


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Barometer 12

On conflicts, human
rights and peace-building

July - September 2006
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- ACH:** Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
- ACP:** Asia, Caribbean, Pacific
- ADF:** Afghanistan Development Forum
- AF:** Government Armed Forces
- AIG:** Armed Islamic Group
- AMIB:** African Mission in Burundi
- ANA:** Albanian National Army
- APHC:** All Parties Hurriyat Conference
- AU:** African Union
- AUC:** Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia)
- BICC:** Bonn International Centre for Conversion
- BONUCA:** United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic
- BRA:** Bougainville Revolutionary Army
- CAEMC:** Central African Economic and Monetary Community
- CAP:** United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process
- CARICOM:** Caribbean Community
- CAR:** Central African Republic
- CAS:** Country Assistance Strategy
- CASA:** Coordinating Action of Small Arms
- CFSP:** Common Security and Foreign Policy
- CIS:** Commonwealth of Independent States
- COAV:** Children in Organised Armed Violence
- CODHES:** *Consejo para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento* (Advisory Council for Human Rights and Displacement)
- CPA:** Coalition Provisional Authority
- CPI:** Corruption Perception Index
- CPN:** Communist Party of Nepal
- DAC:** Development Assistance Committee
- DDR:** Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
- Dollars:** US dollars
- DRM:** Democratic Republican Movement
- GDP:** Gross Domestic Product
- ECHA:** Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
- ECHO:** European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
- ECOMOG:** Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
- ECOSOC:** United Nations Economic and Social Council
- ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States
- EEBC:** Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission
- ELN:** *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army)
- ESCR:** Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
- ESDP:** European Security and Defence Policy
- EU:** European Union
- EUFOR:** European Union Forces
- EZLN:** *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (Zapatista Army of National Liberation)
- FAd'H:** *Forces Armées d'Haiti* (Haiti Armed Forces)
- FAO:** United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
- FARC:** *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
- FATF:** Financial Action Task Force
- FDD:** *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
- FDLR:** *Forces Démocratiques de Libération de Rwanda* (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
- FKM:** *Front Kedaulatan Maluku* (Moluccan Sovereignty Front)
- FLEC:** *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front)
- FNL:** *Forces Nationales de Libération* (National Liberation Force)
- GAM:** *Gerakin Aceh Merdeka* (Movement for Free Aceh)
- GDI:** Gender-related Development Index
- GPP:** *Groupement Patriotique pour la Paix* (Patriotic Grouping for Peace)
- GSPC:** Salafist Group for Call and Combat
- HDI:** Human Development Index
- HIPC:** Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
- HIV/AIDS:** Human Immunodeficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
- IAEA:** International Atomic Energy Agency
- IANSA:** International Action Network on Small Arms
- ICBL:** International Campaign to Ban Landmines
- ICC:** International Criminal Court
- ICO:** Islamic Conference Organisation
- ICRC:** International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
- IDF:** Iraq Development Fund
- IDP:** Internally Displaced Persons
- IEMF:** Interim Emergency Multinational Force
- IFM:** Isatubu Freedom Movement
- IGAD:** Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- IHL:** International Humanitarian Law
- IISS:** International Institute for Strategic Studies
- IMF:** International Monetary Fund
- IOM:** International Organisation for Migration
- IRIN:** United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network
- IRIS:** *Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques* (Institute for International and Strategic Relations)
- ISAF:** International Security Assistance Force
- ISDR:** International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
- JEM:** Justice and Equality Movement
- KANU:** Kenya African National Union
- LDC:** Least Developed Countries
- LRA:** Lord's Resistance Army
- LTTE:** Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam
- LURD:** Liberians United for Reunification and Democracy



