive ceasefire agreement between the government and A. Rwaswa's FNL**, bringing an end to a conflict which had begun back in 1993, **the political situation suffered a serious deterioration following the assumption of power by the democratically elected government in September 2005**, a situation that could cause a setback to all the progress and successes achieved during the peace process. Before the agreement was signed there was sporadic fighting between the security forces and the FNL and many cases involving the detention, torture and disappearance of people supposedly linked to the FNL, for which members of the Burundian armed forces were blamed. This serious political crisis could even affect the implementation of the ceasefire agreement reached with the FNL. The **authoritarian approach of the new CNDD-FDD-led government** was made clear with the arrest of critical opposition members, pressure on the media and numerous human rights violations by the security forces in a climate of complete impunity. The most notable example was the supposed attempted coup in July, which led to the detention of a number of opposition political leaders, including former President D. Ndayizeye, who was accused of involvement in the coup. Both ONUB, which was replaced at the end of the year by a political office (BINUB) and other local and international human rights organisations denounced the continuing use of sexual violence, extra-judicial executions, detention and torture at levels similar to those seen during the conflict itself.

The situation in **DR Congo** was characterised by the **persisting violence and lack of security** in the east of the country, mainly in the provinces of North and South Kivu and the Ituri district (Orientale), and by the tensions that arose from the holding of the country's first democratic parliamentary and presidential elections since independence. There were several confrontations during the course of the campaign between sympathisers of the different opposition parties, with constant complaints of fraud in the build-up to the election. After the first and second rounds (30 July and 29 October respectively) **there was an upsurge in violence in the capital between the militias of the two main candidates and contenders in the second round** (current President J. Kabila, leading the *Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle* coalition, and the Vice President of the outgoing transitional government and former rebel leader J. P. Bemba, who heads the *Union pour la Nation* coalition) which threatened to wreck the process. However, in spite of the numerous irregularities reported by the Independent Electoral Commission and international observer missions, the elections were declared transparent, with victory for J. Kabila, who took 58.05% of the votes as compared with J. P. Bemba's 41.95%. Intervention by both MONUC and the EU's mission in the country (EUFOR DR Congo), combined with calls for calm and agreements signed by the two main contenders managed to bring the situation under control. In spite of his expressed unhappiness J.P. Bemba agreed to lead the opposition in the country's new parliament. There was further fighting after the elections around the town of Sake, in North Kivu, provoked by dissident militias led by L. Nkunda, an illustration of the difficult challenges that this country still faces today.

Chart 1.3. Post-electoral challenges for a country in permanent transition: DR Congo

The armed conflict affecting **DR Congo** has left around four million people dead since 1998 in what has become known as the African First World War, given the involvement of up to eight countries in the region. **This war remains one of the most serious and forgotten wars of present times, in spite of the formal completion of a peace process between 2002 and 2003** which led to the formation of a National Government of Transition. This was finally dissolved following the elections in July and October.

President J. Kabila's victory in the second round of these elections on 29 October was ratified by the Supreme Court, endorsing the provisional results announced by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The Court declared that complaints from J. P. Bemba that the elections had been fraudulent were unfounded. The results showed deep territorial divisions in the support for the two candidates, as the west of the country and capital (mostly Lingala-speaking) voted in the main for J. P. Bemba, while the Swahili-speaking east voted mostly for J. Kabila. The armed conflict had mainly affected the east of the country. J. P. Bemba, who had originally threatened not to recognise the results of the elections and whose supporters had set fire to the Supreme Court building and fought with police in protest against the alleged fraud, expressed unhappiness at the Supreme Court's decision but stated that he was prepared to lead the opposition to J. Kabila's government. According to the IEC, more than 1.4 million people voted on the omitted persons and displaced voters lists (respectively set up for registered voters whose names did not appear on the electoral rolls and people voting outside their constituency because they were working away). The EU's electoral observer mission stated that even if the fraudulent use of these registers had favoured the same candidate in all the electoral areas, this would not have represented more than 650,000 votes, and the candidates were separated by more than 2.6 million.

Nevertheless, in spite of the completion of the electoral process, **the challenges still faced by the country are huge**, most of them a direct consequence of the armed conflict, the country's colonial past and the actions of Field Marshal Mobutu, who turned the country into his own private empire. The **judicial system** needs to be rebuilt from the ground up in order to put an end to impunity, **corruption** persists in many areas of the administration, particularly in relation to the illegal exportation of natural resources, the **security sector** requires reform, and issues of **poverty** and **social injustice** must be tackled, along with the serious **humanitarian crisis** affecting millions of people and the **violence** that persists in the east of the country due to the presence of various militias and armed groups that have not yet integrated into the Congolese armed forces. Mobutu's successors, L. Kabila and his son, J. Kabila, have shown themselves to be incapable of combating this lack of governance, corruption and plundering of natural resources (when they have not actually been responsible for it), and the international community has often remained silent. Evidence of this can be found in United Nation reports⁹ on the role played by many foreign companies, some of them from the western hemisphere, in the looting of the country's natural resources.

The armed conflict affecting the north of **Uganda** was in the same position at the end of 2006 as it had been at the end of the previous two years: **fragile peace talks** between the government and the LRA armed opposition group **remained hanging by a thread due to the lack of trust between the parties**. While the latest advances could yet suffer a reversal, there have recently been encouraging signs, such as the signing of a cessation of hostilities on 26 August after several months of negotiations in Juba in southern Sudan, an agreement that was renewed on 1 November. This mainly provided for the stationing of the LRA's forces in two camps close to the border with southern Sudan, Owiny Ki-Bul and Ri-Kwangba, so that talks could continue.¹⁰ However, the LRA suspended its involvement in the process at the end of November as a result of a violation by government armed forces of the cessation of hostilities, an essential condition for the continuation of these contacts. Until the cessation of hostilities was signed there were continuing acts of violence against the civilian population and military operations by government armed forces against the LRA, though security in the region was notably improved once the signing ceremony had taken place. Nevertheless, in spite of this relative improvement in the situation, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for children in armed conflict from 1997 to 2005, O. Otunnu, declared at the beginning of the year that the country was **the worst place in the world for children to live at this time** (it is estimated that 935,000 of the 1.7 million displaced people in the north of the country are children), blaming both the LRA and the government for the situation of violence and the human rights violations against the civilian population. He stressed that the death rate was double that recorded in Darfur. Mention should be made of Y. Museveni's victory in the February elections, the first multi-party presidential elections held in 26 years, though the Constitution had been revised in order to allow him to stand for a third term. The main opposition leader also complained of fraud, and the elections took place in a climate of tension.

d) Maghreb and North Africa

In **Algeria**, the GSPC Salafist armed opposition group continued to launch attacks throughout the year, while government armed forces mounted counter-insurgency operations in various parts of the country and even in the capital itself. The **amnesty**, which was declared last February and finally ended in August, **was a failure** since, according to the authorities, **only between 250 and 300 rebels out of an expected 800 took advantage of the process**. This amnesty, which to date has also meant the release of around 2,700 Islamists who had been found guilty but had not engaged in group killings, was not accepted by **the GSPC, which reaffirmed its loyalty to al-Qaeda**, a link that it had declared back in 2003. The group also stated that it would continue its Jihad in Algeria under guidance from O. Bin Laden. Several European intelligence services warned that some of the released prisoners were intending to return to the GSPC, an organisation which still has around 1,000 active members in the country. Evidence of the GSPC's active status and alliance with al-Qaeda and the GSPC came with the **upsurge in armed activities by the Salafists** during the last three months of the year, with a number of acts of violence in Algeria, reviving memories of some of the worst moments of the 1990s.

America

Turning to the American continent, the only armed conflict that currently remains ongoing is the one in Colombia, where it should be noted that the DDR process set up for the different paramilitary groups is undergoing its worst crisis of the last two years.

Armed conflicts (beginning)	Main armed participants	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Colombia (1964)	Government, FARC, ELN, AUC paramilitaries	Historical political exclusion, social injustice, control of natural resources and deterioration in the conflict resulting from drug-trafficking	Stalemate

10. See the chapter on peace processes.

2006 saw some significant changes in relation to the different armed groups in **Colombia**. On the one hand, the paramilitary groups organised under the banner of the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) completed a demobilisation process which had begun back in 2004 and involved some 30,000 paramilitary fighters. 10% of these could be tried under the Justice and Peace Act, a controversial instrument of transitional justice designed to regulate the crossover into civilian life. At the same time, 15 of the organisation's main leaders await potential extradition to the USA after being accused of drug-trafficking. However, while the OAS has complained about the appearance of new paramilitary groups, the **penetration of the paramilitaries in all the different institutions of state** became ever more apparent, an issue which had given rise to a considerable constitutional crisis by the end of the year. Elsewhere, at its 4th Annual Congress in August the ELN guerrilla group reaffirmed its desire to enter political negotiations with the government. This group did not engage in any effective military activity during 2006, with the rather surprising exception of a number of skirmishes with the country's main guerrilla movement, the FARC, which left hundreds dead during the second half of the year. The FARC group continued its regular attacks against the government with sporadic offensives throughout the country. The civilian population was once again the main victim of this conflict. At the end of October, the first attempt at talks between the FARC and the government in four years was frustrated with the explosion of a car bomb in the *Escuela de Guerra* shortly before the two sides were due to meet. Finally, it should be mentioned that government armed forces were involved in a series of scandals that included the murder of civilians, links with drug-trafficking and various attacks.

Asia and the Pacific

There were eight conflicts on the **continent of Asia**, the main causes being **demands from certain regions for independence within individual countries and religious divisions**. The Philippines and India account for five of these eight conflicts, the common factor being problems of governance which result in demands for a greater degree of self-governance from some regions. The exploitation of natural resources, religion and the marginalisation of the region in which disputes are being raised are also elements which fan the flames of these problems. In comparison with the situation in Africa, the United Nations has a much smaller role in the different stages of conflicts in Asia.

Armed conflicts (beginning)	Main armed participants	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Afghanistan (2001)¹¹	Government, international coalition (led by the USA), Taliban militias and various groups	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power and ethnic confrontations	Deterioration
India (Assam) (1989)	Government, ULFA, NDFB	Autonomy v. independence, and control of economic resources	Stalemate
India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989)	JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	Autonomy v. independence and religious confrontation	Improvement
Nepal (1996-2006)	Government, CPN	Control of political power and democratic fragility	End of armed conflict
Philippines (1969)	Government, NPA	Control of political power and democratic fragility	Deterioration
Philippines (1978)	Government, MILF, SVO	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious confrontation	Temporary suspension of hostilities
Philippines (1990)	Government, Abu Sayyaf	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious confrontation	Deterioration
Sri Lanka (1983)	Government, LTTE	Autonomy v. independence, religious confrontation	Deterioration
Thailand (2004)	Government, PULO, Bersatu, BRN, BIPP, GIMP	Autonomy v. independence, religious confrontation	Stalemate

11. The current phase of the armed conflict in this country began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has actually been in a situation of armed conflict since 1979.

a) South Asia

The situation in **Afghanistan** was once again marked by a **significant upsurge in violence and attacks** by Taliban militias, operations by government armed forces and US troops against these militias and suicide attacks. This latest upsurge resulted from the **deployment of NATO troops in the south of the country** (they have now taken over command of military operations in the region) after these duties were handed over to them by the USA in what is the organisation's first ground deployment on non-European soil. While local sources reported that just 1,500 people had died during 2005, this figure rose in 2006 to 3,700, according to a study prepared by the Afghan government, the United Nations and representatives of the international community. Among other things, the violence has resulted in the halting of development work in certain parts of the country and the closure of schools in the south (Chart 1.4.). According to the ICG,¹² the bloody fighting that has been seen in the south and east of the country (from where it could spread to the capital) has made it necessary to deploy more international troops in the region, a point made by NATO chiefs at the Riga summit at the end of November though rejected by the European members of the ISAF force. Finally, the Pakistani government reached an agreement in September with tribal groups in North Waziristan, a part of Pakistan that is close to the Afghan border and in which the state authorities have practically no presence. The Taliban militias have a great deal of support in this region, and have been using it to consolidate their presence there and increase their incursions into Afghanistan. Under this agreement, the tribal groups have promised to end their support for the Taliban militias, though the overall situation is still beyond the control of either the Pakistani government or the tribes who signed the agreement.

Table 1.5. Deaths caused by the ISAF and the USA's Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001-2006

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
USA	12	48	48	52	99	97	356
ISAF	0	20	9	6	31	91	157
Total	12	68	57	58	130	188	513

Source: Operation Enduring Freedom, 02/12/06.

There are currently two contexts of violence in **India**. There were continuing reports of sporadic fighting throughout the year between government armed forces and Kashmiri independence groups in the state of **Jammu and Kashmir**, though the Indian government withdrew 5,000 troops as a result of the improved security situation in the area. At the same time, a certain amount of progress was made in the peace talks between India and Pakistan,¹³ talks which were not affected by the attack which took place in Mumbai in July. Elsewhere, in the state of **Assam**, a number of armed groups have been involved in a dispute with the Indian authorities for several decades, claiming independence and fighting for the rights of local communities. Although there were fewer reports of fighting between the Indian security forces and the ULFA armed opposition group over most of the year, there was an upsurge in violence and attacks by the ULFA towards the end of the year, leading Delhi to announce the deployment of a further 2,000 troops in the region, which in turn gave rise to concerns about a potential increase in military operations and the consequences that this could have on contacts between the Indian government and the ULFA.

There was a **significant and positive improvement in the situation in Nepal** over the course of the last year. After a month of intense protests against his authoritarian regime, King Gyanendra found himself **unable to withstand the social pressure** and was forced to order the **reopening of the Nepalese Parliament**, which he had suspended four years previously. Military action by the Maoist armed opposition group, combined with well-attended social demonstrations supported by the democratic opposition, brought hundreds

12. International Crisis Group, *Countering Afghanistan Insurgency: No Quick Fixes*, Asia Report n.123, 021106, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/librarydocumentsasiasouth_asia123_countering_afghanistans_insurgency.pdf>.

13. See the chapter on peace processes.

of thousands of people onto the streets of the country's major cities calling for an end to the dictatorial regime of a King who had himself perpetrated a form of coup d'état at the beginning of 2005. The acts of violence and fighting between the country's armed forces and the CPN were halted half-way through the year. After the appointment of G. P. Koirala as the new Prime Minister and the formation of a new government that included four of the seven democratic parties that had led opposition against the regime, the opposition called off their protests against the King and the government announced **an indefinite ceasefire. This was followed by a peace agreement between the two parties aimed at bringing the armed conflict to an end.** Although the Maoists continued to engage in kidnappings, the ceasefire was generally respected, and a definitive peace agreement was eventually signed by **the Government and the CPN** on 21 November.¹⁴ The Maoists will form part of the transitional government, and elections for seats on a constituent assembly will be held in mid-2007. It should be stressed that this peace agreement not only brings the armed violence to an end, it also represents the beginning of a democratic process to tackle the structural causes that lie behind this cycle of violence.

Chart 1.4. Education: a military target

When the impact of armed conflicts on civilian society is analysed, the effects on the education sector are often overlooked and therefore not taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the extent of the violence perpetrated against this sector has meant that this issue is now beginning to be analysed in some contexts, as is the case in the three most active armed conflicts currently underway in Asia, **Afghanistan, Nepal and Thailand**, as well as the situation in **Iraq**, since violence is having important consequences on members of the educational community, who is now treated by many combatants as a military target.

Turning first to **Afghanistan**, the serious situation facing the education sector was highlighted by a recent attack, in which two women teachers and three members of their family were killed in the southern province of Kunar in the middle of December, bringing the number of teachers murdered during 2006 to 20. The Taliban militias prohibit girls from attending school and are opposed to any form of education for women. They also attack any kind of teaching that does not follow religious lines. These militias are attempting to continue the rules imposed by the regime that governed a large part of the country during the second half of the 1990s until it was finally driven out by a US invasion in support of the Northern coalition in 2001. In 2006 alone, 198 schools were burnt down. The second case is **Nepal**,¹⁵ where many references have been made to the effect of the armed conflict on the educational sector, particularly in relation to the country's children. Schools became battlegrounds and were used for military ends by the warring parties. Amnesty International has published reports of cases in which teachers were tortured and executed because they would not yield to the demands of one side or another, or because they were suspected of supporting an opponent, and hundreds of children and their teachers have been abducted or kidnapped for the purposes of indoctrination. Almost 200 teachers have been killed in Nepal, while a further 3,000 have been forced to move as a result of the conflict, with the inevitable knock-on effect for education as a whole. Thirdly, in **Thailand**, teachers are frequently given a military escort as they have become symbols of the government control represented by the governing Buddhist majority in the south of the country where there is a Muslim majority. Dozens of teachers have been killed in the region, causing thousands of their colleagues to seek a transfer to other parts of the country. Schools have also become military targets, with dozens burnt down since the latest incidents of violence began to escalate in 2004. Finally, in **Iraq**, the Education Ministry reported that at least 280 academics and intellectuals had been murdered and around 30% of all teachers, doctors, chemists and engineers had fled to neighbouring countries since the US invasion in 2003, with clear consequences for standards of education and health in a country that enjoyed very high levels of service in both areas prior to the embargo that followed the first Gulf War in 1991. A report from the *Brookings Institution* puts the brain drain as high as 40%.¹⁶

These four examples point to two very significant problems: one is the violence suffered by both the educational establishment and people with academic training, the root causes of which vary from context to context, and the other is the knock-on effect that this violence creates, such as the enforced displacement of certain groups of people and, more specifically, a brain drain, effects that will have a direct detrimental effect on future generations in the countries in question.

As regards the situation in **Sri Lanka**, a number of serious incidents during the course of the year led to the **resumption of open armed conflict** in the second half of the year, leaving hundreds of people dead and

14. See the chapter on peace processes.

15. Amnesty International, *Nepal: children caught in the conflict*, ASA 31/054/2005, 26 July 2005, <<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa310542005>>.

16. Brookings Institution, *Iraq Index-Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*, Washington, 21 December 2006, <<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>>.

causing the displacement of thousands more. Tamil leader Prabhakaran declared on 27 November that, given the way the situation had evolved, he was left with no other option but to press for the creation of an independent state, a statement which in the eyes of many analysts represented the *de facto* expiry of the ceasefire agreement. Paradoxically, his statements prompted President M. Rajapakse to offer to continue his existing direct talks with the Tamil leader. Nevertheless, serious human rights violations were committed by both sides in the conflict, who acknowledged that more than 3,000 civilians had died as a consequence of the fighting. Government armed forces accused the LTTE of using civilians as human shields.

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

In the **Philippines**, the situation in all three armed conflicts was marked by a lack of progress towards any kind of negotiated peace and a continuation of the violence. An **aborted coup attempt** in February led to the **temporary imposition of a state of emergency** throughout the country, a measure that remained in place until the beginning of March.¹⁷ This set off a series of serious human rights violations against members of the political opposition and left-wing groups. There was also an increase in fighting involving the **NPA** armed opposition group during the course of the year. As far as the conflict between the government and the **MILF** armed opposition group is concerned, there were **sporadic breaches of the ceasefire**, and while these did not threaten to disrupt the peace process, talks remained **blocked from September onwards over the issue of the rights and boundaries of the ancestral territories of the Bangsamoro people**. At the same time there were a number of incidents between the MILF and the CVO, the security groups working for the Governor of Maguindanao. There were also tensions within the MILF itself, caused by some of the more intransigent factions who question the leadership of M. Ebrahim. The most notable positive aspect was the reactivation of the Joint Observer and Assistance Team, whose aim is to oversee the maintenance of security and stability in Maguindanao and assist the return of the more than 50,000 people displaced in the region. The replacement of the military detail deployed in the region by another group that is more practised in peace-keeping issues led to a reduction of tensions in the area and the start of the return of the displaced population. Meanwhile, on the tenth anniversary of the signing of the peace agreement between the government and the MNLF armed opposition group, several members of the group expressed their unhappiness at the lack of progress in implementing the agreement and the continuing house arrest of their leader, N. Misuari. This led to speculation about the possibility that unhappy factions within the MNLF were working with Abu Sayyaf on the island of Jolo (in the Sulu Archipelago). Finally, **during the second half of the year the government intensified its military offensive against the Abu Sayyaf armed opposition group**, saying that it was close to achieving a definitive military victory over the rebels. More than 6,000 soldiers, with technical assistance from the USA, were engaged in fighting on the island of Jolo, where the group has its main base. The military aim is to defeat these Abu Sayyaf militants, who it is estimated number around 200.

Turning to **Thailand**, the country underwent significant political changes during the course of the year, and these could have repercussions on the violent situation affecting the three Muslim majority provinces in the south of the country, where 1,800 people have died since January 2004 (an average of more than 50 people every month). The climate of political tension that had been sparked in February with accusations of corruption directed at Prime Minister T. Shinawatra and the mass demonstrations that finally led to elections being called in April (though these were boycotted by the opposition and declared null and void by the Constitutional Court) culminated on 19 September with a bloodless coup d'état by an army faction led by the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, S. Boonyaratglin. The army dissolved the government and suspended the Constitution, establishing martial law with the blessing of King B. Aduyadej and setting up a new civilian government of transition shortly afterwards. This was led by retired General C. Surayud, who announced that elections would be held the following year and that a new draft Constitution would be drawn up. At the end of November, the interim government lifted martial law in 41 provinces but retained it in 35 (the north and northeast of the country, where the deposed Prime Minister

17. See the chapter on tensions.

has his support base, the troubled provinces in the south and the majority of the border provinces). As regards the violence affecting the south of the country, **public places were bombed and set on fire throughout the year**, forcing the closure of hundreds of schools. The educational establishment has become one of the main victims of the conflict, with more than 30 teachers killed since the violence erupted. C. Surayud began a campaign to deal with the conflict, publicly regretting the deaths in 2004 of more than 80 civilians in Tak Bai, removing activists in the south from blacklists, withdrawing charges against the Tak Bai demonstrators, giving Islamic law a more important role in the region and calling on the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand to cooperate in the process. For its part, the National Legislative Assembly set up a commission to investigate the violence in Pattani, which will start with the recommendations made to T. Shinawatra by the former National reconciliation Commission.

Chart 1.5. Exodus from southern Thailand?

At the end of 2006, the Thai authorities expressed their public **concerns that the violence in the south of the country would lead to an exodus of people**, mainly among the **Buddhist** population. Some political leaders in the southern provinces indicate that the abandonment of the region by certain groups has already begun to have an impact on social structure (fall in the percentage of non-Muslims) and economic activities in the region, mainly among Buddhists and those of Chinese descent. In this same connection, some academics have warned that the only reason why more people are not moving is the precarious financial state in which the majority of the population find themselves.

The fear engendered by the **random daily acts of violence** that have affected the region since 2004 has been exacerbated by a number of recent events. Firstly there are the now frequent pamphlets, which call for the creation of an independent state (governed by Islamic law and inhabited by the Muslim population and which support the separation of people along ethnic lines, comparing the situation in the south of Thailand with other high-intensity conflicts such as Afghanistan. Secondly there is the fact that hundreds of people have taken refuge in Buddhist temples after their communities have been attacked. Thirdly, there is the personal interest shown by the royal family (who are regarded reverentially by the population) towards the situation faced by these people and the construction of provisional displacement centres. Lastly, the specific attacks on two symbolically significant groups (teachers and monks) have led to the closure of schools, the interruption of some regular religious practices by monks and the abandonment of the region by some members of these communities, which has in turn significantly demoralised broad sectors of the population.

While all these elements have very serious implications, to the point that *Human Rights Watch* has called attention to the situation and denounced the use of **violence by the Muslims to expel the Buddhist population and exercise social controls**, certain issues should be taken into consideration. Firstly there is the ideological bias that informs the majority of the communications media, which systematically attribute all the violence in the region to armed secessionists. Secondly, a number of reliable sources say that state armed forces are implicated in disappearances, torture, extra-judicial executions and other "dirty war" tactics which are subsequently attributed to armed organisations. Such practices were systematic under the previous administration of T. Shinawatra. Thirdly, local political, military and economic parties have an interest in overstating the situation of chaos and violence in the south in order to benefit in a number of ways. Finally, while the available information is generally confusing and official data remains scarce, reports from some research centres indicate that the violence is having a greater impact on the Muslim community than on the Buddhists.

Europe and Central Asia

The situation of violence in Chechnya continued throughout the year, spreading to some neighbouring republics.

Table 1.6. Armed conflicts in Europe in 2006

Armed conflicts (beginning)	Main armed participants	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Russian Federation (Chechnya) (1991)	Russian government and the pro-Russian administration in Chechnya, Chechen armed opposition groups	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate

In the republic of **Chechnya** (Russian Federation), the climate of violence saw no improvement during the course of the year. Particular mention should be made of the murder of A. Sadulayev, who had replaced the historic leader and President of the separatist government, A. Maskhadov, following his assassination in 2005, at the hands of the Russian security forces. In addition, the leader of the independence movement and Vice President, S. Basayev, died in an explosion in July in Ingushetia, an incident for which the Russian authorities claimed responsibility, though independence leaders claimed that the cause was an accidental detonation of explosives. After Basayev's death, an **amnesty was introduced for armed opposition members**, though this had little success. In September, D. Umarov, A. Sadulayev's replacement, **withdrew the offer made by the Chechen resistance at the G8 conference in Russia to take part in peace talks with Moscow**. In this regard, and in response to Moscow's attempts to conceal the conflict and harm the legitimacy of separatist demands by reducing them to their most violent form of expression, international observers estimate that, to date, **more than 100,000 civilians, soldiers and insurgents have lost their lives during the last twenty years as a result of this conflict**. At the same time, the Russian NGO *Memorial* and the International Human Rights Federation accused Chechen and Russian security forces of **imposing a regime of terror in the republic**, engaging in systematic abuses of human rights and applying anti-terrorist policies that act as a *de facto* cover for the use of torture, abductions for political and financial purposes (there were 143 in 2006), summary execution and arbitrary detention.

Middle East

The main new event during 2006 was the armed conflict that followed Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the middle of the year. This further exacerbated the situation affecting the entire region and once more highlighted the international community's powerlessness and lack of political will to resolve a conflict that has lasted for more than 50 years and has effectively allowed the Israeli government to act with complete impunity. Mention should also be made of the endless spiral of violence in Iraq, where fighting between Shiite and Sunni militias steadily increased over the course of the year, leaving Iraqi civilians as the main victims.

Armed conflicts (beginning)	Main armed participants	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Iraq (2003)	Transitional government, US/United Kingdom coalition, internal and external armed opposition groups	Struggle for political power, ethnic and religious manipulation, opposition to the presence of foreign troops and access to oil resources	Deterioration
Israel-Palestine (2000, 2nd Intifada)¹⁸	Israeli Government, settlement militias, PNA, armed wings of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organisations, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP, DFLP	Occupation, colonisation and control over land, religious confrontation, security problems and political recognition	Deterioration
Israel-Lebanon (2006)	Israeli government, armed wing of the Hezbollah organisation	Territorial dispute, impact of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, social and political fragility	Deterioration

Turning to the armed conflict between **Israel** and **Palestine**, 2006 saw one of the most violent incidents since the beginning of the 2nd Intifada with the Israeli offensive in Gaza in June. The year began with the unexpected **victory by Hamas in the parliamentary elections in January**, in which it gained an absolute majority, winning 74 of the 132 seats as compared with Fatah's 45. At the same time, **Kadima emerged victorious in the Israeli elections of 28 March**. The PNA suffered a serious financial crisis, exacerbated by the blockade and isolation of its government by the international community as a result of Hamas's victory at the ballot box. The blockade was led by Europe, the USA and Israel, who said that they refused to work with a government they regarded as terrorist, leading to a further deterioration in the political and humanitarian sit-

18. Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report only examines the most recent phase of the conflict relating to the 2nd Intifada, which began in September 2000.

uation in the occupied territories. The Hamas victory also led to an upsurge in violence between supporters of both Al Fatah and Hamas, which continued through to the end of the year and further intensified the situation of chaos and lack of governance in Palestine. At the same time, increased military operations by Israel in the region led Hamas at the beginning of June to **end the self-imposed ceasefire that had been in place for 16 months**. Subsequently, the capture of an Israeli soldier at the end of June by several armed Palestinian groups demanding the release of prisoners led to a **huge attack on Gaza by the Israeli army** and the detention of around one hundred members of the government and Palestinian parliament. However, this was immediately eclipsed by **Israel's invasion of Lebanon** (see Chart 1.6.). A fragile ceasefire between the Israeli government, the Palestinian Authority, Islamic Jihad and the militias of the Popular Resistance Committees came into force on 26 November, aimed at putting an end to the violence in Gaza which had claimed the lives of more than 400 Palestinians in four months, most of them civilians. At the same time, Hamas and Al Fatah tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a government of national unity, and President M. Abbas therefore brought forward the next elections to 2007.

Chart 1.6. Lebanon: the 33-day war

Israel's bombing of **Lebanon** on 12 July marked the beginning of a conflict that would last 33 days until the signing of a permanent ceasefire on 11 August, under UN Security Council Resolution 1701. In spite of frequent incidents in the region the increase in hostilities in July was caused, according to Israeli sources, by the launching of rockets against northern parts of Israel and the kidnapping of two of its soldiers by the Lebanese Hezbollah group, which both Iran and Syria are accused of supporting. The conflict, which broke out shortly after the Israeli offensive in Gaza, **cost the lives of around 1,200 Lebanese, most of them civilians, with the destruction of a lot of strategic structures and many homes** in the south of the country and parts of the capital. Around one million Lebanese were also forced to abandon their homes. On the other side, following attacks from Hezbollah (which was demanding that Lebanese prisoners be released in exchange for the soldiers), **around 150 Israelis died**, the majority of them soldiers, while more than 300,000 people were displaced. Resolution 1701 demanded, among other things, the **deployment of Lebanese and UNIFIL peace-keeping forces throughout the south of the country and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the region**. It also demanded an end to the Israeli blockade and the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. Hezbollah declared that it would accept Resolution 1701, though it viewed it as unfair. The conflict had inevitable repercussions on Syria, which stated that it did not want to see any international deployment along its border with Lebanon and that it was offering its political and moral support to Hezbollah.¹⁹

The **sectarian violence** in **Iraq** continued to worsen during 2006 following an attack on the mosque in Samarra in February, with Baghdad suffering most. The number of deaths among the US-led coalition had reached nearly 3,200 by the end of December, 3,000 of them coming from the ranks of the US army. At the same time, a study published in October indicated that the number of people killed since the beginning of the armed conflict may have reached a total of 655,000.²⁰ The Iraqi Health Ministry estimated the number of deaths at around 150,000, a figure which still indicates the serious extent of the violence seen in Iraq, particularly during the last twelve months, and the catastrophic failure of the US intervention in the country. One of the areas most affected by the violence remains the educational sector (see Chart 1.4). This rising tide of violence has called the enforced displacement of thousands of people towards the mainly Kurdish north of the country, raising **fears of a new area of conflict**, given the fact that this region is rich in oil and the ethnic rivalries between the different communities in the area. The Iraqi government's attempts to halt the violence, including its promotion of the National Reconciliation Plan presented at the end of June and the offer of an amnesty for some insurgents, have had little effect. Meanwhile, the Iraqi authorities identified a total of 25 insurgent groups across the country and there were reports of the **growing influence of Shiite cleric M. al-Sadr and his al-Mahdi army** at both a political and military level.

19. See the chapter on tensions.

20. Burnham G., Lafta R., Doocy S. and Roberts L., *Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey*, John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, 11 October 2006, <<http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf>>.

1.3. Other issues linked with armed conflicts

The following is an analysis of one of the issues that is closely linked with armed conflicts, namely the way in which armed conflicts affect natural resources.

Armed conflicts and natural resources

The **presence of abundant natural resources** like oil, diamonds, other kinds of minerals and precious stones, along with the cultivation of timber and **certain illegal crops** (coca, opium), **have helped encourage and sustain a number of ongoing and recent armed conflicts**, such as the ones in Angola, Colombia, DR Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sudan. A wealth of resources may also lead to the initiation of an armed conflict and cause it to be prolonged over time. In addition, competition for access to scarce resources like water or struggles to obtain ownership over land have also frequently resulted in the emergence of situations of violence and confrontation.

However, does the fact that certain countries with significant natural resources have suffered the consequences of armed conflicts necessarily presuppose the existence of a relationship between the presence of these resources and the wars that they have endured? Several researchers²¹ have analysed this issue and attempted to offer a plausible response by suggesting five questions that can be asked in relation to the relationship being examined: 1) does the existence of natural resources influence the outbreak of an armed conflict?; 2) could the existence of natural resources bear any kind of relationship with the length of time a conflict lasts?; 3) do natural resources have an influence on all kinds of armed conflict or only those that result from ethno-political or separatist claims?; 4) do all kinds of natural resources have some kind of relationship with armed conflicts or just some of them (such as oil or diamonds)?; 5) what causal mechanisms link natural resources and armed conflicts?

Firstly, the outbreak of an armed conflict may cause dependency on the exploitation of natural resources because agricultural and manufacturing activities are abandoned as a result of the existence of a situation of violence throughout the country. The mining sector, which is notable for its localised nature, is more easy to protect and can be used to obtain huge profits in the short term, thus easily becoming the largest source of revenue for the warring parties. Typical examples of this are the cases of Angola and DR Congo, both of which were affected by wars during the 1990s in which the warring parties controlled the exploitation of strategic natural resources (oil and diamonds in the case of Angola, and gold, diamonds, coltan, uranium and timber, *inter alia*, in the case of DR Congo). This situation led to the enforced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, depriving them of access to agriculture as a traditional form of subsistence and even causing certain (non-mining) companies to close down their operations because their activities were restricted by the existence of levels of violence in which the state was unable or unwilling to guarantee a climate of security. Furthermore, the correlation between these armed conflicts and dependence on natural resources could result from other variables that have not been studied, such as the fragile rule of law or deficiencies relating to governance and the functions of the public authorities, situations that would make life complicated for manufacturing industries given the difficulty of working within the country's legal framework.

The presence of abundant natural resources like oil, diamonds, other kinds of minerals and precious stones, along with the cultivation of timber and certain illegal crops have helped encourage and sustain a number of ongoing and recent armed conflicts,

21. *Inter alia*, Ross, M.L., "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 3, London, Sage Publications, 2004. Elbadawi, I. and Sambanis, N., "How much war we will see?", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 46, no. 3, London, Sage Publications, 2002. Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, Oxford University, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford, 2002.

Table 1.8. African countries involved in armed conflicts or situations of tension in which blood diamonds²² have been found since the 1990s

Angola	Congo	Guinea	Sierra Leone
Central African Republic	Congo, DR	Liberia	Zimbabwe
Chad	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	

The countries shown in bold are currently engaged in armed conflicts.

In short, these studies suggested four models relating to the link between natural resources and armed conflicts.²³ Firstly, exports of crude oil are linked with the start of a conflict. It has even been argued in this regard that there is a more important correlation between the exploitation of raw materials and the existence of separatist or inter-community conflicts. Secondly, resources that can be easily plundered and transported (such as drugs and diamonds) are directly connected with the length of time a conflict lasts. Thirdly, another series of studies underlined the fact that the exploitation of agricultural products bears no relation to armed conflicts. Finally, the raw materials themselves are not that closely linked with the outbreak of an armed conflict. It can be concluded from these studies that the correlation will be stronger or weaker depending on the natural resource being examined and the case in question, as well as on the different kinds of armed conflict that are taken as a basis for analysis, all of which may alter the results and any potential correlation that may exist.

Oil and armed conflict

Table 1.9. Countries involved in armed conflict or situations of tension that have important oil resources

Africa	Angola, Algeria, Chad , Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Sudan
America	Colombia , Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela
Asia	India , Indonesia, Thailand and Timor-Leste
Europe and Central Asia	Azerbaijan, Russia , Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
Middle east	Iran, Iraq , Syria and Yemen

The countries shown in bold are currently involved in armed conflicts.

This section focuses on the main conclusion, the relationship between **oil** and armed conflict. There is an increasing body of evidence to suggest that the **exploitation of oil can be found to have been present at the outset in many of today's armed conflicts and situations of tension**, and also that the income resulting from its exploitation is rarely reinvested in improving the living conditions of the majority of the local population. A number of oil-producing countries are currently the scene of armed conflict and tensions and, in many of these cases, the will to control this resource and the uneven distribution of the revenue it generates form the main reasons for dispute. Examples of this can be found in the armed conflicts currently taking place in the **Niger Delta** and the south of **Nigeria**, along with the serious situation of tension currently felt in the region of **Cabinda** in Angola.

In the Niger Delta, the dispute over **political and economic control of the region** continues among the different Delta communities, with attacks on government armed forces and paramilitary groups, as well as against the transnational oil companies. Attacks by armed militias against oil rigs belonging to the transnational oil companies in the country have left hundreds of people dead since 2002, and the kidnapping of oil workers has on several occasions forced the closure of some of the country's oil-drilling facilities. It is estimated that these persistent attacks and the theft of oil have led to the loss each day of between 20% and

22. This term refers to diamonds that originate from regions affected by armed conflicts.

23. Ross, M.L., "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 3, London, Sage Publications, 2004.

30% of the country's oil production, representing around half a million barrels. One of the armed groups responsible for the attacks, the MEND, which has links with the Ijaw community, is demanding control over the profits from oil production in the region. As far as the Angolan enclave of **Cabinda** is concerned, various groups began a **struggle for the enclave's independence and the right to manage its own resources** a full decade before the former Portuguese colony was annexed by Angola in 1975. Following the military defeat of the FLEC pro-independence armed group in 2003, Cabinda has been under the control of more than 30,000 members of the Angolan armed forces, who violently suppress the sporadic outbreaks of violence that still break out in an enclave which has a population of half a million people and produces more than one million barrels a day. A number of peace initiatives have been launched over the years, but the situation remains fragile.²⁴

In recent years, dependence on oil has raised a great deal of interest, particularly as many analysts link US foreign policy with the US government's desire to establish greater strategic control over the world's main oil reserves, **Iraq** being a case in point. The USA has also increased its presence and interest in Africa, with 15% of its oil imports now coming from the continent. This figure is expected to rise to 20% by 2010. At the same time, **political instability and armed conflict have slowed the expansion of the oil industry in Africa** and other parts of the world, though the demand for oil from China and India and the reduction of oil reserves in other parts of the world has meant the arrival of Chinese investment on the African continent and increased interest in Central Asia, in spite of the serious problems experienced in some of the countries towards which investment is directed. As a result, the USA and China will play an important role in the future of Africa as a continent (see Chart 1.7). The challenge will be to find a way in which both of these powers, together with all the other western countries that depend on oil, can include the initiation of peace processes and the promotion of human rights and democratisation on their agenda in oil-producing countries around the African continent and other parts of the world, while ensuring the efficient monitoring and extraction of oil as a secure energy source.


Chart 1.7. China, in search of African oil

China has gradually increased its interest in Africa to the extent that it is now the continent's third most important partner after the USA and France. This issue was highlighted with the holding of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing,²⁵ which was aimed at strengthening the Asian country's investment in the African continent, thus demonstrating China's increasing importance in the region and its desire to obtain some of its wealth of natural resources, including oil. The majority of agreements involve the removal of customs tariffs for African products in China and oil concessions for this huge Asian power. In spite of the fact that the expansion of the Chinese market with its cheap production costs could seriously damage local African production in the event that its manufacturers gain free access to the African continent, it should be remembered that China purchases 60% of Sudan's oil and that Angola accounts for 18% of its crude oil imports, while it still makes significant energy investments in Nigeria: **African oil now represents one third of all China's imports of crude**. China wants to project its relationship with Africa as being designed as an agreement between equals that does not exploit its partners' resources. Above all, it wants to show that it will not interfere in their internal affairs or operate some hidden agenda in its desire to support the development of individual countries in Africa. In this regard, China's indulgent attitude towards some African states whose leaders are responsible for serious human rights violations has led to many criticisms and raised concerns from the international community, as is the case in its dealings with R. Mugabe's regime and its refusal in the UN Security Council to force the Sudanese government under O. El-Bashir to accept a peace-keeping mission in Darfur.

24. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

25. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), 16 November 2006 <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zxxx/t280369.htm>>.

Armed conflicts



■ Countries engaged in armed conflict (indicator no. 1)

★ Ending of armed conflict during 2006 (indicator no. 1)

2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes


- The election of Evo Morales in Bolivia was greeted with protests from certain sectors angry at agricultural reforms and the nationalisation of the energy sector, with a particular rise in tensions between the central authorities and some of the more prosperous regions which are seeking independence.
- The deterioration in relations between Russia and Georgia had a negative influence on attempts at dialogue in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with the latter approving independence in a referendum that was not recognised by the international community.
- Demonstrations in Lebanon showed just how fragile conditions remain in the country following its armed conflict with Israel, underlining the need for regional rapprochement.
- In his report on conflict prevention, the UN Secretary General denounced the unacceptable gulf between rhetoric and reality in the area of prevention.

This chapter identifies and analyses the different contexts of tension seen around the world during 2006 (indicator no. 2) and is divided into five different sections: the first describes the contexts of tension and their individual characteristics; the second contains an analysis of the way tensions and high-risk disputes have evolved and may in some cases escalate into armed conflict; the third refers to other situations of lesser tension; the fourth offers an analysis of some of the issues relating to conflict prevention; and the fifth is a map showing all the current contexts of tension around the world.

2.1. Situations of tension: definition and characteristics

Situations of tension and high-risk disputes are understood to be contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the state, which involve alterations in the operation of the state's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and states of exception or emergency),¹ and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. It is possible that increased tensions in these contexts may, in the short or medium term, eventually explode into armed conflict (Section 2.2). We have also examined those contexts in which the situation of tension is **less intense** and, therefore, less likely to lead to armed conflict in the short or medium term, even though such situations nevertheless require particular monitoring and attention (Section 2.3).²

Figure 2.1. Geographical distribution of situations of tension



At the end of 2006 **there were 56 contexts of tension in all**. Some countries were involved in several of these (Uganda and India), while more than one situation of tension was reported within certain individual countries (as was the case with Sudan and Indonesia). There was no change from the previous year's total

1. For the purposes of this report, a state of emergency is understood to mean a situation in which constitutional order is disrupted with the restriction of certain basic freedoms. This term is used differently in different legislatures, such as, for example, State of Exception, interior disturbance, State of National Disaster, etc.

2. Both types of context (tension and reduced tension) include situations in which peace agreements have at some time been signed between opposing parties, though difficulties have been experienced in their implementation.

figure, though some of the individual cases changed: the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sri Lanka and Togo were no longer classified as situations of tension in comparison with 2005, while 2006 saw the addition of Iran, Mali, Senegal (Casamance), DPR Korea, Timor-Leste, Turkey and Yemen.

2.2. Evolution of situations of tension

The following sections contain an analysis of the 23 contexts of tension reported during 2006 as showing signs of considerable instability, some of which have the potential to escalate into armed conflict in the short or medium term.

Table 2.1. Tensions and high-risk disputes during 2006

Africa	Chad – Sudan, Eritrea – Ethiopia, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Great Lakes Region (DR Congo – Burundi – Rwanda – Uganda), Senegal (Casamance), Sudan (south), Zimbabwe.
America	Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Peru.
Asia	Philippines, Pakistan, Timor-Leste.
Europe and Central Asia	Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Uzbekistan.
Middle East	Iran, Lebanon – Israel – Syria.

Africa

Most contexts of tension during 2006 could be found on the continent of Africa. There were nine in all, with several of them affecting more than one country. Most of these situations of tension deteriorated notably, particularly those involving Chad / Sudan and Eritrea / Ethiopia, all of which were also experiencing serious levels of internal tension. In the Maghreb and North Africa, mention should be made of the elections held in Mauritania, which considerably reduced tensions in the country though without relieving them entirely.

a) Southern Africa

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Zimbabwe	Democratic fragility (political and economic crisis)	Increased tension

In **Zimbabwe**, the constantly rising rate of **inflation to levels in excess of 1,000%** led to a severe crisis for broad sections of the population. The main faction of the MDC opposition party led by M. Tsvangirai, called on the ordinary public to begin a **campaign of civil disobedience and passive resistance** against R. Mugabe's regime, calling for the creation of a new Constitution and the holding of free elections in the country. Given that demonstrating is illegal in Zimbabwe, the protests that were eventually held were sparsely attended and **brutally put down by the security forces**, which detained members of opposition parties and the unions. Many international organisations denounced the **massive human rights violations** in Zimbabwe, pointing to the statements by a number of opposition leaders who said they had been tortured by the police while in detention. The Zimbabwean government threatened on several occasions to confiscate the property of black farmers who were not cultivating the land they had been given after it was originally confiscated from the white farmers, when it was found that the total crop production of the country once known as "the bread basket of Africa" would not be sufficient to feed its own people. Finally, the governing **ZANU-PF party filed a motion proposing the modification of the country's Constitution to allow its leader, R. Mugabe, to remain in power until 2010**, meaning that both parliamentary and presidential elections would be held at the same time. This was greeted with indignation by broad sections of the civilian population.

b) West Africa

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Liberia	Control of natural resources, ethnic manipulation and struggle for political power, impact of regional crises	Reduced tension
Nigeria	Control of natural resources and religious manipulation, control of political power	Increased tension
Senegal (Casamance)	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of a minority group	Increased tension

Tensions in **Liberia** focused on the situation in rubber plantations occupied by former combatants, threatening the security of nearby towns and impeding the work of humanitarian organisations in the region. Some of these plantations were retaken by state security forces, though the situation in the region remains unstable. In addition, the **high level of criminality** in the capital, Monrovia, caused by the scant possibility of finding work, the large number of weapons in circulation and the restricted resources of a police force that is unarmed and still undergoing training, led to concerns about the stability and security of the general population. Nevertheless, the **reforms undertaken to date by the government of E. Johnson-Sirleaf have led to visible progress in the country's reconstruction.**

In **Nigeria** there were marked tensions in three different contexts over the course of the last twelve months. Firstly, **fighting between Christian and Muslim communities** in the north of the country left at least 100 people dead as a result of violence associated with the publication of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in Europe. Secondly, there were tensions between different communities in Plateau and Kawara states in the centre of the country over **control of land and resources**. Thirdly, there was a rising tide of **violence associated with the forthcoming elections in 2007**, with groups of mercenaries engaged by various political opponents responsible for the deaths of at least three State Governors. The **failure to decentralise** power in Nigeria remained a significant cause of tension, leading to fighting between the Biafran independence group MASSOB and police in Onitsha (Anambra State). This led to the establishment of a curfew in the city and left at least 20 people dead. Elsewhere, the action taken by the **Economic and Financial Crimes Commission**, which led to the removal of a number of Governors and members of parliament (including Vice President, A. Abubakar), combined with the violence which broke out in several states while primary elections were being held by the President's PDP party, further exacerbated the state of instability in the country.

In Nigeria, fighting between Christian and Muslim communities left at least 100 people dead as a result of violence associated with the publication of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in Europe.

Finally, there were three contexts of tension in western Africa which were notable for the instability that they generated around the region. The first of these was the Senegalese region of **Casamance**, where fighting broke out on three fronts: the armed forces in Guinea-Bissau mounted an offensive to expel members of the MFDC armed secessionist group; there was fighting between the two active factions of the MFDC, one led by M. Dieme which controls the north of the region and the other led by S. Sadio, which has its power base in the south; and the **government of Senegal launched a military operation** with the excuse that it was providing security for people in the region, causing a mass exodus of people to Gambia, with the **number of people displaced in the conflict estimated to have reached 6,000** in less than a month. The situation became more complicated at the end of 2006 following the hospitalisation in France of the leader of the MFDC faction who signed the peace agreements in 2005, as it was feared that his absence could mean a serious setback for the peace process in Casamance.

c) Horn of Africa

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Eritrea and Ethiopia	Territorial disputes	Increased tension
Ethiopia	Democratic fragility and governance problems	No change
Sudan (South)	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation, control of resources	Increased tension

As far as the border dispute between **Eritrea and Ethiopia** is concerned, the last twelve months saw a **deterioration in the situation due to the failure of both sides to make any progress towards demarcation**. In addition, Eritrea moved around 1,500 soldiers to the Temporary Security Zone during October, and both countries **increased their military support for opposing groups in Somalia, along with their presence in the country**. **Subsequently, the Ethiopian offensive in support of the Transitional Federal Government led to the defeat of the Islamic Courts**.³ It was also feared that this upsurge in violence would lead to the two sides clashing on Somali soil. Eritrea refused to lift its restrictions on UNMEE. Nevertheless, the Boundary Commission (EEBC) held its first meeting in three years in March, and several further meetings were later held in an attempt to relaunch the process. However, both sides made it difficult for the Commission to reopen its offices in their respective capitals, and at the end of November they rejected the EEBC's latest proposal to agree to border demarcation on paper, i.e. publish the border in 45 official UN maps, and leave physical demarcation to be completed within a year by the two countries themselves. The Security Council extended the UNMEE mission's mandate for a year, but reduced its troop numbers to 2,300 given the lack of progress.

There were still tensions in **Ethiopia** itself **as a result of political problems and the crisis of governance affecting the country, along with the actions of rebel movements** in various regions. As far as the first of these issues is concerned, the political climate deteriorated steadily over the course of the year as a consequence of the increasingly hard-line stance taken by the government. This translated into the persecution of opposition groups, the gradual replacement of civil servants by people with ties to the regime and the abandonment of the country by many members of the state authorities (judges, diplomats and members of the army). **Around 150 deserter members of the armed forces fled over the border into Eritrea, joining up with Ethiopian armed groups** based in the neighbouring country. These groups criticise the government for failing to resolve the crisis situation that followed the elections of 2005, accusing it of resorting solely to violent means in order to resolve the problem. As regards the uprisings in various parts of the country, military operations were mounted during the course of the year against opposition movements in Ogaden and the state of Oromia.

In some parts of **southern Sudan**, fighting increased during the course of the year between the SPLA and armed militias that have not yet been demobilised. In addition, the **many confrontations between government armed forces and members of the SPLA endangered the peace process** in the region following clashes in the city of Malakal during December, where humanitarian organisations reported up to 300 dead, though official figures put the number at 150, most of them military personnel on both sides. Another significant focus of tension were the disputes between various communities over control of grazing land and cattle. In addition, **the return of Sudanese refugees from DR Congo was impeded by the outbreak of violence in the region bordering Uganda and the areas around the southern Sudanese capital Juba**, where the parties responsible for a number of attacks and deaths remain unidentified.

3. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Chad - Sudan	Reciprocal allegations of support for armed opposition groups	Increased tension
Great Lakes region (DR Congo – Burundi – Rwanda – Uganda)	Control of natural resources, search for border security	Reduced tension

The last twelve months saw a significant deterioration in relations between **Chad and Sudan**, and in spite of diplomatic efforts in the region, particularly from the AU (agreements in February in Tripoli, framework agreement in August and restoration of diplomatic relations and cooperation between the two countries), **Chad continued to accuse Sudan of supporting Chadian armed opposition groups**. In this connection, following Sudan's refusal to accept the deployment of a UN peace-keeping mission on its soil, **Chad and the Central African Republic said they were in favour of the possibility of deploying a mission along the border between their two countries** in order to prevent the armed conflict affecting the Sudanese region of Darfur from extending across their borders.⁴

Turning to the **Great Lakes** region, mention should be made of the relative improvement in the regional situation due to the pursuit of a peace process in **Burundi**, the peace talks in the north of **Uganda** and, above all, the successful completion of elections in **DR Congo**. While these were held in a climate of tension, the situation did not, in the end, escalate into another crisis. Nevertheless, a number of outstanding issues remain which could still hinder the progress seen throughout the year, such as the situation involving the Rwandan armed opposition group, the FDLR, which called on the new government of J. Kabila to make an undertaking to resolve the armed group's dispute with Rwanda following the elections in DR Congo.

e) Maghreb and North Africa

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Mali	Demand for greater autonomy, marginalisation of a minority group	Reduced tension

In **Mali**, conflict arose once again between the central government and the Tuareg tribes in the north for a brief period, when a dissident group that did not recognise the peace agreement of 1998 violently occupied the cities of Kidal and Menaka, calling for greater autonomy and more investment in the region's development. Fighting ended following the signing of a new agreement in June, reached with mediation from Algeria, in which Mali's government undertook to increase the number and importance of projects associated with the development of the south of the country. Fighting was subsequently reported between the Tuareg Democratic Alliance for Change (DAC) and the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), which has links with the Al-Qaeda network, in an attempt by the DAC to prevent the GSPC from recruiting new members and extending its operations in the north of Mali.

Chart 2.1. Elections in Mauritania: opportunity and risk along the road to transition

19 November 2006 saw the **first parliamentary and municipal elections in Mauritania since the democratic transition process began in August 2005**. Paradoxically, it was a coup d'état and a military junta that set the process in motion and promoted change. Following an ambitious transitional process which was agreed by many different sectors of society and Mauritanian politicians alike, an electoral calendar was drawn up for the establishment of a National Assembly and the appointment of a President.

As part of this process, **the November elections appeared to consolidate this turning point in the democratisation programme** for a number of reasons. Firstly, they were the first elections to be held with democratic guarantees, a fact which was par-

4. See the chapter on armed conflict.

ticularly underlined by the use of a single ballot paper (a move specifically called for by the opposition and many civilian organisations), the invitation to the EU to send an observer mission and the establishment of an independent National Electoral Commission. Secondly, because turnout was very high (70%). And thirdly, because while it was not entirely stamped out, fraud was minimal (at least compared with past elections in the country).

