



Barometer 11

On conflicts, human rights and peace-building

April - June 2006
ALERT UNIT

This Report was compiled by the Alert Unit at the *School of Peace Culture*, comprising: Maria Cañadas Francesch (human rights), Albert Caramés Boada (disarmament), Vicenç Fisas Armengol (peace processes), Patricia García Amado (humanitarian crises), Marta Mendiola Gonzalo (human rights), Maria Prandi Chevalier (human rights), Gema Redondo de la Morena (post-war rehabilitation), Josep Maria Royo Aspa (armed conflicts), Núria Tomàs Collantes (situations of tension), Jordi Urgell Garcia (armed conflicts), Anna Villegas Ariño (situations of tension and armed conflicts) y María Villegas Ariño (gender and peace-building).

Glossary	4	
00 Introduction	7	
01 Armed conflicts	11	
1.1 Evolution of armed conflicts	11	
Africa	11	
a) West Africa	12	
b) Horn of Africa	12	
c) Great Lakes and Central Africa	13	
d) Maghreb and North Africa	15	
America	15	
Asia and the Pacific	15	
a) Southern Asia	16	
b) Southeast Asia and Oceania	17	
Europe	18	
Middle East	19	
1.2 Other items of interest	20	
a) Armed conflicts and natural resources	20	
b) The dependent independents	21	
02 Situations of tension and high-risk disputes	23	
2.1 Evolution of situations of tension	23	
Africa	24	
a) Southern Africa	24	
b) West Africa	25	
c) Horn of Africa	26	
d) Great Lakes and Central Africa	26	
America	27	
a) North America, Central America and the Caribbean	27	
b) South America	27	
Asia	28	
a) South Asia	28	
b) Southeast Asia and Oceania	29	
Europe and Central Asia	29	
a) Central Asia and the Caucasus	29	
Middle East	30	
2.2 Other items of interest	32	
03 Peace Processes	35	
3.1 Evolution of peace processes	35	
Africa	36	
a) Southern Africa	36	
b) West Africa	36	
c) Horn of Africa	37	
d) Great Lakes and Central Africa	39	
e) Maghreb and North Africa	40	
America	41	
Asia and the Pacific	41	
a) South Asia	41	
b) Southeast Asia	44	
Europe and Central Asia	44	
Middle East	46	
3.2. The peace process in the Basque Country	47	
04 Post-war rehabilitation and international involvement	49	
4.1. Country by country analysis	50	
Africa	50	
a) Southern Africa	50	
b) West Africa	50	
c) Horn of Africa	51	
d) Great Lakes and Central Africa	52	
America	52	
Asia and the Pacific	53	
Europe	54	
Middle East	55	
4.2. Other items on the agenda	55	
a) The United Nations Country Team (UNCT)	55	
b) The Peace-Building Commission	57	
05 Humanitarian crises	59	
5.1. Evolution of contexts of humanitarian crisis	59	
Africa	59	
a) Southern Africa	59	
b) West Africa	60	
c) Horn of Africa	60	
d) Great Lakes and Central Africa	61	
America and the Caribbean	62	
Asia and the Pacific	63	
Europe and Central Asia	64	
Middle East	64	
5.2. Humanitarian action during the last three months	65	
a) UNHCR Report on the refugee population in 2005	65	
b) Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF)	66	
c) The response from donors over the last three months	67	
06 Disarmament	69	
6.1. Proliferation of small arms	69	
a) United Nations	69	
b) International initiatives	71	
c) Most important events of the last three months	72	
6.2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)	74	
a) International initiatives	74	
b) Most important events of the last three months	75	
07 Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law	77	
7.1. Violations of human rights and basic freedoms	77	
a) Events reported by non-governmental organisations	77	
b) Events reported by international and inter-governmental organisations	77	
c) The Human Rights Council	79	
7.2. UN Human Rights Committees	80	
a) Definition and characteristics	80	
b) Work by the Committees during the last three months	82	
08 Gender issues in peace-building	87	
8.1. The gender dimension in the impact of armed conflicts	87	
a) The impact of armed conflicts on men and women	87	
b) Women combatants	89	
c) Sexual violence as a weapon of war	90	
8.2. Peace-building from a gender perspective	91	
a) Post-war rehabilitation	91	
b) The role played by men in peace-building from a gender perspective	92	
c) Peace-keeping missions	93	
9 Appendices	95	
Appendix 1.1. UN Security Council Resolutions	95	
Appendix 1.2. Reports by the Secretary General to the Security Council	97	
School of Peace Culture (UAB)	99	



ACH: Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
ACP: Asia, Caribbean, Pacific
ADF: Afghanistan Development Forum
AF: Government Armed Forces
AIG: Armed Islamic Group
AMIB: African Mission in Burundi
ANA: Albanian National Army
APHC: All Parties Hurriyat Conference
AU: African Union
AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia)
BICC: Bonn International Centre for Conversion
BONUCA: United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic
BRA: Bougainville Revolutionary Army
CAEMC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CAP: United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process
CARICOM: Caribbean Community
CAR: Central African Republic
CAS: Country Assistance Strategy
CASA: Coordinating Action of Small Arms
CFSP: Common Security and Foreign Policy
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
COAV: Children in Organised Armed Violence
CODHES: Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (Advisory Council for Human Rights and Displacement)
CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority
CPI: Corruption Perception Index
CPN: Communist Party of Nepal
DAC: Development Assistance Committee
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
Dollars US dollars
DRM: Democratic Republican Movement
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
ECHA: Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ECHO: European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EEBC: Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission
ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)
ESCR: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
EUFOR: European Union Forces
EZLN: Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation)
FAd'H: Forces Armées d'Haiti (Haiti Armed Forces)

FAO: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FATF: Financial Action Task Force
FDD: Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
FDLR: Forces Democratiques de Libération de Rwanda Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FKM: Front Kedauant Maluku (Moluccan Sovereignty Front)
FLEC: Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front)
FNL: Forces Nationales de Libération (National Liberation Force)
GAM: Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (Movement for Free Aceh)
GDI: Gender-related Development Index
GPP: Groupement Patriotique pour la Paix (Patriotic Grouping for Peace)
GSPC: Salafist Group for Call and Combat
HDI: Human Development Index
HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
IANSA: International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL: International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICC: International Criminal Court
ICO: Islamic Conference Organisation
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IDF: Iraq Development Fund
IDP: Internally Displaced Persons
IEMF: Interim Emergency Multinational Force
IFM: Isatubu Freedom Movement
IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IOM: International Organisation for Migration
IRIN: United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network
IRIS: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (Institute for International and Strategic Relations)
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
ISDR: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
KANU: Kenya African National Union
LDC: Least Developed Countries
LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE: Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam
LURD: Liberians United for Reunification and Democracy



MAS: Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism)
MDC: Movement for Democratic Change
MDJT: *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad* (Movement for Democracy and Justice in Cahd)
MDF: Meckaunvi Defence Force
MERCOSUR : *Mercado Común del Sur* (Common Latin American Market)
MDG: Millennium Development Goals
MFDC: *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (Casamance Democratic Forces Movement)
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINUCI: United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MJP: *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (Mouvement for Justice and Peace)
MLC: *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (Congo Liberation Movement)
MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front
MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPCI: *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement)
MPIGO: *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (Ivorian Popular Movement for the Far West)
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSF: *Médecins Sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders)
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Treaty
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDC: National Democratic Congress
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NEPAD: New Economic Partnership for African Development
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation
NLA: National Liberation Army
NLD: National League for Democracy
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
NMRD: National Movement for Reform and Development
NPA: New People's Army
NPP: New Patriotic Party
NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council
NSCN (IM): National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak - Muivah
OAS: Organisation of American States
OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA: Official Development Aid
OECD: Organisation for Economic Trade and Development
ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi
OPM: *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement)
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAC: *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civiles* (Civil Defence Patrols)
PDP: People's Democratic Party
PNA: Palestinian National Authority
PRIO: Peace Research Institute of Oslo
PWG: People's War Group
RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RCD-Goma: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma* (Congolese Rally for Democracy - Goma)
RCD-K-ML: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement pour la Libération* (Congolese Rally for Democracy - Movement of Liberation)
RCD-N: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National* (Congolese Rally for Democracy - National)
RFTF: Results Focused Transnational Framework
RSM: *Republik Maluku Selatan* (Republic of South Moluccas)
RUF: Revolutionary United Front
SADC: South African Development Community
SFOR: Stabilisation Force
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLA: Sudan Liberation Army
SPLA: Sudanese People's Liberation Army
TNG: Transitional National Government
UAB: *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* (Autonomous University of Barcelona)
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam
UNAIDS: United Nations Programs on HIV/AIDS
UNAMA: United Nations Aid Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMIS: United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone
UNDG: United Nations Development Group
UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNEP: United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UNHCHR: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDIR: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon



- UNITA:** União para a Independencia Total de Angola
- UNMA:** United Nations Mission in Angola
- UNMEE:** United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
- UNMIK:** United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
- UNMIL:** United Nations Mission in Liberia
- UNMISSET:** United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste
- UNMOGIP:** United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
- UNMPO:** United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
- UNMOVIC:** United Nations Monitoring and Verification of Inspections Commission
- UNO:** United Nations Organisation
- UNOCI:** United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
- UNOGBIS:** United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
- UNOL:** United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia
- UNOMIG:** United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
- UNOTIL:** United Nations Office in Timor-Leste
- UNPOS:** United Nations Political Office for Somalia
- UNPPB:** United Nations Political and Peace-Building Mission
- UNRWA:** United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
- UNSCO:** Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Middle East
- UNTOP:** United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building
- UNTSO:** United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
- USA:** United States of America
- USAID:** United States Agency for International Development
- USCRI:** United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
- WB:** World Bank
- WFP:** World Food Programme
- WHO:** World Health Organisation
- WTO:** World Trade Organisation
- ZANU-PF:** Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front



"Barometer" is a quarterly report published in Spanish and English by the Alert Unit at the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona's *School of Peace Culture*. The report **analyses the events that have occurred in the world over the course of the previous three months (April – June 2006)** under eight main headings: conflicts, situations of tension, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, humanitarian crises, disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law and gender aspects in peace-building. It serves to update the information contained in the "Alert 2006" annual report and previous issues of "Barometer", using information published fortnightly in "*Semáforo*"¹, an electronic newsheet also published by the Alert Unit.

The following are some of the more important facts contained in this issue of "Barometer" relating to the second quarter of 2006:

Armed conflicts

- The number of armed conflicts increased to 22 as a result of the deteriorating situation in Chad.
- A total of seven conflicts remained at stalemate with no signs of improvement. There were increased confrontations in another twelve, while a further two showed signs of a reduction in violence.
- The armed conflict currently being fought in Darfur further exacerbated the serious internal situation faced by Chad, which has worsened in recent months.
- The mission monitoring the ceasefire in Sri Lanka (SLMM) described the serious situation currently observed in the country as a low-intensity war.
- The increased tensions between militias belonging to the Palestinian Hamas and Fatah organisations threatened to spill over into a civil war that could have disastrous consequences.

Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

- Since violence broke out in the Central African Republic it has been reported that around 100,000 people have been forcibly displaced, 45,000 of them fleeing as refugees to Chad.
- Former Liberian President C. Taylor was sent to The Hague to be tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
- The expulsion of one third of the members of the armed forces in Timor-Leste led to an outbreak of violence that left around 40 people dead and a further 130,000 displaced.
- The government of Uzbekistan forced the UNHCR to close its offices in the country, in spite of the fact that more than 1,800 refugees remain on Uzbek soil.
- A United Nations resolution called on Syria to stem the flow of weapons into Lebanon and urged both countries to re-establish diplomatic relations and define their common border.

Peace processes

- The Sudanese government reached an initial agreement with the armed groups operating in Darfur and the east of the country.
- South Africa took over from Tanzania as official facilitator in the process in Burundi.
- The United Nations shelved the Baker Plan to resolve the conflict in Sahara, proposing direct negotiations between the countries involved.
- Political changes in Nepal made it possible for a peace process to be initiated.
- The crisis in the peace process in Sri Lanka has led to a state of low intensity war.
- The Spanish government announced the opening of direct talks with ETA.

¹ This issue of Barometer comprises issues 122-127 of *Semáforo*



Post-war rehabilitation

- Former Liberian leader C. Taylor, who has been accused of war crimes, was arrested in Nigeria.
- Following the elections that led to the creation of a new government in Haiti, a new donor conference was held to raise funds for the country.
- A pilot programme was introduced in seven different cities in Côte d'Ivoire to begin the process of identifying three million of the country's citizens who as yet have no identity documents.
- In Timor-Leste, the parliament approved the Combatants' Statute in response to the demands being made by former members of the FALINTIL.

Humanitarian crises

- The United Nations issued another warning about the serious food crisis affecting five million people in the Sahel region.
- The upsurge in violence in Myanmar caused the displacement of thousands of people and a deterioration in living conditions.
- The recent violent disturbances have given rise to a humanitarian crisis in Timor-Leste, where 10% of the population have been forcibly displaced during recent months.
- The number of people living below the poverty line in Palestine rose to 51% of the population.

Disarmament

- The United Nations arms embargo system has been called into question in terms of both its imposition criteria and the monitoring and verification mechanisms used.
- The annual cost of armed violence around the world was vastly superior to the income obtained from the trade in small arms, and much more attention should therefore be paid to the impact of these weapons.
- Spain debated the draft Arms Trading bill which the government wants to present in December 2006.
- The Great Lakes region in Africa accounted for one third of all DDR programmes, 40% of all combatants to be demobilised and 25% of the budgets promised to all programmes around the world.

Human rights

- The Human Rights Council began its first working session.
- The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights visited the Horn of Africa.
- The Council of Europe published a report on so-called extraordinary renditions, stating that they are contrary to basic legal principles.
- The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee against Torture, the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers all held sessions.

Gender and peace-building

- Life expectancy for women is falling as a result of the impact of armed conflicts, thus reducing the difference between life expectancy levels for women and men.
- Participation by women as combatants in armed opposition groups is frequently the result of the failure on the part of state authorities to protect women from violence in times of armed conflict.
- The Aceh Women's League was created in reply to women's exclusion from the peace process taking place in the Indonesian region.



- The United Nations jointly with civil society organizations formed a new coalition to deal with the impact of sexual violence in armed conflicts.



Armed conflicts¹

- The number of armed conflicts increased to 22 as a result of the deteriorating situation in Chad.
- A total of seven conflicts remained at stalemate with no signs of improvement. There were increased confrontations in another twelve, while a further two showed signs of a reduction in violence.
- The armed conflict currently being fought in Darfur further exacerbated the serious internal situation faced by Chad, which has worsened in recent months.
- The mission monitoring the ceasefire in Sri Lanka (SLMM) described the serious situation currently observed in the country as a low-intensity war.
- The increased tensions between militias belonging to the Palestinian Hamas and Fatah organisations threatened to spill over into a civil war that could have disastrous consequences.

This section contains an analysis of the **22 armed conflicts** that remained active during the second quarter of 2006. The most notable feature of the last three months was the increase in hostilities in 12 contexts, with particularly virulent consequences in **Chad, Iraq, Israel and Palestine, DR Congo, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan (Darfur)**. The situation remained at stalemate in a further seven countries, however, with no great change or perceptible improvement as compared with the previous quarter. Finally, mention should be made of the relative improvement in the situation in **Côte d'Ivoire** and **Nepal**. The ceasefire between the government of the **Philippines** and the MILF armed opposition group remained in place. This chapter ends with some reflections on the various reports published and other issues considered worthy of mention in relation to the events of the last three months.

1.1. Evolution of armed conflicts

Africa

Table 1.1. Evolution of armed conflicts in Africa

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 2nd quarter of 2006
Algeria (1992-)	Government, GIA, GSPC	Political and economic control (natural resources) by the military over the Islamic opposition, religious manipulation	Stalemate
Burundi (1993-)	Government, A. Rwasa's FNL	Political control by an ethnic minority and difficulties in the handover of power	Increase in hostilities
Chad (2006-)	Government, FUC, SCUD	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power	Increase in hostilities
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	Government, pro-Government militias, Forces Nouvelles	Marginalisation of some regions, democratic fragility, political exclusion, religious manipulation	Reduction
DR Congo (1998-)	TNG, factions of armed groups included in the TNG, Mayi-Mayi militias, armed Ituri groups, FDLR	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power and control over natural resources	Increase in hostilities
Nigeria (Niger Delta) (2003-)	Government, Ijaw, Itsereki and Urhobo community militias, private armies, MEND	Control of political power and natural resources, social and political exclusion	Increase in hostilities
Somalia	Transitional Federal Government	Absence of practical democracy, struggle for	Increase in

¹ An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving groups of various kinds, such as regular or irregular military forces, guerrillas, armed opposition groups, paramilitary groups or ethnic or religious communities which, using arms and other destructive methods, claims more than 100 victims per year. This figure of 100 deaths is just an indicator, and it should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country.



(1988-)	(including several warlords), warlords and militias, UIC, USA	regional political power, confederation v. federation	hostilities
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	Government, pro-government militias, SLA, JEM, NMRD	Regional and political marginalisation	Increase in hostilities
Uganda (1986-)	Government, LRA	Messianic religion and regional marginalisation	Stalemate

a) West Africa

In **Côte d'Ivoire** there were positive developments in both the political situation and the peace process currently being pursued in the country. The month of May saw the first steps in the DDR process for combatants, members of pro-government militias and members of the country's armed forces, while a voter registration process began in preparation for the elections planned for October². However, in spite of the fact that there were no reports of ceasefire violations by the armed forces and the *Forces Nouvelles* coalition of armed groups, violent incidents continued among the civilian population, and fighting was reported in the east of the country in disputes over land ownership in the region bordering Liberia. As a result of these incidents, 200 United Nations and French peace-keeping troops were deployed, and the UN Security Council agreed to expand UNOCI to 1,500 troops.

In the **Niger Delta** region in the south of **Nigeria**, there was an increase in violence and a further deterioration in the overall situation during the course of the quarter. The **ongoing dispute continued between the different Delta communities over political and financial control over the region**, and there were confrontations between these communities, the armed forces and paramilitary groups and transnational oil companies. The **Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)** increased its attacks on oil platforms, killing dozens of people and kidnapping oil workers, while there was continued repression from the security forces in the region, a situation that has led to the loss of between 20% and 30% of crude production every day. MEND views the government's undertakings to resolve the situation as insufficient, and the Shell oil company refused to hand over the 1,500 million dollars that a court had ordered it to pay to the Ijaw community in February by way of compensation for the environmental damage caused to the Delta.

b) Horn of Africa

In **Somalia**, there were **increased confrontations** between the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), **a coalition of Mogadishu warlords financed by the USA, and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)**. The Alliance had accused the Islamic Courts of links with al-Qaeda, an accusation that was denied by the UIC, which reaffirmed that it did not have any political aims. The President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), who requested international help to end the situation, joined the President of the AU in calling on the USA to stop fomenting instability in the country by financing the warlords, whom they estimated were being paid between 100,000 and 150,000 dollars every month by the CIA. According to the United Nations, the two groups spent around 45 million dollars on military material during the course of last year. The fighting ended in victory for the UIC and peace returned to the streets of Mogadishu, though some 350 people have died and 1,500 people have been injured during the last three months. For its part, IGAD decided to impose sanctions on the warlords. The UIC, which removed the majority of the control points used by the militias to extort money from the civilian population and goods convoys, also took control of Jowhar, the domain of some of the Mogadishu warlords close to the capital. In the light of this new situation, the TFG initiated contacts with the UIC. At the same time, a curfew was imposed in Baidoa, the provisional seat of the TFG, due to confrontations provoked by the presidential guard in its attempts to dismantle a number of control points set up by local militias.

² See the chapters on disarmament and post-war rehabilitation.



Consequences of the USA's "war on terror" in Somalia and Iraq

The USA has been implementing a unilateral policy in two of the most violent armed conflicts of recent times, the negative consequences of which should cause the US establishment to reflect on the wisdom of continuing this policy of preventive action.

In the case of **Iraq**, during the three years since the US began a **war** it classified as **preventive**, it has become abundantly clear that the occupying forces have failed in their promise to guarantee security, governance and the restoration of freedom in the country. Inter-community conflict has now become part of everyday life, acts of ethnic cleansing are taking place, ordinary society is showing signs of a drift towards conservatism as a result of the current situation and reconstruction is just an illusion that has been delivered over to the private security companies and large US construction multinationals who are taking a slice of the millions of dollars promised by the international community to create the foundations for the *new Iraq*.

As far as **Somalia** is concerned, the tactic has been different, since it was already in the hands of the CIA (as it was during the Cold War), though the results are no less destructive: **the US has been financing a number of warlords in Mogadishu** in amounts of up to 150,000 dollars a month, in an attempt to combat the power being acquired in the capital by the Islamic Courts, the only credible authority that has attempted to strengthen law and order. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has had its hands tied since its establishment in 2004 as the result of internal disputes, the presence of these same warlords in its midst and the inability of the international community to reach any kind of agreement with this fragile TFG regarding the establishment of a peace-keeping mission comprising countries seen as neutral by the parties involved in the conflict. Neither the United Nations nor the AU nor IGAD have yet taken the appropriate measures to create a mission to proceed with the disarmament of the militias and the formation of new armed forces that might be able to guarantee security and access to the country by humanitarian organisations. The USA has taken advantage of this climate of uncertainty in order once again to involve itself in the *Somali file*, with devastating consequences for the country's civilian population (as occurred at the beginning of the 1990s), thus frustrating the search for any negotiated solution between Somalis actually involved on the ground.

As far as the Sudanese region of **Darfur** is concerned, in spite of the **significant progress seen in the Abuja peace negotiations³**, **there was continuing violence and an escalation in attacks on the civilian population, humanitarian personnel and members of the AU mission**. This climate of violence and insecurity extended across into eastern Chad, where Sudanese pro-government Janjaweed militias engaged in acts of looting. There were also reports of the enforced recruitment of civilians in Sudanese refugee camps in the east of Chad by a number of armed groups from both Chad and Sudan. This situation led to threats from United Nations agencies to suspend their humanitarian aid programmes due to the level of insecurity and the enforced recruitment programme⁴. The Sudanese government remained reluctant to agree to the introduction of a UN peace-keeping mission to replace the current AU mission (as proposed by the UN Security Council with support from the US government), though in mid-June it allowed a UN exploratory mission to travel to the Darfur region. Nevertheless, the government had previously denied access to J. Egeland, Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

The situation in **Chad** deteriorated rapidly as a result of unfolding events in **Darfur** and the **upsurge in violence that resulted from attempts by armed Chadian opposition groups to overthrow President, I. Déby**. At the beginning of April, the United Front for Democratic Change (FUC, which supports regime change by force) began an offensive that brought it up against the country's armed forces in the capital. The latter eventually succeeded in defeating the armed group, though the fighting left hundreds dead on both sides. Confrontations between the country's armed forces and the insurgency and attacks and looting by Sudanese Janjaweed militia in the east of Chad (which was left unprotected as the result of the relocation of Chad's armed forces) have led to the enforced displacement of some 50,000 people. The presidential elections of 3 May only succeeded in exacerbating the situation, since they were boycotted by the political opposition, which had asked for them to be postponed while inclusive talks were

³ See the chapter on peace processes.

⁴ See the chapter on humanitarian crises.



held between all sides in the country in order to decide on its future, an idea supported by the AU, the EU and the USA. I. Deby would not agree to the postponement of the elections, arguing that there was a risk that the country would fall into a power vacuum. Subsequently, following his expected re-election, he made a call for talks which was rejected by the political opposition since his proposal did not include all the country's different political and military groups.

In **Burundi**, peace talks began at the end of May between representatives of the government and A. Rwasa's armed opposition group, the FNL, with facilitation from South Africa⁵. However, the **increasingly authoritarian stance of the government and its tactic to hold back peace talks while supporting continuing military operations by the armed forces** in an attempt to weaken the FNL did not help to improve the situation. In addition, according to sources from the armed forces, the FNL intensified its armed operations in the province of Bubanza in order to show that it still exercised military power, thus forcing the government to accept its demands at the negotiating table and placing pressure on the civilian population to demand that the government show a greater willingness to negotiate. However, the FNL's spokesman P. Habimana declared that the group was actually respecting a unilateral ceasefire in order not to endanger negotiations. Military operations by the armed forces in their search for members of the rebellion led to human rights violations and the enforced displacement of hundreds of people.

In neighbouring **DR Congo**, the last three months saw **increasing political tensions as a result of the approaching elections**, adding to the **lack of security and violence already affecting the region**. According to the United Nations, 1,200 people are dying every day as the result of hunger, violence and associated diseases. In the **Ituri** district (Orientale province), the militias that combined last year to form the Congolese Revolutionary Movement continued to inflict acts of violence on the civilian population, while government armed forces launched several military operations against the movement with support from MONUC. Military operations continued at the same time in the provinces of **North and South Kivu** against the Rwandan FDLR armed opposition group, while the group itself carried out attacks against a number of communities. MONUC sent a contingent to the province of **Katanga** in an attempt to quell the escalating violence seen there in recent months, in which there have been reports of serious and systematic human rights violations by all the warring factions and in which warlord K. Mutanga, alias Gedeon, gave himself up along with 350 of his Mayi-Mayi fighters. Finally, presidential and parliamentary elections were postponed from 18 June to 30 July, and several members of the political opposition called for the opening of talks between all political parties in order to renegotiate the date of the elections.

In **Uganda**, the last three months have been marked by persistent attacks by the LRA on civilians in the south of Sudan and the north of Uganda, and by military operations by government armed forces in pursuit of the insurgent group, with support from the Sudanese SPLA. Although a **relative reduction in the levels of violence** was reported, the armed forces announced that 226 members of the LRA had died between the beginning of January and the end of May during the course of operation *Iron Fist*. A further hundred or so were captured or forced to give themselves up. In this connection, the coalition of local and international NGOs, CSOPNU, warned that **146 people were dying each week as a result of the conflict** affecting the country. The Deputy President for the south of Sudan, R. Machar, urged exploratory contacts as a result of the LRA's stated wish to engage in peace talks⁶. The group's leader, J. Kony, is thought to be with a section of the LRA in Garamba national park in the east of DR Congo, where they are thought to be regrouping. This led to Uganda asking the UN Security Council to request that DR Congo allow Ugandan armed forces to enter Congolese territory in pursuit of the LRA, as has happened in southern Sudan. DR Congo accused Ugandan armed forces of entering Congolese territory, an accusation that was denied by Uganda⁷.

⁵ See the chapter on peace processes.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ See the chapter on tensions.



d) Maghreb and North Africa

In **Algeria**, government armed forces and the GSPC armed opposition group continued to engage in armed acts of insurgency and counter-insurgency. One of the most serious events was an ambush by the GSPC at the beginning of April in Ghardaia, in the south of the country, which left 13 customs agents dead and a further 8 wounded. This incident received a harsh and rapid response by the authorities with the deaths of 15 of the alleged perpetrators in Hassi Messaoud, this being the first attack to take place following the government's implementation of a presidential amnesty in March, one month earlier. Mention should also be made of the discovery of a cave in Jijel, in which government armed forces announced they had found the bodies of 38 members of the GSPC and their families, including 22 children and four women, all allegedly executed to prevent them from falling into the hands of the army. The Algerian government calculated that the **GSPC had no more than 800 active members, and it said that more than 80 rebels had handed themselves in since the amnesty had come into force.**

America

Table 1.2. Evolution of armed conflicts in America

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 2nd quarter of 2006
Colombia (1964-)	Government, FARC, ELN, AUC paramilitaries	History of political exclusion, social injustice, control over natural resources and degradation of the conflict as a result of drug-trafficking	Stalemate

The last three months were notable for the **re-election of President A. Uribe** in an atmosphere of calm, and by the **conclusion of the process for the demobilisation of around 30,000 paramilitaries** fighting under the banner of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. Even so, serious tensions persisted, along with uncertainties regarding the legal status of these demobilised forces, and the OAS announced that it would be doubling the size of its observer mission as the result of the appearance of 22 new paramilitary groups with more than 2,500 members⁸. At the same time, several international organisations warned of the increased risk to the civilian population, while UNHCR warned of the risk of the extinction of some of the oldest and smallest indigenous communities as a result of the armed conflict. Elsewhere, while the **ELN continued its exploratory peace talks with the government** in the context of a *de facto* cessation of hostilities, the **FARC continued to assassinate politicians** (councillors), **lay ambushes for the armed forces** (particularly in the Sierra de la Macarena) and **harass the civilian population**. In the Arauca region (on the border with Venezuela), the **historical rivalry between the two groups led to serious open confrontations**. As far as the government's own forces are concerned, particular mention should be made of the violent repression of thousands of indigenous demonstrators at the Social Summit and the as yet unexplained killing of 10 members of the judicial police (DIJIN) by the army during the course of an anti-drugs operation.

Asia and the Pacific

Table 1.3. Evolution of armed conflicts in Asia

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 2nd quarter of 2006
Afghanistan (2001-)*	Government, international coalition (led by the USA), Taliban militias and various groups	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power and ethnic manipulation	Increase in hostilities
India (Assam) (1989-)	Government, ULFA, BJF, NDFB	Autonomy v. independence and control over economic resources	Stalemate
India (Jammu and	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-	Autonomy v. independence and	Increase in

⁸ See the chapter on disarmament.



Kashmir (1989-)	Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	religious manipulation	hostilities
Nepal (1996-)	Government, CPN	Control of political power and democratic fragility	Reduction
Philippines (1969-)	Government, NPA	Struggle for power and democratic fragility	Increase in hostilities
Philippines (1978-)	Government, MILF	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Temporary suspension of hostilities
Philippines (1991-)	Government, Abu Sayyaf	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Stalemate
Sri Lanka (1989-)	Government, LTTE	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation	Increase in hostilities
Thailand (2004-)	Government, Muslim community militias	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation	Stalemate

* The current phase of the armed conflict in this country began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has actually been in a state of armed conflict since 1979.

a) South Asia

In **Afghanistan**, this quarter saw two of the **most serious incidents reported in the country** since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. In the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, fighting between members of the Taliban militias and the Afghan police left more than 100 people dead. A further 45 were detained after the Taliban launched an offensive against the security forces. The second incident occurred in the province of Kandahar, where 16 civilians and 60 Taliban were killed as the result of bombardment by US armed forces. Serious disturbances were also reported in Kabul during a protest against the present of American forces in the country. Official sources indicated that, as a consequence of these latest incidents, **more than 3,000 people had been forced to leave their homes**. Elsewhere, **NATO troops have begun their expansion towards the south**, a part of the country that is particularly affected by the violence and where state control is practically non-existent. **Control of the mission was handed over to British armed forces**.

The challenges facing NATO as it expands towards the south of Afghanistan

The members of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) will expand into the country's southern regions over the next three months. The provinces of Helmand, Zabul, Uruzgan and Kandahar have been particularly affected by the violence, and state control in these regions is practically non-existent, in spite of the fact that five years have now passed since the fall of the Taliban regime. The North Atlantic Alliance is planning to double the number of troops in these regions from 3,000 to 6,000, in an attempt to guarantee security and stability in the south. Although it is true that, until now, international troops had not been stationed in three of these four provinces (Kandahar was the exception, with 3,000 US troop), for some international analysts, such as the organisation Swiss Peace, NATO's expansion towards the south is likely to lead to an increase in tensions and violence. To date, the Taliban offensive has resulted in the deaths of 400 Afghans since the middle of May. As it gradually moves into the south of the country, ISAF will have to face up to serious threats which, though originating from different sources, are united in their attempts to create instability. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) has indicated⁹, ISAF will have to deal with drug producers and traffickers, warlords, local insurgents and groups linked with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. They will also have to find a way of understanding tribal rivalries, which are particularly rife in the south, if they are to avoid further aggravating existing tensions.

In **India**, the two persisting contexts of violence evolved in different ways. In the **state of Assam**, events were marked by the holding of **parliamentary elections**. In general, the process passed off in a climate of stability, though several episodes of violence were reported during the second phase of the elections in the region inhabited by the Minority Bodo people. Staying in Assam, the government and armed opposition groups in the region were successful in their attempts to find more common ground. The Indian government and the NDFB extended their ceasefire agreement for a further six months, while the facilitator for the ULFA armed opposition group, R. M. Goswami, called on the government to bring an end to military operations and declare a ceasefire as quickly as possible. On the other hand, in the **state of Kashmir**, the agreement between Indian Prime Minister M. Singh and the APHC (coalition of

⁹<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4108&l=1>



independence parties) to establish a system that would allow for the **discussion of potential solutions to the disputes over the region** coincided with one of the **most violent episodes seen in recent years**, after 35 Hindus died as the result of an attack perpetrated by the armed independence group. In addition, a number of violent episodes in Srinagar (the state capital) left around twenty people dead and dozens injured, including a number of civilians.