- MAS:** Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism)
- MDC:** Movement for Democratic Change
- MDJT:** *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad* (Movement for Democracy and Justice in Cahd)
- MDF:** Meckauvi Defence Force
- MERCOSUR:** *Mercado Común del Sur* (Common Latin American Market)
- MDG:** Millennium Development Goals
- MFDC:** *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (Casamance Democratic Forces Movement)
- MILF:** Moro Islamic Liberation Front
- MINUCI:** United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
- MINURSO:** United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
- MINUSTAH:** United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
- MJP:** *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (Mouvement for Justice and Peace)
- MLC:** *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (Congo Liberation Movement)
- MNLF:** Moro National Liberation Front
- MODEL:** Movement for Democracy in Liberia
- MONUC:** United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
- MPCI:** *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement)
- MPIGO:** *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (Ivorian Popular Movement for the Far West)
- MPLA:** Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
- MSF:** *Médecins Sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders)
- NAFTA:** North American Free Trade Treaty
- NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- NDC:** National Democratic Congress
- NDFB:** National Democratic Front of Bodoland
- NEPAD:** New Economic Partnership for African Development
- NGO:** Non-Governmental Organisation
- NLA:** National Liberation Army
- NLD:** National League for Democracy
- NLFT:** National Liberation Front of Tripura
- NMRD:** National Movement for Reform and Development
- NPA:** New People's Army
- NPP:** New Patriotic Party
- NRC:** Norwegian Refugee Council
- NSCN (IM):** National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak - Muivah
- OAS:** Organisation of American States
- OCHA:** United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- ODA:** Official Development Aid
- OECD:** Organisation for Economic Trade and Development
- ONUB:** United Nations Operation in Burundi
- OPM:** *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement)
- OSCE:** Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
- PAC:** *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civiles* (Civil Defence Patrols)
- PDP:** People's Democratic Party
- PNA:** Palestinian National Authority
- PRIO:** Peace Research Institute of Oslo
- PWG:** People's War Group
- RAMSI:** Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
- RCD-Goma:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma* (Congoese Rally for Democracy - Goma)
- RCD-K-ML:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement pour la Libération* (Congoese Rally for Democracy - Movement of Liberation)
- RCD-N:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National* (Congoese Rally for Democracy - National)
- RFTF:** Results Focused Transnational Framework
- RSM:** *Republik Maluku Selatan* (Republic of South Moluccas)
- RUF:** Revolutionary United Front
- SADC:** South African Development Community
- SFOR:** Stabilisation Force
- SIPRI:** Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- SLA:** Sudan Liberation Army
- SPLA:** Sudanese People's Liberation Army
- TNG:** Transitional National Government
- UAB:** *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* (Autonomous University of Barcelona)
- ULFA:** United Liberation Front of Assam
- UNAIDS:** United Nations Programs on HIV/AIDS
- UNAMA:** United Nations Aid Mission in Afghanistan
- UNAMIS:** United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
- UNAMSIL:** United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone
- UNDG:** United Nations Development Group
- UNDOF:** United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
- UNDP:** United Nations Development Programme
- UNEP:** United Nations Environmental Programme
- UNESCO:** United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
- UNFICYP:** United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
- UNFPA:** United Nations Population Fund
- UNHCHR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
- UNHCR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNHRC:** United Nations Human Rights Commission
- UNICEF:** United Nations Children's Fund
- UNIDIR:** United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
- UNIFEM:** United Nations Development Fund for Women
- UNIFIL:** United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNITA: *União para a Independência Total de Angola*

UNMA: United Nations Mission in Angola

UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMISSET: United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste

UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNMPO: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

UNMOVIC: United Nations Monitoring and Verification of Inspections Commission

UNO: United Nations Organisation

UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

UNOGBIS: United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau

UNOL: United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia

UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

UNOTIL: United Nations Office in Timor-Leste

UNPOS: United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UNPPB: United Nations Political and Peace-Building Mission

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNSCO: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Middle East

UNTOP: United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building

UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

USA: United States of America

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

USCRI: United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants

WB: World Bank

WFP: World Food Programme

WHO: World Health Organisation

WTO: World Trade Organisation

ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front



“**Barometer**” is a quarterly report published in Spanish and English by the Alert Unit at the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona’s *School of Peace Culture*. The report **analyses the events that have occurred in the world over the course of the previous three months (July – September 2006)** under eight main headings: armed conflicts, situations of tension, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, humanitarian crises, disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law and gender aspects in peace-building. It serves to update the information contained in the “Alert 2006” annual report and previous issues of “Barometer”, using information published fortnightly in “*Semáforo*”¹, an electronic newsheet also published by the Alert Unit.

The following are some of the more important facts contained in this issue of “Barometer” relating to the third quarter of 2006:

Armed conflicts

- The number of armed conflicts rose to 23 as a result of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon.
- The Nigerian government launched a huge military operation in the Niger Delta, detaining hundreds of people and harassing the civilian population whom it accused of complicity with the armed opposition.
- NATO announced the deaths of 400 members of the Taliban militia as a result of Operation Medusa in the south of Afghanistan, while human rights organisations denounced the deaths of hundreds of civilians as a result of the armed fighting.
- The Ugandan government signed a cessation of hostilities agreement with the LRA, though the international criminal action initiated against the group’s leaders has hindered advances in the process.
- Extremely high levels of violence were recorded in Iraq with more than 6,000 reported dead during the months of July and August.