It's true that **there were some negative aspects, beginning with the emergence of a huge number of independent candidates just a few months before the elections**, presumably encouraged by the military junta in power at the time. This proliferation of candidates created confusion among the electorate which probably contributed to the high number of spoiled votes. Nevertheless, it's also true that the possibility of taking part in elections in a climate of peace and, in general, freedom, reported by a press that enjoyed a certain degree of freedom of expression and criticism, led to the emergence of a feeling of participation and political negotiation with eminently positive prospects for the future.

However, **there are still threats to this process in a multi-ethnic country that has only recently emerged from conflict**. The highly visible consequences of more than 20 years of a highly repressive regime that repeatedly (and between 1989 and 1991 massively) violated human rights must sooner or later be addressed. The discovery of oil in a poor region in which the existing wealth is profoundly unevenly distributed (in spite of its past it is the world's leading producer of fish, with important mineral resources such as iron, etc.) is something which, if badly handled, could be a destabilising rather than a beneficial factor. The endemic corruption and continued siphoning-off of public funds, even in the light of the reforms implemented during the transition process, could also be difficult to resolve in the short term. In any case, the last and most important election in the transitional process, the **vote to elect a President in March 2007, will indicate the direction in which the country is headed**: either towards the consolidation of the country's political, social and economic advances or towards instability and a resumption of the unresolved conflicts and unhealed wounds.

America

The holding of long-awaited elections in Haiti in February led to improvements in the country's situation and advances in the transition process. In contrast, election processes in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru resulted in tensions that gave rise to strong divisions.

a) North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Haiti	Political and economic breakdown and social polarisation	Reduced tension

In **Haiti**, the holding of **presidential and parliamentary elections** in February led to a **significant reduction in tension** as compared with the previous year and **important advances in the political transition**

In Haiti, the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in February led to a significant reduction in tension and important advances in the political transition process,

process, since they resulted in the establishment of the country's first Parliament in a number of years and the replacement of the interim government of G. Latortue by a newly elected administration. After several days of continuous protests and acts of violence in the capital, former leader R. Préval (1996-2001) was named the country's new President amid accusations of fraud from his rivals, though the international community said from the outset that it was willing to work closely with the new Executive. The regional and municipal elections held during December, amid some reports of further violent incidents, brought the electoral cycle to an end in a year that had once again seen high levels of crime,

confrontations between armed gangs, sporadic demonstrations in favour of the return of former President J. B. Aristide and protests against MINUSTAH, which confirmed its intention to remain in the country for around 10 years, in spite of many critics who questioned its ability to guarantee the proper security conditions.

b) South America

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Bolivia	Problems of governance	No change
Ecuador	Problems of governance	No change
Peru	Problems of governance	No change

In **Bolivia**, although the convincing election of E. Morales as the country's new President led to the disappearance of a great many of the continuous protests that had been reported during the previous year, his coming to power caused unease among some foreign governments and social and political circles within Bolivia itself, leading to the emergence of some new points of friction. In the first place, the nationalisation of energy supplies led to ill feeling among most of the many energy companies operating in the country as well as creating diplomatic tensions with various governments. Secondly, the agricultural reforms announced and implemented by the government led to demonstrations from some corporate and social organisations. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, **tensions heightened throughout the year between the Executive and the wealthiest provinces in the east of the country** (Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija), to the point that some of them, particularly Santa Cruz, **formally sought independence from Bolivia**. Traditional differences between La Paz and these provinces regarding the way the country's natural resources should be managed, the way the provinces should be organised and land ownership issues were exacerbated by a dispute over the mechanisms put in place by the Constituent Assembly for the approval of a future Constitution.

The institutional crisis affecting **Ecuador** all year as a result of the confrontation between the President and Parliament over the formation of a Constituent Assembly was finally resolved in October and November with the holding of **parliamentary and presidential elections** in which R. Correa emerged victorious. During the campaign he had been accused of receiving funds from Venezuelan President H. Chávez. The first three months of the year had seen **huge and prolonged social demonstrations demanding the expulsion of the oil company OXY and the holding of a referendum on the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the USA**. In this connection, the US administration suspended negotiations over the treaty after Quito cancelled the oil company's operating contract on legal grounds. During the first half of the year, A. Palacio's provisional government declared a state of emergency in a number of Amazon provinces in order to deal with the many protests being mounted by several groups, some of which were hindering the production and supply of oil. Another massacre of civilians was reported in Amazonia (Pastaza Province) as a result of clashes between loggers and indigenous communities, leading the Executive to increase its security measures in the region.

In **Peru**, former leader A. García emerged victorious after an **intense presidential election process** that was principally notable for the interference from Venezuelan President H. Chávez and accusations that one of the candidates, O. Humala, had been involved in human rights violations during the armed conflict with *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path). At the end of 2006, a judge charged the former soldier with these offences, preventing him from leaving the country and ordering that his effects be provisionally seized. At the same time, a civil court sentenced *Sendero Luminoso's* leader and founder to life in prison, while other leading members of the group were given sentences of between 25 and 35 years. In this connection, **violent incidents between the country's armed forces and members of Sendero Luminoso were reported throughout the year in central parts of the country**, the area that had formed the main focal point of the conflict during the 1980s and 1990s. The alleged leader of the main *Sendero* faction offered a ceasefire (in return for political agreement and a general amnesty), though this was rejected by A. Garcia's government. Finally, mention should be made of the violent incidents reported during the municipal and regional elections in November, the protests mounted over the signing of a Free Trade Agreement with the USA and the warning from the Ombudsman that hundreds of social conflicts could escalate if they were not properly and promptly dealt with.

Asia

In Asia, Pakistan formed a particular focus for instability, mainly as a result of the attacks in the province of Baluchistan. There were also tensions in the Philippines, where there was an attempted coup d'état, and Timor-Leste, which saw the worst outbreak of violence since the country gained its independence.

a) South Asia

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Pakistan	Religious confrontation, the fight against terrorism, demands for greater control over local resources	Increased tension

There were two different contexts of tension in **Pakistan**, each of which evolved in a different way. The first involved the province of **Baluchistan**, where various violent episodes were reported, some of them very serious. **Repeated attacks** on infrastructure in the region were met with **counter-insurgency operations** by the Pakistani security forces. These operations were criticised by the opposition, which called for dialogue with Baluchi armed opposition groups. However, the main armed opposition group, the **BLA, was classified as a terrorist organisation and subsequently banned**, and one of the main leaders in the region, N. Akbar Bugti, was killed following one of these counter-insurgency operations, though this did not reduce support for the armed Baluchi insurgency, which would in fact appear to have increased, given the widespread feeling of grievance among the ordinary population. The second situation of tension involved the region of **Waziristan**, which borders Afghanistan and has been the scene of military operations aimed at combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban militias. The most important event of the year was the **signing of a peace agreement between the Pakistani government and these militias**, which paradoxically led to an **increase in violence in neighbouring Afghanistan**, due to the reduction in military operations by Pakistani armed forces.

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Philippines	Democratic fragility	No change
Timor-Leste	Mass dismissal of members of the armed forces; economic breakdown and institutional fragility	Increased tension

In the **Philippines**, President G. Macapagal Arroyo declared a **state of emergency** at the beginning of the year after the **armed forces had announced they had foiled an attempted coup d'état**. This move was also taken a few hours before the mass demonstrations called to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the popular uprising that put an end to the long dictatorship of F. Marcos and installed C. Aquino as the country's president in 1986. The order, which resulted in a number of confrontations between the police and thousands of demonstrators, was prompted, according to official sources, by an **alleged alliance between extreme right-wing factions in the state security forces and the NPA armed opposition group** (and its political partners in the NDF and CPP), aimed at overthrowing the President and destabilising the country. Elsewhere, a large number of civilian organisations mounted repeated protests against the government throughout the year in connection with the **wave of political assassinations** affecting the country in recent times. Some organisations indicated that more than 750 people (particularly journalists, activists, union members and social workers) have been murdered since G. Macapagal Arroyo came to power in 2001. In the face of pressure from these groups and even from some international organisations, the government set up a commission to investigate the killings, though it attributed them in the main to insurgent groups.

In **Timor-Leste**, the **worst outbreak of violence since the incidents that followed the referendum on independence in 1999** was mainly motivated by the **expulsion of almost 600 soldiers from the armed forces** (a third of their total number), leaving **dozens dead and causing the enforced displacement of**

around ten per cent of the country's population. Although tensions were notably reduced with the replacement of Prime Minister M. Alkatiri, (accused of being incapable of dealing with the problem and even of instigating the wave of violence) by Nobel Peace Laureate J. Ramos-Horta, the prompt deployment of an international military contingent, the extension of UNOTIL's mandate and its subsequent replacement by another mission with a new and broader mandate (UNMIT), the fact is that confrontations and acts of looting and pillaging continued throughout the year in a number of the camps housing the displaced, seriously hindering the return of people to their homes. The situation of unease, exacerbated by the actions of armed gangs with no obvious links to the armed forces, was further heightened at the end of the year when the leader of the expelled rebel soldiers escaped from a jail in Dili along with another 56 prisoners.

Europe and Central Asia

Tensions in this region focused around four different contexts. The case of Georgia was notable for the tensions arising from claims for regional independence and the problems associated with these claims. Turkey saw a rise in tensions arising from ethnic and political disputes and other internal problems. The situation in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was underscored by the extreme democratic fragility of their regimes.

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Georgia	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, independence of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia's regional influence	Increased tension
Kyrgyzstan	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, independence of the Ferghana Valley	Increased tension
Turkey	Political and social tensions, demands for self-government in Kurdistan	Increased tension
Uzbekistan	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, independence of the Ferghana Valley	No change

In **Georgia**, the year was notable for the climate of tension and the failed attempts at talks over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, further influenced by a deterioration in relations between Georgia and Russia. In the case of **Abkhazia**, the **violent confrontations** in the district of Gali at the beginning of the year were followed by an exchange of peace proposals from both sides in May and June. These were rejected on the grounds that they undermined the argument for self-determination (according to Abkhazia) and the integrity of the state (according to Georgia). In addition, **police operations carried out by the Georgian authorities against independence leader E. Kvitsiani** and a local militia in the Kodori Gorge raised tensions during the second half of the year. 2006 ended with heightened tensions in Gali. Turning to **South Ossetia**, Georgia attempted to strengthen its position in the conflict by suggesting a review of the 1992 peace agreement and replacing multilateral talks with bilateral negotiations. South Ossetia also reaffirmed its position, approving independence in an unrecognised referendum in November that further increased the divide between the two sides. Both of these contexts were influenced by the **serious crisis which developed between Georgia and Russia in the last four months of the year** as a result of the arrest of four Russian soldiers accused of spying. Despite their release, Russia's response was to **close down communications with Georgia and deport Georgian immigrants**. The policy of both governments in respect of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was a constant feature of the recriminations exchanged between both sides. This crisis also diverted attention away from opposition protests in Georgia in advance of the municipal elections in October.

A year after the Tulip Revolution, **Kyrgyzstan** remained immersed in **uncertainty and political crisis**. The **struggle for political power between President K. Bakiev (a former member of the opposition) and the Parliament**, in a regime that relies strongly on the cult of personality, remained the main focus of tensions, and these increased during second quarter of the year as a result of protests in the capital demanding constitutional and judicial reform and an internal crisis within the government that ended with a number of resignations. The crisis worsened during the last three months of the year, culminating in a week of **protests in the streets of Bishkek, with demonstrations involving both supporters and opponents of the President**. This polarisation also acquired a geographical ingredient, as the government was supported by

provinces in the south of the country while the opposition found backing in the north. Finally, the Parliament approved a **new Constitution** in November. **Prepared by a combined committee of opposition and pro-government parliamentarians, it is aimed at calming the crisis and establishing a greater balance of power between President and Parliament.** Despite this, the year ended without any resolution to the climate of tension, especially after the resignation of the government in December and the approval of amendments to the new Constitution aimed at strengthening the position of the new President against parliamentary opposition.

Alongside Kyrgyzstan, **Uzbekistan** continued to be another serious focus of tension in Central Asia. The fragility of the internal situation worsened around the **first anniversary of the incidents in Andijan in May 2005**, when security forces fired on civilian demonstrators leaving many hundreds dead and more than 400 displaced. In protest against these events and the absence of any transparent inquiry into the killings, members of the Uzbek opposition demonstrated in Tashkent, while groups of refugees protested along the border with Kyrgyzstan and in some capital cities around the world. One year on, **the government had still not apportioned any blame, and generally continued its policy of repression against political opposition, civilian groups and members of the media throughout 2006, closing down several NGOs and ordering UNHCR to leave the country in April.** The situation inside Uzbekistan raised criticism among the international community and human rights organisations throughout the year, with warnings about the lack of democratic progress, the possible collapse of the regime and the potentially destabilising effect that this would have on the rest of Central Asia.

The south-east of Turkey suffered a situation of **growing tension as a result of the unresolved conflict that has continued for decades between the Turkish government and the PKK armed opposition group.** At the end of March, the funerals of four PKK militants killed along with 10 other people in a military operation in the province of Mus formed the flashpoint for **several days of disturbances** that ended with seven people dead. Fighting between the army and Kurdish groups continued during the months that followed, leaving dozens dead on both sides and among the civilian population. Nevertheless, **the PKK**

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announced a unilateral ceasefire at the beginning of October in order to seek a negotiated settlement. This was rejected by the army, which continued to attack Kurdish rebels, while the government took a more ambiguous stance. At the end of the year, the PKK considered ending its ceasefire if the army persisted with its attacks. The general situation of tension was also heightened by a number of attacks in the capital and some tourist areas in the south of the country during the summer, responsibility for which was mainly claimed by the Kurdish armed group known as the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (*Tayrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan*

or "TAK"). The bombing in Diyarbakir, the most deadly in recent years, was condemned by Kurdish groups and led to demonstrations against the government, which was accused of being behind the blast. Other causes of lesser tension were the country's negotiations over entry to the EU and the conflict in Cyprus, two issues that are inter-connected, along with a number of internal political and social issues.

Middle East

In the Middle East, the increase in tensions centred around the nuclear aspirations of Iran, an issue which represented both the cause and one of the consequences of the deterioration in other contexts of conflict in the region. Tensions remained between Israel, Lebanon and Syria following the 33 –day war between Israel and Hezbollah.

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
Iran	International pressure, national reaffirmation	Increased tension
Lebanon - Israel - Syria	Territorial disputes, impact of the conflict between Palestine and Israel, social and political fragility	Increased tension

Iran played a big part on the world stage during the course of 2006. As far as the nuclear issue was concerned, the year ended without any agreement between the two opposing sides: the Iranian regime which, in contravention of the timetable set by the IAEA on 30 August, **refused to suspend its uranium enrichment, claiming that it was only for civilian use**, and the international community which, under the auspices of the UN and led by the USA and the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), finally approved a resolution in December 2006 imposing sanctions on the country.⁵ In the midst of all the international pressure on Iran, the outbreak of war between Hezbollah and Israel merely made matters worse: **Iran was accused of backing Hezbollah** and, in spite of calls from the UN Secretary General aimed at involving all the powers in the region in a search for solutions to the conflict, Iran was left out. As regards this issue's growing implications on the debate over the security situation in Iraq, the Iranian President declared in a meeting with his Iraqi counterpart that he was **willing to discuss regional issues with the USA** provided that he received a formal invitation to do so.

The endless armed incidents throughout the year between **Hezbollah and the Israeli army** and the confrontations along the Israeli-Lebanese border culminated in the outbreak of an **armed conflict that lasted 33 days**, ending finally on 14 August with a ceasefire resolution at the United Nations.⁶ The flashpoint for this conflict was the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and the death of eight Hezbollah fighters, leading to a large-scale Israeli assault. Nevertheless, the real causes go back much further and deeper and include issues such as the Israeli occupation of the Sheba Farms region in spite of its theoretical withdrawal from Lebanese territory in 2000. The conflict was fought out against a backdrop of **increasing internal polarisation in Lebanese political circles, a situation that worsened after the war had ended** and reached a peak at the end of the year. Continuous demonstrations by supporters of Hezbollah and the former Maronite General M. Aoun accused F. Siniora's government of pro-western bias, calling for its overthrow if it did not form a government of national unity, following the resignation of six Shiite Ministers. The **murder at the end of November of a Minister from the Phalange party**, the fifth prominent anti-Syrian Lebanese to be killed in two years, reawakened tensions and meant that President E. Lahoud's refusal to set up a Court to investigate the death of former Prime Minister R. Hariri became a new point of friction. While all this was going on, **Syria put itself in the eye of the storm**, firstly through its reticence to set up a court to review a death in which it had been implicated, then because of its support for Hezbollah (confirmed in a United Nations report),⁷ and finally because it was supposedly behind a plot to overthrow the government of F. Siniora (an accusation made by the USA).

It became ever clearer that the transformation of the long, complex and intertwined conflict in the Middle East required a regional approach involving all the different players without any unworkable pre-conditions.

Chart 2.2. Lebanon: today's weakness, tomorrow's danger

After the cessation of hostilities was declared in August 2006 following the 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah, the country's weaknesses were clear in a number of areas: Firstly, the year ended with mass demonstrations in the streets of Beirut, reflecting the **growing political and social polarisation of the country**. These protests were led by Hezbollah and aimed against the government, which it accused of being pro-western (among other reasons because of its wish to create an international court that would confirm the involvement of Hezbollah's ally, Syria, in the assassination of former Prime Minister R. Hariri). The singular feature of this situation was that the opposition brought together not only Shiite groups but also some of the Maronite Christian community led by General M. Aoun, a group that has traditionally been against Syrian power in the country. Thus, the events of the last two years and particularly the conflict in July have heightened the feeling that countries such as the USA and France are interfering. This realignment of loyalties will substantially complicate the political landscape in Lebanon.

This leads us on to a second worrying issue relating to the Lebanese situation (and one that is not at all new): its internal crisis has a **significant foreign component**. Firstly, the Bush administration has used the country in its regional strategy to protect Israel and

5. Security Council Resolution S/RES/1737 of 23/12/06 <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions06.htm>.

6. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

7. Final Report by the Monitoring Group on Somalia, S/2006/913 de 22/11/06, <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/627/40/PDF/N0662740.pdf?OpenElement>>.

attack Syria and, above all, Iran. Furthermore, the war in August and the turbulence that Lebanon suffered in the aftermath could be explained by the fact that the country is also the battleground for other conflicts: Syria v. Israel and Sunni Arab groups against the majority Shiites (Iran and Syria v. Hezbollah), among others. All of this is taking place within the context of the endless Israeli-Palestinian conflict that has provided Israeli with a basis to continue demonstrating its strength. For these reasons it became ever clearer that the transformation of the long, complex and intertwined conflict in the Middle East, including Lebanon, **required a regional approach involving all the different players without any unworkable pre-conditions.**

Another emerging cause for concern is linked to all the others: **UN resolution 1701**,⁸ which brought an end to the conflict in Lebanon in August, **did not tackle the deep-rooted causes** that led to the conflict. It failed to deal with the internal political situation and did not encourage a regional approach. It also contained a number of weaknesses and ambiguities (such as its failure to define UNIFIL's mandate and its vagueness when setting out a timetable), the result of the fragile way in which it was approved. This was reflected in way it was subsequently continually violated (Israel made attacks on Lebanese soil, delayed the lifting of its blockade and its withdrawal from Lebanon, and violated the country's air-space, claiming that it needed to stop Hezbollah rearming; actually, this rearming continued, as reported by United Nations sources in December).

Lebanon is therefore a broken country that essentially relied on the international community during 2006 for help with its rehabilitation (the Paris III donor conference was held in January 2007). Its foundations remain cracked as a result of its fragile internal situation and interference from the outside, and the task for the future is to try and shore them up.

2.3. Lesser situations of tension

The following are the 33 situations of tension that are regarded as being of lesser intensity, many of which can be found on the continent of Africa.

Table 2.2. Contexts of reduced tension

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
AFRICA		
Angola (Cabinda)	Autonomy v. Independence	Reduced tension
Congo	Political control over different ethnic groups and democratic fragility	No change
Equatorial Guinea	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)	No change
Ethiopia (Gambella)	Demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Reduced tension
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	Autonomy v. independence	No change
Guinea	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability), governance problems	No change
Mano River Region (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone)⁹	Widespread destabilisation due to enforced displacement and the flow of weapons and mercenaries	Reduced tension
Mauritania	Democratic fragility	Reduced tension
Nigeria (centre and north of the country)	Control over natural resources and religious manipulation	Increased tension
Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)	Territorial disputes	No change
Sudan (East)	Marginalisation of the region	Reduced tension
Tanzania (Zanzibar)	Struggle for political power	No change
Uganda-Kenya (Karamoja-Turkana)	Governance, regional marginalisation, inter-community confrontations over natural resources	No change

8. Security Council Resolution S/RES/1701 of 11/08/06 <[http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1701%20\(2006\)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1701%20(2006)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC)>

9. The Mano River region covers Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire is also taken into account here, given its proximity and its influence on the surrounding area. The situation of tension between the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso will also be analysed within the framework of this region.

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2006
AMERICA		
Guatemala	Political and historical exclusion, social injustice, failure to comply with peace agreements, impunity and organised crime	No change
Mexico (Chiapas)	Exclusion and economic inequalities	No change
Venezuela	Problems of governance	Reduced tension
ASIA		
India-Pakistan	Territorial disputes	No change
India (Tripura)	Autonomy v. independence	No change
Indonesia (West Papua)	Autonomy v. independence, religious disputes, demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Increased tension
Indonesia (Moluccas)	Religious differences, democratic colonisation, autonomy v. independence	No change
Indonesia (Sulawesi)	Religious differences, democratic colonisation	Increased tension
Myanmar	Democratic fragility and ethnic confrontations	Increased tension
DPR Korea	Nuclear programme, arms testing	Increased tension
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA		
Armenia	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	No change
Azerbaijan	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Reduced tension
Belarus	Democratic fragility (repression of political opposition)	No change
Moldova, Rep. (Transdniester)	Democratic fragility	No change
Serbia	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power	Increased tension
Serbia (Kosovo)	Demands for self-government	Increased tension
Turkmenistan	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	No change
Ukraine	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Reduced tension
MIDDLE EAST		
Egypt	Political and social tensions, repression	No change
Yemen	Struggle for political power	No change

2.4. Conflict prevention

Responsibility and a willingness to prevent

In his second report on the prevention of armed conflict, presented in 2006,¹⁰ the outgoing UN Secretary General K. Annan once again attacked the **unacceptable divide between rhetoric and reality in relation to conflict prevention**. This time, K. Annan regretted the international community's lack of commitment to prevention and called on member states to come up with more resources in this connection. Bearing in mind that United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) have cost 18,000 million dollars during the last five years, K. Annan underlined the fact that **if some of this money had been invested in preventive measures, the loss of both human life and money could have been avoided**. More specifically, the report suggested that individual states should allocate an amount equivalent to 2% of the annual peace-keeping budget to the prevention of armed conflict. Implementation of a commitment to make this allocation would have a twofold advantage, as it would also allow the organisation to budget for the amounts avail-

In his second report on the prevention of armed conflict K. Annan suggested that individual states should allocate an amount equivalent to 2% of the annual peace-keeping budget to the prevention of armed conflict.

10. *Progress Report on the prevention of Armed Conflict, A/60/891*, Report of the Secretary general to the UN General Assembly, 18/07/06 <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/Prevention%20Report.pdf>>. The first report dates from 2001, and in 2003 K. Annan presented a provisional report.

able. The report therefore signalled that **the lack of greater and more reliable financial resources was one of the reasons for the United Nations' failure in the area of prevention**. Could individual states invest more in prevention? The figure of more than 5,000 million dollars allocated to PKO during the 2005/1006 financial year appears to be a huge amount, but if one bears in mind that this only represents 0.45% of military spending during 2005 it doesn't seem so large. Is it therefore a question of economics?


This was not the only request that K. Annan made of member states in his report. For example, he called for the more creative and constructive use of sanctions, and said that peace-keeping operations should not end prematurely. He also identified defects in the United Nations system itself, such as the absence of a permanent debating forum, the lack of coordination mechanisms that would encourage more coherent strategy, and the absence of a complete institutional memory. In contrast to these weaknesses, 2006 stood out as the year in which **the Security Council assumed the principle¹¹ of the "Responsibility to Protect" ('R2P')**,¹² recognising the **responsibility of member states or, failing this, the international community, to protect their population** from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The acceptance of this doctrine was a hugely positive event. However, is the approval of a document sufficient for its principles to be taken into account?

2006 saw the outbreak of armed conflicts, the resumption of violence and the conversion of situations of tension into high-risk contexts. However, **it was the war in Iraq that forms the current benchmark in armed conflict, both for its virulence and for its repercussions on the world as a whole**. Given the US involvement in the Iraqi conflict, one should ask **what responsibility certain states have in the generation of conflicts**. We should also examine how contexts like Iraq and Israel and Palestine affect work on prevention. In this regard it could be said that **conflict prevention would be much easier in many parts of the world if, from the outset, conflicts such as those occurring in 2006 in the Middle east didn't happen**, since their enormous coverage in the press, their broad geopolitical repercussions and the strong resonance they create in many collective imaginations act as a brake on the transformation of many other contexts around the world. Given this situation, the most plausible response to the questions posed above would perhaps be that **without a real political willingness to prevent conflict, it would be difficult for a call to allocate more money to have any effect, or for the approval of an individual document to have sufficient repercussions**.

11. Security Council Resolution S/RES/1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, 28/04/06, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm>

12. Undertaken by Member States at the World Summit in 2005 (Document adopted by the UN Assembly General on 24/10/2006, paragraphs 138 and 139: <<http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html>>) and refined in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (<<http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp>>)

Situations of tension and high-risk disputes



3. Peace Processes¹

This chapter contains an analysis of conflicts in which negotiations to seek a peace agreement are currently underway, regardless of whether these are formal negotiations or currently in an exploratory phase, or whether they are proceeding in a satisfactory way or currently stalled. The majority of negotiations relate to armed conflicts, though this chapter also contains an analysis of some contexts in which, while there are currently no armed confrontations to speak of, the parties involved have not yet reached any agreement that might bring a definitive end to hostilities and their as yet unresolved differences. The first part of this chapter contains a definition of the concepts used, the second examines the progress made in negotiations throughout the year, and the third includes a graph showing the “peace temperature”, which reflects the monthly state of all current negotiations.


3.1. Peace processes: definition and classification

Negotiation is understood to mean a process in which two or more opposing parties agree to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to find a satisfactory solution. Negotiations may be held directly or with facilitation from third parties. Usually, formal negotiations include a prior or exploratory stage which is used to establish the framework (format, place, conditions, guarantees, etc.) for the future negotiating process. A **peace process** is understood to mean the consolidation of a negotiated plan, once the agenda, the procedures to be followed, the timetable and facilitation have been agreed.

Depending on the eventual aims sought and the dynamics experienced during the different negotiating phases, the majority of peace processes can be classified under one of these five **categories or models**:

- a) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion;
- b) Sharing of political, military or economic power;
- c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for the recognition of rights, peace for ending occupation, etc.);
- d) Trust-building measures;
- e) Formulas for self-government or an “intermediate political architecture”.

Figure 3.1. Usual stages in negotiation processes



1. The number of negotiations analysed in this chapter is greater than the total number of “armed conflicts”, as in some cases it refers to negotiations between several groups in the same country, as well as processes in contexts that are not currently classified as “armed conflicts”.

3.2. Evolution of peace processes

This section contains an analysis of 42 negotiation processes, some of which are in a purely exploratory or tentative stage while others are more established. Ceasefires have been proposed in two of these contexts (in Chechnya and Turkish Kurdistan), though the respective governments refused the offer in both cases so there is currently no negotiation. Initiatives are still being explored in the case of Iraq, though as yet without success. This section also contains an analysis of the situation in southern Sudan, where fighting still persists in spite of the peace agreement. There is also an account of events in Indonesia (Aceh) and Northern Ireland, where the negotiating process was completed during the course of the year, though implementation of the agreements signed requires careful monitoring. A similar observation should be made in the cases of Nigeria and Cameroon and Burundi and the FNL, which have been practically resolved during the course of the year, though a number of difficulties remain in the case of Burundi. 42% of all negotiations have experienced some

Particular mention should be made of the agreement in eastern Sudan, the ceasefire agreement in Burundi, the peace agreement in Nepal and the Security Council resolution that brought an end to the fighting between Israel and Lebanon

problems this year and a further 42% have gone badly. Only 18% have gone relatively well. These percentages are very similar to those seen last year, though in contrast to previous years it is the African processes that have shown a relative improvement, bringing them up to levels comparable with those in Asia.

Particular mention should be made of the agreement reached with the majority of FLEC members operating in the Cabinda region in Angola, the partial agreement with groups in Darfur (Sudan), the agreement in eastern Sudan, the ceasefire agreement in Burundi, the disarmament of the majority of the militias operating in Ituri (DR Congo), the cessation of hostilities between the Ugandan Government and the LRA, the peace agreement between the Government of Mali and the Tuareg, the cessation of hostilities proposed by the ELN in Colombia, the peace agreement in Nepal, the problems arising from the inclusion of the Sri Lankan LTTE in the EU's list of terrorist organisations, the delay in the agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF as a result of disagreements over ancestral land, the refusal by both Armenia and Myanmar to let the UN intervene in their conflicts, the Security Council resolution that brought an end to the fighting between Israel and Lebanon,² and the significance of a GAM candidate winning the elections for Governor of Aceh (Indonesia).

Table 3.1. State of negotiations at the end of 2006

Going well (5)	In difficulty (16)	Going badly (13)	At an exploratory stage (3)	Resolved(1)
Colombia (ELN)	Algeria	Colombia (AUC)	Colombia (FARC) ³	<i>Nigeria-Cameroon</i>
DR Congo (Ituri)	<i>Angola (Cabinda)</i>	Chad-Sudan	<i>Spain (ETA)⁴</i>	
<i>India (NSCN-IM)</i>	<i>Armenia-Azerbaijan</i>	Côte d'Ivoire	Iraq	
Nepal	<i>Burundi (FNL)</i>	<i>Georgia (Abkhazia)</i>		
Sudan (East)	Cyprus	<i>Georgia (South Ossetia)</i>		
	<i>India (NDFB)</i>	India (CPI)		
	India (ULFA)	Israel-Palestine		
	India-Pakistan	<i>Kosovo</i>		
	Israel-Lebanon	Myanmar (KNU)		
	Mali (Tuareg)	Nigeria (Delta)		
	Philippines (MILF)	Philippines (NPA)		
	Senegal (Casamance)	Sri Lanka		
	Somalia	<i>Western Sahara</i>		
	Sudan (Darfur)			
	Sudan (South)			
	Thailand (South)			
	Uganda (LRA)			

(The contexts shown in italics are non-armed conflicts in which negotiations are taking place. Processes shown in bold are new, though negotiations may have already existed at some time in the past.)

2. Security Council Resolution S/RES/1701 of 11/08/06 <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions06.htm>.

3. Exploratory contacts were formally broken off at the end of the year.

4. Contacts were also broken off at the end of the year as the result of an ETA attack that left people dead.

When compared with the previous year, the list for 2006 contains five new processes: Chad-Sudan, Israel-Lebanon, Mali (Tuareg), Senegal (Casamance) and southern Thailand. Of the 38 negotiating processes shown in the above table, 23 relate to the 21 armed conflicts studied in 2006,⁵ while the remaining 15 relate to conflicts that have not been completely resolved but are not currently in an armed phase, though they may involve sporadic violent outbursts.

Africa

a) Southern Africa

In spite of the fact that it seemed throughout 2005 that the peace process in **Angola (Cabinda)** would end up being suspended as a result of the lack of progress in negotiations with members of the FLEC armed opposition group who had not laid down their arms by the beginning of 2006, the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (FCD), which was created in 2004 and includes members of the FLEC, held a meeting in Congo-Brazzaville to move the peace process forward. A few days earlier, the Government had presented the FCD with a Memorandum of Understanding for Peace and Reconciliation in the Province of Cabinda, which included special status for the enclave. During the second half of July, the **Angolan Government and the FCD signed a peace agreement** that took in five main points: an amnesty law, a cessation of hostilities, demilitarisation of Cabindan armed opposition groups, a reduction in the number of military troops in the oil-rich region and progressive adjustment to a normalised situation, with reintegration of members of the FCD into civilian life. In December, the government expressed its satisfaction with the way the peace agreements were going and declared that it would begin the process to incorporate former members of the FLEC into the armed forces, though FLEC leader N. Tiago still refused to recognise the agreements signed or the authority of A. Bento Bembe as signatory, a sign of the divisions that remain within the ranks of the FLEC.

b) West Africa

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the difficult peace process was further complicated at the beginning of the year by attacks by the "Young Patriot" pro-Government militias on United Nations facilities, and by UNMIL's deployment along the border with Liberia, threats from another pro-Government militia force (*Greater West Liberation Front*), questions about the peace efforts of UNOCI during the last three years and criticisms from some sectors regarding the International Working Group which is attempting to mediate in the conflict and is accused by some of being a tool of the French Government. Nevertheless, the five main parties in the conflict held an historic first meeting at the beginning of March, publicly promising to give their support to the damaged peace process and comply with Security Council resolutions. A year after the original peace process was broken off, the Council of Ministers held a meeting in mid-March with input from the leader of the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN). Both sides agreed to the disarmament of 42,000 members of these forces, along with 5,000 members of the Government's armed forces and 12,000 members of President L. Gbagbo's militia. However, pro-Government militias refused to agree to members of the FN maintaining their rank following demilitarisation, and **the disarmament programme that these militias had tentatively begun had to be suspended in August due to the small number of weapons handed in**. In October, the UN Security Council unanimously approved the extension of the mandates of both Prime Minister C. K. Banny and President L. Gbagbo for a further year, giving greater powers to the Prime Minister. In November, the President of Congo and acting president of the AU, D. Sassou-Nguesso, was chosen by the AU's Council for Peace and Security as the new mediator in the Côte d'Ivoire conflict, while the UA's representative in the country will be given the title of special mediation representative. In December, President L. Gbagbo put forward a proposal aimed at unblocking the peace process and opening a way to the holding of elections in July.

Turning to the process aimed at reducing the violence in **Nigeria (Niger Delta)**, some sources reported in May that the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) had expressed its intention to begin

See the chapter on armed conflicts.

a three-month ceasefire and set up talks with the Government. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) also said that it was willing to resume talks. However, the prospect that both the MEND and the MOSOP would begin some kind of talks with the Nigerian Government did not materialise. On the contrary, the MEND accused the police of having executed three of its members extra-judicially and carried out reprisals against oil companies, threatening the police in River State. In November, **the Ijaw communities in Delta State signed an agreement with the oil companies** operating in the region that would allow them to resume operations, though in December the MEND carried out new attacks on these companies.

Away from this conflict, it should be mentioned that in mid-June the Governments of **Nigeria and Cameroon** signed an agreement that **brought an end to the border dispute over the Bakassi Peninsular in the Gulf of Guinea**. Talks were facilitated by the then Secretary General of the UN, K. Annan. Under this agreement, there will be a two-year transitional period while control over the peninsula is handed over to the Cameroon Government. The local population will be offered the opportunity of living in Bakassi under a special regime for four years, and after this any Nigerians living on the peninsula can decide whether to remain or to go and settle in Nigeria.

The peace process relating to the region of **Casamance in Senegal** was once again hampered by constant divisions and confrontations between factions of the MFDC, particularly those led by S. Sadio (who controls the south) and I. Magne Diéme, leader of the Northern Front and an ally of military leader C. Atoute Badiate, who eventually ended up supporting armed forces from Guinea-Bissau in their fight against S. Sadio, whom some sources accused of receiving financial support from the Government of Côte d'Ivoire. In August, the Senegalese Government created a conflict alert and prevention unit in the Casamance region, using the National Agency for the Recovery of Social and Economic Activities in Casamance (ANRAC). This is financed by the World Bank and includes support for the demobilisation and reinsertion of members of the MFDC. In December, Senegalese President A. Wade held a meeting with a council of elders in Casamance, suggesting that they act as mediators in the conflict. A spokesperson for this council said that the various factions of the MFDC were willing to lay down their arms in return for a proper peace agreement.

c) Horn of Africa

The first signs of a slow return to normalisation in **Somalia** were seen at the beginning of January, when a group of political leaders representing the faction of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that had based itself in Mogadishu accepted an agreement for the reconciliation of the two factions reached in Aden (Yemen), with facilitation from the latter country. In addition, **seven countries in the region finally agreed to deploy a peace-keeping force in Somalia under the command of IGAD and the African Union (AU)**. In March, the process suffered a serious setback, and the capital once again descended into turmoil during May due to fighting between a number of militia groups united under the banner of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), which was given support by the USA, and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC, which subsequently changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Courts of Somalia, SICS), which succeeded in taking control over the country's main cities, including the capital. **The President of the TFG called on his Libyan counterpart, M. Gaddafi, to intervene personally** in order to create a commission to monitor peace in the country, and in mid-June the leaders of the Islamic militias and the interim Government accepted an **offer from Yemen to mediate in the conflict**. The recently created International Contact Group for Somalia held its first meeting at around the same time. Delegations from the TFG and the SICS met in the Sudanese capital to begin reconciliation talks, under the auspices of the Arab League, reaching a seven point agreement. This recognised the legality of the TFG and the presence of the SICS, and called for unconditional talks in a framework of mutual recognition. Delegations from the TFG, led by head of Parliament S. Hassan Sheikh Aden, and the SICS, represented by its Vice President A. Ali Umar, reached a **peace agreement in Khartoum on 4 September with mediation from the Arab League** and Sudanese President O. Al-Bashir. Under this agreement, the two sides undertook to form unified armed forces and a new national police force from militias loyal to the TFG, the SICS and other groups. They also agreed to respect the ceasefire agreement signed on 22 June, which both parties had been accused of violating, and to bring an end to the external support which was exacerbating the situation both within the country and on a regional level, as the TFG

had the support of Ethiopia while the SICS was backed by Eritrea. For its part, the AU adopted a plan to deploy a regional peace-keeping mission (IGASOM) comprising some 8,000 members, the aim of which would be to support the transitional Government and help to stabilise the country by implementing DDR programmes. The SICS systematically refused to accept this mission, which also received the approval of the UN Security Council. Peace talks between the TFG and the SICS which should have been held under the auspices of the Arab league at the end of October had to be postponed because both sides refused to meet face to face. **The main obstacles were the presence of Ethiopian troops in the country and the involvement of Kenya as co-facilitator**, since the SICS accused the latter of not being neutral and favouring the interests of the TFG. At the beginning of December however, both parties expressed a commitment to meet again in Sudan. Earlier, the Ethiopian Deputy Foreign Minister had held direct talks with representatives of the SICS in Djibouti to explain his country's support for the TFG. In spite of all these efforts, there were new outbreaks of fighting in the middle of December, leading EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, L. Michel, to attempt to mediate in the conflict, with the backing of IGAD. The President of the TFG also held meetings in Yemen in an attempt to get the SICS to express its support for talks. The situation deteriorated notably at the end of the year with aerial attacks by Ethiopian forces on the airport in the Somali capital with Ethiopian forces eventually taking control of much of the country.

As regards the different conflicts affecting **Sudan**, President O. al-Bashir (leader of the governing NCP party) met S. Kiir (leader of the former armed opposition group, the SPLA, and current Vice President of the transitional Government) over a three-day period to discuss the **growing disagreements over the implementation of peace agreements** that had brought armed fighting to an end in the south of the country in January 2005. Both men acknowledged the existence of important differences in respect of specific issues, such as implementation of the report by the Abyei Border Commission, the lack of transparency and accuracy in the distribution of oil revenues, the delay in the withdrawal of security forces and the demarcation of the north-south border of 1956. However, tensions rose in the south of the country towards the end of the year, both as a result of fighting between members of the SPLA and Sudanese armed forces (Vice President S. Kiir accused the Government of continuing to finance the militias) and the SSDF supported by Baggara militias, and because of the **spillover from the conflict in Darfur**. At the same time, the Sudanese Government began a program in November to return the more than two million refugees living in the outskirts of the capital back to their homes in the south.

In **Darfur**, the rounds of talks held in Nigeria with the SLA and JEM armed groups did not initially lead to any positive outcome. The Sudanese Government reiterated its **criticism of the possible deployment of a UN peace-keeping mission in the region to replace the current AU-led mission**, comprising 7,000 troops, stating that it is against the participation of international troops in such a mission and would prefer to seek an all African solution. Splits within the SLA also had a severe impact on the negotiating process. **The Sudanese Government and the majority faction of the SLA armed opposition group, led by M. Minnawi, signed a peace agreement on 5 May in Abuja (Nigeria)**, in an attempt to bring an end to the armed conflict that has affected the Darfur region for more than three years. The minority SLA faction (main representative of the Fur ethnic group) and the JEM armed opposition group did not initially want to sign up to the agreement, but at the beginning of June they signed a declaration in Ethiopia in which they committed themselves to the process. In this connection, JEM leader K. Ibrahim held a meeting in Slovenia at the end of May with Slovenian President J. Drnovsek, who had been working on a rapprochement initiative since January. In July, **the armed opposition groups that had refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement during May met President M. Gaddafi in Libya** with a view to persuading the Libyan leader to intercede on their behalf with the Government of Sudan. At the beginning of September, the UN Security Council approved a resolution put forward by the USA and the United Kingdom for the deployment of UNMIS troops in the Darfur region before October, increasing their forces by 17,300 additional soldiers and 3,300 police in order to provide support for the AU mission. At the end of September, the leader of the dissident faction of the SLA, A. Al-Nur, said that he was willing to hold talks with Khartoum, reiterating his demands for greater representation at a national level and individual compensation for refugees and the inter-

The Sudanese Government and the majority faction of the SLA armed opposition group, led by M. Minnawi, signed a peace agreement on 5 May in Abuja (Nigeria).

nally displaced. In October, the Government announced that it had presented the AU with a proposal for the disarmament of the *Janjaweed* militias, which nevertheless continued to carry out attacks on civilians in Darfur. In addition, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, J. Pronk, was forced to leave the country after the Sudanese Government demanded his resignation for criticising the actions of the Executive. The Sudanese Government also later refused to allow UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, J. Egeland, to visit the camps for the displaced. In November however, the United Nations proposed the creation of a joint AU-UN force under the latter's command, seeking consensus with Khartoum in order to allow this force to enter Darfur, a proposal that was rejected by the Sudanese President. Later that same month, **the Sudanese Government said that it was willing to talk to the NRF armed coalition** (comprising members of both the JEM and the SLA) without setting any kind of pre-conditions, and it also announced the forthcoming signing of an agreement with local heads of a dissident faction of the SLA led by A. Qassem Haj (who had not signed the Abuja agreements), thanks to mediation from both the Libyan President and the Government of Eritrea. In December, former Swedish Foreign Minister J. Eliasson was appointed as the new United Nations Envoy for Darfur.

Turning to the conflict in **Eastern Sudan**, following earlier failed attempts at an agreement led by Libya, **the Sudanese Government and the Eastern Front (EF) armed opposition group signed an agreement in the second half of May, setting out the procedure for peace negotiations**. This agreement included acceptance of the **Government of Eritrea as the main mediator between both sides**, and also established that there would be no pre-conditions for the talks. In August, these resumed talks between the Government and the EF in Asmara (Eritrea) made significant progress, with sufficient rapprochement to allow **the government and the EF finally to sign an agreement in mid-October aimed at bringing an end to the armed conflict affecting this part of the country**. A member of the EF will take up the position of Assistant President, with others acting as presidential adviser and Minister of State, and the group will also be given eight parliamentary seats in Khartoum and 10 seats in each of the three states in the east of Sudan. As regards control over natural resources, the agreement sets out that Sudan's wealth must be distributed in a way that aids the development of the entire country, and the areas affected by the war must benefit from positive action. The Government has undertaken to allocate 100 million dollars for development of the east of the country during 2007, with 125 million a year for the period between 2008 and 2011 (600 million dollars over five years).

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa


In **Burundi**, after Tanzanian-based efforts to promote a peace process between the Government and A. Rwasas's FNL, the country's President announced at the beginning of the year that the armed group had said that it was willing to enter peace negotiations and he had therefore once again contacted the Tanzanian Government in this connection. Attempts to restart peace negotiations suffered various delays due to changes in the countries acting as facilitators. At Tanzania's request, **the parties agreed in May to seek involvement from South Africa in official facilitation duties**, a task that fell

The Government of Burundi and A. Rwasas's FNL signed a definitive ceasefire agreement on 7 September.

to the latter country's Minister for Protection and Security, C. Nqakula. In the middle of June, both parties signed a two-week **cessation of hostilities agreement** in the Tanzanian capital, during which time a permanent ceasefire agreement was negotiated. After several rounds of talks in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), **the Government and A. Rwasas's FNL signed a definitive ceasefire agreement on 7 September**. This definitive agreement, which was backed by the UN, was based on the

Agreement of Principles towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability reached on 18 June, and it is hoped that the agreement of 7 September will: 1) bring an end to hostilities between the two parties; 2) establish the implementation of a repatriation programme for FNL leaders in the Great Lakes region and the wider diaspora, including protection both while they are in transit and while they remain in the country; and 3) provide for the disarmament of FNL combatants and their transfer to temporary settlement areas overseen by the United Nations. Hundreds of members of the group began to emerge from their hiding places as a result of the ceasefire, and it is estimated that some 3,000 members moved to the different camps before decid-

ing whether to join the country's security forces or demobilise. Nevertheless, the process gradually fell several weeks behind schedule. In November, the country's parliament approved a law guaranteeing immunity for members of the FNL, except where they had committed genocide or crimes against humanity. This immunity will remain in place in advance of the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission supported by the United Nations. Nevertheless, in December there was still a possibility that fighting might resume as the FLN was continuing to recruit new members.



In an attempt to reduce tensions between **Chad and Sudan**, which worsened in December 2005 following the declaration of a state of war by Chad as a result of a series of confrontations and border attacks in which each country accused the other of supporting armed opposition groups, a delegation from the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) made a visit to both countries with a view to mediating in the dispute. Sudan backed the proposal by Libyan leader M. Gaddafi to agree to the creation of joint Chadian and Sudanese units to patrol border areas. The Libyan leader organised a meeting in Tripoli between the Presidents of Chad and Sudan during the first half of February. **The two leaders agreed to bring an end to the crisis, stop their mutual accusations** and end the use of their respective territory to support military activities by armed opposition groups. At the end of August, **Chad and Sudan signed a framework agreement for the normalisation of friendly and neighbourly relations** in N'Djamena, after a number of working meetings. In November, Chadian armed groups reiterated their willingness to begin talks with the Government. In spite of this, at the end of November **the Chadian Government agreed to the deployment of an international peace force in the east of the country bordering Sudan**, and the United Nations was considering deploying a protection force along the border between Chad, Sudan and the CAR, because the spread of the conflict in Darfur was threatening to destabilise the entire region. In December however, there was once again serious fighting along the border with Sudan between Chadian armed forces and armed opposition groups, particularly the UFDD. In mid-December, the leader of the FUC armed group, M. Nour, held a conciliatory meeting with President I. Déby, bringing an end to the fighting that the group had been involved in during recent months. However, other rebel groups (UFDD, RAFD and SCUD) continued to engage in fighting with Chadian Government forces.

Turning to the violence affecting several regions of **DR Congo**, particularly the **Ituri** district, MONUC announced the disarmament and demobilisation of 4,800 combatants during the months of June and July, along with the collection of 2,400 weapons. In July, **the three main militias operating in the eastern part of DRC as part of the MRC armed opposition coalition decided to lay down their weapons** and facilitate the free movement of displaced people in the region so that they could exercise their right to vote. They also agreed that they would gradually join the country's armed forces in return for an amnesty for all their members. This agreement was reached with mediation from a UN peace-building team in the region.

November saw J. Kabila emerge victorious in elections for the country's President, with 58% of the votes. A few days later, the Rwanda FDLR armed opposition group called on the new President to take part in moves to bring peace to the Great Lakes region. In December, leaders of the Hutu and Tutsi communities in the province of North Kivu demanded an end to fighting between Congolese armed forces and soldiers loyal to rebel Tutsi General L. Nkunda, who were also involved in skirmishes with MONUC. Right at the end of the year, Rwanda set up a mediating process between the Government of DR Congo and L. Nkunda.

At the end of the year in the **Central African Republic**, a new coalition calling itself the *Union de Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR), formed from three armed groups opposed to the Government of F. Bozizé, took control of three cities in the northwest of the country, one of which is rich in diamonds. The group's leader, M. Detodia, nevertheless announced that he was willing to talk to the Government, which responded by seeking military support from France and beginning a military counter-offensive. The regional organisation CEMAC also authorised the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) to support the Government's armed forces. Resentment against Chad gradually increased among a portion of the population, partly due to the fact that Chadian soldiers form part of the bodyguard protecting the Central African President.

Finally, the conflict between the Government of **Uganda** and the LRA armed opposition group led by J. Kony was notable for the contradictory messages as to whether or not the Government would grant an amnesty to the LRA leader if he laid down his weapons. In May, the Government made a new offer of amnesty and

safekeeping if he disarmed before July. This offer was made shortly after **the LRA leader had held a secret meeting with the Vice President of Southern Sudan**, R. Machar, in which J. Kony agreed to end attacks on the civilian population and hold talks with the Ugandan President. After several meetings had been held in Juba (Sudan) with mediation from R. Machar (though these meetings were criticised for the lack of credibility and political weight of the LRA delegation), **the [Ugandan]**

The Ugandan Government and LRA armed opposition group reached a cessation of hostilities agreement on 26 August.

Government and LRA armed opposition group reached a cessation of hostilities agreement on 26 August. This came into force three days later for an initial term of three weeks, during which negotiations continued with a view to reaching a definitive peace agreement.

Chart 3.1. Agreement between the Ugandan Government and the LRA, 26-8-2006

- 1) Both parties are obliged to bring an end to all forms of hostile military action, any kind of action that could affect the talks and all hostile propaganda campaigns using any kind of media.
- 2) The places where the LRA has its bases are designated as sanctuaries, and they will move from here to the appointed settlement camps.
- 3) The areas chosen for LRA settlement camps are Owiny Ki-bul, in East Equatoria state, to the east of the River Nile, and Ri-Kwang-ba, in West Equatoria state, to the west of the Nile.
- 4) The Ugandan Government will guarantee free passage for all LRA members.
- 5) The settlement camps will be supervised and protected by the Sudanese SPLA and the Government of South Sudan will provide food aid.
- 6) The agreement guarantees that the LRA can leave the designated areas unchallenged in the event that talks break down.
- and 7) A Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team has been created to keep the mediator informed of events. This will be led by a high-ranking SPLA officer, who is to be appointed by the Government of South Sudan following consultations between all parties including two representatives from the Government and the LRA and two military officers appointed by the AU.

A few days later, hundreds of members of the LRA began to travel from their bases in various parts of north-eastern DR Congo, southern Sudan and the north of Uganda towards the two settlement areas in the south of Sudan indicated in the cessation of hostilities agreement. In October, **the process underwent a crisis**

due to the withdrawal of LRA representatives from the settlement areas, as they believed that they were surrounded by Ugandan armed forces, while both sides accused each other of breaking the cessation of hostilities agreement. The LRA then sought a review of the agreement in order to obtain further security guarantees. In November it announced that it would not return to the talks until Ugandan armed forces had withdrawn from their positions east of the Nile and returned to Uganda. At the beginning of December, the UN Secretary General appointed the former President of Mozambique, J. Chissano, as his Special Envoy to assist in negotiations with the LRA. In the middle of December however, talks began once again in Juba between the Government and the LRA, and a new cessation of hostilities agreement was reached, to last until February 2007. LRA members were also required to move to camps in the designated areas within one month. In addition, given that the LRA maintained at the end of the year that the call for its main leaders to be tried by the International Criminal Court (ICC) represented the main obstacle to any peace agreement, President Y. Museveni said that he was in favour of offering an amnesty to the leaders of the LRA if they abandoned their arms and committed themselves to the peace process, using the traditional "Mato" reconciliation system of the Acholi community, of which J. Kony is a member.

e) Maghreb and North Africa

As part of the policy of national reconciliation implemented by President A. Buteflika, the Government of **Algeria** introduced an **amnesty plan** in the middle of February that established a period of six months for rebels to give themselves up, offering financial compensation for the families of the disappeared and assistance for the families of rebels killed during the 1990s. At the beginning of September the Government declared that it was willing to extend the amnesty (which had ended on 31 August) as it had not brought the expected results. By the end of the year, a total of 2,629 Islamists who had been condemned of crimes other than mass killings had been pardoned.

A minor conflict broke out in the north of **Mali** in May when a group of several hundred Tuareg attacked various barracks and made off with weapons and military vehicles, heading for the mountains along the border with Algeria. In mid-June, this group announced that it was asking Algeria to arrange talks with the Government of Mali with facilitation from a team of four Algerian negotiators, aimed at achieving greater autonomy. At the beginning of July, **the Government and the Tuareg rebels, who were operating under the name of the "Democratic Alliance for Change", met in Algeria to sign the "Algiers Agreement",** otherwise known as the "Agreement for peace, security and development in the Kidal region", though it was not signed by some of the more prominent Tuareg leaders.