In **Sri Lanka**, the events of the last three months were marked by a **rising tide of violence** that left several hundred people dead. Although Norway redoubled its diplomatic efforts, it was unable to reduce the level of violence in the north and east of the island, which saw repeated **bomb attacks and anti-personnel mine explosions** that forced around 40,000 people out of their homes. The mission charged with monitoring the ceasefire agreement (SLMM) also denounced the lack of security and indicated that the situation in which the country now found itself could be classified as a low-intensity war. The most serious incident occurred at the end of June, when an attack on a bus attributed to the LTTE armed opposition group killed more than sixty people, with government armed forces responding by bombing territory controlled by the LTTE. Against this background, the main donors (the USA, Japan, Norway and the EU) called on both sides to bring an end to the rising spiral of violence. They called on the LTTE to return to the negotiating process (from which it had decided to withdraw indefinitely) and renounce armed action, while at the same time urging the government to attend to the grievances of the Tamil population.

Following a month of intense social protests against the authoritarian regime of King Gyanendra in April, the **Nepalese parliament held its first session for four years in May. It had originally been suspended by the King, but he ordered it to sit once again at the end of April, unable to resist the pressure from the people**. Military pressure from the Maoist armed opposition group, the CPN, was combined with large demonstrations organised by the democratic opposition, which brought hundreds of thousands of people onto the streets in the country's main cities to protest against the dictatorial regime imposed by the King, who perpetrated a coup d'état more than a year ago. Acts of violence and confrontations between the country's armed forces and the CPN were suspended at the beginning of April. The leader of the Nepalese Congress (the country's main political party), G. P. Koirala, was appointed Prime Minister, a post he had already held on several occasions, and a new government was formed that included four of the seven democratic parties that had led opposition against the regime. These parties called off their protests against the King following the announcement of the restoration of parliament, and at the beginning of May the new government announced **an indefinite ceasefire**. Subsequently, the **government and the CPN reached an agreement¹⁰ aimed at bringing the armed conflict to an end**.

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

In the **Philippines**, events associated with the main theatres of conflict developed in different ways. The **NPA** armed opposition group **signalled its intention to increase its attacks against mining companies** in reaction to the move by G. Macapagal Arroyo's government to offer incentives for the exploitation of the country's mineral resources in order to solve its delicate financial problems. Tensions also rose in this region due both to intense fighting between government armed forces and the NPA and the **murder of a prominent former member of the Communist Party, S. Llamas**, one of 52 people accused of having orchestrated the alleged coup d'état against the President. Elsewhere, the police announced that they had killed two members of the **Abu Sayyaf** armed opposition group, an organisation that supposedly maintains close links with al-Qaeda. Finally, **peace talks resumed in Malaysia between the Philippine government and the MILF armed opposition group¹¹**.

In **Thailand**, the persisting violence in the country's three southern provinces was accompanied by a worsening of the political crisis that has affected the country since February. Thousands of people turned out to **demonstrate once again in Bangkok**, calling for an end to the crisis. This eventually forced the resignation of Prime Minister T. Shinawatra, who called an election and

¹⁰ See the chapter on peace processes.

¹¹ See the chapter on peace processes.



succeeded in returning with the largest share of the vote (56%) in April. However, the elections were boycotted by the opposition and subsequently **annulled by the Constitutional Court**. The holding of these elections was also not enough to prevent the mass protests, and **T. Shinawatra was once again forced to resign**. As a consequence, the government announced that **new general elections will be held on the coming 15 October**. As regards the violence affecting the south of the country, the government once again extended the **state of emergency** in the region at the end of April (it has so far been renewed every three months), due to persistent attacks on both the civilian population and the security forces which have left more than 1,300 people dead since January 2004. The last three months saw an increase in the number of attempts to kidnap teachers, one of the groups that has suffered most from the violence in the south of the country, leading to the closure of a large number of schools. Positive developments during the last quarter included the creation of a political party by Muslim academics in the south and calls from the National Commission for Reconciliation for justice and reconciliation to be given priority over the military response.

Europe

Table 1.4. Evolution of armed conflicts in Europe and the Middle East

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 2nd quarter of 2006
Russian Federation (Chechnya) (1991-)	Russian Government, pro-Russian regional government, Chechen armed opposition groups	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate

The conflict in the republic of **Chechnya** (Russian Federation) was marked by the death in mid-June of the President of the separatist Chechen government, A. Sadulayev, who died at the hands of Russian security forces, as his predecessor A. Maskhadov had done a year earlier. The resistance named Commander D. Umarov as his successor. In this connection, and in contrast to the attempts by Moscow to conceal the conflict and harm the legitimacy of separatist demands by reducing them to their most violent form of expression, international observers estimate that, to date, **more than 100,000 civilians, soldiers and insurgents have lost their lives during the last twenty years as a result of this conflict**. In addition, 57 bodies were found in a park in the capital, Grozny, in an unmarked mass grave. According to the Chechen authorities, these were victims of the armed fighting in 1999 or 2000. During the last three months the Russian government has threatened to **close Chechen refugee** camps, claiming that they have become the focus of violence, crime and drugs. The government made its announcement in spite of the fact that at the beginning of March the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, A. Guterres, had held meetings with Chechen leaders and assured refugees that they should not be forced to abandon the camps.

Chechnya, an overview of the separatist groups

In recent years, Chechen separatists have divided themselves up into a number of groups, depending on their political and religious leanings. The Institute for War, Peace and Reporting (IWPR) in London and its specialist in the region, T. de Waal, have identified **three main factions**.

The first and most extreme group is dominated by **Islamic radicals** and has carried out a number of group kidnappings and attacks on the Russian civilian population in recent years. Although this group receives funds and support from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, there isn't sufficient evidence, according to the IWPR, to link these Chechen Islamists with al-Qaeda, as Russian President V. Putin has claimed in his attempts to paint the Russian military campaign in Chechnya as part of the war on terror.

At the other end of the spectrum are the so-called **moderate Chechen separatists**, led until recently by A. Maskhadov, who was elected President of Chechnya in 1997. Although they have not renounced arms, they are principally seeking to gain independence by political means. Their influence would seem to be waning however. On the one hand, the majority of resources sent to help the Chechen cause from abroad ends up with the more radical groups. On the other, Russia's refusal for years to hold any kind of talks with A. Maskhadov unless he renounced his claim for self-determination also weakened his position. Furthermore, a few months ago Moscow eradicated A. Maskhadov along with one of his Chechen commanders, A. Avdorkhanov, who also represented the moderate side of the Chechen opposition. This



extrajudicial execution was part of Moscow's strategy aimed at silencing the sectors that are open to dialogue in order to eliminate any kind of legitimacy for Chechen claims and reduce the opposition to its most violent and extremist form.

The third and final group, which sits mid-way between the moderates and the Islamic radicals, is the group led by S. Basayev, a very popular Chechen commander who is currently the Republic's Prime Minister and number two in the political and military structure opposing the occupation. This group is marked by a political though non-religious radicalism, though it is opposed to kidnappings and attacks on Russian civilians.

Middle East

Table 1.5. Evolution of armed conflicts in the Middle East

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 2nd quarter of 2006
Iraq (2003-)	Transitional Government, US/United Kingdom coalition, internal and external armed opposition groups	Struggle for political power and opposition to the presence of foreign troops, access to oil resources and US military strategy	Increase in hostilities
Israel – Palestine (2000, 2 nd Intifada-) ¹²	Israeli Government, settlement militias, PNA government, armed wings of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organisations, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP, DFLP	Occupation, colonisation and control over land, religious manipulation, security problems and political recognition	Increase in hostilities

Turning to the conflict between **Israel and Palestine**, the **capture of an Israeli soldier** by the armed wing of Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees and the Army of Islam (which demanded the release of around a thousand Palestinian prisoners as the price of his return) resulted in a **hard-line response from the Israelis at the end of June, with an aerial and ground offensive in the Gaza strip**, the detention of more than 80 members of Hamas, including high-ranking government officials, and the destruction of a number of infrastructure items. Earlier there had been an **upsurge in violence in Gaza between Hamas and Fatah militias in a dispute over power and control of the security forces**. This fighting threatened to turn into a full-scale civil war which could have disastrous consequences, given the current **humanitarian and financial crisis** affecting both the Palestinian Authority and its people, a situation that is exacerbated by the economic blockade imposed by the international community to try to force Hamas to recognise the state of Israel. In an attempt to alleviate the situation, Palestinian President M. Abbas arranged a national dialogue between the various rival Palestinian factions, a process that also included civilian groups¹³, and an agreement was reached that could be interpreted as an implicit acknowledgement of the state of Israel. At the same time, Israel completed half of the 670 km of its separation wall ahead of schedule (of the total amount planned, three quarters cuts into the West Bank, going beyond the Green Line). It also made a number of incursions in the north of Gaza in order to stop rockets being launched from the area by Palestinian militias, leaving several civilians dead. These events, coupled with another extrajudicial execution of two Hamas militants by Israel, caused the Palestinian organisation in June to **end the self-imposed ceasefire that had been in place for 16 months**.

Iraq suffered worsening levels of violence. In March and April alone, a number of violent incidents left **2,500 people dead and forced more than 85,000 to flee their homes**. Sectarian violence and fighting between rival factions even led to a state of emergency being called in Basra, an area considered until now to be one of the most stable in the country. In this connection, **human rights in Iraq are still being seriously abused**. Around 20,000 people, half of them women and children, have been kidnapped since the beginning of the year according to a study carried out by several local NGOs. Among the more serious incidents during the last quarter was the US bombing of a building in Ramadi in which 13 Iraqi civilians were killed and a further 21 injured, and the death of al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, A. M. al-Zarqawi,

¹² Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report only examines the most recent phase of the conflict relating to the 2nd Intifada, which began in September 2000.

¹³ See the chapter on peace processes.



assassinated by US armed forces. On the political front, the last three months saw the **appointment of a new Prime Minister, N. al-Maliki**, and the formation of a new government of national unity. **Talks** also began in an attempt to reach an agreement with certain **insurgent groups, in order to curb the violence**.

1.2. Other items of interest

The following are some of the more important issues to have been commented and reported on during the last three months in areas relating to armed conflicts.

a) Armed conflicts and natural resources

The **presence of abundant natural resources** like oil, diamonds, other kinds of minerals and precious stones, along with the cultivation of timber and drugs (coca, opium), **have helped encourage and sustain a number of armed conflicts**. A wealth of resources may also lead to the initiation of an armed conflict and cause it to be prolonged over time. In addition, competition for access to scarce resources like water or struggles to obtain ownership over land can also result in the emergence of situations of violence and confrontation.

In the case of the diamond trade, in an attempt to prevent the exploitation of these precious stones from being used to finance armed conflicts, a consultation process was held in Kimberley (South Africa) in 2000. This culminated in the adoption of the Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme (KPCS) at a meeting in Interlaken, Switzerland, in November 2002. The KPCS established a fixed international framework for the individual national certification schemes operated by each participating state through their own domestic legislation. The KPCS was introduced in January 2003, and at the present time comprises 45 members, who together account for 99.8% of gross world diamond production. Almost half of all the diamonds produced around the world come from Africa, more specifically, central and southern Africa, though important finds have also been made in Canada, India, Russia, Brazil and Australia. By contrast, diamonds are mainly distributed and used in the West.

After the KPCS had been in operation for three years, the organisation Global Witness (GW) carried out an audit of the way the trade in diamonds had evolved in regions immersed in conflict, referring to them as "blood diamonds". The organisation found that although the Certificate Scheme had helped to contain the trade in blood diamonds, millions of dollars in profits are still being generated from the illegal trade in the stones, perpetuating numerous human rights violations. The organisation stressed that many producer countries had not implemented the measures required in order to comply with the Scheme throughout all stages of the trading and distribution of diamonds, in spite of the fact that they had formally undertaken to do so. Furthermore, the diamond industry has also made no progress in establishing mechanisms for self-regulation. Between 4 and 14% of the diamonds placed on the world markets come from African countries that are currently embroiled in armed conflicts, according to an interesting study that was recently published¹⁴.

Table 1.6. African countries involved in armed conflicts or situations of tension in which blood diamonds have been found since the 1990s

Angola Central African Republic Congo	Congo, DR Côte d'Ivoire Guinea	Liberia Mali Sierra Leone Zimbabwe
---	--	---

The countries shown in bold are currently engaged in armed conflicts

b) The dependent independents

¹⁴ Zoellner, T., *The Heartless Stone: A Journey Through the World of Diamonds, Deceit and Desire*, St. Martin's Press, May 2006




The recent outbreak of violence in Timor-Leste, Montenegro's move to independence via a referendum, the Vienna talks on the definitive status of Kosovo, the negotiations on the ancestral lands of the Moro people in Mindanao (Philippines), the resurgence of secessionist demands and the reopening of the conflict resolution process in Abkhazia (Georgia), the increased tensions in another *de facto* independent republic in the Caucasus, South Ossetia, and the rising violence and deteriorating peace process in Sri Lanka, are all events that have arisen during the last three months and that make it worth taking a while to reflect on the common space in which the territorial aspirations of many armed groups come into conflict with the efforts of both individual states and the international community as a whole to maintain the *status quo*.

Firstly, it should be emphasised that **organised political violence of a secessionist nature has hardly made any inroads into the territorial integrity and inviolable borders by which the international system is defined**. As acknowledged in the report entitled "Peace and Conflict 2005"¹⁵, during the last 40 years only five internationally recognised states have actually emerged as a more or less direct consequence of armed independence movements: Bangladesh (1971), Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), Eritrea (1993) and Timor-Leste (2002). To these we should add other *de facto* independent political entities such as Somaliland and Puntland in Somalia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Trans-Dniester in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Kosovo in Serbia. Indeed, the modification of international borders and the emergence of new states during the 20th century was not so much linked to the numerous armed movements that fought for self-determination over the course of 100 years or so but instead resulted from the major events that occurred during the century: the First World War (and the end of the great central European, Russian and Ottoman empires), the Second World War (which ushered in the beginning of the decolonisation period) and the end of the Cold War (the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). It has therefore been war on a global scale (and not domestic or regional conflict) that has led to the maps being redrawn.

Secondly, the **international system would seem to be ready to guarantee the *status quo* that emerged following the end of the Cold War with very few modifications**. Firstly because, as can be seen in the following graph, conflicts seeking self-determination began to fall sharply from the second half of the 1990s onwards, though this has not meant that the armed conflicts being fought on the two fronts of autonomy and independence have not continued to represent the most frequently seen form of contemporary organised violence. Secondly, and more importantly, because the international system would seem to have found a formula for accommodating the demands of secessionist armed groups without risking the inviolability of its borders, i.e. autonomy and other ways of redistributing sovereignty internally that will guarantee these groups greater levels of self-government and improved protection for their interests or rights without resorting to the separation of their territory. Experiments in this type of institutional arrangement can be found in some of the main peace agreements signed during the last year and a half: Sudan (north-south), Indonesia (Aceh) and Iraq (not as the result of a peace agreement but through inclusion in the country's Constitution) during 2005, and Sudan again (Darfur) and in all probability the Philippines (Mindanao) in 2006. Judging by recent developments in the way that armed conflicts involving territorial aspirations have been handled, it would therefore appear that autonomy (and its various federal and decentralising alternatives) has become consolidated as an acceptable compromise option for the opposing parties. Individual states would seem to have accepted that autonomy is not necessarily the precursor to independence, nor does it generally result in a domino or Balkanisation effect. For their part, the armed groups that have for decades fought for the establishment of their own state would seem now to be willing to relax their aspirations towards independence in favour of systems that allow them to express their differences and enjoy their own resources within the framework of the existing state.

¹⁵ <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC05print.pdf>

**Graph 1.1. Evolution of armed conflicts seeking self-determination (1956-2004)**

Source: From "Peace and Conflict 2005"

The third and final reflection relates to the fragility (institutional, political, economic and social) that tends to accompany the kind of independence or near independence that has been seen since the 1990s, and the debate on the role that the international community ought to play in the transition process. The case of Timor-Leste, the world's "youngest" country if we leave aside Montenegro, would seem to be a relevant subject in this regard, though the cases mentioned above (Somaliland, Puntland, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester, Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo) also invite reflection on the viability of political entities that have the powers and competences of an individual state but no international recognition. Such entities also tend to suffer from important tensions with the states from which they originated or some of their other neighbours, causing them difficulties that add to the problems caused by their sometimes indeterminate political status in terms of international law.

In the case of Timor-Leste, although no official conclusion has yet been reached regarding the reasons behind the sudden and unexpected outbreak of violence that led to the enforced displacement of almost one tenth of the population, all the signs would seem to point more towards the country's institutional weakness (particularly among the state security forces) and its precarious economic situation (Timor-Leste is the poorest country in Asia) than to any internal power struggle among the governing parties. This being the case, four years on from its entry to the world states club and seven years after the dramatic referendum that made this possible, Timor-Leste would seem to have gained an independence that is more formal than substantive, lacking any control over the main resources on which the viability of an independent nation rests. As far as security is concerned (at least in the short term), it depends on the 2,000 troops from Australia, Malaysia, Portugal and New Zealand that have just deployed around the country, and on the decision of the Indonesian army not to continue allowing militias to filter across the western Timorese border. On a political and institutional level, it depends on the forthcoming restructuring and expansion of the United Nations mission and its effectiveness in assisting the country in its institutional duties and the successful holding of elections next year. As regards the economic situation, it is almost entirely dependent on Australia's "generosity" in the bilateral talks on the exploitation of the huge hydrocarbon reserves under the Timorese Sea, which are claimed by both sides. This would seem to be too much dependence for a country that calls itself, and wants to be, independent.




Situations of tension and high-risk dispute¹

- Since violence broke out in the Central African Republic it has been reported that around 100,000 people have been forcibly displaced, 45,000 of them fleeing as refugees to Chad.
- Former Liberian President C. Taylor was sent to the Hague to be tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
- The expulsion of one third of the members of the armed forces in Timor-Leste led to an outbreak of violence that left around 40 people dead and a further 130,000 displaced.
- The government of Uzbekistan forced the UNHCR to close its offices in the country, in spite of the fact that more than 1,800 refugees remain on Uzbek soil.
- A United Nations resolution called on Syria to stem the flow of weapons into Lebanon and urged both countries to re-establish diplomatic relations and define their common border.

This section contains a detailed analysis of **25 situations of extreme tension** in which events that are notable for their particular seriousness have taken place during the last three months. It also refers to a further **33 contexts in which tensions have not been especially pronounced during this period**.

Graph 2.1. Geographical distribution of situations of tension



Of the 25 contexts of extreme tension listed in the following table, twelve are in Africa, four in Latin America and the Caribbean, two in Asia, three in Europe and Central Asia, and finally four in the Middle East.

2.1. Evolution of situations of tension

Chart 2.1. Contexts of extreme tension during the last three months

Africa	America	Central Asia and the Caucasus
Chad – Sudan	Nigeria (north and centre)	Bolivia
Central African Republic	Great Lakes Region (DR Congo –Burundi – Rwanda –Uganda)	Ecuador
Eritrea and Ethiopia	Sudan (SPLA)	Haiti
Ethiopia	Zimbabwe	Peru
Guinea		Asia
Guinea Bissau		Pakistan
Liberia		Timor - Leste
Mali		

¹ Contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political tension and polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the State, which involve alterations in the operation of the State's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and states of emergency), and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. In some areas there is a strong possibility that a situation of armed conflict will emerge. Moreover, these tensions may not occur within the geographical territory of the State in question, but the extent to which the State's own interests or stability are directly affected is taken into account, as well as the fact that these tensions may lead to specific attacks on the territory of another country. Finally, any areas currently experiencing serious difficulties in implementing peace agreements (in the event that they exist) are also included.



Africa

a) Southern Africa

Country	Main causes
Zimbabwe	Democratic fragility (political and economic crisis)

In **Zimbabwe** the last three months have been marked by the emergence of a **campaign of civil disobedience** promoted by the faction of the main opposition party (**MDC**) led by M. Tsvangirai. This faction also issued an **ultimatum to the government** of R. Mugabe, calling among other things for the drawing up of a new Constitution and the holding of free elections. Faced with the threat of a wave of **demonstrations**, the army warned that it was ready to put down any protest, an announcement that many commentators saw as confirming growing fears about the **country's militarization**. As well as prohibiting the activities of certain international humanitarian organisations, **Zimbabwe has once again been accused of serious human rights violations** and of carrying out arbitrary detentions in some parts of the country.

b) West Africa

Country	Main causes
Guinea	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability), problems of governance
Guinea Bissau	Autonomy v. Independence, search for border security
Liberia	Control of natural resources, ethnic manipulation and struggle for political power, impact of regional crises
Mali	Demand for greater autonomy, marginalisation of minority groups
Nigeria (north and centre)	Control of natural resources and religious manipulation

In **Guinea Bissau**, fighting continued along the border with Senegal between **Guinean armed forces and one faction of the MFDC**, a Senegalese armed secessionist group seeking independence for the Casamance region. The Guinean government called on the armed group to halt its activities in the region and announced that the army had succeeded in expelling the MFDC from Guinean territory. Elsewhere, **the North and South factions of the armed Casamance group were involved in several outbreaks of fighting** on the Gambian border, over control of the northern part of the region. These two groups emerged from the split suffered by the MFDC following the signing of the peace agreements with the Senegalese government in December 2004, when several of the group's members refused to comply with the points that had been agreed.

A new context of tension that has emerged during the last three months is that of **Mali**, where the status of **Tuareg rebels** once again came to the fore when a group of dissidents critical of the peace agreement signed with the government in 1998 **violently overran the northern towns of Kidal and Menaka**, claiming greater autonomy and increased investment in the region's development. Four members of the Malian armed forces died in the clashes, while the rebels captured weapons and then fled towards the mountains. The **Malian government announced that it was willing to negotiate with the rebels**, naming **Algeria as mediator** and making the handover of the Tuareg group's weapons a prerequisite for the negotiations.

This instability once again threatened the government of **Guinea**, where the country's largest unions called an **indefinite general strike** which was massively supported in Conakry and the main cities in Guinea. Student demonstrations were put down heavily by the police, leaving around **15 people dead** in the clashes that occurred in the capital. The strike was called in order to demand an increase in civil servants' salaries and a fall in the price of rice and fuel. The ICG also warned of the **growing risk of a coup d'état in the country**, due to the illness of the current President, L. Conté.

Liberia continued to make progress in the areas of peace-building and post-war rehabilitation. There were however new outbreaks of tension when **groups of former combatants occupied**



rubber plantations, threatening the security of nearby towns and impeding the work of humanitarian organisations in the region. UNMIL pointed to the importance of neutralising the resources that these soldiers exploit in order to achieve stability in the region. The illegal trafficking of timber and diamonds is the fuel that has fed war in the country for years. The United Nations warned about the use of **private security companies to control the plantations, as they were making illegal detentions** without any involvement from state security forces. Tensions increased in the north of the country with the return of the internally displaced to their original communities, and a number of attacks **against returning Mandinga by members of the Mano tribe** were reported in Nimba county. These groups have been in conflict since the beginning of the war in 1989, when **they divided up into supporters and detractors of C. Taylor**. Elsewhere, former Liberian President **C. Taylor was moved to the ICC in the Hague** to be tried for the war crimes and crimes against humanity that he is charged with in Sierra Leone. The decision was made **with the approval of the UN Security Council**, which regarded the presence of the former leader as a potentially destabilising influence on the **Manu River Region**.

Finally, the number of disputes over the control of land and resources in central and northern parts of **Nigeria** have increased over the last three months. **A state of emergency was declared in Plateau** (central Nigeria) following **the fighting that broke out between the Gamai and Kwalla communities** in Namu, where, according to official sources, the violence left a total of **25 people dead (though local sources put the figure at 100)** and caused a further 1,300 to be displaced. Elsewhere, the long **border conflict that Nigeria and Cameroon have fought for years** over control of the Bakassi peninsula **ended with the signing of an agreement between the two countries, with support from the United Nations**. Under this agreement, **Nigeria agreed to withdraw its army from the region within 30 days** and return sovereignty over the peninsula's institutions to the Cameroonian government within the space of two years.

c) Horn of Africa

Country	Main causes
Eritrea and Ethiopia	Territorial disputes
Ethiopia	Democratic fragility and governance problems
Sudan (SPLA)	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation, control of resources

As far as tensions between **Eritrea and Ethiopia** are concerned, the UN Security Council decided to extend UNMEE's mandate for a second time in April and May, with the aim of forcing the parties to find some way forward at the meeting of the Border Commission, which was scheduled for London at the end of April but which ended up being postponed until mid-May. However, **the meeting, finally held on 18 and 19 May, failed to result in any advance on the issue of border demarcation**, and the Security Council therefore decided at the end of May to extend the mission's mandate until 30 September, though it reduced the maximum number of UNMEE troops to 2,300 given the failure to make any progress. The only positive note regarding this conflict was the holding of the 36th meeting of the Military Coordination Committee, which brings together military representatives from both countries and is the only forum for direct and frank dialogue aimed at encouraging mutual trust and preventing the scaling up of military forces along the border between the two countries.

The last three months also saw a **series of explosions in Ethiopia that left a number of people dead** and many injured. No-one claimed responsibility for the attacks, but they occurred at a time of persisting political tensions that erupted following the elections of May last year. At the same time, the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy, a coalition opposing the government of M. Zenawi, was formed in Holland at the end of May. Political tensions in the country became even more evident when members of the main opposition party, the CUD, abandoned parliament following the government's decision to appoint an authority to run the capital, since the opposition party had gained 137 of the 138 seats on Addis Ababa city council during last year's elections. Nevertheless, the arrest and trial for treason of a number of the party's leaders meant that many of them did not take up their posts, thus delaying the appointment of a new mayor by the CUD. The trials of 111 members of opposition parties are still ongoing.



Away from the violent conflict in the Darfur region, Sudan continues to endure two situations of tension. Although peace negotiations have progressed in the country², significant disturbances were reported in the south, leading to continued fears over the fragile rehabilitation process. The fighting reported between factions of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) in mid-April left at least 15 people dead, 11 of them civilians. The SSDF, which backed the Khartoum government during the 22 years of armed fighting in the south of Sudan, continues to suffer internal disputes over its incorporation into the SPLM/A army. While the faction led by P. Matip supports the agreement over incorporation signed between the two sides in January of this year, the faction led by G. Kong still opposes the decision. There were also a number of attacks on farming communities in the town of Akobo (**Upper Nile state**) which left at least 13 dead. Mention should also be made of the report published by the Ugandan authorities, in which it was announced that the accident that claimed the life of the historic leader of the SPLA and then Vice President of the transitional government, **J. Garang**, in August 2005, was due to pilot error. The report dismissed the theory that the governments in Khartoum or Kampala had anything to do with his death.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Country	Main causes
Chad - Sudan	Reciprocal allegations of support for armed opposition groups
Central African Republic	Democratic fragility, problems of governance
Great Lakes region (DR Congo – Burundi – Rwanda – Uganda)	Control of natural resources, search for border security

Turning to **Chad**, the last three months saw a serious deterioration in the climate of violence and insecurity³. This situation is directly linked with the worsening relations with neighbouring **Sudan**. In spite of the agreement brokered by Libya in February, aimed at improving relations between the two countries, **Chad continued to allege that Sudan was behind the armed rebellion currently affecting the country**. The AU sent an exploratory mission to clarify the situation, although information coming from various sources within the armed groups themselves would seem to confirm the thesis. In addition, there was a marked increase in incursions and **attacks by Sudanese pro-government militias on towns and camps for displaced people and refugees in the east of Chad**, causing a serious deterioration in the situation. This in turn led humanitarian organisations to reduce their presence in the region, as they were left unprotected after Chadian forces moved to the country's interior to counter attacks by armed opposition groups. Chad has asked the international community to intervene.

In the **Central African Republic**, the last three months have been marked by a persisting climate of violence and insecurity in north-eastern parts of the country, which originally emerged in June 2005 and worsened at the beginning of this year. Attacks on the civilian population by armed groups operating in the area and operations by government armed forces trying to control the situation have so far led to the **enforced displacement of around 100,000 people, 45,000 of whom have sought refuge in neighbouring Chad**. Information coming from the refugee population accuses both government armed forces and armed opposition groups of carrying out systematic attacks on towns and perpetrating serious human rights violations. A contingent from CEMAC travelled to the region to support the government's armed forces. For its part, the government decided on 14 April to close its border with Sudan in protest against Sudan's support for the rebel offensive in Chad, since the forces that attacked the Chadian capital originally came from Sudan and passed through CAR territory on its way to N'Djamena. As a result of these events, around 3,000 people demonstrated in Bangui in protest against the upsurge in violence and the poor quality of governance in the country.

Turning to the situation in the **Great Lakes** region, no progress was made in respect of the proposed disarmament and return of members of the Rwandan FDLR armed opposition group following the Rome declaration of March 2005. Meanwhile, fighting continued between the FDLR and Congolese armed forces supported by MONUC, while FDLR leader I. Murwanashyaka was detained and then subsequently released in Germany. The Foreign Ministers of **Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda** called on the United Nations and the

² See the chapter on peace processes.

³ This situation will be analysed in the chapter on armed conflicts.



AU to impose sanctions on the leaders of the various armed opposition groups in the region that represent a permanent threat to stability: the Ugandan LRA, the Rwandan FDLR and the Burundian FNL. **Rwanda stressed the improved security situation along its border with DR Congo, which represents a step forward in relations between the two countries.** For its part, Uganda proposed the creation of a regional mechanism to deal with the LRA. However, **Ugandan armed forces were accused of crossing into Congolese territory in their pursuit of the LRA**, an event that led to protests from the Congolese and the despatch of a contingent of Congolese soldiers to supervise the border in the region. Uganda denied these reports and asked MONUC to intervene in order to end the group's activities or force it to return to Uganda.

America

a) North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Country	Main causes
Haiti	Political and economic breakdown and social polarisation

In **Haiti**, as President elect R. Préval took office and the new parliament and government occupied their seats, **the tensions reported over the previous year reduced considerably**. Nevertheless, human rights organisations continued to denounce, among other things, the **high death rates** (which once again attracted the attentions of the media as a result of the assassination of a number of political figures) and the treatment dished out by Dominican migration authorities to the many members of the Haitian community resident in the neighbouring country. **Hundreds of people demonstrated to demand the return of former President J. B. Aristide**, who has been living in exile in South Africa since the beginning of 2004 and who has raised speculation from some quarters that he may return to Haiti. The new President, who had already held the top job between 1996 and 2001, was also Prime Minister while J. B. Aristide was President. However, a number of international commentators advised the new Executive of the problems that might arise with J. B. Aristide's return to Haiti, as many accuse him of close links with some of the armed bands (*chimères*) operating in the country's main towns and cities, particularly Port-au-Prince.

b) South America

Country	Main causes
Bolivia	Governance problems
Ecuador	Governance problems
Peru	Governance problems

In **Bolivia**, the arrival in power of **E. Morales helped to diffuse many of the social protests** that had been reported during the previous year, though it also led to **demonstrations by different groups** (particularly in the Department of Cruz) who opposed some of the measures taken by the new executive, such as the **nationalisation of hydrocarbon resources** and the introduction of **agricultural reforms**. On this last point, some farming bosses implied that they might resort to force and create Land Defence Committees in order to prevent the redistribution of some 20 million hectares of land. As regards the nationalisation of hydrocarbon resources, several of the many energy companies operating in Bolivia, along with a number of governments, expressed their unease at the decisions taken in La Paz and the way the process had been implemented. Previously, during the month of April, **public transport** and **teaching** organisations held a number of separate **demonstrations** to demand improvements in their respective sectors. At the same time, the country's main union, the COB, urged its members to protest against the composition of the Constituent Assembly.

In **Ecuador**, some of the country's main indigenous organisations linked the government's decision to declare the contract held by US oil company OXY null and void with the **massive and prolonged civilian demonstrations** reported during the first three months of the year. These demonstrations had called for **OXY's expulsion** and the holding of a referendum on the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the USA. The US administration suspended the negotiating process for the treaty, saying that Quito's actions were an attack on their bilateral



investment treaty. The Ecuadorian government, which received the support of some of its counterparts in neighbouring countries, declared that the decision to intervene in the case of OXY, which was producing approximately 100,000 barrels a day in the Amazon, was strictly legal. Also in the Amazon, in the province of Pastaza, information once again began to emerge about the **alleged massacre of civilians as the result of fighting between logging companies and indigenous communities** opposed to the illegal removal of trees. The government admitted that there were high levels of violence in the region and announced its intention to deploy the army to restore security.