Situations of tension and high-risk dispute

- Senegalese armed forces launched a new offensive in the Casamance region which led to a rise in the number of displaced people heading for Gambia.
- The number of kidnappings for ransom in Haiti rose as the general lack of security worsened.
- In Baluchistan, the assassination of the leader of the BLA armed opposition group further added to the already high levels of tension.
- The Thai army carried out a coup d’état following three months of crisis due to financial scandals and complaints of corruption.
- An attack in the southeast of Turkey, which was condemned by armed Kurdish groups, left 10 people dead.

Peace processes

- Peace agreements or preliminary undertakings were signed in a number of African countries (Angola, Burundi, Chad-Sudan, Mali, DR Congo (Ituri), Somalia and Uganda), making the continent a focal point for current peace-building efforts.
- The Colombian government began a rapprochement process with the FARC guerrilla group, aimed at reaching a humanitarian agreement.
- Advances were made in the peace process between the Nepalese government and the CPN Maoist guerrillas.
- A new technical agreement process was introduced in Cyprus in a further attempt to achieve unification of the island.
- A UN Security Council resolution ended the upsurge in violence between Israel and Lebanon.

¹ This issue of Barometer includes issues 148-153 of *Semáforo*

Post-war rehabilitation

- The date set for elections in Côte d'Ivoire was postponed once again, due to the lack of political will among the different parties involved in the process.
- The new government elect in Macedonia set out a series of measures aimed at improving the country's economic situation.
- The UN Security Council approved the terms of reference for the new peace-building fund, aiming to raise 250 million dollars in voluntary donations.

Humanitarian crises

- The humanitarian crisis in DR Congo is leaving 1,200 people dead each day and is now classified as the most serious crisis in the world.
- There has been an alarming increase in violence against the civilian population and humanitarian personnel in Darfur, and the situation is now worse than it was at the height of the armed conflict.
- Both the government and the LTTE prevented aid from reaching the thousands of displaced people in the Jaffna Peninsular and the east of Sri Lanka.
- The armed forces and the CPN worked together to assist victims of a landslide in the west of Nepal.
- Israeli attacks on civilian targets in Lebanon led to the displacement of a million people during the height of the conflict.

Disarmament

- The UN Security Council proposed reducing the arms embargo in Somalia while extending the sanction imposed on DR Congo for one more year.
- The Review Conference for the Programme of Action to Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms ended without reaching consensus on any kind of agreed text.
- Approximately 800,000 small arms are manufactured around the world every year, and half the victims of this kind of weapon, about 100,000 a year, are men aged between 15 and 29, according to the Small Arms Survey Yearbook.
- The DDR programmes in Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo and Uganda were suspended, while the process was completed in Afghanistan.

Human rights

- International NGOs mainly focused their attentions on the situation in Lebanon, Darfur (Sudan) and DR Congo.
- The AU launched the African Court on Human and People's Rights.
- There were important regulatory advances in respect of the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
- The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights held a period of sessions that was marked by uncertainty over its future in the context of the reform of the Human Rights Council.

Gender and peace-building

- A number of international and local groups have denounced the endemic violence against women in Afghanistan in all its forms.
- Nepalese women's organisations have called for a greater role in the peace and democratisation process that has begun in the country.



- A women's alliance including Palestinians, Israelis and representatives from the international community has called for the immediate resumption of peace talks in order to put an end to the violence in the Middle East.
- Half the world's migrant population are women, according to a report by the United Nations Population Fund.



Armed conflicts¹

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- ❑ NATO announced the deaths of 400 members of the Taliban militia as a result of Operation Medusa in the south of Afghanistan, while human rights organisations denounced the deaths of hundreds of civilians as a result of the armed fighting.
- ❑ The Ugandan government signed a cessation of hostilities agreement with the LRA, though the international criminal action initiated against the group's leaders has hindered advances in the process.
- ❑ Extremely high levels of violence were recorded in Iraq with more than 6,000 reported dead during the months of July and August.