Events in the conflict in **Western Sahara** were marked at the beginning of the year by the announcement by the Moroccan Government that it would present an **offer of autonomy** for the region. Although the contents of the plan were not revealed during the course of the year, the POLISARIO Front sent a letter to the UN Secretary General rejecting any proposal for autonomy and also warning of the danger that it might resume hostilities. In April, then UN Secretary General **K. Annan came out in favour of direct negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front,** with contributions from Algeria and Mauritania, in the search for a political solution to the conflict in the Sahara. The **United Nations thus finally abandoned the Baker Plan,** which had been approved by the Security Council in 2003, and instead accepted the suggestion of the new Secretary General's Representative for the Sahara, P. van Walsum from Holland. According to K. Annan, a new UN plan would be doomed to failure because Morocco would reject it unless it excluded an option for a referendum on independence. The POLISARIO Front rejected the UN's proposal for direct negotiations with Morocco over the Western Sahara. In October, a report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for the immediate implementation of a right to self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. At the end of the year, Morocco stated that it would take its autonomy proposal to the UN.

America

The exploratory process between the Government of **Colombia** and the **ELN** guerrilla group continued to advance throughout the year. After a first meeting in Havana (Cuba) during December of 2005, a second session was held in the same place during February, after which the **President of the Colombian Government, A. Uribe, recognised the three ELN representatives as mediators**, lifting the orders for their arrest and

ELN Central Command (COCE) issued a communiqué in which it maintained its willingness to agree to a ceasefire and a bilateral cessation of hostilities with the Colombian Government.

thus making it possible for them to travel both inside and outside Colombia. In mid-December, **ELN Central Command (COCE) issued a communiqué in which it maintained its willingness to agree to a ceasefire and a bilateral cessation of hostilities with the Government.** It also called for the creation of a new coalition Government, the formation of a Special Truth Commission that could be informed by the paramilitaries of all the incidents and secrets that needed to be brought into the open, the clearing out of all institutions, an in-depth solution to drug-trafficking without resorting to crop-burning and the refusal to

allow Colombians to be extradited. The following morning, the **Commission charged with safeguarding the process with the ELN called a press conference in which it presented its "road map" for 2007**, a move criticised by Peace Commissioner L. C. Restrepo because it had not previously been debated by both sides (the Government and the ELN), and because it included issues that were to be tackled during the next round of negotiations, planned in Havana in January.

As regards the process for the demobilisation of the **AUC**, Peace Commissioner L. C. Restrepo announced that **almost all the paramilitary groups that had combined under the banner of the Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) had been demobilised.** More than 30,000 former combatants have returned to civilian life, 1,175 have been jailed and 604 are due to appear before the courts. 17,000 weapons have been handed in. The Government decided to create a Presidential Council for Reinsertion, given the high number of people that have been demobilised in recent years. The most controversial issue was, however, the decision **handed down by the Constitutional Court in May, which declared the legality of the Justice and Peace Act governing the demobilisation of paramilitary groups but cut a number of the benefits offered to those being demobilised.** In October, the Government suspended the rule guaranteeing safe-conduct for demobilised chiefs and ordered the capture of any that had not remained in the places prepared for them, after warning that they may lose their benefits under the Justice and Peace Act. In mid-December, some paramilitaries began to appear before the courts to confess their crimes and make reparation to victims.

As regards the **FARC** guerrilla group, with which there have been neither negotiations nor humanitarian agreements, President A. Uribe stated upon re-election that he and his team would examine a way in which peace talks could be opened up with the group. Towards the end of September, **the Government began a rapprochement process with the guerrilla group** after four years without any kind of negotiation, and the High Commissioner for Peace urged the creation of a single front that would allow a single line of communication with the FARC. A few days later, the Colombian Government said it would be willing to authorise a "meeting zone" in Valle Province so that **talks could begin with the FARC, with a view to reaching a humanitarian agreement and beginning political negotiations** with the group. However, this proposal was short-lived, as a subsequent attack on a military academy served as an excuse for the President to break off all contact with the FARC.

Asia and the Pacific

a) South Asia

In **India**, no progress was achieved during the course of the year that would lead to the resumption of talks with the CPI armed opposition group operating in the state of **Andra Pradesh**. These talks were interrupted right back at the beginning of the previous year. In the state of **Assam** however, the Indian Government

indicated at the beginning of the year that it was willing to meet the People's Consultative Group (PCG) appointed as negotiators by the **ULFA** armed opposition group. After a preliminary meeting, both parties agreed to a series of trust-building measures, including the possible release of ULFA prisoners by the Government and measures relating to human rights. The ULFA nevertheless indicated that it was in favour of negotiating under the auspices of the United Nations. **The ULFA asked for written guarantees that the issue of sovereignty would be discussed during negotiations**, and it once again demanded the release of five of its members, along with information on combatants who had disappeared. In September, the PCG called for intervention from Prime Minister M. Singh in order to bring an end to the stalemate that was impeding the peace process. The writer R. Goswami and a representative of the PCG held a meeting in November with the National Security Adviser in an attempt to reactivate the peace process and forward a message to the Government from the leader of the armed group, A. Rajkhowa, regarding the need to ensure that the issue of sovereignty would be discussed in any peace negotiations. In December, however, the group declared that the Government was not interested in reaching a political solution to the conflict and that the ULFA favoured the expulsion of all the illegal immigrants who were threatening the existence of Assam. Shortly afterwards, at the beginning of 2006, the ULFA carried out a number of attacks that placed the future of the negotiations under severe pressure. As regards the **NDFB** armed opposition group, which a year ago agreed a ceasefire with the Government and renewed it in May for a further six months, representatives of the group indicated that they had not yet presented a proposal document as they were **waiting for a formal invitation from the Government to begin negotiations**. The NDFB denied that it was planning to form a political party and indicated that it is currently concentrating all its efforts on the peace process with the Government. It said that the meetings it had held with various political parties were merely an attempt to establish contact with a view to finding a political solution to the current conflict and obtain support for the peace process. December saw demonstrations organised by the All Bodo Peace Forum (ABFP), calling for the resumption of peace talks. In the state of **Nagaland**, the Government and the NSCN (IM) armed opposition group met in Bangkok (Thailand) in February and agreed to extend the current ceasefire (already in place for eight years) for a further six months. The Government and the NSCN (IM) also agreed to modify the bases for the current ceasefire in order to make it more effective. During the second quarter of the year, the Government and the NSCN (IM) held a three-day meeting in Amsterdam, agreeing to meet more regularly. In August, both sides agreed in Bangkok to extend the ceasefire agreement for a further year, and in October representatives of the government and the NSCN-IM met once again in Amsterdam. Previously, **the Government had said that it would consider asymmetrical federalism formulas as a solution to the conflict**. Both sides agreed to meet again during 2007 and discuss adjustments to the country's Constitution.

As regards the conflict between **India and Pakistan** over the region of Kashmir, both countries reiterated their commitment to peace at the beginning of the year, though no tangible progress was seen. India said that it would not reduce the number of military troops deployed in the region, while the **Pakistani Prime Minister discounted the possibility of establishing a federation between both countries**, though both sides **continued to engage in trust-building measures** throughout the year. The APHC, a coalition of various nationalist groups, announced that it would put together a negotiating team to hold talks with the Indian Government. The two countries also agreed partially to open the Line of Control (the *de facto* border between them) in order to increase trade links via a road haulage service and extend the bus service between the two sides of Kashmir. During the third quarter, India temporarily suspended the process and called on Pakistan to take stronger measures to halt terrorism, while in August each country expelled one of the other's diplomats during a brief political crisis. Particular mention should also be made of the fact that at the end of August the **Hizbul Mujahideen armed opposition group stated that it was committed to taking all the necessary measures in order to reach a solution to the Kashmir dispute** that would take the wishes of the Kashmiri people into account. In September, the leaders of the two countries agreed to resume peace negotiations, and the Pakistani Foreign Minister also said that both sides were close to agreement over the disputed Siachen glacier. At the end of the year, Pakistani President P. Musharraf announced that **Pakistan might abandon its claims over Kashmir if India acceded to its peace proposals**: a gradual withdrawal of troops from the region, self-governance for the Kashmiris and a joint monitoring mechanism that would involve Pakistanis, Indians and Kashmiris. At the end of the year, the Pakistani

Pakistan might abandon its claims over Kashmir if India acceded to its peace proposals.

Prime Minister asked a visiting commission for the European parliament to mediate in the conflict. It was expected that a delegation of Kashmiri separatist leaders would visit Pakistan during January 2007.

Turning to the conflict in **Nepal**, the political situation changed drastically during the second quarter of the year, with huge and prolonged public demonstrations reported during the course of the month of April. These finally forced the King to reopen parliament which in turn drastically restricted the King's powers. The leader of the Nepalese Congress, G.P. Koirala, was appointed Prime Minister, and he formed a new Government that included four of the seven democratic parties. Deputy Prime Minister K.P. Oli announced a definitive ceasefire by the Government and withdrew the **CPN** Maoist armed opposition group's classification as a terrorist organisation. This allowed a process of dialogue to be established with the armed group, culminating in June in an historic **direct meeting between the Prime Minister and the leader of the CPN, Prachanda** (who had already stated that he saw no reason why his troops should not join the country's new armed forces), and the signing of an eight-point agreement. In May, the Government announced that elections for a Constituent Assembly would be held within the year and that it expected the CPN to be disarmed by then. **The Government and the Maoist group reached an agreement over the monitoring of weapons by the United Nations**, following a meeting between CPN leader Prachanda and Prime Minister G.P. Koirala. They subsequently agreed that the Maoist group's weapons would be handed in whilst those belonging to the armed forces would be stored in their barracks.

Chart 3.2. Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the CPN, 17-6-2006

1. Implement the 12-point agreement reached in November 2005 between the CPN and the seven political parties, along with a code of conduct for the ceasefire signed by the Government and the CPN on 22 May 2006.
2. Work peacefully in relation to commitments relating to multi-party government, civil liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, freedom of the press and a state of law, following democratic rules and values.
3. Ask the United Nations to help manage the country's armed forces and weapons belonging to both sides, and to observe impartial elections for a Constituent Assembly.
4. Guarantee the democratic rights established by the popular movement between 1990 and 2006, based on the undertakings made in the 12-point agreement, the preamble to the ceasefire code of conduct and the draft interim Constitution, and subsequently form an interim Government, set a date for the election of a Constituent Assembly and dissolve the Congress and the popular Maoist Government, in an alternative agreement reached by consensus.
5. Agree that these issues are of national importance and must be achieved on the basis of understanding.
6. Guarantee that the fundamental rights of the Nepali people form part of the process of shaping a new Constitution, without the influence of fear, threats or violence. International observers and monitors will be required for the elections.
7. The state will be gradually restructured in order to resolve problems relating to class, race, region and gender, with elections for a Constituent Assembly. There will be commitment to transforming the ceasefire into a permanent peace and to resolving problems through dialogue, with a particular focus on democracy, peace, prosperity, progress, the independence and sovereignty of the country and self-esteem.
8. The negotiation teams from both the Government and the CPN will immediately take the measures required in order to ensure compliance with the foregoing points.

A Ceasefire Code of Conduct National Monitoring Committee (CCCNMC) was also established, along with five other sub-committees aimed at facilitating the peace process. In September, both the Government and the CPN approved a draft interim Constitution which left out sensitive political issues (such as the role to be played by the monarchy) since these aspects will be dealt with in a separate document. In October however, the central Maoist committee made five alternative proposals to the coalition of governing parties in relation to the status of the monarchy, indicating that it would not join the government if none of these alternatives was accepted. It also repeated that it would not hand in its weapons until the monarchy had been abolished.


During the second half of November, the Government and the CPN signed a peace agreement and formally declared an end to the armed conflict that has affected the country over the last 10 years.

The CPN indicated that it numbered 30,000 combatants in its ranks, though this figure has yet to be con-

firmed by the United Nations. In spite of the agreement, a new dispute arose in December over whether the Maoists should hand over their weapons before a coalition Government had been formed or whether they could do it afterwards, though the two sides announced that they were on the point of reaching agreement over an interim Constitution. Despite their difficulties, it is expected that the disarmament process will begin in mid-January 2007.

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In **Sri Lanka**, the most notable event was the **resumption of direct negotiations** at the beginning of the year between the Government and the LTTE armed opposition groups, after talks had been suspended in 2003. A meeting was held in February at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, based in Geneva, with mediation from Norway, and the only item on the agenda was a review of the ceasefire agreement. However, the peace process was seriously compromised during the second quarter of the year following a **significant upsurge in violence between the LTTE armed opposition group and Sri Lankan armed forces that led to a situation of low-intensity war**. There were also confrontations between the main body of the LTTE and the dissident faction led by Colonel Karuna, along with a breakdown in negotiations caused by an absence of security for the LTTE's negotiators. The LTTE then declared that the members of the ceasefire monitoring mission (SLMM) from Denmark, Finland and Sweden must leave the country before 1 September as they could not be declared neutral after the EU had placed the LTTE on its list of terrorist organisations. At the beginning of October, the Government indicated that it wanted to discuss substantive issues that would lead to a long-term solution, and the head of the government's Peace Secretariat announced that **the Government was considering the possibility of a federal solution within the framework of a united and indivisible Sri Lanka**. In the second half of November, during his annual speech, LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran declared that the group had no alternative but to press for the creation of an independent state, given the way they had been successively deceived by the Government. Sri Lankan President M. Rajapakse said that he would be willing to hold direct talks with the LTTE leader, though skirmishes continued and military operations against the LTTE were intensified.



b) Southeast Asia

In the **Philippines**, negotiations between the Government and the **MILF** armed opposition group continued throughout the year. A new round of talks was held in Malaysia in February, which included the discussion of financial issues such as the distribution of income from the exploitation of natural resources. **A further new round of talks was held to discuss ownership of the ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro peo-**

ple (basic concept, lands, resources, areas of influence and governance by the MILF), which became the main stumbling block for the negotiations from September onwards with no final agreement reached. Subsequent negotiations failed to reach agreement on this issue, and there was some fighting on the island of Mindanao. In the middle of December, the MILF stated that it was willing to begin new talks with the Government in January after both sides had held consultations in Malaysia. The MILF is claiming 1,000 plots of land which it regards as its ancestral territory, while the Government is only willing to grant it 600. Another point of disagreement between the parties is the mechanism that would be used to validate a new political entity, since the MILF rejects the holding of a referendum. As regards the peace agreement that the Government signed with the **MNLF** in 1996, a team of 16 people from the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) travelled to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in May to oversee and advise on the implementation of the peace process. This mission asked the President to release the emeritus president of the MNLF and former governor of the ARMM, N. Misauri, or transfer him to Mindanao, so that he could attend a meeting scheduled in Saudi Arabia in July to deal with the more controversial aspects of the 1996 agreement.

Turning to the process with the **NPA/NDF**, the only point that is particularly worthy of note is that the Government and the Philippine Communist Party (PCP, the political wing of the NPA) travelled separately to Oslo to hold meetings with the Norwegian Government, which is acting as mediator and attempting to unblock the negotiations which broke down in 2004. After the meeting, the Presidential Adviser for Peace, J. Dureza, said that there was an opportunity to resume talks if the NPA complied with certain conditions, without actually specifying what they were. Nevertheless, J. Dureza also warned that Manila would continue with its legal and military offensive against the NPA. High-ranking members of the Government also recently denounced the tactics being employed by the NPA in the peace talks. Fighting intensified during the final months of the year, and the Philippine President gave the country's armed forces two years to defeat the Communist guerrillas.

After the signing of an agreement between the Government and the GAM in August, with mediation from the Finnish organisation Crisis Management Initiative, the peace process in **Indonesia (Aceh)** continued to progress as planned. The main leaders of the former armed opposition group, the GAM, returned to the region in April after spending many years abroad, particularly in Sweden. After five months of intense debate and considerable delays, the Indonesian parliament unanimously approved the new legislation for Aceh in July, finally giving the contents of the peace agreement the full force of law. Both the GAM and several civilian organisations expressed both disappointment and disagreement with the new legislation, regarding it as contravening the spirit of the peace agreement. Nevertheless, GAM candidate I. Yusuf won the election for the post of Governor of Aceh province in the middle of December. GAM Prime Minister in exile, M. Mahmud, announced at the end of the year that the GAM was planning to turn itself into a political party, and the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) completed its mandate in mid-December. Some of its duties will be taken over by the InterPeace organisation, led by former Finnish President M. Ahtisaari.

As regards the situation in **Myanmar**, in February the military Government suspended the National Convention process charged with drawing up a new Constitution. The Government also refused to renew the visa of L. de Riedmatten, international mediator with the opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, A. S. Suu Kyi, forcing the **closure of the headquarters of the Swiss organisation Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue**. It also temporarily suspended visits by the ICRC to prisons and forced labour camps in the country. In spite of an informal offer of talks from the Junta, the KNU armed opposition group dismissed any possibility of negotiating with the military Junta in August, indicating that peace talks could not take place until attacks on civilian members of the Karen community were halted. **The Military Junta rejected the UN decision to include the Myanmar question on the Security Council agenda at the suggestion of the US**, announcing the resumption of the National Convention process during the month of October. The Government also announced that it was **cancelling the informal agreement reached with the KNU armed opposition group** following recent negotiations between the two sides. At the end of December however, a delegation from the KNU visited Thailand to study the possibility of reopening negotiations.

In **Thailand**, in January the Government rejected any possibility of negotiating with the PULO armed opposition group after one of the organisation's leaders declared in a Swedish newspaper that he was willing to abandon calls for the independence of the country's southern provinces if the Government would agree to begin a round of talks, withdraw the military forces it had deployed in the region and release the group's political and military leaders, who have been in prison for more than seven years now. In the middle of September, however, a section of the Thai army mounted a coup d'état and overthrew Prime Minister T. Shinawatra while he was in New York. The coup received support from both the King and a large section of the country's population. **The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, S. Boonyarataglin, said early on that he intended to set up talks with rebel leaders in the south of the country and obtained a positive response from several armed opposition groups**, including the BRN and the Bersatu. He also planned to re-establish the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), a civilian body which had been dissolved by the previous Government and which is now operational once again. In October, former Malaysian Prime Minister M. Mahathir confirmed that armed opposition groups from the Pattani region (in the south of Thailand) were interested in holding peace talks, and he offered himself as mediator after having acted as facilitator in informal contacts on the island of Langkawi (northern Malaysia) during recent months between Thai armed forces and the most important armed groups: Bersatu, PULO, BRN, BIPP and GIMP. According to the Malaysian national news agency, these groups have agreed to withdraw their demands for independence in return for amnesty, economic development for the region and promotion of the use of the Malaysian language in schools. However, Thai intelligence sources suggested that secessionist insurgent groups were planning the creation of a clandestine government in Pattani.

Europe and Central Asia

Negotiations between **Armenia and Azerbaijan** over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh still failed to show any significant progress. The sub-committee on Nagorno-Karabakh, run by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, presented a document at the beginning of the year in which it proposed autonomy as a model for resolution of the conflict and suggested that the status of the region be decided in a second phase of the so-called "Prague Process". Negotiations moved forward during the second quarter of the year after the breakdown of the first round of talks in February 2006 in France. In May, **Armenian and Azeri representatives met in Washington (USA) and succeeded in finding some rapprochement** in their peace negotiations. Armenian Foreign Minister, V. Oskanian, announced in September that the talks underway with Azerbaijan had reached a crucial stage, with agreement over the basic issues in dispute. He warned, however, that any attempt by the United Nations to mediate in the peace negotiations would bring them to a standstill, referring to the **joint call to the UN General Assembly by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova**, asking the organisation to discuss the conflict. During the second half of November, Armenian President R. Kocharian and his Azeri counterpart, I. Aliyev, held a meeting during the Community of Independent States (CIS) summit in an attempt to relaunch diplomatic efforts to resolve the territorial dispute between the two countries. I. Aliyev confirmed after the meeting that his country was close to overcoming the stand-off in its conflict with Armenia. In December however, a referendum held in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh approved a Constitution that described the region as a sovereign state. Azerbaijan criticised the referendum and the OSCE said that this process could endanger current talks, reiterating its own proposal for autonomy.

The unresolved conflict in **Cyprus** saw new developments during the course of the first three months of the year, after the **Turkish Government presented the UN Secretary General with a plan of action to resolve the island's status during January**. The Turkish plan contained eleven separate points and provided for initial meetings between Greek and Turkish representatives and representatives of the island's two communities during May or June. It also talked about opening up Turkish ports and airports to boats and aircraft originating from Cyprus, in return for the lifting of restrictions on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. During the first half of July, Greek Cypriot leader T. Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader M. Ali Talat agreed to **begin a process of technical negotiations** on issues affecting the day-to-day lives of both communities at the same time as tackling more substantive issues, with a view to reaching an integrated agreement over the island's future. A list of principles was also drawn up during this meeting, and these included

Commitment to achieve the unification of Cyprus on the basis of a bi-zonal and bi-community federation.

a **commitment to achieve the unification of Cyprus on the basis of a bi-zonal and bi-community federation** and political equality. In November, UN representative I. Gambari suggested that working groups be created to discuss political issues, with technical committees to set out the agenda and a coordinating committee that would examine reports from all sides. The leaders of the two communities accepted the proposal, classifying it as positive. M. A. Talat also said that the meeting

had been positive, stressing the importance of keeping this issue on the UN agenda and saying that he did not regard the EU as the proper body to be tackling the resolution of the conflict.

Particularly notable in **Spain** was the announcement by the armed group **ETA** that it was introducing a **permanent ceasefire** from 24 March, and that it intended to begin a “democratic process to construct a new framework in which the rights of the Basque people are recognised”. At the time that the announcement was made, ETA had gone three years without committing any attacks that had caused loss of life. The event that had led to the permanent ceasefire declaration was a letter sent by ETA to the President of the Spanish Government, J. L. Rodríguez Zapatero in August 2004, asking him to initiate negotiations. Subsequently, between the summer and autumn of 2005 there were contacts through intermediaries in both Geneva and Oslo. The President of the Spanish Government appeared before the Congress of Deputies to seek their support for the initiation of a peace process that he said would be “long and difficult”. It was suggested that two processes be set up, one in which the Government would discuss the issue of prisoners and disarmament directly with ETA, and the other in which Basque parties would discuss political normalisation among themselves. The process became stalled from the summer onwards, with both sides accusing the other of not taking initiatives that would help create a climate of trust, and **talks were finally broken off at the end of the year when ETA carried out an attack at Madrid airport that left several people dead.**

As regards the conflict in **Georgia (Abkhazia)**, the *de facto* President of the Republic of Abkhazia, S. Bagapsh, wrote a letter to the Security Council in January proposing a number of measures to resolve the conflict. The only issue on which S. Bagapsh was not willing to negotiate was the political status of Abkhazia, which was decided in the referendum of 1999. In June, the Georgian Government presented parliament with its own peace plan based on the principle of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, autonomy for the region, the return of the displaced, and participation by international bodies in the process. Attempts to resolve **the conflict deteriorated during the third quarter of the year, particularly as regards relations between Georgia and Russia**, in spite of different peace proposals put forward during previous months. In July, the UN Secretary General appointed J. Arnault as head of the UN’s mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), replacing H. Tagliavini. Shortly afterwards, Georgia’s Foreign Minister G. Bezhuashvili announced that he would be presenting a **report calling for the withdrawal of Russian peace-keeping forces from their positions in Ossetia and Abkhazia**, and requesting a review of the Sochi agreement that allowed these troops to be deployed in the area. For its part, the Abkhaz Government announced that it would only resume negotiations with Georgia when the Georgian Government undertook to withdraw its troops from the Kodori Gorge Heights and respect the agreements reached in 1994 which excluded the Georgian army from this area. In October, at Georgia’s request, Georgian Foreign Minister G. Bezhuashvili held a meeting in Moscow with his Russian counterpart S. Lavrov, in what was the first high level meeting between the two countries since relations had begun to deteriorate. During the second half of November, leaders of the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia announced that talks could be resumed with Tbilisi if certain conditions were met, which in Abkhazia’s case, according to the region’s leader S. Bagapsh, meant the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge, though tensions were increasing at the end of the year.

Turning to the conflict in **South Ossetia**, the Georgian parliament recommended that an international mission should replace the Russian peace-keeping forces which were deployed in the region following the signing of the peace agreement in 1992 and which are currently supervised by the OSCE. Both the Russian Government and the USA criticised this decision. In April, the Georgian Government put forward a draft bill for the return of property in South Ossetia to people affected by the conflict, as a mechanism designed to foster peace in the region. **The situation also deteriorated as a result of the poor relations between Georgia and Russia.** During the first half of November however, a referendum was held in the province which

was not recognised internationally and which supported independence for the territory, with more than 90% of the 50,000 votes cast in favour of secession. E. Kokoity was also re-elected as President of the region, and he cited his political priorities as independence for South Ossetia and integration with Russia. In order to vote, residents had to show a South Ossetian passport, though the majority of ethnic Georgians in the province do not have one. This group held its own alternative consultation process, which was also not legally recognised, in which it voted to remain as part of Georgia and elected D. Sanakoyev as its President.

As regards the ongoing process in **Northern Ireland**, in April the Prime Ministers of Ireland and the United Kingdom, B. Ahern and T. Blair, announced a **plan for the partial return of autonomy for Northern Ireland**, with the specific aim of choosing an executive during the course of November. The Ulster Assembly sat once again in May after remaining inactive for four years. The Monitoring Commission also confirmed that the IRA had scaled down its military capacity and was meeting its undertakings. For its part, the British Government sped up its demilitarisation process in Ulster, closing three more military barracks than had originally been planned. During the first half of November, the process to restore autonomy to Northern Ireland moved forward along the lines of the Saint Andrews road map proposed by both London and Dublin in October. This led to majority acceptance of the Saint Andrews agreements by all sides and also resulted in the calling of elections. The timetable and measures set out in the road map were fully accepted by all the parties represented in the Northern Ireland Assembly except the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which expressed its support but only on the condition that the Republicans expressly recognise the Ulster police force.

Mention should be made of the **initial rounds of talks** between representatives of Serbia and **Kosovo**, in discussions relating to the status of the latter province. Serbian President, B. Tadic, suggested autonomy for the province and a period of 20 years to determine its final status, with the United Nations carrying out security duties. He also defended the right of Kosovo Serbs to form mono-ethnic municipalities. During the second round of negotiations, held in Vienna in March under the auspices of UN Special Representative M. Ahtisaari, the **options of autonomy or independence for the province** were once again discussed, though Serbia had already said that it would oppose the second of these two options. The Serbian plan, which was rejected by leaders of the Kosovo Albanians, provided for the possibility of Kosovo having its own police force (but no army), as well as being fiscally independent. The **EU and NATO supported the calling of a referendum on independence for the province of Kosovo before the end of the year**, thus reducing the risk of a further outbreak of violence among the Albanian population if the date of elections continued to be put off. The Serbian Parliament unanimously approved a new Constitution that claimed sovereignty over Serbia, reiterating Serbia's refusal to agree to independence. During the first half of October, M. Ahtisaari expressed doubts about the possibility of reaching a negotiated agreement over the future of Kosovo, given that the positions held by both sides remained diametrically opposed. **M. Ahtissari's own recommendation was for limited sovereignty with a continued international presence and partial powers.** M. Ahtissari postponed the presentation of a proposal on the final status of Kosovo until after the Serbian parliamentary elections have been held, undertaking that a decision would be taken without delay following the elections, which are due to be held on 21 January. Given the changes to the negotiating timetable, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, A. Ceku, announced that the province could unilaterally declare independence if talks with the Serbian authorities did not offer a response to the demands of Kosovo Albanians, who are in the majority in the province, though he stressed that he would prefer independence to be gained with support from the UN.

Initial rounds of talks between representatives of Serbia and Kosovo relating to the status of the latter province.

In **Russia (Chechnya)**, while there is no ongoing peace process, it should be mentioned that in July the Russian authorities claimed responsibility for the death of Chechen independence leader S. Basayev, after an operation by the security forces in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia. Shortly afterwards, the Foreign Minister of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), A. Zakayev, announced that **the Chechen resistance was willing to take part in peace talks** on the basis of a manifesto adopted in Berlin on 5 July and sent to delegates attending the meeting of the group of industrialised countries (G8 plus Russia) held in Saint Petersburg (Russia). The proposal for talks was reiterated in September. It should be mentioned as well that **in Kurdish Turkistan the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire at the end of September**, following

a call made by their leader, A. Ocalan, from his prison cell. However, both the Government and, in particular, the military rejected the proposal. Nevertheless, Iraqi President J. Talabani appealed for amnesty for the PKK, claiming that the Kurdish problem could be solved if this happened. He also said that he would not allow Iraqi soil to be used to launch attacks against other countries. At the end of the year, the PKK was looking at the possibility of terminating its unilateral ceasefire if the Turkish army did not end its attacks on the group.

Middle East

In spite of the fact that there was no let-up in the number of deadly attacks in **Iraq** over the course of the year, attempts continued to seek ways of reducing the violence, though without success. According to Prime Minister N. al-Maliki, **several Iraqi groups, some of them armed, expressed an interest in the National Reconciliation Plan** presented on 25 June by the Prime Minister as a way of reducing sectarian violence. At the beginning of October, around 70 tribal leaders met in the province of Babylon to sign a pact of honour aimed at bringing an end to the violence and the displacements it is causing. At the same time, a law was approved that would result in autonomy for the regions, though it was agreed that this would not become effective until 2008. Thus, in exchange for an undertaking to engage in debate on their demands for federalism, the Shiites accepted a review of the Constitution, as demanded by the Sunnis. In October, the UN Envoy in the country, A. Qazi, welcomed the 'Makkah al-Mukarramah' declaration which was adopted by a number of religious leaders and which appealed for an end to sectarian violence in the country. In November, a report prepared by the US Iraq Study Group recommended that the US make a gradual withdrawal of troops from the country, suggesting a new diplomatic strategy that sought rapprochement with Syria and Iran. The diplomatic map of the Middle East was subsequently redrawn following the resumption of relations between Iraq and Syria and a visit by Iraqi President J. Talabani to Iran to seek help from the Iranian Government. In December, the different Iraqi political blocs withdrew their support for the creation of a new moderate coalition that would have excluded supporters of the radical Shiite cleric M. Al.Sader.

The difficult peace process between **Israel and Palestine** was initially marked by **Hamas' victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections** and the **subsequent international blockade of the new Islamist Government**. In February, one of the main leaders of Hamas, K. Meshaal, declared that his organisation was willing to take steps towards peace if Israel did the same, talking about a possible long-term ceasefire if Israel

withdrew from the occupied territories on the West Bank, recognised the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and dismantled all of its settlements. There were also **a number of calls for dialogue and negotiation** during the second quarter of the year. In April, the new Prime Minister and Hamas leader I. Haniya defended the right of Palestinians to continue their fight for independence, though he also expressed a wish to begin talks with international bodies in order to end the conflict with Israel and showed himself to be in favour of international involvement in the peace process, referring to the Quartet and particularly Europe. For its part, the PLO **called for an international**

peace conference to be held as part of the Road Map process, saying that it was willing to negotiate with any Israeli Prime Minister, given the closeness of elections in Israel, which were eventually won by E. Olmert. The Palestinian President also hosted **a meeting aimed at creating national dialogue between rival Palestinian factions**, shortly after Hamas decided to withdraw the military unit of 3,000 men that it had deployed in Gaza. However, in June Hamas ended the self-imposed ceasefire that it had maintained for a year and a half after two of the organisation's militant members were assassinated in an Israeli attack. For its part, the Israeli army mounted the largest incursion into Gaza of the last twelve months. During the first half of November, France and Italy announced their support for a **Spanish peace proposal for the Middle East**, which was rejected by Israel. The plan would include the deployment of international observers in the Gaza strip, culminating with the holding of an international peace conference. During the second half of November, the PNA, Islamic Jihad and the militias of the Popular Resistance Committee agreed to a ceasefire with the Israeli Government, and it was agreed that Israeli armed forces would withdraw from the Gaza strip

The difficult peace process between Israel and Palestine was initially marked by Hamas' victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections and the subsequent international blockade of the new Islamist Government.

in return for an end to Qassam rocket attacks on Jewish settlements. Both sides also expressed a willingness to extend their ceasefire to the West Bank if it held. E. Olmert later offered to free Palestinian prisoners in return for the release of the Israeli soldier held by militant Palestinians since June. In December, following serious confrontations between the official forces of Hamas and forces loyal to Fatah's M. Abbas, both sides withdrew their troops from the streets of Gaza, though the Palestinian Prime Minister said his group would boycott any early call for elections by the PNA President.

As regards the conflict between **Israel and Lebanon**, which began on 12 July 2006, the first initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict began at the G8 Summit in Saint Petersburg on 16 July, where consensus was reached on a joint statement calling for a ceasefire and the release of the captured Israeli soldiers. On 12 August 2006, **the UN Security Council finally approved Resolution 1701, which was to come into force on 14 September, bringing an end to the violence.** The Resolution was based on a total cessation of hostilities, the deployment of Lebanese troops in the south of the country, the strengthening of UNIFIL, the creation of a demilitarised zone, the disarmament of all armed groups and the prevention of any further weapons reaching Lebanon. At the beginning of October, Israel withdrew the majority of its troops from Lebanon. International peace-keeping troops (around 5,000) and Lebanese forces (around 10,000) continued to be deployed in the territory in order to monitor the ceasefire. Hezbollah, which had already declared its intention not to disarm in spite of the fact that this formed part of the UN resolution, continued to hold the two Israeli soldiers captured on 12 July. The United Nations appointed a mediator to negotiate their release, which will probably involve an exchange of prisoners with Israel. In October, Hezbollah confirmed that it was holding indirect talks with Israel over a future exchange of prisoners, conducted through a German intermediary secretly sent by the UN. During the second half of November, Lebanese Industry Minister P. Gemayel (one of the leaders of the coalition seeking an end to Syrian involvement in the country, a member of the Phalange party and Maronite Christian son of former President A. Gemayel) was assassinated in a hail of bullets. This attack took place in an atmosphere of intense fragility in a country that was attempting to recover from the Israeli invasion in the summer and a deep internal political crisis, and analysts indicated that it could only increase internal divisions and further destabilise the country.

3.3. The “peace temperature” during 2006

For three years now, the School of Peace Culture has drawn up a monthly indicator of the current state of peace negotiations around the world with a view to analysing the general dynamics of these processes. The indicator is currently based on a total of 25 sets of negotiations, 20 of which relate to situations of armed conflict⁶ while 5 relate to unresolved conflicts.⁷ Two conflicts from 2005 (Indonesia-Aceh and Sudan-SPLA) are not included this year as they have been resolved from a military point of view and are therefore no longer involved in peace negotiations.


The indicator shows an average score, calculated by awarding three points to processes that have gone well during the previous month, one point to those that are at a standstill or have not seen any new developments and no points to processes that have experienced problems. Thus, the maximum score would be 3 while the average would be 1.5.

As shown in the above figure, **the year ended with a monthly average of just 1.2 points (1.3 in 2005 and 1.4 in 2004)** and an average score of 1.5 or more was recorded in only two months (3 months the previous year). Curiously, the overall picture in 2006 was very similar to that of 2005, with events reaching their most critical in March and their most favourable showing in May. In any case, this indicator helps to highlight the difficulties in keeping the majority of processes on a positive course in any sustained way. Processes in Asia have progressed similarly to those underway in Africa. **The processes that showed the greatest**

6. Algeria, Burundi, Colombia (AUC, ELN and FARC), DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Philippines (MILF and NPA), India (ULFA and NDFB), Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Nepal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan (Darfur and Eastern Sudan) and Uganda.

7. Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia (Abkhazia), India (CPI and NSCN-IM) and Western Sahara.

Graph 3.1. The “peace temperature” in 2006




advances during 2006 were those involving the NSCN-IM (India), Nepal, India-Pakistan and Sudan (East), while the least successful involved the NPA (Philippines), Iraq, Israel-Palestine, the FARC (Colombia), Sudan (Darfur), Sri Lanka, Côte d’Ivoire and Western Sahara. There are, however, vast differences in the way that the different peace processes have evolved, with sudden changes in direction. By way of example, the most successful processes over the two-year period from 2005 to 2006, based on their average monthly score, were those involving India-Pakistan (with an average of 2.1 points out of a maximum of 3), Colombia-ELN (1.9), India-NSC-IM (1.7) and India-ULFA (1.6). By contrast, if we look only at the processes underway during the last five months of 2006, the best results were shown by Nepal-CPN (2.6 points), DR Congo-Ituri (2.2), Colombia-ELN (1.8), Burundi-FNL (1.8) and India-NSC-IM (1.8). These results therefore represent a continuation in two cases, while the other three indicated new developments occurring during the latter months of 2006.

The processes that showed the greatest advances during 2006 were those involving the NSCN-IM (India), Nepal, India-Pakistan and Sudan (East).


If we use similar criteria to look at the least successful of the processes analysed in this chapter, the most negative results from 2005-2006 were those involving the Philippines-NPA (0.3 points), Nigeria-Niger Delta (0.4), India-CPI (0.6), Western Sahara (0.7) and Colombia-AUC (0.7). By contrast, the most negative results in the last five months of 2006 were those

involving the Philippines-NPA, Sri Lanka and Nigeria-Niger Delta (all scoring 0 points), along with Sudan-Darfur and Côte d’Ivoire, both of which scored an average of 0.4 points. Here once again, two contexts repeat their poor showing (scoring even lower), with a further three new cases in which negotiations have notably deteriorated. As can be seen from the following graph, although 50% of all negotiations are normally in difficulty, the five cases that developed most successfully over the two years between 2005 and 2006, with a positive showing in 40% of the months analysed, were in marked contrast to the five that developed most badly, which gave negative results in 45% of the months analysed. As an average of all the negotiation processes studied, only 20% have continually been seen to progress satisfactorily.

Graph 3.2. Evolution of negotiations during 2005 and 2006



Peace processes



4. Post-war rehabilitation and international involvement

- The post-war rehabilitation processes currently underway continue to apply the general western model of democratisation, which still in itself cannot guarantee a state of law or the proper social welfare conditions.
- Corruption, high unemployment rates, reform of the justice and security sectors and a shortage of public officials to undertake the basic duties of government are just some of the main challenges faced by countries in a rehabilitation phase.
- Approval was given for the creation of a Peacebuilding Fund to make up for the shortage of financial resources that frequently affects the development of post-war rehabilitation processes.
- The high levels of financial investment made in Afghanistan and Iraq did nothing to assuage the harmful effects of international intervention in both countries.

The following chapter contains an analysis of developments in the **post-war rehabilitation processes**¹ currently underway in 22 countries and territories around the world, based on the criteria referred to in indicator no. 4, which divides them up into three groups of countries. Firstly there are those in which a cessation of hostilities has been reached (either because one of the sides has emerged victorious or as a result of mediation from third parties), along with those in which a peace process is giving reasonably good results, a total of twelve countries (G1). Secondly there are those in which a cessation of hostilities or peace agreement has been signed but is going badly and impeding post-war rehabilitation work, a total of eight (G2). Finally there are the countries and territories that remain in a state of war but are nevertheless receiving a considerable amount of international aid of a post-war nature, offered in many cases as an incentive to assist the pursuit of or compliance with an agreement that will bring hostilities to an end, a total of two (G3). The chapter closes with an account of the most notable international initiatives in this area and a map showing the countries analysed.

Table 4.1. Developments in post-war rehabilitation

IND	Start date	Country	Evolution
G1	1994	Rwanda	Deterioration: The trial of current members of the Rwandan government over their alleged involvement in the genocide has led to a political crisis with France.
	1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Stalemate: Nationalist sentiments once again dominated the results of elections while pending reforms remained unimplemented.
	1996	Guatemala	Deterioration: The number of people meeting their death as a result of violent causes rose in comparison with previous years.
	1997	Tajikistan	Deterioration: E. Rahmonov was once again elected in a process that lacked any plurality, while living conditions for the ordinary population continued to deteriorate.
	1999	Serbia (Kosovo)	Stalemate: A final decision on the status of the province was put off until after general elections are held in Serbia.
	1999	Timor-Leste	Deterioration: The fragile humanitarian situation and lack of security caused by the fighting in April 2006 continued.
	2001	Sierra Leone	Progress: A commission was set up to review and adjust the Constitution approved in 1991 to reflect the current situation in the country.
	2001	Macedonia, FYR	Stalemate: Application of the reforms approved in compliance with the Ohrid Agreement has slowed, according to a report by the EU.
	2003	Liberia	Progress: UNMIL prolonged its mandate, increasing the number of police who form part of the mission.
	2005	Indonesia (Aceh)	Progress: GAM leader I. Yusuf emerged as the region's new Governor after local elections that were supervised by the EU.
	2006	Nepal	Progress: Introduction of a new rehabilitation process led by the United Nations at the request of the current coalition government.
	2006	Burundi	Stalemate: Tensions remained, in spite of the signing of a definitive peace agreement and the replacement of ONUB by an integrated mission, BINUB.

1. Post-war rehabilitation is understood to mean the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling: the security of the ordinary population; addressing priorities of a humanitarian nature and the resettlement of refugees or displaced people; physical reconstruction and the reconstruction of basic institutions; the resolution of basic incompatibilities (i.e. social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); reconciliation, respect for human rights and the fight against impunity; regional stability and reintegration in international forums and bodies; and the empowerment of civilian society and the construction of a state of law.

IND	Start date	Country	Evolution
G2	1999	Guinea-Bissau	Progress: A donor conference succeeded in attracting almost all the money that the government had asked for.
	2000	Eritrea	Stalemate: The rehabilitation process remained at a standstill due to the failure to apply border demarcation with Ethiopia.
	2002	Angola	Stalemate: The year ended without the President setting a date for elections.
	2003	Congo	Progress: Improvement in the security situation in the Pool region led to the introduction of international involvement in the area.
	2003	Côte d'Ivoire	Stalemate: The UN Security Council extended the Prime Minister's powers in order to unblock the current stalemate situation.
	2003	DR Congo	Progress: J. Kabila was confirmed as President in the second round of elections. J. P. Bemba undertook to lead the opposition.
	2005	Sudan (South)	Deterioration: The United Nations extended the mandate of UNMIS until April, though the restrictions imposed by the government made implementation of this decision difficult.
	2004	Haiti	Progress: The international community renewed its support for the new government at a third donor conference, held this year.
G3	2001	Afghanistan	Deterioration: The security situation worsened considerably with increases in armed fighting between the Taliban militias and NATO.
	2003	Iraq	Deterioration: Worsening sectarian violence led to an increase in the number of people internally displaced.

4.1. Country by country analysis

The following sections contain a description of the contexts currently classified as being in a post-war rehabilitation phase, broken down into continents and regions.

Africa

The post-war rehabilitation processes introduced across the African continent still involve the use of the **western model** for democratisation, reform of the security sector and the imposition of a market economy as the only alternative, though this does not in itself guarantee good governance, the development of a state of law or proper social welfare conditions. This same model has also been applied on other continents.

a) Southern Africa

No date has as yet been set for the **elections in Angola**, in spite of the fact that the main institutional organisations charged with running the process, including the National Electoral Committee, began work during the course of the year. The country's President stood by his decision not to set an election date, though members of the government sought aid from the international community to finance the process. **Donors**, for their part, remained reluctant to offer their financial support as they believed that the government was earning sufficient amounts of oil revenues to finance the rehabilitation process itself. In this regard, it is interesting to note that according to a 2005 report on the country's progress towards the Millennium Development Goals which was published at the end of the year,² it is not known where 70% of the state **budget** ends up.

b) West Africa

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the year ended without any progress in implementing the DDR programme, and the process to identify voters prior to the elections remained incomplete, meaning that the elections planned

2. UNDP and the Angolan Planning Ministry; Millennium Development Goals. *Progress Report 2005*. See the complete report (in Portuguese) at: <http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/Angola_MDG_Prog_Report_2005.pdf>.

for the end of October could not take place. The **lack of political will** on the part of the country's leaders, who have placed their own personal and political ambitions ahead of the national interest, is the main reason for the **stalemate** in the country. In an attempt to resolve the situation, the UN Security Council adopted **Resolution 1721**³ in November 2006, in which it backed an earlier decision by the African Union's Peace and Security Council that extended the mandates of Prime Minister C. K. Banny and President L. Gbagbo for a further year and called for the immediate implementation of the DDR programme and the voter-identification process. This resolution also gave the Prime Minister greater powers, including the capacity to legislate by decree and control the army and state security forces. For his part, L. Gbagbo put forward an **alternative peace plan** before the end of the year in which he proposed the initiation of talks with the *Forces Nouvelles* and the dismantling of the buffer zone patrolled by French and UN soldiers, along with a series of other measures aimed at unblocking the process. He also hinted at the possibility that elections would be held in July 2007.

The lack of political will on the part of the country's leaders, who have placed their own personal and political ambitions ahead of the national interest, is the main reason for the stalemate in Côte d'Ivoire.

Turning to **Guinea-Bissau**, a **donor conference** was finally held in Geneva which succeeded in raising almost 263 million dollars for development projects and around 179 million dollars for security sector reform. The government presented a package of reforms costing a total of 400 million dollars in which the cost of **security sector reform** and the modernisation of the country's armed forces amounted to 184 million dollars. Under these reforms, the armed forces would be reduced from 9,000 to 3,500 troops, sufficient for a country of just one and a half million inhabitants. As regards the budget required to undertake this task, of the 184 million dollars estimated, 70 million would be spent on retraining former combatants. As promised last year, the United Kingdom helped the government to prepare this plan. During the last quarter of the year, the Secretary General's Special Representative J. B. Honwana was replaced as head of **UNOGBIS** by S. Omoregie, and the mission's mandate was renewed for a further year by the UN Security Council. Finally, the international community pointed to the risk that the country was becoming an important centre for the trafficking of both drugs and weapons to Europe, mainly via Portugal, due to the absence of an effective legal regime.

There were **very positive advances** throughout the year in **Liberia**, such as the formation of a **Government** that includes a number of former officials from the United Nations and international financial institutions, the arrest of **former leader** C. Taylor, who has been accused of war crimes, the completion of the UNHCR's **return programme** and the holding of a donor conference to provide support for implementation of the development agenda proposed by recently elected President E. Johnson-Sirleaf during the second quarter of the year. The UN Security Council decided to extend **UNMIL's mandate** until March 2007.⁴ The number of police attached to the mission was increased while the military contingent was reduced. The new police officers will offer a more suitable response to the duties required for **reform of the country's police force**, part of the mission's mandate. To date, 1,800 members of the police have been given UN training courses, and the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in the country, A. Doss, has stated that the aim is to prepare a total of 3,500 officers to be deployed around the country during the first half of 2007. One of the **problems** that will be faced in 2007 is a lack of the funds required in order to set up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other key projects needed to move the rehabilitation process forward in Liberia.

The **security** situation in **Sierra Leone** remained stable but fragile. During his appearance before the **Peace-building Commission**,⁵ Vice President S. Berewa pointed to youth unemployment,⁶ widespread poverty and the perception among sections of the population that public funds are being misused as the main prob-

3. See S/RES/1721 de 01/11/06 en: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions06.htm>.

4. See S/RES/1712 of 29/09/06, at: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions06.htm>.

5. Sierra Leone is, along with Burundi, one of the countries being helped by this recently created UN Commission.

6. 60% of the population of Sierra Leone is under 35 years old, and the vast majority of them are unemployed.

lems facing the country. The Commission recommended that Sierra Leone receive support from the Peacebuilding Fund and fully endorsed the priorities set out by the government, in particular those set out in its strategies to reduce poverty and consolidate peace.⁷ A conference was held towards the end of the year to examine national strategies to combat **corruption**, and it was decided to set up a control mechanism to correct any problems detected. Elsewhere, the **National Electoral Commission** set up a database with an estimate of potential voter numbers in each district, continuing with its voter registration programme with help from the United Nations. Finally, the government established a **constitutional review commission** to adapt the Constitution approved in 1991 to the country's new requirements. The proposed amendments will be set out in a referendum during the elections to be held sometime in 2007.

Chart 4.1. Peacebuilding Fund

One of the main obstacles to the success of any post-war rehabilitation process is a lack of resources, particularly money.⁸ This is the main reason why the UN General Assembly asked the Secretary General to create a Peacebuilding Fund that would provide financial support to the Peacebuilding Commission and its Support Office.

This new Fund will provide financial resources to be used in response to urgent and key issues for which no funds are immediately available, not only in the countries currently being analysed by the Commission but also in those that find themselves in similar circumstances even though they do not fall within the Commission's remit. Emergency payments may, where required amount to up to one million dollars. The UNDP will be the UN agency that is responsible for managing the Fund, which will be fed by voluntary contributions and which is aiming initially to attract some 250 million dollars. Donors have already promised a total of around 140 million.

One of the key aspects of this fund is that it is the authorities in the country in question that will be principally responsible for determining the use to which the funds will be put, since the aim is to encourage individual countries to take responsibility for their own rehabilitation programmes. The main purpose of the Fund will be to act as a catalyst in facilitating the implementation of activities that offer a key contribution to peace-building, such as the integration of demobilised combatants. Subsequently, any projects financed by the Fund must be topped up with contributions from other donors (both multilateral and bilateral) to ensure their continuity and sustainability.

c) Horn of Africa

In **Eritrea**, the post-war rehabilitation process remained stalled throughout the year as a result of the failure to implement the **border demarcation** between Ethiopia and Eritrea that the Independent Border Commission had indicated back in 2002. The **restrictions** that the Eritrean government imposed on the movement of UNMEE personnel in January 2006 remained in place throughout the year, and the authorities also continued to harass local people working for the United Nations. In addition, applying regulations imposed more than a year ago on all NGOs present in the country, the government **expelled at least six international NGOs**, while the number of humanitarian organisations fell considerably during the course of the year, a worrying development bearing in mind that Eritrea is one of the countries that depends most on humanitarian aid. It is vitally important to find a way out of the current **stalemate** in the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, not only because of the conflict that could once again break out between the two countries but also because of the involvement of both sides in the fighting in neighbouring Somalia, which could lead to a more regionalised conflict.

In **Sudan (South)**, management of **oil revenues** remained a destabilising factor throughout the year, as it is overseen by the National Ministry for Energy and Mining and the Ministry of Finance, both of which are

7. See School of Peace Culture, *Barometer 11 on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building*. School of Peace Culture, Barcelona, July 2006.

8. Annan, K., *Remarks on the Launch of the Peacebuilding Fund*, United Nations, New York, 11 October 2006, <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/pdf/SG_PBF.pdf>.

controlled by the National Congress Party (NCP), instead of the National Petroleum Commission⁹ as had been established in the Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, an agreement on the Commission's internal regulation was reached during November, a move which is expected to improve the management of the profits obtained from oil and, as a consequence, the budgetary plans of the South Sudanese government. As regards the other **bodies provided for in the Peace Agreement**, the following Commissions have not yet been set up: human rights, land, anti-corruption, rehabilitation and DDR, though the relevant commissioners have been appointed. At the only meeting held by the Consortium for Sudan, the government of South Sudan set out its intention to design a **Strategy for Aid**, aimed at improving its capacity to manage the financial assistance received, allocate it to the budgetary priorities identified by the Executive and improve coordination between donors and the government.¹⁰ Throughout the year, aid was mainly channelled into humanitarian activities. Finally, the UN Security Council extended **UNMIS's mandate** until April 2007,¹¹ although it expressed regret at the restrictions that the Sudanese government had imposed on the movement of personnel and material belonging to the mission and the effect that such restrictions have on its mandate. During the last quarter of the year, the **Secretary General's Special Representative** in charge of UNMIS, J. Pronk, **was declared persona non grata by the government and expelled**.¹² Before stepping down, UN Secretary General K. Annan appointed J. Eliasson, former Chairman of the General Assembly, as provisional Special Representative.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Burundi**, a definitive ceasefire agreement was signed on 7 September by the government and A. Rwas'a's Forces of National Liberation (FNL) with support from the United Nations. The agreement provided ratification for the post-war rehabilitation process that had already been introduced in this Central African country.¹³ The **transitional process** was first managed by the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), deployed by the African Union, whose duties were subsequently taken over by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). ONUB will be replaced in January 2007 by a **United Nations Integrated Mission**,¹⁴ (BINUB), as agreed by the UN Security Council.¹⁵ The **principal aims** of BINUB will be to consolidate peace and democracy, support the disarmament process and security sector reform, promote human rights and establish ways of combating impunity and coordinating the work of both the United Nations and donor countries active in the country. One of the main challenges will be to ensure a seamless and effective handover from ONUB to BINUB, one of the aspects of United Nations operations which is often the most problematic.