Peru experienced a slight increase in tensions as a result of the intense **electoral campaign** that brought former nationalist soldier O. Humala up against former **President A. García** and ended in victory for the latter. Two of the main points of friction in recent months were the repeated **accusations that O. Humala had committed human rights violations** during the armed conflict with *Sendero Luminoso*, and the alleged interference from Venezuelan President H. Chávez, which manifested itself in the reciprocal withdrawal of the countries' ambassadors and a series of disputes within the OAS. Elsewhere, there were continuing reports of **violent episodes in central parts of the country** (particularly the department of Ayacucho, the nerve centre of the armed conflict during the 1980s and 90s) between government armed forces and alleged members of *Sendero Luminoso*. It should be mentioned in this regard that a court handed down a 24-year prison sentence on the highest ranking leader of the group to be tried to date.

Asia

a) South Asia

Country	Main causes
Pakistan	Religious confrontation, the fight against terrorism

Turning to the situation in **Pakistan**, particular mention should be made of **the government's banning of the BLA armed opposition group** and its classification as a terrorist organisation. The armed group operates in the **Baluchistan** region and has been behind a number of violent episodes in the province. After it had been banned there were a number of different acts of protest in the province, and there were further attacks during the last three months in both Baluchistan and in **Waziristan**, the region bordering Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the government declared that it had the situation under control and repeated its announcements regarding the deaths of members of armed groups as a result of military operations carried out by its armed forces. Finally, a suicide attack in the city of Karachi claimed the lives of 60 people during the celebration of a religious festival in which tens of thousands of Sunnis were taking part.



b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Country	Main causes
Timor-Leste	Mass dismissal of members of the armed forces; economic disintegration and institutional fragility

In **Timor-Leste**, the **expulsion of almost 600 soldiers** from the armed forces (a third of the total) sparked an **outbreak in violence** in the country's capital during the end of March. This continued and gradually intensified over the course of the following months, with the involvement of armed bands and other groups with no obvious connection with the armed forces. According to UNOTIL, some **40 people have died and more than 130,000** (approximately one tenth of the country's population) have been forced to **abandon their homes**. UNOTIL also reported continuous acts of pillaging and looting and attacks on refugee camps. As a result of this situation, the UN Security Council unanimously extended UNOTIL's mandate and welcomed the **deployment** of a military contingent of some **2,000 members from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal**. The Secretary General also announced that an international mission could soon be deployed with the aim of re-establishing order and security, helping the country to hold the elections planned for next year and supporting the Timorese government in the reform of certain institutions and its state security forces. The exact cause of these events has not yet been fully established, and Dili has asked the United Nations to set up an investigating committee. However, some commentators pointed to the tensions between President X. Gusmao and Prime Minister M. Alkatiri, and were particularly critical of the way the latter had handled the crisis.

Europe and Central Asia

Central Asia and the Caucasus

Country	Main causes
Georgia	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, independence of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Kyrgyzstan	Democratic fragility, independence of the Ferghana Valley
Uzbekistan	Governance problems, independence of the Ferghana Valley

In the two contexts of tension in **Georgia** (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), issues such as the talks on the possible independence of Kosovo and the recent referendum in Montenegro would seem to have **impeded the Georgian government's efforts to defend a solution to the conflicts based on the reintegration of these territories**. In **Abkhazia**, the Conflict Resolution Board set up by Georgian President I. Alazana presented a peace plan that contemplated greater political autonomy for the region. This document was, however, rejected by the separatists, who furthermore reaffirmed their right to self-determination. Some weeks earlier, the Abkhaz government had put its own peace plan on the table, though this was received with little enthusiasm in Tbilisi. Given the need to encourage talks between both sides, the UN Security Council decided to **prolong UNOMIG's mandate until 15 October 2006**. In **South Ossetia**, the separatist authorities called for a new agreement on security guarantees after, according to their own representatives, the OSCE prevented an upsurge in violence in the region following the controversial detention of several people in South Ossetia due to irregularities in their visas. For its part, the Tbilisi government, which did not believe such an agreement to be necessary, announced a draft bill for the return of property to people affected by the conflict as a way of promoting peace.

The political situation in **Kyrgyzstan** deteriorated considerably during the course of the last three months. Thousands of people demonstrated for several weeks in Bishkek, the capital, demanding **greater judicial and constitutional reform in the country**. The protests were organised by the Coalition for Reform, which includes a total of 20 different political parties and NGOs that are unhappy with the way in which President K. Bakiev is running the government. Among other measures, demonstrators were demanding reforms to limit presidential powers (as promised during the elections of July 2005), changes that would grant greater authority to



parliament and the Prime Minister and provide active policies to eradicate corruption and crime in Kyrgyzstan. The protest organisers set 27 May as the deadline for President K. Bakiev to meet his electoral promises for greater democracy or resign. During this period, K. Bakiev also had to deal with a **serious crisis in his governing team**: 13 of the 17 members of the Baku government announced their intention to resign, a situation that further exacerbated the **climate of political instability**. Finally, the popular protests were partially successful as the President accepted the resignation of some of the members of the government that had been named by the opposition.

In **Uzbekistan**, a number of protests arose on the first anniversary of events in Andijan, in which Uzbek security forces mounted a charge against a group of civilians protesting about the poor economic situation, leaving **several hundred people dead and more than 400 displaced**. Members of the Uzbek opposition demonstrated in the capital, Tashkent, while groups of refugees held protests on the border with Kyrgyzstan, as well as in London, Moscow, New York, Kiev and Istanbul. The demonstrators complained that, one year on from these events, **nobody has yet been identified as responsible**. In addition, the **UNHCR office in Uzbekistan was forced to close its doors**, as demanded in the ultimatum issued by the Uzbek government on 20 March. The government document had called on the UN agency to halt its activities in the country before 17 April since, according to Tashkent, the UNHCR had completed its mission and there was therefore no obvious reason for it to continue operating in the country. The agency, which has been present in Uzbekistan for more than 13 years, continued to express its disagreement with this decision and **warned that 1,800 refugees still remain on Uzbek soil**.

Middle East

Country	Main causes
Egypt	Political and social tensions, repression
Iran	International pressure on nuclear policy, national reaffirmation
Israel - Lebanon - Syria ⁴	Territorial dispute, fragility of the Lebanese system and its historical protection by Syria, impact of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
Syria	Internal political tensions, international pressure

In **Egypt**, tensions increased over the course of the last three months for a number of reasons. Firstly, the **condemnation of several judges who had complained about fraud during the recent elections** resulted in a number of protests in favour of an independent judiciary. Secondly, the continuing operations to **arrest dozens of members of the Muslim Brotherhood** were seen as yet another attempt by H. Mubarak's regime to silence any opposition. At the same time, the **religious violence between Muslims and Copts** saw a further upsurge in mid-April, leading to attacks on religious centres that left some people dead. Finally, the **attacks on the Sinai peninsula** on 24 April, in the tourist area of Daha, left 20 people dead. These attacks led to the extension of the state of emergency (which has been in force since 1981) throughout the country and an operation to seek out and capture those responsible. As a result, six people classified by the authorities as terrorists died at the hands of the security forces in May.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that **Iran** had succeeded in enriching uranium and that the country had disregarded the 28 April deadline imposed by the UN Security Council to halt this process. From that point on, the already tense stand-off between Teheran and the international community led by the USA and the EU3 (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) continued to intensify, though with opposition from Russia and China. While **Iran continued to insist that its nuclear programme was being developed for peaceful purposes, the USA and Europe still feared that the country was developing a clandestine atomic weapons programme**. In this context, international threats of sanctions were answered by Iranian threats to attack US interests in all parts of the world, until the **EU announced an offer of incentives to Iran to drop its uranium enrichment programme**. This offer, backed by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, proposed offering

⁴ From here onwards, tensions that spring from the relationship between two or three of these countries (Israel, Lebanon, Syria) will be examined jointly in order to provide a better analysis of the situation, given their clearly interdependent nature.



Iran access to nuclear technology and aeroplane components, as well as inviting the country to join the WTO. In mid-June, Iranian President M. Ahmadinejad said that the offer was a step forward. Meanwhile, IAEA Director M. El-Baradei warned of the need to tread carefully in order to avoid the same mistakes that had been made with Iraq and DPR Korea.

In **Lebanon**, the celebration in May of the sixth anniversary of the withdrawal of the **Israeli** army from the south of the country was marked by the most **violent cross-border incidents** seen in recent years, ending in a number of people dying under fire from Israeli forces, among them the leader of Islamic Jihad in Lebanon and a number of Hezbollah guerrillas. Meanwhile, on an internal level, Lebanon remained immersed in a number of attempts, so far unsuccessful, to engage in a national dialogue that would allow consensus to be reached regarding the fate of pro-Syrian President E. Lahoud and the disarmament of Hezbollah. In this connection, a **UN resolution called on Syria to reduce the flow of arms to Lebanon and urged the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the definition of their common border**, which covers some 250 km. However, Syria made any border agreement conditional upon Israel's withdrawal from the Sheba Farms region. Elsewhere, the United Nations investigation into Syrian involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister R. Hariri continued, and the organisation described the cooperation offered by Syrian President B. al-Assad as positive, asking for a further year to continue its investigation. As far as internal politics in **Syria** are concerned, a **recently created opposition group in exile**, which includes, among others, one of the country's former Presidents, A. H. Khaddam, and various members of the Muslim Brotherhood, denounced the government as corrupt and dictatorial and **stated its intention to create a democratic and modern state**. The regime itself reported an armed attack in Damascus which the official media attributed to supporters of the USA and Israel in the region.

Chart 2.2. Evolution over the last three months of other situations of tension		
Country	Main causes	Evolution
Africa		
Angola	Political violence, social frustration	Reduction
Angola (Cabinda)	Autonomy v. Independence	Stalemate
Congo	Political control over different ethnic groups and democratic fragility	Stalemate
Equatorial Guinea	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)	Stalemate
Ethiopia (Gambella)	Demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Stalemate
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Manu River region (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone)⁵	Widespread destabilisation due to enforced displacement and the flow of weapons and mercenaries	Reduction
Mauritania	Democratic fragility	Stalemate
Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)	Territorial disputes	Stalemate
Sudan (East)	Marginalisation of the region	Improvement
Tanzania (Zanzibar)	Struggle for political power	Reduction
Uganda-Kenya (Karamoja-Turkana)	Governance, regional marginalisation, inter-community confrontations over natural resources	Stalemate
America		
Guatemala	Political and historical exclusion, social injustice, failure to comply with peace agreements, impunity and organised crime	Stalemate
Mexico (Chiapas)	Exclusion and economic inequalities	Stalemate
Venezuela	Problems of governance	Stalemate
Asia		
India-Pakistan	Territorial disputes	Reduction
India (Tripura)	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Indonesia (Moluccas)	Religious differences, democratic colonisation, autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Indonesia (Sulawesi)	Religious differences, democratic colonisation	Stalemate

⁵ The Manu River region covers Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire is also taken into account here, given its proximity and its influence on the surrounding area. The situation of tension between the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso will also be analysed within the framework of this region.



Indonesia (West Papua)	Autonomy v. independence, religious disputes, demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Stalemate
Myanmar	Democratic fragility and ethnic confrontations	Increase in tensions
Europe and Central Asia		
Armenia	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Reduction
Azerbaijan	Inequality in the distribution of resources, democratic fragility	Stalemate
Belarus	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Kazakhstan	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Moldova, Rep.	Democratic fragility, independence of the Dniester region	Stalemate
Serbia and Montenegro	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power	Reduction
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)	Autonomy v. Independence	Stalemate
Tajikistan	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Turkey	Political and social tensions, autonomy v. independence in Kurdistan	Increase in tensions
Turkmenistan	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Ukraine	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Increase
Middle East		
Yemen	Struggle for political power	Stalemate

2.2. Other issues of interest

Preventing genocide: new instruments for new challenges

The **1994 genocide in Rwanda**, in which almost a million people died, marks a **before and after** point in respect of several issues: international intervention, humanitarian action, the principle of non-interference, collective responsibility to provide protection and conflict prevention. The tenth anniversary of this distressing event was commemorated with the appointment by the United Nations of a **Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide**. Two years on, UN Secretary General K. Annan has just appointed an **Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention** to help Special Adviser J. Méndez in his work on the prevention of genocide.

The appointment of a Special Adviser and the creation of a Committee on Genocide Prevention form part of the plan, set out on a number of occasions by the UN Secretary General, to **replace a culture of reaction by one of prevention**, in particular the prevention of armed conflicts. Indeed, **it is in the context of armed conflicts that the majority of incidents of genocide occur** (though not all), and conflict prevention would therefore help to ensure that such incidents occur far less frequently.

A number of points can be made in respect of the new instruments developed by the United Nations:

- Firstly, the creation of both an adviser and a body specifically devoted to combating genocide indicates an **acknowledgement of the differences that exist between genocide and other threats to peace and security**. This differentiation will undoubtedly contribute to the creation of instruments and the adoption of more specific and suitable measures than the ones that are currently in place.
- Secondly, the Special Adviser has a **mandate to disclose potential genocide situations directly to the Security Council**, and to gather information on any mass violation of human rights that may lead to genocide. This direct contact with the Security Council will make it difficult for it argue, in defence of any failure to act, that it was not aware of the potential risk of genocide.
- Thirdly, the creation of the Committee will **help to improve the limited infrastructure available to the Special Advisor**, which until now has consisted of help from one member



of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs and one person from the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

- Finally, the new Committee for the Prevention of Genocide **includes several people who are linked with conflict prevention, human rights and peace-keeping** and whose contributions could be enormously valuable. For example, the former Commander of UN forces in Rwanda, R. Dallaire, Nobel Peace Laureate D. Tutu and the President of the International Crisis Group, G. Evans, are among the seven experts appointed to the Committee.

As regards the preventive work to be performed by this new Committee, a number of observations can be made, principally in respect of past experiences that may shed some light on current contexts and events:

- Firstly, **the use or non-use of the term ‘genocide’** (based on the 1948 Convention on Genocide) has had serious implications and remains a controversial issue. Indeed, it can be said that, in the past, denial of the existence of genocide was used as an excuse to exempt parties from any responsibility for taking action. This happened in the case of Rwanda, where events were not classified as genocide by the majority of governments and institutions, including the United Nations and the AUO, until the 100 days of massacres had practically ended. **It would seem that to have classified it as such would have implied a greater obligation to intervene.**

For this reason, the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, J. Méndez, believed that the **debate over what did or did not constitute genocide, aside from being sterile and a hindrance in the past, was based on the false premise** that a situation had to be labelled as such before any reaction could be provoked. For this reason, the Advisor's mandate does not include determining whether or not genocide is taking place, this duty being left to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Thus, as J. Méndez pointed out, both ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity or war crimes should spur the international community into action. In this regard, G. Evans **proposed the establishment of a generic definition** so that that a 'label' could not be used as an excuse for avoiding the introduction of prevention mechanisms. We could conclude that, whatever it may be called, the use of preventive or at least palliative action would have to be unquestioned. In addition, as J. Méndez pointed out, a move to **an overly technical definition of genocide would mean diverting attention away from the task of prevention**, since effective action in this area would have to be taken before all the elements that combine to create a potential situation of genocide appeared.

- Secondly, one must ask how we can act in order to prevent genocide. There may be much work to be done, but it seems to be unanimously accepted that there is a need to **improve early warning systems**. However, going back to the genocide in Rwanda, the Commander of UN Forces at the time warned his superiors in a communication sent in August 1993 of the intentions of those who would subsequently turn out to be the perpetrators of the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, though his warnings were in vain. One of the first signs that he warned of was the considerable increase in arms imports and the confirmation of stores of equipment around the capital. As this example clearly shows, **no early warning mechanism can serve as a substitute for political will**. This was confirmed by the UN Secretary General following the events in both Rwanda and Srebrenica, in the former Yugoslavia, also during the 1990s. In the past, the right of veto held by the five permanent members of the Security Council has been exercised in a way that has been shown to be misguided. Their political, electoral and financial motivations have not yet been overcome.

At present **there are many challenges**, the most important of all being the **worrying situation in Darfur** (Sudan). For the time being, in spite of the continuous stark warnings, the international community has not intervened or even paid the situation much importance. In April 2004, when presenting his five-point plan for the prevention of genocide, K. Annan took the opportunity to announce that the world should not allow Darfur to become another Rwanda. Nevertheless, **in mid-June 2006, the chief prosecutor at the ICC informed the Security Council of the existence of significant evidence that pointed to the perpetration of massacres on a large scale in Sudan** with a certain 'specific intention to commit genocide'.



Indeed, the criteria as to whether the international community should or should not intervene in Sudan include, as on other occasions, reasons that go beyond strictly humanitarian considerations. For example, Sudan has become an important asset for the US intelligence services in their war on terror. It is true that the ICC is working on a "Sudan Dossier" and that one should not discount the contribution made by the court in dissuading the potential perpetrators of acts of genocide, but the progress made to date has been slight. By way of example, talks with the government of Sudan and the Sudanese military regarding the situation in Darfur have still not taken place, in spite of them being requested by the ICC in 2005.

Aside from Darfur, if we draw a map of the **countries or regions at risk of genocide**, large-scale massacres or any other name that you want to give it, it could include **Chad, Uganda and Chechnya** (all of them contexts of armed conflict), along with other areas classified as situations of tension, such as the **Great Lakes Region**. During his first year in the job, the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide presented the Security Council with seven notices: five on Darfur, one on DR Congo and one on Côte d'Ivoire. It remains to be seen whether the debates, reports and proposals of the new Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention are transformed into action, measures and challenges finally faced.



Peace Processes

- The Sudanese Government reached an initial agreement with the armed groups operating in Darfur and the east of the country.
- South Africa took over from Tanzania as official facilitator in the process in Burundi.
- The United Nations shelved the Baker Plan to resolve the conflict in Sahara, proposing direct negotiations between the countries involved.
- Political changes in Nepal made it possible for a peace process to be initiated.
- The crisis in the peace process in Sri Lanka has led to a state of low intensity war.
- The Spanish government announced the opening of direct talks with ETA.

This chapter contains an analysis of the armed conflicts and unresolved conflicts which have entered a phase of formal negotiation, or in which a clear peace process is under way or exploratory negotiations have been initiated. Of the **31 processes analysed**, 14 are in Africa, 7 in Europe and another 7 in Asia. 24 of them involve formal negotiations (though these may suffer interruptions), while the possibility of talks is being explored in 7 contexts. A total of 16 sets of negotiations or exploratory talks relate to armed conflicts and 12 to unresolved conflicts¹. New exploratory processes have begun during the last three months in Mali with the Tuareg and in Nigeria (Delta region). Observations are also made in this chapter on the end of the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula and the situation in Myanmar, and we have analysed the progress made in the now completed peace process in Indonesia (Aceh). Section 3.2 contains observations on the new peace process that has begun in the Basque Country.

3.1. Evolution of peace processes

Throughout the second quarter of 2006, the majority of negotiations have found themselves in some difficulty or have progressed positively, as reflected in Table 3.1., and the overall picture is as good as it has been over the last twelve months. Particular mention should be made of the **introduction of formal processes in the armed conflicts in Nepal, Sudan (Darfur and the east of the country) and Burundi**.

Table 3.1. Progress in negotiations at the end of the second quarter			
Going well (5)	In difficulty (14)	Going badly (5)	Exploratory stage (7)
<i>India-Pakistan</i> <i>Nepal</i> <i>Northern Ireland</i> Sudan (Darfur-SLA) Sudan (East-EF)	Algeria <i>Armenia-Azerbaijan</i> <i>Burundi</i> <i>Colombia (AUC)</i> <i>Côte d'Ivoire</i> <i>Philippines (MILF)</i> <i>Georgia (Abkhazia)</i> <i>Georgia (South Ossetia)</i> <i>India (NDFB)</i> <i>India (NSCN-IM)</i> <i>India (ULFA)</i> <i>Kosovo</i> <i>RD Congo</i> <i>Sudan (Darfur-JEM)</i>	<i>Chad-Sudan</i> <i>Israel-Palestine</i> <i>Somalia</i> <i>Sri Lanka</i> <i>Western Sahara</i>	<i>Angola (Cabinda)</i> <i>Cyprus</i> <i>Colombia (ELN)</i> <i>Spain (ETA)</i> Mali (Tuareg) Nigeria (Delta) <i>Uganda</i>

(The processes shown in italics indicate conflicts which are not in an armed phase or not currently classified as "armed conflicts" but are as yet unresolved. Processes shown in bold are new, though they may have already existed at some time in the past)

¹ In this chapter, the term "unresolved conflict" refers to situations in which, while high levels of tension, threats of a military nature or armed confrontations have existed in the past, this type of confrontation does not exist at the moment, though the parties have not yet reached a definitive peace agreement, meaning that negotiations are in progress or being explored.



Africa

a) Southern Africa

The exploratory process underway in **Angola (Cabinda)** has been marked by **tensions and divisions between the leaders of several opposition groups** in the enclave. At the end of April, the Armed Resistance Forces of Cabinda (FARC), the armed wing of the Cabinda Democratic Front that emerged in 1992 and is regarded as the third most important political and military force in Cabinda, lent its support to the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (FCD) created in 2004 and led by A. Bento Bembe, while at the same time indicating a desire to resolve the conflict by means of political negotiation. However, in mid-May the Unified Armed Forces of Cabinda (FACU) stated that they would not recognise any agreement with the government of Angola that was not handled by the FLEC armed opposition group led by N. Tiago. In June, the Mpalaabanda Civic Association of Cabinda said that it no longer had any confidence in A. Bento Bembe as President of the FCD, accusing him of making undertakings to the Angolan government without agreement from the remaining opposition groups. Elsewhere, the President of the Portuguese Nova Democracia party, M. Monteiro, called on Portuguese head of state A. Cavaco Silva to intercede in an attempt to achieve peace in Cabinda.

b) West Africa

As regards the peace process in **Côte d'Ivoire**, after a first round of talks at the end of March between representatives of the government and the *Forces Nouvelles* armed opposition group, both parties agreed to the disarmament of around 42,000 *Forces Nouvelles* troops, 5,000 members of the armed forces and 12,000 members of President L. Gbagbo's militia. However, the disarmament of all these forces, which should take place simultaneously with the process for the identification and registration of voters entitled to participate in the elections planned for the end of October, suffered a number of delays during the course of the last three months, though **an agreement to introduce the DDR programme from 15 June** was finally reached. In preparation for the disarmament process, both government armed forces and armed opposition groups decided to withdraw their front-line troops. A spokesperson for the *Forces Nouvelles* announced that the amnesty law adopted after the peace agreements had been signed will not cover human rights violations or economic offences, covering only the offence of armed insurrection. In April, the EU promised around 100 million euros for work aimed at restoring peace.

As regards the process aimed at reducing the violence in **Nigeria (Niger Delta)**, during May some sources reported that **the movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) had set out its intention to begin a three-month ceasefire and enter into talks with the government**. The Deputy Secretary of the Youth Council of Ijaw, which signed this communiqué, said that the group was preparing to lay down its weapons and offer the federal Government the opportunity to create a development programme in the region. However, this communiqué was in sharp contrast to the threats made a few days later by MEND against federal governors in the region who had expressed their support for the extension of the third mandate of O. Obasanjo as the country's President. MEND believed these governors to be betraying their people and going against regional interests. The armed opposition group stated that it would resume its attacks on oil company installations in the region. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) also announced that it was willing to resume talks. Oil production in Nigeria has been reduced by 25% as a result of the activities of MEND and other armed groups in the Delta region.


Away from this conflict, it should be mentioned that in mid-June the Governments of **Nigeria and Cameroon** signed an agreement bringing an end to the border dispute over the Bakassi Peninsular in the Gulf of Guinea. These talks had been facilitated by UN Secretary General, K. Annan. Under the agreement there will be an initial two-year transitional period for control of the Peninsular to be handed over to the Cameroon Government. People will have the opportunity to live in Bakassi under a special regime for four years, and after this time the Nigerian people



living on the Peninsular will be able to decide whether they want to remain there or return to their own country.

c) Horn of Africa

The peace process in **Somalia**, which had already suffered a serious setback in March as a result of the fighting between several of the capital's militias, finally broke down completely in May as a result of the confrontations between the groups that form part of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), who receive backing from the USA, and the Union of Islamic Courts, which succeeded in taking control of the country's main cities, including the capital. According to the President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), A. Yusuf Ahmed, the USA is using warlords in Mogadishu, many of whom have seats on the TFG, in its attempts to capture members of al-Qaeda, whom the USA claim are being protected by the capital's Islamic Courts. At the same time, the **President of the TFG asked his Libyan counterpart, M. al Gaddafi, to intervene personally** in the creation of a committee to monitor the peace process in the country, and in mid-June the heads of the Islamic militias and the interim Government accepted **Yemen's offer to mediate in the resolution of the conflict**. At around the same time, the recently created International Contact Group for Somalia comprising representatives from the USA, Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, the EU, Tanzania and the Norwegian UN mission met for the first time. This Contact Group could be expanded or hold consulting sessions with other organisations such as the AU, IGAD and the Arab League. In June, Prime Minister A.M. Ghedi expelled the four "warlords" overthrown by the ISC from the TFG.




Turning to the conflicts affecting **Sudan**, the leader of the governing NCP party and the President of the Government, O. al-Bashir, joined the head of the SPLA former armed opposition group and current Vice President of the Government, S. Kiir, in a three-day meeting to discuss the growing disagreements regarding implementation of the peace agreements that brought an end to 22 years of armed fighting in the country in January 2005. Although both sides stressed the willingness of the parties to comply with the undertakings made, emphasising that the meeting had been constructive, O. al-Bashir and S. Kiir both acknowledged that there were significant disagreements in respect of certain specific issues, such as the implementation of the report by the Abyei Border Commission, the absence of transparency and accuracy in the distribution of oil revenues, the delay in withdrawing the security forces and the demarcation of the north-south border of 1956. However, the Abyei issue is one of the topics raising most controversy, as it had been during the peace negotiations held in Kenya. In this regard, the NCP rejected the official demarcation of Abyei, a region with important oil fields whose people are to

decide in 2011 whether they will belong to the north or the south of the country, while the SPLA has warned that any decision should be based strictly on the terms set out in the peace agreement of 2005.

As regards the peace process in the Sudanese region of **Darfur**, it should be stressed that the **Sudanese Government and the majority faction of the SLA armed opposition group signed a peace agreement on 5 May in Abuja (Nigeria), under the auspices of the AU**, in an attempt to bring an end to the armed conflict that has affected the Darfur region for more than three years. In mid-June, the majority faction of the SLA began a round of talks with the Government in the Sudanese capital, aimed at implementing the peace agreement signed in Nigeria. Although this agreement represented a significant turning point that was broadly welcomed by the United Nations and many different countries and organisations around the world, the minority faction of the SLA (the main representative of the Fur ethnic group) and the JEM armed opposition group (which, according to mediators has less of a bearing on the outcome of talks) did not initially wish to agree to the arrangement. However, at the beginning of June they signed a declaration in June in which they committed themselves to the agreement. In this regard, **JEM leader K. Ibrahim held a meeting in Slovenia at the end of May with Slovenian President J. Drnovsek**, who had been pursuing an initiative for rapprochement since January. This meeting was interpreted as an exploratory process aimed at bringing the JEM into the peace agreement. In April, before the peace agreement was signed, the government of Chad withdrew from the negotiating process after officially breaking off diplomatic relations with Sudan. It should also be stressed that spokespersons from NATO announced that the organisation was discussing the possibility of becoming involved in Darfur at some point in the future, though for the moment there were no plans to send any military forces. It was also announced that the Sudanese government had accepted the despatch of a UN exploratory mission to Darfur. The AU announced that a ministerial meeting would be held in Banjul (Gambia) during the month of July, in order to resolve differences with the groups that remained opposed to the agreement. A conference for the reconstruction and development of Darfur is also planned for September in the Netherlands.

Graph 3.2. Negotiations in Darfur





Undertakings made in the peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the majority SLA faction, 05/05/06

These include the following: the effective disarmament and demobilisation of the pro-government Janjaweed militias towards mid-October this year and the restriction of movements by other militias such as the Popular Defence Force (PDF); the integration of 4,000 former combatants into the Sudanese armed forces and a further 1,000 into the police force with educational help and training for 3,000 troops; the appointment of someone from the armed groups in Darfur to the fourth seat at the head of the Government of National Unity, known as the "Assistant to the President of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority" (TDRA), which will be responsible for implementing the undertakings made in the peace agreement; the holding of a referendum in July 2010 to decide whether Darfur is to be designated as a single region with an autonomous government; the holding of local elections no later than July 2009; as regards the next three years, the award to the different armed groups of 12 seats in the National Assembly, 21 seats in each of the regional state parliaments, one state governor and key posts in some ministries and local governments. The agreement also provides for the holding of a donor conference for Darfur in which the TDRA must set out all its needs and priorities. In addition, the Government of National Unity must initially contribute 300 million dollars to the reconstruction of the region and a further 200 million during each of the following two years. As regards humanitarian issues, security zones are established around the camps for the internally displaced with safe passage for humanitarian aid, and a commission will be created that will work jointly with the United Nations in the return of refugees and displaced people. Finally, the agreement specifies that the Sudanese government will provide 30 million dollars to compensate victims of the conflict.

As regards the conflict in the **east of Sudan**, following earlier failed attempts led by Libya, **the Sudanese government and the Eastern Front armed opposition group signed an agreement during the second half of May in which they set out the procedures necessary for peace negotiations to take place**. This agreement sets out the Government's acceptance of Eritrea as the principal mediator between the parties, along with the fact that there will be no prior conditions for the talks, and it was signed by A. Sabdarat, representing Khartoum, M. Mohamed Ahmed for the Eastern Front and Y. Giraba, who is responsible for political affairs in the Eritrean Government. Negotiations will focus on the issues of power sharing, security and the integration of members of the armed groups into the country's national army. In mid-June, both parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement in the Sudanese capital, with a declaration of principles regarding the negotiations to come. The JEM, which is particularly active in Darfur, threatened to boycott the peace process unless it was also included in the talks relating to the eastern region.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Attempts in Tanzania to reopen peace negotiations between the government of **Burundi** and the FNL armed opposition group suffered a number of setbacks with a change in the countries engaged in facilitating at the talks. At Tanzania's request, given the Burundian Government's fears that Tanzanian mediation was not impartial because a number of FNL leaders had frequently sought refuge in the country, **all the parties agreed in May to ask South Africa to become involved in official facilitation duties**. The task fell to the country's Minister for Protection and Security, C. Nqakula, who held initial meetings in Dar es Salaam shortly afterwards with Government contacts and members of the dissident faction of the FNL led by J.B. Sinyayigaya. He also visited Kampala to hold discussions on the peace process with the Ugandan President and then returned to Dar es Salaam to meet representatives of the Burundian government and FNL leader A. Rwasa. In mid-June, both parties signed a two-week **cessation of hostilities agreement** in the Tanzanian capital, to provide time for the negotiation of a permanent ceasefire agreement. The cessation of hostilities agreement provided the opportunity for the FNL to become a political party, offering provisional immunity for its members and the release of political prisoners.

Turning to the fighting between **Chad**'s armed forces and the armed opposition groups operating in the country (particularly the RDL, which the Chadian Government claims is receiving support from armed groups originating from the Sudanese region of Darfur), at the beginning of April **the President of Chad, I. Déby, called once again on his Libyan counterpart, M. Gaddafi, to act as mediator between Chad and Sudan**. Gaddafi had already carried out goodwill missions with the Presidents of the two countries in February.



As regards the violence affecting various parts of **DR Congo**, it should be mentioned that in May around 200 members of the Mai-Mai militias handed their weapons in to MONUC troops in the province of Kananga. Although 15,000 members of the militias operating in the region have signed up to DDR programmes, around 2,000 have refused to accept disarmament and formed a new armed coalition, the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC), which has been active since the middle of last year and would seem to be receiving support from Uganda.

Finally, the conflict between the Government of **Uganda** and the LRA armed opposition group led by J. Kony has been notable for the mixed messages relating to whether or not the Government will grant an amnesty to the LRA leader if he lays down his weapons. While the President denied this possibility at the end of March, a stance that was supported by the Ugandan parliament, in May he made a renewed offer of amnesty and safe passage if the group disarmed before July. This offer was made shortly after **the LRA leader held a secret meeting with the Vice President of southern Sudan**, R. Machar, in which J. Kony agreed to end attacks on the civilian population and hold talks with the Ugandan President, an offer that was accepted by President Y. Museveni so long as the LRA ended its military activities before July. In June, INTERPOL issued warrants for the arrest of the five main leaders of the LRA which led to a request from the ARLPI religious initiative asking for these warrants to be withdrawn in order to allow negotiations to take place.

e) Maghreb and North Africa

A minor conflict broke out in the north of **Mali** in May when a group of several hundred Tuareg attacked various barracks and made off with weapons and military vehicles, heading for the mountains along the border with Algeria. In mid-June, this group announced that it was asking Algeria to arrange talks with the government of Mali with facilitation from a team of four Algerian negotiators, aimed at achieving greater autonomy. The Tuareg had organised uprisings in the north of the country twice before, during the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1990s. The latter ended with the National Agreement of 1992, in which Algeria also acted as mediator. Some of the Tuareg then joined the country's armed forces, and several politicians were given positions of greater responsibility. Nevertheless, problems of unemployment and economic marginalisation have persisted in the region, and in spite of all these events, the Government of Mali announced days later that it would only enter negotiations if the rebels first returned the weapons they had captured.