This section contains an analysis of the **23 armed conflicts** that remained active during the third quarter of 2006. The most notable feature of the last three months was the increase in hostilities in 9 contexts, with particularly virulent consequences in **Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel and Palestine, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Sri Lanka and Sudan (Darfur), to which the violent conflict between Lebanon and Israel should be added.** The situation remained at stalemate in a further eight countries, however, with no great change or perceptible improvement as compared with the previous quarter. Finally, mention should be made of the relative improvement in the situation in **Burundi, Uganda and India (Assam).**

1.1. Evolution of armed conflicts

Africa

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 3 rd quarter of 2006
Algeria (1992-)	Government, GIA, GSPC	Political and economic control (natural resources) by the military over the Islamic opposition, religious manipulation	Stalemate
Burundi (1993-)	Government, A. Rwasa's FNL	Political control by an ethnic minority and difficulties in the handover of power	Reduction in hostilities
Chad (2006-)	Government, FUC, SCUD	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power	Stalemate
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	Government, pro-Government militias, Forces Nouvelles	Marginalisation of some regions, democratic fragility, political exclusion, religious manipulation	Increase in hostilities
Nigeria (Niger Delta) (2003-)	Government, Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo community militias, private armies, MEND	Control of political power and natural resources, social and political exclusion	Increase in hostilities
DR Congo (1998-)	TNG, factions of armed groups included in the TNG, Mayi-Mayi militias, armed Ituri groups, FDLR	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power and control over natural resources	Increase in hostilities
Somalia	Transitional Federal Government	Absence of practical democracy, struggle for	Stalemate

¹ An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving groups of various kinds, such as regular or irregular military forces, guerrillas, armed opposition groups, paramilitary groups or ethnic or religious communities which, using arms and other destructive methods, claims more than 100 victims per year. This figure of 100 deaths is just an indicator, and it should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country.



(1988-)	(including several warlords), warlords and militias, UIC, USA	regional political power, confederation v. federation	
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	Government, pro-government militias, SLA, JEM, NMRD	Regional and political marginalisation	Increase in hostilities
Uganda (1986-)	Government, LRA	Messianic religion and regional marginalisation	Reduction in hostilities

a) West Africa

The peace process in Côte d'Ivoire was once again in danger of collapsing due to the absence of any progress in the campaign to register people individually prior to the elections and the suspension of the disarmament programme following the poor response to the weapons handover. In this connection, the **refusal by President L. Gbagbo to recognise the identity documents granted by travelling courts on the grounds that they were anti-constitutional** led to violent action by the Young Patriots, a militia group with close links with the president, during the days on which documents were to be distributed in both the south of the country and the capital. The recent resignation of the government following a toxic waste spill that left seven people dead in Abidjan did nothing to improve the situation. In the meantime, **UNOWA reported that there have been continuing attacks in the buffer zone in the southwest of the country.**

The Nigerian government launched a **huge military operation in the Niger Delta** with the aim of stemming the rising number of kidnappings being carried out by various armed opposition groups, mainly the MEND. Hundreds of people were detained by the police during the first week, though the majority of them were released shortly afterwards. This hardening of the government's attitude towards the conflict in the region has led to **fears of an increase in violence** due to the great pressure that the military machine is placing on both the armed groups and civilians, accused of supporting the insurgents. However, reports from the **United Nations and the International Crisis Group (ICG) viewed some of the claims made by armed groups in the region as legitimate, though they condemned the violence they use to pursue their aims**, calling on the Nigerian government to respond to demands by local authorities for greater control over the oil extraction's income, along with increased transparency in the use of oil revenues.

b) Horn of Africa

In **Somalia**, a period which ended with a **peace agreement between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (SICS)** had actually begun with the **surrender or defeat of a number of warlords in Mogadishu**, following several days of **armed fighting** with the SICS militias that left hundreds dead or wounded. After these victories by the SICS, **Ethiopian troops were deployed in the country** with a view to demonstrating the country's support for the TFG, which had established itself in the city of Baidoa after the SICS had taken control of Mogadishu and subsequently moved on to control other Somali cities like Beletwejn (a city of great strategic importance) and Harardhere. The SICS threatened to use military force to counter any Ethiopian intervention in Somalia's internal affairs. The growing military power of the SICS and disagreements within the government over the way that peace negotiations with the SICS were progressing had also led President A. Yusuf Ahmed to dissolve the government and form a new cabinet. Elsewhere, particular mention should be made of the announcement by IGAD of the deployment of the first contingent of peace-keeping force, following a meeting of the organisation's defence ministers, which would include Sudanese and Ugandan troops. The deployment of this force has been rejected by the SICS, which has classified it as an act of aggression and has announced that it will take any means necessary to protect Somalia from such an attack.