In **Congo**, the fight to combat **corruption** and bring greater transparency, particularly in connection with the management of oil revenues, remained one of the main challenges for the government. As far as **development** plans are concerned, the government implemented a training programme for national cooperation frameworks, the eventual aim of which is the preparation of a definitive document setting out its Poverty Reduction Strategy, which will replace the interim document drawn up by the Executive in 2004. Elsewhere, the EU signed various agreements with the government that will contribute to development of the forestry sector and the **rehabilitation and socio-economic development** of the Pool region. The aim of this latter agreement, which provides funding of almost 3 million euros, is to improve conditions for the movement of people and assets and offer access to basic health services in one of the areas most affected by the armed conflict. In order to ensure that the parliamentary **elections** planned for sometime in 2007 are free and transparent, 21 opposition groups called during the course of the year for the formation of a new Indepen-

9. The National Petroleum Commission was set up in 2005, based on rules set out by the CPA at the suggestion of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), as a department that would manage oil production and distribution independently of the Department of Energy.

10.A. Akuien Chol, *GoSS Aid Management, Budget and Thematic Working Groups*, presentation. Sudan Consortium. Paris, March 2006, at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSUDAN/Resources/GOSS_Aid_Management_Presentation.ppt>

11. See S/RES/1714 of 06/10/06, at: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm>.

12. See the chapter on peace processes.

13. See School of Peace Culture, *Barometers 10, 11 and 12*, chapters on peace processes and armed conflict, School of Peace Culture, Barcelona 2006.

14. Burundi is, along with Sierra Leona, one of the two cases being examined by the UN's Peacebuilding Commission.

15. See S/RES/1719 of 25/10/96, at: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm>.

dent National Commission that would be responsible for organising the elections, given the serious doubts raised about the impartiality of the current body.¹⁶

DR Congo saw its first free elections in more than 40 years.

DR Congo saw its **first free elections** in more than 40 years, in which J. Kabila, leader of the Transitional National Government, emerged victorious at the end of the second round with 58% of the votes. More than 65% of the registered electorate turned out to vote. Although opposition candidate J. P. Bemba announced that he did not recognise the result of the elections, he said he would be willing to work in opposition. The elections had been preceded by the approval by popular referendum of a **Constitution** and the inauguration of a **National Assembly**, in which J. Kabila was sworn into office in December 2006. On the **financial** front, one of the **main challenges** of the new programme that began following the elections involves maintaining both interest and support from donors. During the transitional period, the EU and the United Nations were the country's main donors. At the end of the year, the USA signed an order under which it undertook to provide 57 million dollars a year in conditional aid during the financial years 2006 and 2007, to be allocated to providing economic, social and political support, though this aid could be withheld if the government failed to achieve the targets established. Challenges on the **political** front include the setting up of the Provincial Assembly and the appointment of Senators, Governors and Deputy Governors. Turning to **security**, the main problems faced involve the reform of state security forces (both the police and the armed forces), which have been blamed for the country's previous collapse, and dealing with the fighting that continues in several parts of the country.¹⁷ The outgoing UN Secretary General announced that he intended to engage in consultations with the new government following its inauguration with a view to modifying MONUC's mandate and powers. It should be pointed out that at the beginning of October the UN Security Council extended MONUC's mandate and authorised an increase in the number of military and police personnel assigned to the mission.¹⁸

Chart 4.2. Conditional aid¹⁹

Relationships between donor and recipient countries took a variety of forms up to the end of the 1940s. The Marshall plan then established the best example of how one should establish a relationship between aid and the targets one wants to achieve, in that particular case, the political and economic hegemony of the USA and stemming the advance of communism.

The conditions established for aid to be handed over are the instrument by which a third party can achieve its objectives. Bearing this in mind, five past models of conditional aid can be identified:

- **First generation, financial** conditions (1980): the aid handed over was intended to bring about financial reforms in response to the economic crises affecting many developing countries and Latin American states, a device mainly used by international financial organisations.
- **Second generation, political** conditions (1990): the solely economic approach of the previous model turned out to be ineffective, so a new approach was sought that would focus on the reform of political and administrative systems, with particular attention paid to governance and the promotion of a market economy.
- **Third generation, peace** conditions (from 1995): this arose as a result of the large number of countries that were emerging from armed conflict at the time. The aim was to contribute to conflict resolution and the promotion of peace.
- **Fourth generation**, conditions associated with **security** (from 1999): these received a boost following the attacks of 11 September and the start of the war on terror. Aid is based on military considerations and is no longer independent. Some donor agents are against this trend as they believe it threatens the basic principles of humanitarianism and development cooperation.

16. Formed by the government in 2005.

17. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

18. See S/RES/1711 of 29/09/06, at: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm>.

19. Frerks, G., *The Use of Peace Conditionalities in Conflict and Post-conflict settings: A Conceptual Framework and a Checklist*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. Netherlands, 2006, <http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html>.

- **Fifth generation or post-conditions** (from 2005): donors have begun to believe that conditional aid will not bring about political change if this is not wanted by the countries receiving the aid. Emphasis is placed on symmetrical relationships between donor and recipient, the latter being regarded as a partner and the party that is principally responsible for the process. The key elements involved in this are transparency and accountability.

It is considered that conditional aid is linked with peace when it is used as an incentive for: 1) persuading the parties in a conflict to sign a peace agreement; 2) implementing a peace agreement; or 3) consolidating peace. There are five separate elements to this kind of peace-conditioned aid:

- **Incentive:** a donor offers aid to a recipient country as an incentive to change its politics or behaviour. The aim is to persuade the country's government to do something that it would not have done if the aid incentive had not existed.
- **Selectiveness:** this works on the principle that aid is more productive in a favourable political climate, so it is therefore offered in disproportionate amounts to countries regarded as more suitable.
- **Paternalism:** the donor ensures that aid is invested in certain specific goods and services and restricts the way in which it can be used in order to increase its effectiveness in improving the welfare of the recipient country.
- **Restriction:** aid is used as a mechanism to ensure that the recipient country is committed to its policies. It is based on an agreement between both sides, so aid is reduced or completely withdrawn if the recipient government does not meet the established political objectives.
- **Example:** If an agreement has been reached on the conditions imposed by the donor, the donor must provide evidence of the advances that have been made in the recipient country's policies to any third parties that find it difficult to identify the potential improvements (such as the private sector).

The sustainability of the results achieved with conditional aid that follows, for example, a paternalistic or incentivising pattern, is questionable, since supporting only the countries that act most efficiently prevents the aid from being invested in places where peace is most at risk. The establishment of conditions can be a positive and effective way of changing policy and behaviour that is contrary to peace-building, such as the conditions imposed on Balkan countries before they could join the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, including compliance with the requirements of the ICCY. However, some examples from the recent past also show how the conditions established can end up being more to the benefit of the donor while at the same time impeding development in the recipient country, which finds itself trapped within a set of economic or political rules that will not allow it to progress. The Paris Declaration²⁰ of March 2005, under which multilateral agencies and individual countries undertake to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development, placing the emphasis on appropriation, accountability, harmonisation, alignment with the priorities identified by the recipient government, the joint management of the results of aid and joint accountability, would seem in principle to represent a good initiative for reversing the negative effects of conditional aid.

In **Rwanda**, the government carried out a **restructuring process**, replacing the country's former divisions with five provinces, in an attempt to create multiethnic areas and encourage community development. The local government representatives for these provinces, who will play an important role in the traditional Gacaca courts, were elected during the first part of the year. The government also agreed its **initial policy on foreign aid**, informing donors of its priorities and attempting to provide effective management for all funds received, which donors often hand directly to local authorities. As regards **reconciliation**, France's proposal to work with Belgium and Holland and the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICCR) in bringing people living on their soil who are suspected of having taken part in the genocide to trial was rejected by the Rwandan government's representative at the ICCR, who indicated that France could not try people accused by the Court as the country itself had also been involved in the 1994 genocide. Finally, the warrant for the arrest of nine high-ranking political and military officers, including Rwandan President P. Kagame, for involvement in the attack that resulted in the assassination of former Rwandan President J. Habyarimana in 1994, led to a political crisis with France.

20. For more information, see The Paris Declaration in: http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html.

America

2006 turned out to be the worst year for **violent deaths** in **Guatemala** since the Peace Agreements were signed ten years ago. According to the United Nations, around 5,000 people lose their lives every year, and the number of violent deaths that have been reported since the armed conflict ended is comparable with the number dying during its worst periods.²¹ Before the year ended, the government signed an agreement with the United Nations in which it undertook to tackle the illegal armed groups and implement a Commission against Impunity. During the next two years, this Commission, led by the United Nations, will attempt to identify the different illegal groups and clandestine security organisations and ascertain their sources of finance, along with any potential links with government, so that these can be cut. Finally, as regards the **elections** planned for 2007, the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights pointed to logistical complications (data transfer systems, personnel training, voter registration) that could affect the election process.

In **Haiti** the year ended with municipal and regional elections which brought the electoral cycle to an end, though voting was accompanied by incidents of violence in some parts of the country. A **Conference on Economic and Social Development in Haiti** was also held in Madrid, the third such meeting this year.

Reform of the Haitian national police force and the justice system are the main challenges for the new Haitian executive elected during 2006.

The aim of the Conference was to examine compliance with the undertakings previously made and to discuss issues relating to governance and the coordination of donors. **Reform of the Haitian national police force** and the justice system are the main challenges for the new Haitian executive elected during 2006, issues that R. Préval's government will have to tackle during 2007. The **security situation** remained extremely fragile, meaning that implementation of the new model of DDR programme that has been proposed for Haiti should be one of

the priorities of both the government and the international community.²² Finally, the World Bank's International Development Association and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced the country's inclusion in the **Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative**.

Asia and the Pacific

In **Afghanistan**, the **security situation**²³ worsened considerably during the course of the year as **armed fighting** between Taliban militias and ISAF troops (now under NATO rather than US command) became more intense in the south and east of the country. Attacks on western workers and their local colleagues gradually increased during the year to the point that these people became one of the main military targets, a fact which in turn impeded the implementation of post-war rehabilitation activities. It should be pointed out that the **Afghanistan Compact**, which was presented at the donor conference in London this year, represents a good working plan that includes an undertaking from both the Afghan government and the international community to the rehabilitation objectives set out by the government in its **National Development Strategy**. Nevertheless, this working plan will not be feasible as long as the lack of security and attacks against foreign nationals continue, and, as a result, some commentators have noted that the financial resources required to pursue its objectives have not yet been made available. By way of example, the **lack of funds** for the **reform of the Afghan police force** means that the force still has no presence in many regions. Furthermore, most members of the new forces have still not been paid by central government, leading to the possibility that they will engage in corrupt practices.

21. According to the Myrna Mack Foundation, around 23,000 violent deaths were recorded between 2000 and 2005, and this trend is increasing.

22. See the chapter on disarmament.

23. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

In **Aceh (Indonesia)**, the last three months of the year saw **local elections** for the posts of Governor, Deputy Governor and representatives of the 21 districts and cities that make up the region, as stipulated in the agreement signed between the government of Indonesia and armed opposition groups in Aceh in 2005.²⁴ Two of the eight candidates who stood in these elections had links with the GAM, offering an illustration of the tensions within the movement between its leaders who have remained in exile in Sweden and those who stayed in the province during the armed conflict. The elections, which were supervised by an EU **electoral observer mission**, went off peacefully. As far as the results are concerned, former GAM member I. Yusuf polled 38% of the vote, well above the 25% required to be appointed Governor after the first round. The candidate who came second was the one who had received the tacit support of the GAM leadership in exile, receiving 16.5% of the vote. Aid to the people affected both by the tsunami and by the armed conflict remains one of the **pending challenges**. Two years on from the tsunami, a large section of the affected population is still living in temporary shelters without even the most basic living requirements, and a great many of the houses that were rebuilt have had to be knocked down again due to their poor quality. There have also been disputes between the people affected by the tsunami and those affected by the armed conflict due to the different levels of aid they have received. These disputes will need to be managed very carefully in a province in which unemployment is estimated to be as high as 50% and even higher among former GAM combatants.

In **Nepal**, the signing of the General Peace Agreement on 21 November 2006, between the seven political parties that make up the coalition government and the Maoist armed opposition group (CPN) signalled the start of a **new post-war rehabilitation process**. This will be led by the United Nations at the request of both Nepalese Prime Minister G.P. Koirala and CPN leader Prachanda. The UN Secretary General promised to deploy a technical assessment mission to establish the logistical and security requirements in advance of creating a **United Nations political mission** based on the organisation's current formulae for integrated operations. This future mission's responsibilities will include **supervising the ceasefire and the disarmament process**, as well as offering technical assistance to the Electoral Commission and supervising the **elections** to the Constituent Assembly, planned for July 2007. Finally, according to estimates made by the Peace Secretariat, 24.28 million dollars will be needed for infrastructure reconstruction. Germany, Denmark and the USA have announced that they are willing to contribute funds for the rehabilitation process.

In **Tajikistan**, E. Rahmonov was returned to power once again and will therefore occupy the Presidency for a further seven years.²⁵ The international community said that the elections lacked plurality, and opposition parties refused to take part since they regarded them as neither free nor fair. The country showed **positive macroeconomic indicators** throughout the year and thus attracted favourable attention from investors, as well as from powers like Russia and the USA who are particularly interested in the country's strategic position in Central Asia and its potential as an ally against terrorism. However, while its economic development can be taken as a positive sign, mention should be made of the **worsening social conditions** suffered by the ordinary population and the growing authoritarianism of the E. Rahmonov regime, as demonstrated by the continuing **repression** of the media that refuse to take the government line and the harassment of the **political opposition**, which eventually opted to boycott the elections. The political stability that has been achieved during E. Rahmonov's time in power has benefited economic growth, though this could be reversed if the recently re-elected President persists with his authoritarian behaviour.

In Tajikistan, President E. Rahmonov continued to maintain firm control over the political opposition and the media that did not follow the government line.

24. The governor of Aceh was previously appointed by Jakarta.

25. E. Rahmonov has been President of Tajikistan since 1994, and this will be his third term. According to opposition groups, the re-elected President should not by law have stood for a third term, as the Constitution only allows incumbents to complete two consecutive terms. E. Rahmonov justified this breach of the regulations by saying that his first term did not count, since it had been served under the previous Constitution, before it was reformed following a referendum in 2003 to allow Presidents to serve two terms instead of one.

The violence that broke out in **Timor-Leste** half-way through the year had an influence on subsequent events on the island, giving rise to a **fragile political, humanitarian and security situation**. At the government's request, a **Special Independent Investigation Commission** was set up to establish the causes and identify the people responsible for the events that set off the crisis. According to the Commission's final report, the fragility of state institutions and the absence of a solid state of law were the main underlying reasons for the crisis. The Commission does not have any punitive powers and could only identify the people suspected of taking part in criminal activities, recommending that they be tried by the country's legal authorities. According to the Commission, the judicial system should be strengthened in order to end the **culture of impunity** that has become embedded in the country. This is being exacerbated by the fact that none of the people so far named in reports and independent commission statements as being responsible for the atrocities committed on the island have yet been processed or brought to trial. In addition, **international forces** from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia remain on the island at the request of X. Gusmao's government. They are provisionally responsible for the maintenance of law and public security until a **national police force** is once again established after the review and remodelling process planned for the coming year. The main challenge in 2007 will be the holding of **presidential and parliamentary elections**, the first since the country gained its independence. The government will be provided with technical and logistical assistance in this process by UNMIT.

Europe

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the **negotiation process** that the country had begun with the EU over entry into the Agreement for Stabilisation and Association process with Europe became **stalled** as a result of the government's failure to implement the reforms that it had promised. As a result, the processes for **reform of the police and the media**, the approval by parliament of the **constitutional reforms** agreed during the year and the handover to the ICCY of **alleged war criminals** R. Karadzic and R. Mladic are all issues that remain to be tackled during 2007. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) announced that the post of **High Representative** and the powers that have been invested in this position over recent years could disappear in July 2007. This would mean that the new government will have to take the lead in implementing reforms that are opposed by the parliament of the Republika Sprska and the Croatian part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as was clear during 2006. Finally, NATO approved the country's entry into its **Partnership for Peace**, even though it had not met the condition that it attend to the demands of the ICCY.

In **Kosovo (Serbia)**, representatives of Pristina and Belgrade held a series of talks on a variety of issues during the course of the year, including the decentralisation process, with a view to arriving at an agreement that would allow a decision to be taken regarding the **status of Kosovo**, though no final conclusion was reached. Representatives from both sides set out positions that are clearly still a long way from consensus. In spite of this, the UN Security Council decided to continue working towards a final agreement, postponing a presentation by the UN Special Envoy on the future status of Kosovo, M. Ahtissari, until after the Serbian elections planned for January 2007. The enactment at the end of the year of the **new Serbian Constitution**, which describes the Province as an integral part of Serbia, led to a certain degree of instability. Finally, the participation of **Kosovo Serbs** in central political institutions remains minimal, thus impeding the process of political normalisation that the international community is calling for. The **process for the return of minority communities** continued, though the number of people returning was very small. A lack of business opportunities and an absence of security were the main reasons slowing their return, in addition to the failure to decide the future status of Kosovo. On the **security** issue, the north of Kosovo remained stable, though confrontations continued in Mitrovica. Finally, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe began training members of the newly created General Police Service for Kosovo.

In **Macedonia**, the pace of the **reforms** required if the country is to join the EU²⁶ slowed considerably during the course of the year according to a report published by the European Commission.²⁷ According to this report, the country must increase its efforts to implement the reform of the **police and the judiciary**, as well as its work to combat **organised** crime and **corruption**. Likewise, completion of the **decentralisation process** remained one of the main hurdles to be overcome in order to ensure complete implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. In this regard, the government's decision to reduce taxes could have a negative effect on the ability of individual municipal regions to obtain revenue, thus hampering them in the performance of their duties. Finally, the mandate of the **European Agency for Reconstruction**, which is responsible for managing the main EU aid programmes in Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia, was extended to the end of 2008.

Middle East

The tide of sectarian violence seen in **Iraq** throughout the year should mean that the country is solely analysed as a context of armed conflict. However, the significant amounts being invested by international funding organisations in connection with rehabilitation projects and the development of a political process means that the country is also still analysed from the point of view of post-war rehabilitation. By way of example, a second meeting of the **International Covenant for Iraq** was held in Kuwait at the end of October, at which the government asked donors for 100,000 million dollars for **infrastructure reconstruction** during the next five years, the time the government has estimated it will take to bring the oil production sector completely back on line. However, armed fighting prevented the introduction of most rehabilitation projects, and those that did actually see the light of day took place under strict security conditions. In the meantime, the violence caused the internal displacement of around 500,000 people,²⁸ provoking a **humanitarian crisis** for which funds have not been allocated on the grounds, according to the Brookings Institute, that the situation will stabilise. Armed Shiite and Sunni groups engaged in activities aimed at provoking the **forced displacement of people** belonging to different ethnic groups, causing the demographic and social picture to change in many cities and thus further impeding the formation of a multi-ethnic state, the main aim of the multinational forces deployed in the country. Finally, the year ended with the execution of S. Hussein in conditions that only served to heighten confrontations between the different factions.

4.2. The Peacebuilding Commission

This section contains an analysis of the most important issues that have arisen during the year, in an attempt to enrich debate regarding the capabilities of an international response. The most notable event this year was the process for the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission,²⁹ given the influence that this new UN body and its Peacebuilding Office will have on future peace-building processes implemented by the United Nations.

At the end of 2005, the UN General Assembly and the Security Council approved the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission with one sole aim, namely that of fulfilling the need within the organisation for a structure that could give a systematic response to post-conflict situations, as indicated by former UN Secretary General K. Annan in a report in which he set out a number of proposals aimed at reforming the organisation.³⁰

26. Macedonia and Croatia are as yet the only two Balkan states that have been accepted as potential candidates for EU membership.

27. European Commission: *The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2006 Progress Report*, Brussels, November 2006, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/reports_nov_2006_en.htm>

28. It is estimated that more than 500,000 people have been displaced from their homes since the overthrow of S. Hussein's regime.

29. The *Alert 2006* report referred to the process for the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission as it took place at the end of 2005.

30. Annan, K., *In larger freedom; towards development, security and human rights for all*, at: <<http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>>. United Nations, A/59/2005, New York, 21 March 2005 (p. 35).

The UN's two main governing bodies gave their joint approval³¹ for the formation of this Commission, which will comprise 31 members drawn from the Security Council (7), the Economic and Social Council (7), countries that contribute to the United Nations budgets (5), countries that provide troops and police personnel for United Nations missions (5), and regional groups and countries that have experienced situations of recovery after an armed conflict (7). The Resolution also provided for the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office which will report directly to the Secretary, headed by the Secretary General's former Special Representative for Burundi, C. McAskie. This Office will provide the Commission with support for the design of coherent peace-building strategies, the assessment of existing coordination on the ground in all peace-building work and financial supervision for rehabilitation processes, as well as ensuring the continuity of funding sources and other activities that are essential to the performance of the Commission's mandate.

It was decided that the Commission would organise its work in individual countries on a committee basis, and Sierra Leone and Burundi became the first countries to be handled by this new body. During the course of the year, both were nominated for the allocation of financial aid from the Peacebuilding Fund which had been created during the last quarter of 2006, as mentioned earlier in this chapter.

The work of both the Commission and its Support Office did not begin as quickly as had been hoped, bearing in mind all the rehabilitation processes that are currently underway. The activities organised by the Commission during the year (an inaugural session and meetings of the two committees dealing with Sierra Leone and Burundi) would not appear to have fulfilled the expectations created when the Commission was originally set up.

A practical use for the Commission: integrated missions

2006 saw the creation of two peace-building missions that were given the title of "integrated mission", indicating the UN's desire to implement the proposals that have been put forward on paper during the recent reforms. In August 2006, the UN Security Council decided to create the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), which would begin its mandate from 1 January 2007.³² Also during 2006, the UN Security Council agreed to replace the United Nations Mission in Burundi, ONUB, with a United Nations Integrated Mission (BINUB), which would begin operations from January 2007.³³ While the mandates of these two missions refer specifically to the term "integrated mission", it should be pointed out that these are not the only missions that the UN classifies in this way, as the term is also used for the United Nations mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and MONUC in DR Congo, among others.

The origins of these integrated missions can be found in the proposals made in 2000 in the Report by the Panel of Experts on United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations,³⁴ better known as the **Brahimi Report**. **As one of the measures aimed at solving the serious problems identified in respect of planning and operational support,**³⁵ **the Report proposed the establishment of integrated working groups** made up of personnel from all the UN programmes and agencies involved in a UN mission on the ground. The aim of these integrated working groups would be to improve planning and coordinate the different activities being undertaken by the mission, as well as providing support on the ground from UN headquarters. This system thus facilitates a unified response that had always been organised independently by the different bodies involved prior to the report's publication. This working method has been applied since 2000 to the United Nations mission in Afghanistan and has also served as the basis for the reshaping of some

31. See S/RES/1645 of 20/12/05, <S/RES/1645 of 20 December 2005>

32. See S/RES/1620 of 31/08/05, at: <<http://www.uniosil.org/documents/resolutions/1620sres310805.pdf>>.

33. See S/RES/1719 of 25/10/06, at:

<<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PBC%20SRES%201719.pdf>>

34. "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations", General Assembly / Security Council, 21/08/00. A/55/305-S/2000/809.

35. Ibid. Page 8.

existing missions, such as the transition from UNTAET to UNMISET in Timor-Leste, among others. These new **integrated missions** represent the further evolution of the integrated working teams suggested by the Brahimi Report.

Operation of Integrated Missions

In May 2005 an **independent study** by an enlarged United Nations Development Group (UNDG/ECHA)³⁶ indicated that this type of mission was seen as the most suitable working framework for complex situations in which an integrated response was required from the entire United Nations system. According to the study, the success of such a mission would depend on its having, from the outset, a **global strategic vision of the aims to be achieved** and the steps necessary to achieve them. In other words, it must from the very beginning have a clear idea of the responsibilities of the international community on the one hand and the role to be played by the local government and civilian population on the other. The UN Secretary General subsequently supported the directives suggested in relation to the planning of these integrated missions during 2006. Under these directives, once the decision has been taken to set up an integrated mission, the planning process must follow **three distinct steps**, each of which must have the necessary human, financial and material resources.

Chart 4.3. Steps required during the planning of an integrated mission	
1st Step advanced planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advance planning with a view to developing the strategic options required to obtain a broad commitment from the United Nations. • The basic planning required in order to develop the operational side.
2nd Step Operational planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of a draft plan for the mission. • Transfer of responsibility to personnel on the ground.
3rd Step Review and Transitional planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continual review and updating of the mission plan whenever required. • Preparation of options for the peace-keeping and transition processes.

This new integrated mission approach by the United Nations has led to a certain amount of controversy among workers, mainly on the humanitarian side, involved in rehabilitation processes in which this type of mission has been deployed. Humanitarian personnel see the integration of the international response as a threat to their basic working principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, qualities that they regard as essential if they are to carry out their duties properly.


A large number of the more key humanitarian organisations have expressed their disagreement with this type of integrated mission, indicating that while their own intervention must be coordinated, aid cannot be conditioned by the specific political interests that an integrated mission might have at a particular moment in time. Once again, the international response must be moulded to suit each specific case and context.

This disagreement between international elements working in a third country has once again highlighted the strategic importance of coordination if an international response is to be successful. It should be emphasised that coordination does not have to mean losing the capacity to decide or act, though it does involve efforts that go beyond the strategic planning required from each individual agency.

36. *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, May 2005, at: <<http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Report%20on%20Integrated%20Missions%20May%202005%20Final.pdf>>

The increased financial capacity of agencies, donors and NGOs working in post-war rehabilitation scenarios, particularly those that are currently occupying the front pages, has given these organisations the ability to become involved on a more autonomous basis. Making such organisations aware of the need for transparency vis-à-vis the affected population and their private or public donors, or the respective governments and parliaments in the case of bilateral intervention by a particular country, has on many (though not all) occasions prevented aid from being misused. However, international intervention in third countries is not bringing the benefits that had been hoped for and is in many cases prolonging conflicts (whether latent or otherwise), situations of vulnerability and abuse. It will therefore be necessary to take a further step forward and improve coordination of the international response. Although integrated missions may not be the most adequate solution, given the implied renunciation of the basic humanitarian principles that they involve, the idea of working in a team is still the best possible response that has been suggested to date.

The people affected by a particular situation and the national bodies in the country in which it is unfolding should be given a privileged position in these teams, given that it is they who will be responsible for guaranteeing the sustainability of any successes achieved once the international community has withdrawn. This is an issue which has not as yet been resolved by the Peacebuilding Commission.



■ Countries in post-war rehabilitation phase (Indicator no. 4)

5. Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action

- The humanitarian crises reported in 2006 pointed to the effect of conflict on humanitarian action.
- Four million people were dependent on humanitarian aid in Darfur.
- Half the Palestinian population are now living below the poverty line.
- Only 34% of the humanitarian funding requested for countries in the Horn of Africa was forthcoming.


This chapter contains an analysis of the situation relating to contexts of humanitarian crisis and humanitarian action. The first part deals with the definition of the term “humanitarian crisis” and analyses the indicators that help to identify which countries have undergone a situation of crisis during 2006. The second part examines the evolution of each context of humanitarian crisis on a region by region basis. The third and final part reviews some of the more important events relating to humanitarian action, and the chapter ends with a map showing the humanitarian crises around the world.

5.1. Humanitarian crises: definition and indicators

The term “**humanitarian crisis**” is understood to mean any situation in which there is an exceptional and widespread threat to human life, health or subsistence.¹ Such crises tend to occur in situations of vulnerability in which a number of pre-existing factors (poverty, inequality, lack of access to basic services) are further exacerbated by a natural disaster or armed conflict that vastly increases their destructive effects.

Since the end of the Cold War, a certain type of humanitarian crisis known as a “complex emergency” has proliferated. Such phenomena, also known as **complex political emergencies**, are man-made situations in which people fall victim to the effect of armed conflict, displacement and famine, combined with the weakening or total collapse of economic and state structures and the potential occurrence of a natural catastrophe. Complex emergencies are different from crises because they last for long periods of time and because they have fundamentally political origins and give rise to more serious humanitarian consequences. Although some of the contexts analysed in this report fall within the strict definition of complex emergencies, there are others that do not meet all the requirements, so we have opted for a broader concept that covers all the scenarios analysed below.


Figure 5.1. Appearance of a humanitarian crisis



1. The expression “humanitarian crisis or emergency” is not correct from a grammatical point of view, as the correct term is “human crisis”. However, this is a term that has been coined and is now habitually used in the literature dealing with this subject.

This section uses **four indicators to identify the countries that faced a situation of humanitarian crisis during 2006**. Firstly, the reports published periodically by the FAO on projected harvests and the general food situation indicate that **47 countries** suffered a **food emergency** during the course of 2006 (**indicator no. 5**). Of these, 28 were in Africa, 10 were in the Asia and Pacific region, 4 were in South America and the Caribbean, 4 were in Europe and Central Asia and 1 was in the Middle East. There was a slight increase in the number of food emergencies in comparison with the previous year (45), a fact which is making it even more difficult for many countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals established by the UN, as indicated in the FAO report on the State of Food Insecurity in the World in 2006,² which records that during the last 10 years the number of people suffering from hunger in the world has been reduced by only 3 million, a figure which is a long way from the 50% target set for 2015 (more than 400 million people).

Secondly, an analysis is made of the evolution of **internal displacements (indicator no. 6)**, i.e. displacements that occurred within the borders of a single country. In this regard, reports issued by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre indicated that **50 countries reported internally displaced people** during the past year, two more than the previous year, although the number of serious cases (in which one in every hundred people was affected) fell from 26 to 22. The regional expansion of the conflict in Darfur contributed substantially to the increased number of internally displaced people in neighbouring countries (Chad and the Central African Republic). By contrast, UNHCR completed its process to return all those who were internally displaced in Liberia during the course of last year. At the same time, the escalating conflicts in Sri Lanka and Timor-Leste led to a significant rise in the number of people displaced in both countries. An analysis of the situation by region shows that **Sub-Saharan Africa (20 countries), Europe and Central Asia (11) and Asia (9) were once again the worst affected**.



Source: the authors from *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*, <<http://www.internal-displacement.org>>.

The third indicator, which relates to the **number of refugees recorded by UNHCR (indicator no. 7)**, shows a significant fall of **around 12%** in the number of people granted refugee status under the organisation's protection, a fact that UNHCR itself claims is due to the increased opportunities for refugees to return to their places of origin. However, this interpretation perhaps overlooks the fall in the number of people seeking asylum as a result of the fact that host countries are now more likely to reject them. This trend has led UNHCR to demand that EU countries design policies that maintain the highest levels of protection for people who qualify for refugee status. Likewise, in spite of the fact that the total number of refugees attended to has fallen, the rising numbers of internally displaced people being cared for by the agency (22% more than in 2005) has meant a 6% increase in the total number of people in the care of UNHCR, 20.8 million people in 2006. The number of **situations classified as serious**, in which at least one in every 100 people in a country is a refugee, **fell slightly from 16 to 15 countries**, though the number of **countries with a significant refugee population fell to 64**, two fewer than in 2005. It should be pointed out that eight of the regions with the largest refugee population are in Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa, East Africa, Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, where the conflicts in **DR Congo, Somalia and Sudan are a key cause of the displacement crisis**. Afghanistan remains the country from which the highest number of refugees originate, while Togo, Sudan, DR Congo, Somalia, Central African Republic and Iraq were the countries that saw the largest number of displacements during 2006.

Table 5.1. Refugee population according to UNHCR

Region	Beginning 2005	Beginning 2006	Change
Central Africa and the Great Lakes	1,267,700	1,193,700	-5.8%
East Africa and Horn of Africa	770,500	772,000	0.2%
Southern Africa	245,100	228,000	-6%
West Africa	465,100	337,200	-18.9%
Whole of Africa *	2,748,400	2,571,000	-6.4%
CASWANAME**	2,735,200	2,467,300	-19.4%
America	598,400	564,300	-2.9%
Asia and the Pacific	836,700	825,600	-1.4%
Europe	2,317,800	1,965,800	-15.2%
Total	9,236,500	8,394,500	-12%


*Excludes North Africa; ** Central Asia, Southeast Asia, North Africa and the Middle East.

Source: UNHCR, 2005 Global Refugee Trends. Statistical Overview of population of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and other persons of concern to UNHCR, June 2006.

Finally, the fourth indicator used is the **Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) (Indicator no. 8)**, through which the United Nations seeks funds for the humanitarian crisis situations that it considers most serious or that require more international aid.³ The CAP for 2007 included **13 appeals seeking a total of 3,900 million dollars, to bring assistance to 29 million people in 27 different countries**. There was a significant fall in the total amount of funding sought via the CAP, **around 28.6% less** than the year before, due to the absence of large natural disasters during the year. Apart from the appeal relating to the Palestinian Occupied Territories, all the other **emergencies are in Africa**, though it should be noted that **Liberia, Guinea and Malawi no longer feature in individual appeals**, a sign that the humanitarian situation in these countries improved during 2006, though the first two countries are still included under the general appeal for West Africa. Also notable for its absence is Lebanon, as the rapid response offered by the international community and the Lebanese government's own capacity to manage the situation successfully headed off the humanitarian crisis caused by the war in the country. Similarly, **Nepal's absence** from the CAP this year would appear to indicate that OCHA achieved its aim of preventing the crisis situation in the country from turning into a complex emergency.

3. The second section of this chapter contains an analysis of the financing trends among donor countries, both within the framework of the CAP and in relation to overall humanitarian assistance.

Graph 5.1. United Nations Humanitarian Appeals for 2007 (millions of dollars)



Source: United Nations, *Humanitarian Appeal 2007*, UN, November 2006.

(*) Benin, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. (**) Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda.

Based on an assessment of the data provided by these 4 indicators and information gathered over the course of the year by the School of Peace Culture, **45 countries were classified as having suffered a humanitarian crisis during 2006**, two more than in 2005. **Chad, Lebanon and Timor-Leste** featured as new crisis situations due to the escalation of violence in all three places, while the situation improved in Southeast Asia as the result of the absence of large natural disasters, leading to an improved situation in both the **Maldives** and **Bangladesh**.

5.2. Evolution of humanitarian crisis situations⁴

Once again, **Africa remained the main source of humanitarian crises**, as 59% of all recorded crises affected countries on the continent. The list showing the other regions most affected also remained the same, with Asia and the Pacific (18%) followed by Europe and Central Asia (11%), the Middle East (7%) and America (5%).

As regards their **evolution**, there were clear **improvements** in the situation in **Guinea, Liberia, Malawi, Pakistan, Rwanda** and **Tanzania**, while people living in other contexts such as **Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, DR Congo, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Iraq and Palestine** suffered a marked downturn in their humanitarian conditions. Elsewhere, the situation in countries such as Sierra Leone, Haiti, Colombia, Angola and the Caucasus and Balkan regions remained pretty much unchanged throughout the year.

Chart 5.1. Regional overview of the most important humanitarian crises during 2006

AFRICA:

- **Sudan (Darfur), Chad and Central African Republic:** the escalating conflict in Darfur had a serious effect on the number and worsening conditions of the internally displaced and refugees in neighbouring countries.
- **Somalia:** the impact of further fighting in Mogadishu and floods in the country caused a mass exodus of refugees to Kenya.

AMERICA:

- **Haiti:** lack of access to basic services, an increase in the number of kidnappings and a general lack of security caused an increase in the number of people trying to leave the country.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC:

- **Sri Lanka:** the breakdown of the ceasefire and disputes between the LTTE and the government hampered access by humanitarian organisations.
- **Timor-Leste:** 10% of the population were forced from their homes as a result of the escalating conflict.

EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA:

- **Chechnya (Russia):** the precarious conditions faced by Chechen refugees in Ingushetia were exacerbated by constant threats from the Russian government that they would close the camps for the displaced.

MIDDLE EAST:

- **Palestine:** the economic embargo imposed by Israel and a number of western states on the Hamas government, combined with constant attacks on the civilian population by the Israeli army, especially in Gaza, and internal disputes between Hamas and Al-Fatah, led to a dramatic worsening of the humanitarian situation for millions of Palestinians.

Africa

a) Southern Africa

Countries	Causes of the crisis
Angola	Return and resettlement process
Lesotho	Drought, HIV/AIDS
Madagascar	Drought, HIV/AIDS
Malawi	Drought, HIV/AIDS
Swaziland	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political crisis
Zimbabwe	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political and economic crisis, international isolation

The improved harvests obtained in the southern part of the continent led to predictions of a vastly improved food security situation in the region, though countries like **Lesotho**, **Swaziland** and **Zimbabwe** continued to require aid in order to ensure food for a large proportion of their respective populations. In this regard, **Zimbabwe**, which refused to be included on the UN's list of least developed countries and so lost the associated benefit of debt relief, found itself obliged at the end of the year to ask humanitarian organisations to provide food aid for the whole country. Several NGOs reported that the continuing practice of enforced eviction by the government in the capital's suburbs was contributing in an alarming way to increased levels of vulnerability to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other diseases such as cholera. Similarly, the economic and political situation, which remains in continual decline, has made Zimbabwe the country with the lowest life expectancy in the world (34 for men and 37 for women). At the same time, the drought in **Madagascar** greatly reduced the harvest, making international food aid a necessity.

There was a sharp fall in the amount of funding allocated to humanitarian crises in the southern tip of Africa, which in turn threatened the capacity of individual humanitarian agencies to provide aid. Along with the WFP, these agencies were forced to reduce their operations in the region, including their work with the most vulnerable groups. In the case of **Angola**, the WFP was forced to announce that it was delegating all its aid projects to the Angolan government due to the lack of commitment from donors in a country whose revenues from oil production have not been reflected in an improvement of living standards for ordinary people. Furthermore, the return to the country of large numbers of refugees, combined with the widespread incidence of cholera, which has caused the deaths of 1,200 people in three months, have further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the country.

Elsewhere, the prospects were more optimistic for **Malawi**, which saw a notable improvement in comparison with the previous year, thanks to good harvests and the government's great efforts to improve agriculture and provide assistance for the general population, as well as the preventive action taken by several agencies and NGOs.

b) Àfrica Occidental

Countries	Causes of the crisis
Côte d'Ivoire	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people, delays in the electoral and disarmament processes
Guinea	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of refugees
Liberia	Impact of conflicts in the region, resettlement and return of refugees
Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger)	Drought, political instability
Sierra Leone	Impact of conflicts in the region, resettlement and return of refugees

In the western part of the continent, the **Sahel** region, particularly **Niger** and the north of **Mali**, formed the main focus of humanitarian alerts during the year. In spite of the attempt by individual governments and the United Nations to avoid a repetition of the crisis from the previous year, only half the funds promised to tackle the food emergency in the region were eventually handed over by donor countries. If measures are not taken now to deal with the serious problems in the region, particularly the lack of water, this could become a source of conflict in Niger between the indigenous population and the groups of nomadic herders coming from Chad. Elsewhere, an upsurge in fighting in the Senegalese region of **Casamance** caused thousands of people to flee towards **Gambia** and the border with **Guinea-Bissau**.

Turning to the countries in the **Mano River** region, the process for the return of refugees and the internally displaced continued, though UNHCR stressed that living conditions for returnees were far from ideal for their proper reinsertion, particularly in **Liberia** and **Côte d'Ivoire**. Elsewhere, OCHA drew attention to the changes being made to the kind of operations being implemented in the region, with a move away from humanitarian aid towards post-war rehabilitation, which leaves many problems relating to both food and aid unresolved in the countries involved. Finally, the return of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees lightened the load on **Guinea**, the country in which they had sought refuge.

c) Horn of Africa

Countries	Causes of the crisis
Eritrea	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought
Ethiopia	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought
Somalia	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought
Sudan	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought

Two countries in the Horn of Africa were notable for the scale of their humanitarian crises, **Somalia** and **Sudan**, while the effects of the drought, the worst in 50 years, and the subsequent floods in **Ethiopia** and **Eritrea** contributed to the increase in the number of people affected by famine in both countries. The escalating conflict in **Somalia** made the provision of humanitarian aid impossible, particularly in Mogadishu, where intense levels of fighting prevented access by humanitarian agencies, though the reopening of the port in the capital after 11 years subsequently made it possible to get emergency aid into the city. Increasing tensions in the country hampered humanitarian access to more than 330,000 people affected by floods at the end of the year.

During May, the signing of a peace agreement for **Darfur** led to hopes of a possible improvement in the situation affecting this part of Sudan. However, it had entirely the opposite effect, causing an increase in the climate of violence and worsening the humanitarian crisis, making it very difficult for aid agencies and humanitarian organisations to get to the areas most badly affected by the armed conflict. At the same time, the AU

mission showed itself to be clearly incapable of guaranteeing the protection of the civilian population, and humanitarian workers became the target of many attacks from different groups, raising the death toll among those working for the different organisations and agencies. By the end of the year, four million people required humanitarian aid in Darfur. Elsewhere, the process for the return of refugees continued in the **South of Sudan**, though these people are battling a shortage of the resources they need merely to subsist, while the climate of instability worsens and yet more people are displaced as a result of fighting between clans.

Chart 5.2. In the shadow of Darfur: the situation facing refugees and the internally displaced in the east of Sudan

While the media's eyes are drawn to the harsh realities of the internally displaced and refugees in Darfur, other parts of Sudan in which people are seriously vulnerable and at risk are receiving little or no attention from the international community. Among the most forgotten groups in the country are the **200,000 refugees and internally displaced people** who are surviving on the scantest of resources in Kassala, Red State and Gedaref, in the east of the country. The low-intensity conflict being waged against the Sudanese government by the armed opposition alliance known as the Eastern Front ended this year with the signing of a **peace agreement**, in which the group was promised a certain amount of political representation in both the government and parliament, along with an undertaking from the government to allocate 600 million dollars to the region's development over the next five years. However, this will not be enough to remedy the effects of several decades of exclusion and marginalisation. Furthermore, **the refugee problem was not included on the negotiating agenda, meaning that this community is destined to be ostracised and forgotten.**

It is calculated that there are currently around **110,000 refugees** in the east of the country, most of them originally from Ethiopia and Eritrea, and some of these have spent **more than 40 years** living in the twelve camps dotted around the three states. The volatile situation in the Horn of Africa has meant that the number of refugees continues to increase, while their living conditions worsen as a result of the Sudanese government's policy of preventing those who have recently arrived from getting work. The amount of arable land available within the settlement camps is very small and continually affected by drought.

Conditions for the local population are not much better. At least **74,000 people have been displaced as a result of attacks by pro-government militias**, some 50% of the population of Kassala state are suffering from chronic malnutrition and at least 30,000 people were affected by floods during the course of the year. Nevertheless, there is **hope that the situation in the region will improve if peace and stability are finally achieved**, with a return to trading relations with Eritrea and the arrival of more humanitarian aid, though there is nothing to indicate that this eastern region, which was ignored during the conflict, will now acquire greater importance in the international scheme of things.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Countries	Causes of the crisis
Burundi	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
Central African Rep.	Armed internal disputes, volume of internally displaced people
Chad	Armed internal disputes, regional instability, volume of enforced displacements and refugees
Congo	Armed internal disputes, volume of enforced displacements
DR Congo	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements
Kenya	Volume of enforced displacements, drought
Rwanda	Impact of regional conflicts, volume of enforced displacements
Tanzania	Volume of refugees, drought
Uganda	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought

The worsening humanitarian situation in **Chad, Central African Republic** and **Kenya** was of key concern during the past year. The large volume of displaced people caused by the growing political instability in **Chad** and the **Central African Republic**, along with the conditions faced by refugees in both countries, was further exacerbated by the spread of the crisis in Darfur. Attacks by Sudanese militias in the border town of Abeche, which was being used as a centre for the distribution and coordination of humanitarian aid, forced humanitarian agencies to withdraw to Cameroon, while constant fighting between insurgent groups and government armed forces from both Chad and the Central African Republic seriously impeded access by humanitarian personnel.

In **Kenya**, an increase in the number of refugees fleeing from the escalating conflict in Somalia, combined with the failing rains, subsequent floods and a lack of funding, forced the WFP to make an extraordinary appeal for funds that would allow it to tackle the humanitarian crisis in the country. It is estimated that 1.8 million people were affected by the torrential rains which further worsened conditions for people living in refugee camps in Kenya and Somalia during November. The Kenyan government later decided to close its border with Somalia in order to prevent members of the UIC from entering the country, a move that provoked strong criticism and complaints that it was at the same time closing the door on civilians trying to escape the conflict. On the other hand, the humanitarian situation improved in **Tanzania** and **Rwanda**, and particularly in **Burundi**, where the signing of a peace agreement led to the return of a large number of refugees, though the WFP warned that access to the country and the supply of food aid remained difficult.

The most worrying humanitarian crisis in the region throughout the year remained that of **DR Congo**, where 1,200 people died every day as a result of both the conflict and the resulting complex emergency. Violence in the country caused an increase in the number of people who were internally displaced and led to humanitarian organisations closing down their operations in many provinces, all of which contributed to the spread of hunger and worsening incidents of disease caused by lack of access to fresh water. Conditions in the camps for the internally displaced in the north of **Uganda** were also of great concern, though hopes of peace made it possible to create a humanitarian corridor that led to improved access to people living in the region. After four years of negotiations, the countries in the **Great Lakes** region finally signed an agreement in Nairobi, Kenya, to support the creation of **national protocols to provide protection and assistance to the internally displaced**. If this agreement is implemented, it will be the first legal instrument of its kind in the world.

America

Countries	Causes of the crisis
Colombia	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
Haiti	Natural disasters, political and economic crisis

Colombia and **Haiti** were the main contexts of crisis on the American continent. Violence and insecurity led to a rise in the number of displaced people in both countries, as well as forcing an increasing number of Colombians to seek asylum in neighbouring countries while Haitians attempted to migrate to the Dominican Republic. In Haiti itself, the provision of aid by humanitarian organisations was hampered by an increase in the number of kidnappings and other activities by armed gangs in the suburbs of the capital, Port au Prince. A large number of people were affected by abnormal weather conditions such as floods, typhoons and tropical storms, further evidence of the need to improve early warning systems and create action plans for cases of emergency and natural disaster.

In **Colombia**, the United Nations warned of the low visibility of the humanitarian crisis in the country, where the media only report on events relating to the armed conflict and often ignore the effect that this violence is having on the country's ordinary population. During the course of the year it was the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities that suffered most from enforced displacement as a result of both the violence and the effects of Plan Colombia on their lands, while the Nariño region in the south of the country was the area that suffered the most serious humanitarian situation.

Asia and the Pacific

In **Afghanistan**, humanitarian workers remained a clear target of the Taliban militias, a situation that was exacerbated by NATO's involvement in humanitarian activities, thus increasing the risk to the people working for the various agencies and NGOs in the region. In addition, the increased levels of violence that followed the Alliance Organisation's actions as part of Operation Medusa led to a new displacement crisis, while the persisting drought could affect food supplies for more than two million people in the country. In spite of the criticism levelled at the government of **Pakistan** at the beginning of the year following its poor handling of

Countries	Causes of the crisis
Afghanistan	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought
DPR Korea	Economic, food and health crises
Indonesia	Tsunami, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements
Myanmar	Volume of internally displaced people
Nepal	Armed conflict
Pakistan	Earthquake
Philippines	Natural disasters, armed conflict
Sri Lanka	Natural disasters, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements
Timor-Leste	Civil conflict, violence against the displaced population

the earthquake, conditions for the majority of those left homeless by the disaster improved during 2006 as they were able to rebuild their homes and leave the temporary camps in which they had been living, leading UNHCR to announce that its work in Kashmir was complete.

The year ended with the signing of a peace agreement in **Nepal**, which will hopefully open the way for refugees and those who have been internally displaced to return to their homes. The WFP promised to guarantee food aid to members of the CPN and their families once the armed group had signed the peace agreement, a decision that could be beneficial for the maintenance of peace while members of the armed forces and the Maoist group are being stood down. In spite of the CPN's announcement that it would respect the humanitarian corridors, it proved very difficult to get aid to the people affected by the floods during 2006. In **Myanmar**, the government seriously intensified its violent attacks in Karen state, causing the displacement of more than 80,000 people. It is currently estimated that around 500,000 people remain displaced in the country as a result of the violence of recent years. Elsewhere, the decision of the government of **DPR Korea** to continue with its nuclear programme and its continued refusal to allow the WFP to send an evaluation mission to the country led to a drastic fall in the amount of funds allocated for humanitarian aid..

The year ended with the signing of a peace agreement in Nepal, which will hopefully open the way for refugees and those who have been internally displaced to return to their homes.

Chart 5.3. Implications of the famine and the nuclear crisis in DPR Korea

The most recent nuclear test carried out by the Pyongyang regime led to a **significant reduction in the amounts offered by donor countries for humanitarian action programmes in DPR Korea**. The food aid provided by United Nations agencies during 2006 helped 13,000 people as opposed to the 6.5 million who had been helped during the previous year. This reduction in aid was also due to the **constant obstacles raised by the North Korean regime, making it difficult to supervise humanitarian aid programmes and gain access to certain parts of the country**. All of these factors may have considerably increased the lack of food security in the country, threatening famine on a scale similar to the one seen during the 1990s. They have also led to an **increasing number of people trying to leave the country**.

Given this situation, the governments of **China and South Korea** (North Korea's direct neighbours) used all the means at their disposal to prevent that UN Security Council from bringing more pressure to bear on DPR Korea by **strengthening economic sanctions** against the country, which could lead to the total collapse of its economy and increase the flow of people leaving the country. Both countries continued to send humanitarian aid and maintained their bilateral agreements with DPR Korea. In spite of the strict controls on movement imposed by the Pyongyang regime, thousands of North Koreans have tried to flee into China, though **Beijing refuses to recognise their refugee status** as it judges them to have entered the country illegally. Given the absence of any effective border controls, the Chinese government offers compensation to anyone who reports an illegal immigrant from North Korea, subsequently deporting them back to their own country.

The solution to this problem lies with **greater commitment from the international community** to ease the terrible plight of the ordinary North Korean people, both inside and outside the country. Countries such as the USA and the EU, which have frequently denounced human rights violations in DPR Korea, should **urge China to suspend its policy of deporting North Korean refugees and pass them on to UNHCR**, so that the organisation can take the necessary measures to ensure that these people are taken in by a third country. At the present time, the majority of the 9,000 North Korean Refugees live in South Korea, though many of them cross China to seek political asylum in Mongolia and other countries in Southeast Asia. The USA and the EU have offered asylum to very few people of North Korean origin.

Finally, mention should be made of a new humanitarian crisis that emerged this year as a result of the large number of people displaced by the violence in **Timor-Leste** (between 10 and 15% of the country's total population) and the problems that arose in Dili following attacks on the camps for the displaced. At the same time there were further attacks on members of humanitarian organisations working in **Sri Lanka**, where constant breaches of the ceasefire by both government and LTTE forces caused the number of people displaced inside the country to rise to 240,000, with a drastic worsening of their living conditions as a result of the blocking of channels for the delivery of humanitarian aid. In **Indonesia**, further earthquakes and tsunamis on the island of Java left almost 300,000 people homeless. During November the government reiterated its promise to build housing for people displaced by the conflict in the Sulawesi region in 2000. The region of Aceh, which suffered serious damage as a result of the tsunamis of 2005, gradually returned to normality. At least 3,000 people died last year as the result of natural disasters in the **Philippines** (typhoons, torrential rains, landslides), where the total damage to infrastructure and agriculture is estimated to amount to 430,000 million dollars.

Europe and Central Asia

Countries	Causes of the crisis
Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)	Volume of internally displaced people, political and economic crisis
Russia (Chechnya)*	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
Serbia (Kosovo)	Internal civil disputes, volume of internally displaced people

*Neighbouring Republics (Dagestan, North Ossetia and Ingushetia)

The crisis between Russia and Georgia over the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia led to the deportation of hundreds of Georgians living in Russia and the refusal to grant visas to enter the country, which combined with the economic blockade imposed by the Russian government could have serious repercussions on **Georgia's** internal economy. It is expected that if this situation continues the price of gas and electricity will double, with significant consequences for Georgian householders. Elsewhere, **the Russian government continued to threaten to close Chechen refugee camps in Ingushetia**, which it regards as a stronghold of the insurgency. This is a flagrant violation of the rights of the refugees, who will have no programme to aid their reintegration once they have returned to **Chechnya**. UNHCR also attempted to strengthen its role as peacemaker in the **Caucasus** during the year, confident that the orderly resettlement of refugees and displaced people in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan forms the key to peace and stability in the region. At the same time, the FAO and the WFP reiterated their calls for help with people who had been displaced internally as a result of the different conflicts in the region.

In spite of the signing of an agreement between the Serbian government and Kosovo Albanians aimed at facilitating the return and reintegration of Serbian families in **Kosovo**, this group continued to suffer attacks, and 2006 ended without any firm proposal for the status of the region or how this might affect reconciliation among residents.

Middle East

Countries	Causes of the crisis
Iraq	Armed conflict, drought
Lebanon	Armed conflict, post-war rehabilitation, political instability
Palestine	Armed conflict, humanitarian isolation of the population

In the Middle East, **the war in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah** led to a further increase in the humanitarian crisis in the region. The million people displaced by the conflict in Lebanon, who included both the internally displaced and refugees, required a rapid response from the international community, which allocated a huge amount of funds to ease the effects of the crisis once the armed conflict had ended. It should

be pointed out that the Israeli government constantly made conditions difficult for humanitarian workers trying to get aid to villages in southern Lebanon, while its forces also attacked civilian structures, thus seriously impeding the country's reconstruction. Nevertheless, those who had been displaced were quickly returned to their homes and the Lebanese government's management of the funds received meant that the humanitarian crisis was diminished.