Libya's new diplomatic role, 2006

- Goodwill mission by Gaddafi in the conflict between Chad and Sudan
- Presence at the Abuja talks on the conflict in Darfur (Sudan)
- Offer to host talks between the Eastern Front and the Government of Sudan
- Monitoring of the ceasefire between the Philippines armed forces and the MILF

As regards the dispute over **Western Sahara**, it should be mentioned that in April UN Secretary General **K. Annan came out in favour of direct negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front**, with contributions from Algeria and Mauritania, in the search for a political solution to the conflict in the Sahara. The **United Nations thus finally abandoned the Baker Plan**, which had been approved by the Security Council in 2003, and instead accepted the suggestion of the new Secretary General's Representative for the Sahara, Dutchman P. van Walsum. According to diplomatic sources, taking a radically different approach from his predecessor, P. Van Walsum believes that the Baker Plan was a mistake, that the independence option should be discounted and that Algeria should be ready to negotiate, something which it has always refused to do because it believed that Morocco did not represent the Saharan people. According to K. Annan, a new plan drawn up by the UN would be doomed to failure because Morocco would reject it unless it excluded an option for a referendum on independence. The POLISARIO Front rejected the UN's proposal for direct negotiations with Morocco over the Western Sahara. The Saharan representative at the UN, A. Bujari, described direct negotiations as both unacceptable and unviable. Both A. Bujari and the Secretary General of the POLISARIO Front, M. Abdelaziz, reiterated their support for the Baker Plan, which had been unanimously approved in 2003 by the UN Security Council and which Morocco had always opposed. In April, King Mohamed VI announced the release of 37 Sharan



independence activists who had been serving sentences in El Aaiun for ten months for inciting protests against Morocco. They were released at the request of the recently created Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), which includes some Saharan tribal chiefs, local elected officials and NGOs. This body has come out in favour of broad autonomy within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.

America

The current and future direction of the conflict in **Colombia** has been conditioned by the resounding victory of A. Uribe in the presidential elections held in May, in which he was re-elected with 62.2% of the vote, a result that was interpreted as offering the opportunity to make changes to the strategy followed up to now by the President. A while earlier, Peace Commissioner L. C. Restrepo announced that almost all the paramilitary groups that had combined under the banner of the Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (**AUC**) had been demobilised. More than 30,000 former combatants have returned to civilian life, 1,175 have been jailed and 604 are due to appear before the courts. 17,000 weapons have been handed in. The Government decided to create a Presidential Council for Reinsertion, given the high number of people that have been demobilised in recent years. In April, the US Congress approved a payment of 15.4 million dollars for this demobilisation process, conditional upon Colombian cooperation in the extradition of some paramilitary leaders. For his part, the Secretary General of the OAS announced the doubling of the Mapp-OAS mission monitoring this demobilisation process. However, controversy arose with the decision **handed down by the Constitutional Court in May, which declared the legality of the Justice and Peace Act governing the demobilisation of paramilitary groups but cut a number of the benefits offered to those being demobilised**. The Court refused to accept the political status of the self-defence forces, emphasising that victims had the right to hear the truth, refusing to grant any concessions to those who would not confess to their crimes, forcing members of paramilitary groups to take joint responsibility for the crimes committed by their organisations, offering more time to the Public Prosecutor to bring the accused before the courts and stipulating that any prison facilities provided for these people would operate under normal prison regulations. This Constitutional Court ruling caused a serious crisis among leaders of the AUC, who met to discuss their future.

As regards the exploratory process that the Government is engaged in with the **ELN** guerrilla group, the third exploratory round of talks was held in Havana in April, and **it is expected that the next round will represent the beginning of formal negotiations on specific themes**. According to the head of the guerrilla movement, A. García, countries like the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and Japan are willing to support these talks. For its part, the Catholic Church in Colombia announced that it was going to ask the Vatican to join the international team in the negotiation process. As regards the **FARC** guerrilla group, with which no negotiations or humanitarian agreements have been reached, President A. Uribe said on his re-election that he and his team would look at ways of seeking peace with the group, and to this end he held a meeting with former Minister A. Leyva, who has mediated with the FARC in the past. Colombian business leaders said that they were willing to support negotiations with this guerrilla group. The Government had previously rejected any possibility of regional talks with the FARC until the group declared a cessation of hostilities.

Asia and the Pacific

a) South Asia

Turning to the various conflicts currently affecting **India**, the last three months have not seen any progress in the resumption of talks with the **CPI** armed opposition group, which operates mainly in the state of **Andra Pradesh**. These talks were interrupted at the beginning of last year. However, a third round of negotiations was held in relation to the state of **Assam** at the end of June. The talks took place in New Delhi with the People's Consultative Group, which is acting as mediator for the **ULFA** armed opposition group. The meeting took place after elections



had been held in the state, and it was attended by the Interior Minister, S. Patil. The first round took place in October 2005 (attended by Prime Minister M. Singh) and the second in February of this year. It is expected that the fourth round will involve direct talks and include discussions about the natural sources in the region (which is rich in tea, oil and timber), along with the ceasefire. The ULFA has also asked for five of its representatives to be released from jail so that they can take part in the next negotiating round. It should be mentioned that in April the USA took the ULFA off its list of terrorist groups, though it kept it on the list of "other terrorist organisations" who do not carry out attacks on US citizens. In May, the Government of Assam recommended that the central Indian Government release the five jailed leaders. As regards the **NDFB** armed opposition group which agreed a ceasefire with the Government a year ago and renewed it for a further six months in May, representatives of the group stated that they had not submitted any document with their proposals because they were waiting for a formal invitation from the Government to begin negotiations. In the state of **Nagaland**, the Government and the **NSCN (I-M)** armed opposition group met for three days in Amsterdam, agreeing to hold meetings more frequently. The Government delegation was led by the Union Minister, O. Fernández, along with the Interior Minister of Nagaland State, S. Reghupathy, and the Minister of State from the Office of the Prime Minister, P. Chouan. All three are members of the Group of Ministers formed by Indian Prime Minister M. Singh to manage the peace process in Nagaland.

Contextualisation of Asian peace processes

Recent trends:

- Movement of the area in conflict from Indochina towards southeast Asia.
- Since 9/11 the situation has been read simply as one of terrorism and many forms of political opposition have since suffered repression in several conflict situations.
- Presence of a radical regional Islamist network, especially in Indonesia and the Philippines, making it more difficult to read and deal politically with some conflicts.
- Gradual loss of power, public support and military capacity among many armed groups, and an increase in their levels of criminalisation.
- Combination of nationalist causes and claims for Islamic identity.

Characteristics of the conflicts:

- Many are long-standing (the average length is 26 years, as compared with 20 in the rest of the world's conflicts). The oldest is the conflict in Kashmir (59 years), while the most recent is the one in Nepal.
- Half of the conflicts are remarkable for involving a highly ideological component, with several Maoist groups operational. This characteristic makes a context very difficult in negotiating terms.
- These groups emerged during periods in which the social and political background to the countries in question involved dictatorships, discrimination against nationalist minorities who were seeking independence, the federation of divided peoples or forms of self-government, and religious problems between Buddhists, Hindus and Christians, associated with processes of migratory colonisation and difficulties in gaining access to their own natural resources. There were also feudal monarchies, large landed estates and widespread cultural violence.
- As regards the sale of arms and military assistance, the USA is providing particular support for the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, while Russia particularly supports India. Pakistan also receives military support from France and China.

Peace processes

- Peace processes are underway in almost all the conflicts taking place in Asia, with some negotiations at an advanced stage and others less so. The continent of Asia is, at present, the part of the world with the greatest experience in peace processes and, in spite of all the difficulties, offers a more hopeful picture than the one displayed by Africa.
- Probably due to the strong ideological content of many of these conflicts, the majority have had to wait many years before entering a negotiating stage. The now completed peace process in Indonesia (Aceh) took around 24 years to set up but was finally completed after 5 years of talks. The Naga people in India took 23 years to begin negotiations, and the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh (India) 22. On the other hand, the Tamils in Sri Lanka began to negotiate from the moment the conflict began, though they have now been going for 22 years without as yet reaching any solution. The conflicts in which attempts at negotiation have lasted longest are Sri Lanka-LTTE (22 years) and Philippines-NPA (19 years).

Mediation:

- The majority of conflicts use outside mediators. Four of these involve European countries (Indonesia through Finland, Sri Lanka and the Philippines (NPA) through Norway, and the Naga people in India through the Netherlands). The MILF in the Philippines are negotiating through Malaysia, while the NSCM-IM in Nagaland use Thailand. A number of Islamic countries have been involved at various points in the negotiating process, such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and the Islamic Conference Organisation itself.



- Other conflicts involve internal mediators, particularly those in India, with the creation of bodies such as the Conciliation Committee in Andhra Pradesh and the People's Consultative Group in Assam (which assists the facilitation provided by writer R. Goswami).
- Direct negotiations are being held in the conflict between India and Pakistan (over the region of Kashmir) and the conflict in Nepal.
- A number of groups have asked for involvement from the United Nations, and greater implication by this organisation in the short term cannot be discounted.
- In a number of conflicts important use has been made of exiled politicians and the popular Diaspora in order to open channels of communication, a fact which explains the involvement of Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Thailand in a number of peace processes.
- Three armed groups (the GAM, NPA and LTTE) are included on the EU's lists of terrorists, a fact that has hugely complicated negotiations as they have to take place in non-EU countries.

As regards the conflict between **India and Pakistan** over the region of Kashmir, **the trust-building measures pursued by both sides over recent years have continued to advance**. Indian Prime Minister M. Singh and the APHC (a coalition of the main independence parties in Kashmir) agreed to establish a system that will permit discussion of potential solutions for the dispute over the region. This was the second meeting between the two sides since M. Singh was appointed Prime Minister. The AHPC announced shortly afterwards that it would put together a negotiating team to hold talks with the Indian Government. The two countries also agreed partially to open the Line of Control (the *de facto* border between them) in order to increase trade links via a road haulage service and extend the bus service between the two sides of Kashmir. Pakistan announced that it was releasing 71 Indian fishermen whom it had been holding and the two countries held a tenth round of negotiations over the withdrawal of troops from the Siachen glacier, where 7,000 Indian soldiers and 4,000 Pakistani troops are stationed. They also agreed to the rebroadcast of Indian programmes on Pakistani TV.

The political situation in **Nepal** has changed drastically during the last three months, with huge and prolonged public demonstrations reported during the course of the month of April. These finally forced the King to reopen parliament which in turn drastically restricted the King's powers. The leader of the Nepalese Congress, G.P. Koirala, was appointed Prime Minister, and he formed a new Government that included four of the seven democratic parties. Deputy Prime Minister K.P. Oli announced a definitive ceasefire by the Government and withdrew the **CPN** Maoist armed opposition group's classification as a terrorist organisation. This allowed a process of dialogue to be established with the armed group, culminating in June in an historic **direct meeting between the Prime Minister and the leader of the CPN, Prachanda**, who had already stated that he saw no reason why his troops should not join the country's new armed forces. A number of countries such as Norway and Denmark (which offered seven million dollars for the peace process), along with the United Nations, expressed a willingness to facilitate in these talks. It would seem that both the Maoists and India have agreed that the United Nations should be given the role of supervising the ceasefire, the arms decommissioning process and the demobilisation of members of the CPN. In May, the Government announced that elections for a Constituent Assembly would be held within the year and that it expected the CPN to be disarmed by then.

The peace process in **Sri Lanka**, on the other hand, has been severely damaged during the past three months, in spite of diplomatic efforts from Norway and warnings from the international community, following a **significant upsurge in violence between the LTTE armed opposition group and Sri Lankan armed forces that have led to a situation of low-intensity war**. There have also been confrontations between the main body of the LTTE and the dissident faction led by Colonel Karuna, along with a breakdown in negotiations caused by an absence of security for the LTTE's negotiators. In April, the recently appointed Norwegian Special Envoy, J. Hanssen-Bauer, held his first meeting with representatives of the LTTE in Sri Lanka in order to study the possibility of bringing members of the group to Geneva to resume talks with the Sri Lankan Government. In June, the Norwegian Government offered to host a meeting between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government that would permit discussions on the role to be played by the ceasefire monitoring mission (SLMM), whose members have faced serious danger in recent months. However, the LTTE eventually withdrew from the meeting, claiming that the Government delegation was very low-level. Given the climate of violence in the country, the EU and Canada added the LTTE to their lists of terrorist groups. Finally, at the end of May the country's President, M. Rajapakse, called on all Sinhalese political parties to work on



a new plan that would involve power being ceded to the Tamil minority in return for the establishment of peace and an end to the violence.

b) Southeast Asia

Turning to the different conflicts in the **Philippines**, particular mention should be made of the increased number of extrajudicial executions that have been perpetrated against many people linked with leftist parties. Some sources put the number of people killed since 2001 as high as 600, in addition to some 70 journalists, a situation that has led the main international human rights organisations to publish reports warning of the high levels of impunity that are currently to be found in the country. Fighting has continued over the last three months between the country's armed forces and the **NPA** armed opposition group, without any apparent possibility of negotiations being resumed in the short term. By contrast, talks continued in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) between the Philippines government and the **MILF** armed opposition group. These dealt with the **issue of the ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro people (principle, lands, resources, areas of influence and government by the MILF)**, an issue that has become the main stumbling block for the negotiations. At the end of April the USA promised 30 million dollars for the reconstruction of Mindanao if a peace agreement was reached. President G. Macapagal Arroyo believes that such an agreement can be achieved before the end of the year. Japan has also made important donations for reconstruction on the island.

As regards the peace agreement that the government signed with the **MNLF** in 1996, a team of 16 people from the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) travelled to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to oversee and advise on the implementation of the peace process. This mission asked the President to release the emeritus president of the MNLF and former governor of the ARMM, N. Misauri, or transfer him to Mindanao, so that he can attend a meeting that has been scheduled in Saudi Arabia in July to deal with the more controversial aspects of the 1996 agreement.

Although the peace process in **Indonesia (Aceh)** came to a successful conclusion last year, it should be pointed out in respect of its implementation that the main leaders of the former armed opposition group, the GAM, returned to the region after spending many years abroad, particularly in Sweden. This group aims to create a political organisation called the Free Aceh Movement Council, also known as the Majelis GAM, though it announced that it would not be standing as such in the October elections for Governor and Deputy Governor due to a lack of internal agreement regarding suitable candidates and disputes between the orthodox and more moderate sectors.

Turning to the conflict between the military junta ruling **Myanmar** and the Karen people, it should be mentioned that the **Karen KNU organisation called on the Government in May to hold new talks on a possible ceasefire**, given the desperate conditions in which the Karen community is living. The KNU complained that the country's armed forces had begun systematic military operations against its armed wing, the KNLA, in spite of the ceasefire agreement signed by both sides in 2004.

Europe and Central Asia

Negotiations between **Armenia and Azerbaijan** over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh have seen advances during the last three months after the breakdown of the first round of talks in February 2006 in France. In May, **Armenian and Azeri representatives met in Washington (USA) and succeeded in finding some rapprochement** in their peace negotiations. This meeting took place after the OSCE's Minsk group met and decided to send French representative B. Fassier to talk to both sides and agree to resume their meetings, since Armenia and Azerbaijan had suspended all contact. French President J. Chirac asked his Azeri counterpart, I. Aliyev, to make new efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, Armenian representatives said that they would not be attending the meeting of the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) planned for Azerbaijan after an Azeri spokesman had said that the Azeri authorities were not in a position to guarantee their security. Finally, in



June, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Bucharest (Romania) to study the talks held with the Minsk Group and the OSCE.

Following the Turkish government's submission of a plan of action to the UN Secretary General in January, aimed at resolving the situation on the island of **Cyprus**, in May **K. Annan rejected the possibility of mediating in the conflict**, given what he saw as a lack of progress in the attempts to resolve the conflict on the ground. However, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Cyprus, M. Moler, began to weigh up the options in order to gauge the possibility of attempting to reopen talks between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island, a process which had broken down some two years previously.

As regards the conflict in **Georgia (Abkhazia)**, the *de facto* President of the Republic of Abkhazia, S. Bagapsh, addressed the regional parliament in May, setting out a **peace proposal** aimed at resolving the conflict with Georgia. Among other measures, this initiative sought an official apology from Georgia for the war and its policy of isolation and assimilation, the halting of economic and political pressures on Abkhazia and the blockade imposed by the CIS in 1996, the signing of a peace agreement that would guarantee security in the region, assurances from the international community and the UN Security Council that hostilities would cease, cooperation in the fight against organised crime, and greater regional cooperation. This proposal is in line with the letter that S. Bagapsh sent to the UN Security Council in January, and the majority of parliamentarians supported the President's initiative. In this connection, the Georgian Minister for Conflict Resolution, G. Khaindrava, announced that in spite of the fact that the document contained a number of interesting points, it was more a declaration of independence than a peace plan. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister confirmed that both parties were willing to work together and make certain undertakings. In June, the Georgian Government presented Parliament with a peace plan based on the principle of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, autonomy for the region, the return of the displaced and participation by international bodies in the process. Finally, the UN working group for conflict resolution in Abkhazia held a meeting, its first for five years.

As far as the conflict in **South Ossetia** is concerned, it should be mentioned that in April the Georgian Government put forward a draft bill for the return of property in South Ossetia to people affected by the conflict, as a mechanism designed to foster peace in the region. The *de facto* Government of South Ossetia accused the OSCE, an international body that operates a mission in the region, of not being objective as regards the conflict and of favouring Georgian interests. In May, the **Government in Tbilisi set up a task force for peace in South Ossetia**. This group comprises ten people and forms part of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), whose members also include South Ossetia and Russia. Some days later, the authorities in the separatist region of South Ossetia asked for new talks between representatives of the Government, South Ossetia and Moscow that would also include input from the current President of the OSCE, Dutch Foreign Minister K. De Gucht. This meeting would be aimed at achieving the signing of a new agreement on security guarantees and the non-resumption of hostilities. The Tbilisi Government said, however, that it did not believe it was necessary to sign this new document since it considered that its Peace Plan for South Ossetia was sufficient to ensure stability in the region. A meeting of international donors for South Ossetia was held in Brussels in June, at which it was agreed to allocate 10 million euros for the region.

As regards the ongoing process in **Northern Ireland**, in April the Prime Ministers of Ireland and the United Kingdom, B. Ahern and T. Blair, announced a **plan for the partial return of autonomy for Northern Ireland**, with the specific aim of choosing an executive during the course of November. The Ulster Assembly sat once again in May after remaining inactive for four years. The Monitoring Commission also confirmed that the IRA had scaled down its military capacity and was meeting its undertakings. For its part, the British government sped up its demilitarisation process in Ulster, closing three more military barracks than were originally planned. Finally, it should be mentioned that the name of Sinn Fein leader G. Adams was removed from the USA's list of terrorists.

Two new rounds of talks have taken place in Vienna during the last three months between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians debating the political future of **Kosovo**, under the auspices of UN Special Representative M. Ahtisaari. As well as talking about decentralisation, these talks



included discussions on cultural and religious heritage, human rights, the economy, local financing, inter-municipal and cross-border cooperation and the creation of new municipal entities. In May, the Serbian authorities suggested autonomy for the region, though they did not accept the possibility of independence for Kosovo. They also suggested that **the United Nations might remain in charge of security in the province for the next twenty years**. The Serbian plan, which was rejected by the Kosovo Albanian authorities, discusses the possibility of giving Kosovo its own police force, though no army, and also suggests that the region could be fiscally independent.

Middle East

Although reports in the press on the conflict between **Israel and Palestine** have been overshadowed by the fighting between members of Hamas and Fatah and the controversy that has arisen following the Palestinian President's announcement that a referendum would be called to vote on a document on national unity, there have nevertheless been a **number of calls for dialogue and negotiation** during the course of the last three months. In April, the new Prime Minister and Hamas leader I. Haniya defended the right of Palestinians to continue their fight for independence, though he also expressed a wish to begin talks with international bodies in order to end the conflict with Israel and showed himself to be in favour of international involvement in the peace process, referring to the Quartet and particularly Europe. For its part, the PLO **called for an international peace conference to be held as part of the Road Map process**, saying that it was willing to negotiate with any Israeli Prime Minister. In May, Israeli Defence Minister A. Peretz called for the introduction of serious and open peace talks with the Palestinians, before Israel implemented its unilateral convergence plan. For his part, the Palestinian Telecommunications Minister, the independent J. al-Khouani, said he was willing to begin talks with international mediators from the Quartet, provided that there were no pre-conditions. Hamas's Deputy President for Political Affairs, M. Abu Marzouk, also announced that he would not oppose any talks between the Israeli Prime Minister and Palestinian President M. Abbas, and a preparatory meeting was held in Egypt, attended by the Palestinian President, the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister, S. Peres, and the country's Foreign Minister, T. Livni. The Palestinian President also hosted a **meeting aimed at creating national dialogue between rival Palestinian factions**, shortly after Hamas decided to withdraw the military unit of 3,000 men that it had deployed in Gaza. However, in June Hamas ended the self-imposed ceasefire that it had maintained for a year and a half after two of the organisation's militant members were assassinated in an Israeli attack. Finally, mention should be made of the resignation of the Quartet's Envoy to the Middle East, J. Wolfensohn (in protest against the stance taken by western governments in cutting aid to the PNA following the Hamas election victory), and the appointment of K.M. Kennedy as UN Deputy Special Coordinator for the Peace Process in the Middle East.

3.2. The peace process in the Basque Country

ETA was formed in 1959 and carried out its first fatal attack in June 1968. By the time of its last attack in 2004, it had killed 817 people during the course of 38 years (478 military personnel and 339 civilians) and carried out 84 kidnappings. Following the restoration of democracy, successive governments have tried to hold talks with the armed group. Between 1981 and 1982, negotiations were led by the Interior Minister from the UCD Government, leading to the dissolution of the 7th ETA Political-Military Assembly in September 1982 and the agreement of a Social Reinsertion Plan for members of ETA who agreed to lay down their arms.

In the face of continuing attacks by the remaining members of ETA, the socialist Government set up a series of contacts in Algeria during 1986 and 1987, in which the Secretary of State for Security and a delegate from the Government, among others, held meetings with ETA leaders "Txomin" and "Antxon". Around thirty members of ETA had taken refuge in Algeria, fleeing the attentions of the Spanish and French police. However, it wasn't until 1989 that the so-called "Algiers Talks" were officially opened after a three-month ceasefire had been called by ETA. These ended without success at the beginning of April, after the Government refused ETA's demands to transfer several of its members from prisons in France to Algeria and to hold talks



with the leftist Abertzale group. It would also seem that a huge demonstration in Bilbao protesting against violence and terrorism had a negative influence on these talks. In spite of this breakdown, the Government continued to work with "Antxón" during 1990, exploring the possibility of reopening negotiations, though this was again unsuccessful. Finally, in April 1991 the Government announced that it would negotiate with ETA in Sweden if the organisation maintained a ceasefire for two months.

In September 1998, while the *Partido Popular* (Popular Party) were in power, ETA had declared a ceasefire that was to last for 14 months, allowing the Government to make its first approaches to ETA during December of the same year and culminating in a meeting in Zurich during May 1989 with mediation from Bishop Juan María Uriarte. The Government were represented by Ricardo Martí Fluxá, Francisco Javier Zarzalejos and Pedro Arriola, while Mikel Antza and Belén González "Carmen" represented ETA. This meeting was unsuccessful and ETA finally broke off the talks in August.

When the PSOE came to power, the government of Rodríguez Zapatero committed itself from the outset to resolving the Basque conflict during its time in office, a fact that led ETA to send it a letter requesting talks. Representatives of the Government held meetings with former ETA leader "Josu Ternera" in Oslo and Switzerland during the summer of 2005, beginning an exploratory process that eventually led ETA to declare a permanent ceasefire on 24 March 2006. In June, the President of the Spanish Government announced that he would begin direct talks with ETA in order to bring an end to the violence, and at the end of the month he appeared before the Spanish Congress to inform the press of this decision. Talks will be held with specialist support from the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva.

Intervention by the President of the Spanish Government, 29/06/06

The announcements made during the President of the Government's speech included the following:

- The government is going to begin talks with ETA, adhering to the immutable principle that **political issues may only be resolved with the legitimate representatives** of the people's will.
- **The government will respect the decisions of the Basque people when they are adopted freely**, with respect for legal rules and procedures, democratic methods, the rights and freedoms of the people and without any form of violence or coercion.
- Agreements between the various political groups in Euskadi must be reached with **the greatest possible consensus**, with respect for political plurality in Euskadi and with equal opportunities for all parties.
- I believe that the political parties and the representatives of civil society, business and the unions must **adopt agreements aimed at permitting coexistence through the appropriate forms of dialogue** and, of course, through democratic measures that will allow these agreements to be implemented in all the different institutional areas.

Table 3.2. Road map suggested by the government (2006)²

June	Congress informed of the beginning of direct talks.
July	First official meeting between the PSE and Batasuna. Invitation to Batasuna to sign up to the Parties Act (<i>Ley de Partidos</i>)
August – October	Batasuna requests legalisation (probably under another name). Movement of prisoners and other new prison measures.
No date	Establishment of party talks, once the leftist Abertzale is legalised.

Table 3.3. Past and current attempts to negotiate with ETA

Governing party	Date	Place	Observations
UCD	From 1981 to September 1982		Ended with the dissolution of the 7 th ETA Political-Military Assembly. Mario Onaindía and J.M. Bandrés acted as mediators. A Social Reinsertion Plan was adopted.
PSOE	Summer 1986	Algiers	Exploratory contacts with facilitation from the PNV
PSOE	Jan - Nov 1987	Algiers	Exploratory contacts. "Txomín" died in February.
PSOE	Jan - April 1989	Algiers	ETA announced a three-month ceasefire so that talks could be held. These were interrupted on 4 April.

² *El País*, 18 June 2006, p. 20.



PSOE	1990	Algiers	Further exploratory contacts without any result. In April 1991 the Government announced it would negotiate with ETA in Sweden if it maintained a two-month ceasefire.
PP	December 1998 - August 1999	Zurich	Talks during the fourteen-month ceasefire that began in September 1998 and ended in November 1999. The Zurich meeting was held on 19 May 1999. ON 25 August, ETA broke off the talks.
PSOE	July 2005 to date	Oslo, Switzerland	As a result of these contacts, ETA called a permanent ceasefire on 24 March.



Post-war rehabilitation and international involvement¹

- Former Liberian leader C. Taylor, who has been accused of war crimes, was arrested in Nigeria.
- Following the elections that led to the creation of a new government in Haiti, a new donor conference was held to raise funds for the country.
- A pilot programme was introduced in seven different cities in Côte d'Ivoire to begin the process of identifying three million of the country's citizens who as yet have no identity documents.
- In Timor-Leste, the parliament approved the Combatants' Statute in response to the demands being made by former members of the FALINTIL.

The following chapter analyses **the evolution during the last three months of the 20 countries** regarded as being in a phase of post-war rehabilitation. Given that a conflict, the way in which a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities is brought about and the contents of such agreements all have a bearing on the way that this process evolves, the countries analysed in this chapter have been **classified** by continent on the basis of **indicator no. 4**, one of the analytical indicators used during the preparation of the Alert Report². At the end of the chapter is a section on the **most important international initiatives** that have taken place, as seen from the perspective of international involvement.

Chart 4.1. Classification of countries engaged in post-war rehabilitation

Group	Start of PWR	Country	Evolution over the last three months
1	1994	Rwanda	Progress: Rehabilitation continued to revolve around judicial issues.
	1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Stalemate: Parliament blocked constitutional reforms.
	1996	Guatemala	Stalemate: High levels of violence and ineffectiveness of the judicial system.
	1997	Tajikistan	Deterioration: Government harassment of dissident voices continued.
	1999	Serbia (Kosovo)	Deterioration: Talks on status ended without any solution.
	1999	Timor-Leste	Deterioration: Situation of instability that has led to an exodus of the population.
	2001	Sierra Leone	Progress: There were no reports of any increase in lack of security after UN troops left.
	2001	Macedonia, FYR	Progress: Introduction of the process leading to elections on 5 July.
	2003	Liberia	Progress: Presentation of a five-month development agenda.
2	2005	Indonesia (Aceh)	Progress: The mandate of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was extended.
	1999	Guinea-Bissau	Progress: Creation of a commission of former Presidents to promote dialogue.
	2000	Eritrea	Stalemate: It was decided to reopen the Border Commission's offices.
	2002	Angola	Progress: Fourth anniversary of the signing of the peace agreements.
	2003	Congo	Stalemate: The government proposed a new territorial layout.
	2003	Côte d'Ivoire	Progress: Though the situation remains unstable, a pilot programme was introduced to identify around three million people.
	2005	Sudan (South)	Stalemate: DDR and mine-clearing processes have not yet begun.
3	2004	Haiti	Progress: R. Preval was elected President in the second round of elections.
	2001	Afghanistan	Deterioration: The south of the country remained under the control of the insurgents, and the ordinary people have still seen none of the benefits of rehabilitation.
	2003	DR Congo	Stalemate: The presidential and parliamentary elections were once more postponed, this time from 18 June to 30 July.
3	2003	Iraq	Deterioration: The composition of the new Cabinet reflects the sectarian divisions in the new government, while the situation for the ordinary people continues to worsen.

¹ Post-war rehabilitation is understood to mean the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling the following issues: security of the local population; priority humanitarian requirements and the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees; physical reconstruction and the reinstatement of basic institutional services; the resolution of fundamental incompatibilities (socio-economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); reconciliation, respect for human rights and the fight to combat impunity; regional stability and reincorporation in international bodies and forums; and the empowerment of civilian society and the establishment of good governance through international involvement.

² Indicator no. 4: 1) Countries or territories that have reached a cessation of hostilities or have signed a peace agreement (either as the result of one party emerging victorious or through mediation by third parties) and in which post-war rehabilitation is progressing reasonably well; 2) Countries or territories in which a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities exists but is progressing badly and thus impeding post-war rehabilitation work; 3) Countries or territories that remain in a state of war but which are receiving considerable amounts of post-war international aid, which is often used as an incentive to facilitate the pursuit or fulfilment of an agreement that will allow hostilities to be brought to an end.



4.1. Country by country analysis

The following sections contain descriptions of the countries regarded as being in a rehabilitation phase, grouped into continents.

Africa

a) Southern Africa

In **Angola**, four years on from the signing of the Peace Agreement, mine-clearance, the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the improvement of the economic situation remained the main challenges to the country's rehabilitation. Added to this is the fact that elections are approaching. As regards **mine-clearance**, a seminar was held in Luanda to discuss the influence of this issue on national reconstruction, and it was announced that 46.5 million square metres had been cleared during the period from 1996 to 2005. As regards the **repatriation and reintegration** of refugees and the internally displaced, UNHCR indicated that it did not have sufficient funds to aid the return of around 15,000 refugees who remain in neighbouring countries. As far as the **economic situation** is concerned, it is calculated that the reconstruction of the infrastructure destroyed during the war will cost 60 billion dollars. Finally, turning to the **elections**, ACCORD organised a training seminar in electoral skills in Luanda, aimed at members of the government, civilian groups and the media. The aim of this seminar was to increase awareness among these groups regarding their responsibilities during the run-up to elections, with particular emphasis on how to handle any potential conflicts that may be associated with the electoral process.

b) West Africa

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, a pilot programme was introduced in seven cities to proceed with the **identification** of approximately three million citizens who still have no identity documents. This first stage in the organisation of future **elections**, which will also serve to demonstrate the capacity of the Ivorian justice system, was postponed during the course of the last quarter as a result of the delay in the implementation of the **DDR process**³. According to the United Nations-backed peace agreement, the identification process (which basically consists of a medical check-up and an interview) and the process for the disarmament of rebels and pro-government militia forces must happen simultaneously in order for presidential elections to be organised.

A **State Honour Commission** was created in **Guinea-Bissau**, a body that will be chaired by the head of the country's government, J. Bernardo "Nino" Vieira. This initiative resulted from an idea developed by a group of political leaders and civilian organisations and its aim is to achieve a "stability pact". The Commission has the support of all the former Presidents with the exception of L. Cabral (1973/1980), whose opinion on the idea is not yet known. The aim is to **promote reconciliation** in a country that is deeply divided by involving all the different parties in a movement to counter the confrontations that have marked the political dynamic in Guinea-Bissau. At the seventh meeting of Representatives of the UN Secretary General for West Africa, held in Côte d'Ivoire, the head of UNOGBIS, J. Honwana, pointed to the **mixed picture currently offered by the country**. While on the one hand, the **military operation in the north**⁴ has led to a humanitarian crisis and political tension, on the other, the **government programme for 2006 has been approved** and a monitoring process by IMF personnel has been extended. Both of these circumstances have made it more likely that a donor conference will be held at the end of the year.

In **Liberia**, President E. Johnson-Sirleaf presented a **development agenda** for the next five months, the main aims being economic reform, the restructuring of security, improvements in the humanitarian situation (though the parts of the country in which these improvements are to

³ For more information, see the chapter on disarmament and human security.

⁴ See the chapter on armed conflicts.



take place are not specified) and strengthening of the rule of law. The main item on this agenda is the **fight to combat corruption**, an issue supported by GEMAP⁵. The development agenda does not include reform of the judicial system, even though this has been identified as an issue that is key to the country's positive development. Elsewhere, the **arrest in Nigeria of former leader C. Taylor on charges of war crimes** was seen during the course of the last three months as a potentially destabilising element, given that the former President has some allies in the recently elected government. C. Taylor stayed in Sierra Leone until he was extradited to the Hague for trial on 11 counts. Finally, **UNHCR announced the end of its return programme** with the return of 314,000 internally displaced people to their places of origin, though the organisation will continue to work in Liberia through community rehabilitation programmes and other activities aimed at encouraging reintegration.

The report prepared by the UN Secretary General in relation to the transition from UNAMSIL to UNIOSIL⁶ in **Sierra Leone** underlined issues such as **youth unemployment, increased criminality** and the **trial of C. Taylor** as potentially destabilising elements that should be given particular attention by both the country's own government and the international community. For its part, UNIOSIL published its **Peace Consolidation Strategy** (PCS), entitled "*Harnessing Hope*"⁷. While preparing its PCS, the United Nations team looked at other long-term national plans, particularly the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The PCS, the aim of which is to coordinate the international community's work in the country, prioritises and provides support for the building of national capabilities in the prevention, management and resolution of potentially violent threats, in conjunction with the PRSP, which is aimed at reducing poverty and encouraging sustainable development. **There was no reported decrease in security** during the course of the last three months, as had been predicted following the exit of United Nations troops, though mention should be made of the violent protests organised by young people angry at the lack of jobs.

c) Horn of Africa

In **Eritrea**, the dispute with Ethiopia over **border demarcation** remained at stalemate. As a result, the UN Security Council will continue to extend the mandate of the United Nations mission in the country on a month-by-month basis until the results of the meeting held by the Border Commission in mid-May are known. Among the main conclusions reached by the meeting were the **decision to reopen the Commission's local offices in Addis Ababa and Asmara**, although they will not effectively resume operations until they have recruited staff, a process that will take several months. After the meeting, the Security Council decided to **renew UNMEE's mandate for a further four months**, reshaping its military component which will now number 2,300 troops, including a maximum of 230 military observers. The mandates of both UN Special Representative, J. Legwaila, and UNMEE's military chief, R. Singh, ended during the course of the quarter, the latter being replaced by Jordanian General M. Taisir Masadeh. Finally, the Eritrean government continued to impose restrictions on UN mission personnel, preventing them from properly fulfilling their mandate.

In **Sudan (south)**, the autonomous parliament decided to increase **military spending** by the SPLM/A, meaning that 40% of its budget would now be used for military purposes. Elsewhere, oil once again emerged as a destabilising factor in the rehabilitation process. Since the CPA was signed, new oil exploration work has prevented the return of **people who were displaced by the conflict** to their original lands, a fact reported by the NGO Refugees International, which also underlined the new government's limited capacity to control the oil companies, in spite of the establishment of a National Oil Commission⁸. In this connection it should be pointed out that both China and the USA are showing great interest in the oil fields in the region. Furthermore, the **humanitarian situation** remains extremely complicated⁹ and the provision of services over the past three months has been at best minimal and at worst non-existent, a situation that

⁵ See School of Peace Culture, *Alert 2006! Report on Conflicts, human rights and peace-building*, Icaria, 2006.

⁶ See the complete report at:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/325/47/PDF/N0632547.pdf?OpenElement>

⁷ "Harnessing Hope", at: http://www.undg.org/documents/7600-Sierra_Leone_-_Peace_Consolidation_Strategy.doc

⁸ For more information see: http://www.refintl.org/files/8831_file_sosudan_oil0614.pdf

⁹ See the chapters on armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.



threatens the CPA. By way of example, two of the main priorities for rehabilitation, the **disarmament and mine-clearance processes**, have not yet been implemented because both the Sudanese armed forces and the SPLA are avoiding their responsibilities in indicating where the minefields are, while the autonomous government is blaming the United Nations for the failure to begin mine clearance.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Congo**, The Ministry for the Administration of Land and Decentralisation published a document entitled "Departmentalisation" in which it set out a **new proposed territorial layout** under which the current number of departments would increase from 11 to 19. The aim is to bring administrative duties closer to the local people in order to make them more effective, though it should be pointed out that this new arrangement organises the new departments along ethnic lines. Defenders of the process argue that this will make the administrative management process easier, since each department will have fewer districts to control, while opponents point to confrontations between tribal groups and political scheming prior to the parliamentary elections in 2007. In this regard, a coalition of 21 political groups from the **Congolese opposition** requested the formation of a **new independent National Electoral Commission** to organise the elections planned for 2007 and the presidential elections of 2009. The current Commission was formed by the government in 2005, and opposition groups accuse it of bias.

In **DR Congo**, the date for **presidential and parliamentary elections** was postponed once again from 18 June to 30 July. This will be one of the widest-reaching electoral processes in which the international community has taken part, and the United Nations, the EU and other donors will be contributing around 422 million dollars. The lists of candidates were published in April by the Electoral Commission. 33 candidates are running for President, including current President J. Kabila, while around 9,500 people are standing as members of parliament, only 10% of whom are women. They represent 269 different political parties and are contesting 500 seats in the Lower Chamber. At the end of April, the EU approved the deployment of the military force known as **EUFOR DR Congo**, which will comprise 1,450 troops from 16 different countries. The mandate of this EU security mission will be restricted to implementing the possible evacuation of electoral observers and ensuring the security of Kinshasa airport.

In **Rwanda**, the UN Security Council approved resolution 1684, in which it agreed to extend the mandate of the 11 permanent judges at the International Criminal Court for Rwanda until the end of 2008, the date on which it is estimated that the Court will complete all the actions before it. In addition, according to reports from UNHCR, the Burundian government has repatriated more than 5,000 Rwandans from among the thousands that fled the country in 2005 supposedly as a result of the **official introduction of the traditional Gacaca courts and alleged reprisals carried out by the government with the help of local officials**. It is calculated that so far this year 19,000 people have left Rwanda to seek political asylum in Burundi. Finally, the Council of Ministers appointed new members of the Senior Committee of the Press.

America

In **Guatemala**, the government for the first time raised the possibility of creating a **Commission for the Disappeared**, to investigate the whereabouts of 45,000 people, the majority of them students and supporters of communism, who disappeared during the armed conflict. If this proposal is approved in Congress, a national register of victims may be set up, and the soldiers, members of the police and paramilitaries who may have been responsible for their disappearance could be pursued and brought to trial. In addition, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visited the country during the last quarter and pointed to the **ineffectiveness of the justice system**, the lack of progress in compensating victims, the serious social and economic problems in the country and the lack of security for ordinary people as particularly worrying issues. Finally, it should be mentioned that around 5,000 people died as a result of incidents of violence during 2005, exceeding the figures reported during the armed conflict itself. In response, President O. Berger deployed around 11,000 members of the armed forces to help the police to reduce the violence being perpetrated by the Mara gangs.



In **Haiti**, R. Préval was **elected President** during the second round of elections, which obtained a turnout of approximately 30% of the population. As far as support from the international community is concerned, a further **donor conference was held in Brazil** which was attended by countries who have donated both funds and troops and which sought to raise funds to support the newly elected President. **Of the more than 1,000 million dollars promised in July 2004, approximately 800 million has already been spent**, and it was therefore decided to hold a new conference soon, this time in Haiti itself, under the auspices of the World Bank. During this conference, the Secretary General's new Special Representative in the country, Guatemalan E. Mulet, who replaced J. G. Valdés as the head of MINUSTAH, pointed to the need for donors to continue their involvement in the rehabilitation process and underlined that they should not abandon the country now that a new government was in place, as had happened on previous occasions.

Asia and the Pacific

In **Tajikistan**, both the USA and Russia engaged in diplomatic actions during the course of the quarter that clearly signalled their interest in this Central Asian country. Meanwhile, this **international approval** allowed President E. Rakhmonov to continue his **campaign to silence dissident voices**. As a result, the political representatives who might offer an alternative in the forthcoming general elections continued to suffer harassment from E. Rakhmonov's regime. There was also continuing **repression against communications media** not aligned with the regime. Finally, mention should be made of the **positive macroeconomic indices** achieved by Tajikistan. This led to an increase in investor confidence and further consolidated the position President, who still failed to implement any measure aimed at fomenting improvements in the social situation.

In **Timor-Leste**, the expulsion of around 600 soldiers, almost 40% of the country's armed forces, led to a **situation of instability and confrontation** that caused an exodus among the ordinary people and intervention by international forces, mainly from Australia, though the Australian government took this decision unilaterally without consulting its Timorese counterpart¹⁰. Elsewhere, the parliament approved the **combatants' statute**, though it has not yet been published either by the government or by UNOTIL. The aim of this statute is to provide a response to claims made by many of the former combatants who found themselves being discriminated against following the armed conflict, since no adequate DDR process was put in place. Finally, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1677, extending UNOTIL's mandate to 20 June 2006, calling on the UN Secretary General to present an updated report setting out the organisation's future in the country. It should be pointed out that the government officially sought United Nations involvement in the elections planned for 2007.

In **Indonesia (Aceh)**, the EU approved the **extension of the AMM's mandate** until local elections had been held in the region, in response to a request from the Indonesian government's with support from the GAM. It nevertheless indicated that it would not extend its leaving date beyond 15 September 2006. The last three months have seen a series of incidents provoked by delays in the management of **aid for reintegration of the population** by the Aceh Reintegration Body (BRA). In this regard, a particularly marked potential factor for conflict is the fact that 75% of returning GAM members have no jobs and have not received sufficient assistance as regards their reintegration. During one of the monthly meetings of the Security Agreements Commission¹¹, it was agreed to restructure the BRA to improve its effectiveness. It should also be mentioned that the GAM withdrew from the BRA, saying that its structure was too large to allow it to operate effectively.

The first meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) took place in **Afghanistan**. The aim of the JCMB is to resolve strategic issues and provide political support for the **Compact**. The Board will sit for five years, to coincide with the duration of the Compact, and it will meet every four months to assess the progress being made. As far as **security** is

¹⁰ For more information, see the chapter on tensions.

¹¹ These meetings are attended by the AMM, the Indonesian government and the GAM.



concerned, British troops took over control of the ISAF from the Italians. This contingent comprises 9,000 soldiers, a figure that is expected to rise to 11,000 in November. A report published during the last quarter by the NGO *Senlis Council* denounced the state of war in the province of Helmand¹², where the government has as yet been unable to guarantee the security of the ordinary population. This fact, coupled with corrupt practices in local government has led to a fall in the popularity of H. Karzai's government. Furthermore, the policy of eradicating opium crops, which is supported by the international community, has not been accompanied by a suitable alternative for crop cultivation. This has resulted in a situation of extreme poverty that has led the population to return once again to the more lucrative cultivation of drugs, for which the insurgents offer them protection, exercising a parallel power base in a region that is a long way from Kabul and has few international troops.

Europe

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the new Representative of the International Community, C Schwartz-Shilling, completed the first 100 days of his mandate. In his status report to the country's parliament, he reaffirmed his decision to take a more distanced position than his predecessors. In this connection he criticised the attitude of Bosnian politicians who still refused to take responsibility for any decisions that were politically controversial and who placed their own partisan interests above those of the country, particularly in respect of the rejection by 16 members of parliament of the **constitutional reforms** agreed by the majority parties¹³ after four months of debate, reforms that are essential if the negotiation process with the EU is to continue. As a result, the implementation of constitutional reforms could be delayed until after the elections planned for the month of October, sending a negative message in respect of the association and stabilisation process currently underway with the EU.

Talks on **Serbia (Kosovo)** finally ended in Vienna, the most controversial issue being that of decentralisation. At the beginning of these talks, both the United Nations and the Contact Group¹⁴ indicated that possible independence for Kosovo could only be achieved if the Kosovo Albanian authorities guaranteed that they would protect the rights of Kosovo Serbs and other minorities living in the Province. Two important events have demonstrated that the political talks and the real situation on the ground are following parallel courses. On the one hand is the fact that the other ethnic minorities (Bosnians, Gorani, Turks, Egyptians, Roma¹⁵ and Ashkhalii) have not participated in the talks but have instead been relegated to a Consultative Committee on minorities, which has advisory status, thus contradicting the stance taken by both the United Nations and the international community which have sought a multi-ethnic Kosovo. On the other is the fact that **application of the eight standards for Kosovo**¹⁶ remains uneven, and in some aspects, such as freedom of movement, inadequate. It should also be mentioned that the presence of KFOR soldiers continued to be required in order to guarantee security in the Serbian enclaves that still exist within regions occupied by Albanians in the south and east of the country, such as Strpce and Novo Brdo, and that tensions remain strong between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in the divided city of Mitrovica.

In **Macedonia**, the parliament opted for 5 July as the date for **parliamentary elections**. A State Electoral Commission has been set up to prepare for the process, comprising seven members led by the Secretary of the Parliamentary Committee for Social and Employment Affairs, J. Jofisovski. He was appointed by the main opposition party, as set out in the **new electoral code** signed by President B. Crvenkovski and approved by consensus in parliament. In order to prevent the kind of disputes that international observers have reported during past elections, the OSCE has introduced a project to **promote dialogue** between the different parties, beginning with round table talks in Kumanovo. As regards **international commitment**, Sweden signed a

¹² See the complete report at: http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Helmand_Report_June_2006.

¹³ See the chapter on post-war rehabilitation in Barometer 10.

¹⁴ Comprising the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia.

¹⁵ The Roma continue to live in degrading conditions in refugee camps set up by the United Nations.

¹⁶ The conclusions regarding the status of the eight standards for Kosovo are set out in a report on Kosovo prepared by the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, K. Eide, at the end of 2005. The complete report can be found at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/540/72/PDF/N0554072.pdf?OpenElement>



bilateral agreement with the government worth 15 million euros, to finance development projects during 2006 and 2007.

Middle East

In **Iraq**, the new Prime Minister, N. al-Maliki, announced the **composition of his new Cabinet**, which was approved by the Board of Representatives in Iraq. Ministerial portfolios were distributed almost mathematically on the basis of the number of seats in parliament won by each party, reflecting a sectarian arrangement of Ministers. As regards **international conduct**, the NGO Coordination Committee¹⁷ carried out an assessment that showed that the absence of financing from neutral institutions is one of the main problems facing humanitarian agencies in their attempts to work in Iraq. This problem was further exacerbated by the closure for **security** reasons of the European Office for Humanitarian Affairs, though this organisation continued to work through its local counterparts. Finally, **UNAMI** extended the Baghdad Peace Initiative (previously only pursued in political circles) to include civilian groups and communities in an attempt to assist political negotiations. Finally, the UN Secretary General appointed the Lebanese diplomat J. M. Fakhouri as his Special Representative in Iraq to take care of humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development.

4.2. Other items on the agenda

This section deals with aspects relating to the theory and analysis of post-war rehabilitation, along with good practices and the lessons learned in this area.

a) The United Nations Country Team (UNCT)

When deploying a mission in response to a humanitarian emergency situation, the United Nations' specialist agencies, funds and programmes on the ground are organised into a working team, known as a UNCT, charged with coordinating and increasing the effectiveness of any international response. Its **main aims** are: to analyse the situation affecting the country in which they are deployed, to establish working priorities, to set out the results and define the responsibilities of each of the individual agencies, to design country programmes and projects and to monitor and assess how events are developing.

The idea of unifying actions at a country level arose in 1997 as part of the programme of reforms suggested by UN Secretary General K. Annan¹⁸. This document pointed out that each of the Organisation's agencies and programmes was working individually, coordinating their own response with other government organisations, NGOs and governments themselves, without deriving any mutual benefit from the presence of other United Nations agencies and programmes. The reform programme proposed integrating all the aid assistance offered under an **Integrated Development Assistance Framework**, acting under the mandate of the United Nations' Resident Coordinator.

Subsequently, at the request of donors and personnel on the ground, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), which provides the framework for the UNCT, developed a **harmonised programme cycle** to improve and simplify the work of the UNCT and give unity to the involvement by the Organisation's agencies and programmes on a country-by-country basis.

¹⁷ For more information on this committee, go to: <http://www.ncciraq.org/sommaire.php3>

¹⁸ See *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*. UN General Assembly A/51/950, 14 July 1997. At: <http://www.un.org/reform/pdfs/1997%20renewing%20the%20un-prog%20for%20reform.pdf>



Chart 4.2. Common Planning Processes

Common Country Assessment (CCA)

Comprising: Members of the UNCT, government, civilian groups, international development counterparts and regional institutions.

Assessment and analysis of the key causes of poverty, bearing in mind the Millennium Development Goals and the domestic priorities of the country in question, identifying the areas in which the United Nations can make a difference by acting collectively. Systematic integration of significant issues such as human rights, gender equality and questions relating to sustainable development. This is not required if a national analysis process has already taken place, such as a Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP), in which case it will be this plan that is used as a basis by the UNCT, though the possibility of carrying out additional and complementary analyses will remain.

UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)

Comprising: Members of the UNCT, residents and non-residents.

This is the common strategic framework for the UN's operational activities in a particular country. Based on the Millennium Goals at a country level, along with the main challenges identified in the CCA, it defines the key results to be achieved by United Nations agencies, tying them directly in with the individual country programmes for each agency.

The **UNDAF Results Matrix** provides a picture of how the work of the United Nations is to be organised in the country and how this will be linked with domestic priorities, serving as a fund-raising tool.

The **UNDAF Monitoring and Evaluation Framework** allows agencies to make a joint assessment of the progress achieved in action taken by the United Nations towards attainment of the Millennium Goals.

Joint planning

The joint planning and design of programmes increases efficiency, offering agencies the results of their combined experiences and skills, strengthening the work done by each of them and benefiting sustainability, preventing the duplication of duties, reducing costs and offering synergies between the different national organisations and United Nations agencies.

Joint Strategy Meeting (JSM)

Jointly sponsored by: The United Nations and the country's government, with the **involvement** of representatives from civilian groups, NGOs and donors.

The aim is to review and discuss consistency between the expected results set out in the UNDAF Results Matrix and those pursued in the country programmes of the individual agencies. This process should provide a basis for gaining government approval for proposed programmes prior to their presentation to the executive committees in charge of each of the agencies involved.

Country Programme Document (CPD)

This sets out the priority issues with the aim of defining a programme for cooperation between agencies, with emphasis on the programme components and a clear picture of how the programme strategies will achieve the expected results identified in the UNDAF Results Matrix. It also indicates the resources that will be needed. It is prepared after the JSM, between 8 and 12 weeks before the agencies' executive committees meet. Each of the four agencies that form the UNDG's executive committee (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP) prepares and presents the CPD to their respective executive committees, using the same format to describe the way in which the agency's country programme will contribute to the UNDAF results. The CPD unifies the formats used by the different agencies.

Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP)

The document signed by the United Nations and the government of the country in question which provides the legal agreement by which the programme cycle will be governed. It contains an explicit reference to the United Nations' long-term results. This is the tangible expression of how the UNDAF is to operate and provides a clear explanation of the strategy pursued by both the government and the different agencies, along with any undertakings established.

Annual Work Plan (AWP)

This provides operational details and is tied in with the strategic results indicated in the UNDAF and the CPD through the CPAP. All the parties involved must be in agreement with the AWP.

It consists of a simple standard format that clarifies the role of each of the agencies and serves to allow for more fluent communication of operational details between the executive committees of the different agencies, local groups and donors. It can also serve as a monitoring tool and a basis for the preparation of an annual review with input from the government in question and other local parties.

Standard Progress Report (SPR)

The aim of the SPR is to reduce administrative loads on local organisations in countries in which these programmes are being implemented. It follows a harmonised format based on one single currency, the dollar, and takes in all the programme objectives, the way the programme is to be implemented, the resources used and the results obtained. It also acts as a mechanism to offer donors information on the funds received, giving a breakdown of how financial resources have been used on a donor-by-donor basis. As a management and fund-mobilisation tool, the SPR sets out the problems faced during implementation and any area where funds may potentially be lacking. It is prepared annually.



While a UNCT is more appropriate to the emergency phase, we have decided to make particular mention of it here as we believe that the harmonised cycle programme proposed by the United Nations is a structure that could facilitate transition between the emergency phase and the rehabilitation phase, as well as improving coordination between organisations, one of the main problems identified during the rehabilitation phase.

b) Peace-Building Commission¹⁹

The process to select **members of the Organising Committee** has finally been completed. The former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Burundi, C. McAskie, was the person chosen to take the position of Assistant Secretary General at the Peace-Building Support Office. It is interesting to note here that the first countries that the Commission will look at once finalised will be Burundi and Sierra Leone.

The amount finally allocated to the **Peace-Building Fund**, another item that has been under discussion in recent months, will be around one and a half million dollars (to be drawn from the budget set aside for special political missions this year), rather than the three million dollars originally requested by the UN Secretary General. The UNDP will be the department responsible for managing this fund. Finally, Angola will chair the Commission for a year, and Norway and El Salvador have been chosen as Deputy Chairs.

Chart 4.3. The 31 Members of the Organising Committee

UN Security Council (7) – The five permanent members plus two non-permanent members (Denmark and Tanzania).			
Economic and Social Committee (7) Preference given to countries that have suffered a period of armed conflict	Region	Seats	Countries
	Africa	2	Angola, Guinea Bissau
	Asia	2	Sri Lanka, Indonesia
	Eastern Europe	1	Poland, Czech Rep.
	Latin America/Caribbean	1	Brazil
	Western Europe	1	Belgium
Main contributors to UN funds (5) – Appointed by rotation. Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway (still to be confirmed).			
Main contributors of troops and police to UN missions (5) – Appointed regionally by rotation. Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Ghana			
General Assembly (7) Regional groupings and countries that have undergone recovery processes following periods of armed conflict. These will be reviewed annually.	Region	Seats	Countries
	Africa	2	Burundi, Egypt Libya
	Asia	1	Malaysia, Philippines, Fiji
	Eastern Europe	1	Croatia, B&H
	Latin America/Caribbean	3	El Salvador, Jamaica, Chile
	Western Europe	0	...

¹⁹ A new United Nations inter-governmental organisation created in response to the need, identified by the UN Secretary General, for a forum in which all the parties involved in rehabilitation can meet and coordinate the international response. For more information, see Barometer 10 and School of Peace Culture, *op. cit.*



Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action

- The United Nations issued another warning about the serious food crisis affecting five million people in the Sahel region.
- The upsurge in violence in Myanmar caused the displacement of thousands of people and the deterioration of living conditions.
- The recent violent disturbances have given rise to a humanitarian crisis in Timor-Leste, where 10% of the population has been forcibly displaced during recent months.
- The number of people living below the poverty line in Palestine rose to 51% of the population.

This section contains a review of the current situation in the different contexts of humanitarian crisis around the world and their recent evolution. It also details the main events that have occurred over the past three months in the area of humanitarian action.

5.1. - Evolution of humanitarian crises¹

The following is an analysis of the evolution of the different humanitarian crises in which there have been significant developments during the past three months. **44 countries or regions currently find themselves in this situation**², 26 of them in Africa, 9 in the Asia and Pacific region, 5 in Europe and Central Asia, 2 in America and another 2 in the Middle East. It should be mention the **inclusion during this quarter of Timor-Leste as a context of humanitarian crisis** due to the after-effects of the upsurge in violence in the country, while **the Maldives have been removed from this category**, having gradually recovered from the effects of the tsunamis in December 2004.

Africa

The impact of the drought in the **Horn of Africa**, the effects of the violence in the Sudanese region of **Darfur** and the east of **Chad**, and the food crisis facing millions of people in the countries of the **Sahel** region were all issues that raised **major concerns** in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mention should be made in this regard of the warning issued by UNICEF, which in May reported an alarming **increase in infant mortality**, with death rates rising to one in every five children.

a) Southern Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Angola	Return and resettlement process	Unchanged
Lesotho	Drought, HIV/AIDS	Improved
Madagascar	Natural disasters, HIV/AIDS	Unchanged
Malawi	Drought, HIV/AIDS	Improved
Swaziland	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political crisis	Unchanged
Zimbabwe	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political and economic crisis, international isolation	Deteriorated

¹ In this report, "humanitarian crises" are understood to be situations in which there is an exceptional and widespread threat to human life, health or subsistence. Such crises tend to occur against a background of poverty, state fragility and a lack of food, in which a natural disaster or armed conflict give rise to the occurrence of food emergencies, disease, the enforced displacement of people within the country or outside it, along with a significant mobilisation of international resources in the form of aid.

² Any improvement or deterioration in these crises is judged on the basis of certain specific indicators, such as food safety, access to the population by humanitarian agencies, population displacements and the response to a particular situation by the international community. Nevertheless, the mere fact that these contexts are regarded as humanitarian crises automatically means that they are acknowledged to represent a highly serious problem.



The arrival of rains meant that the whole of southern Africa was able to **improve its annual harvests** in comparison with last year, meaning that countries like **Malawi** and **Lesotho** will not have to cope with food shortages this year, according to the WFP. Elsewhere, **minefields remain an obstacle to improvements in agricultural production in Angola** following the war, and the country also had to face one of its most severe outbreaks of cholera in recent years. The spread of the disease is affecting the return and resettlement of refugees. Finally, as regards the worrying situation in **Zimbabwe**, particular mention should be made of the latest WHO report, which said that **life expectancy in the country had fallen to 34 for men (the lowest on the planet) and 37 for women**, the main reasons being the economic and political crisis in the country and an increase in HIV/AIDS infections.

b) West Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Côte d'Ivoire	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Unchanged
Guinea	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements and political crisis	Unchanged
Liberia	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements	Unchanged
Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger)	Drought, plague of locusts	Deteriorated
Sierra Leone	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements	Unchanged

Although the humanitarian situation has, in general terms, evolved favourably in the countries that form the Mano River Region (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone), the United Nations warned of the **lack of funds** and the **large number of humanitarian challenges** that remain unresolved, particularly in places such as **Côte d'Ivoire**. In **Liberia**, UNHCR announced that it had completed its duties in relation to the programme for the return of more than 300,000 internally displaced people to their places of origin. Although the situation is not regarded as a humanitarian crisis, specific mention should be made of the emergency faced by more than 20,000 people (mainly women and children) in the **north of Guinea-Bissau**, as a result of the upsurge in fighting between Senegalese armed groups and Guinean troops³. Humanitarian organisations also warned of the **risk of famine** affecting around 32,000 people in certain southern parts of the country.

As regards the countries in the **Sahel** region, both the United Nations and humanitarian agencies expressed **concern over the persisting food crisis which is affecting more than five million people** and which could potentially be causing the deaths of some 300,000 children every year. The same groups complained about the constant **lack of funds** which is making it very difficult to tackle the situation.

c) Horn of Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Eritrea	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Ethiopia	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Somalia	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Sudan	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated

The effects of the **drought** on more than 15 million people, along with the **shortage of funds** available to tackle the crisis remained the issues of most concern in the region. Given the situation, the United Nations Special Envoy for the humanitarian situation in the Horn of Africa, K. Magne Bondevik, sought **urgent help from the international community**, while a number of humanitarian organisations increased their requests for funds, particularly for **Somalia**, where the

³ See the chapter on situations of tension and high-risk disputes



crisis is most alarming. As regards this country, the United Nations Special Advisor for internal displacement, D. McNamara, stressed that 400,000 displaced Somalis are suffering the **worst living conditions in the whole of the African continent**. Furthermore, indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population and on medical facilities during May led to condemnations from humanitarian organisations and a request for the normalisation of humanitarian access.

However, the current crisis in various parts of **Sudan** remained the main concern for the whole of the humanitarian community. In addition to the **evacuations forced on some humanitarian organisations in the southern provinces of Upper Nile and Jonglei** as a result of sporadic armed clashes and the deterioration of the food situation in the state of **Bahr el Ghazal**, there were serious **security problems in Sudanese refugee camps located in the east of Chad**, while the violence continued in the region of **Darfur**. In this last region, the upsurge in violence left several members of the peace-keeping mission (AMIS) dead and led to the withdrawal of **a number of humanitarian organisations**, in spite of the fact that a peace agreement⁴ was signed at the beginning of May, providing for the establishment of humanitarian aid corridors and security zones around the camps for the internally displaced. The agreement also provided for the creation of a commission that would work together with the United Nations on the supposed process for the return of refugees and the displaced. For his part, the Assistant Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Aid Coordinator, **J. Egeland, was finally able to visit some of the towns and camps for displaced people in the region**, after being prevented from doing so some weeks earlier. Among other demands, J. Egeland called on the parties to comply with the undertakings they had made in the peace agreement and to respect access by humanitarian organisations.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Burundi	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Improved
Central African Republic	Armed internal disputes, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Chad	Armed internal disputes, regional instability, volume of enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Congo	Armed internal disputes, volume of enforced displacements	Unchanged
DR Congo	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Kenya	Volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Rwanda	Impact of regional conflicts, volume of enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Tanzania	Volume of refugees, drought	Unchanged
Uganda	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated

In recent months, the **situation facing the internally displaced in Chad and the Central African Republic has continued to deteriorate**, with fresh displacements being caused by the activities of various armed groups in both countries. United Nations sources **put the figure of internally displaced people in the CAR at 50,000**, while a further 45,000 are currently living as refugees in neighbouring Chad. The prevailing lack of stability in the region also **makes it difficult for humanitarian organisations to gain access**. At the same time, UNICEF warned of the scant amount of aid being received by displaced Chadians in comparison with the amount being delivered to Sudanese refugees.

In **Uganda**, a report by a number of NGOs operating in the country revealed some important data on the humanitarian effects of the conflict, warning that **41% of the people dying in the camps for the internally displaced are children under 5 years old**. The same report indicates that **146 people die each week as a result of the conflict**, a figure that is three times the number dying in Iraq even though the communications media pays this context scant attention. The country's armed forces withdrew their protection from food aid organisations, arguing that security had now improved, while President Y. Museveni called on humanitarian organisations to stop publishing negative reports on the situation in the north of the country. In

⁴ See the chapter on peace processes.



Tanzania, **floods** left 19,000 people homeless, while in **Kenya**, work to distribute aid around the towns affected by the **drought** was seriously impeded during the rainy season.

Refugees from **Burundi** continued to **return to the country thanks to the progress achieved in peace negotiations**, leading to a presumption that the situation has improved. Nevertheless, the WFP warned that the situation remained unstable and that supplies and access to food were still insufficient. In **Rwanda**, OCHA stressed that the **overcrowding of camps for the internally displaced** was endangering conditions for their inhabitants, in spite of the aid received. Meanwhile, the critical situation faced in **DR Congo**, where people were still being forcibly displaced in the eastern part of the country, led to warnings from the United Nations that the **funds reaching the country to provide humanitarian aid for the displaced were clearly insufficient**, amounting to only 13% of the aid that the international community had promised for this purpose.

Central African Republic: a crisis that has been kept quiet?

The **refusal by the government of the Central African Republic to acknowledge the importance of the conflict currently taking place in the north-west of the country** has meant that thousands of people have been forced to move in order to escape attacks from the different armed opposition groups operating in the region. The first attacks occurred in September last year in the region of Ouham, the place where the country's current President, F. Bozizé, originally comes from. The main objective of the three armed opposition groups (UFR, MPRPC and APRDR), which have no known alliances between them, is to destabilise the current government. Added to the warring activities of these groups is the **disastrous intervention by Central African armed forces** (in particular the Presidential Guard), which were sent to the region in March and which have engaged in a "scorched earth" policy when faced with the possible presence of members of armed groups.