Turning to **Iraq**, the number of attacks, kidnappings and assassinations perpetrated against the civilian population continued to rise, causing a steady increase in the number of refugees (1.8 million people who are not officially recognised as refugees in the countries to which they have fled and therefore lack the proper protection under international law) and internally displaced (1.6 million). This led UNHCR to make another appeal for funds to allow it to continue its aid programmes in the country. According to the agency, the estimates originally made at the beginning of the conflict regarding the number of people who would require assistance have been hugely exceeded, while the total amount of funding allocated to aid programmes has gradually fallen in comparison with the money invested in reconstruction. UNHCR funds for Iraq fell from 150 million dollars in 2003 to 29 million last year.

Finally, in **Palestine**, conditions for those living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank deteriorated notably following the elections in which Hamas emerged victorious. The resulting economic sanctions imposed on the new government by Israel, the USA and the EU brought the already weak Palestinian economy to a complete standstill and caused a sharp rise in the number of people seeking humanitarian aid. The proportion of people living below the poverty line rose above 50%, and public services completely collapsed when civil servants failed to receive their salaries. Subsequently, after an Israeli soldier was kidnapped in June, a harsh campaign of repression was launched in Gaza which left 400 people dead and caused many to be displaced from their homes, though this situation was overshadowed in September by the war in Lebanon.

5.3. Humanitarian action during 2006⁵

The following section contains an analysis of three issues that arose in relation to humanitarian crises and humanitarian action during 2006: the main difficulties faced by humanitarian organisations; the role played by donor countries; and the relationship between humanitarian action and peace-building.

a) The main difficulties facing humanitarian action

While the most serious crises of 2005 were caused by the huge natural disasters which struck parts of south-east Asia, 2006 (which ended with a typhoon that left more than 1,000 people dead in the southern Philippines) was particularly notable for the worsening crises caused by so-called "man-made disasters", i.e. **complex political emergencies**. In this regard, the majority of humanitarian crises unfolded in areas of conflict and tension or post-war situations, though they were in some cases exacerbated by natural phenomena such as droughts or floods. These events had an effect on humanitarian activities, particularly as regards the blocking of access to victims and attacks on humanitarian personnel, which increased as a result of the **constant breaches of the principles of humanitarian law by the warring parties**. At the same time, the **political decisions adopted by the international community**, such as the action taken after the political group Hamas came to power in **Palestine** and the moves against **DPR Korea** as a result of the reactivation of its nuclear programme, contributed greatly to a **deterioration in the humanitarian situation** in a number of places due to the interruption or suspension of aid.

5. "Humanitarian action" is understood to mean the group of activities aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering in situations of humanitarian crisis. These activities are guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian action also includes the protection of civilians and the provision of basic aid.

Table 5.2. Main problems faced by humanitarian organisations during 2006

Problems	Consequences	Contexts
Insecurity and lack of protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attacks on security personnel • Looting of aid • Reduction or indefinite suspension of aid • Withdrawal of organisations and humanitarian personnel • Increased vulnerability of the population affected by the crisis 	Afghanistan, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Iraq, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda
Lack of access to victims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased vulnerability of the civilian population • Enforced displacement • Increased risk to humanitarian personnel 	Afghanistan, Chad, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uganda, Zimbabwe
Shortage of funds and resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suspension of humanitarian supplies • Deterioration and perpetuation of the lack of attention paid to the crisis • Increased appeals and donor fatigue 	Angola, Caucasus, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, DPR Korea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Niger, PNA, Somalia
Poor management of aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased death rate • Lack of trust from donor countries • Reduction of humanitarian contributions • Political confrontations for control over aid 	Angola, Eritrea, Haiti, Myanmar, Niger, PNA, Sri Lanka


There was once again a **shortage of funds** to deal with crises on the African continent, particularly in **Niger, Kenya and the countries of southern Africa**, where the WFP constantly warned of the need to continue funding its programmes for communities badly affected by HIV/AIDS, as the effects of the pandemic continue to hold back development in the region. Also alarming was the lack of funds for countries in the **Horn of Africa, where only 34% of the humanitarian funds requested as part of the UN appeal process in 2006** were offered by donors. Finally, the **poor management by the Pakistani government** of funds collected for those affected by the earthquake of 2005, and the **end of humanitarian aid by the WFP in Angola** as a result of the international community's refusal to provide funds for a country with high oil revenues once again underlined the importance of managing aid in a transparent way.

Although the number of attacks on humanitarian organisations has increased in real terms year on year, it is also true that the number of humanitarian personnel on the ground has increased at a commensurate rate. The increased lack of security must therefore be assessed in relation to the rise in the number of people involved. A recent study by the Humanitarian Policy Group rejects the idea that there is a correlation between higher levels of violence in a country in which assistance is being given and a rise in the number of attacks against humanitarian personnel,⁶ though it does draw attention to the **increasing attacks on humanitarian workers for financial and/or political ends**, which once again raises the debate regarding neutrality in humanitarian activities. Although the study's conclusions discount this correlation, the **most dangerous contexts** for those working on humanitarian projects were still the countries with large-scale armed conflicts such as **Darfur (Sudan), Afghanistan, DR Congo and Iraq**, along with **Sri Lanka**, where the **murder of 17 members of the NGO Action Against Hunger** was one of the most serious incidents of the last year.

b) The role of donors and humanitarian reform

2006 saw the **consolidation of the United Nations system as the preferred channel for the financing of humanitarian aid**, with 50% of all funds allocated for humanitarian purposes managed by the organisation, as opposed to 30% during the previous year. There was a notable **improvement in financing for humanitarian appeals** (flash appeals and CAP), with 64% of the amounts requested covered by December

Graph 5.2. Evolution of humanitarian financing (2001-2006)



Source: United Nations. *Humanitarian Appeal 2007*. UN, November 2007

2006, as compared with 55% in the previous year. This was due to the improvements introduced during 2006, with the establishment of the **Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF)** during March, which allowed for quicker and more effective coverage of unexpected emergencies and contexts suffering from a persistent shortage of funds. Nevertheless, there were once again **imbalances between the different appeals made**: while Lebanon, Nepal and Timor-Leste quickly attracted almost 100% of the funds sought, some of the places enduring the world's most deadly crises, such as Burundi, the Horn of Africa, DR Congo and Somalia, barely raised 50% of the financing needed. The fall in the total amount of aid requested, 1,120 million dollars less, was due to the fact that there was no crisis in 2006 of the kind that had resulted from the tsunamis of the previous year, and **fewer flash appeals** were therefore necessary.

As regards the contributions made by individual donor countries, the USA, the EU, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Norway were the donors who gave most to humanitarian crises, though Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Holland and Ireland were the countries that gave a greater percentage of their GDP to United Nations appeals. The **bodies receiving most financing** were the WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC and UNRWA, while the sectors that received most funding were food, security, coordination and support services and infrastructure (see Appendix V).

The debate over humanitarian reform focused this year on **how to deliver aid more quickly and efficiently**. In this regard, the United Nations extended its so-called **Cluster Approach** to the strategic planning of its appeals for Liberia,⁷ DR Congo, Somalia and Uganda, which allowed a more effective sharing of responsibilities in relation to action on the ground and facilitated coordination between the different humanitarian organisations. It also introduced its **Needs Analysis Framework (NAF)**, a new tool for evaluating, analysing and organising priorities for action in a humanitarian crisis situation. Another of the issues that remained a central topic of debate was the participation of military troops and civilian protection forces in areas of humanitarian crisis, with a **review of the Oslo Guidelines**, which determine when and how armed forces should be involved in humanitarian contexts.

7. United Nations, *Appeal for Improving Humanitarian Response Capacity: Cluster 2006*. United Nations, March 2006.

Chart 5.4. The CERF on trial: an assessment of the achievements of the first year

The Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) began operating in March 2006 with the ambitious aim of collecting 450 million dollars from donor countries for the rapid allocation of funds in situations of sudden humanitarian crisis or to provide financing for so-called forgotten crises, situations which suffer a chronic funding shortfall. During the year, the **CERF provided funds for 316 projects in 28 countries, allocating a total of 207.7 million dollars.**

When it was originally created, questions were raised about the way in which the existence of this common fund might affect the collection of donations through other mechanisms, such as emergency appeals and the UN's CAP. There were also doubts regarding its capacity to act quickly and worries about how accessible these funds would be to NGOs working on the ground. However, in its report on the CAP for 2007, the United Nations has provided data that rebuts these early concerns, claiming that all the **extraordinary emergency appeals made during 2006 received funds from the CERF, and 37% of the total amount requested was received during the first month**, while in previous years half of them had only attracted 17% of the amount required. It repeats its view that the CERF and the CAP are complementary mechanisms and that they are not in competition with one another, with the result that by December 64% of the funds requested as part of the CAP had been collected. As regards speed of action, **funds allocated by the CERF to countries suffering sudden crises arrived even before a flash appeal had been made in some cases.**

Nevertheless, the scant importance of the CERF in terms of the percentage of the total worldwide aid budget that it accounts for (just **10%**) is one of the reasons why **it has not achieved one of its main objectives: to even out the percentage of funds received from all the humanitarian appeals** made by the United Nations. It is also still not clear whether it will attract the 450 million dollars required in order to be properly operational.

c) Humanitarian crises and peace processes


The dramatic scale of the humanitarian crises suffered in many of the countries that saw armed conflict during the course of the year have, once again, demonstrated the **close connection between humanitarian crises and war**. Conflict multiplies the devastating effects of natural disasters, as it prevents access by humanitarian workers and limits the capacity of ordinary people to respond, often forcing them to live in areas prone to drought or flooding as the fighting prevents them from returning to their homes. Famine and displacement are weapons of war that are knowingly used in many parts of the globe, and the peace agreements that have been reached still do not offer an answer to the lack of access to basic services and necessities faced by the ordinary people in these places, nor do they help to change the structures that serve to perpetuate inequality and injustice. Is peace really possible without a response to the related humanitarian crises?

The dramatic scale of the humanitarian crises suffered in many of the countries that saw armed conflict during the course of the year have, once again, demonstrated the close connection between humanitarian crises and war

The signing of **peace agreements in Burundi and Nepal** have led to hopes of a solution to the humanitarian crises in both countries. At the same time, the lack of stability in Central Africa (**Sudan, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, DR Congo**), **Somalia, Sri Lanka** and **Palestine** have led to a decline in the amount of funds offered due to the **fear among donors that aid will become unworkable if levels of conflict become more acute.**

Peace agreements may to a certain extent be unsuccessful if they fail to take account of the needs of the population affected by the associated humanitarian crises, as is the case in **Darfur**, where the agreement was only signed by one faction of the SLA and where **the absence of greater recognition of the damage caused to the people displaced by the conflict and lack of reparation for this damage made it impossible for the agreement to be signed by the SLA faction led by A. Al-Nur**, who belongs to the ethnic group that has suffered most badly from displacement in the region.

Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action



6. Disarmament

- World military spending totalled 1,118,000 million dollars in 2005, equivalent to 2.5% of world GDP.
- The UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on DPR Korea after it tested a nuclear weapon.
- The UN General Assembly voted in favour of implementing an International Arms Trade Treaty.
- The United Nations published its Integrated Standards for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.

This chapter contains an analysis of the issues relating to disarmament. The chapter begins with an overview of the trends seen in the **arms cycle**, with particular emphasis on military spending and arms exports. This is followed by a section looking at the issue of **arms control** from the point of view of arms embargoes and the principal international initiatives. Finally, there is a section dealing with issues relating to **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes** for former combatants. The map included at the end of the chapter shows the countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed and the places in which DDR programmes have been introduced.

The following indicators have been referred to in the preparation of this chapter: **military spending** (indicator 9), **military spending in relation to spending on health and education** (indicator 10), **heavy weapons imports as a percentage of GDP** (indicator 11), the **number of soldiers as a percentage of the population** (indicator 12), **arms embargoes** imposed by the **UN Security Council** (indicator 13) or by regional bodies like the **EU** and the **OSCE** (indicator 14), and finally, **DDR programmes** for former combatants (indicator 15).

6.1. The arms cycle

This first section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sets out current trends in the arms cycle, while the second pays particular attention to the issue of small arms.

a) Trends in the arms cycle


World military spending totalled 1,118,000 million dollars in 2005, equivalent to 2.5% of world GDP and an average spend of 173 dollars for every person on the planet.¹ The most notable feature of this is that a group of just 15 countries accounted for 84% of the entire world total. The figure represents an increase of 3.4% on 2004 and 34% over the last decade. The methodology used here involves monitoring all the different phases of the arms cycle, an approach which is useful not only because it shows the use to which weapons are eventually put but also because it provides evidence of trends in military spending and the production and export of weapons. This analysis is made on the basis of data provided by the Swedish research centre SIPRI.

The above figure is further evidence of the fact that levels of military spending are higher than they were during the Cold War, this time coinciding with the intensification of the so-called war on terror. As regards the way that spending has evolved, while it is true that this latest upward trend began before the attacks of 11 September 2001, it has significantly quickened since then. The **USA** is a continuing example of this trend, accounting for 48% of all military spending and increasing the total amount spent by 5.7% on the previous year, with a budget higher than that of all the countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia (except

Levels of military spending are higher than they were during the Cold War.

1. In the most recent year for which figures are available.

Graph 6.1. Estimated world military spending by region (1996-2005)
(The figures are in thousands of millions of dollars at constant 2003 prices)




Source: SIPRI; *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*, Oxford University Press, 2006.

Japan) combined. One should also remember the **extraordinary provisions** that the USA has made, including amounts set aside for the so-called global war on terror and the forces deployed in **Afghanistan** and **Iraq**. As far as this last conflict is concerned, the figures show that the USA has invested more than 200,000 million dollars and, if this trend continues, its spending on operations in the conflict over the coming decade will total around half a billion dollars.

After the USA, **France** and the **United Kingdom** are the countries that are currently spending most, as they are carrying out a complete restructuring of their military forces, though military spending for Europe, as a whole, has fallen by 1.7%. Another country to be borne in mind is **China**, which has been in the process of modernising its armed forces since 1998, with a gradual increase in its spending and little sign that this trend

Graph 6.2. Distribution of world military spending in 2005
(In thousands of millions of dollars at constant 2005 prices)



* Sum of the various NATO member states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Turkey.

Source: Centre for Defence Information at <<http://www.cdi.org>> and SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*, Oxford University Press, 2006.

is likely to be reversed. However, the most potent indicator of the increase in military spending comes from the **Middle East**, the region that has seen the highest percentage rise (7%), led mainly by the spectacular increase in spending by **Saudi Arabia** (21%).

The grouping arrangement shown in the above Graph is the work of the Centre for Defence Information, a US organisation, and it involves dividing the main military powers into three large groups, plus the USA: the first group includes countries that are direct partners of the USA, the second involves other partners and military powers, while the third group contains countries that have no links with the USA. This clearly shows that the countries which the US administration points to as representing the greatest threat to international security (the so-called “rogue states”) have military budgets that are lower than the countries in the other groups, and much lower than those of the USA itself. On this basis, we should ask ourselves who really represents a **threat to international security**, in other words, we should not only evaluate the threats made in the form of strategies and posturing, we should also look at logistical and weapons capacity. If we take this into consideration, the USA should be regarded as the biggest threat.

Taking this point further, the stance taken in relation to **DPR Korea** and **Iran** is a good example of the USA's ability to define the meaning of threat. At the end of the year, the government of **DPR Korea** carried out its first nuclear weapons test. It was also defiant in the face of international reaction, especially the commercial and arms embargoes imposed by the USA and the UN Security Council respectively. Although the rounds of six-sided talks may be a very useful tool,² there must also be bilateral meetings between DPR Korea and the USA. Furthermore, the differences that have emerged between the countries involved in the six-sided talks became clear both during the talks themselves and following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1718,³ when China, South Korea and Russia showed themselves to be in favour of more limited action while the USA and Japan argued for sanctions to be strengthened. At the same time, **Iran** also tested the reactions of the international community in 2006 with the development of its nuclear programme. The Iranian government defended the peaceful purposes of its uranium enrichment programme, something which caused suspicion among the principle negotiators from the **USA** and representatives of the **EU** from **France**, **Germany** and the **United Kingdom**. The year ended with the imposition of sanctions on the trade in sensitive material connected with its nuclear programme, accompanied by requests to halt its uranium enrichment activities.⁴

A number of conclusions can be drawn from these two cases, the main one being that the diplomatic approach must take precedence over any sanctions that might prevent fluent dialogue. It would also be a good idea to **strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty** (NPT), ensuring a stricter set of criteria and gaining the treaty's ratification from a larger number of countries. Under no circumstances should we forget the threat that these kind of weapons may be used in circumstances such as the (currently latent) conflict between **India** and **Pakistan**, or that **Israel** retains an officially albeit unacknowledged nuclear arsenal.

Turning to an analysis of **military spending as a percentage of GDP** in each country (indicator 9), it can be seen that 12 countries show high levels of military spending (in excess of 4% of GDP), including the USA and Russia, and particular note should be taken of the fact that spending in four of these countries exceeds 6% of their GDP:

Table 6.1. Countries with high levels of military spending in 2005 (exceeding 4% of GDP)

Angola	Israel	Morocco	Singapore
Greece	Jordan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Iran	Kuwait	Russia	Yemen

Note: Military spending in the countries shown in bold exceeds 6% of GDP.

2. The USA and DPR Korea are joined in these talks by China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.

3. See the complete resolution at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions06.htm>.

4. See S/RES/1737 of 27 December 2006, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions06.htm>.

The above table is closely related to **public sector spending priorities** (indicator 10). In 2005, military spending exceeded the amounts spent on education and health in nine countries, while a further 16 spent more on their military procurement than on either one or the other of these two sectors.

Table 6.2. Countries in which military spending exceeded spending on education and health in 2005

Angola (12%)	Israel (9%)	Saudi Arabia (11.8%)
Cambodia (2.6%)	Jordan (8.4%)	Sri Lanka (3.4%)
Ethiopia (3.1%)	Pakistan (3.8%)	Turkey (3.8%)

Note: The figures in brackets show military spending as a percentage of GDP.

The fact that public spending on health and/or education is lower than military spending indicates that **budget priorities** place a country's militarization and defence ahead of its attendance to the **human rights of the ordinary population** and the financing of public social services. It also points to a strictly militaristic approach to security that entirely ignores the human security models which were developed more than a decade ago by the UNDP and which focus principally on satisfying the basic daily needs of the population.⁵

As regards **arms production**, the profits earned by the top 100 companies around the world (81 of which can be found in the **USA** and **Europe**) are showing an upward trend, though the rate at which they are increasing is slowing. In the middle of 2006, **Europe adopted a Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement**, a legal instrument that allows defence materials to circulate with fewer restrictions within the EU. This should allow transactions to be carried out more quickly, but will increase the risk of weapons being diverted to third countries due to the more relaxed levels of monitoring. All the EU member states signed up to the Code of Conduct with the exception of Spain and Hungary, which refused on protectionist grounds.

As far as **arms exports** are concerned, in global terms the figures show that in 2005 the five main exporters accounted for 82% of all exports (based on value). Country by country, the **USA** was the biggest exporter, taking over from **Russia** as a result of its opening of bilateral relations with **India, Israel** and **Japan**. It is a cause for concern, however, that during 2005 the US government supplied 8,100 million dollars worth of weapons to developing countries. The figures show that sales of this kind are essential for the US industry, along with its portfolio of pending contracts which is worth some 44 billion dollars. Furthermore, 13 of the 25 countries that bought weapons from the **USA** are classified as non-democratic by the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW). One should not forget the increasingly important role played by **EU** member states, whose

Table 6.3. Main arms exporters and importers during 2005
(Values are shown in thousands of millions of dollars at fixed 1990 prices)

Exporters	Value	Importers	Value
USA	7,101	China	2,697
Russia	5,771	United Arab Emirates	2,381
France	2,399	India	1,471
Germany	1,855	Israel	1,422
Netherlands	840	Greece	1,114
Italy	827	Taiwan	777
United Kingdom	791	Turkey	746
Sweden	592	Czech Republic	630
Canada	365	South Africa	606
Ukraine	188	Egypt	596

Source: SIPRI; *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*, Oxford University Press, 2006.

arms industry is not only expanding but also showing increased versatility, offering both weapons and new technologies.

When analysing the figures relating to **arms importers** one sees a continual variation in the positions in which countries appear in the list, the most likely explanation being the way that markets are expanding from the Middle East towards Asia. **China's** rise to first position in the table can be explained by the fact that it is currently modernising its armed forces, as mentioned in the analysis of military spending. **India** maintained a strategic position with contracts with the main exporters and the expansion of its portfolio with western countries.

Turning to the information provided by the indicator on **imports of conventional heavy weapons as a percentage of GDP** (indicator 11), there are eight countries in which arms purchases exceed 0.5% of GDP, and in four of these the figure rises above 1% (**Eritrea, Israel, Romania and Yemen**). Although it is very difficult to ascertain the overall amount spent by an individual state on acquiring military material, this indicator serves to show how certain countries that exceed this percentage do not generally show high percentages of military spending. Finally, as regards the **number of soldiers as a percentage of a country's total population** (indicator 12), there has been a marked fall worldwide, in line with the trend seen for a number of years now, due to improved weapons technologies, a reduction in numbers and the use of purely professional troops in many countries, combined with the increasing use of private security companies, as has happened in the conflict in Iraq. Nevertheless, **the number of soldiers as a percentage of the total population still exceeds 1.5% in nine countries (Armenia, Bulgaria, DPR Korea, Eritrea, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Oman and Somalia)**.

b) Small arms

The studies carried out in relation to the issue of small arms in 2006 focused on aspects which have until now been regarded as secondary, and yet which greatly assist understanding of the problems caused by such weapons. **Small Arms Survey** is one of the organisations that has been most active in this area. In its yearbook it reported that some **800,000 small arms** are manufactured around the world every year, and that **half of all victims of this type of firearm** (around 100,000 a year) **are men aged between 15 and 29**.⁶ The same organisation published a report on the demand for weapons, recognising the importance of not only identifying non-state participants but also **understanding their desires and motivations**, with a view to creating and implementing effective solutions to control the availability of small arms. Finally, another issue examined once again was that of **munitions**. Among the **most important data**, it was revealed that **66 countries are in a position to manufacture munitions** and 23 of them can produce equipment of the most sophisticated kind.⁷ The main criticism centred around the fact that the monitoring of the **manufacture, transfer and storage** of this necessary complement to small arms is very lax. As a result, munitions are widely available and pose a great threat of insecurity and violence to the ordinary populace. The reasons for this lack of control can be found in the **low priority given to munitions on the international agenda** in spite of their vital role in maintaining both armed conflicts and crime, an area in which the international community must take decisive action.

On the issue of **anti-personnel mines**, the **International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)** gave its findings with the publication of its yearbook,⁸ which welcomed the fact that **151 countries** have now joined the treaty to ban this kind of weapon. On the negative side it should be said that **13 countries** still manufacture anti-personnel mines and that they are still used by three governments (**Myanmar, Nepal and Rus-**

6. Small Arms Survey; *Small Arms Survey 2006. Unfinished Business*, Oxford University Press, 2006.

7. Weapons used in portable aerial defence systems (MANPADS) and anti-tank guided missiles.

8. ICBL; *Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Towards a Mine-Free World*. ICBL, 2006, at <<http://www.icbl.org/lm/2006/>>.

sia), while financing for mine-clearance fell to 376 million dollars. An area of more than 740 square kilometres was cleared, and the report indicated the need for a sharp increase in this type of operation in order to ensure the clearance of all mines around the world in the not too distant future. The negative aspects of the report remind us that the rapid and effective implementation of a treaty banning the use of mines should not be seen to be enough, and many challenges remain in respect of this issue. Pressure must be brought to bear on the remaining countries to sign up to the treaty and more financing should be provided for mine-clearance work, an essential part of the security side of peace-building. Countries must also reflect on the **violation of International Humanitarian Law** that these weapons represent.

6.2. Arms control initiatives

To combat the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons, a series of worldwide and regional initiatives is needed to ensure that the arms trade does not cause further damage. An analysis must therefore be made of the current state of arms embargoes and the main initiatives introduced to regulate weapons, with particular emphasis on the issue of small arms.

a) Arms embargoes

A total of **22 arms embargoes** were in place at the end of 2006:

Table 6.4. Countries and armed groups embargoed during 2006

Al-Qaeda	China	Myanmar	Uganda
Taliban groups (Afghanistan)	Congo, DR	Rwanda ⁹	Yemen
Armenia	Côte d'Ivoire	RUF + other groups (Sierra Leone)	Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan	Iraq	Somalia	Zimbabwe
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Korea, DPR	Sudan	
Burundi	Liberia	Tanzania	

The year was marked by a number of different decisions by the **United Nations** (indicator 13). The Security Council decided to introduce an arms embargo following the nuclear test carried out by **DPR Korea**, as mentioned above. Elsewhere, the embargo imposed on **DR Congo** was extended for another year, along with the mandate of its Monitoring Commission. The embargo imposed on **Côte d'Ivoire** was also extended. By contrast, it was decided partially to lift the arms embargoes on **Liberia** (to allow the transfer of weapons for use by the country's armed forces and police) and **Somalia**. In connection with this latter country, a United Nations report indicated that 10 countries had broken the embargo on Somalia, with Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria supplying the Union of Islamic Courts and Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen supplying the Transitional Federal Government. Incidents such as this have once again **raised doubts about the effectiveness of arms embargoes**.¹⁰ The scant number of sanctions imposed in the conflicts of the last decade, the fragility of the methods used to monitor them and the constant breaches are just some of the problems to be borne in mind. A review of the design of these sanctions, the strengthening of sanctions committees and a more effective monitoring framework are areas in which improvements could be made.

There have not been any substantial changes within the **EU** and the **OSCE** (indicator 14) beyond their continued lifting of the arms embargo on **China**, a stance which is being driven by **France** on the basis of spe-

9. These arms embargoes apply to non-government forces in Rwanda and to Burundi, DR Congo, Tanzania and Uganda, in the event that the weapons in question are destined for Rwanda.

10. Control Arms; *UN arms embargoes: an overview of the last ten years, 2006*, at <http://www.controlarms.org/es/assets/dc160306_embargo_armas.pdf>.

cific political and economic criteria designed to strengthen diplomatic and trading links with the country. In support of the lifting of sanctions, it is argued that EU member states do not subscribe to the human rights criteria included in the Code of Conduct in respect of the blocking of arms exports.¹¹ Regardless of the need to strengthen these criteria, along with the rest of the Code of Conduct, there are other reasons why weapons should not be sold to China. These not only relate to the human rights violations against ethnic, religious and social groups that the government finds unacceptable but also to the risk that such weapons will be diverted, given that there is already evidence of China's involvement in **nuclear proliferation** in countries such as **DPR Korea, Iran, Pakistan** and **Syria**, as well as its **sale of small arms to Chad, Indonesia, Myanmar** and **Sudan**, among others.¹²

b) The main international initiatives

This section examines the different events that have occurred throughout the year within the **United Nations** system. The most negative of these was the **Review Conference for the Programme of Action to Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms**. This ended without any kind of agreement on a common text, meaning that the Programme of Action remains entirely unchanged from the way it was following its approval in 2001. One of the reasons that led to this situation of stalemate is the difficulty of approving any document by general consensus. In this case, disagreement arose not as a result of an excessively divided debate but more from the strength of feeling among a coalition of a small number of countries (**Cuba, the USA, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan** and **Venezuela**, some of whom are not traditional allies). To this one should add the ineffectual negotiating process and the weakness of both Conference President P. Kariyawasam (Sri Lanka) and many of the world powers who all played a part in the failure to advance this process.

By contrast, the end of the year saw a meeting of the UN General Assembly's First Committee, which handles disarmament issues. 139 countries voted in favour of establishing a Governmental Group of Experts to explore the possibility of creating an **International Arms Trade Treaty**.¹³ This represented a first step towards regulating conventional weapons, the only kind of weapons that still remain unregulated. Among the countries offering their support were three of the top six arms exporters (**France, Germany and the United Kingdom**), many arms-exporting emerging economies (**Brazil, Bulgaria and Ukraine**), and many countries affected by armed violence, such as **Colombia, Timor-Leste, Haiti, Liberia** and **Rwanda**. The areas in which the creation of a treaty has received most support include **Africa, Latin America** and **Europe**. Finally, it should be mentioned that the only vote against this process came from the **USA**, which sadly is the largest arms exporter and which permanently blocks any legislative advances, in spite of the fact that it has some of the most transparent export policies.

139 countries voted in favour of establishing a Governmental Group of Experts to explore the possibility of creating an International Arms Trade Treaty.

Turning to the **EU**, despite the announcement during 2005 that the **Code of Conduct** on arms exports was to become legally binding, this has not yet happened.¹⁴ To date there have been discussions on the strengthening of criteria 2 (human rights), 7 (risk of diversion) and 8 (sustainable development), while debate currently continues in relation to criteria 3 (internal situation in the recipient country) and 4 (regional peace, security and stability). It should be borne in mind that, in the event that it is adopted, this Common Position will not change the contents of the Code of Conduct,¹⁵ though it should serve to establish

11. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is a regulation that was approved by the Council of Europe in 1998 and that consists of the implementation of eight criteria to be followed in respect of arms exports between member states. These are based on not exporting weapons to countries in which there is an armed conflict or where human rights are being violated, among other conditions.

12. Poitevin, C. ; *Embargo de l'UE sur les ventes d'armes à la Chine: stop ou encore?* GRIP, November 2006, at <<http://www.grip.org/bdg/g1059.html>>.

13. See the complete resolutions at <<http://www.iansa.org/un/documents/ArmsTradeTreatyL55.pdf>>.

14. School of Peace Culture, *Alert 2006! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building*, Icaria, Barcelona, 2006.

15. The Common Position is the name that will be given to the Code of Conduct once it becomes legally binding.

a more complete structure for controlling exports by member states. Some weaknesses still have to be remedied such as, for example, improving transparency regarding the end user.

Aside from government initiatives, important work is being done by the **Control Arms** campaign led by Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam.¹⁶ In 2006, in addition to its various organised activities (the 100 Days of Action prior to the Review Conference, the Week of Action and the Global Day of Action for an Arms Trade Treaty), the campaign published a number of reports that called for greater control of the trade in small arms and made the relevant recommendations.¹⁷

Chart 6.2. Main information, criticisms and recommendations contained in reports published by the "Control Arms" campaign

- The **uncontrolled proliferation of small arms** has a terrible **human cost**, exacerbating **poverty**, hampering **development** and causing huge **health costs**. Governments are also urged to take the **measures** necessary to solve these problems in four main areas: the implementation of global standards for regulating international arms transfers; the regulation of weapons in civilian hands; the inclusion of the prevention of armed violence in development projects; and the provision of aid to survivors.
- The **globalisation of the arms industry** has meant that companies are taking advantage of important **loopholes in current arms export legislation** that allow them to sell to parties responsible for **human rights abuses** and to countries covered by arms embargoes.
- **Fewer than half of UN member states have mechanisms to coordinate action against small arms**; only 37 involve civilian groups in this process; 68 have reviewed their legislation since the implementation of the Programme of Action; and 37 have specific controls on arms dealing. The main **recommendations** include: agreeing global standards on international transfers; underlining the link between small arms and development, integrating action to prevent armed violence with poverty reduction projects; and increasing cooperation and financial aid in relation to existing initiatives.
- **The growing network of dealers acting as mediators in arms sales results in human rights violations around the world**. The study finds that current monitoring methods are both antiquated and ineffective, while large quantities of arms are despatched around the world using ever more complex mediation and transport operations. It recommends the urgent implementation of **national laws, regulations and administrative procedures** to prevent the activities of **arms dealers and logistics and transport companies** from committing **serious and systematic human rights violations**.

The **UNDP** also organised a conference to discuss the **relationship between small arms and human development**. After the conference, delegates signed the **Geneva Declaration**,¹⁸ in which they made an undertaking to restrict the impact of weapons on their own communities. At the same time, the United Nations **Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights** approved a **resolution calling on governments to adopt measures relating to the manufacture, possession, transfer and use of small arms** that complied with the principles of international law. It also backed a series of principles for the prevention of human rights violations caused by small arms.¹⁹

As far as regional initiatives are concerned, Africa saw the entry into force of the **Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of small arms in the Great Lakes Region**. **ECOWAS** member states also approved a Convention on the **control of small arms trafficking in West Africa**.²⁰ In **America**, the **Latin American Coalition for the Prevention of Armed Violence** (CLAVE) was launched. The coalition comprises some 167 organisations working for urban harmony, security and disarmament right across the continent. Initiatives of this kind should act as an example of the important role that can be played by regional associations and NGOs and take the emphasis off purely national or global arguments.

16. IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) is a network of more than 600 NGOs working in 115 countries around the world.

17. For more information and copies of the reports mentioned, go to the campaign website at <<http://www.controlarms.org/>>.

18. See the complete Geneva Declaration at <http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=500133>.

19. See the resolution at <http://www.iansa.org/issues/documents/hr_salw_resn_2006.pdf>.

20. See the complete Convention at <<http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/documents/CONVENTION-CEDEAO-ENGLISH.PDF>>.

In **Europe**, the **European Commission** proposed the establishment of **stricter regulations governing the control of arms sales**, including a requirement that records of sales be kept for ten years, along with an obligation to mark weapons during the manufacturing process and a guarantee that the relevant penalties will be imposed in the event of any breach. It should be noted that the Spanish government introduced an **Arms Trade Law** at the end of the year that will guarantee greater control and transparency in the export of military, security and policing material. It is generally viewed as a good start, though in the absence of parliamentary amendments it could be improved in the areas relating to the **transparency and monitoring of arms transfers**.

Finally, events in the **Middle East** were notable for the reports of the **import and use of weapons by Israel**. HRW reported that **Israel** had used cluster munitions in attacks on civilian areas in **Lebanon**, saying that these could not be used in areas where civilians were found due to their low level of precision. In addition, **Amnesty International** called for an immediate arms embargo on **Israel** and the Lebanese **Hezbollah** group, criticising the persistent transfer of arms from the USA during the armed Israeli intervention in the south of Lebanon.

6.3. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes (DDR)

This last section is divided into three parts. The first contains an analysis of the main international initiative of 2006, the United Nations Integrated Strategy, the second deals with the most notable events of the year and the last includes an overall assessment of the way DDR programmes are evolving.

United Nations Integrated Standards

In terms of international initiatives, 2006 was the year of the official launch of the **United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)** for former combatants.²¹ These have resulted from the UN's attempts to improve its multi-dimensional capacity in the area of peace-building. In recent years, some 15 UN agencies, member states, regional organisations, NGOs and the World Bank have engaged an intense debate over the way such programmes should be conceived. The preparation of these standards meant examining the lessons and best practices put forward by each of these bodies in order to provide the UN with a series of policies, guidelines and procedures that could be used in the planning, implementation and evaluation of DDR programmes in peace-building contexts.

The Standards have **three common aims** (final decisions will be taken by the parties implementing the DDR programme on the ground; operational planning will be integrated both at the organisation's headquarters and on the ground; and resources will be provided for training DDR specialists). The IDDRS strategy document is divided into five **modules**, each independent of the other, though they are all inter-connected:

1. **Introduction** to the Strategy, glossary and definitions.
2. **United Nations approach to DDR**: structure of peace-building and recovery work in post-war contexts.
3. **Structures and processes**: integrated planning, programme design, national institutions, missions and programme support for DDR, financing, personnel and monitoring and follow-up.
4. **Operations, programmes and support**: disarmament, control of small arms, security and development, demobilisation, social and economic reintegration, military and police roles and responsibilities, public information and communications strategies.

21. United Nations; *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards*, United Nations, 2006, at <<http://www.unddr.org>>.

5. **Cross-cutting issues:** gender, children, migratory movement, food aid, healthcare and the prevention of HIV/AIDS.

The **initial aims** of this Integrated Strategy are to be people-centred, to be flexible, transparent and responsible, to be based on national empowerment and to be integrated and well planned. In the medium and long term, the standardisation of these programmes should serve to improve understanding of political, social and economic processes in a post-war rehabilitation context and the way that they relate to DDR programmes. Although this strategy may represent a sound basis for planning these programmes, it remains to be seen whether the same mistakes will be made, with vast gaps between the theoretical reasoning coming out of central headquarters and implementation of the programmes on the ground leading to the derailment of the original proposal.

Most notable events relating to DDR programmes in 2006

If DDR programmes are to be properly implemented, it is necessary to have a **good knowledge of the context and proper monitoring of each case**. The purpose of indicator 15 is to provide a synthesis of the **current contexts in which DDR programmes are taking place**.²² A total of 22 DDR programmes were in place in 2006, covering the demobilisation of more than one million combatants. Two thirds of these programmes were taking place in African countries, and the total budget amounted to 2,000 million dollars. The main financing institutions were the World Bank, the UNDP and the EU, while individual countries donating large amounts of funding included the USA and Japan. One of the most worrying aspects was the small number of weapons handed over in all the programmes for which data is available, with the average failing to rise above four weapons for every 10 combatants.

Beginning with the continent of Africa, in **Angola**, with 70% of former combatants demobilised and 32% reintegrated, the government and UNITA met to analyse the reintegration process and its role in stabilising the country. **Burundi** entered a final demobilisation phase, in spite of the fact that only 40% of the expected former members of the militias and the *Gardiens de la Paix* have been processed. The demobilisation of members of the FNL began after the ceasefire agreement was signed.²³

The DDR process would seem to have begun in **Côte d'Ivoire**, though the low numbers of weapons handed in compared with the number of militia troops demobilised in the west of the country, along with the continuing disagreement between the government and the *Forces Nouvelles* regarding the simultaneous implementation of a voter registration process have led to the programme's suspension. However, the end of the year saw talks on the process resume once again. The DDR programme in the **Central African Republic** has passed off with the expected number of troops demobilised and reintegrated, though there were problems involving disparities between the lists prepared by the Commissions and those drawn up by the leaders of former combatants, as well as poor awareness and information levels of regarding the process and pressure on former combatants from certain authorities. Although 2006 was not a significant year for the DDR process in **Chad**, attention must be paid during 2007 to the programme involving the FUC armed opposition group, following the signing of a peace agreement.²⁴ The regional component took on particular significance in the DDR process in **DR Congo**, where the UN Secretary General issued a report on a complete and integrated strategy for the disarmament, repatriation and resettlement of foreign combatants in the country. Added to this was the fact that the programme had to be suspended with only 65% of the combatants demobilised, due to a lack of funds, while there were security problems in the Ituri region.

The process in **Liberia** was marked by several protests by groups of former combatants complaining that they had not received their annual incentive payments, though reform of the country's military and police forces continued to progress. **Niger** introduced a programme for the reintegration of 3,160 of the 7,000

22. See also Appendix VI.

23. See the chapter on peace processes.

24. Ibid.

members of the FLAA former armed group, with a total budget of 2.4 million dollars. This programme is due to be completed in December 2007. The World Bank and the government of the **Republic of Congo** signed an agreement under which the former would provide 17 million dollars for the DDR of 30,000 combatants. To date, some 17,400 combatants have been reinserted and 11,776 weapons collected, and it is expected that the National DDR Programme will remain operational until August 2009. It should be noted that 73% of combatants have been demobilised in **Rwanda**, while the process to repatriate former combatants living in DR Congo continues.

Somalia could be said to be engaging in pilot troop reduction processes. The situation changed drastically at the end of the year with an incursion by Ethiopian troops reaching all the way to the capital, Mogadishu, and the subsequent initiation of the disarmament of the Supreme Islamic Courts of Somalia.²⁵ In **Sudan**, the government and the European Commission signed an agreement to finance DDR programmes in the country worth 16 million euros, while a process was begun in the south of the country to demobilise the most vulnerable groups: women and children. It has been shown that former LRA combatants in **Uganda** have received very little assistance from the government or donors. It has also arrived two years later than promised, placing the legitimacy of the whole process in doubt.

Turning to the **American continent**, the demobilisation of the AUC cadres in **Colombia** ended with more than 30,000 troops demobilised and 17,500 weapons and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition handed over. However, the OAS reported that at least 4,000 of the demobilised militia had returned to criminal ways, and it also pointed to the connections between these groups, the drugs trafficking business and battles for control over cocaine exports and weapons smuggling. HRW announced that the Colombian government could reclaim the process if it implemented the Constitutional Court ruling offering demobilised paramilitaries reduced sentences in return for a confession and full explanation of their crimes and the payment of reparation to the victims. In **Haiti**, following approval of the new National DDR Commission, **MINUSTAH's Integrated DDR Section** planned a multi-faceted rapprochement process to reduce armed violence in the country. Under this plan, responsibility should not lie solely with the organising body with benefits going purely to former combatants, but there should instead be **participation from the community** (graph 6.3). This strategy will be implemented through a network of community-based organisations.

Turning finally to **Asia**, the official programme for **Afghanistan** ended, though both the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP) and the UNDP promised to continue supervising the reintegration stage of the programme and maintenance of the operation for the Dismantling of Illegal Armed Groups (**DIAG**) during 2007. In **Cambodia**, 40,000 people have been signed up for the restructuring of the country's armed forces. This process remained stalled due to a lack of funds from the World Bank, which has refused to continue funding because of a lack of guarantees. In the **Philippines**, the government doubled the amount of money to be received for each weapon handed over to the armed forces by militants leaving the NPA, while the USA's offer of 30 million dollars in aid to MILF combatants if they sign a peace agreement with the Philippine government was well received.


The DDR process in **Indonesia (Aceh)** entered the reintegration phase, and it was found that the number of GAM members was twice than expected. This miscalculation in the original agreement and the planning of the programme could well be offset by the high level of trust expressed by former combatants and by the high degree of acceptance among the communities in which they are settling. Finally, following the peace agreement between the government and the CPN Maoist armed group in **Nepal**, the introduction of a disarmament and demobilisation process was agreed. This is to be implemented in the settlement camps, which is where the former combatants will remain until an interim government is formed, under supervision from the United Nations.²⁶ The initiation of the process was marked by protests from Maoist groups against the refusal to allow them to enter government until all their weapons had been placed under United Nations supervision, a condition that was not stipulated in the peace agreement.²⁷

25. Op. Cit. 9.

26. Op. Cit. 24.

27. Ibid.

Graph 6.3. Planning community reintegration in Haiti



Source: UN, *Haiti Country Programme*, 2006 at <<http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=80>>.

Assessment of DDR programmes

One cannot on the whole make a positive evaluation of the way DDR programmes have evolved, given the **problems detected in a number of areas**, whether due to defective planning, activities that do not pay sufficient attention to the most vulnerable groups, the absence of monitoring mechanisms or ineffective

One cannot on the whole make a positive evaluation of the way DDR programmes have evolved, given the problems detected in a number of areas.

evaluations. The **planning process** must begin during the course of the peace process in order to prevent instability as far as possible and ensure that structures and activities are not duplicated. It is also necessary to take account of existing precedents from most of the processes that are already ongoing, along with the growing number of available tools and lessons learned (to be avoided or repeated) from other programmes. In addition, attention must be paid to the specific requirements of the groups being demobilised and these must be cross-refer-


enced with the needs of the community in which they are to settle.²⁸ In the majority of cases, the groups to be demobilised will include people in a situation of greater vulnerability, such as **child soldiers**, and there is widespread consensus that the demobilisation of these people should be seen as a priority. It has also been shown that **women** are often excluded from DDR processes and this means that many of today's programmes should be redrawn, not only to ensure that they can participate on equal terms with all the other combat-

ants but also so that their specific needs can be taken into account during the DDR process (including protection from sexual violence).

As regards **implementation**, a programme of this kind should be supported at all levels and recipient communities should feel as though they are fully involved in a process in which the method of implementation (the “how”) is as important as the aim to be achieved (the “what”). In short, there should be a **balance between security and development**, just two of the elements to be taken into account in peace-building, along with the often forgotten issue of transitional justice. There must therefore be improvements in the channels of communication between the different bodies responsible and more complete information for the people affected. The final aim should be to ensure that the process is as visible and transparent as possible and to shut out any elements or parties that may sabotage it. One of the long-term aims of peace-building in a post-war rehabilitation context is to provide a peace dividend, i.e. a redirection of public spending from the military towards more economic and social areas. Thus, a DDR process must be linked to **security sector reform** through, in many cases, the reduction of troop numbers, the professionalisation of institutions and training that is focused on human rights and international law. The decisions taken regarding reform of the security sector may have repercussions on the DDR process in respect of issues such as the size of the new army or the eligibility of former combatants from armed opposition groups. Similarly, although it must be remembered that the two processes have their own singular aspects, some measures are, in practice, identical in both cases, such as absorption into the new armed forces, the demobilisation of child soldiers, medical check-ups, etc.

Finally, one element that should be more firmly included in DDR programmes is a **follow-up and monitoring process**, which is necessary in order to track the degree of compliance with the programme as it was originally planned and understood. This will also act as a mechanism to reinforce trust between the participating organisations and donors. Although there are quantifiable indicators that can be used to assess the disarmament and demobilisation stages, these are insufficient when making a complete evaluation. However, the reintegration phase, which takes much longer and is assessed more qualitatively, presents more problems due to a lack of effective indicators, generating mistrust among the different financing organisations or states.

Disarmament



7. Human rights and International Humanitarian Law

- An analysis of the indicators for 2006 shows that very serious human rights violations were committed in 55 countries.
- The General Assembly dissolved the Human Rights Commission and created the new Human Rights Council. The Islamic Conference Organisation played an important role in influencing some of the preliminary work undertaken by this body in terms of both issues and geographical areas.
- The Council began its work to reform the international system for the protection of human rights, in which attempts to control the working methods of the special mechanisms emerged as one of the main causes for concern.
- The General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

This section contains an analysis of the situation relating to human rights around the world, along with certain issues relating to International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The **first part contains an analysis of the level of protection for human rights around the world** based on a series of indicators monitored by non-governmental human rights organisations (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and other international organisations. The **second part contains an assessment of the initial work done by the recently created Human Rights Council**.¹ Finally there is a map showing countries in which serious human rights violations were reported and the countries that have been visited by the UNHCHR and the UN's geographical special mechanisms.

7.1. Human rights: definition and analysis of the situation at an international level

Human rights are the inherent rights and freedoms of all people. The six indicators analysed in this section relate mainly to civil and political rights, though all human rights are unquestionably indivisible and interdependent. This report calls for responsibility to be taken by individual states, and the majority of the sources used in relation to the different indicators therefore refer to violations committed by governmental authorities or their agents. However, where required, account is also taken of the abuses committed by other parties, such as armed opposition groups.

Table 7.1. Classification of human rights and their violation by government agents

Civil and political rights	Kinds of abuse, groups in a vulnerable situation and related international legislation ²
The right to life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Genocide, covered by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. - Extra-judicial executions and summary disappearances, covered by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. - Death Penalty, covered by the 2nd Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The right to personal integrity	- Torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment and sexual violence , covered by the Convention against Torture.
The right not to be arbitrarily detained or punished	- Arbitrary detentions and legal proceedings without guarantees , covered in both cases by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Fundamental freedoms	- Restrictions on Expression, Association, Conscience, Thought and Religion, and Participation , all covered by the Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

1. The Human Rights Programme has prepared a special web page on the Council at <<http://www.escolapau.org>>.

2. The basic protection of these rights is set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in addition to the nine main human rights treaties.

Civil and political rights	Kinds of abuse, groups in a vulnerable situation and related international legislation
The right not to be discriminated against and not to suffer a diminishment of one's rights and freedoms as the result of belonging to one of these groups	<p>Groups discriminated against and instruments protecting them</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defenders of human rights, covered by the Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individual Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Women, covered by the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women - Children, covered by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols to this Convention - Minority groups and indigenous peoples, covered by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (pending approval by the GA) - Refugees, IDPs and asylum-seekers, covered by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the two additional Protocols to the Four Geneva Conventions, as well as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families

a) The commitment of individual states to the different international instruments protecting human rights (indicator 16)

In the more than fifty years since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1951), a series of legal instruments have been created to protect human rights at both an international and a regional level.³

Indicator 16 is based on the **main human rights treaties** that are legally binding for signatory states. The indicator refers to the two Covenants that govern human rights and fundamental freedoms in a generic way, along with the seven Conventions that relate to more specific issues such as genocide, refugee status, racial discrimination, women's rights, the rights of the child, the rights of migrants and torture and other forms of cruel treatment. These nine instruments form the basis for the protection of human rights within the United Nations system.

Table 7.2. Countries that had signed and ratified the main legal instruments protecting human rights by the end of 2006

Legal instrument	S	R	R (2006)
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	67	160	Andorra, Bahrain, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Montenegro
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)	66	155	Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Montenegro
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)	41	140	Andorra, Montenegro,
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)	19	144	Montenegro
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)	84	173	Andorra, Montenegro, Saint Kitts and Nevis
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)	99	185	Brunei Darussalam, Cook Is., Marshall Is., Montenegro, Oman
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)	74	144	Andorra, Montenegro, San Marino,
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)	140	193	Montenegro
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (2003)	28	34	-

Note: S: Signed; R: Ratified; R (2006): Ratified during 2006.

3. This internationalisation during the 20th century of the system for the protection of human rights places the emphasis on the responsibility of individual states to guarantee the protection and promotion of human rights, though it also underlines the need for international protection from bodies such as the United Nations.

The process of signing and ratifying international human rights treaties represents a first step towards compliance by individual states with their obligation to protect and promote human rights, which is why this information represents one of the first indicators used in this chapter to identify states which have not even formally committed to a series of universal values and principles.

Only thirty or so states had ratified all nine of these treaties by 31 December 2006. It should be particularly pointed out that not a single European country, nor the USA, Canada or Australia, have yet ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (2003), in spite of the fact that a great number of workers who fall into this category and tend to suffer conditions of vulnerability are to be found in these countries.

Three great events that occurred during 2006 particularly illustrate the continuing evolution of this international protection system. Firstly, the UN General Assembly adopted the **International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities**. Secondly, there was the historic vote at the UN Human Rights Council on the **Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples** after more than 20 years of intense debate,⁴ though the General Assembly did not immediately proceed with its adoption. Lastly, the Third Commission of the General Assembly adopted the **Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance** by consensus, making enforced disappearance an international crime and establishing the absolute right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance. This Convention has come about following continuous pressure from the families of the disappeared, non-governmental organisations, individual governments and international organisations since 1981.

b) The human rights situation in the world (indicators 17, 18, 20 and 21)

This section contains an analysis of the situation relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world, as reported by various sources. An analysis of indicator 19 is included in the second part of this chapter, which specifically describes the recently created United Nations Human Rights Council and the work it has done to date.

According to the situation described in the **annual reports from both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for 2006** (referring to events that occurred in 2005) (**indicator 17**), the following serious human rights violations were reported: a) systematic and widespread abuses relating to the right to life and personal security as a result of the actions or omissions of the State in 87 countries; b) torture and maltreatment in 97 countries; and c) serious infringements of fundamental freedoms in 140 countries, the most affected groups being women, defenders of human rights, the political opposition and people working in the communications media. These abuses are generally committed against a background of impunity in the majority of countries examined.

Chart 7.1. Enforced Disappearance

During 2006, the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearance presented more than 50,000 individual cases to the governments of approximately 90 countries and expressed its profound concern over the large number of complaints received during the last year. The Group's five members also made particular mention of the threats made against defenders or human rights, the families of the disappeared, witnesses and lawyers, and indicated that an ever increasing number of states were using the war on terror as an excuse to avoid respecting their international obligations in this regard.

NGOs repeatedly commented during the whole of 2006 that a large number of governments on almost all continents were breaching their obligations in respect of human rights, using the excuse of the so-called "war on terror" and the prioritisation of "security" over individual and collective freedoms. It should be remem-

4. However, by the end of 2006 the General Assembly had only published a resolution explaining that a vote would have to be postponed on this issue to allow for further debate to take place.

bered that the Convention against Torture forbids the use of this practice by any state that has ratified it, calling on them to take legal measures to ensure its prevention and punish any individual responsible. It also obliges governments to guarantee the right of victims to obtain compensation and be rehabilitated. Among other notable cases, it should be mentioned that after publication of the Council of Europe's report on the USA's secret detention centres in Europe, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Commission of Jurists and the Association for the Prevention of Torture put out a special appeal to European countries to put an end to the so-called "extraordinary rendition" and secret detention of prisoners in Europe.

Chart 7.2. The links between socio-economic inequality and violence

In 2006, the NGO World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) presented an innovative study into the economic, social and cultural causes of violence, including torture. On the basis of the work it has carried out over the last 20 years among the 280 members of its network, the organisation believes that it is essential to protect economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) if torture and other forms of violence are to be eliminated.⁵ In other words, the struggle to combat violations of civil rights cannot evolve in isolation from the fight against violations of ESCR, which often lie at the root of the violence.

NGOs also put out repeated reports throughout 2006 regarding human rights violations against the civilian population in specific situations of conflict, humanitarian crisis and/or tension, particularly in the Sudanese region of Darfur, Burundi, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Lebanon⁶ and the Palestinian Occupied Territories,⁷ Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Myanmar, Nepal, Belarus, the Russian Federation (Chechnya), Guatemala and Colombia. However, they also reported some positive events that had occurred during 2006, such as the introduction of the African Court on Human and People's Rights.