The armed forces classify the violence that has broken out in the north as a **low intensity conflict**, a description that contrasts sharply with the alarming displacement figures: **55,000 internally displaced and 45,000 people living as refugees in Chad**. Although some families have spent months away from their places of origin, none of them has received humanitarian assistance. Local health workers have also fled the area, increasing vulnerability even further. The serious lack of security is making the distribution of humanitarian aid to the displaced even more complicated, and the United Nations estimates that **around 35,000 people require food and healthcare**. The displaced population avoids any contact with people who are unfamiliar to them for fear that they may be soldiers dressed as civilians. Only the CAR Red Cross remains in the areas most affected by the violence, while UNHCR is working with MSF Spain and other international NGOs to distribute aid among these people.

America and the Caribbean

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Colombia	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Haiti	Natural disasters, political and economic crisis	Unchanged

Turning to the Americas, two theatres of crisis persist. As far as **Colombia** is concerned, the respective visits in May and June by senior members of UNHCR P. Lavanche and J. Cheng-Hopkins led them both to indicate the **invisibility and extreme seriousness of the crisis affecting the country**, where more than two million people are displaced and some 450,000 have fled as refugees to Venezuela and Ecuador. The UN refugee agency also expressed its **concern over security in a number of the country's regional departments**.

In **Haiti**, even though the security situation remained fairly stable, there were further kidnappings and some incidents of isolated violence which **forced humanitarian organisations to strengthen their own security measures**, particularly in places like the capital, Port-au-Prince. For its part, the United Nations announced the **inclusion of Haiti** in the list of 12 countries that will receive money from the recently created **Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)**⁵.

⁵ See the section on humanitarian action.



Asia and the Pacific

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Afghanistan	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Bangladesh	Floods	Unchanged
DPR Korea	Economic, food and health crises	Improved
Indonesia	Tsunami, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Myanmar	Volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Nepal	Armed conflict	Unchanged
Pakistan	Earthquake	Unchanged
Sri Lanka	Natural disasters, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Timor-Leste	Civil conflict	New

There were several notable crisis situations on the continent of Asia. In **Afghanistan** the US humanitarian organisation CARE **called on NATO to pull its troops off humanitarian duties** and concentrate solely on security issues, due to the growing danger that their involvement in this work created for humanitarian personnel. For its part, the **UN Security Council expressed its concern over the increasing violence affecting humanitarian workers** which left several UNICEF workers dead over the course of the last quarter. As it has already done in the case of some African countries, the WFP urged donors to provide funds in order to prevent a potential breakdown in the supply of food aid as a result of a shortage of resources.

Turning to **Indonesia**, a country that is still recovering from the devastating effects of the tsunamis of December 2004, **another earthquake**, this time in the eastern part of the **island of Java**, left **5,736 dead**, 78,200 injured, 200,000 displaced and more than a million and a half people homeless. Despite the seriousness of the event, the response by humanitarian institutions and organisations already present in the country succeeded in stabilising the situation relatively quickly. In **Myanmar**, the **situation has deteriorated considerably** due to an increase in armed violence and the intensification of military operations which forced the **displacement of tens of thousands of people** (mainly belonging to the Karen community), who joined the half million people in the country who have already suffered displacement. In this connection, some organisations **called on the UN Security Council to show greater commitment to this situation**, which they classified as the **worst displacement crisis currently seen on the Asian continent**. In **Nepal**, various NGOs warned that in spite of the ceasefire, the 200,000 people who had been displaced by the armed conflict would not yet be able to return to their places of origin, and the **United Nations called on all parties to allow the unrestricted passage of humanitarian aid to the people affected**. As regards the situation in **DPR Korea**, the government and the WFP signed an **agreement** at the beginning of May **allowing the agency to resume its supply of aid** to almost two million people, after a break of almost six months caused by disputes with the country's leaders.

In **Sri Lanka**, the renewed violence caused the **displacement of thousands of people** and a serious deterioration in living conditions for all those affected. Elsewhere, the President announced that the **programme to rebuild the areas affected by the tsunamis would be completed** by the end of the year, blaming delays on the work being done by humanitarian organisations. Finally, it should be mentioned that **Timor-Leste** is a new inclusion in this list of humanitarian crises, after **more than 130,000 people (10% of the total population)** were **forcibly displaced as a result of the armed fighting** that began in May⁶. Both the United Nations, which has requested around 19 million dollars, and the combined humanitarian organisations, have mobilised their forces in an attempt to tackle the situation.

⁶ See the chapter on tensions.



Violence, displacement and humanitarian action in Asia

During the course of the last three months the Asian continent has experienced an extraordinary increase in levels of violence that has directly resulted in the **displacement of tens of thousands of people**. The already entrenched situation of armed conflict in **Afghanistan** has been joined by military repression in **Myanmar**, the resumption of hostilities in **Sri Lanka** and violent disturbances in **Timor-Leste**, which in this last case caused the displacement of 10% of the total population.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, **almost three million people are affected by this problem in more than ten countries around the Asian continent**. Although annual figures showed a slight fall, and the problem cannot in global terms be compared with the huge figures reported in Africa, which amount to some four times the figure in Asia, the majority of these contexts of violence **offer little hope of any swift solution** to the situation. Conditions are not suitable for the return of these people in many countries (lack of security, absence of infrastructure and basic services, etc.), and the countries involved have failed to offer any guarantees or protection for the people affected, particularly where governments themselves are responsible for instigating the violence and causing their displacement in the first place.

In cases like Myanmar and Sri Lanka where, as in some other places, displacement has become a strategic weapon, it is **very difficult for humanitarian organisation to maintain a presence and carry out their duties**, as they are often unable to tackle the huge inadequacies that still abound in this area. Aid to the affected population, together with proper reporting and the establishment of an international legal framework to protect the people affected, are just some of the tasks still to be faced in the area of humanitarian action.

Europe and Central Asia

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)	Volume of internally displaced people, political and economic crisis,	Unchanged
Russia (Chechnya)*	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)	Internal civil disputes, volume of internally displaced people,	Unchanged

* Neighbouring Republics (Dagestan, North Ossetia and Ingushetia)

Once again there is concern in the **Caucasus** sub-region over the condition of tens of thousands of Azeris who have been internally displaced as a result of the conflict over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, where the **FAO called for international help** in launching a new food supply programme.

Meanwhile, in **Chechnya**, the **Russian government threatened** in mid-April to **close Chechyan refugee camps** and return all residents to their places of origin, claiming that the camps had become the domain of the insurgency. However, some humanitarian organisations warned that conditions were not right for their return, as many of these people were ill and had no homes to return to. For his part, the head of UNHCR, **A. Guterres, held a meeting with Chechen leaders and expressed his unhappiness at Moscow's decision**, while at the same time announcing that the agency was opening a new office in Chechnya.

Middle East

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Iraq	Armed conflict, drought	Deteriorated
Palestine	Armed conflict, humanitarian isolation of the population	Unchanged

There are currently two serious contexts of humanitarian crisis in the Middle East. In **Iraq**, the incessant wave of attacks and violent incidents during the course of the last three months have caused the **displacement of more than 100,000 people in various parts of the country**, though unofficial sources have claimed that the figure is much higher.



Meanwhile, in the occupied **Palestinian** territories, attentions were focused on the **threat from certain sectors of the international community to halt the supply of aid** as a result of the controversial change of government. This raised great concerns among a number of humanitarian organisations that basic services in the Palestinian territories would eventually collapse completely. In addition, organisations like MSF **denounced the conditions in which almost one and a half million people were living in the Gaza Strip**, after severe attacks from the armed forces. As a result of this situation, both the United Nations and various NGOs made an **emergency call** during May for an **80% increase in the amount of money allocated to these people**, given the worsening humanitarian crisis. Countries such as Finland, Sweden and Norway also indicated that they would be willing to provide further financing for this crisis through the United Nations agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA), which provides aid for almost four and a half million people.

Public sector workers: the key to easing the crisis in Palestine

The situation faced by the Palestinian people is deteriorating ever more quickly. Unemployment rates and levels of poverty have risen sharply as a result of the political pressures imposed on the Hamas government by Israel, the USA and the EU, leading to an **unprecedented humanitarian crisis**. According to the Palestinian Central Office of Statistics, **the number of people living below the poverty line in the country rose from 1.3 to 2.7 million during the last three months** (51% of the population). Likewise, the lack of funds has made it difficult to pay the salaries of public sector workers (152,000 in the Palestinian Authority), seriously endangering the stability of the territory's institutions and further worsening the situation for ordinary people. It should be borne in mind that one in four people in the occupied territories rely on these salaries in order to survive.

The United Nations has stated that **no organisation would be capable of undertaking the provision of services provided by the Palestinian Authority**, indicating that under the 4th Geneva Convention, **responsibility for providing aid to the population lies directly with Israel as the occupying nation**, meaning that it must ensure their welfare. The UN also warned that the **failure to pay the salaries of the 70,000 people who form part of the security service** could mean an increase in criminality and the exacerbation of the crisis, thus impeding the work of humanitarian organisations on the ground. As a result, the continuation of financial restrictions and political pressure could lead to a worsening of the cycle of violence. In this connection, the United Nations recalled that, **under the principle of impartiality, humanitarian assistance must be based on the needs of the population and not be subject to political conditionality**.

http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/docs/UN/OCHA/Assessment%20of%20the%20future%20humanitarian%20risks%20oPt_Eng_apr_19.pdf

5.2. Humanitarian action⁷ during the last three months

The following are some of the relevant events, initiatives and reports that have had an effect on the various activities involved in humanitarian action.

a) UNHCR report on the refugee population in 2005

UNHCR has once again published its report on the worldwide refugee situation. The United Nations agency stressed that during 2005 **the overall figures for refugees reached their lowest level for the last 26 years, falling from 9.5 million to 8.4 million**. This figure, which for the fifth year running confirmed the downward trend in refugee numbers (in 2001 the total was 12.1 million), is the result of the agency's work in providing the refugee population with access to lasting solutions (some six million people have returned to their places of origin since 2002), particularly in respect of so-called voluntary repatriation.

However, as in previous years, the decrease in refugee numbers contrasts strongly with the **substantial rise in the number of people in the care of UNHCR, which rose from 19.5**

⁷ "Humanitarian action" is understood to mean the group of activities aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering in situations of humanitarian crisis. These activities are guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian action also includes the protection of civilians and the provision of basic aid.



million to 20.8 million. This is once again the result of the **increase in the number of internally displaced people under the responsibility of the agency**, a figure that rose from 5.4 million at the end of 2004 to 6.6 million in 2005. Along with the internally displaced (32% of the people for whom UNHCR is responsible) and refugees (40%), other groups of concern to the agency are repatriated people (1.6 million), asylum-seekers (773,000), stateless people (2.4 million), and several groups that are unable to apply for asylum but nevertheless need protection (960,000). However, UNHCR's statistics do not include the 4.3 million Palestinian refugees who remain under the care of UNRWA.

Table 5.1.- Persons of concern to UNHCR during 2005

Sub-region	Refugees	Assisted by UNHCR	Asylum seekers	Returned refugees	Internal Displaced People concerned by UNHCR	Returned IDP	Stateless People	Miscellaneous	Total Population of concern to UNHCR
Central Africa and Great Lakes	1,119,653	758,585	35,003	119,015	11,500	-	-	-	1,359,171
East and Horn of Africa	771,967	647,553	24,611	30,647	1,241,946	-	-	36,141	2,105,312
West Africa	377,168	250,443	27,316	77,814	278,861	266,744	-	3,034	1,030,937
Southern Africa	236,084	91,559	152,429	53,821	-	-	-	-	442,334
North Africa	107,205	94,400	2,543	1	-	-	5	29,500	139,254
Middle East	492,182	155,365	35,149	56,183	1,200,000	196,000	586,105	15,019	2,580,638
Southwest Asia	1,801,129	1,801,097	3,580	751,726	142,505	17,044	-	-	2,715,984
Central Asia	69,082	20,289	1,610	30	-	-	145,644	-	216,366
South Asia	286,923	138,703	1,754	2,792	324,699	27,185	886,495	10,928	1,540,776
East Asia and the Pacific	523,476	139,256	61,226	314	-	-	15,000	62,730	662,746
Eastern Europe	229,729	18,272	2,307	205	983,338	2,075	97,814	243,230	1,558,698
Southeastern Europe	162,819	152,825	1,523	8,930	433,942	10,382	5,213	85,000	707,809
Central Europe and Baltic States	25,189	5,421	25,207	21	-	-	565,408	1,400	607,225
Western Europe	1,729,971	149	228,615	-	-	-	13,532	3,000	1,975,118
North America and the Caribbean	527,217	559	190,327	1	-	-	-	-	717,545
Central America and Mexico	4,542	447	230	44	-	-	-	-	4,816
South America (North)	23,616	2,100	9,419	8	2,000,000	-	-	460,265	2,493,308
South America (South)	8,044	4,242	1,139	-	-	-	-	4,000	13,183
Total	8,569,996	4,281,265	803,988	1,101,552	6,616,791	519,430	2,305,216	954,247	20,871,220

Source: UNHCR

The refugees' **main countries of origin** were still **Afghanistan** (2.9 million), **Colombia** (2.5 million), **Iraq** (1.8 million), **Sudan** (1.6 million) and **Somalia** (839,000). However, the total number of refugees from Afghanistan was reduced by 21% as a result of the current repatriation programme, which has assisted the return of more than four and a half million people since 2002. **Repatriation operations** also brought a **reduction in the number of Burundian (10%) and Liberian (31%) refugees**. In this regard, the **most significant regional reduction was seen in West Africa** and the region that includes Central Asia, Southwest Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, referred to by UNHCR as the CASWANAME region.



b) Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF)

By the end of June a total of **263 million dollars** had been allocated to the Fund by **43 donor countries**, more than half of the financing requested. Significant among the most recent donations was Japan's promise to contribute 7.5 million dollars to CERF programmes. The Central Emergency Relief Fund was created with the aim of offering a rapid response to crisis situations caused by armed conflicts and natural disasters. It is also intended to restore the balance between the forgotten crises and those that have for one reason or another attracted greater amounts of funding.

The **inaugural session of the CERF Advisory Group** was held in May. This is an independent body of experts who will meet twice a year with the aim of providing the UN Secretary General with information on the use and impact of the CERF and establishing the lines of action to be taken in the coming months. This group comprises representatives of donor countries and NGOs.

The NGOs expressed optimism about the creation of the CERF, though **they pointed to some potential failings and problems for the future**, such as the fact that only United Nations agencies will have direct access to the funds available. Organisations like US Save The Children warned that NGOs carry out 50% of humanitarian aid activity, and the available data indicates that they are more agile, more flexible and quicker than UN agencies. They believe it would be a **waste of time to use UN agencies as intermediaries between the CERF and NGOs**. They are also concerned that the response by individual states to special crisis and disaster appeals will be diminished if governments claim they have already made the necessary contributions to the emergency fund.

c) The response from donors over the last three months

The following table shows **donor trends on a quarterly basis** both as regards overall humanitarian aid and in relation to the United Nations Humanitarian Appeals process.

Table 5.3.- Response from donors during the last three months					
	Main Humanitarian Appeals ¹	Main bodies receiving aid ²	Main sectors receiving aid ³	Main donors ⁴	TOTAL ⁵
Aid provided via the United Nations ⁶	1.- West Africa (51%) 2.- Uganda (47%) 3.- Chad (45%) 4.- Somalia (43%) 5.- Nepal (43%) 6.- Zimbabwe (43%)	1.- WFP 2.- UNHCR 3.- UNICEF 4.- CERF* 5.- UNRWA	1.- Food 2.- Coordination 3.- Multi-sector 4.- Security 5.- Water and Sanitation	1.- USA (32.7%) 2.- United Kingdom (9.3%) 3.- Sweden (6.6%) 4. Norway (4.4%) 5. - ECHO (3.9%)	1,556 million dollars
Overall Humanitarian Aid ⁷		1.- WFP 2.- UNHCR 3.- ICRC 4.- UNICEF 5.- CERF*	1.- Food 2.- Multi-sector 3.- Unspecified 4.- Coordination 5.- Health	1.- USA (30.9%) 2.- Sweden (6.9%) 3.- Switzerland (5.9%) 4.- United Kingdom (5.8%) 5.- ECHO (4.8%)	2,912 million dollars

1 Made every year by the United Nations. The percentage shows the ones that have so far attracted the most financing from the international community, regardless of the amount requested.

2 United Nations agencies or NGOs that have so far attracted the majority of aid

3 Main sectors in which agencies or NGOs have decided to focus aid

4 Donors who have provided the largest amount of aid, regardless of their GDP

5 Total amount provided for humanitarian crises up to 30 June 2004

6 Multilateral humanitarian aid

7 Humanitarian aid provided outside the United Nations framework

* Central Emergency Relief Fund

Source: Reliefweb, www.reliefweb.int/fts



Among the appeals made by the United Nations, particular mention should be made of Zimbabwe's appearance among the countries receiving the greatest financial help in recent months. The state of political isolation affecting the Zimbabwean government has not prevented aid from continuing to arrive in response to the country's growing economic crisis. There has been a **clear increase in the percentage of funds allocated to African countries, due to the contributions recently made by the CERF to Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and Somalia**. As regards the organisations receiving funds, it is important to mention the heavy increase in funding for UNHCR in recent months, a phenomenon that coincided with the publication of its report on the status of refugees around the world, along with the increased allocation to **UNRWA due to the serious crisis in Palestine**. The shape of the sectors that have received aid has not changed greatly, with food aid remaining in first place and the WFP the organisation receiving the most financing. Finally, mention should be made of **ECHO's inclusion among the principal donors**. The USA remained the largest donor in terms of total amount of aid provided, though the figures do not take account of GDP.

The amount of aid offered during the course of the last three months has shown a notable increase over the preceding quarter, rising from 894 million dollars in March to 2,912 million during the month of June. Some of the reasons for this increase could be the donations made to the CERF, the increased commitment from ECHO and the emergency aid provided following the earthquake in Java, for which more than 42 million dollars has been promised.



Disarmament

- The United Nations arms embargo system has questioned in terms of both its imposition criteria and the monitoring and verification mechanisms used.
- The Review Conference for the Programme of Action to Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms opened in New York.
- The annual cost of armed violence around the world was vastly superior to the income obtained from the trade in small arms, and much more attention should therefore be paid to the impact of these weapons.
- Spain debated the draft Arms Trading bill which the government wants to present in December 2006.
- The Great Lakes region in Africa accounted for one third of all DDR programmes, 40% of all combatants to be demobilised and 25% of the budgets promised to all programmes around the world.

This chapter contains an analysis of issues relating to disarmament, as seen from the perspective of militarization. On the subject of disarmament, it includes a study of the way in which small arms have proliferated over the last quarter, with particular emphasis on the international initiatives implemented within the framework of the United Nations and the more important events that have occurred in the different regional contexts. Special emphasis is also placed on the different aspects of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programs, both from the point of view of international initiatives and in terms of the progress made in the individual contexts in which programmes of this type are being pursued.

6.1. Proliferation of small arms

The first part of this chapter is divided into three sub-sections. The first focuses on the issues relating to small arms that have been discussed at the **United Nations** over the last three months, the second deals with the **most important initiatives implemented at an international level** in respect of studies and projects completed outside the United Nations structure, while the third deals with the **most notable events of the last quarter**, i.e. the way in which contexts affected by small arms issues have evolved.

a) United Nations

As far as the work done by the **United Nations** is concerned, we will first analyse the issue of **arms embargoes**. The UN Panel of Experts monitoring the embargo imposed on **Sudan** by the UN Security Council recommended that sanctions be strengthened. The Panel reported that both government armed forces and weapons were still being moved to the **Darfur** region. Elsewhere, the Security Council also decided in Resolution 1676 to extend the mandate of the Monitoring Group for the arms embargo in **Somalia** for further six months¹, calling for a cessation of hostilities in the capital and denouncing the persistent flow of weapons and military material. The Security Council also decided partially to lift the arms embargo on **Liberia**, allowing weapons to be sent for use by the country's armed forces and police².

United Nations arms embargoes: an effective instrument?

A report by the "**Control Arms**" campaign denounced several aspects of the **arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations**³. Firstly, it pointed to the **small number of embargoes imposed in situations of armed conflict** during the last 10 years. Likewise, the question of whether or not these embargoes are effective has been called into question as a result of the fragility of the **investigation and monitoring methods** employed and the inadequate resources and time periods allocated.

¹ UN Security Council resolution 1676, at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/343/85/PDF/N0634385.pdf?OpenElement>

² UN Security Council resolution 1683, at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/384/82/PDF/N0638482.pdf?OpenElement>

³ Control Arms. *UN Arms Embargoes: An Overview of the Last Ten Years*. March 2006, at http://www.controlarms.org/find_out_more/reports/UN-arms-embargoes-final-13306.pdf



Added to this are the **constant breaches** of what is one of the few mechanisms that currently exist in the area of arms control. Both **private and individuals** (dealers, brokers, financiers and arms traffickers) and **companies** from around the world have been involved in breaches of embargoes, normally as part of organised **networks** that use a number of different **mechanisms**: false documents, specialised brokers and a variety of haulage companies and forwarding agents, among other devices.

Finally, United Nations arms embargoes have generally been imposed as a last resort in situations of crisis. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that these embargoes are **legally binding under the United Nations Charter**, many member states don't even classify a **breach of such embargoes as a criminal offence under their own domestic legislation**. As a result, the following **recommendations** have been made:

- The Security Council should improve the **design of arms embargoes**.
- The issue of the **impunity of parties breaching embargoes** should be addressed.
- **Sanctions committees and investigation and monitoring teams** should be strengthened in terms of their verification methods, techniques and procedures.
- A more effective framework should be created to control international arms transfers, such as the establishment of an **International Arms Trade Treaty**.

Source: Control Arms. *UN Arms Embargoes: An Overview of the Last Ten Years*. March 2006.

The **UN Review Conference Programme of Action on Small Arms** began towards the end of June in New York. This conference is intended to strengthen political support for the Programme of Action, aiding its implementation and providing it with real impact⁴. Five years on from the Programme's approval, the main thrust of the work being done by civilian groups in relation to this Conference (as part of the "**Control Arms**" campaign) has centred on calls for an **International Arms Trade Treaty**. It is hoped that the contents of this treaty will be presented during the course of the UN Assembly General's First Committee Meeting in October. In his inaugural address, the UN Secretary General underlined the significant progress that had been made in the Programme of Action during the last five years, though he said that much remained to be done to combat the illicit trade in small arms.

However, some aspects of the Programme of Action require strengthening or review⁵. On the one hand, there is a clearly need for an **instrument that can be used to track small arms** (and one that can be quickly implemented and developed), along with the urgent introduction of another **instrument to control the activities of brokers**. It has also been stressed that **other undertakings must be properly clarified**: the creation of directives to govern **national controls on arms transfers**, clarity in undertakings relating to **ammunition** for small arms, and greater consideration for the **humanitarian and development dimension**. Finally, action must be taken to include **aspects that are missing from the current Programme of Action**: respect for human rights, transfers and their use by **non-state parties**, controls on the **possession and use of these weapons by civilians**, acknowledgement of the fact that the illegal trade springs from the legal trade, and **restrictions on transfers** in specific small arms categories.

Elsewhere, the **UNDP** organised a conference to initiate debate on the **relationship between small arms and human development**. The main aim was to analyse the damage caused by armed conflicts to the economies of developing countries, as well as offering support for international efforts to restrict the use of this kind of weapon. The conference was attended by representatives from 42 countries, along with delegates from the World Bank, the ICRC and NGOs from a number of different countries. Following the conference, those present signed the **Geneva Declaration**⁶, which sets out an undertaking to limit the impact of weapons among their peoples:

Principle of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development

⁴ McCarthy, P.: *Scratching the surface of a global scourge: the first five years of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms*, at the Disarmament Forum (2006).

⁵ Greene, O.: *Promoting effective global action on small arms: priorities for the 2006 UN Review Conference*. Biting the Bullet (2006), at <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Priorities%20for%20PoA.pdf>

⁶ See the complete Geneva Declaration at http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=506900



The countries that signed the Declaration undertook to implement the following practical measures (either at national, regional or multilateral level):

- Promote **conflict prevention**, resolution and reconciliation.
- Support **post-conflict peace-building**.
- Stem the **proliferation, illegal trafficking and misuse** of small arms and light weapons and ammunition. Lead effective weapons reduction, post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and control arms transfers and illicit brokering
- Halt **proliferation**.
- Respect **human rights**, promote the peaceful settlement of conflicts based on justice and eradicate impunity.
- Foster effective and accountable **public security institutions**.
- Promote a comprehensive approach to **armed violence reduction** issues, recognizing the different situations, needs and resources of men and women, boys and girls, as reflected in the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1612.
- Examine **armed violence prevention** on the basis of the relevant risk factors and groups, providing links with non-violent alternative livelihoods for individuals and communities.

In general, signatory states have undertaken to comply strictly with the **United Nations Programme of Action**, offering help with all the financial, logistical and human resources need for this purpose. They have also undertaken to meet the Millennium Development Goals relating to the reduction of armed violence, and will monitor the way in which the situation is evolving no later than 2008.

Finally, the very first **International Day for Land-Mine Awareness** was celebrated, during which the UN Secretary General called for a universal ban on this type of weapon and an increase in mine-clearance work throughout the world. For its part, **UNICEF** warned that explosive devices left behind by warring factions are threatening the lives of thousands of children in more than 80 countries, in spite of the fact that the armed conflicts in many of them are over. The countries most affected by the presence of landmines at the present time are **Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq and Sudan**.

b) International initiatives

The “**Control Arms**” campaign ended during the course of the quarter, coinciding with the beginning of the United Nations Review Conference. One of the culminating acts in this campaign was the delivery of more than a million faces to the Conference authorities, as part of the “face up to the arms crisis” initiative. 22 to 29 May also marked the **Global Week of Action against Small Arms**, with a variety of events being held in more than 50 countries. IANSA, the NGO network to combat small arms also issued a **new report**⁷, aiming to maintain awareness of the fragility of the process to control the arms trade and its serious impact on the world.

This report focused on the general problem of the **uncontrolled proliferation of small arms**, pointing to the terrible **human cost**, the significant **legal loopholes** that currently exist, the exacerbation of **poverty**, the obstacles this represents for **development**, the high **health costs** and the **absence of progress** that has been made at the United Nations because of the disregard for the fact that these weapons in the mainly affect the **civilian population** and not countries themselves. The report also called on governments to take the necessary **measures** to resolve the issue along **four main lines**: global standards to regulate international arms transfers; the regulation of arms in civilian hands; the inclusion of processes for the prevention of armed violence in development projects; and the offer of help to people who have survived armed violence.

For its part, **Amnesty International** reported that the **growing network of brokers intervening in arms sales is leading to widespread human rights abuses throughout the world**⁸. Its study asserts that current monitoring methods are entirely ineffective and out-of-date, as huge quantities of weapons are despatched around the world in operations that are ever more complex in terms of the broking and transport arrangements involved. The report recommends the urgent establishment of **domestic rules**,

⁷ IANSA, 2006: *Bringing the global gun crisis under control*. May 2006, at <http://www.iansa.org/members/IANSA-media-briefing-low-res.pdf>

⁸ Amnesty International: *Dead on time: arms transportation, brokering and the threat to human rights*. AI, May 2006, at <http://www.controlarms.org/downloads/FINALtransportersandbrokersREPORTpdf.pdf>



regulations and administrative processes in order to prevent the **activities of brokers, logistics companies and arms carriers** from leading to **systematic human rights abuses**.

In addition, Oxfam published another report, concentrating on this occasion on the production and trafficking of ammunition⁹. This new study reported that around 14,000 million bullets are manufactured every year, and the precise destination of 83% of them is not actually known. It is calculated that ammunition is manufactured in at least 76 countries, the American continent being the place where the highest number of manufacturers are concentrated (39%). Among the more serious cases, the study points to the availability of **fresh ammunition in Iraq**, originating from countries in Eastern Europe. **Spain**, on the other hand, stands out as the main exporter of **ammunition to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa**, with average annual sales of **8.7 million euros**.

Finally, a conference on the prevention of armed violence was held in Durban (**South Africa**) at the beginning of the quarter, organised by IANSA and the Institute for Security Studies. The aim of the conference was to focus on the **debate over the financial cost of armed violence** throughout the world, so that this could be **recognised during the United Nations Review Conference** mentioned earlier. The conference was broken down into four main topics for debate: the multi-dimensional nature of the problem and solutions; the link between the illicit trafficking of small arms and development; contributions to research directed towards action; and policy relating to the attention given to survivors of armed violence.

The cost of armed violence

The importance of calculating the cost of armed violence lies in the fact that it far outweighs the financial profits obtained from arms trafficking. In the first place, most estimates regarding **profits from the trafficking of small arms** put the figure at around 5,000 million dollars per years¹⁰, a figure that demonstrates the scant financial impact of the illicit arms trade in comparison with the high levels of human cost. Secondly, a number of estimates have been made regarding the approximate financial cost of armed violence in different countries. In studies presented during the conference, it was estimated that the medical costs resulting from the effect of firearms in **Brazil** alone amounted to 100,000 million dollars a year. These figures serve to show how **the medical costs of armed violence exceed the total cost of the trade in small arms around the world**, and this point should therefore be paid a great deal more attention.

Debate relating to the calculation of the cost of armed violence centres around which parameters should be included. The **most simplistic calculations** are made on the basis of the **weapons** themselves, i.e. the **cost of collecting and destroying weapons**. However, the more ambitious calculations extend to many more parameters: **direct costs** (medical) and indirect costs (**criminal and judicial costs, psychological effects, loss of productivity, inability to work, disincentives for foreign investment**). According to the WHO, the inter-personal cost of armed violence can be divided up into four specific categories: **individual** (age, education, psychological disorders, alcoholism, drug addiction); **relational** (dysfunctional families, poverty, gender, friendship); **community**: (neighbourhood, school, work, poverty, high residential mobility, unemployment, social isolation); and **social**: (economic, health, education)¹¹.

c) Most important events of the last three months

At a **regional level**, starting with the **continent of Africa**, it should be mentioned that the **Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region** has now come into force. This Protocol is supported by 12 countries in the region¹² and is based on an agreement to combat crime and the lack of security. Likewise, **ECOWAS** member states approved a Convention for the **control of the trade in small arms in the region of West Africa**¹³. In **Kenya**, the government signalled its intention to implement stricter measures to control the illegal arms trade throughout the country, the impact of which is hugely serious for the ordinary population, in spite of criticisms from certain opposition groups who believe that it fails to guarantee security in border zones. In response to this criticism, a cooperation agreement was signed with **Uganda**, allowing the two countries to work together to combat the illegal proliferation of small arms.

⁹ Oxfam: *Ammunition: the fuel of conflict*. Oxfam, June 2006, at http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/briefingnotes/bn060615_ammunition

¹⁰ IANSA, *op. cit.*

¹¹ WHO: *The economic dimensions of interpersonal violence*. WHO, 2004.

¹² The other countries are: Burundi, DR Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya (the country that has taken over leadership of the group) Rwanda, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

¹³ See the complete Convention at <http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/documents/CONVENTION-CEDEAO-ENGLISH.PDF>



Elsewhere, the **Latin American Coalition against Armed Violence** (CLAVE) was introduced in **America**, a coalition of 167 organisations fighting for urban co-existence, security and disarmament across the continent. This coalition met to adopt an immediate combined working agenda and to identify the regional priorities, institutional mechanisms and strategies needed to combat armed violence. A project was presented in **Argentina** for the creation of a Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, which would set out policy in respect of arms sales, and the development of transparency mechanisms so that the government could issue a public annual report detailing all the exports that had been made that year. Finally, the **European Commission** contributed 2.5 million euros to mine-clearance operations in **Colombia**.

Turning to **Asia and Oceania**, some 70 representatives from NGOs in the region met in **Thailand** to prepare for the United Nations Review Conference. **Amnesty International** also denounced **China** as one of the largest arms exporters¹⁴, with sales exceeding 1,000 million dollars every year. The organisation also reported that the country's regime has one of the most closed and irresponsible systems, since it has not signed any unilateral agreement on this issue. According to this report, the Chinese government has exported arms to countries that are experiencing serious situations of tension and human rights violations, such as **Myanmar, Nepal, South Africa** and **Sudan**. In response to this, the government stated that it has always maintained a prudent and responsible attitude in relation to its weapons exports. Finally, in **Australia**, The Institute of Criminology confirmed that the **number of deaths as a result of firearms had fallen by 60% during the previous 10 years**, as a result of the enactment of a law governing the strict control of firearms coupled with a period of amnesty during which around 600,000 weapons were handed over in return for payment.

On the **European continent**, following fresh racist-style attacks involving firearms in **Belgium**, the country's arms legislation was amended, the main aspects centring around the halting of the unrestricted sale of weapons, greater control during manufacturing, tracking systems and the creation of a federal monitoring system¹⁵. An **International Seminar on Controlling the Arms Trade** was held in **Spain**. This involved representatives from several NGOs, national and international experts and government representatives, who gathered to discuss the draft Arms Trading Act that the government aims to introduce in December 2006.

The Arms Trading Act in Spain: the lowest or highest common denominator?

For more than 10 years now, a number of civilian organisations in Spain¹⁶ have been calling for **greater transparency and control** in the Spanish arms trade business, after sales to countries involved in armed conflicts or guilty of clear human rights abuses have been repeatedly uncovered. Although the **milestones achieved** during this period would have been unthinkable at the outset, the next stage regarded as essential would be the approval of **legislation on the trade in defence and dual-use material**¹⁷.

This Act should pursue **strict compliance with the EU Code of Conduct**¹⁸ and **incorporate the best legislative practices that are already being developed in some other countries**. Taking advantage of this meeting, civilian organisations presented a report¹⁹ setting out best practices and the **aspects to be borne in mind when the legislation is implemented**, offering both a **comparative analysis with other countries** and an examination of the **current weaknesses in Spain's regulations**. This report mentions the criteria to be used to ensure that arms do not eventually reach undesirable end-users along with other issues, such as the contents of government licences for the whole arms **sale** process, including **production, broking and exporting**. In general terms, there is no call to introduce legislation that has not already been applied in other countries, though the level of response and commitment shown by the government remains to be seen.

¹⁴ AI, *People's Republic of China: Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights Abuses. The Flow of Arms Accelerates*, June 2006, at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170302006>

¹⁵ Berkol, I.: *Une nouvelle loi sur les armes en Belgique*. GRIP, May 2006, at <http://www.grip.org/bdg/g4602.html>

¹⁶ Currently Amnesty International, Greenpeace and Intermón Oxfam, with technical assistance provided by the School of Peace Culture.

¹⁷ Dual-use material is regarded as that which can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

¹⁸ The Code of Conduct on arms exports is a regulation that was approved by the European Council in 1998, consisting of the implementation of eight policy criteria for arms exports between member states. These criteria are based on not exporting to countries involved in armed conflict or places where there clear human rights abuses are taking place, among others.

¹⁹ Control Arms Campaign: *Towards and Arms Trade Treaty*. Amnesty International, Greenpeace and Intermón Oxfam, April 2006, at <http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/informes/06informe021.pdf>



6.2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

The following section is subdivided into segments dealing with the main international initiatives and the most important events of the last three months as regards issues relating to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.

a) International initiatives

Although earlier issues of the newsletter have examined a number of global approaches to DDR programmes, mention should be made on this occasion of a regional approach: the **UN Secretary General** issued a report²⁰ calling for a complete and integrated strategy of **disarmament, repatriation and the resettlement of foreign combatants in DR Congo**. This report includes the military, political, economic and judicial aspects required to resolve the problem of foreign armed groups in the country, based on all kinds of incentives and punishments. The main aim of the repatriation process is to help the Transitional Government to hold **elections** in a secure atmosphere, while at the same time reforming the Congolese security sector. In general terms, the report gives an assessment of foreign armed groups and calls for **coordination in the efforts of both MONUC and the government of DR Congo**, as well as **greater cooperation between this country's government and the governments of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda**. It also asks for greater **international support** for the reform of the Congolese armed forces so that they are able to carry out their duties effectively, and underlines the essential role played by donors in the adoption of sub-regional economic measures.

It is currently calculated that around 13,000 former combatants and family members have been repatriated to their respective countries since the year 2002. One of the most important contributions to the implementation of DDR programmes in the Great Lakes and Central African regions has been the establishment of ***Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP)***.

A regional view of DDR: the role of the MDRP in the Great Lakes

This MDRP is a regional DDR strategy for the establishment of peace and security which also addresses issues such as sustainable growth and poverty reduction in the Great Lakes region of Africa. It is sponsored by the **World Bank** together with donor countries, United Nations agencies and governments. This **regional approach** is necessary to ensure **conflict prevention** through cooperation, the mobilisation of resources, the benefits of working together, incentives, empowerment and coordination. The programmes are divided up into the following sections: **national programmes**: verification, registration, identification, orientation, transport, cash payments, teaching and skill development, healthcare and help with social reintegration; **special projects**: focusing on the most sensitive groups (women, child soldiers, etc.) and combatants located in other countries; and **regional activities**: awareness and information campaigns in border areas, research and the monitoring of border areas.

At present, following an assessment made during the first quarter of 2006²¹, it is estimated that as part of the seven processes that remain ongoing in the region (the most prolific of this kind of programme), **more than 404,000 combatants still need to be demobilised**, some 55% of the original number, while **355,000 have been reintegrated** (36% of the total). The programmes in which the majority of troops still await demobilisation and reintegration are the ones in **Angola** and **DR Congo**. As regards **financing**, it is estimated that these programmes will cost a total of around **475 million dollars**, of which 46.1% of the amount promised has actually been handed over, half of which is destined for **DR Congo**. In global terms, the **importance of taking a regional approach** in this part of Africa must once again be emphasised, since the region is home to one third of all current DDR processes, 40% of all combatants in transition to civilian life and 25% of the money promised for the implementation of these plans throughout the world.

b) Most important events of the last three months

The following table shows **how the main countries in which DDR programmes are currently being implemented** have evolved over the last three months:

²⁰ See the complete report at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/352/06/PDF/N0635206.pdf?OpenElement>

²¹ MDRP, *Quarterly Progress Report. January – March 2006*, at <http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/2006-Q1-QPR-MDRP-1.pdf>



Table 6.1. Countries that have been the subject of international attention in relation to DDR	
AFRICA	
Country	Remarks
Angola	The IRSEM office in the Bocoio district completed its first demobilisation phase for around 950 former combatants from both the armed forces and UNITA. This first phase began last year, and includes professional training in various trades for 165 additional former combatants.
Burundi	The government decided to reopen the demobilisation camp for the FNL armed opposition group in the north-east of the country. Its decision to reopen the camp was based on assurances that security had improved in this part of the country, the area in which the armed group has been operating. For its part, Human Rights Watch denounced the fact that the government continues to hold child soldiers associated with the FNL armed group instead of working on their rehabilitation, and it called for their release from the prisons in which they are being held.
Côte d'Ivoire	The end of June should have marked the beginning of the disarmament of the armed forces and coalition of armed opposition groups, though the process had to be postponed on several occasions, firstly because the process was being carried out jointly with the electoral registration process and subsequently because groups associated with the government refused to integrate with the <i>Forces Nouvelles</i> .
DR Congo	Around 200 former Mayi-Mayi militia members handed in their weapons to MONUC troops in the province of Katanga, making this move in return for security guarantees . Nevertheless, MONUC acknowledged that many demobilised former combatants remain unhappy about the failure to pay them the amounts promised, leading to violent demonstrations in several parts of the country. The UN mission opened up two new centres in the Ituri district to deal with the voluntary disarmament of the 18,000 troops that have yet to be disarmed in the region, though only 2,000 had so far been processed by the end of June. Both MONUC and the NGO Watch List called on all political forces in the country to stop using child soldiers , in an attempt to return these children to civilian life ²² .
Liberia	The European Commission donated a further 10.9 million dollars to the DDR Programme Fund run by the UNDP, which will be allocated to action for the reintegration of former combatants . By contrast, 100 former combatants mounted violent protests in Monrovia after they had not received any payment for demobilising . In response, the government announced that it was taking steps to ensure that this kind of action did not happen again.
Sudan	The government and the European Commission signed an agreement to provide 16 million euros to finance DDR programmes in the country. In addition, UNICEF spokesman B. Parker announced that some 200 child soldiers had handed in their weapons and uniforms in the south of the country in order to return to their families. The UN agency estimates that there are around 2,000 child soldiers in the country, and it hopes to have demobilised them all by the end of the year.
Uganda	Government armed forces began the forced disarmament of the Karamajong community in the north-east of the country in an attempt to reduce the current levels of armed violence. The country's Defence and Foreign Ministers also called on the UN Security Council to take punitive measures against the LRA. Among these measures, the Ministers asked that the peace-keeping missions in southern Sudan (UNMIS) and DR Congo (MONUC) disarm any members of the LRA found in their territory by force. They also stressed the importance of regional cooperation , suggesting that DR Congo allow Ugandan forces to enter Congolese territory in pursuit of the LRA, as was already happening in southern Sudan.
AMERICA	
Country	Remarks
Colombia	Peace Commissioner L. C. Restrepo announced that the demobilisation of the AUC had been completed . It is estimated that 30,150 illegal combatants have now returned to civilian life, with 1,175 in jail and a further 604 awaiting trial. Some 17,000 weapons have been handed in (see Table 6.2). Finally, the US Congress approved the allocation of 15.4 million dollars for the demobilisation of the AUC, conditional upon Colombian cooperation in the extradition of paramilitary leaders. These events were in sharp contrast to the failure to apply the Justice and Peace Act a year on from its approval. The principal paramilitary leaders have also expressed their unhappiness at the modifications introduced in the recent and confusing judgement by the Constitutional Court , and they have suspended the handover of assets until the judgement has been clarified.
Haiti	The DDR Section at the UNDP and MINUSTAH published a report giving its assessment of the first quarter of 2006 . This report underlined the reasons against introducing an immediate DDR programme : the absence of an appropriate political space, the growing failure of the justice system and increasing impunity. However, they reported that there had been a reduction in armed violence in the country, as a result of community mechanisms for conflict resolution, awareness campaigns and

²² The call from the NGO Watch List came in its report: WATCH LIST ON CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT. Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. April 2006, at http://www.watchlist.org/reports/dr_congo.report.20060426.pdf



	the creation of centres for violence reduction and development. MINUSTAH's Regional Office in Hinche gave 19 former Fad'H combatants reinsertion packages worth a total of 16,700 dollars . Finally, the United Nations Administration and Finance Commission decided to maintain the amount allocated to disarmament duties during the 2006/2007 period, referring to the high number of small arms circulating in the country.
ASIA	
Country	Remarks
Afghanistan	Ceremonies were held to mark the handover of weapons by former combatants in the provinces of Jalalabad, Laghman, Nangarhar and Takhar. To date more than 20,000 weapons have been collected, along with 175,000 rounds of ammunition, as part of the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups process (DIAG). Elsewhere, the Interior Minister and the UNDP signed an agreement for female family members of former combatants to be trained as teachers , in an attempt to facilitate reintegration into civilian life.

Table 6.2. Demobilisation of the self-defence forces			
Year	Demobilised	Weapons (ammunition)	Weapons per demobilised person (%)
2003	1,494	897 (51,485)	60
2004	203	194 (23,963)	95
2005	12,720	8,411 (1,274,616)	66
2006	24,057	8,047 (1,213,629)	33
TOTAL	30,151	17,564 (2,576,497)	58

Source: Government of Colombia²³

By way of **conclusion**, it should be mentioned that the urgent need for greater **controls over the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms** is becoming increasingly clear for a number of reasons, including the weakness of the United Nations arms embargo system and the ways in which it is being breached, and the illegal production and distribution of ammunition. This contrasts with the great opportunity presented by the **Review Conference for the United Nations Programme on Small Arms**. This review is aimed at identifying various aspects that require greater support (marking and tracking) or clarification (domestic controls), along with issues that need to be brought into the debate for the first time (transfers to non-state forces). All of these aspects should eventually culminate in an **International Arms Trade Treaty**. If this opportunity is missed it will demonstrate the lack of consistency between the way that **governments approach this issue at a world level and the huge human impact that these weapons have**.

Contrasts of a similar kind can also be seen in **DDR programmes**, in which the **financial and logistical efforts and successes** seen in some countries (Liberia, Sudan, Colombia) are offset by various **problems that have arisen** or continued during the last three months in others: delays in initiating processes (Côte d'Ivoire), protests against non-payment (Liberia) and reports of the continuing use of child soldiers (Burundi). The **effectiveness and plausibility of this type of programme** will inevitably require the implementation of attainable goals, coherent strategies, achievable actions and respect for international law. Any **failure to comply with requirements** such as these could lead to a lack of trust from **donors** where these programmes are concerned, and even lead to the emergence of new outbreaks of **armed violence**.

²³ Republic of Colombia. *Peace Process with the Self-Defence Forces. Executive Report*, at <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/libro/librofinal.pdf>



Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

- The Human Rights Council began its first working session.
- The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights visited the Horn of Africa.
- The Council of Europe published a report on so-called *extraordinary renditions*, stating that they are contrary to basic legal principles.
- The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee against Torture, the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers all held sessions.

This chapter contains an analysis of the situation relating to human rights and basic freedoms, based on accounts of violations reported by non-Governmental human rights organisations (mainly Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and international and inter-governmental organisations, particularly within Europe and the United Nations. This quarter has seen particular attention focused on the recently-created United Nations Human Rights Council, as well as on the work being done by the **UN Committees for the protection of human rights**.

7.1. Violations of human rights and basic freedoms

The following section contains information on the reports that have been used to focus the efforts of NGOs, and includes an account of the main events and developments reported by international organisations.

a) Events reported by non-Governmental organisations

During the course of the last three months, the majority of human rights organisations, among them Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have made specific mention of a number of issues: the status of the people held at **Guantanamo** and those that have been transferred from there to other places, such as Saudi Arabia, the increasing threats against defenders of human rights in **Colombia**, the Government of **Zimbabwe**'s obstruction of work by NGOs, the excessive use of force in **Timor-Leste** and **Nepal**, the racially motivated murders and attacks in the **Russian Federation**, the more than 20,000 people condemned to **death** throughout the world and the abolition of the death penalty in the **Philippines**. Amnesty International also published its 2006 annual report, in which it concluded that human rights have been further damaged by the broken promises of the major powers and the security programmes that they have implemented, which have taken the world's attention away from the serious human rights crises occurring in other places.

b) Events reported by international and inter-governmental organisations

In **Europe**, particular mention should be made of the report on *extraordinary renditions* published by the Council of Europe, which roundly and unreservedly condemns these acts. The report states that the spider's web of extraordinary renditions spun by the USA beyond the rule of law is contrary to all basic legal principles, as it involves *disappearances*, arbitrary detentions, illegal transfers and torture and other mistreatment. Specific mention should also be made of the report presented to the Council of Europe by Luxembourg Prime Minister J.C. Juncker, in which he proposed that the EU became a member of the Council of Europe by 2010. The Luxembourg Prime Minister's recommendations included, among other things, the European Convention on Human Rights being signed by the EU, recognition of the Council of Europe as a reference organisation for human rights in Europe, and the establishment of a joint platform for the analysis of legal and judicial regulations.



As regards the **American continent**, experts from the Organisation of America States (OAS) concluded that significant progress had been made in the region in respect of freedom of expression. The organisation attributed this to more widespread and improved access to information.

With regard to the **United Nations**, mention should be made of the official visit by the organisation's High Commissioner for Human Rights to the **Horn of Africa**. Among other things, L. Arbour stressed the Sudanese authorities' failure to comply with many of the undertakings they had made in respect of human rights issues, particularly as regards the region of Darfur. She also underlined the need for the situation in Somalia to receive international attention and pointed to the illegality of the laws being applied in Ethiopia against members of opposition groups. For his part, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, J. Ziegler, expressed grave concern over the drastic reduction in food rations for millions of Sudanese in Darfur. The UNHCHR also made an official visit to **Guatemala**, where she became the spokesperson for the people's growing frustration as regards security, equity and justice, stressing that the delay in justice and reparation for victims of the armed conflict was a particularly worrying issue.

During the course of the last three months, L. Arbour also made statements on the situation in **Nepal**, expressing concern over the use of force by the security forces during recent demonstrations. A number of experts announced that it was unacceptable that peaceful demonstrators, among them a number of human rights defenders, had been arbitrarily detained for taking part in these demonstrations. The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, P. Alston, called for an independent investigation to be set up to examine these events, and the Special Rapporteur on Torture, M. Nowak, stressed that Nepal is the only country he has visited to date in which torture is systematically applied. As regards **Sri Lanka**, L. Arbour expressed concern at the murder of civilians in the country and call on all sides to take immediate steps to reduce the climate of violence, resume talks and strengthen the methods used to protect against potential abuses.

Another important event of the last three months was the suicide of three prisoners at **Guantanamo** and the chain reaction that this set off. The Rapporteur for the Task Force on Arbitrary Detention, L. Zerrougui, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of the judiciary and lawyers, L. Despouy, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, M. Nowak, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief, A. Jahangir, and the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to enjoy the highest possible level of physical and mental health, P. Hunt, all stressed that the suicide of the three prisoners could to a certain extent have been predicted, given the harsh and prolonged conditions of seclusion, and he insisted that these events confirmed the importance of the recommendations contained in the report he had published last quarter and the urgent need for them to be implemented as quickly as possible. All these experts called for the immediate closure of the detention centre at the US naval based in Guantanamo.

A number of visits have also been made by the UN's **special procedures**, including one by the UN Special Rapporteur for violence against women, Y. Ertürk, to **Turkey**, where suicide rates among women are very high. By way of conclusion, the Rapporteur indicated that the patriarchal order and the human rights violations that this engenders, such as forced marriages, domestic violence and the denial of reproductive rights, are often key factors that contribute to women taking their own lives. In turn, the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, R. Stavenhagen, complained about the high levels of poverty and exclusion that are still being suffered by indigenous people in **Guatemala**, after he had completed an official visit to the country.

Celebrating **World Press Freedom Day**, several special rapporteurs underlined the vital role played by the press in promoting democracy and human rights. These experts also denounced the high levels of violence directed against the press and announced that 2005 had been the year in which most incidents of this type, which often go unpunished, had been reported. They called on individual Governments to release any reporters they had detained as a result of their professional activities.



Another important report published during the last quarter is the one relating to **people trafficking** prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC report warns that no country is unconnected with the trafficking of people for sexual exploitation or forced labour. It identifies 127 countries of origin, 8 used for transit and 137 that represent the final destination in the international people-trafficking business.

Finally, specific mention should be made of the sessions held by several Committees charged with overseeing the different international treaties on human rights¹.

c) The Human Rights Council

The recently created Human Rights Council met for the first time from 19 to 30 June. The first criticism encountered by the new body related to the way in which its members had been chosen, given that they included the Russian Federation, China, Saudi Arabia and Cuba, countries whose record on respect for human rights is more than questionable². However, once the Council had been set up, the criticisms subsided and the work of the various NGOs focused on seeking approval for a number of human rights instruments and trying to achieve rapid progress in various aspects of the Council's working methods. The aim of this strategy would seem to be to avoid falling into the trap of diminishing the body's legitimacy and thus undermining any future decisions it might take. During the first session, both the UN Secretary General and the UNHCHR made an appeal aimed at persuading countries to look beyond their own national and regional interests and concentrate their efforts on preventing human rights violations and helping victims. Among the positive results of the Council's first session were its approval of the Convention on the protection of all people against forced disappearances, the Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples and the extension of the mandate of the Task Force charged with drawing up an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, a mechanism that will guarantee greater protection for the victims of violations of these rights. In a repeat of one of the issues that has drawn much criticism during past phases of the Human Rights Commission, European countries refused to approve a Resolution on the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories that merely asked the special rapporteurs to carry out a study of the human rights violations committed by Israel. An assessment of the Council's work can be expected when the next period of sessions is held, when the renewed system for the protection of human rights will be shaped.

Table 7.1. Member states on the Council (years membership)

Africa	Asia	Eastern Europe	Latin American and the Caribbean	Western Europe and others
Algeria (1)	Bahrain (1)	Azerbaijan (3)	Argentina (1)	Canada (3)
Cameroon (3)	Bangladesh (3)	Rep. Rep. (1)	Brazil (2)	Finland (1)
Djibouti (3)	China (3)	Poland (1)	Cuba (3)	France (2)
Gabon (2)	India (1)	Romania (2)	Ecuador (1)	Germany (3)
Ghana (2)	Indonesia (1)	Russian Fed. (3)	Guatemala (2)	Holland (1)
Mali (2)	Japan (2)	Ukraine (2)	Mexico (3)	Switzerland (3)
Mauritius (3)	Jordan (3)		Peru (2)	United Kingdom (2)
Morocco (1)	Malaysia (3)		Uruguay (3)	
Nigeria (3)	Pakistan (2)			
Senegal (3)	Philippines (1)			
South Africa (1)	Korea, Rep. (2)			
Tunisia (1)	Saudi Arabia (3)			
Zambia (2)	Sri Lanka (2)			

¹ See section 7.2.

² See the press release from the School of Peace Culture on 10 May.
<http://www.escolapau.org/img/prensa/06prensa067.pdf>



The Challenges Faced by the Human Rights Council

The main challenge faced by this new Human Rights Council is to ensure that its work does not become politicised and instead attains a high degree of credibility and legitimacy, an issue which led to the demise of its predecessor, the Human Rights Commission. Although the run-up to the Council's first working session was marked by questions regarding its composition, the Council ought to respond to this criticism by moving quickly and cleanly forwards in specific areas relating to its working methodologies, without trying to protect itself under the mantle of a period of transition during this first year.

The new body should ensure the consolidation of the special mechanisms and the establishment of a body that replaces the Sub-Commission but preserves its functions, introducing procedures that ensure independence and rigour in the protection of victims. It must also correct one of the defects in the human rights protection system, i.e. the failure of individual states to follow up and implement the decisions taken. Finally, the oft-mentioned dialogue between the Human Rights Council and individual states should not result in a *de facto* acceptance of human rights abuses but must instead be directed towards promoting a new culture in which international law relating to human rights is strengthened in respect of individual countries, imposing a legal standard from which they cannot escape.

7.2. UN Human Rights Committees

a) Definition and characteristics

The Committees are the bodies charged with overseeing some of the main Human Rights Treaties introduced by the United Nations. Their existence is fundamental to the international system for the protection of human rights as it permits 1) the monitoring of the application by individual states of the provisions in the treaties to which they are signatories, through the analysis of regular reports, 2) visits and *ex officio* investigations to be carried out in certain cases, 3) individual or collective complaints to be heard under certain circumstances in relation to alleged human rights abuses in signatory countries (with the exception of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), and 4) additional contributions to be made in respect of the interpretation of the contents and scope of the obligations set out in the international covenants and treaties, through their general observations. In this regard, a large number of Committees (particularly the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) have made relevant observations regarding their respective conventions, without being expressly required to do so, and these observations have been highly useful in advancing the protection of human rights at an international level.

However, in spite of the importance of the Committees, it is clear that they lack significant resources in order to be able to undertake their duties properly, and their procedures are subsequently often badly delayed. In response to these difficulties, some Committees have created Task Forces or Working Groups that meet before a period of Committee sessions. Another, more recent proposal was put forward by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, L. Arbour, when she launched the idea of **unifying the Covenant and Convention Committees** into one single body. However, in view of the fact that this would still not receive any more resources, this initiative was opposed from the outset by many NGOs.

What are the Committees?

The Committees are bodies created under International Covenants or Conventions (with the exception of the ESCR Committee) to oversee compliance with these covenants and conventions in the countries that have ratified them. They are made up of independent experts (numbering between 10 and 23, depending on the committee), and signatory states must submit periodic reports to them (every four or five years) in respect of the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures that they have adopted in this regard. In effect, by ratifying a Convention or Treaty, a state assumes the legal obligation to submit full and prompt reports. In practice, many states have failed to comply with their obligations, meaning that a large number



of reports remain pending while many others are incomplete. The Committees meet in Geneva and hold one or more periods of sessions each year.

The procedure for **submitting reports** represents a complicated duty for the majority of Governments, often due to a lack of personnel and experience, or the absence of any political will to meet the international undertakings that they have made. NGOs may participate in the process in all cases. The independent experts who sit on these Committees examine each report and set out their concerns and recommendations to the signatory state in a two-way procedure that concludes with a number of "final observations".

In some specific cases, the Committees may **hear individual complaints** against states that have allegedly committed abuses in relation to the rights protected by the Treaty in question³. Once a complaint has been admitted, the Committee informs the relevant state which must respond in writing. The Committee finally issues a non-binding report in which it decides whether or not there has been any breach of one or more rights, indicating any reparation measures that the Government should put in place. This process is confidential, though the decisions handed down are published in the final report submitted by the Committee to the UN Assembly, representing a moral punishment for the state concerned. As a guide, it is estimated that individual states actually abide by around 30% of the reports in accordance with the terms and conditions established by the Committee.

Finally, the **general recommendations** put forward by the Committees are of limited scope and effect, since they are usually broad-based and often difficult to follow-up and verify. Nevertheless, these recommendations represent a *de facto* and practical development of International Law on human rights through their gradual refinement of the provisions contained in the different international treaties and conventions.

The Committees and their main characteristics:

- The **Human Rights Committee (HRC)** is a body of independent experts that supervises the application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The First Optional Protocol of the Covenant grants the Committee the power to examine complaints from individuals in relation to alleged violations of the Covenant by signatory states.
- The **Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)** is a body of 18 independent experts who oversee the application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It does not have the power to hear complaints from individuals. This issue would, however, be resolved following the adoption of an optional Protocol, which is being debated by an *ad hoc* Task Force created by the Human Rights Commission.
- The **Committee against Torture (CAT)** is a body of independent experts that supervises the application of the Convention on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishments. This Committee may hear complaints or communications from individuals and it may also investigate and examine complaints between states, although this does not actually occur in practice.
- The **Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)** is the body that supervises application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. This Committee can perform early warning duties and can also hear complaints between states and complaints from individuals.
- The **Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)** comprises 23 experts who monitor the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The Committee may hear complaints and communications from individuals and, with one sole exception, it has since its creation been made up solely of women.
- The **Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)** oversees application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as the Convention's two Optional Protocols relating to participation by children in

³ If a complaint is to be admitted, for example, by the Human Rights Committee, the following requirements must be met: 1) it must be presented in writing by the victim or his/her representative and refer to a state that is a party to the Treaty; 2) it must be properly founded and correctly worded, 3) it must not have been presented simultaneously before other international bodies, and 4) all internal appeals must have been exhausted.




armed conflicts and the sale of children, infant prostitution and the use of children in pornography. The Committee cannot examine complaints from private individuals. As an exceptional measure, in 2006 the Committee examined two reports simultaneously in two sessions each comprising 9 members, "as an exceptional and temporary measure" to allow it to examine all the reports that had accumulated.

- The **Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families (CMW)** is a body of independent experts that supervises the application of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families which came into force in 2003. This Committee is the most recently created treaty organisation and it held its first period of sessions in March 2004. The committee may also, under certain circumstances, examine complaints or communications submitted by individuals once ten signatory states have agreed to the procedure. Spain has not yet ratified this Convention.

b) Work by the Committees during the last three months

The last quarter saw meetings of the Committees on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Torture, the Rights of the Child and Migratory Workers. Their respective reports focused on the following issues.



The **Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)** spent its last session examining reports presented by Canada, Liechtenstein, Morocco, Mexico and Monaco, from which the following recommendations can be highlighted:

Main recommendations of the ESCR Committee

Canada: The Committee noted as positive the low level of unemployment in the country, the fall in poverty levels and the reduction of child mortality among aboriginal people. It recommended re-examining policies and practices regarding the rights of aboriginal people and asked the authorities to reform federal, provincial and municipal legislation in order to ensure that the country's obligations under the Covenant are more completely adhered to.

Liechtenstein: The Committee expressed satisfaction at the adoption of legislation on gender equality, but was concerned about the persistent xenophobia, particularly against Muslims and people of Turkish origin, as well as the over-representation of women among the lowest paid jobs, among other issues. Among other recommendations, the Committee suggested moves to combat discrimination.

Morocco: The Committee welcomed the New Family Code and the training in human rights aimed at students, judges and public sector workers. The Committee also recommended that efforts be intensified in the area of respect for and the protection of women, suggesting that polygamy be banned.

Mexico: The Committee particularly welcomed the creation of the National Institute of Women and a committee to assess poverty indices in the country. Among other recommendations, the Committee asked the country to adopt legislation on gender equality, the regularisation of the informal labour market,



improved working conditions for indigenous people and a ban on the practice of asking for a certificate stating that a woman is not pregnant when seeking work.

Monaco: The committee welcomed the country's accession to the Convention Against all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the adoption of legislation on freedom of expression that prohibits insults based on racial, ethnic, sexual or religious grounds and the almost non-existent unemployment. However, among other measures, the Committee recommended the adoption of legislation granting equal rights to men and women as regards the transfer of citizenship, along with the reduction to 5 years of the length of time non-nationals must be resident in order to obtain social assistance for housing and health, and the adoption of specific legislation on family violence.

During the Committee's 36th working session there was also a General Day of Debate in which the right to social security (Article 9 of the ICESCR) and the obligations of signatory states in this respect formed the subject of debate, with a view to general observation of these obligations in the future.

For its part, the **Committee Against Torture** (CAT) examined reports from the following countries over the course of the last three months, issuing the relevant opinions:

Main recommendations of the Committee Against Torture

Korea, Rep: The Committee welcomed the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission. Among its recommendations, the Committee pointed to the need to incorporate a definition of the offence of torture in the country's criminal code, along with the need to investigate complaints of torture and mistreatment and adopt programmes aimed at providing reparation, rehabilitation and treatment for the victims of torture and mistreatment.

USA: The Committee (which for the first time since 11 September examined the country's observance of the Convention Against Torture) noted the Government's intention to adopt an interrogation manual for the army and enact a law on the elimination of rape in prison, though it expressed its concern at the failure to include the offence of torture in its domestic legislation. The Committee also regretted the country's opinion that the Convention Against Torture is not applicable in times of war, expressing concern over the complaints received regarding the existence of secret detention centres that cannot be accessed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the practice of torture at these centres. It also recommended the closure of the detention centre at Guantanamo Bay and the introduction of legal processes with guarantees or the immediate release of those detained with assurances that they will not be returned to any state in which they run the risk of being tortured.

Georgia: The Committee welcomed the country's acceptance of the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and its legislative reforms aimed at eradicating the practice. It recommended the prioritisation of a human rights culture among police officers that would bring an end to the persistent impunity and strengthen investigatory powers, asking the Government at the same time to provide more information on the circumstances of the sudden deaths that have occurred at detention centres. Finally, the Committee recommended continued cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and NGOs so that programmes for the treatment of tuberculosis and the distribution of medicine in prisons could be implemented.

Guatemala: The Committee welcomed the country's reform of its judicial system and the absence of complaints relating to forced disappearances and secret detention centres in the country. However, it also expressed its concern at the many complaints it had received in relation to social violence, which included torture and maltreatment in the case of children and sexual violence in the case of women. The fact that the country's laws also allow the army to become involved in internal public security and crime-prevention activities, instead of strengthening the police force, was also a cause for concern. The Committee recommended that the Government reform its legislation under which torture is justified if ordered by a higher authority. It also recommended that measures be taken to prevent the threats and persecution suffered by defenders of human rights and that police offices and members of the judiciary be trained in human rights issues.

Peru: The Committee welcomed the work of the Reconciliation and Truth Commission and the resources allocated to the implementation of the Commission's recommendations. The Committee stated that it was still receiving complaints of torture by members of the police, the armed forces and prison officers, and it expressed its concern at the overcrowded jails, the lack of medical personnel, the absence of a public defence system, the abuses committed during the state of emergency and the delays in the trials of people accused of having used torture. The Committee asked the country to adopt measures to prevent torture and reminded it of its obligation to investigate all the complaints received in an impartial manner. The



committee reiterated its recommendation that Yanamayo prison be closed and stressed that responsibility for prisons must lie with the civilian authorities and not the military.

Togo: The Committee welcomed the country's efforts in modernising the power of the judiciary and the training given to prison workers on the prohibition of torture, along with its signing of the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture. The Committee expressed its concern about the complaints it had received, particularly following the 2005 elections, in respect of torture, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and the rape of women by military personnel and stressed that those responsible are still going unpunished. It underlined that under no circumstances must the military be involved in the detention of civilians and recommended that the judicial authorities exercise greater control over detention centres, adopting legislative, administrative and judicial measures to prevent and investigate cases of torture. Finally, the Committee expressed its concern about the presence of the former President of the Central African Republic, A. F. Patasse, requesting that he be transferred to appear before the International Criminal Court.

Qatar: The Committee welcomed the country's new Constitution which includes the right not to suffer torture and recommends that torture be included as an offence in the country's criminal code. Among its concerns, the committee mentioned the fact that certain provisions in the criminal code allow punishments such as flogging and stoning as criminal penalties, along with the absence of any legal provision that explicitly prohibits the expulsion, handover or extradition of people to other states where they may be at risk of being tortured.

As an exceptional measure, in 2006 the **Committee on the Rights of the Child** (CRC) examined two reports simultaneously in two sessions each comprising 9 members, "as an exceptional and temporary measure" to allow it to examine all the reports that had accumulated over recent months.