The second indicator (**indicator 18**) refers to the countries listed in the eighth **European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2006**.⁸ This report offers an overview of all the policies adopted by the EU in the area of human rights, from the point of view of both its bilateral relations with third parties and its activities in different multinational forums. Thus, its so-called "actions" and "declarations" are designed to transmit human rights concerns to the respective governments. More specifically, the EU drew up actions to be taken in respect of 24 countries, along with 28 declarations on other states. Turning to multilateral issues, in 2005 the EU submitted six specific country resolutions to the Third Commission of the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 (October-November 2005), while in 2006 it submitted resolutions on DPR Korea and Myanmar to the same body. Finally, its annual report underlined its belief that human rights are universal and not the internal concern of a particular state, adding that EU policy should therefore be based on dialogue and the pursuit of compliance with the undertakings made by all sides.

The existence and application of the **death penalty (indicator 20)** represents the denial of the most fundamental right: the right to life. It should be noted that the death penalty remained on the statute books in almost half the countries in the world in 2006, in spite of the call for an international moratorium on executions and the existence of two instruments prohibiting the practice.⁹ Amnesty International reported that while 68 countries still retain the death penalty there has been a clear worldwide trend towards its abolition

5. OMCT, *Attacking the Root Causes of Torture - Poverty, Inequality and Violence - Interdisciplinary Study*. <http://www.omct.org/pdf/ESCR/2006/omct_desc_study_2006_cd/read_me_first.html>.

6. The UN Rapporteur on the situation of children in armed conflicts, R. Coomaraswamy, announced when presenting his annual report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2006 that more children than combatants had died during the Lebanon conflict.

7. In its third extraordinary session, the UN Human Rights Council published a resolution in which it condemned the attacks in Beit Hanoun in Gaza, calling for the immediate protection of the Palestinian people and demanding that all parties respect the international humanitarian law that protects civilians in times of armed conflict.

8. Council of Europe, *European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2006*, Brussels, 12 October 2006 (July 2005 to June 2006). In 2006, the European Parliament also published a report on the human rights situation around the world and the human rights policy of the EU (PE 368.090/v02-00).

9. The Second Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Protocol no. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the latter permits the application of the death penalty in time of war or when there is imminent danger of war).

over the last 30 years, though an exceptionally serious case was the death sentence passed on S. Hussein in the final days of 2006 and the methods used during his execution.

According to data from Amnesty International, at least 2,148 people were executed in 22 countries during 2005, of which 94% occurred in China (1,770 known executions, though according to Chinese experts between 8,000 and 10,000 people are executed every year), Saudi Arabia (86 known executions) and the USA (60 people executed), while 5,186 people were condemned to death. According to the NGO, more than 20,000 have been condemned and are awaiting execution around the world at the present time. It warns, however, that its figures are approximate due to the secrecy that generally surrounds this practice. Many governments, such as China, refuse to publish full official statistics on executions, while the government of Vietnam has even classified the statistics on the death penalty in the country as a “state secret”. Amnesty International criticised countries such as the USA for continuing to execute people with mental illnesses, and others such as Iran and Pakistan for executing children during 2006. It also regretted the fact that the new Iraqi Constitution recognises the use of the death penalty.

This report has also considered the question of the **grant of asylum (indicator 21)**. The grant of such status implies recognition by the host Government of the fact that the safety and freedom of the applicant is under threat in his or her country of origin. It therefore represents government recognition of some human rights violation in the country of origin and/or persecution due to incidents of armed conflict or tension, among other reasons (discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group).

In this area, 2006 saw an increasing trend towards a lack of respect for the human rights of groups in vulnerable situations. Half of all the UNHCR’s national offices reported the forced return of refugees or asylum seekers from the countries in which these offices were operating, in spite of the fact that people’s lives could be at risk in their country of origin, with the consequent violation of their human rights and the international regulations that protect them. During 2006, UNHCR called on member states of the UN General Assembly to acknowledge and reaffirm the specific rights and needs of refugees and migrants, including the fundamental obligation not to repatriate them if it was considered that their life and liberty might be at risk.

The Council of Europe’s Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population announced in 2006 that European states should re-examine what have been referred to as their hardening policies on refugees and asylum-seekers. The Committee also expressed its concern over the small number of people being granted asylum and refugee status, the increasingly dangerous routes being taken by refugees and the degrading conditions in which they live once they have arrived on European soil. The Committee also reminded states of their responsibility to these groups in vulnerable situations. Finally, the UN Human Rights Committee found that the Swedish government had violated the absolute ban on torture by returning an asylum-seeker to Egypt, where he was subsequently tortured.

c) International Humanitarian Law (indicators 22, 23 and 24)

This section contains an analysis of two indicators relating to International Humanitarian Law (IHL).¹⁰ IHL was born in 1864 with the 1st Geneva Convention, and this first document eventually evolved into the Four Geneva Conventions¹¹ and the additional Protocol on the protection of victims in international armed conflicts (Pro-

10. IHL is understood to refer to a group of international regulations intended for application in areas engaged in both international and internal domestic armed conflicts. The aim is to protect people who may become the victims of acts of war (whether they are actual combatants or not) and to restrict the means and methods of war used. IHL regulations have both moral and political force (giving rise to international responsibility), and their incorporation in a country’s internal legislation involves legal responsibilities that particularly affect their governments as signatories to the different Conventions and Protocols.

11. Geneva Convention I for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; Geneva Convention II for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; Geneva Convention III relating to the treatment of prisoners of war; and Geneva Convention IV relating to the protection of civilians in times of war.

Protocol I of 1979). In any case, given that the civilian population is increasingly becoming a target in today's armed conflicts¹² and the subject of serious human rights violations by the various armed parties, it was thought appropriate here to look at the number of ratifications of the **Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions** (1949), **relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts** (Protocol II)¹³ (**indicator 22**). By the end of 2006 this Protocol had been ratified by 163 states.

The second and final indicator examined in this sub-section indicates those **countries in which Government armed forces or other armed groups recruit children as soldiers (indicator 23)**. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2000), which relates to participation in armed conflicts, considers a child-soldier to be any «person under the age of 18 who voluntarily or forcibly joins the Armed Forces or armed opposition groups and participates directly in combat». ¹⁴ The 110 states that have signed up to the Protocol undertake to impose criminal sanctions on such practices, though the impunity that is widespread in situations of conflict generally means that observance of this requirement is questionable.

According to the latest report by the Secretary General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, R. Coomaraswamy, now is the time to assess the actions taken to date by the different groups involved, 10 years on from publication of G. Machel's report on the issue.¹⁵ Although a number of advances have been made (in 2006 the EU approved a strategy for the practical application of its Directives on children and armed conflicts, the interests of children are more systematically included in peace agreements (Darfur) and charges of child recruitment have begun to be filed by the International Criminal Court), a large number of challenges still remain, given that 250,000 children are still engaged as soldiers and tens of thousands of young girls remain the victims of sexual violence.

In his last report,¹⁶ the UN Secretary General warned that although some progress had been made he had particular concerns about violence against children in the Middle East, Lebanon, Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, and their recruitment by rebel groups in the Mano River and Great Lakes regions. His report also placed particular emphasis on the problems affecting child soldiers in Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, the Philippines, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Uganda, and the interesting DDR initiatives currently being implemented.¹⁷

Using these indicators, and based on the trends observed internationally in relation to the many challenges involved in protecting and implementing human rights, a list has been drawn up indicating the **countries in which very serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are taking place**. Our report concludes that very serious human rights violations occurred in **55** countries during 2006.

12. See the chapters on armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.

13. Non-international armed conflicts are understood to be those in which the regular armed forces are in conflict with armed opposition groups, or armed groups are fighting each other, within the boundaries of an individual state. In these cases, a more restricted series of regulations applies, in particular the provisions of article 3, which are common to all four Geneva Conventions and the second additional protocol. Article 3 regulated armed conflicts within states until the publication of Protocol II.

14. See Articles 2 and 4 of the Optional Protocol of 2000. Until the adoption of this Protocol, a child was considered to be a boy or girl of 15 or under (including in the International Criminal Court).

15. Machel G., *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* (A/51/306 and Add.1), 1996. Graça Machel was commissioned by the UN Secretary General to carry out a study of the impact of armed conflict on children.

16. UN Secretary General's Report, *Children and Armed Conflict*, A/61/529 – S/2006/826 of 26 October 2006.

17. See the chapter on disarmament.

Table 7.3. Countries in which serious human rights violations took place

Afghanistan	DPR Korea	Iraq	Myanmar	Syria
Algeria	DR Congo	Israel	Nepal	Sri Lanka
Bangladesh	Egypt	Jamaica	Nigeria	Sudan
Belarus	Eritrea	Jordan	Pakistan	Thailand
Burundi	Ethiopia	Kyrgyzstan	Palestine	Timor-Leste
Cambodia	Equatorial Guinea	Kuwait	Peru	Turkmenistan
Cameroon	Guatemala	Libya	Philippines	Uganda
China	Haiti	Lebanon	Russian Federation	USA
Colombia	India	Liberia	Saudi Arabia	Uzbekistan
Côte d'Ivoire	Indonesia	Malaysia	Sierra Leone	Vietnam
Cuba	Iran	Mexico	Somalia	Zimbabwe

7.2. Reform of the international system for the protection of human rights

Indicator 19 refers to the work of the new Human Rights Council, the special mechanisms it has inherited from the Commission, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Third Committee of the General Assembly (social, humanitarian and cultural issues).

2006 was an historic year for the international system for the protection of human rights. **The General Assembly dissolved the Human Rights Commission and created the new Council.** Two years after it was suggested in 2004 that the Commission should be replaced by a new Human Rights Council,¹⁸ and following several months of talks, the General Assembly finally adopted a resolution creating the new body.¹⁹

The Human Rights Commission decided to end its duties on 27 March, resolving to transfer all of its pending reports to the Human Rights Council without making a further examination of any of them, even though the UN General Assembly had recommended that it be dissolved on 16 June, which would have allowed the 62nd period of sessions to be held. Several NGOs along with the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States expressed their total objection to the suspension of the Commission's period of sessions, and some NGOs even spoke of a "vacuum" in the protection of human rights until such a time as the new Council was able to hold its first meeting.

Chart 7.3 Main distinctive characteristics of the Human Rights Council

- Higher ranking position than its predecessor as it is a direct subsidiary of the UN General Assembly.
- Members are elected by secret ballot and returned by a majority of members of the General Assembly.
- Fewer member countries, 47 as opposed to the 53 who sat on the Commission.
- Potential to suspend members for serious human rights violations with a 2/3 majority of the General Assembly.
- Longer periods of sessions; ten weeks a year split up into three periods of sessions, as opposed to the Commission's six weeks a year.
- Introduction of a new universal periodic review of the extent to which each country is complying with its obligations and undertakings in relation to human rights.
- Review of the special mechanisms inherited from the Commission.
- Coordination and incorporation of human rights in the activities of the United Nations system.

18. See the report by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. *A More Secure World*, 2 December 2004, A/59/565 <<http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf>>.

19. See General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 3 April 2006. <http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251_En.pdf>.

The Resolution in which the Council was created was adopted with the support of 170 countries, with only four voting against (USA, Israel, the Marshall Islands and Palau) and a further three abstaining (Venezuela, Iran and Belarus). The Mexican delegation, which holds the Council's presidency this year, described the resolution as an intermediate solution in a world divided between those who saw human rights as a way of promoting dignity and fundamental freedoms and those who saw them as an inconvenient obligation applied as a result of certain ideological views or ways of perceiving power.

This same line of thinking (i.e. the view that there are two groups of countries that both approach and comply with human rights issues differently) led to the practical application of double standards under the old Commission. The creation of a new body should get away from this idea that there is one group of countries that has more respect for human rights (those which are economically more prosperous) and another that is responsible for committing human rights abuses (which includes more developing countries).

Chart 7.4. The legacy of the Commission's politicisation

This first year has shown that the criticism of politicisation that was levelled against the old Commission is going to be a difficult burden for the new Council to shake off, since the discussions held have had more to do with political alliances between states than with specific concerns about human rights, which have ended up being marginalised.

One example of this politicisation is the practice of block-voting by countries forming a regional group. Although this tendency is seen among all regional groups, the EU has shown itself to be an international organisation with a stricter discipline when it comes to voting. While such practices are difficult to avoid for intergovernmental organisations, what they show is that political strategies can alter and/or neutralise the stance taken by individual states in relation to situations which, in the light of objective international law, could represent a real violation of human rights.

The only possible solution would be to strengthen more independent mechanisms that will guarantee a more neutral and objective assessment of the compliance by each country with its obligations in the area of human rights.

a) Which countries form part of the Human Rights Council?

The Council is made up of 47 countries, as compared with the 53 that made up the Commission. Members, who are elected by secret ballot in order to prevent external pressure being brought to bear, are elected for periods of between one and three years, and cannot be re-elected after two consecutive terms. **The election of Council members was marked by controversy.** Although one of the requirements for sitting on the Council was the ability to show a high level of compliance with human rights, many of the members eventually elected have a known reputation for breaching human rights. According to an analysis of the indicators in the first section, which relate to the human rights situation around the world, 17 members of the council are guilty of serious human rights violations.

Chart 7.5. Council member states (membership in years)

Africa	Asia	Eastern Europe	Lat. America and the Caribbean	Western Europe and others
Algeria (1)	Bahrain (1)	Azerbaijan (3)	Argentina (1)	Canada (3)
Cameroon (3)	Bangladesh (3)	Czech Rep. (1)	Brazil (2)	Finland (1)
Djibouti (3)	China (3)	Poland (1)	Cuba (3)	France (2)
Gabon (2)	India (1)	Romania (2)	Ecuador (1)	Germany (3)
Ghana (2)	Indonesia (1)	Russian Fed. (3)	Guatemala (2)	Netherlands (1)
Mali (2)	Japan (2)	Ukraine (2)	Mexico (3)	Switzerland (3)
Mauritius (3)	Jordan (3)		Peru (2)	United Kingdom (2)
Morocco (1)	Malaysia (3)		Uruguay (3)	
Nigeria (3)	Pakistan (2)			
Senegal (3)	Philippines (1)			
South Africa (1)	Saudi Arabia (3)			
Tunisia (1)	South Korea (2)			

Mention should be made of the USA's proposal that countries on which the Security Council has imposed sanctions due to issues relating to human rights should be prevented from being elected. The USA also attempted to recall the device of the five permanent members of the Security Council and transfer it to the Council, which would have created a new *de facto* platform for these five countries to evade the possibility of being expelled for serious human rights violations. Several NGOs pointed to the hypocrisy of this proposal, given subsequent US criticism of the fact that countries such as Russia and China had become members of the Council.

The Council redesigned the map of the balance of power. The main groups that have acquired more power are in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. The fact that these three regions are represented by Algeria, Azerbaijan and Pakistan, all members of the Islamic Conference Organisation, meant that this latter body played an important role in the first six months of the Council's existence.

REGIONAL GROUPS	Africa	Asia	Eastern Europe	Lat. America & Caribbean	Western Europe and others
No. of members of the Commission	15	12	5	11	10
No. of members of the Council	13	13	6	8	7

b) What is a universal periodic review?

As regards the new body's duties, one of the main differences between the Council and the old Commission is the introduction of the universal periodic review. The UN Secretary General's initial suggestion was to create a mechanism under which reviews were to be carried out by the countries themselves. However, the resolution in the form that it was eventually adopted talks about a universal mechanism, which dispenses with the need for it to be an inter-governmental mechanism, meaning that an independent body may take charge of the process.

Chart 7. 6. Bases for a universal periodic review

Universal periodic reviews involve examining the degree to which states comply with their obligations and commitments in respect of human rights, based on objective and reliable information. They are **universal** because they spring from the desire to **overcome the problems of politicisation and double standards** attributed to the Commission. Each and every country must submit to such reviews, thus avoiding any favouritism.

The Resolution affords this process the status of cooperative mechanism, based on interactive dialogue with the state in question. The General Assembly decided that this review would take account of the need to encourage a country's cooperation, and that it would perform a duty that would be complementary to other United Nations mechanisms and thus avoid duplicating the work of the bodies created as a result of the different treaties. In order to define the form that this mechanism should take, the Council created a working group which is due to complete its work on 30 June 2007, i.e. one year after the Council held its first period of sessions.

The mechanism will focus on the degree to which countries have complied with their obligations and undertakings in respect of human rights. Several NGOs have asked that the undertakings to be reviewed include those made by countries when presenting themselves as candidates for the Council, with the aim of dissuading future members from including promises that they cannot keep. As regards the "objective and reliable" information that is to serve as the basis for these universal periodic reviews, several NGOs have also asked for civilian groups to be allowed to take part, in the same way that they do under the system that applies to the treaty organisations.

The majority of countries, both members and observers on the Council, have placed particular emphasis on the spirit of cooperation required under this mechanism, and some have even proposed that the review should

not come to any specific conclusion but merely create a space for dialogue. Although the resolution imbued the mechanism with cooperative characteristics, the work of these reviews must be seen in the light of the duties and origins of the Council itself, which specifically state that the Council shall be responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights²⁰ and complete compliance with the obligations that states have undertaken.²¹ Several international NGOs have suggested that **the Council should create mechanisms to deal with countries that do not cooperate during these reviews.**²²

During the discussion held by the Working Group, several countries pointed to the need to take account of the level of development of a particular country when examining its compliance with its human rights obligations. In this regard, it should be pointed out that there are what are known as minimum obligations, i.e. human rights obligations that must be observed immediately and are not dependent upon a country's level of development. However, a maximum level of compliance must be required from the most developed countries, and their external obligations in the area of human rights must also be monitored, in order to make the review process equal.

Reviews should not just become a space for dialogue on the state of human rights in a specific country, but must instead **incorporate instruments that guarantee compliance with the country's obligations.** Several NGOs asked the Council to appoint an independent expert who could study the recommendations and decisions of the special procedures and treaty bodies and then publish a ruling setting out the areas in which a state has not yet complied with its obligations. What this proposal points to is the need to improve one of the main defects in the international system for the protection of human rights: the failure to implement the decisions taken.

c) The process for the review of the special mechanisms

The mandate given to the Council by the General Assembly includes the possibility of reviewing the special mechanisms, once again restarting the continuous review process to which the special mechanisms have been subjected in recent years. Back in 2000, the Human Rights Commission made some specific recommendations aimed at increasing the effectiveness of these mechanisms, and two years later the UN Secretary General acknowledged the need to increase their effectiveness and the support given to them.²³ As a result, the holders of the various mandates updated the Manual that they themselves created in 1999, in an attempt to reflect best practices and support the holders of the individual mandates in their efforts to promote and protect human rights.²⁴ Nevertheless, despite the importance of the Manual, the General Assembly is now suggesting a further review phase.

Chart 7.8. What will the review of the special mechanisms entail?

The Resolution by which the Council was created included a clause for establishing, examining and, where necessary, improving and rationalising all the mandates, mechanisms, duties and responsibilities of the Human Rights Commission with the aim of **maintaining a system of special procedures**, specialised advice and a complaints process.

The actual wording of the Resolution does not establish that mandates *must* be rationalised but instead that, as part of its primary duties, the Council must **adopt and examine** and, whenever necessary, rationalise these mandates. However, the Council interpreted the Resolution as giving it *carte blanche* to introduce a process of reforms, and it therefore created a working group charged with drawing up specific recommendations on the review of mandates, setting a deadline of 30 June 2007 for completion of this review. The first results of the review have revealed a danger that there may be a reverse in the operational capacity of the special mechanisms.

20. See General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 3 April 2006, Paragraph 2.

21. See General Assembly Resolution 60/251, of 3 April 2006, Paragraph 5 d.

22. *Guiding Principles for the Development of the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism.* Amnesty International. AI index: IOR 40/031/2006.

23. Measure 4 from the report by the UN Secretary General. *An Agenda for Further Change.* A/57/387, 2002.

24. *Manual of the United Nations Human Rights Special Procedures.* <<http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/manual.htm>>.

One of the first consequences of this review was the Council's decision to entrust the Working Group with drawing up a new code of conduct to regulate the activities of those granted mandates. Of the 30 countries that voted in favour of the resolution proposing the preparation of this code of conduct, only three have made an open invitation to the mechanisms, offering an indication of the way in which the spirit of the future code will take shape.

The resolution under which the Code was created disregarded the observation from many states, mainly from the EU, some countries in the Latin American block and some NGOs, who suggested that the Manual prepared by the actual holders of the mandates along with the current consultation period, represented, in themselves, a valuable review forum. Nevertheless, by the end of 2006 there was a draft of this resolution which had been presented by the Asian group and which focused mainly on the definition and control by states of the working methods of the special mechanisms. The final approval of a code of conduct that contains this kind of regulation would greatly limit the effectiveness of the special mechanisms and, more seriously, endanger the provision of an immediate response to victims, one of the specific aspects that has marked the success of the special procedures' work.

The first point raised by this approval of rules of conduct relating to the special mechanisms is that it is difficult to see how these bodies can be independent in the future when, from the moment that the review begins, the measures taken are aimed at controlling their behaviour. However, what is more important is that this will **dangerously open the way towards the diminishment of the already weak institutional culture of respect for the work and inherent characteristics of the mechanisms**, particularly among individual states. It is this lack of political will to guarantee independent supervisory mechanisms that has led to a specific course being taken in the initial tasks carried out during the review period.

One of the more tangible risks identified during the Council's first six months of operation can be found in the proposal to prevent mandates from taking a stance on a specific situation in a country, and the disappearance of the geographical rapporteurs. Such stances on particular countries are seen by several states as a legacy of the old politicisation that eventually brought down the Commission. However, the Islamic Conference Organisation and several countries from the African and Asian blocs, the main supporters of restricting the powers of the mandates, believed that the rapporteur's office for the occupied Palestinian territories should nevertheless retain its mandate, thus revealing a political bias that is in contrast with its opposition to the geographical mandates. In any case, the Resolution indicated that the work of the Council will be guided by universality, impartiality, objectivity and a lack of favouritism, which leaves one in no doubt regarding the need for the mechanisms to take a stance on the specific situation in a particular country.²⁵

One of the issues that has been much debated during the Working Group's sessions is the need for cooperation between the special mechanisms and individual states. Although such cooperation is essential, it should not be incumbent upon the mechanisms to make an approach to the states in question. Cooperation should on the contrary come mainly from the states in the form of their guaranteeing and not hampering the work of the mechanisms. **Several NGOs view the special mechanisms as the most innovative and flexible bodies in the system and the ones which have greatest capacity to respond** and which therefore play a unique role in the protection of human rights on an international scale.

The organisations themselves stress that without independent experts to monitor and respond rapidly to allegations of abuse, the capacity of both the UN and the Council to respond to human rights violations would be severely compromised.²⁶ The reform of the mandates should therefore strengthen emergency actions, access to victims, independence, objectivity and compliance with recommendations, characteristics that have

25. See General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 3 April 2006, Paragraph 4.

26. UN Human Rights Council: *Criteria for a successful outcome of the review of Special Procedures*. Document presented at the Working Group on the review of mandates and mechanisms. Signed by the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, International Human Rights Service, Forum Asia, OMCT, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Commission of Jurists and COHRE, among others.

led them to be acknowledged internationally as valid interlocutors within the UN system. This same idea was taken up at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, where delegates pointed to the need to preserve and strengthen the special procedures system with the aim of allowing these procedures to perform their mandates in all countries with all the necessary financial and human resources.

d) The process for the reform of the Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights²⁷

As a result of the Commission's dissolution, the Sub-Commission has also been affected by the reform process and this year saw it hold its last period of sessions. The Resolution by which the Council was created announced that a similar body would maintain the capacity to offer expert advice, which effectively represented a proposal that a body be created to replace the Sub-Commission but that it retain its powers as independent advisor to the Council.

As regards the new duties to be performed by the successor to the Sub-Commission, which has already been called the Expert Advisory Body, there is as yet no consensus between the different countries. The issues on which debate has focused have related to its composition, the way its members are selected and the duties that it will perform. However, the issue that caused most controversy related to the possibility that this body take a position regarding the human rights situation in a particular country. The countries that opposed this suggestion came, in the main, from Asia and Africa.

e) What work has been done by the Human Rights Council during the first six months?

Indicator 20 focuses on an analysis of countries that have been the subject of a condemnatory resolution or that have been seen as a cause for concern by the Human Rights Council, the Third Commission of the General Assembly, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and/or the special mechanisms.

Since beginning its work in June, the Council has so far held **three ordinary sessions** (June, September and November). It has also held **four special sessions**, two of them relating to the military offensive launched by Israel in Palestine, one relating to the crisis in Lebanon and one devoted to an analysis of the situation in Darfur.

As regards the individual country resolutions adopted by the recently created Human Rights Council, **the strongest condemnation was levelled against Israel**. The military offensives launched against Palestine and Lebanon and the serious human rights violations led to three special council sessions and three resolutions condemning Israel's action. During its ordinary periods of sessions, the Council also adopted resolutions against the Israeli settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and occupied Syrian Golan.

Another crisis that formed the subject of a special session of the Council was the situation in **Darfur**. Sudan had already been the subject of a resolution during the Council's second ordinary period of sessions, in which, in much gentler terms than it used in its resolutions against Israel, the Council recommended that the parties bring an end to the human rights violations taking place but did not at any point condemn the emergency situation afflicting the region. In December 2006, given the seriousness of the situation in Darfur, the Council held its fourth extraordinary session and published a ruling in which it decided to send an urgent fact-finding mission to Darfur, led by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Sudan.

In respect of **Afghanistan and Nepal**, the Council adopted resolutions in which it simply referred to human rights from the perspective of technical cooperation, thus eluding any condemnation of the current human rights situation.

27. For more information, see the chapter on human rights in Barometer 12, which deals with the Sub-Commission for the promotion and protection of human rights, at <<http://www.escolapau.org/english/index.htm>>

The first six months of the Human Rights Council was characterised by the **complete domination of negotiations by the Islamic Conference Organisation** and the Asian and African blocs of countries, which resulted in a refusal to analyse the situation in countries such as Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka and to make a strong condemnation of the situation in Darfur, among other crises. This tendency of the Council to focus solely on the Arab-Israeli conflict and to remain silent in relation to other situations in which human rights were being violated led the UN Secretary General to express concern over the issue and ask the Council to avoid politicising its work.²⁸

The current composition of the Council, combined with the prevailing tendency of the new body to focus its work on activities of cooperation and technical assistance, thus relegating its duties of vigilance and condemnation to a secondary level, has resulted in **almost no condemnatory resolutions being adopted**. This has led to our inclusion under indicator 19 of the resolutions of the Third Commission of the General Assembly (which also relate to human rights violations), given the close links that are expected to develop between the two bodies in the area of human rights. The **Third Commission of the General Assembly** adopted resolutions in which it expressed concern for the serious human rights violations being committed in **DPR Korea, Myanmar, Belarus and Iran**, along with those committed by **Israel** in Lebanon. For its part, the **General Assembly** adopted three resolutions on **Belarus, DPR Korea and Iran**.

It should be pointed out that during this year of reforms in the international system for the protection of human rights, there has been a notable **reverse in the way countries view the supranational monitoring of compliance with human rights**. Particularly worrying was the resolution proposed by Belarus and adopted by the General Assembly, in which it was recommended that countries should not propose resolutions relating to the human rights situation in a particular country based on political criteria. This resolution represents a dangerous return to the once discredited view of human rights as an internal matter for each individual country. Claiming that resolutions are based on political grounds is an excuse that can be readily used by countries in order to avoid international criticism of their compliance with human rights legislation and one that has been quickly used by both Israel and the USA in the General Assembly.

Turning to the activities of the special mechanisms, the Council examined the reports that the special mechanisms had planned to present at the 62nd session of the Human Rights Commission. The **reports that the geographical special mechanisms** presented this year expressed particular concern over the prolonged detention of more than 1,000 political prisoners in **Myanmar**, the increasing repression of the independent press, opposition candidates and human rights defenders in **Belarus** and the systematic, widespread and serious human rights abuses in **DPR Korea**.

The **UNHCHR** published reports expressing concern over the delay in achieving justice and reparations for the victims of the armed conflict in **Guatemala**, the excessive use of force exercised in **Nepal** during the demonstrations held in the country during the course of the year and the threats endured by human rights defenders in **Columbia**. The UNHCHR's reports on **Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Uganda** concentrated on the technical cooperation activities being developed with the governments of each of these countries.


As far as legislative developments are concerned, mention should be made of the approval by the Council of **legislative achievements inherited from the Commission**, such as the Convention on the protection of all persons against enforced disappearance (also adopted by the General Assembly), the formal start of the preparation of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. As regards this last document, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which recognised the unhappiness of certain countries, particularly Canada, with the Council's approval of this Declaration, and asked for more time to continue negotiations on its content. This led to criticism from NGOs and a call to the General Assembly from the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples demanding the prompt approval of the Declaration.

28. Message from United Nations general Secretary, K. Annan, to the Human Rights Council, during its third period of sessions, 29 November 2006. <<http://www.unhcr.ch/hurricane/hurricane.nsf/view01/089DB9A910C291C3C1257235005BBBA3?opendocument>>

The change in the balance of membership of the Council, as mentioned above, meant that issues of **religious intolerance, racial discrimination and related forms of intolerance** took on particular importance, due to the growing criminalisation of the Muslim religion and the crisis unleashed by the publication of caricatures of Mohammed, seen in the Muslim world as a violation of their freedom to worship.

As a result, the first six months' work by the new Council can in short be said to have resulted in far fewer condemnations and the manipulation of this transitional phase by many countries intent on restoring political control over some of the more independent bodies in the international system for the protection of human rights.

Human Rights



8. Gender issues in peace-building

- The development situation faced by women was particularly serious in 31 countries, 7 of which are currently embroiled in armed conflict.
- The UN Secretary General published the first in-depth report on all forms of violence against women, which established that the most habitual instance of violence against women comes from their partners.
- Demands from women's organisations for greater female representation in peace processes were not listened to by the people leading such processes or the majority of institutions and governments charged with facilitating them. Mindanao in the Philippines and Nepal were just two examples.
- The Partnership that regulates relations between the EU and 10 Mediterranean countries introduced an undertaking to promote the status of women, with emphasis on full participation by women in conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building.

This section contains an analysis of the different initiatives being pursued by the United Nations and various international organisations and movements in relation to peace-building as seen from a **gender perspective**.¹ Viewing events from this perspective provides a picture of the different levels of impact that armed conflicts have on both women and men, the different ways and degrees in which women and men participate in peace-building and the real contribution offered by women in these processes. The section is divided into three main sub-sections: the first contains a review of the overall situation as regards gender inequalities, based on an analysis of the different indicators, the second contains an analysis of gender issues as seen in relation to the impact of armed conflicts, while the third looks at different initiatives in peace-building as seen from a gender perspective. A map is also attached showing the countries in which serious gender inequalities can be found.

8.1. Gender inequalities

Indicator number 30 is the **Gender-related Development Index (GDI)**, which reflects the differences between men and women in three basic aspects of human development: life expectancy, income per capita and literacy and numeracy. The importance of this indicator lies in the fact that it is not simply limited to disintegrate the relevant information by sex but also involves assessing the information on the basis of the inequalities that are thus established between men and women, making it an indicator that is gender-sensitive.² Although the GDI does not deal with the many facets of gender equality, it does however indicate that the **situation for women is particularly serious in 31 countries**, of which 29 are in Africa. It should be stressed that these include seven situations of armed conflict and six of post-war rehabilitation. Not all countries in a situation of armed conflict show serious gender inequalities, though a significant number do, which demonstrates how the impact of these situations of armed violence represents an obstacle (if not a reverse) to the improvement of living conditions and development for women. The disappearance of a number of countries from this list in comparison with

The situation for women is particularly serious in 31 countries.

1. The gender perspective, according to N. Vázquez, a Mexican feminist and researcher into the impact of war on women, is a *conceptual operational instrument that makes it possible to see what is really happening from a new perspective which transcends the biological explanation of what is different between the sexes, concentrating on the identification of cultural, historical and social factors, among other things, that differentiate men from women and generate conditions and positions of inequality between them, thus allowing us to intervene effectively in order to change these unequal positions*. The definition offered by the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women indicates that *gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with the fact of being a man or a woman, and the relationships between men and women, boys and girls, as well as the relationships among women and relationships among men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and learned during the socialisation process. They are specific to both context and time and can change. Gender determines what is expected, permitted and appreciated in both women and men in a given context [...]*.

2. While the statistics broken down by gender provide factual information on the situation faced by women, a gender-sensitive indicator offers direct evidence of the status of women in relation to a particular standard or reference group, in this case, men. Schmeidl, S. and Piza-Lopez, E., *Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action*, International Alert at <<http://www.international-alert.org/women/publications/EWGEN.PDF>>.

2004 and 2005 (in which 35 and 32 countries were listed respectively) is not only due to improvements in the situation experienced by women in some of these countries but also results from an absence of up-to-date information for places like Haiti, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia. It is worrying that the amount of available information decreases every year, particularly in the case of countries that have displayed the worst conditions in respect of women's development, since this information is vital for the development of public policies aimed at improving their living conditions.

Table 8.1. Countries with serious gender inequalities

Afghanistan ³	Central African Republic	Guinea	Mozambique	Sudan	Zambia
Angola		Kenya	Niger	Swaziland	Zimbabwe
Benin	Chad	Lesotho	Nigeria	Tanzania	
Burkina Faso	Congo, DR	Malawi	Rwanda	Togo	
Burundi	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Senegal	Uganda	
Cameroon	Ethiopia	Mauritania	Sierra Leone	Yemen	

It should also be pointed out that the methodology used by the UNDP when preparing this indicator involves looking at purely development-related issues and thus takes no account of a series of other aspects which have an enormous influence on gender inequality but are not discussed here. This emphasis on the development dimension also means that the majority of countries indicated are in Africa rather than other parts of the globe, where it can nevertheless be assumed that better development conditions do not necessarily mean greater equality between men and women. We should also add that armed conflicts have a clear impact on the issues analysed in the GDI, as shown by the lower rates of school attendance among young and adolescent girls in areas affected by conflict, the huge difficulties in gaining access to health services and the lack of provision of health services designed specifically for women, such as reproductive health.

8.2. Peace-building from a gender perspective

This section contains an analysis of some of the more important initiatives aimed at incorporating the gender perspective in various areas of peace-building.

a) Peace and gender on the international agenda during 2006

In contrast to the events of 2005, 2006 has not been a year in which the issue of gender has occupied an important place on the international agenda in the areas of peace and security. The fact that there has been an absence of notable events and anniversaries⁴ merely serves to underline the scant importance of this issue on the international agenda, since if such events do not occur, the gender issue ceases to become a topic for public debate.

However, mention should be made of the publication of the Secretary General's report on women, peace and security as part of the plan of action set out in 2005, which required the presentation of an annual report setting out the progress made.⁵ The report analysed the advances seen during 2005 and 2006, particularly within the United Nations and the sectors to which the UN has given its support.

3. The data relating to *Afghanistan* is drawn from the *Afghanistan National Human Development Report: Security With a Human Face*, published by UNDP in 2004.

4. 2005 saw the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the UN Security Council's approval of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, and the Secretary General presented his plan of action for the application of this resolution. The year also saw the Beijing+10 celebration, an event that led to the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action ten years after its approval at the 4th World Conference on Women.

5. Report by the Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security, 27 September 2006, S/2006/770 <<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.htm>>.

Chart 8.1. Areas in which the plan of action for the application of resolution 1325 is to be implemented

- Conflict prevention and early warning
- Peace-making and peace-building
- Peace-keeping operations
- Humanitarian response
- Post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation
- Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
- Preventing and responding to gender-based violence in armed conflict
- Preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations staff, related personnel and partners
- Equality between the genders
- Coordination and cooperation
- Vigilance and the presentation of reports
- Financial resources

It can be concluded from the report's findings that while a certain number of undeniably important advances have been made, continuing the trend seen in recent years, the majority of these have been seen in the formal arena rather than in terms of specific and wide-ranging results. The policies that have been implemented have a highly limited and localised effect, and there is no evidence of any willingness to bring the gender perspective into the more global projects with wider-reaching effects. Furthermore, as our own report shows, one of the principal difficulties lies in fact that the majority of UN personnel do not have the necessary skills required to carry out their work from a gender perspective, nor are they even aware of the need for such a perspective. This shortcoming can also be seen among the highest decision-making bodies such as the UN Security Council, given the Secretary General's observation that "its attention to gender issues is not systematic. Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000), as of 30 June 2006, only 55 of 211 or 26.07% of country-specific Council resolutions include language on women or gender".⁶

The gender policies that have been implemented have a highly limited and localised effect, and there is no evidence of any willingness to bring the gender perspective into the more global projects.

Chart 8.2. Three decades of international instruments on gender and peace

Since pioneering instruments were approved in the 1970s to specifically regulate women's rights, the following three decades have seen the creation of a series of international legal instruments that have gradually improved, extended and complemented the original document, particularly the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the central reference. The majority of these instruments have come about as a result of the various International Women's Conferences. The instruments relating to peace-building from a gender perspective are particularly significant, given the importance of the international agenda of issues relating to peace, security and armed conflict and the accompanying masculinisation of this agenda.⁷ Appreciation of these issues (peace and security) from a gender perspective has fuelled the debate that has arisen in recent years in respect of these issues, such as the discussions relating to human security. It is particularly important now to go back and look again at the contributions made in the area of gender and peace-building, bearing in mind the current return to profoundly militaristic views on security. It is therefore worth reviewing some of these instruments that have served in the past to bring inclusive and not discriminatory proposals on peace and security to the table:

- **Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)**. This represents a declaration of women's rights. It does not deal specifically with peace and security issues, but it has nevertheless formed the reference for everything that has come after it.
- **UN General Assembly Resolution 3519 on Women's Participation in the Strengthening of International Peace and Security (1975)**. This resolution underlined the contribution made by women in the fight to combat colonialism and racial discrimination.

6. Ibid.

7. INSTRAW, *Gender and Security Sector. International Agreements*. <<http://www.un-instraw.org/en/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=954&Itemid=209>> (consulted in December 2006).

- **UN General Assembly Resolution 3519 on the Participation of Women in Promoting International Peace and Cooperation** (1982). This indicated that greater participation by women in social, political, economic, civil and cultural issues helped to promote international peace and cooperation.
- **Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women** (1994). This set out a definition of what constitutes violence against women and called for the introduction of national legislation to put an end to domestic violence and establish criminal penalties against such violence.
- **Beijing Platform for Action** (1995). The Platform included a section of special concern regarding women and armed conflicts and included specific proposals on the incorporation of the perspective of gender and women in peace and security issues.
- **European Parliament resolution on participation of women in peaceful conflict resolution** (2000). This resolution appealed to member states to include the gender perspective in their peace and security initiatives, calling on them to ratify the Rome Statute. It also included condemnation of the behaviour of soldiers attached to peace-keeping missions who had been involved in sexual abuse.
- **UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security** (2000). This represented a turning point, firstly because of the importance of the instrument used, and secondly because it represents a practical tool that can be used by women involved the world over in situations of armed conflict and peace processes.
- **Windhoek Declaration: The Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations** (2000). This called for the inclusion of the gender perspective in such operations, making specific and detailed recommendations for the incorporation of gender and ensuring participation by women in the negotiation of ceasefires and/or peace agreements, among other issues.
- **Statute of the International Criminal Court** (2002). For the first time, this classifies rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution and other forms of sexual violence as war crimes and crimes against humanity.
- **Agreed conclusions on women's equal participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution and post-conflict peace-building, by the Commission on the Status of Women** (2004). These conclusions focus on participation by women under equal conditions in peace processes, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, as well as in the post-war rehabilitation process.

Another notable event of 2006 was the holding of the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on “**Strengthening the Role of Women in Society**”, held in Istanbul in November. The conclusions reached by the Conference were ratified later that month at the 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers in Tampere.⁸ The Istanbul document set out a **framework for multidimensional action aimed at promoting the status of women**, and among other things it called on Euro-Mediterranean members to **strengthen participation by women in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building**. Although the Istanbul conclusions are not specifically focused on the dual issues of gender and peace, they do contain elements that are closely related to these issues, meaning that after the gender perspective has been excluded for more than a decade, women have finally begun to form an explicit part of the agenda of the formal framework governing relations between the European union and 10 Mediterranean countries.

However, this conference should be seen against a background of developing relations between the EU and its southern Mediterranean partners. An analysis of the conclusions adopted in Istanbul and Tampere and the context in which these arose leads to a number of observations, both positive and negative. It should first be said that despite some explicit allusions to a commitment to gender equality, the adopted document does not include any form of gender analysis, nor does it therefore look directly at how gender hierarchies might be transformed, thus raising doubts about the effectiveness of a plan of action that seeks to promote the status of women without questioning the male hegemony under which women have been subordinated on both sides of the Mediterranean.

8. The conference was held as part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, which consists of an extensive formal framework for political, economic and social relations between EU member states and 10 Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). Libya has held observer status since 1999. This framework was formally established in 1995 with the Barcelona Declaration, which established the following as the partnership's three main objectives: a) the establishment of a common area of peace and stability through political dialogue and security, b) the construction of an area of prosperity through economic and political partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area, and c) rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership. This framework for relations has both a bilateral and regional dimension.

Having set out this shortcoming from the outset, it is nevertheless worth taking a look at the positives. It should first be said that after ten years of silence and inaction in respect of gender and, in particular, women's issues,⁹ this is a qualitatively positive step. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has set out its commitment to the promotion of women by means of a **holistic approach and a dual form of action that combines integration with positive measures**.¹⁰ The approach to this aim of "strengthening the role of women in society" is three-fold, pursuing three inter-connected priority objectives: the promotion of the civil and political rights of women, the social and economic rights of women and sustainable growth, and rights in the cultural sphere and the role of the communications media. Particularly notable and innovative is the first of these, given the contribution that it makes to the dual issues of gender and peace. This area includes important issues such as: a) support to **combat all forms of violence against women**, guaranteeing protection and reparation for women in the event that their rights are violated; b) **promoting full and equal participation by women in conflict-prevention, crisis management and peace-building** among other processes, through implementation of UN resolutions, including UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security; and c) **developing greater awareness of women in areas of conflict, increasing protection for women and an awareness of their rights in any war, foreign occupation or violent conflict** and alleviating the negative effects of armed conflicts on the status of women in the region.

Another notable event was the agreement to establish a panel of independent experts to give an annual evaluation of the plan of action adopted. A further ministerial conference has been called to deal with the status of women within the countries of the Partnership in 2009.

The undertakings adopted are positive from both an historic and a current point of view, as they represent a sophisticated and multidimensional move forward from a past in which women were neglected and seem to reflect a willingness to be accountable in these commitments. This may therefore mean that a new stage has begun that will lead gradually towards gender equality and inclusive peace, which is particularly important in a geographical area affected by conflicts as serious as the one in Palestine. However, there are reasons for caution, characterised by the aforementioned scant mention of gender in the documents approved. The past absence of commitment to equality raises questions as to how such a great qualitative leap can be taken in practice. The aims are ambitious, though no specific goals have been set that might facilitate an evaluation of this huge undertaking or ensure its implementation. Beyond the annual document assessing its effectiveness (which in itself raises problems given the lack of information regarding the parameters to be used) there is a vast vacuum regarding what will happen if the Euro-Mediterranean partners fail to keep their promise to put the plan of action into practice. The urgency of this question springs from the EU's past record and its flagrant lack of willingness to implement the theoretical undertakings made in relation to gender in geographical regions such as the ACP group of countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific) or in thematic areas such as development policy, combined with the inherent bias of these theoretical undertakings.¹¹

In short, the opportunity has been created, though it will once again be **political will or the lack of it on the part of the governments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership** that eventually determines the outcome of this new opening of the way to the promotion of gender equality and inclusive peace.

9. Kynsilehto, A. and Melasuo, T., "Gender Equality: A truly Euro-Mediterranean Concern?" in *Quaderns de la Mediterrània*, No. 7, Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, 2006.

10. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, "Ministerial Conclusions on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society", at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/women/docs/conclusions_1106.pdf> (consulted on 06.12.06).

11. More information on the EU and gender in: Aprove and One World Action, "Everywhere and Nowhere: Assessing Gender Mainstreaming in European Community Development Cooperation", 2002; Braithwaite, M. et al., "Thematic evaluation of the Integration of Gender in EC Development Cooperation with Third Countries", European Commission, March 2003; European Commission, "A roadmap for Equality Between Women and Men 2006-2010", SEC(2006)275, 2006; Mazey, S., *Gender Mainstreaming in the European Union. Principles and Practice*. London: Kogan Page, 2001; Mazey, S., "Gender Mainstreaming strategies in the EU: Delivering on an Agenda?", in *Feminist Legal Studies*, Vol. 10, pp. 227-240, 2000; Pollack, M.A. and Hafner-Burton, E., "Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union", in *Journal of European Union Public Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 432-456, 2000.

b) The gender agenda in peace processes

2006 was no different from previous years as regards participation by women in peace processes. Continuing a trend that would seem indelibly set, women had hardly any space in which to participate in the different peace talks that took place during the course of the year, and where they were able to take part it was in an isolated, anecdotal and individual way, though this does not mean that they did not make important contributions. Neither governments nor armed opposition groups, nor even the various international bodies taking part in one way or another in these negotiating processes¹² have shown sufficient willingness or determination to implement what was required under UN Security Council resolution 1325, when it called on all participants in the negotiations for and subsequent implementation of a peace agreement to take account of the gender perspective.

Women had hardly any space in which to participate in the different peace talks and where they were able to take part it was in an isolated, anecdotal and individual way.

Furthermore, in some cases, the absence of women from negotiating processes has been supplemented by the **creation of parallel spaces** that are in some way connected with the official process, though they generally remain on the margins. Although this is unquestionably a merely **intermediate solution** that does nothing to tackle the structural causes that mean that the majority of peace negotiations are almost exclusively masculine affairs, it does allow this issue to be increasingly included as part of the agenda and granted a certain degree of importance. The biggest problem lies in the **capacity of these arenas to have any real influence**, since there is a risk that any recommendations and proposals they make will fall on deaf ears and not be acknowledged by those with the power to make decisions. Furthermore, the fact that the political profile of local women's organisations is usually not very high may mean that their suggestions are not given sufficient value. Another **danger** that should be mentioned is that of the **institutionalisation of women's arenas as secondary spaces**, rather than their establishment as one of the initial steps in a process that should gradually lead to participation on equal terms and the view that the incorporation of the gender and equality perspective can be fully achieved through this kind of action. Nevertheless, these criticisms should not be allowed to cloud the importance of these spaces, which have led to the empowerment of many women and helped to ensure that in some political and military environments, a certain awareness of the importance of the gender dimension and the participation of women in peace negotiations is gradually emerging, albeit very gradually.

A number of initiatives were seen during 2006, in which women demanded greater participation in the peace processes taking place in their countries. The first of these was in **Mindanao (Philippines)**, during the course of a meeting of **Women for Peace**, organised with the aim of achieving the inclusion of the **recommendations made by women's organisations in the peace negotiations** being pursued by the Philippines government and the MILF armed opposition group. This meeting represented the culmination of a consulting process which had been held during the preceding months with various women's organisations in the region, aimed at giving women a voice at the negotiating table, given that the female presence at these talks was limited to just one woman. The result of the meeting, which discussed the central issue of what would happen if women were to negotiate the peace agreement, was the presentation of a document which set out the issues that delegates believed should be included in the final peace agreement. Among the issues mentioned were the question of Mindanao's demilitarization, the recognition of the right of the Bangsamoro people to self-determination and the guarantee that women would be able to participate in the decision-making process.

12. Some of the roles that these parties perform may be as exploratory aid, organiser, unifier, trainer, idea-generator, guarantor, facilitator, legitimator, incentiviser and reconciler. Fisas, V., *Procesos de paz y negociación en conflictos armados* (Peace and Negotiation in Armed Conflicts), Paidós, Barcelona, 2004.

Chart 8.3. The challenges facing women peace-builders

The majority of women involved in peace-building in their own individual countries find they have to face similar obstacles and challenges, in spite of the obvious differences between the contexts and armed conflicts from which these processes have sprung. This was recognised in a recent report published by the International Crisis Group,¹³ which examined the work being done by women in Sudan, DR Congo and Uganda. A better analysis of these common difficulties and challenges could lead to the improved design of policies aimed at supporting peace-building initiatives led by women and alleviate the consequences of armed conflicts. It is worth remembering that UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security refers to many of the issues mentioned. The main challenges referred to in the International Crisis Group report are as follows:

- **Lack of access to justice:** this means that the majority of crimes against women, particularly those of a sexual nature, go unpunished both while an armed conflict remains ongoing and after it has ended.
- **Lack of access to reproductive health services.**
- **HIV/AIDS:** the growing impact of the pandemic, particularly in areas affected by violence, is having serious consequences on the lives of women, condemning many of them to stigmatisation and marginalisation.
- **Limited information:** in spite of the difficulty that many women experience in obtaining information, some organisations are introducing initiatives to spread their peace work to many countries. The translation of Resolution 1325 into local languages has become one of the more useful tools in this regard.
- **Cross-border issues:** many women find themselves forced to move to neighbouring countries, thus increasing their vulnerability. In addition, regional women's networks are both few and not formally organised.
- **The role of men:** high levels of male violence are undermining many women's efforts. As well as putting a stop to this kind of violence, it is essential that new roles and changes are undertaken after an armed conflict has ended.
- **Small arms:** disarmament and the fight to combat gender violence should be more closely linked. Women should also enjoy greater involvement in DDR processes.

Elsewhere, in an entirely different environment in **Somalia**, representatives of women's organisations held a meeting supported by IGAD and UNIFEM at which they discussed issues such as the need to ensure that the implementation of the Transitional Federal Charter (regarded as a peace agreement) and the Reconstruction and Development Programme included a gender perspective and guaranteed participation by women. This meeting took place prior to the 4th Meeting of Ministers responsible for Gender-related Affairs in the IGAD region. As UNIFEM pointed out, **this is an opportunity to translate the experiences gained by women in the conflict into action aimed at guaranteeing security and increasing the power of women in the peace-building process.** For their part, the Ministers took advantage of the meeting to call on their own governments to promote political participation by women and include women in the different peace-building policies and initiatives developed in the region.

Thirdly, particular mention should be made of the peace process in **Nepal**, which began in May 2006 with peace talks between the CPN Maoist armed opposition group and the recently created government, formed by members of what until that point had been the democratic opposition parties. These negotiations culminated in the signing of a peace agreement at the end of 2006. However, this unexpected coalition between the political opposition and the armed opposition, which succeeded in bringing about the end of a despotic monarchic regime, followed the usual patterns as regards the inclusion of women and the gender perspective in current peace negotiations: a significant absence of women from the negotiating teams, vague and formal declarations to satisfy the international community and little specific action aimed at improving the lot of women and offering them greater political weight. Many commentators remarked that **Nepalese women have not received any recognition, in spite of the important role they played during the weeks of protest that led to the fall of the old monarchic regime and their participation in the opposition movement organised in recent years** following the serious reverses in democracy in Nepal and the suspension of the country's parliament.

13. International Crisis Group, *Beyond Victimhood Women's Peace-building in Sudan, Congo and Uganda*, Africa Report No. 112, 28 June 2006 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4186&l=1>

For this reason, since the government and the Maoists began their peace talks, **Nepalese women's organisations, working together with representatives from the international community, have called for the opportunity to participate in this peace process.** Once again, resolution 1325 on women, peace and security has become a point of reference for Nepalese women, who are using this Resolution's recognition of the importance of their participation as the basis for their demands.

It should be pointed out that when talks on constitutional reform began only one woman had been appointed by the Maoists to the committee charged with engaging in consultations and negotiations with the government, while the government delegation was entirely made up of men, as is the norm in the majority of peace processes and negotiations. However, pressure from women's organisations and the United Nations itself led the government to make an undertaking that two women would be included on the committee. A number of statements in a similar vein were made by different political representatives, underlining the importance of women being offered more opportunity to participate in the political arena. However, words have not yet been converted into deeds, and these statements have not led to the introduction of any practical measures. The demands heard, which mainly come from women activists in civilian organisations that in turn mainly belong to organisations for the defence of women's rights, have received support from bodies within the United Nations such as UNIFEM.

Another notable initiative seen during last year was the meeting of the various high-level delegations that form the International Women's Commission for a Just and Sustainable Israeli-Palestinian Peace (IWC), which is made up of women representatives from Palestine, Israel and the international community and was created as the result of an initiative from the Executive Director of UNIFEM, N. Heyzer, with the aim of ensuring that Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security has an impact on the resolution of the conflict in the Middle East. This meeting represented the crystallisation of a year-long process in which repeated calls have been made for a resumption of talks between all sides, accompanied by a cessation of hostilities. It should be pointed out that Israeli and Palestinian women have been pioneers in the joint work done by women in the search for peace between opposing communities.¹⁴ Thus, the creation of this high-level group, which mainly comprises women from the political and academic spheres, represents the crystallisation of all the efforts invested by pacifist women's organisations in this region over the course of many years.