Main recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child

Colombia: The Committee expressed serious concern at the high level of child victims of extrajudicial executions, murders and massacres as the result of the armed conflict, calling on the Government to end impunity by investigating each case. It also called on the Government to establish a mechanism by which it could supervise the number of cases and the extent of the violence, sexual abuse, mistreatment and exploitation of children, both within the family environment and in schools and care centres.

Latvia: The Committee recommended that the state authorities launch public education campaigns with the aim of preventing and combating discriminatory social attitudes based on sex, age, race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, disability, etc. Another recommendation was aimed at persuading the Government to guarantee that the principle of a child's general interests is paramount and to ensure that this forms a full part of all legislation relating to the rights of the child.

Lebanon: The Committee strongly recommended that the Government prioritise its review of the regulation of crimes of honour and the removal of all provisions that allow sentences to be reduced, and that it promote awareness of the fact that this practice is unacceptable. Another of the Committee's recommendations was that the age of criminal responsibility be raised from 7 to 12 years.

Mexico: The Committee recommended that the country allow NGOs to participate more extensively in the planning and implementation of policies on the rights of the child. It also expressed grave concerns at information received about cases of torture and cruel and degrading treatment, especially against street children, migrant children and children who have been the victims of sexual and financial exploitation. Finally, the Committee stressed that the health, mortality and malnutrition indexes are significantly worse in rural areas.

Tanzania: The Committee recommended that the authorities develop the appropriate mechanisms to control and influence investment, and that it allocate more financial resources to programmes relating to children within the framework of the National Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction. It also recommended that the state continue its efforts to combat the spread and effects of HIV/AIDS, guaranteeing the distribution of antiretroviral drugs.

Turkmenistan: The Committee recommended that the authorities carry out a survey of the number, composition and characteristics of child workers, with the aim of designing and implementing a strategy to combat and prevent their exploitation. It also expressed concerns at reported cases of the mistreatment and torture of detained children, both at the time of their arrest and while they remain in detention.

Uzbekistan: Among other issues, the Committee recommended that the Government adopt all the measures necessary to combat discrimination against child refugees, asylum seekers, the internally



displaced and disabled children, and children living in areas with few resources. It also urged the authorities to create an independent commission to investigate the incidents that occurred in Andizan in May 2005. Finally, the Committee expressed its concern at the large amount of information it had received about the torture and maltreatment suffered by children.

The optional protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflicts

Belgium: The Committee recommended that the Government pay particular attention to child migrants, refugees and asylum seekers who may have been involved in or affected by armed conflicts, and that it strengthen its efforts to identify these children and offer them help.

Canada: The Committee invited the Government to provide more information on the status of children attending the Royal Military College, i.e. whether they are regarded as civilian students at a military college or have already been recruited as soldiers.

El Salvador: The Committee recommended that the Government ensure while recruiting troops that the documents presented to establish the age of a potential recruit are adequate.

Iceland: The Committee recommended that the programmes for the social reinsertion of child refugees affected by armed conflict continue.

Italy: The Committee recommended banning the sale of small arms to countries in which people who are not yet 18 years old are directly involved in hostilities, and it also recommended that the country explicitly prohibit the recruitment of children aged under 15 to the armed forces.

Czech Republic: The Committee recommended that the country's draft criminal code make the recruitment of children to the armed forces a criminal offence, without limiting this to times of war or armed conflict.

The **Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families** has only been recently created. It should be noted that the Convention has not been ratified by any country in Europe or North America, the regions where 60% of the world's migrant workers are found. The Committee has examined its first country report and issued the following opinion:

Main recommendations of the Committee on Migrant Workers

Mali: The Committee warmly welcomed the introduction of new legislation in 2005 to regulate the conditions under which foreigners enter and stay in Mali, thus replacing earlier legislation that did not respect the standards set out in the Convention. The Committee urged the country to seek the necessary technical assistance in order to create a database that classified workers by gender and allowed the status of migrant workers to be monitored, including those without official recognition. It also recommended that the country intensify its efforts to combat the mistreatment of children.

By way of conclusion, it should be stressed that the first session of the Human Rights Council is a transitional one, marking the beginning of efforts to design a universal review and overhaul of all the special procedures, work that will gradually take shape over the course of the next year. Of particular interest in the near future will be the debate regarding the possible unification of the Committees monitoring the different international treaties, in view of the important opposition that a measure of this nature could provoke.



Gender issues in peace-building

- Life expectancy for women is falling as a result of the impact of armed conflicts, thus reducing the difference between life expectancy levels for women and men.
- Participation by women as combatants in armed opposition groups is frequently the result of the failure on the part of state authorities to protect women from violence in times of armed conflict.
- The Aceh Women's League has been created in response to the exclusion of women from the peace process in this Indonesian region.
- The United Nations and civilian groups have created a coalition to combat the impact of sexual violence in armed conflicts.

This section contains an analysis of the different initiatives being pursued by the United Nations and various international organisations and movements in relation to peace-building as seen from a **gender perspective**¹. Viewing events from this perspective provides a picture of the different levels of impact that armed conflicts have on both women and men, the different ways and degrees in which women and men participate in peace-building and the real contribution offered by women in these processes. The section is divided into two main sub-sections: the first contains a review of gender issues as seen in relation to the impact of armed conflicts, while the second analyses different initiatives in peace-building as seen from a gender perspective.

9.1. The gender dimension in the impact of armed conflicts

This section deals with two main issues. The first is the different kind of impact that some of today's armed conflicts have on women and men, while the second is an analysis of the issue of women combatants, with particular reference to the reasons that have led some women to become active agents of violence.

a) The impact of armed conflicts on men and women

It is well known that the main victims of the armed conflicts currently taking place around the world are the civilian population. It has even been suggested that the number of civilian casualties may be as high as 90% of the total number of victims. However, this is rarely broken down into the various different groups that make up this "civilian population" in order to offer a view of the different levels of impact that armed conflicts may have, for example, in terms of gender.

Armed conflicts unquestionably affect the entire population of the place in which they are fought. Nevertheless, the patriarchal way in which the majority of societies are organised, the different positions occupied by men and women in society, the roles they play and their ability to gain access to certain resources all condition the way in which men and women are affected by a particular armed conflict. Thus, **given that the majority of combatants are still men, the**

¹ The gender perspective, according to N. Vázquez, a Mexican feminist and researcher into the impact of war on women, is a *conceptual operational instrument that makes it possible to see what is really happening from a new perspective which transcends the biological explanation of what is different between the sexes, concentrating on the identification of cultural, historical and social factors, among other things, that differentiate men from women and generate conditions and positions of inequality between them, thus allowing us to intervene effectively in order to change these unequal positions*. The definition offered by the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women indicates that *gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with the fact of being a man or a woman, and the relationships between men and women, boys and girls, as well as the relationships among women and relationships among men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and learned during the socialisation process. They are specific to both context and time and can change. Gender determines what is expected, permitted and appreciated in both women and men in a given context [...]*.



direct effects of armed fighting, in terms of the loss of human life and the wounds inflicted, are principally borne by men.

However, the **indirect consequences** of this armed fighting, which on occasion become direct consequences as they can be used as deliberate strategies of war by the combatants themselves, **are mainly borne by women**. These indirect effects include the consequences that result from the destruction of fields and crops or restrictions on access to certain goods and services such as healthcare, infrastructure and food. Given that it is frequently women who become the main support for their communities and families while armed conflicts are being fought, as women often take care of the basic needs of all the people in their charge, the fact that the normal functioning of vital sectors such as agriculture and healthcare is interrupted becomes a particular problem for women.

Some commentators point to the fact that **on many occasions the indirect consequences of armed conflicts are more serious than the direct consequences**, since the deaths that result directly from the armed violence do not provide even the remotest idea of the real human cost of an armed conflict.² Some examples of this are the increase in deaths in childbirth of both mother and child due to the disappearance of sexual and reproductive health services, increased malnutrition and the growing impact of HIV/AIDS for women in some conflicts as a result of the increased prevalence of sexual violence.

Furthermore, once the armed conflict has ended, women are usually left in charge of caring for those who have been affected by the fighting, such as the wounded and the disabled. **The consequences faced by women are prolonged over time, while the effects for men are generally only felt while the armed conflict is in progress**, since they relate more to the armed confrontations and combat situations themselves are therefore considerably reduced once the conflict is over.

The impact of armed conflicts on life expectancy

One of the consequences that armed conflicts have on women is that they **reduce the difference between life expectancy in men and women**. Where there is no armed conflict, life expectancy for women is general longer than it is for men. However, certain studies³ have shown that in spite of the fact that **the number of deaths in combat is higher among men**, the combined **indirect consequences** have a greater effect, since they cause the deaths of a greater number of women or young girls, thus **leading to a reduction in life expectancy** among this group. In addition, certain factors such as the fact that the conflict is being fought on ethnic grounds (in which the impact on the civilian population, and therefore women, is greater) contribute to this reduction in life expectancy.

It should also be pointed out that certain **sectors of the male population** are particularly **vulnerable** to some of the consequences of armed conflicts. This is the case with **young, non-combatant men**, who are often the victims of forced recruitment and therefore become unwillingly involved in the armed conflict. Examples include the armed conflict in Chechnya, where the forced recruitment of young men has been habitually practiced by the Russian armed forces, as also happened in the former Yugoslavia.

b) Women combatants

In spite of the increasing involvement of women at the heart of the armed groups taking part in conflicts, their participation in the conflicts themselves remains anecdotal and has rarely been the subject of analysis. It is therefore usual to hear generalised and imprecise explanations which, in the framework of an imaginary picture that associates the female sex with innate pacifist attitudes, turn women combatants into characters that sit at the margins of what is socially expected, or the exception that proves the rule. It should also be pointed out that on more than a few occasions the active participation of women in armed conflicts as agents of violence has not been willingly given, particularly in the case of young girls, who are abducted

² Plümper, T. and Nemayer, E., *The unequal burden of war: the effect of armed conflict on the gender gap in life expectancy*, London School of Economics, February 2006.

³ *Ibid.*



and forced to join armed groups, either as combatants or to perform other kinds of duties required to sustain the armed group in question, or even as sexual slaves. Finally, it should be mentioned that the issue of women combatants is now being dealt with more systematically when DDR processes are analysed, in order to show how these generally exclude women. However, the **reasons and motives that lead women to take up arms** have been analysed on a few occasions, along with the ways in which they participate in the organisations they form part of.

In any case, it should be pointed out that women do not become combatants in armed conflicts for just one reason. Their motives are varied and the decision is not always forced on them. Some commentators point to the fact that **voluntary participation by women as combatants is more common in certain types of armed groups**, in which the particular characteristics or ideology of the group offer certain women a space in which to pursue their political aspirations. This is the case in "ethno-nationalist", anti-state and liberation-type armed organisations⁴ in which participation by women, as a symbol of their own emancipation, is seen as a sign of a particular nation's liberation. In addition, some of the characteristics of today's armed conflicts can also become catalysts for their participation. The fact that in many of these conflicts the battlefield has moved into the more traditionally civilian spaces (towns and cities, agricultural land, even individual homes themselves) could lead to greater participation by women as combatants, since these are spaces that in time of conflict generally have a disproportionately high female presence.

Several reasons can be particularly highlighted from among those that are put forward to explain why women come to play an active role in armed opposition groups.⁵ Firstly, **their participation is a response to the absence of state protection against the violence they are suffering**, more specifically, forms of sexual violence. The fact that they have been the direct victim or the family member of a victim of violence, torture or abuse from state forces has led many women to join armed opposition groups. Participation in this case results from the belief that the only way of defending oneself against these excesses is to become part of the armed opposition. In addition, the case of women who join armed groups as young girls also demonstrates the **lack of commitment from many states to uphold the rights of the child and ensure that children are protected**.

The ferocity of women combatants

Women combatants have been accused on many occasions of engaging in much more cruel and heartless forms of violence than their male colleagues. Thus, the offence engendered when a woman takes actively to violence is seen to be even worse if she is actually more violent. What explanations can be offered? Firstly, it is pointed out that, as in other situations, any woman who finds herself involved in a basically masculine environment must prove her abilities in order to gain standing and recognition from other members of the group. In other words, she must demonstrate that she can use violence, since this is not taken for granted as it would be for a man. Furthermore, many men are reluctant or even refuse to allow women to become involved as they see the presence of women in armed organisations as a burden that will reduce the organisation's effectiveness. Other commentators⁶ allude to the fact that this type of violence and cruelty is perceived disproportionately, as the use of violence by women is something that surprises many people and something that, within the context of a patriarchal society, deserves greater social sanctions than violent behaviour by men. In this way, women would not be more violent, they would just be perceived as more violent.

Participation by women raises a number of questions, both within the armed groups themselves and in society in general. The fact that women may reach positions of responsibility within armed groups raises questions about the patriarchal leadership structure of such groups, which are generally no more than a reflection of the leadership structures in the societies from which

⁴ Alison, M., "Women as agents of political violence: gender security" in *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 2004, PRIO. The examples used by the author in this study are those of women combatants in the IRA (Northern Ireland) and the LTTE (Sri Lanka), two organisations that display the characteristics mentioned.

⁵ Mazurana, D., *Women in Armed Opposition Groups Speak on War, Protection and Obligations under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law*, Geneva Call and PSIO, 2004. This report sets out the conclusions of a seminar attended by women combatants and former combatants from 18 armed opposition groups.

⁶ Alison, M., *op. cit.*



they originally came. In addition, participation by women is still seen as a temporary aberration, something that is due to extraordinary events and that will be short-lived. Thus, at the end of the armed conflict in question, there is no reason why women should become more involved in certain areas in society such as politics or institutional organisations, or even the security services. In other words, the existence of women combatants is seen as merely a break in the natural order of things which does not have to lead to any kind of transformation when the armed conflict ends, and on many occasions this actually results in the exclusion and stigmatisation of women who have been combatants.

Furthermore, women combatants participate in these organisations without questioning the pre-established gender structures and with no sense that they might transform the patriarchal order, a situation which results in roles being allocated and performed along traditional lines. Nevertheless, on many occasions, joining up with an armed group leads to a growing awareness of the real inequalities and discrimination that exist, particularly in groups that follow ideologies of emancipation.

c) Sexual violence as a weapon of war

The last three months have seen the introduction of a number of initiatives aimed at combating and preventing the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.

Firstly, particular mention should be made of the **Creation of a joint coalition of civilian organisations and the United Nations to combat sexual violence in situations of conflict** and tension. This aimed at tackling not only the impact of this violence on the lives of victims and survivors but also the long-term effect on development in the communities that have been affected. With the aim of strengthening prevention strategies, the coalition wants to improve access to justice and strengthen national legislation, as well as increasing attention services for victims, providing psycho-social assistance and introducing programmes to restore dignity through the use of tools designed by the United Nations and creating directives aimed at preventing and responding to sexual violence in emergency situations.⁷

Elsewhere, UNFPA sponsored an international symposium on sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations which was attended by representatives from 30 different countries. This symposium was held as a result of the recognition that sexual violence represents a serious problem for health, human rights and development in countries affected by armed conflicts. Delegates approved a plan of action that set out measures aimed at putting an end to impunity and developing national programmes for preventive action. UNFPA also indicated that in spite of the fact that the occurrence of sexual violence during the course of armed conflicts is nothing new, there is evidence that it could be becoming more widespread as a result of the increased involvement of the civilian population in today's armed conflicts.

Finally, mention should be made of the life sentences handed down on seven members of the Congolese armed forces accused of crimes against humanity, including the rape of 119 women in the province of Equateur. This sets an important precedent since it is the first time that any members of this country's armed forces have been tried for crimes against humanity, and it is additionally important in that these acts of sexual violence against women have not gone unpunished.

9.2. Peace-building from a gender perspective

This section contains an analysis of the way that both women and men have participated in the different aspects of peace-building, including post-war rehabilitation processes.

a) Post-war rehabilitation

⁷ IASC Taskforce on Gender in Humanitarian Assistance, *Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings Focusing on Prevention of and Response to Sexual Violence in Emergencies* <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/iasc-gen-30sep.pdf>



During the month of June, a group of women from the Indonesian region of Aceh announced the **creation of the Aceh Women's League, in response to the exclusion and lack of participation by women throughout the peace process** in the region, following the signing last year of a peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the GAM armed opposition group. The aim of this organisation, which is made up of both women who were victims of the armed conflict and women who belonged to the GAM, is to achieve the **political empowerment of women in the region** and promote political participation, not just in order to build a political party but also to strengthen women's skills and abilities.

The organisation's founders have denounced the lack of spaces offered to women to voice their demands and complaints in a process that has been marked by its exclusion of women from the outset.⁸ This is not the first time that the women of Aceh have called for greater involvement in the decision-making spaces. After the tsunami that laid the entire region flat in December 2004 (the event that formed the catalyst for the peace agreement), women called for a greater presence and more opportunity to participate in the decisions being taken in respect of the region's reconstruction.

Participation by women in post-war rehabilitation processes not only means that these processes become more equitable and inclusive, it also affords **greater sustainability to the peace-building process itself**. In the case of Aceh, in which several of the women supporting this project aimed at encouraging political participation by women had been combatants in the conflict,⁹ this benefit is very clear. The combatants complained that they had been ignored since the process had started. And participation by women in the specifically political context of a post-war rehabilitation process¹⁰ plays a hugely important role if the idea of the process is to provoke changes that will bring an end to the structural causes of an armed conflict, which always include (although not, of course, in isolation) a patriarchal system and the militarist ideology that tends to go with it. Thus, if one wants to avoid the danger of a country falling back into a situation of armed conflict, incorporating gender equality as one of the fundamental pillars of this new society would seem to be the right way to go. A variety of studies have demonstrated that **states in which there is equality in the political, social and economic arenas have a lesser tendency to resolve their disputes by military means**,¹¹ and gender equality should therefore be seen as a primary preventive tool, given the high risk that countries in a phase of post-war rehabilitation may not emerge from this phase successfully. It could also be expected that an improvement in levels of gender equality in a particular country will bring a reduction in militarization at both a state level and among society at large, thus reducing the risk that violence will once again be used as a way of resolving conflict.

The limited perception of what a post-war rehabilitation or peace-building process entails, a perception that is frequently due to the preconceptions of the people involved in these processes, means that there is no place for women to become involved, a situation that merely perpetuates discrimination against them.

Furthermore, when women are able to participate at a higher level in the various aspects of a rehabilitation process, **the experiences of war as seen by women become more visible**, experiences which, particularly in the case of non-combatants, tend usually to be played down in comparison with those of men, who are basically the combatants. The fact that the experiences of the civilian population, and therefore women, are made known and passed on can help to banish the glorified and heroic view of armed conflicts that may well have driven the combatants, and change the perception that these combatants have of their own experiences,

⁸ For more information on the participation of women in the Aceh peace process, see Barometer issue 9.

⁹ Members of Inong Balee (warrior widows), the women's faction in the GAM, which may have numbered around 1,500 out of a total of 20,000 combatants.

¹⁰ For more information on the different aspects and contexts involved in post-war rehabilitation processes, see the chapter dealing with this subject.

¹¹ One of these is a study by Mary Caprioli, in which she explains how countries in which there is political equality (based on the number of years that women have had the vote and the number of women in parliament), social equality (based on low fertility levels) and economic equality (based on the number of women working) are less inclined to resolve their international disputes by military means. In her study she demonstrates that equality for women helps to reduce militarization in society. Caprioli, M., "Gendered Conflict" in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, No. 1, 2000, pp. 53-68



which is certainly far detached from the suffering and destruction experienced by the civilian population.

b) The role played by men in peace-building from a gender perspective

When any issue is approached from a gender perspective, it is often mistakenly only seen from a woman's point of view, with an analysis of the impact of a particular phenomenon on the lives of women or the way in which women have made the most significant contribution to a particular event or situation. This is undoubtedly the result of a desire to end the invisibility of women in the public arena and redress the historical marginalisation that the contribution of women to social progress has suffered. However, the inherent desire for transformation that accompanies the use of the gender perspective as a methodological and analytical tool means that the other side of the coin must not be forgotten, since the gender perspective involves analysing why the relationship between men and women is unequal and discriminatory.

Without active involvement from men, it will not be possible to achieve any effective and sustainable change in this unequal relationship. Furthermore, there is also a risk that the specific consequences that armed conflicts have on men will be overlooked, along with their ability to make positive contributions.

In spite of the fact that the issue of what role should be played by men and boys in the pursuit of gender equality has been on the agenda since the preparation of the Beijing Platform for Action, this debate has only acquired a significant amount of importance in recent times. In 2003, the Commission on the Status of Women devoted one of its sessions to this specific subject, setting out recommendations on how men and boys could contribute to greater equality in the area of jobs and economics and bring an end to gender-based violence, among other issues.

In all of this process, particular mention should be made of the contributions made by men's organisations to combat gender-based violence in places as significant as South Africa (which has one of the highest rates of violence against women, mainly sexual violence, in the world) and Nicaragua (where, as in many countries in South America, violence against women is granted a high level of social acceptance). Some commentators point to the particularly important role that young men can play as agents for social change, providing a bridge to older generations who may initially be more resistant to social change.¹² Making men a more visible part of the gender perspective means recognising that they can act as agents for change, as well as being made jointly responsible in the fight against inequality.

The White Ribbon Campaign

One of the most important international initiatives currently in place is the White Ribbon Campaign, run by a number of different men's organisations to combat gender-based violence in various countries. The basic aim of the campaign is to increase male awareness of the importance of their own role in eradicating violence against women. This platform is also aimed at encouraging debate about the perceptions that lead to the use of violence as a central aspect of masculine identity and deconstructing the idea that men are inherently violent. In societies that are affected by high levels of violence against women, the role of men as active agents for prevention and education in this area is key, since they are often regarded as more valid negotiators by the people perpetrating the violence. They also provide an example of other ways of understanding masculinity that do not involve the use of violence but instead question and criticise such methods.

However, in spite of the important role that men can play in putting an end to violence against women, the changes aimed at increasing gender equality continue to raise a great deal of **reluctance, since the dividends of the patriarchal system in terms of privilege, access to power and economic benefits, among other things, remain enormous.** Men, as a group, have benefited from discrimination and inequality, and violence has been one of the tools used to consolidate the privileges afforded by the patriarchal system. It is therefore necessary to

¹² Brun, C., "Hacer visibles a hombres jóvenes desplazados" [Making young displaced men visible], in *Migraciones Forzadas*, no. 9, January-March 2001



demonstrate the benefits and improvements that are offered by a society that is not structured along patriarchal lines but instead enjoys equality and an absence of discrimination.

One of the key contributions that men can make to peace-building from a gender perspective is that of encouraging substantial participation by women in peace processes, particularly during the course of the negotiations themselves. On the few occasions in which women have been offered the opportunity to take part in peace negotiations, their involvement has generally come about as a result of pressure from the international community and not as a result of the clear wishes of the local participants. On such occasions there is a danger that the presence of women will not make any significant difference, since they are merely a symbolic presence and have no real possibility of intervening. The international community should therefore try to create alliances with sectors that are better placed or more aware of the importance of including women in the negotiating process, so that their presence can provide qualitative benefits.

c) Peace-keeping missions

The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) published a report on the lessons learned in the process to combat sexual exploitation within the mission, after numerous complaints had been received in this regard about some of the mission's own members. After the scandal arising from these acts of sexual exploitation, which involved a large number of MONUC personnel, became public, the United Nations began an investigation and took disciplinary action to put an end to the problem, creating an Office to deal with sexual exploitation and abuse. Some of the main conclusions reached as a result of this process are contained in the report entitled *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Lessons Learned Study. Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in MONUC*.

The lessons learned at MONUC in order to combat sexual abuse

- **Training is the best preventive measure**, and more effort and resources should be allocated in this area, particular in relation to the more senior officers.
- The number and seriousness of these abuses bears a direct relation to the **failure or negligence of commanding officers** in preventing them.
- Accusations of sexual abuse and exploitation are often **linked** with other forms of poor conduct, such as **corruption and the abuse of power**.
- Abuses have been committed by people from all ranks, but are generally committed by **non-uniformed personnel**.
- The nature of prostitution in DR Congo (women and children sold as a result of the collapse of society caused by armed conflict) combined with poverty demonstrate the **complexity of the environment**. Furthermore, a lot of prostitution occurs clandestinely, through intermediaries, which increases the vulnerability of the prostitutes, heightens the probability that local authorities have been corrupted by MONUC personnel and impedes any investigation.
- The **victims of exploitation require long-term attention**, which is in direct contrast to the finite and short-term nature of peace-keeping missions.
- As regards members of the mission who have fathered children, it is recommended that financial assistance be channelled through humanitarian organisations on the ground, rather than being paid directly to the victim.



Appendix 1.1. UN Security Council Resolutions

Country	No.	Date	Content
ICC for the former Yugoslavia	S/RES/1668	10/04/06	Confirmed that Judge J. Canivell can continue hearing the <i>Krajišnik</i> case from April 2006 and see it through to its conclusion.
DR Congo	S/RES/1669	10/04/06	Decided to authorise the UN Secretary General temporarily to redeploy a maximum of a battalion of infantry, a military hospital and up to 50 military observers from ONUB to MONUC, until 1 July 2006, in accordance with the contents of Resolution 1650 (2005).
Eritrea and Ethiopia	S/RES/1670	13/04/06	Extended the mandate of the peace-keeping mission between the two countries (UNMEE) for one month to 15 May. However, the Council warned that if Ethiopia and Eritrea fail to comply with the requirements of Resolution 1640 of November 2005 it will consider withdrawing the mission.
RD Congo	S/RES/1671	25/04/06	Approved the deployment of the EU mission in DR Congo for a period that will end four months after the holding of the first round of elections, to be held on 30 July.
Sudan	S/RES/1672	25/04/06	Imposed financial sanctions and a travel ban on four Sudanese individuals suspected of involvement in atrocities against the civilian population in the Darfur region.
Weapons of mass destruction	S/RES/1673	27/04/06	Called on member states to comply with an earlier resolution (1540 from 2004) and meet their obligations under non-conventional arms treaties: the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Convention on Chemical Weapons and the Convention on Biological Weapons.
Protection of civilians in armed conflicts	S/RES/1674	28/04/06	Importance of the prevention of armed conflicts, denunciation of the violation of international law with deliberate attacks on the civilian population and the various ways in which this becomes manifest (torture and other prohibited practices, gender-based and sexual violence, violence against children, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, human mistreatment, enforced displacement and the intentional refusal of humanitarian assistance).
Western Sahara	S/RES/1675	28/04/06	Called for compliance with the military agreements arranged by MINURSO and extended its mandate until 31 October 2006
Somalia	S/RES/1676	10/05/06	Extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group overseeing the arms embargo in Somalia for a further six months, calling for a cessation of hostilities in the capital and denouncing the persistent flow of weapons, military material and financial support, which represents a breach of this embargo.
Timor-Leste	S/RES/1677	12/05/06	Extended the mandate of UNOTIL for a further month (until 20 June) and called on the Timorese government to deal with the causes of the recent outbreak of violence.
Eritrea and Ethiopia	S/RES/1678	15/05/06	Extended the mandate of the peace-keeping mission between the two countries (UNMEE) until the end of May and called on the UN Secretary General to report to the UN Security Council within one week regarding compliance with Resolution 1640
Sudan	S/RES/1679	16/05/06	Called for compliance with the Darfur Peace Agreement by all the parties and called on the AU to reach an agreement with the United Nations and other relevant organisations in order to strengthen the capacity of its mission.
Middle East	S/RES/1680	17/05/06	Renewed the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) until 31 December 2006.
Eritrea and Ethiopia	S/RES/1681	31/05/06	Extended UNMEE's mandate to 30 September 2006 and reduced the size of the mission to 2,300 troops.
Côte d'Ivoire	S/RES/1682	02/06/06	Increased the UNOCI contingent by 1,500 troops. These additional members include 1,025 military personnel and 475 civilian staff.
Liberia	S/RES/1683	13/06/06	Partially lifted the embargo, allowing weapons to be delivered for use by the country's armed forces and police.
ICC Rwanda	S/RES/1684	13/06/06	Extended the mandate of 11 members of the International Court until 31 December 2008
Middle east	S/RES/1685	13/06/06	Called for compliance with Resolution 338 (1973), expressed satisfaction at the work of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and extended its mandate until 31 December 2006
Middle East	S/RES/1686	15/06/06	Approved the report by the International Independent Investigation Commission and extended its mandate until 15 June 2007.
Cyprus	S/RES/1687	15/06/06	Reaffirmed all previous Resolutions, especially 1251 (1999) and expressed unconditional support for UNFYCIP.
Sierra Leone	S/RES/1688	16/06/06	Moved the trial of C. Taylor to the Hague, bearing in mind the instability that would be caused in western parts of Africa if the trial were to be held in Freetown




Liberia	S/RES/1689	20/06/06	Lifted the ban on timber exports, since the Liberian government gave assurances that all profits from this trade would be invested in reconstruction and development of the country.
Timor-Leste	S/RES/1690	20/06/06	Extended the mandate of the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) to 20 August 2006 with a view to planning the role to be played by the United Nations following the end of this mandate.
Montenegro	S/RES/1691	22/06/06	Admitted the country as a new member of the United Nations
Burundi	S/RES/1692	30/06/06	Extended ONUB's mandate to 31 December 2006



Appendix 1.2. Reports by the Secretary General to the Security Council

No.	Date	Content
S/2006/218	05/05/06	Monthly report by the Secretary-General on Darfur
S/2006/222	11/04/06	Eighth report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
S/2006/249	19/04/06	Report by the Secretary General on the situation in Western Sahara
S/2006/251 S/2006/251/Corr.1	20/04/06	Report by the Secretary General on the end of the mandate of the United Nations in Timor-Leste (relating to the period from 14 January to 12 April 2006)
S/2006/269	28/04/06	First report by the Secretary General on the United Nations integrated office in Sierra Leone
S/2006/306	19/05/06	Report by the Secretary General on Darfur
S/2006/310	22/05/06	Report by the Secretary General on paragraphs 10 and 14 of Security Council Resolution 1649 (2005)
S/2006/315	23/05/06	Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus
S/2006/333	01/06/06	Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (relating to the period from 10 December 2005 to 1 June 2006)
S/2006/360	02/06/06	Report by the Secretary General on paragraph 30 of Security Council Resolution 16491546 (2004)
S/2006/361	05/06/06	Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
S/2006/376	09/05/06	Eleventh report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia
S/2006/389	13/06/06	Report by the Secretary General on children and armed conflict in DR Congo
S/2006/390	13/06/06	Twenty-first report by the Secretary General on MONUC
S/2006/429	21/06/06	Tenth report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia



The School of Peace Culture (*Escola de Cultura de Pau*) was formed in 1999, with the aim of organising various academic and research activities relating to peace culture, the prevention and transformation of conflicts, disarmament and the promotion of human rights.

The School is essentially financed by the Government of Catalonia, through its Department for Universities, Research and the Information Society, and through its Foreign Relations Secretariat. It also receives support from other departments of the Catalan Government, as well as from local councils, foundations and other institutions. The School is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Peace and Human Rights Chair at *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*.

The main activities of the School of Peace Culture are as follows:

Teaching
Diploma course in Peace Culture (230-hour post-graduate course with 70 places).
Elective subjects "Peace culture and conflict management" and "Educating for peace and in conflicts".
Programmes
Initiatives for awareness and intervention in conflicts, to facilitate dialogue between the parties involved.
Programme Colombia , dedicated to raising awareness of the peace initiatives in this country.
Educating for Peace Programme. The team that run this programme aim to encourage and develop the knowledge, values and skills needed in order to Educate for Peace.
Music, Arts and Peace Programme , which concentrates on research into artistic initiatives that assist peace-building.
Human Rights Programme, aimed at encouraging human rights culture through the analysis, promotion and defence of human rights on both a local and an international scale.
Disarmament Programme, which acts as a specialist advisory service for the campaigns carried out by various NGOs for the control of small arms and as an advisory body for international organisations.
Alert Unit Programme on Conflicts, Peace and Human Rights . This programme involves the day-to-day monitoring of the international situation, particularly as regards conflicts and the human rights situation in all countries, the movement of displaced people and refugees, the peace processes currently under way, the different phases of post-war rehabilitation and the dynamics of development, for the purposes of preparing annual, quarterly and weekly reports.
Peace Processes Programme, which monitors and analyses the different countries currently pursuing peace processes or formal negotiations, along with countries in which negotiations are at an exploratory stage.
Post-war Rehabilitation Programme, which monitors and analyses international aid in terms of peace-building in contexts of conflict and post-war environments.

ecp escola de
cultura de pau

Edifici G6 ~ Campus de la UAB
08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès)
Barcelona, Spain

Tel. 34 93 581 24 14 unescopau@pangea.org
Fax 34 93 581 32 94 www.pangea.org/unescopau



Agència Catalana
de Cooperació
al Desenvolupament