The cases described are a clear example of **two of the trends** that would seem to be **repeated in the majority of peace processes** taking place around the world at the moment. The first is the **systematic marginalisation of women by both governments and armed opposition groups.** It would seem that these parties are only willing to provide women with a space to participate after social pressure has been brought to bear. This means that pressure from women must be constant and repeated, so that the issue can remain both on the political agenda and in the public consciousness. Secondly, **pressure is much more effective**

Pressure is much more effective when the demands made by women come from a whole network of alliances in which other actors are involved.

when the demands made by women come not only from local women's groups but also from a whole network of alliances in which other (actors), fundamentally international organisations are involved, such as the United Nations and even some individual governments. This has occurred in both of the above cases and these alliances have served to raise the visibility of both the demands of Nepalese women and the joint initiative by Israeli and Palestinian women and representatives among the international community.

This is just one of the resulting benefits, since without this collaboration the direct participation of women in other peace negotiations such as Sri Lanka and Burundi would have been much more difficult. Furthermore, thanks to the existence of these alliances, the demands of women receive much more attention and enjoy

14. The Women in Black Network, which brings together women from a number of countries in defence of pacifism and against militarism and war has its origins in Israel and Palestine, where women from both communities united to protest against the Israeli invasion of Palestinian territories and the human rights violations committed by the Israeli army. Israeli and Palestinian women also called for a negotiated end to the armed conflict. The work of this network has since been imitated in other situations of armed conflict, with similar movements springing up in places like the Balkans in the 1990s and Colombia.

greater legitimacy among groups that are reluctant to allow women to play a decisive role in the processes being pursued in each of the different contexts. This was acknowledged by UNIFEM itself in the recommendations that it prepared with a view to persuading the international community to intervene to ensure effective participation by women in peace processes.¹⁵ If the international community perhaps increased the level of pressure on the main parties involved in peace negotiations in a way that did not damage the negotiating process, once these negotiations had been consolidated and passed the point of no return, there could be greater participation by women in these negotiating teams.

8.3. Gender and the impact of armed conflicts

This section contains an analysis of certain issues that highlight the way in which the impact of armed conflicts and violence affects men and women in different ways.

a) Violence against women

Following a request by the UN General Assembly in 2003, the organisation's Secretary General published an **In-depth study on all forms of violence against women** in 2006.¹⁶ The General Assembly had stipulated that the study should include: a) a statistical overview of all forms of violence against women in order to assist an evaluation of the scale of such violence and at the same time identify the gaps in the information gathered and put forward proposals to assess the extent of the problem; b) the reasons for violence against women, including the deep-rooted causes and other contributing factors; c) the medium- and long-term consequences of violence against women; d) the cost of violence against women from a social, economic and health point of view; e) examples of best practices in areas such as legislation, politics, programmes and effective resources, and the effectiveness of the mechanisms used to combat and eradicate violence against women.

This is an **exhaustive study of the worldwide incidence of violence against women** which comes to some important conclusions, such as the fact that the violence most frequently suffered by women is perpetrated by their partners. As the report indicates, at least one in every three women is subjected to violence from their partner at some time in their life. Furthermore, it shows that such violence does not result from individual causes, such as an absence of personal or circumstantial ethics on the part of the aggressor, but is instead a phenomenon that is deeply rooted in the different societies around the world and stems from the unequal relationships between men and women. This study indicates that violence against women is a widespread phenomenon throughout the world that affects women even before they are born (selective abortion) and during the early stages of their lives (female infanticide), with long-lasting consequences for women, their families (particularly their children) and society as a whole. Violence against women impoverishes society and furthermore serves to reinforce other forms of violence that may emerge.

Finally, the report indicates that the current relatively developed legal framework, which includes instruments designed both to punish and prevent this type of violence, is not being adequately applied, and many countries are still without the appropriate legislation to put an end to violence against women.

15. For more information on these recommendations, see School for a Culture of Peace, *Alert 2006! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace Building*, published by Icaria, or the document prepared by UNIFEM entitled *Securing the peace. Guiding the International Community towards Women's effective participation throughout Peace Processes*. October 2005, <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/peaceprocess/Securing_the_Peace.pdf>.

16. UN Secretary General, *In-depth study on all forms of violence against women*, July 2006, A/61/122/Add.1 <<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/index.htm>>.

b) Armed conflicts, nationalism, gender and feminism

In many of the armed conflicts currently taking place around the world, the issue of identity is hugely important. Thus, the initial causes of the violence may be rooted in feelings of grievance among particular communities that have been historically marginalised and that find in their common identity a platform on which to build a collective struggle demanding greater recognition in terms of their rights and the capacity to run their own affairs as a group. In certain contexts this collective feeling can even lead to demands for the creation of an independent state in which the complete management of their economic, social and political affairs becomes the responsibility of leaders and representatives of the community in question.

In the armed conflicts reported during 2006, this issue of identity (understood in its broadest sense, i.e. ethnic identity, religious identity, national identity or a combination of these) featured in contexts like Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur (Sudan), DR Congo, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Israel and Palestine. This means that this issue takes on significant importance in almost two thirds of all armed conflicts. However, what place do women have in such conflicts? Do nationalist ideologies have a gender element? Is an analysis of gender relevant in these armed conflicts?

The **relationship between feminism and nationalism is complex**. Both are dynamic and plural issues with internal nuances, meaning that one cannot generalise. However, despite the difficulties raised by the multi-faceted nature of such issues, analysing the relationship between feminism and nationalism, particularly the contribution that feminism makes to the nationalist discourse or discourses, can prove extremely interesting in an international context in which a great many conflicts involve demands of a nationalist nature, whether through demands for independence or through a struggle for greater autonomy.

Traditionally, the gender aspect (and with it an analysis of power relationships and potential differences regarding the definition, participation and effects of nationalist discourses among groups of men and women) has not been included in theoretical and historical studies of nationalism; gender and nation have been dealt with separately as gender has not been regarded as relevant to the political dynamics of nationalism. However, working on the premise that leaving the gender perspective out of an examination of nationalism greatly restricts our understanding of the complex political and symbolic processes involved in the articulation of nationalist discourses,¹⁷ feminists have for almost two decades now been rethinking the issue of nationalism and introducing new analytical categories, questioning traditional narratives and creating more inclusive spaces.

Nations and national projects, like states and any kind of social or political organisation, are gender-based regimes, i.e. spaces or projects that are shaped, among other elements, by a specific gender relationship structure.¹⁸ By introducing gender as one of the categories to be analysed in a study of nationalism, and thus giving shape to the gender-related power relationships that can be seen in any social group, feminists have raised a simple but fundamental question: **the shape of an "imagined community"** (which is what nations are, or have at least been described as) **cannot be seen as unrelated to the way in which power is distributed within this community**. Thus, several of the works on feminism and nationalism published to date have analysed the ways in which nations or national projects have frequently been constructed and legitimised on the basis of discourses that reproduce and perpetuate the existing power relationships and men's domination over women.¹⁹

17. Kandiyoti, D., "Guest Editor's introduction. The awkward relationship: gender and nationalism", in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 491-499, 2000; Hadjipavlou, M., "No permission to cross: Cypriot women's dialogue across the divide", in *Gender, Place and Culture*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 329-351, August 2006.

18. Al-Ali, N., "Review Article. Nationalisms, national identities and nation status: gendered perspectives", in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 631-638, 2000; Cusack, T., "Janus and gender: women and the nation's backward look", in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 541-551, 2000; Kandiyoti, D., *op. cit.*; Walby, "Gender, nations and states in a global area", in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 523-540, 2000.

19. Bracewell, W., "Rape in Kosovo: masculinity and Serbian nationalism", in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 563-590, 2000.

Often presented in the form of a large family, national identities and communities have quite frequently tended to produce **rhetoric and roles that are both founded on and constructed from naturalised gender identities**. Thus, women are frequently presented in the role of symbolic representatives of the nation in question (“the motherland”), its biological reproducers who reconfirm the borders between ethnic or national groups, handing down cultural traditions and acting as agents for ideological reproduction, the people who give meaning to national differences and who participate in the national, economic and military struggle.²⁰ These are constructed roles with clear and real implications for the way in which the processes and conflicts that arise around national identity will affect the different men’s and women’s groups.

Thus, the concept of honour as it applies to women and the community’s control over their sexuality have evolved into a way of reproducing the boundaries of such groups, in such a way that their bodies are used as a way of defining the national community. As a consequence, in areas of conflict in which nationalist elements are present, rape and sexual violence in general become practices designed not only to break or hurt the individual woman concerned but are also intended as an attack on the racial purity of a given community constructed around the notion of women’s honour.²¹ Added to this is the dual victimisation suffered by women as a result of the stigmatisation to which they are subjected by their own communities once they have been violated. The violent appropriation of a woman’s body (rape, forced pregnancy, etc.), following nationalist ideals supported by power relationships between the sexes, reached such proportions in contexts of armed conflict such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda that rape has now been classified as a war crime.²² Popular controls that condition women’s reproductive rights or make women’s aspirations secondary to the supposed collective interests of the community are other examples of the way in which women’s independence is controlled in the name of particular national, hierarchical and exclusive structures.

Furthermore, several gender studies of the myths and legends of individual communities have identified a recurring ideological theme in which the mother is the person who passes on collective memory to the child, thus turning the mythical figure of the mother into a conduit for nationalist propaganda, enshrining issues such as sacrifice, heroism in war and the pride of a mother over her martyred son, thus dictating the roles to be performed by the members of the national community in question.

Furthermore, women as signifiers of national differences are also attributed with a symbolic power on a quasi spiritual plane, in the form of the reproduction of symbols (robes, ornaments) and rituals that afford visibility to the national identity. In this context, acts such as rape and female mutilation in ethnic conflicts or as part of an ethnic manifestation can be seen once again as an attempt to desecrate this vision of identity. As R. Coomaraswamy has pointed out, it is not unusual for men to tattoo their chests or genitals with the mark or symbol of the other community after they have raped one of its women.²³

Thus, if we examine the observations that feminists have made in respect of the different forms of nationalism, we can see that a not insignificant number of these forms involve the reproduction, manipulation, legitimisation and promotion of hierarchical and dominant relationships (perhaps not *per se* but more in the manner in which they are articulated), expressed in ways that spring from identities founded on male hegemony. As a result, not only have women been constrained within national discourses that have perpetuated their subordination, but men have also been restricted to expressing their masculinity in purely hegemonic terms, as was the case in the Balkans war.²⁴

20. Kandiyoti, D., *op. cit.*

21. Coomaraswamy, R., “A question of honour: women, ethnicity and armed conflict”, address given at the Third Minority Rights Lecture, Hotel Intercontinental, Geneva, 25 May 1999.

22. For more information on this subject, see Zorrilla, M., *La Corte Penal Internacional ante el crimen de violencia sexual*, (The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Sexual Violence), Cuaderno Deusto de Derechos Humanos, issue 34, Bilbao, 2005.

23. Coomaraswamy, R., *op. cit.*

24. Bracewell, W., *op. cit.*

However, as we pointed out earlier, feminism and nationalism are plural and dynamic phenomena, as are identities and roles that are constructed from a gender point of view, elements that in turn interact to varying degrees with other forms of identity, such as class or ethnicity. Examples of this plurality can be seen in such classifications as cultural nationalism and civil nationalism. The first of these is expressed in terms of common cultural traditions with a common cultural heritage that frequently harks back to a (sometimes idealized) common past, while the second is associated with a shared territory that depends on the attribution of political rights within this territorial unit. Other classifications have in turn been used in an attempt to overcome this ethnic/civil dichotomy.²⁵

However, leaving aside a more in-depth examination of the different nationalist models or the varying ways in which nationalism has been expressed down the ages, what is interesting in terms of its interaction with feminism is the observation that women, whether feminists or not, have interacted with nationalist projects in very different ways, ranging from actively participating in such projects to resisting or even superseding them. In turn, **national projects have debated or tackled the aspirations of the different women's groups within their communities from varying angles, progressive and inclusive in some cases and regressive and exclusive in others.**

The fact that it is impossible to generalise or make "judgements" on the relationship between feminism and nationalism is hugely positive, since it implies dynamism and plurality in the ways in which nationalism is conceived and shaped, and the ways in which it sees itself in relation to other nations in a context of international relations. However, to the extent that nations and their national projects are expressed in gender terms, there is a significant danger that a particular form of nationalism will just reproduce or reinforce the internal power hierarchy if it is uncritically assumed and accepted that a nation is a unified, cohesive and homogeneous community that is by necessity defined in contrast to "the others". Faced with this regressive approach, feminist women have chosen in some cases to defend plural, inclusive and liberating nationalist projects, while others have dispensed with the idea of the nation as a source of identity, preferring unifying bonds that transcend national communities. It is no accident that both groups have on occasion formed alliances that have crossed ethnic, communal or national borders, as a shared feeling of marginalisation, exclusion or historical discrimination has become a common space from which to rethink roles and identities and create more inclusive spaces.

Some women have found ways of building bridges through dialogue and empathy that have overcome the causes that originally led to the armed conflict.

Indeed, the formation of alliances between women belonging to opposing communities is one of the ways in which women in fiercely polarised communities have been able to contribute to the peace-building process. In these societies, some women have found ways of building bridges

through dialogue and empathy that have overcome the causes that originally led to the armed conflict and the deep-seated hatred and polarisation, finding common positions and points from which they can begin to work towards rapprochement and new ways of coexisting in peace. It is particularly important that in societies in which the construction of exclusive identities and the manipulation of such identities by particular groups has led to an outbreak of conflict, there should be initiatives that make it possible to find a way to talk and coexist.

It is a well known fact that today's armed conflicts have a disproportionate impact on the lives of women, and that strategies such as the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war turn them into prime targets. It is therefore understandable that those who have suffered similarly from such violence, regardless of the side of the fence that they are on, are more easily able to identify with the suffering of other victims and see beyond any social, ethnic, political or religious differences that may exist. The frequent political invisibility of many women's movements has, paradoxically, sometimes been very useful, since it has allowed them to make approaches that would not have been so easy between their male counterparts.

25. Sluga, G., "Female and national self-determination: a gender re-reading of 'the apogee of nationalism'", in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 495-521, 2000.

26. Bell, C., "Women address the problems of peace agreements", in *Peace Work. Women, Armed Conflicts and Negotiation*, 2004, Delhi, ICES.

What specific examples are there of such alliances? **Israeli and Palestinian** women have been working together since the 1980s, when some Israelis began to protest publicly against the occupation of Palestinian territory by their own government. Palestinians living in Israel joined in the protests. In **Northern Ireland**, Catholic and Protestant women got together to create a political party, the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, thus allowing them to take part in peace negotiations. While these talks continued, the Coalition tried to ensure that there were always both Republican and Unionist women at the table at any given moment, helping to make the process as inclusive as possible. As some commentators have pointed out,²⁶ the use of the inclusion principle led to the establishment of an agenda in the peace process that was simultaneously relevant to both the women of Northern Ireland and the peace process itself. Furthermore, the existence of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition meant that the participation of women in peace processes was finally acknowledged by other political groups. In **Sri Lanka**, Tamil and Sinhalese women who took part in the gender sub-committee established during the peace negotiations were able to establish a common agenda for discussion, setting out their own priorities with the same starting point: acknowledgement of the devastating effects that the armed conflict had had on the lives of women. In **Cyprus**, women from both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities formed the Hands Across the Divide organisation, describing it as a unifying organisation which brings women together regardless of their ethnic or national identity or their geographical location and which takes account of the inequalities and differences suffered by women in both communities.²⁷


Chart 8.4. Ahotsak: women's voices for peace and dialogue in The Basque Country

2006 was a particularly intense and complex year for the conflict in The Basque Country, with the declaration of a ceasefire by ETA, the initiation of a process of dialogue and then its subsequent breakdown at the end of the year following an attack by ETA that left two people dead. Despite the pessimism surrounding the Basque situation as the year ended, mention should be made of a peace initiative that was announced in April 2006. This involved **200 women from all the political parties in The Basque Country (except for the PP) coming together to create a collective, Ahotsak, an expression of the willingness of all those involved to seek a negotiated way out of the conflict.** As the women themselves indicated in their founding manifesto, "we are women with differing ideologies, traditions and feelings who, on a personal level, based on the things that both unite and separate us, want to explore the way forward in search of peace and reconciliation".²⁸ Inspired by similar initiatives in other parts of the world that have endured conflict, this forum of women from different and even opposing political spaces and national identities has gradually broadened to include women from the union and feminist movements and brought together as many as 2,000 women in public meetings. They specifically argue for dialogue without pre-conditions or exclusions, supporting a search for points of common agreement between the different political and social positions found in The Basque Country, and recognition from all sides. These are key points if a peace process is to move forwards and avoid becoming stalled in the differences that inevitably emerge in any negotiating process. Since its creation in April 2006, a great many women from both The Basque Country and other parts of Spain have signed up to this initiative, the origins of which can be traced back over a number of years. In a political context that is as polarised as the one in The Basque Country, in which the points of contact between the different political options are notable by their absence, Ahotsak is a pioneering initiative and one that offers the potential to make real advances towards peace.

A common theme among all these initiatives is that they have been joined in the majority of cases by women from the feminist movement, i.e. women who not only demand participation by women and highlight their exclusion, but who also, more importantly, want to see a change in the unequal and discriminatory relationships that have existed until now and who advocate new forms of social organisation which are inclusive and non-patriarchal.

27. Hadjipavlou, M., *op. cit.*

29. Ahotsak, <<http://www.ahotsak.blogspot.com/>>, (consulted on 05.12.06).



Countries with serious gender inequalities

Conclusions

At the end of 2006, there were **21 armed conflicts** around the world, **the same number as at the end of 2005, marking a break in the downward trend that had been seen in recent years**. Of these, nine were being fought in Africa, and while the armed conflict in Burundi was finally brought to an end (following a peace agreement between A. Rwsa's FNL and the Government), violence escalated in the Central African Republic and Chad. The main causes for conflict were the same as had been noted in previous years: the struggle for political power (democratic fragility which often results from the legacy of the colonial and post-colonial periods) and disputes over the control of natural resources, two issues which are themselves inter-related. A large number of these conflicts involve a **significant regional dimension**, and a **huge number of armed groups** are involved in their evolution. As far as Asia was concerned, eight armed conflicts were being fought, the main causes being **demands from certain regions for independence within individual countries, and religious divisions**. Particular mention should be made of the breakdown in the ceasefire that had been in force in Sri Lanka since 2002, an event that once again left the country suffering high levels of violence. On the other hand, the agreement reached in Nepal between the Government and the Maoist CPN after the climb-down by King Gyanendra was a welcome development. The Philippines and India accounted for five of the eight conflicts being fought in Asia, the common factor being problems of governance resulting in demands for a greater degree of self-governance from some regions. The saddest news of 2006 was the **armed conflict that Israel began in July with its invasion of Lebanon**, a move that further exacerbated the problems already suffered by inhabitants of the region as a result of the armed conflicts in the **Palestinian occupied territories and Iraq**.

It should also be mentioned that there is increasing evidence that **the exploitation of oil resources could be at the heart of many current armed conflicts and situations of tension**, and that China's growing importance in the search for natural resources could influence the future political and social evolution of the continent of Africa.

In addition to these armed conflicts, many areas around the world continue to experience **situations of social and political tension**, in some cases with significant levels of violence that have caused death, displacement and suffering. **Africa was once again the continent where most cases of escalating tensions were reported**, in places such as Zimbabwe and Nigeria, and instability was spreading rapidly from country to country, as in the case of Chad and the Central African Republic, and Eritrea and Ethiopia in relation to Somalia. While they may have been less visible, regions such as **Asia and Central Asia also experienced serious confrontations, often as the result of democratic fragility and problems of governance**. Examples include Georgia, where demands for independence in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia threatened the stability of M. Saakashvili's Government, and Timor-Leste, where violent incidents caused the displacement of a tenth of the country's entire population.

The fact that this year's Report deals with almost as many situations of tension as its predecessor (more than 50) serves to underline the **lack of progress that has been made in respect of conflict prevention**. This point was made by outgoing UN Secretary General K. Annan in a report published in the middle of the year, in which he said that the divide between rhetoric and reality in the area of conflict prevention was unacceptable. According to K. Annan, this is partly a question of financial resources, and he therefore sought a **financial undertaking from member states to allocate an amount equivalent to 2% of the annual peace-keeping budget to conflict prevention**. However, given the priorities that many countries display as regards their budgetary allocations (such as military spending), this is not so much a question of financing but one of political will. The **adoption by the Security Council of the principle of the "responsibility to protect"**, which places the international community at the head of efforts to protect civilians in the event that a state fails to offer such protection, could be a good way in which to begin.

As far as peace processes are concerned, **an analysis of the 42 negotiating processes** currently underway, some in a purely exploratory or tentative stage and others more established, shows that **three out of every four conflicts involved some kind of negotiation**. Ceasefires were proposed in two of these con-

texts (Chechnya and Turkish Kurdistan), though the respective Governments refused the offer in both cases so there is currently no negotiation. Initiatives are still being explored in the case of Iraq, though as yet without success. An analysis has also been made in relation to the situation in southern Sudan, where fighting still persists in spite of the peace agreement. There is also an account of events in Indonesia (Aceh) and Northern Ireland, where negotiating processes were completed during the course of the year, though implementation of the agreements signed requires careful monitoring. A similar observation should be made in the cases of Nigeria and Cameroon and Burundi and the FNL, which were practically resolved during the course of 2006, though a number of difficulties remained in Burundi as the year came to an end. 42% of all negotiations experienced some problems and a further 42% went badly. **Only 18% went relatively well.** These percentages are very similar to those seen last year, though in contrast to previous years it is the African processes that have shown a relative improvement, bringing them up to levels comparable with those in Asia.

As regards the processes in which advances were seen, particular mention should be made of the agreement reached with the majority of FLEC members operating in the Cabinda region in Angola, the partial agreement with groups in Darfur (Sudan), the **agreement in eastern Sudan**, the ceasefire agreement in Burundi, the disarmament of the majority of the militias operating in Ituri (DR Congo), the cessation of hostilities between the Ugandan Government and the LRA, the peace agreement between the Government of Mali and the Tuareg, the cessation of hostilities proposed by the ELN in Colombia, the **peace agreement in Nepal**, the problems arising from the inclusion of the Sri Lankan LTTE in the EU's list of terrorist organisations, the delay in the agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF as a result of disagreements over ancestral land, the refusal by both Armenia and Myanmar to let the UN intervene in their conflicts, the **Security Council resolution that brought an end to the fighting between Israel and Lebanon**, and the significance of a GAM candidate winning the elections for Governor of Aceh (Indonesia).

The "average negotiating temperature" over the course of the year was 1.2 points (on a scale of 0 to 3), slightly lower than both last year (1.3) and 2004 (1.4), demonstrating how difficult it has been to make positive advances in the majority of processes.

Turning to the issue of post-war rehabilitation processes, the **western model** for democratisation, reform of the security sector and the imposition of a market economy is still continually applied, even though this does not in itself guarantee good governance, the development of a state of law or proper social welfare conditions. Advances were reported in some areas during 2006, though this was offset by reverses or stagnation in the majority, particular examples being the south of Sudan, Afghanistan and the region of Kosovo. Nevertheless, the international community **failed to rethink the existing model, and there was once again a fall in interest from donors** once certain phases of the post-war rehabilitation process had been completed (such as elections, for example), thus limiting any chance of success. One example was Liberia, which failed to raise the funds required to finance programmes aimed at bringing about economic recovery, education and rehabilitation in the country, and only a quarter of the amount requested as part of the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process was pledged.

The behaviour of the international community towards areas undergoing post-war rehabilitation processes was not devoid of strategic interest, and the majority of interventions were therefore not neutral. By way of example, Ethiopia's refusal to respect the border demarcation agreed with Eritrea obstructed the rehabilitation process, a clear illustration of Ethiopia's defiance (for which it has the blessing of the USA). Returning to our initial observation regarding markedly western models of post-war rehabilitation, it would be more useful to approach this issue from the point of view of the people affected. **Peacebuilding can only work if it has the agreement of local leaders and involves the local population.** On the positive side, the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission at the end of 2005 was unquestionably a good sign, although the work for which it is currently responsible (two countries, Burundi and Sierra Leone) is still too limited for it to make much of a difference. Furthermore, although the Commission has begun to discuss the issue, there has still been no final decision as to how to involve the affected population in the decision-making process in countries emerging from armed conflict. The people who should be leading the rehabilitation process remain on the fringes, in spite of the fact that it is they who can guarantee long-term sustainability.

As far as **humanitarian crises** are concerned, the year ended with a **slight increase** in the number of places suffering significant humanitarian problems (rising from 43 to 45), the majority occurring in countries embroiled in conflict and/or situations of tension. Compared with 2005, when the predominant feature of the international humanitarian scene was natural disasters, in 2006 it was **a lack of political will, the use of hunger, enforced displacement and rape as weapons of war and a lack of respect for international humanitarian law that increased the size and extent of the world's humanitarian crises**. While the overall number of refugees around the world fell, the number of internally displaced people increased, a fact which should lead to questions about why displacement patterns are changing. This year was also an important one for the **United Nations**, as it consolidated its position as the **main conduit for the financing of humanitarian action programmes** throughout the world, managing half of all the funds donated for this purpose. Although the organisation still faces many challenges if it is not only to provide a rapid response but also head off humanitarian crises before they develop, the introduction this year of the **Central Emergency Relief Fund significantly improved the management of its resources**.

Finally, humanitarian workers continued to face serious difficulties while carrying out their duties, and on several occasions had to abandon the country in which they were working for security reasons, leaving the people affected by the humanitarian crisis in an even more vulnerable situation. As the links between war and humanitarian crisis became increasingly interwoven during 2006, **debate continued on the combination of humanitarian action and peace-building**, with attempts to define the capacities and limits of humanitarian workers in this area. A review of the Oslo Guidelines also highlighted the importance of **establishing a clear dividing line between military and humanitarian personnel when they are working together in a particular crisis situation**.

As always, the worldwide **disarmament** situation is worrying. While the figures relating to the arms cycle continue to rise at an alarming rate, effective arms control initiatives remain insufficient. The so-called war on terror would appear to be providing the justification for something that had once seemed inconceivable: the level of **military spending** has reached levels comparable with those seen during the Cold War. Furthermore, this trend does not look like being reversed, as indicated by the fact that the use of diplomatic channels rather than sanctions to resolve conflicts and prioritising public investment in social issues would seem to have been pushed aside. On the subject of **arms exports**, not only are these reaching alarming levels, with the **permanent members of the UN Security Council heading the list of exporters**, there are also grave concerns about the countries taking delivery, many of which are developing nations with little respect for International Humanitarian Law.

There were, however, positive signs, with continuing moves towards **arms control initiatives**. The progress made in this area during 2006 was relatively significant, with the approval of an **International Arms Trade Treaty**, despite opposition from the leading player in this sector (the USA once again). This is the first ever document of its kind, and will ultimately provide legal regulation for all kinds of weapons when fully implemented. Although there is still a long way to go, it would seem clear on a European level that a distinction should be made between the discussions relating to the legal obligations arising from the **EU Code of Conduct** on arms exports and the suggested lifting of the embargo on China. Finally, although there have been continued improvements in the theoretical approach to **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)** programmes for former combatants (including the United Nations' own Integrated Standards for such programmes), many problems remain to be resolved in this area if one analyses the programmes that are currently underway. The improved **planning, implementation and evaluation** of these programmes remains one aspect that needs to be tackled.

Turning to the issue of **human rights**, 2006 **was an historic year for the international system designed to protect such rights**, with the General Assembly dissolving the Human Rights Commission and creating the new Human Rights Council. As regards the strengthening of international human rights law within this forum, significant advances were seen with the adoption of a **Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance**, a **Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities** and a **Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples**, though this last document has not yet been adopted by the General Assembly. Finally, formal preparations began for the Optional Protocol to the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which represents an important advance in respect of the indivisibility of human rights. As far as the reform of the UN system for the protection of human rights is concerned, it remains to be seen whether 2006, though a historical year in general, will actually represent a turning point in terms of the effectiveness of this system.

The human rights abuses committed by governmental agents once again highlighted the fact that all these regulatory efforts have done nothing to remedy individual countries' general disregard for international regulations in the area of human rights. Once again, the **war on terror** was legally manipulated by some countries to criminalise political dissent and by others to discriminate against groups that are already socially marginalised, leading to abuses of the laws governing the legal right to a **fair trial** and the banning of **torture** and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. However, this year was notable for the strong condemnation by international organisations of the practice of so-called extraordinary rendition and the abuses committed at the USA's secret detention centres. As regards the right to life, while the general trend was still towards abolishing the **death penalty, extrajudicial executions** were still a persisting problem in many situations of conflict or tension in which the human rights of the civilian population remained subject to abuse.

Finally, turning to **gender issues in peace-building**, 2006 once again underlined the general atmosphere of total indifference to the calls first heard decades ago for the international community's formal undertakings in respect of gender to be transformed into practical realities. The tendency over recent years (and further strengthened in 2006) to **return to a more militarist approach to security, which is widely at variance with the intrinsically holistic precepts of the gender perspective**, make it necessary to revitalise and implement the relatively sophisticated body of legal instruments developed over the last three decades aimed at incorporating the gender dimension in peace-building programmes. However, **the gender dimension's low profile on the international agenda** in a year that has not benefited from any big anniversaries (in contrast to the Beijing+10 celebrations in 2005) would suggest that, even at a formal level, governments are still failing to take account of the gender perspective, regarding it as a secondary issue. In this regard, the continuing lack of understanding of the dual issues of gender and peace and the absence of political will are two of the main obstacles to be overcome.

On a more positive note, the initiatives created during 2006 in the area of peace-building from a gender perspective were once again indicative of new trends, offering fresh lessons, albeit at a more local level. While women were still marginalised by both governments and armed groups engaged in peace processes, **strategies to apply pressure by networks of local women's alliances and other agents, mainly from the international stage, have led to practical benefits in certain specific contexts** (e.g. Nepal). Furthermore, pressure from women's organisations working with strategic institutional alliances have resulted in the creation of new agendas in certain inter-governmental forums (such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). Once again, alliances between women who have risen above the differences separating them in individual conflict situations have succeeded in raising questions about the inertia of the warring factions and demonstrated ways in which understanding can be reached.

Appendix I. Country and indicator table and explanation of indicators

The following table has been prepared using a list of 30 indicators which combine to offer information on the 192 United Nations member states and a further 18 states and territories in nine different categories: armed conflicts and high-risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, humanitarian crises, militarization and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development and gender. The table can thus be read in a number of different ways, observing the way an individual country behaves in respect of a combination of indicators or comparing the development status of different countries, for example.

The table also contains a number of symbols. “Serious situations” (indicated with a white dot) are distinguished from “very serious situations” (distinguished with a black dot) for the majority of indicators. Square and triangle symbols have also been used for the indicators relating to human rights and development to identify situations classified as “very serious”.¹ Figures are also set alongside symbols in some cases, where it is thought that their inclusion may be of interest. There are four cases in which indicators are shown as initials. The first refers to countries that were engaged in formal peace processes or negotiations at the end of the year (**PN**). The second involves countries engaged in exploratory talks at the end of the year (**EX**). The idea in both these cases is to highlight situations that require particular attention from the international community. Thirdly, countries classified in the group of Least Developed Countries are shown with the initials **LDC**, the idea being to emphasise their internationally recognised position of vulnerability and recall the undertaking to prioritise poverty-reduction strategies in these countries. Finally, the initials **HIPC** refer to countries classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. Given that the various sources consulted do not always give information for every country, a dash “-” indicates that this information is not available for the country in question.

1. For more information, please see the explanation of indicators.

1. Armed conflicts

1. Countries in armed conflict

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School for a Culture of Peace using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGOs, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving armed groups of regular or irregular forces of various kinds which, in an organised way and using arms and other destructive methods, claim more than 100 victims per year. This classification of an armed conflict based on the number of victims should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country.

- Armed conflict.

2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

2. Countries experiencing situations of tension and high-risk disputes

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School for a Culture of Peace using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGOs, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

Situations of tension and high-risk disputes are understood to be contexts in which there are serious situations of social or political polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the state, which involve alterations in the operation of the state's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and States of Exception or Emergency),¹ and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. It is possible that increased tensions in some of these contexts may, in the short or medium term, eventually erupt into armed conflict. It is possible that these tensions may not be felt directly within the borders of a particular country, but attention is paid to the extent to which they affect the interests or stability of the country in question or lead to specific attacks within the territory of another.

The report also contains an analysis of the contexts in which there are **lower-level tensions** than those described above and where armed conflict is therefore not expected to erupt in the short or medium term. The section on tensions also deals with contexts in which peace agreements have at some point been signed between the warring factions, though with serious difficulties in respect of their implementation.

- Situations of tension and high-risk disputes.
- Situations of lesser tension.
- ▲ Contexts that include both situations of tension and high-risk disputes and situations of lesser tension.

1. For the purposes of this report, a state of emergency is understood to mean a situation in which constitutional order is disrupted with the restriction of certain basic freedoms. This term is used differently in different legislatures, such as, for example, state of exception, interior disturbance, state of national disaster, etc.

3. Peace processes

3. Countries with formal peace or negotiating processes or talks in an exploratory phase

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School for a Culture of Peace using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGOs, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

It is understood that a **peace process** is underway when the parties involved in an armed conflict have reached an agreement to pursue negotiations that will lead them to a peaceful way out of the conflict and regulate or resolve any basic disagreement that they may have. The process may be given a variety of names, but in all cases talks have been formalised, with or without the assistance of third parties. The fact that a negotiating process exists is viewed independently of whether it is evolving well or badly, an aspect analysed in the chapter dealing with peace processes. A peace or negotiation process is regarded as being in an **exploratory phase** when the parties are involving in a preliminary trial and consulting process, without having reached any final agreement on opening negotiations. This also includes peace processes that have been interrupted or have broken down, where attempts to relaunch them remain ongoing.

- PN** Countries engaged in formal peace processes or negotiations at the end of the year.
- EX** Countries engaged in exploratory negotiations at the end of the year.

4. Post-war rehabilitation (international involvement)

4. Countries that receive international aid for post-war rehabilitation

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation using information provided by the United Nations, international bodies, NGOs, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

Post-war rehabilitation means the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents aimed at tackling: 1) the security of the ordinary people; 2) priorities of a humanitarian nature and the resettlement of refugees or displaced people; 3) physical reconstruction and the restoration of basic institutional services; 4) the resolution of basic incompatibilities (through social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation, among other things); 5) reconciliation, a respect for human rights and the fight against impunity; 6) regional stability and reintegration in international forums and organisations; and 7) the construction of good governance and involvement of civilian society in the process through international involvement. The starting point for this analysis from an international involvement point of view is taken as one of three situations: the signing of a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities between all the parties engaged in the conflict, the victory of one or more of the parties over the rest, or a victory by one or more of the parties that is clearly brought about by international involvement. The cases analysed all involve post-war rehabilitation processes that are regarded as having begun in 1994 (the date of the Rwandan genocide) or later.

- Countries or territories that have reached a cessation of hostilities or have signed a peace agreement (either as the result of one party emerging victorious or through mediation by third parties) and in which post-war rehabilitation (PWR) is progressing reasonably well.
- Countries or territories in which a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities exists but is progressing badly and thus impeding post-war rehabilitation work.
- Countries or territories that remain in a state of war but which are receiving considerable amounts of post-war international aid, which is often used as an incentive to facilitate the pursuit or fulfilment of an agreement that will allow hostilities to be brought to an end.

5. Humanitarian crises

5. Countries facing food emergencies

SOURCE: FAO, *Crop Prospects and Food Situation* (October and November 2006)

<<http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/j8122e/j8122e00.htm>>

<<http://www.fao.org/giews/english/hotspots/index.htm>>

FAO alerts refer to countries facing food shortages, whether due to drought, floods or other natural disasters, civil disturbances, population displacements, economic problems or sanctions. Countries are classified as suffering **food emergencies** when they are facing (or have at some point in the year faced) unfavourable prospects for the current harvest and/or a deficit in food supplies that has not been covered and that requires (or has required during the course of the year) exceptional external aid.

- Food emergency.

6. Countries in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is internally displaced

SOURCES: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, at <<http://www.internal-displacement.org>>

(December 2006) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), at

<http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2006/pdf/en_sowp06.pdf>

This indicator provides an assessment of the situation in a particular country, based on the number of displaced people as a percentage of the total population, while the figure indicates the absolute number of people displaced, as of December 2006. In cases in which the sources give two different figures, an average is shown.

- Situation regarded as very serious: at least 1 in every 100 people is internally displaced.
- Situation regarded as serious: 1 in every 1,000 people is internally displaced or, where this proportion is not reached, the internally displaced number at least 5,000.

7. Countries of origin in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is a refugee

SOURCES: UNHCR, *2005 Global Refugee Trends. Statistical overview of population of refugees, asylum-seekers, internal displaced persons, stateless persons, and other persons of concern to UNHCR*, June 2006, <<http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4486ceb12.pdf>> and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), at <http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2006/pdf/en_sowp06.pdf> (September 2006)

This indicator provides an assessment of the situation in a particular country, based on the number of refugees as a percentage of the country of origin's total population. The numbers show the absolute figure for refugees during 2005.

- Situation regarded as very serious: at least 1 in every 100 people is a refugee.
- Situation regarded as serious: at least 1 in every 1,000 people is a refugee or, where this proportion is not reached, refugees number at least 5,000.

8. Countries included in the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for 2007

SOURCE: CAP 2007, at <<http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/>>

Since 1994, the United Nations has made an annual appeal to the donor community through OCHA, in an attempt to collect the funds required to deal with certain humanitarian emergency situations. The fact that a country or region is included in this appeal process implies the existence of a serious humanitarian crisis that has been acknowledged by the international community.

- Countries included in the United Nations CAP for 2007.

6. Disarmament

9. Countries whose military spending exceeds 4% of GDP

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*, Oxford University Press, 2006 and the World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2006*, at <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006>>.

Military spending is understood to include the Ministry of Defence budget along with any costs of a military nature that are distributed among other Ministries. Given that there is frequently no standard calculation, information has been drawn from various sources in order to give a more reliable result. The fact that percentages are calculated in dollars at constant 2003 prices may result in a certain lack of precision as regards these figures.

- Very serious situation: military spending exceeds 6% of GDP.
- Serious situation: military spending totals between 4% and 6% of GDP.

10. Countries in which military spending exceeds public spending on health and education

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*, Oxford University Press, 2006 (the data on military spending refers to 2003 or the most recent year for which information is available), and the World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2006*, at <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006>> (the data on health refers to 2003; the data on education refers to the most recent year between 2002 and 2004 for which information is available).

- Military spending exceeds public spending on both health and education.
- Military spending exceeds public spending on either health or education.

11. Countries with imports of conventional heavy weapons exceeding 0.5% of their GDP

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*, Oxford University Press, 2006 and the World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2006*, at <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006>>.

When calculating this indicator, import figures for 6 categories of conventional heavy weapons were taken into account, as set out by SIPRI: warplanes, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar and surveillance systems, missiles and warships. Other types of weaponry, i.e. conventional small arms and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) have not been included as no statistics are available for these kinds of weapons. The numbers shown indicate conventional heavy weapons imports as a percentage of GDP. A value of 0.5% is regarded as indicating a high level of militarization.

- Very serious situation: imports of heavy weapons exceed 1% of GDP.
- Serious situation: imports of heavy weapons total between 0.5% and 1% of GDP.

12. Countries in which the number of soldiers exceeds 1.5% of the population

SOURCES: IISS, *The Military Balance 2006*, Oxford University Press, 2006, and the World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2006*, at <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006>>.

This definition only includes members of Government armed forces. Members of armed opposition groups and paramilitary forces are excluded due to the difficulties involved in calculating their numbers in many countries. The figure reflects the number of soldiers as a percentage of the country's total population.

- Very serious situation: number of soldiers exceeds 2% of the population.
- Serious situation: number of soldiers amounts to between 1.5% and 2% of the population.

13. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the UN Security Council

SOURCE: UN Security Council Resolutions, at <<http://www.un.org/documents/>>.

The imposition or recommendation of an embargo by the United Nations Security Council is understood to represent an acknowledgement that the situation in the country affected is exceptional. As a result, for the purposes of this study, no distinction is made between binding and voluntary embargoes. Voluntary United Nations embargoes take the form of non-binding “appeals” or “emergencies” on arms supplies. Nevertheless, a distinction is made here between sanctions which are imposed on individual countries and those which apply to armed opposition groups.

- Sanctions imposed on countries.
- Sanctions imposed on armed opposition groups.

14. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the EU and the OSCE

SOURCES: EU, at <<http://i/>>, and *Committee of Senior Officials*, Journal No. 2, Annex 1, Seventh Committee on Senior Officials meeting, Prague, 27-28/02/92

The imposition or recommendation of an embargo by European bodies (whether the EU or the OSCE) is understood to represent an acknowledgement that the situation in the country affected is exceptional. As a result, for the purposes of this study, no distinction is made between binding and voluntary embargoes. Nevertheless, a distinction is made here between sanctions which are imposed on individual countries and those which apply to armed opposition groups.

- Sanctions imposed on countries.
- Sanctions imposed on armed opposition groups.

15. Countries with DDR programmes

SOURCES: Monitoring of the international situation using information provided by the United Nations (*UN Integrated DDR Standards*, at <<http://www.unddr.org>>), international bodies, research centres and international and regional media organisations.

Programmes for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants are initiatives implemented in post-war rehabilitation contexts aimed at disarming one or more armed groups that have been involved in the preceding conflict, demobilising their members from military life and reintegrating them into civilian society. This indicator identifies countries in which DDR programmes were underway or in an exploratory phase in 2006.

DDR Countries with DDR programmes underway at the end of the year.

EX Countries with DDR programmes in an exploratory phase at the end of the year.

7. Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

16. Countries that have not ratified the United Nation’s main legal instruments on human rights

SOURCE: UNHCHR, at <<http://www.unhchr.org>> (on 31 December 2006).

This indicator is based on the total number of legal human rights instruments that a country has ratified from the 9 selected by the United Nations. These 9 instruments are:

- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
- Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
- Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)
- International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)

- Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)
 - Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
 - Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)
 - Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)
 - International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (2003)
- Have ratified four or fewer instruments.
 - Have ratified five or more instruments.

17. Countries with serious and systematic human rights violations according to non-governmental sources

SOURCES: Amnesty International, *Report 2006, the state of the world's human rights*, at <<http://www.amnesty.org>>, Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2006*, at <<http://www.hrw.org>> and the School for a Culture of Peace's own monitoring of the current international situation from daily reports by various local and international human rights NGOs (the classification given to countries is the authors' own, as neither Amnesty International nor Human Rights Watch make this type of classification).

Very serious human rights violations are regarded as those abuses which affect the right to life and personal security and which occur in a systematic and widespread way as the result of the state's own actions or omissions, particularly in the case of extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, deaths in custody, torture, arbitrary detention and widespread impunity. Serious human rights violations are all the abuses mentioned above when they occur frequently, in addition to abuses that violate personal, political and civil rights, particularly trials without the necessary minimum procedural guarantees and the existence of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, based on the methodology applied by the PIOOM (in Schmid, Alex P.; Jongman, Albert J. (eds.), *Monitoring Human Rights Violations*).

- Context regarded as involving very serious violations of human rights.
- Context regarded as involving serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

18. Countries giving cause for concern according to the European Union

SOURCE: Council of the European Union, *EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2006*, Brussels, 12 October 2006.

This indicator refers to countries whose position in human rights issues made them a cause for concern or the subject of some kind of action by the European Council during the period between July 2005 and 30 June 2006. (Please see the previous indicator for a definition of very serious and serious human rights violations according to the PIOOM).

- Context regarded as involving very serious violations of human rights.
- Context regarded as involving serious violations of human rights.
- ▲ Countries forming the subject of a declaration or action by the EU.

19. Countries with serious human rights violations according to reports from the special mechanisms and resolutions adopted at the first three sessions of the UNHRC and the 60th period of sessions of the UN General Assembly's Third Committee.

SOURCES: UNHCHR, at <<http://www.ohchr.org>> and Antena de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos (Antenna for the Human Rights Commission) in Spain, at <<http://www.escolapau.org/antena/index.htm>> (in Spanish)

This indicator relates to the special mechanisms set up by the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights with the mandate to examine, research and publicise the human rights situation in particular geographical areas. The work of these experts was assessed during the periods of sessions of

the recently created Human Rights Council, and some of them also presented their findings to the UN General Assembly. The indicators show the countries for which a special mechanism has been set up (either to assess the human rights situation or promote technical cooperation in the human rights field), the countries which have been examined by the UNHCHR and, finally, the countries which have formed the subject of a resolution adopted by either the Human Rights Council or the General Assembly's Third Committee. This latter source has been included due to the reform process to which the Human Rights Council is currently being subjected and the closer links planned between this UN body and the field of human rights.

- Reports from geographical special mechanisms expressing concern over the human rights situation in a country.
- Reports by the UNHCHR.
- ▲ Resolution by the UNHCHR condemning or expressing concern about the situation in a particular country.
- Resolution by the General Assembly's Third Committee condemning or expressing concern about the situation in a particular country during its 60th period of sessions.

20. Countries that apply and/or retain the death penalty

SOURCE: Amnesty International, *Facts and Figures 2006*, October 2006.
<<http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng>>.

This indicator deals with the countries which have abolished the death penalty for all offences (with no exceptions), countries which have abolished the death penalty for common offences (though they maintain it for exceptional offences, under military law or in the context of an armed conflict), countries which have abolished the death penalty in practice (countries which have retained it for common offences but have not carried out any executions in the last ten years, and countries which have undertaken not to apply the death penalty) and countries which still retain the death penalty (where this penalty is retained for common offences).

- Countries that still retain the death penalty.
- Countries that have abolished the death penalty in practice.
- ▲ Countries that have only abolished the death penalty for common offences.
- Countries that have abolished the death penalty for all offences.

21. Countries of origin of people who have obtained political asylum

SOURCE: UNHCR, *2005 Global Refugee Trends. Statistical Overview of population of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and other persons of concern to UNHCR*, June 2006, at <<http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4486ceb12.pdf>>

This indicator gives provisional data on people granted asylum. The grant of asylum status, though sometimes subject to national or international restrictions, implies recognition by the host country that the security and freedom of the person seeking asylum is threatened in his or her country of origin. It therefore implies Government recognition of some human rights violations in this country of origin. The figures indicate numbers of people who were granted asylum status during 2005 where this number exceeded 100 from a particular country of origin.

- The country of origin of more than a thousand people granted political asylum status.
- The country of origin of between one hundred and a thousand people granted political asylum status.

22. Countries that have not ratified Additional Protocol II of 1977, dealing with inter-state armed conflicts relating to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949

SOURCES: ICRC, at <<http://www.icrc.org>> (on 31 December 2006), and UNHRC, at <<http://www.ohchr.org>>.

The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (the First Convention deals with the treatment of war wounded, the Second with the situation in the event of shipwreck, the Third with prisoners of war and the Fourth with the protection of civilians in times of occupation) and Protocol I of 1977 provide legislation and regulation for inter-state armed conflicts. This indicator looks at failure to ratify Protocol II, due to the fact that the majority of today's armed conflicts are taking place within a single country.

- Countries which have not ratified Protocol II.

23. Countries that recruit child soldiers and have not ratified the optional Protocol for the Convention on the Rights of the Child in relation to the participation of children in armed conflicts

SOURCES: Secretary general's Report on Children and Armed Conflict, at <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/641/72/PDF/N0664172.pdf?OpenElement>> and the Optional Protocol for the Convention of the Rights of the Child, relating to participation by children in armed conflicts, at <<http://www.unhchr.ch>> (on 31 December 2006).

Child soldiers, both male and female, are defined in the most restrictive way, i.e. any person below the age of 18 who joins Government armed forces, either voluntarily or under duress, and takes part directly in combat operations.

- Countries which have ratified the Protocol in which Government armed forces and armed opposition groups include child soldiers.
- Countries which have not ratified the Protocol in which Government armed forces and armed opposition groups include child soldiers.
- Countries in which armed opposition groups include child soldiers.

8. Development

24. Countries with a Human Development Index (HDI) lower than in 1990 and countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

SOURCES: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2006*, at <<http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006>>, and UNCTAD, *The Least Developed Countries Report 2006*, at <<http://www.unctad.org/lpcs>>.

The UNDP prepares a compound index each year (HDI) based on 3 different areas of human development: health (which measures life expectancy), learning (which measures literacy and levels of schooling) and standard of living (calculating per capita GDP). A fall in the HDI to levels below those recorded in 1990, the first year for which data is available, indicates the difficulties experienced in some countries in guaranteeing the main elements of human development. In addition, ECOSOC updates the list of countries classified as LDCs every three years. In 2006 it based this list on the following variables: income (per capita GDP); human resources, a combination of indicators relating to nutrition (percentage of the population which is malnourished), health (infant mortality), schooling and literacy; and economic vulnerability (financial instability based on exposure to "shocks" and the capacity to deal with them).

- Countries with a HDI lower than in 1990.

LDC Country belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries.

25. Countries with serious internal inequalities according to the Gini coefficient

SOURCE: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2006*, at <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006>>.

The Gini coefficient measures the level of inequality in income among an individual country's population. The value 0 represents perfect equality while 100 indicates complete inequality.

- Countries with very serious internal inequalities: a Gini coefficient exceeding 60.
- Countries with serious internal inequalities: a Gini coefficient exceeding a 40.

26. Countries receiving official development aid (ODA) equivalent to more than 10% of GDP

SOURCE: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2006*, at <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006>>.

ODA as a percentage of GDP is one of the indicators that shows how economically dependent an individual country is, firstly because the state can delegate the services for which it is itself intrinsically responsible to parties offering international cooperation, and secondly because the increasing politicisation of ODA may place excessive conditions on the identification of a country's development priorities and the strategies to be pursued in order to advance them.

- ODA represents more than 20% of GDP.
- ODA represents more than 10% of GDP.

27. Countries with total external borrowings exceeding their GDP, countries that pay more to service their debt than they receive in official development aid and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

SOURCES: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2006*, at <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006>>, UNDP, *Human Development Report 2006*, at <<http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006>>, and the OECD's Development Aid Committee at <<http://www.oecd.org/dac>>.

This indicator is intended to point to a number of elements that detail the level of a country's foreign debt. Firstly, when a country's foreign debt is higher than its GDP, this indicates that the country will have problems in repaying this debt and financing some of the country's other development priorities. Secondly, the fact that a country pays more in total to service its debt (in terms of the amortisation of capital and interest payments) than it receives in ODA shows that in many cases there is a net transfer of resources from poor countries to the industrialised world. Finally, this indicator shows the countries included in the HIPC initiative, which was approved by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1996 and is aimed at reducing debt (whether multilateral, bilateral or private) in these countries to a level that allows them to meet their repayments. It therefore represents a first step in reducing debt, thus allowing a debtor country to pay off its loans without endangering economic growth and without accumulating yet more back-payments in respect of its future debt levels.

- Countries with external borrowings higher than their GDP.
- Countries that pay more to service their debt than they receive in ODA.
- ▲ Countries with external borrowings higher than their GDP and which pay more to service their debt than they receive in ODA.

HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).

28. Countries with high rates of deforestation and countries with high levels of polluting emissions

SOURCE: *World Development Indicators 2006*, at <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006>>.

This indicator signals those countries with high average levels of deforestation between 1990 and 2005 and countries with carbon dioxide emissions of more than 10 metric tonnes per person. Deforestation not only reflects a certain level of environmental degradation in a country but is also closely linked with other issues, such as poverty, demographic pressure on resources and vulnerability to natural disasters. In addition, high levels of polluting emissions per person indicate a lack of respect for the planet's environment and points to unsustainable economic growth models.

- Countries with an average annual deforestation rate of more than 3% between 1990 and 2005.

- Countries with an average annual deforestation rate of more than 1% between 1990 and 2005.
- Countries with carbon dioxide emissions of more than 15 metric tonnes per head (data from 2002).
- Countries with carbon dioxide emissions of more than 10 metric tonnes per head (data from 2002).

29. Countries with poor governance according to the World Bank

SOURCE: World Bank, *Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996–2005*, at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/1740479-1150402582357/2661829-1158008871017/gov_matters_5_no_annex.pdf>.

The World Bank's aggregate indicator is calculated on the basis of 6 governance components, these being accountability, political stability and absence of violence, effective government, procedural guarantees, rule of law and control of corruption. These are in turn drawn from a number of indicators based on polls and surveys published by other institutions.

- Countries with very poor governance: a percentile figure of up to 10.
- Countries with poor governance: a percentile figure of between 10 and 25.

9. Gender and peace-building

30. Countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

SOURCE: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2006*, at <<http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006>>.

The GDI measures inequality between men and women in three basic areas of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy), learning (adult literacy and gross schooling levels) and decent standard of living (per capita GDP). The countries indicated are those that scored less than 0.500, this being the point from which the UNDP classifies its Human Development Index as "low".

- Countries with a GDI lower than 0.500.

Country	Conflicts and peace-building			Humanitarian crises			Disarmament			International Humanitarian Law			Development			Gender issues and peace-building														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Afghanistan	●			■	●	○	●							○	DDR		●	●	■	■	●	●		LDC	-	●			○	●
Albania		○				○	○			○	○	○				○				▲	●	●								
Algeria	●		PN			●	○									○	●	▲		○	○						■			
Andorra																○	-													
Angola			PN	●		○	●		○					○	DDR	○	●	▲			○	○	●	LDC			■		○	●
Anguilla (UK)																○	-													
Antigua and Barbuda																○	-			■										
Argentina														○		○	○	▲		▲						○	▲			
Armenia			PN	●		○	○		○					●		○	○	○			●		●						○	
Aruba (Nether.)																○	-													
Australia																○														
Austria																○														
Azerbaijan			PN			●	●			○				●		○	○	○			●		●				■		○	
Bahamas																●				■										
Bahrain																○	○	○		○										
Bangladesh				●		○	○									○	●	○		■	●		●	LDC					○	
Barbados																○	-			■										
Belarus						○	○									○	●	□			○		○				■		○	
Belgium																○														
Belice																○				■										
Benin									○							○	-			○				LDC			HIPC		○	●
Bermudas (UK)																○	-													
Bhutan							●									○	-						●							
Bolivia																○	○			▲							HIPC			
Bosnia and Herzegovina				○		●	●							●		○	○				○		○							
Botswana																○	-			■				○			■			

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30							
Brazil																																					
Brunei Darussalam																●	○	▲	○	○	-																
Bulgaria											○ 0.8	○ 1.8										○ 182															
Burkina Faso					●											○	○	○					LDC														
Burundi	●		PN	○	●	● 1,000,000	● 438,673	●								○	○	■	●	■	● 1,930		●		○	○	●	○	○	○	○						
Caiman, I. (UK)																○																					
Cambodia							○ 17,806		●							○	○	○	○	○	○	○ 170		LDC													
Cameroon			PN				○ 9,016									○	○	○	○	○	○	○										○	○				
Canada																○																					
Cape Verde								●								○								LDC													
Central African Rep.	●			●		● 150,000	● 42,890	●								○	○	○	○	○	○ 272			LDC		●							○	○			
Chad	●	●	PN	○	●	○ 90,000	○ 48,400	●								○	○	○	○	○	○	○		LDC		-	○						○	○			
Chile									○	○ 0.5						○		▲																			
China					●		○ 124,021							●		○	○	●	●	■	○	○															
Colombia	●				●	● 2,842,528	○ 60,415									○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○														
Comoros																○		■						LDC													
Congo				●	●	○ 123,500	○ 24,413	●								○	○	○	○	○	○	○													○		
Cook, I. (NZ)																○		▲																			
Costa Rica																○																					
Côte d'Ivoire	●	○	PN	●	●	● 750,000	○ 18,303	●								○	○	○	○	○	○	○													○	○	
Croatia						○ 5,600	● 119,148									○																					
Cuba							○ 19,000									○	○	○	○	○	○	○														○	
Cyprus						○ 210,000		●								○																					
Czech Republic																○																					
Dem. Peop. Rep. Korea		○														○																					
Dem. Rep. of Congo	●	●	PN	●	●	● 1,480,000	○ 430,625	●					●			○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○													○	○

Country	Conflicts and peace-building			Humanitarian crises			Disarmament			Human rights and International Humanitarian Law					Development					Gender issues and peace-building										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Liberia		▲		○	●	○	●	●						DDR	○	○	○	○	●		●	1,139		LDC	-	●	HIPC	▲	○	●
Lybian, Arab Jamahiriya						○	●	●			○	○	○			○	●	●	■		○	○		-	-	-	-	-	○	
Liechtenstein																○														
Lituania																○												■		
Luxembourg																○														
Madagascar				●											○	-	-	○	○	○	○	○	○	LDC	○	●	HIPC			
Malawi															○								LDC	○	●	HIPC				●
Malaysia															●	○	○	○	■		●									
Maldives															○	○	○	○	○	○			LDC							
Mali		●	PN	●			●	●							○	-	-	○	○	○			LDC	○	○	HIPC				●
Malta															○	○														
Man I. (UK)																○														
Marshall I.															●						●									
Mauritania		○		●			○	●							○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	LDC	○	○	HIPC	○	○		●
Mauritius															○															
Mexico						○									○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○								
Micronesia Fed. S.																														
Monaco																														
Mongolia				●											○															
Montenegro ¹															○															
Montserrat (UK)															○															
Morocco								○							○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○								
Mozambique															○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	LDC		●	HIPC				●
Myanmar		○	PN			●	○								●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	LDC	-	-	-	-	○	○	●
Namibia															○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○			●					
Nauru															○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○								

1. Montenegro obtained independence following a referendum held in May 2006. Therefore, indicators based on data collected before independence offer information concerning "Serbia and Montenegro" within the section of "Serbia".

Conflicts and peace-building | Humanitarian crises | Disarmament | International Humanitarian Law | Development | Gender issues and peace-building

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30			
Nepal					●	○	○								DDR	○	●	●▲	■			○	○	LDC	○		HIPC	○	○				
Netherland Antillen																○	-																
Netherlands																○																	
New Zealand																○	-																
Nicaragua																○											●						
Niger					●			●							DDR	○	-						LDC	○	○	○	HIPC	○			●		
Nigeria	●	▲				○	○	○								○	●								○		■	○	○	○	●		
Niue (NZ)																●																	
Norway																○	-																
Oman												○	1.6			○	○										■	○					
Pakistan					●	○				●						○	○	●▲									■	○	○	○			
Palau																○	-																
Palestine N-A	●				●	●	●	●								○	●	○	●	■							-	-	-				
Panama																○	-									○							
Papua New Guinea																●	●										■						
Paraguay																○											■						
Peru																○	○										■						
Philippines	●				●	○	○									○	●	●▲									■	○					
Poland																○											■						
Portugal																○																	
Qatar																○			■														
Republic of Korea																○																	
Republic of Moldova																○	●																
Romania																○	○	○									■						
Russian Fed.	●				●	○	○	○	○	○						○	●	●▲						○			■						
Rwanda						○	○	●							DDR	○	○										■	○					●

Country	Conflicts and peace-building			Humanitarian crises			Disarmament			Human rights and International Humanitarian Law						Development			Gender issues and peace-building															
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30				
Saint Lucia																●	-																	
Saint Kitts and Nevis																●	-																	
S. Vincent and Grenadines																○	-				○ 104													
Salomon I.																○	○							LDC										
Samoa																●	-							LDC										
San Marino																○	-																	
Sao Tome and Principe																○	-							LDC										
Saudi Arabia								●	●							●	●	●▲	■										□					
Senegal		●	PN	●	●	○ 64,000	○ 8,671	●								○	○							LDC	○	○	○	HIPC				●		
Serbia ¹		○	PN	○		● 228,000	● 181,850									○	○	○				● 3,225												
Seychelles																○	-																	
Sierra Leone		○		○	●	○ 5,950	○ 40,447	●						○		○	○							LDC	●	●	●	HIPC		○		●		
Singapore								○	○							●	○												□					
Slovakia																○	-																	
Slovenia																○	-																	
Somalia	●	○	PN	●	●	● 400,000	● 394,760	●						○ 1.6	●	●	●	●	●	■	● 17,758	●	●	LDC	-	-	HIPC		-	●				
South Africa																○	●							○	○									
Spain																○	-																	
Sri Lanka	●		PN	●	●	● 500,000	○ 108,059		●							●	●	○	○											○				
Sudan	●	▲	PN	●	●	● 5,355,000	● 693,266	●							●	○	●	●▲	●▲	■	● 12,117	■	■	LDC	-	-	HIPC	●	●	●	●	●		
Surinam																○	-		○															
Swaziland																○	○	○	○					○	●								●	
Sweden																○	-																	
Switzerland																○	-																	
Syria Arab Rep.		●				● 305,000	○ 16,281									○	●	●▲	■														○	
Taiwan																○	○	■	■															

1. The information on peace process refers to Kosovo.

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30					
Tajikistan																																			
T.F.Y.R. of Macedonia							54,753 8,599																												
Thailand	●		PN																																
Timor-Leste						● 150,000		●																											
Togo							51,107	●																											
Tonga																																			
Trinidad and Tobago																																			
Tunisia																																			
Turkey		●				675,000	170,131			●																									
Turkmenistan		○				○																													
Turks and Caicos (UK)																																			
Tuvalu																																			
Uganda	●	▲				● 2,000,000	34,170	●																											
Ukraine		○					84,213																												
United Arab Emirates																																			
United Kingdom																																			
United Rep. Tanzania		○						●																											
United States of America									○																										
Uruguay																																			
Uzbekistan		●					8,325																												
Vanuatu																																			
Venezuela		○																																	
Vietnam							358,248																												
Virgin I. (UK)																																			
Virgin I. (USA)																																			
Yemen		○								○	● 2.2																								

Appendix II. Oil-producing countries on alert due to conflict/tensions, human rights, human development, governance and/or militarization

League table of producer countries in 2005*	World reserves (%) and estimated exploitation period remaining (years)	Conflict and/or tensions 2006 Indicators no. 1 and 2 (1)	Human rights 2006 Indicator no. 17 (2)	Countries with a HDI lower than in 1990 and LDCs Indicator no. 24 (3)	Poor governance 2004 Indicator no. 29 (4)	Militarization Indicator no. 9 (5)
1. Saudi Arabia	22.0% (65.6)		●			●
2. Iran	11.5% (93.0)	▲	●		○	○
3. Iraq	9.6% (+100)	●	●		●	
4. Kuwait	8.5% (+100)		●			●
5. UAE	8.1% (97.4)		○			
13. Qatar	1.3% (38)					
21. Oman	0.5% (19.6)		○			●
32. Syria	0.2% (17.5)	▲	●		○	
32. Yemen	0.2% (18.3)	○	○	LDC	○	○
Total Middle East	61.9% (81.0)	4/9	8/9		4/9	5/9
6. Venezuela	6.6% (72.6)	○	●		○	
11. USA	2.4% (11.8)	●	●			○
12. Canada	1.4% (14.8)					
15. Mexico	1.1% (10.0)	○	●			
16. Brazil	1.0% (18.8)		○			
24. Ecuador	0.4% (25.6)	▲	○		○	
32. Argentina	0.2% (8.7)		●			
35. Peru	0.1% (27.1)	▲				
35. Trinidad & Tobago	0.1% (13.0)					
35. Colombia	0.1% (7.3)	●	●			
Total America	13.6% (***)	6/10	7/10		2/10	1/10
7. Russian Federation	6.2% (21.4)	●	●	○		○
8. Kazakhstan	3.3% (79.6)				○	
18. Norway	0.8% (8.9)					
20. Azerbaijan	0.6% (42.4)	○	○		○	
27. United Kingdom	0.3% (8.1)	●				
35. Italy	0.1% (17.0)					
43. Denmark	0.1% (9.3)					
45. Romania	0.05% (11.3)		○			
45. Uzbekistan	0.05% (12.9)	▲	●		●	
45. Turkmenistan	0.05% (7.8)	○	●		●	
Total Europe and Central Asia	11.7% (22.0)	5/10	5/10		4/10	1/10
8. Libya	3.3% (63.1)		●		○	
10. Nigeria	3.0% (38.1)	●▲○	●		○	
16. Algeria	1.0% (16.6)	●	●			
18. Angola	0.8% (19.9)	○	●	LDC	○	○
21. Sudan	0.5% (46.3)	●▲○	●	LDC	●	
27. Egypt	0.3% (14.6)	○	○			
32. Gabon	0.2% (25.8)		–			
35. Congo	0.1% (19.3)	○	○	○	○	
35. Tunisia	0.1% (25.2)		○			

League table of producer countries in 2005*	World reserves (%) and estimated exploitation period remaining (years)	Conflict and/or tensions 2006 Indicators no. 1 and 2 (1)	Human rights 2006 Indicator no. 17 (2)	Countries with a HDI lower than in 1990 and LDCs Indicator no. 24 (3)	Poor governance 2004 Indicator no. 29 (4)	Militarization Indicator no. 9 (5)
35. Chad	0.1% (14.3)	●▲	○	LDC	○	
35. Equatorial Guinea	0.1% (13.6)	○	●	LDC	○	
49. Sao Tome & P.	3000-8000**		–	LDC		
Total Africa	9.5% (31.8)	8/12	10/12		7/12	1/12
13. China	1.3% (12.1)		●			
23. India	0.5% (20.7)	●○	●			
24. Malaysia	0.4% (12.9)		○			
24. Indonesia	0.4% (10.4)	○	●			
27. Australia	0.3% (20.4)					
27. Vietnam	0.2% (21.8)		○			
35. Brunei	0.1% (13.6)		–			
45. Thailand	0.05% (5.2)	●	●			
Total Asia and the Pacific	3.5% (14.2)	3/8	6/8	0/8	0/8	0/8
Total	100% (40.5)	24/49	38/49	3/49, 5 LDC	15/49	7/49

● (1) Countries in armed conflict, (2) Countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to non-governmental sources, (3) Countries with a Human Development Index (HDI) lower than in 1990 (4) Countries with poor governance, (5) Countries with military spending exceeding 4% of GDP.

▲ (1) Situations of extreme tension and high-risk disputes.

○ (1) Situations of lesser tension, (2) Countries with violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to non-governmental sources.

○ (4) Countries with poor governance.

NDA = No data available

* Proven reserves. ** Reserves estimated in millions of barrels. *** The estimated period is 11.8 years for North America and 40.9 years for Central and South America.

Source: Prepared by the authors from *BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2006*, at <http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6842&contentId=7021390>.

Appendix III. Multilateral peace missions

UN peace missions (16 PKO, 2 PO/PKO, ¹ 11 PO and PBO)				
Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission ² (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/Military Observers/Police	Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
AFRICA				
Continent of Africa	(Office in Geneva)			Special Adviser for Africa, Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria) (1997)
	(Office in New York)			Special Adviser for Africa, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana) (2006)
Region of West Africa	UNOWA, SR's Office (PO) since 03/02			SR Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania) (2002)
Great Lakes region	SR's Office (PO) since 19/12/97			SR Ibrahima Fall (Senegal) (2002)
<i>Burundi** (1993-2006)</i>	<i>ONUB³ (PKO) S/RES/1545</i>	<i>June 2004</i>	<i>5,336/189/87</i>	<i>SR C. McAskie (Canada) (2004), succeeded by Assistant SR, Nureldin Satti (Morocco) (2006)</i>
Burundi (1993-2006)	BINUB (PBO), S/RES/1719	January 2007		
Congo, DR (1998-)	MONUC (PKO), S/RES/1279	Nov. 1999	16,622/776/1,075	SR William Lacy Swing (USA) (2003)
Côte d'Ivoire(2002-)	UNOCI ⁴ (PKO), S/RES/1528	April 2004	7,849/195/992	SR Pierre Schori (Sweden) (2005)
Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998-2000)	UNMEE (PKO) S/RES/1312	July 2000	2,062/222/-	Pending appointment in January 2007
Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999)	UNOGBIS (PBO), S/RES/1216	March 1999	-/2/1	SR Joao Bernardo Honwana (Mozambique) (2004) succeeded by Shola Omoregie (Nigeria) (2006)
Liberia (1989-2005)	UNMIL (PKO), S/RES/1509	Sept. 2003	14,334/207/1,097	SR Alan Doss (United Kingdom) (2005)
Morocco-Western Sahara * (1975-)	MINURSO (PKO) S/RES/690	Sept. 1991	27/175/12	Pending appointment of successor to SR Francesco Bastagli (Italy) (2005), and SE Peter van Walsum (Netherlands)
Central African Republic (1996-2000) (2002-2003)	BONUCA ⁵ (PBO), S/RES/1271	Feb. 2000	-/5/6	SR Lamine Sissé (Senegal) (2001)
Sierra Leone (1991-2001)	UNIOSIL ⁶ (PBO), S/RES/1620	January 2006	-/10/18	Executive Representative Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal) (2006)
Somalia (1988-)	UNPOS ⁷ (PO), S/RES/954	April 1995		SR François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) (2005)

1. The UNOTIL (Timor-Leste) and UNAMA (Afghanistan) political missions are directed and supported by the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.

2. Peace-keeping Mission (PKO), Political Office or Mission (PO) and Peace-building Operation (PBO).

3. The original AU mission (AMIB) was integrated into ONUB in June 2004.

4. A UN political mission (MINUCI, S/RES/1479) had been in place since May 2003, and this was joined by 1,300 ECOWAS troops (ECOMICI, ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire) in April 2004, with support from 4,000 French troops (Operation Licorne).

5. MINURCA (1998-2000) (PKO).

6. UNOMSIL (1998-1999) (OMP), UNAMSIL (1999-2005) (OMP).

7. UNOSOM I (1992-1993) UNITAF (1992-1993, USA with a UN Security Council mandate) UNOSOM II (1993-1995) (PKO). Resolution S/RES/954 agreed the closure of UNOSOM II and established that the UN would continue observing events in Somalia through a Political Office based in Kenya.

UN peace missions (16 PKO, 2 PO/PKO, 11 PO and PBO) (continuation)

Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observers/ Police	Special Representative/ head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
Sudan (1983-2004)	UNMIS ⁸ (PKO), S/RES/1590	March 2005	8,732/611/680	Pending appointment of successor to SR Jan Pronk (Netherlands) (2004)
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)				SE for Darfur, Jan Eliasson (Sweden) (2006)
Uganda (1986-)				SR for the areas affected by the LRA armed opposition group, Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique) (2006)
AMERICA				
Region of Latin America				SA Diego Cordovez (Ecuador) (1999)
Guyana-Venezuela				SR for the border dispute between the two countries, Oliver Jackman (Barbados) (1999)
Haiti (2004-2005)	MINUSTAH (PKO) S/RES/1542	June 2004	6,668/-/1,692	SR Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile) (2004), succeeded by Edmond Mulet (Guatemala) (2006)
ASIA				
Afghanistan ⁹ (2002-)	UNAMA (PO), S/RES/1401	March 2002	-/12/8	SR Tom Koenings (Germany), 27/12/05
Cambodia (1975-1979)		Nov. 2005		SR for the human rights situation, Yash Gay (Kenya), 01/11/05
India-Pakistan* (1946-)	UNMOGIP ¹⁰ (PKO), S/RES/91	January 1949	-/42/-	Military head of the observer mission, General Guido Palmieri (Italy), succeeded by General Dragutin Repinc (Croatia), 12/12/05
Myanmar				Pending appointment of successor to SE Razzali Ismail (Malaysia) (2000)
Nepal (1996-2006)				Personal Rep. Ian Martin (United Kingdom) (2006)
Tajikistan (1992-1997)	UNTOP (PO)	June 2000	-/1	SR Vladimir Sotirov (Bulgaria) (2002)
Timor-Leste (1975-1999)	UNOTIL ¹¹ (PO), S/RES/1599	May 2005	-/15/56	SR Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan) (2004), succeeded by SR Abu Khare (India) (2006)

8. The duties of the UNAMIS political mission (created in 2004) were passed on to UNMIS in Resolution S/RES/1590 in March 2005.

9. This current phase of the armed conflict began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has been in armed conflict since 1979.

10. UNIPOM (1965-1966) (PKO).

11. UNTAET (1999-2002) (PKO), UNMISSET (2002-2005) (PKO).

UN peace missions (16 PKO, 2 PO/PKO, 11 PO and PBO) (continuation)

Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/Military Observers/Police	Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
EUROPE				
Continent of Europe	No special adviser ¹²			
Cyprus*(1974-)	UNFICYP (PKO) S/RES/186	March 1964	854/-/64	SR Michael Moller (Denmark), 01/01/06
FYR Macedonia-Greece				Personal Envoy for talks between the two countries, Matthew Nimetz (USA) (1999)
Georgia (Abkhazia)* (1992-1993)	UNOMIG (PKO) S/RES/849, S/RES/858	August 1993	-/123/12	SR Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland) (2002), succeeded by SR Jean Arnault (France) (2006)
Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	UNMIK (PKO) S/RES/1244	June 1999	-/37/1,883	SR Soren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark) (2004) succeeded by SR Joaquim Rückner (Germany) (2006) SE for the future state of Kosovo, Marti Ahtisaari (Finland) (2005)
MIDDLE EAST				
Iraq (2003-)	UNAMI (PO), S/RES/1500	August 2003	-/4/-	SR Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) (2004)
Iraq-Kuwait (1990 - 1991)				High Level Coordinator for Iraq's compliance with its obligations regarding the repatriation and return of Kuwaitis and other third-party nationals, Yuli Vorontsov (Russian Federation) (2000)
Israel-Palestine ¹³ (1948-)	UNSCO ¹⁴ (PO)	May 1948		SA for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative for the PLO and the PNA, Álvaro de Soto (Peru), 06/05/05
Israel-Syria (Golan Heights) (1967, 1973)	UNDOF(PKO)	June 1974	1,048/-/-	Head of mission, General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal) (2004)
Israel-Lebanon (1967, 1982-2000, 2006)	UNIFIL (PKO), S/RES/425 SRES/426, S/RES/1701	March 1978	10,884/-/-	SR Geir O. Pedersen (Norway) (2005)
Middle East (1948-)	UNTSO(PKO), S/RES/50	June 1948	-/150/-	Military chief, General Ian Campbell Gordon (Australia) (2006)
Middle East (1948-)				SE for compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1559, Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway) (2005)

12. The UN Secretary General's former Special Adviser for European Affairs, Jean-Bernard Merimée (France), officially resigned his post in 2002, and is currently appearing before the courts as a result of his involvement in the UN "Oil for Food" corruption scandal in Iraq. However, until October 2005, Jean-Bernard Merimée still featured as a Special Adviser in the United Nations organisation chart, a fact that has given rise to an important controversy.

13. Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report only examines the most recent phase of the conflict which began with the 2nd Intifada in September 2000.

14. UNEF I (1956-1967) (PKO) UNEF II (1973-1979) (PKO).

OSCE operations (18 missions)¹⁵

Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observers/ Police	Special Representative/ head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
ASIA CENTRAL				
<i>Central Asia</i>				<i>OSCE President's Personal Envoy for Central Asia, Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)</i>
Kazakhstan	OSCE Centre in Almaty (PC/DEC 243, 23/07/98)	January 1999		Ambassador Ivar Kristian Vikki (Norway)
Kyrgyzstan	OSCE Centre in Bishek, PC/DEC 245, 23/07/98	January 1999		Ambassador Markus Mueller (Switzerland)
Tajikistan	OSCE Centre in Dushanbe, Min. Council, 01/12/93	Feb. 1994	-/16/-	Ambassador Alain Couanon (France)
Turkmenistan	OSCE Centre in Ashgabad (PC/DEC 244, 23/07/98)	January 1999		Ambassador Ibrahim Djikic (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Uzbekistan	OSCE Centre in Tashkent, PC/DEC 397, 14/12/00 ¹⁶	1995		Ambassador Miroslav Jenca (Slovakia)
CAUCASUS				
Armenia	OSCE Office in Yerevan, PC/DEC 314, 22/07/99	Feb. 2000		Ambassador Vladimir Pryakhin (Russian Federation)
Azerbaijan	OSCE Mission in Baku, PC/DEC 318, 16/11/99	July 2000		Ambassador Maurizio Pavesi (Italy), succeeded by José Luis Herrero Ansola (Spain) in February 2006
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (1991-1994)	Personal Rep. of the President of the Minsk Conference	August 1995		Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland)
Georgia (1992-1993)	OSCE Mission in Georgia CSO 06/11/92	December 1992	-/144/-	Ambassador Roy Stephen Reeve (United Kingdom)
EASTERN EUROPE				
Belarus	OSCE Office in Minsk, PC/DEC 526, 30/12/02	January 2003		Ambassador Ake Peterson (Sweden)
Moldova, Rep. of	OSCE Mission in Moldova CSO 04/02/93	Feb. 1993		Ambassador William H. Hill (USA), succeeded by Ambassador Louis F. O'Neill (USA) in July 2006
Ukraine	Coordination Project in Ukraine, ¹⁷ PC/DEC 295 01/06/99	June 1999		Ambassador James F. Schumaker (USA)
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE				
Albania	OSCE presence in Albania, PC/DEC 160, 27/03/97	April 1997		Ambassador Pavel Vacek (Czech Rep.)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	OSCE Mission in B&H, MC/5/DEC 18/12/95	December 1995	-/142/-	Ambassador Douglas Davidson (USA)
Croatia (1991-1995)	OSCE Mission in Croatia PC/DEC 112, 18/04/96	July 1996		Ambassador Jorge Fuentes Monzonis-Villalonga (Spain)
Macedonia, FYR	OSCE Mission in Skopje CSO 18/09/92	September 1992		Ambassador Carlos Pais (Portugal), succeeded by Ambassador Giorgio Radicati (Italy) (2006)

15. Troop deployment figures refer to 2006, and exact figures are not available for the countries not shown. See <<http://www.osce.org/regions/>>.

16. Formally the Central Asia Liaison Office, PC/DEC 28 of 16/03/95.

17. Replaced the OSCE mission in Ukraine (1994-1999) devoted to managing the crisis in the Crimea.

OSCE operations (18 missions) (continuation)				
Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/Military Observers/Police	Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
Montenegro	OSCE Mission in Montenegro PC/DEC 732	June 2006		Ambassador Paraschiva Badescu
Serbia	OmiSaM (OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro), PC/DEC 401, 11/01/01, became the OSCE Mission in Serbia	March 2001/ June 2006	-/-/30	Ambassador Douglas Wake (USA) succeeded by Ambassador Hans Ola Urstad (Norway) in February 2006
Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	OMiK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo) PC/DEC 305, 01/07/99	July 1999		Ambassador Werner Wnendt (Germany)
NATO missions (5 missions)				
Afghanistan (2002-)	ISAF, S/RES/1386	December 2001	33,250/-/-	
Europe-Mediterranean	Operation Active Endeavour	11/09/01		
Iraq (2003-)	NTIM-I, NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, S/RES/1546	August 2004	65/-/-	
Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	KFOR S/RES/1244	June 1999	16,000/-/-	
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	Support for the AU in Darfur	July 2005		
EU operations (12 missions and 9 SR)				
EUROPE AND ASIA				
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan)	Joint Action 2005/588/PESC	July 2005		SR Ján Kubis (Slovakia), 18/07/05, succeeded by Pierre Morel (France) (2006)
Balkans	Council Decision, 2005/912/EC of 12/12/05			Special Coordinator for the Stability Pact in South-eastern Europe, Erhard Busek (Austria), 12/12/05
Southern Caucasus	Joint Action 2005/496/PESC	July 2003		SR Heikki Talvitie (Finland) (2003), succeeded by Peter Semneby (Sweden) (2006)
Afghanistan ¹⁸ (2002-)	Joint Action 2001/875/PESC reformed 25/06/02	July 2002		SR Francesc Vendrell (Spain) (2002)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	Office of the High Representative and Special Representative of the EU in B&H	December 1995		SR Lord Ashdown (United Kingdom) (2002)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUPM, EU Police Mission in B&H Joint Action 2002/210/PESC	January 2003	-/-/500	RE Christian Schwarz-Schilling (Austria), January 2006
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUFOR ALTHEA, ¹⁹ EU Military Operation in B&H Joint Action 2004/523/PESC	December 2004	7,000/-/-	
Indonesia (Aceh) (1976-2005)	AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) (EU + ASEAN) Joint Action 2005/643/PESC	September 2005 ²⁰	-/130+96/-	

18. This current phase of the armed conflict began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has been in armed conflict since 1979.

19. The UN Security Council prepared Resolution S/RES/1551 of 09/07/04 to provide the mission with a mandate under the Council's guidance. This mission is a continuation of NATO's SFOR mission and holds the mandate to implement the Dayton Agreement of 1995.

20. Completed its mandate on 15 December 2006 following the elections held in Aceh on 11 December.

EU operations (12 missions and 9 SR) (continuation)

Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observers/ Police	Special Representative/ head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
Macedonia, FYR	EUPAT, ²¹ EU Police Advisory Team in FYR Macedonia, Joint Action 2005/826/PESC	December 2005		SR Erwan Fouéré (Ireland), 17/10/05
Moldova	EU Special Representative's Office for Moldova Joint Action 2005/776/PESC	March 2005		SR Adrian Jacobovits de Szeged (Netherlands), 23/03/05
Moldova-Ukraine	EU Border Mission for Moldova and Ukraine	November 2005		
Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	EU Planning Team (EUPT) in Kosovo, EU Council for Foreign Relations and General Affairs, September 2006	November 2005		Head of Mission, Casper Klynge (Denmark) (2006)
AFRICA				
Great Lakes	Joint Action, OJ L 87, 04/04/96	March 1996		EU SE for the Great Lakes region, Aldo Ajello (Italy) (1996)
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUPOL Kinshasa, EU Police Mission in DR Congo Joint Action 2004/847/PESC	January 2005, extended to June 2007	-/-/30	
Congo, RD (1998-)	EUSEC DR Congo, Mission to Assist Security Sector Reform in DR Congo Joint Action 2005/355/PESC	June 2005	8/-/-	
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUFOR DR Congo, S/RES/1671, 2006	July 2006 ²²	1,450/-/-	
Sudan	EU Special Representative's Office for Sudan, Joint Action 2005/556/PESC			SR Pekka Haavisto (Finland), 18/07/05
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	AMIS EU Supporting Action for the AU Joint Action 2005/557/PESC	July 2005		SR Pekka Haavisto (Finland), 18/07/05
MIDDLE EAST				
Middle East (1948-)	EU Special Representative's Office for the Middle East Peace Process	November 1996		SR for the Middle East Peace Process, Marc Otte (Belgium) (2003)
Iraq (2003-)	EUJUST LEX, Integrated EU mission for the rule of law in Iraq Joint Action 2005/190/PESC	March 2005, extended to December 2007		
Israel-Palestine (1948-)	EU BAM Rafah, Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point Joint Action 2005/889/PESC	November 2005, extended to May 2007	-/-/70	
Israel-Palestine (1948-)	EUPOL COPPS, ²³ an EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories is created within the EU Special Representative's Office for the Middle East, Decision 13696/05	Effective as of January 2006	-/-/33	

21. EUPAT became the continuation of EUPOL Proxima from December 2005, and it must carry out its duties in coordination with the EU's Special Representative, Erwan Fouéré (Ireland).

22. Completed its mandate on 30 November 2006.

23. Mission resulting from the prior work done by the EU's Coordination Office to Support the Palestinian Police (EU COPPS), established in April 2005.

Operations by Russia and the Community of Independent States (CIS)²⁴

Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/Military Observers/Police	Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
Georgia (South Ossetia)	Joint Force for South Ossetia (Bilateral, 24/06/92)	July 1992	586/40/-	
Georgia (Abkhazia)	CIS Peace-Keeping Force in Georgia	June 1994	2,325/-/-	
Moldova, Rep. (TransDniester)	Peace-Keeping Force of the Joint Monitoring Commission (Bilateral, 21/07/92)	July 1992	1,120/-/-	

CEMAC

Central African Republic (Oct. 2002 - March 2003)	CEMAC Multinational Force in CAR, Libreville Summit, 02/10/02	December 2002	380/-/-	
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AU

Somalia (1988-)	AU Mission Planned for 2007			
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	AMIS (AU Mission in Sudan)	June 2004	5,645/650/1,320	RE

Other operations

Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep.	NSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) Armistice Agreement	July 1953	-/9/-	
Salomon Islands	RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission Salomon Islands (Biketawa Declaration)	July 2003	80/-/300	
Israel-Palestine (1948-)	TIPH 2 (Temporary International Presence in Hebron)	January 1997		
Egypt (Sinai)	Multinational Observer Force (Protocol to the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel of 26/03/1979)	April 1982	-/1,686/-	
Iraq (2003-)	Multinational Force in Iraq (USA-United Kingdom), S/RES/1511	October 2003	155,000 ²⁵	
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	Operation Licorne (France)	February 2003	4,000	

*Situations engaged in unresolved conflicts in 2004 (see the chapter on peace processes). The case of India-Pakistan is analysed from the point of view of a peace process.

**In italics, missions that ended during 2005.

24. The figures for CIS peace-keeping missions are taken from *SIPRI 2006*, op. cit.

25. Of these, 140,000 are from the USA, with the remaining 15,000 from the countries that form the Multinational Force in Iraq, excluding those that will result from President G. W. Bush's announcement that a further 23,000 soldiers would be sent to the country. See O'Hanlon, Michael E., Campbell, J. H., *Iraq Index*, Brookings Institution, 22 January 2007, <<http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex/>>.

Appendix IV. Donor response and CAP balance sheet for 2006

Response from donors during 2006

Main Humanitarian Appeals ¹	Main bodies receiving aid ²	Main sectors receiving aid ³	Main donors ⁴	TOTAL ⁵
Aid provided via the United Nations⁶				
1. Lebanon Flash Appeal (120%)	1. WFP	1. Food	1. USA (29.2%)	3,224 millions dollars
2. Timor-Leste Flash Appeal (120%)	2. UNHCR	2. Coordination	2. ECHO (EU) (10.5%)	
3. Nepal (91%)	3. UNICEF	3. Multi-sector	3. United Kingdom (8.4%)	
4. West Africa (90%)	4. UNRWA	4. Economic recovery and infrastructure	4. CERF (4.8%)	
5. Uganda (84%)	5. FAO	5. Protection of human rights/security	5. Private (4.7%)	
Overall Humanitarian Aid⁷				
	1. WFP	1. Food	1. USA (27.2%)	6,655 million dollars
	2. UNHCR	2. Multi-sector	2. ECHO (EU) (10.57%)	
	3. UNICEF	3. Health	3. United Kingdom (7%)	
	4. ICRC	4. Coordination	4. Sweden (5.4%)	
	5. UNRWA	5. Economic recovery and infrastructure	5. Norway (5.2%)	

1. Made every year by the United Nations. The percentage shows the ones that have so far attracted the most financing from the international community, regardless of the amount requested.

2. United Nations agencies or NGOs that have so far attracted the majority of aid.

3. Main sectors in which agencies or NGOs have decided to focus aid.

4. Donors who have provided the largest amount of aid, regardless of their GDP.


5. Total amount provided for humanitarian crises up to 22 January 2007

6. Multilateral humanitarian aid.

7. Humanitarian aid provided outside the United Nations framework.

Source: Reliefweb at <<http://www.reliefweb.int/fts>>

Total amounts allocated to the different humanitarian appeals during 2006



Source: United Nations

Appendix V. Distribution of CERF Funds during 2006, shown in dollars

Country	Rapid response to crisis	Emergencies with insufficient funds	Total donations
Afghanistan	31,873,651	-	31,873,651
Burkina Faso	-	Not specified	
Burundi	-	4,069,847	4,069,847
Central African Republic	2,506,519	3,002,515	
Chad	3,152,623	6,268,442	
Colombia	Not specified	-	
Congo	-	2,000,000	2,000,000
Côte d'Ivoire	1,752,282	4,000,000	5,752,282
Djibouti	1,905,355	-	1,905,355
DR Congo	-	38,000,000	38,000,000
Eritrea	3,886,740	1,998,565	
Ethiopia	6,945,841	1,000,000	7,945,841
Guinea	-	1,997,549	1,997,549
Guinea-Bissau	Not specified	-	
Haiti	-	1,000,000	1,000,000
Kenya	11,865,500	1,000,000	12,865,500
Lebanon	5,000,000		5,000,000
Liberia	-	3,983,681	3,983,681
Mali	Not specified	-	
Mauritania	Not specified	-	
Myanmar	Not specified	-	
Niger	5,503,823	-	5,503,823
Palestinian Occupied Territories	7,200,000	-	7,200,000
Somalia	6,172,013	-	6,172,013
Sri Lanka	4,704,100	-	4,704,100
Sudan	25,524,699	-	25,524,699
Timor-Leste	4,047,931	-	4,047,931
Zambia	-	500,000	500,000
Zimbabwe	-	1,999,963	1,999,963
TOTAL (29 countries):	122,041,077	71,360,562	193,401,639

Appendix VI. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes of former combatants

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes for former combatants represent a very important part of peace-keeping operations and post-war rehabilitation processes. The main aim of this kind of initiative is to ensure the transition of former combatants (including members of both government and non-government forces) from military to civilian status.

As the following table shows, these programmes differ widely in terms of the number of **troops to be demobilised** and reintegrated, the **cost of the programme** in question and the bodies **overseeing and financing** the process. The table also illustrates the broad role played by international bodies, both as overseers and financiers, though it should be pointed out that this finance is generally only forthcoming for the initial stages, with quite fixed time limits and specific objectives, leaving a shortage of resources for the reintegration process. Finally, it is regrettable that so many **child soldiers** feature among these groups, a situation that would seem to indicate that a different approach to this problem is required.

Table 6.5. Main ongoing DDR programmes

Country	Overseeing bodies	Period (start and end dates)	Combatants to be demobilised		Programmes for vulnerable groups			Total budget (Millions of \$)	Financing formulas		
			SAF	AOG	C	F	D		WB	M	C
Afghanistan	M	10/03-06/06	-	63,300	•	•		140.9			•
Angola	N	08/02-06/06	33,000	105,000	•	•	•	255.8			•
Burundi	M	12/04-12/08	41,000	37,000	•		•	84.4	•	•	
Cambodia	M	10/01-	30,000		•			42	•		•
Central African Rep.	M	12/04-12/07	-	7,565	-	-	-	13.3			•
Chad	N	12/05-12/10	9,000	-	-	-	-	10	•		•
Colombia (AUC)	N	11/03-02/06		31,761	•			302.6			•
Côte d'Ivoire	M	-	4,000	41,000	•	•		150			•
DR Congo	M	01/04-12/07	23,000	127,000	•	•		200	•	•	
Eritrea	N	10/02-	200,000			•	•	197.2	•	•	
Guinea-Bissau	M	01/01-	10,544	2,051				26			
Haiti	M	08/06-	-	6,000	•			15.75			•
Indonesia (GAM)	N	09/05-06/06	-	5,000	•			35			•
Liberia	M	12/03-12/06	12,000	107,000	•			71			•
Nepal	M	12/06-		12,000				5.9			•
Niger	Int	03/06-12/07	-	3,160		•		2.4			•
Philippines (MNLF)	M	97/06		25,000	•			254			•
Rep. Congo	M	12/05-12/08	-	42,500	•	•		25	•		•
Rwanda	N	12/01-	15,000	30,000	•	•	•	57.3	•	•	•
Somalia	M	01/05-06/06	-	53,000	•			32.8			•
Sudan	M	01/05-12/07	121,000	57,500	•	•	•	69.4			•
Uganda	N	-	-	15,310	•	•		6.74			•
TOTAL (22)			513,544	741,966	16	10	5	1,996.75	7	13	11

Legend:

Overseeing bodies: **N** - National / **Int** - International / **M** - Mixed

Troops to be demobilised: **SAF** - State armed forces / **AOG** - Armed Opposition Groups

Vulnerable groups: **C** - Child soldiers / **F** - Female combatants / **D** - Disabled soldiers

Financing formulas: **WB** - World Bank / **M** - Multinational funds / **C** - Country-specific funds

* DDR programme in exploratory phase.

Appendix VII. EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports

Approved by the Council of the European Union on 25 May 1998

The Council of the European Union,

BUILDING on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992,

RECOGNISING the special responsibility of arms exporting states,

DETERMINED to set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency,

DETERMINED to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or contribute to regional instability,

WISHING within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports,

NOTING complementary measures taken by the EU against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms,

ACKNOWLEDGING the wish of EU Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort,

RECOGNISING that states have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter, have adopted the following Code of Conduct and operative provisions:

CRITERION ONE

Respect for the international commitments of EU member states, in particular the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.

An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia: the international obligations of member states and their commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes; the international obligations of member states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention; their commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement; their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine.

CRITERION TWO

The respect of human rights in the country of final destination.

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States will: not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression; exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-

by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU.

For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with operative paragraph 1 of this Code, the nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes.

Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

CRITERION THREE

The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.

Member States will not allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

CRITERION FOUR

Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.

Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.

When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into account inter alia: the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country; a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force; whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient; the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.

CRITERION FIVE

The national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.

Member States will take into account: the potential effect of the proposed export on their defence and security interests and those of friends, allies and other member states, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability; the risk of use of the goods concerned against their forces or those of friends, allies or other member states; the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

CRITERION SIX

The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.

Member States will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard to: its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime; its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts; its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One.

CRITERION SEVEN

The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.

In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered: the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity; the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment; the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls; the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist organisations (anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context).

CRITERION EIGHT

The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.

Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.

OPERATIVE PROVISIONS

Each EU Member State will assess export licence applications for military equipment made to it **on a case-by-case basis** against the provisions of the Code of Conduct.

This Code will not infringe on the right of Member States to **operate more restrictive national policies**. EU Member States **will circulate through diplomatic channels details of licences refused** in accordance with the Code of Conduct for military equipment together with an explanation of why the licence has been refused. The details to be notified are set out in the form of a draft pro-forma at Annex A. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it will first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it will notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning.

The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any item of military equipment will remain **at the national discretion of each Member State**. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the member state has refused to authorise the actual sale or physical export of the item of military equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order.

EU Member States will **keep such denials and consultations confidential** and not to use them for commercial advantage.

EU Member States will work for the **early adoption of a common list** of military equipment covered by the Code, based on similar national and international lists. Until then, the Code will operate on the basis of national control lists incorporating where appropriate elements from relevant international lists.

The criteria in this Code and the consultation procedure provided for by paragraph 3 of the operative provisions **will also apply to dual-use** goods as specified in Annex 1 of Council Decision 94/942/CFSP as amended, where there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country.

In order to maximise the efficiency of this Code, EU Member States will work within the framework of the CFSP to **reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence** in the field of conventional arms exports.

Each EU Member State will circulate to other EU Partners in confidence an **annual report** on its defence exports and on its implementation of the Code. These reports will be discussed at an annual meeting held within the framework of the CFSP. The meeting will also review the operation of the Code, identify any improvements which need to be made and submit to the Council a consolidated report, based on contributions from Member States.

EU Member States will, as appropriate, **assess** jointly through the CFSP framework **the situation of potential or actual recipients** of arms exports from EU Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of the Code of Conduct.

It is recognised that Member States, where appropriate, may also **take into account the effect of proposed exports** on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the above criteria.

EU Member States will use their best endeavours to **encourage other arms exporting states to subscribe to the principles of this Code of Conduct.**

This Code of Conduct and the operative provisions will replace any previous elaboration of the 1991 and 1992 Common Criteria.

Appendix VIII. Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the Human Rights Council

Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council		
1 st Session (19/06-30/06)		
No.	Subject	Content
RESOLUTIONS		
1/1	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	Approved the Convention and recommended its approval by the UN General Assembly and its preparation for signing.
1/2	Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples	Approved the Declaration and recommended its approval by the General Assembly.
1/3	Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)	Decided to extend the mandate of the Working Group for a period of two years so that it can prepare an optional protocol, and called on the chairman of the Working Group to prepare a first draft of this optional protocol.
1/4	Right to development	The Council adopted the conclusions of the Working Group on the right to development and extended its mandate for one year.
1/5	Application of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action	Called on the UNHCHR to appoint a group of experts to carry out a study on the weaknesses of the current international instruments relating to the fight against racial discrimination.
DECISIONS		
1/102	Commission's Mandates and Mechanisms	The Council extended all the mandates, mechanisms, powers and responsibilities of the Human Rights Commission.
1/103	Universal Periodic Review (UPR)	Established a Working Group with the mandate to establish the UPR's operational mechanisms.
1/104	Reform of special procedures, the Sub-Committee and procedure 1503	Established a Working Group charged with preparing specific recommendations on the issue of the reform of special procedures, specialised advice and complaint procedure 1503.
1/105	Council's working programme for the first year	Approved a framework for a working programme for the first year.
1/106	Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories	Called on the relevant Special Rapporteurs to report on Israel's violations against human rights in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories.
1/107	Inciting racial and religious hatred and promoting tolerance	Called on the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and the UNHCHR to report on this issue during the coming period of sessions.
DECLARATIONS BY THE PRESIDENT		
1/PRST.1	Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	Decision on the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council		
2 nd Session (18/09-06/10, 27/11-29/11)		
No.	Subject	Content
RESOLUTIONS		
2/1	Special procedures	Called on the Working Group to prepare a draft code of conduct for the working practices of special procedures.
2/2	Human rights and extreme poverty	Noted the draft guiding principles on human rights and extreme poverty prepared by the Sub-Committee for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and called on the UNHCHR to submit this draft to a consultation process involving states, UN bodies and NGOs, then subsequently present a report.

Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council

2nd Session (18/09-06/10, 27/11-29/11) (continuation)

No.	Subject	Content
2/3	Occupied Syrian Golan	Called on Israel to comply with the relevant General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions and allow people displaced from occupied Syrian Golan to return to their homes. Declared that all the measures adopted by Israel and any others that may be adopted for the purposes of modifying the nature and legal status of occupied Syrian Golan are null and void and represent manifest violations of international law.
2/4	Israeli settlements	Expressed its serious concern over Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem and Syrian Golan, which it considered to be a violation of international law, calling on Israel to put an end to this settlement policy and apply the recommendations relating to settlements made by UNHCR in 2001. Appealed to Israel to prevent acts of violence by Israeli colonists and guarantee the safety of the civilian population and Palestinian property in occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. Demanded that Israel comply with the legal obligations by which it is bound, in accordance with the consultative opinion issued by the International Court of Justice, and called on all sides to make fresh efforts in the peace process and fully apply the Road Map approved by the Security Council.
/5	Treaty bodies	Noted the UNHCR proposal relating to the creation of a permanent unified body to bring together the different treaty bodies, along with the conclusions of the Liechtenstein meeting (known as "Malbun II") on the reform of these bodies, urging the UNHCHR to carry out a study into the different reform options for treaty bodies, taking account of the opinions of individual states and other interested parties.
DECISIONS		
2/101	Kyrgyzstan	Urged the government to continue its efforts and decided to remove the country from procedure 1503.
2/102	Reports from special procedures	Noted the reports presented by the special mechanisms and the progress made in the informal consultations by the Working Group on universal periodic reviews, and decided to forward the Sub-Committee's opinions on the Council's future expert advice mechanism to the Working Group on the future of the Commission's mandates.
2/103	Working programme	Decided to add a segment on "Follow-up to the decisions of the Human Rights Council" to the working programme for the first year.
2/104	Access to water	Called on the Office of the UNHCHR to conduct a detailed study of the obligations relating to equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation.
2/105	Right to the truth	Called on the Office of the UNHCHR to prepare a follow-up report on the study of the right to the truth.
2/106	Democracy and racism	Invited the Office of the UNHCHR, in collaboration with the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, to continue to analyse further the issue of incitement and promotion of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in the political debate.
2/107	Access to medication	Asked the Secretary General to issue a report including a study on the exploration of innovative financing mechanisms that could contribute to improved access to medication to treat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, from a human rights perspective
2/108	The right to health	Called on the Special Rapporteur on the right to health to attempt, bearing in mind the level of development of countries, to identify the key features of an efficient, integrated and accessible health system.
2/109	Foreign debt	Asked the UNHCHR to convene an expert consultation to contribute to the process of drafting the draft general guidelines to be followed by States and by financial institutions in the execution of debt repayments and structural reform programmes
2/110	Integrity in the judicial system	Called on the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers to take full account of the issue of administration of justice through military tribunals in the discharge of his mandate.

Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council

2nd Session (18/09-06/10, 27/11-29/11) (continuation)

No.	Subject	Content
2/111	Arbitrary deprivation of nationality	Called on the Secretary General, the Office of the UNHCHR and the UN treaty bodies to continue to collect information on the arbitrary deprivation of nationality and to take account of this information in their reports and activities conducted within their respective mandates.
2/112	Counter-terrorism measures	Urged all States to take all necessary steps to ensure that persons deprived of liberty, regardless of the place of arrest or of detention, benefit from the guarantees to which they are entitled to under international law.
2/113	Afghanistan	Called on the UNHCHR to work with UNAMA to provide and expand advisory services and technical cooperation in the field of human rights and the rule of law.
2/114	Nepal	Called on all parties to ensure full respect for human rights and asked the UNHCHR to present a report on the human rights situation in Nepal and the activities of her Office in the country.
2/115	Darfur	Called on all the parties in the conflict to bring an end to human rights violations, respect the principles of the Peace Agreement and cooperate in its application. It also urged them not to hinder the return of the internally displaced to their homes and to guarantee unfettered access by observers from the Office of the UNHCHR in the country and the provision of humanitarian assistance.
2/116	Postponement	Noted the postponement of the consideration of various draft resolutions

Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council

3rd Session (29/11-08/12)

No.	Subject	Content
RESOLUTIONS		
3/1	Occupied Palestinian territories	Called for the speedy implementation of resolution S-1/1, including the despatch of the urgent fact-finding mission.
3/2	Durban Review Conference	Decided that the Human Rights Committee would act as the Preparatory Committee for the Durban Review Conference, and also decided to keep this priority issue on its working programme and provide regular reports to the General Assembly on the progress made in this regard.
3/3	Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon	Noted with appreciation the report by the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon and asked the UNHCHR to hold consultations with the Lebanese government on the report and its conclusions and recommendations, and to report to the Council during its 4 th period of sessions.
3/4	Annual working programme	Decided to create an open-ended inter-governmental inter-session working group to formulate concrete recommendations on its agenda, its annual working programme, its working methods and rules of procedure, and to hold transparent, well-programmed and inclusive consultations in which all interested parties can participate.
DECISIONS		
3/101	Indigenous peoples	Decided to defer discussion of a draft decision entitled "The rights of indigenous peoples" to its next session.
3/102	Asia and the Pacific	Decided to hold a workshop on cooperation for the promotion and protection of human rights in Asia and the Pacific during 2007.
3/103	Racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance	Established a Special Committee with the mandate to prepare complementary standards in the form of a convention or additional protocol to the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination to fill the existing gaps in this Convention. Expressed its satisfaction at the recent appointment by the UNHCHR of five experts with the mandate to prepare a base document pointing out the important gaps in the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, and called on the Working Group on the effective application of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action to work with the experts and Special Committee. Asked the UNHCHR to give visibility and a high profile to the fight to combat discrimination.

Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council

3rd Session (29/11-08/12) (continuation)

No.	Subject	Content
3/104	Financial support	Reaffirmed the need to ensure the necessary support and financial resources so that the Council can properly fulfil its mandate, including any costs resulting from the implementation of the Council's decisions, including fact-finding missions and special committees.

Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Human Rights Council

Special Sessions

No.	Subject	Content
RESOLUTION 1st SPECIAL SESSION (05-06/06)		
S-1/1	Occupied Palestinian Territories	Expressed deep concern at the human rights violations suffered by the Palestinian people as a result of the Israeli occupation. Demanded that Israel put an end to its military operations on Palestinian soil. Called on Israel to release all arrested Palestinians. Urged all sides to respect the provisions of international humanitarian law and refrain from the use of violence against the civilian population, and decided to send an emergency fact-finding mission led by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories.
RESOLUTION 2nd SPECIAL SESSION (11/08)		
S-2/1	Israeli military operations in Lebanon	Strongly condemned the serious human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law by Israel in Lebanon. Condemned the mass bombing of the Lebanese civilian population and vital civilian infrastructure. Called on Israel to comply immediately with its obligations under human rights regulations. Urged all sides to respect international humanitarian law and refrain from the use of violence against the civilian population. Called on Israel to bring an immediate end to its military operations against the civilian population. Decided urgently to set up and dispatch a high-level fact-finding mission. Called on the international community to send emergency humanitarian and financial aid to Lebanon and asked the Investigating Committee to inform the Council by September 2006 at the latest on the progress made in the performance of its mandate.
RESOLUTION 3rd SPECIAL SESSION (15/11)		
S-3/1	Israeli military incursions into Occupied Palestinian Territory. Attack on Beit Hanun	Expressed its shock at the killing of civilians, the mass destruction of homes, property and infrastructure by Israel in Beit Hanun, and called for those responsible to be brought to trial. Expressed its alarm at the serious and systematic violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Palestinian Territories occupied by Israel, and called for urgent international measures to be adopted to bring an end to these violations. Urged all sides to respect international humanitarian law, refrain from the use of violence against the civilian population and in all cases treat any detained combatants and civilians in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Conventions. Decided to send a high-level fact-finding mission immediately to Beit Hanun to assess and attend to victims' requirements and make recommendations on ways of protecting Palestinian civilians from further Israeli attacks.
DECISION 4th SPECIAL SESSION (12-13/12)		
S-4/101	Darfur	Expressed concern over the serious humanitarian and human rights situation in Darfur and decided to send a High-Level Mission to assess the human rights situation in the region and Sudan's needs in this regard.

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School for a Culture of Peace (UAB)

The School for a Culture of Peace (*Escola de Cultura de Pau*) was formed in 1999, with the aim of organising various academic and research activities relating to peace culture, the prevention and transformation of conflicts, disarmament and the promotion of human rights.

The School is essentially financed by the Government of Catalonia, through the Catalan Development Cooperation Agency (ACCD), the Foreign Relations Secretariat and the Department for Universities, Research and the Information Society. It also receives support from other departments of the Catalan Government, as well as from local councils, foundations and other institutions. The School is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Peace and Human Rights Chair at *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*.

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