Turning to **Sudan**, the **UN Security Council approved Resolution 1706, which ordered the deployment of UNMIS in Darfur** with reinforcements amounting to 20,000 new troops. However, the way that the Resolution was worded meant that it would need to obtain authorisation from the Sudanese government before deploying the mission. At present, the



situation in this region of Sudan has worsened considerably with the **increased presence of government troops** in the region and intensifying attacks on armed groups that have not signed the peace agreement, which have in turn come together under the banner of the National Redemption Front (NRF) and declared the north of the region of Darfur to be under their control. In this regard, the **United Nations called attention to the air strikes being carried out by Sudanese forces**, which in some cases involved white helicopters (the colour used to carry humanitarian aid by air) being used to attack the SLA - Nur and the JEM, and which included attacks on numerous civilian villages controlled by the rebels in the region, actions that were **denounced as war crimes** by Human Rights Watch (HRW). Another factor that contributed to the worsening of the situation in the region were the **continuing confrontations between the faction that signed the peace agreement, M. Minnawi's SLA, and the Al-Nur SLA**, in which the former was supported by Sudanese armed forces. As a result of these events, and following various statements from both the government and armed opposition groups, the ceasefire can be regarded as having been practically **abandoned, while the peace agreement has still not been implemented**. The **AU mission has been extended to the end of the year** and will be financed by the Arab League with logistical help from the United Nations, which will prevent the security vacuum from developing in the region. **President O. Al-Bashir still refused to allow the United Nations to deploy its forces in Darfur**.

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Burundi**, the **government and A. Rwsa's FNL signed a definitive ceasefire agreement at the beginning of September**, with backing from the UN. The FNL is the last armed group to have signed up to the peace process, and this therefore represents a significant step forward in the resolution of this conflict². The agreement, based on a preliminary agreement reached in mid-June, **allows members of the FNL to join the armed forces, if they wish to, or alternatively demobilise within a period of one month**. It was the position taken by both sides in respect of the armed forces that had been a continual obstacle to peace talks, since the FNL had called for them to be disbanded or entirely reformed, while the government had offered the rebels the chance to join but with no reforms. Although the ceasefire agreement was implemented there were some minor outbreaks of fighting and the FNL continued to collect taxes and recruit civilians. Prior to the agreement, the country had suffered a **turbulent three months**, marked by an increase in **attacks on the civilian population** perpetrated by both the FNL and unidentified groups. There were also reports of an **alleged coup attempt** after a number of well-known political leaders were arrested, presumably for involvement in the attempt, including former President D. Ndayizeye of the FRODEBU party. In addition, Vice President A. Nzomukunda resigned in protest against the rising levels of corruption, human rights violations and security problems in the country. The local human rights organisation ITEKA also denounced the increase in **human rights violations** by the government and reports of extra-judicial executions, kidnappings and illegal and arbitrary arrests. The situation in Burundi is therefore very fragile, leading to uncertainties over the immediate future of the peace process. Meanwhile, the **UN Security Council decided to extend the mandate of its peace-keeping mission in the country (ONUB) to 31 December 2006 and replace it in 2007 with the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)**.

In **Chad**, fighting continued along the country's eastern border with Sudan between government armed forces and armed opposition groups, particularly the FUC, which succeeded in its attempts to reach the capital. In the meantime, President I. Deby called on all opposition parties to take part in a **National Dialogue initiative** with the aim of seeking solutions to the political crisis in the country. The call was **boycotted by the two main opposition groups, the CPDC and the FAR**, as it did not include all the different politico-military groupings and excluded armed opposition groups. These talks finally ended with agreements to reform the electoral system and modify the Commission overseeing the electoral process, along with the creation of a code of electoral conduct. Elsewhere, questions were asked about the presence of the French army in Chad, and some politico-military movements saw it as providing support for the current government.

² See the chapter on peace processes.



The last three months were marked by the tensions that have arisen in relation to the elections being held in **DR Congo**, where there were various outbreaks of fighting between followers of the different opposition parties and constant complaints of fraud in the run-up to the elections themselves. **When the results were announced there was an upsurge in violence in the capital between the militias run by the two main candidates** (current President J. Kabila and Vice President J. P. Bemba) which left 16 people dead and caused **MONUC and EUFOR forces** to intervene to maintain order. The final result gave **44.8% of the votes cast to J. Kabila and 20% to J.P. Bemba**. After the fighting in the capital had calm down, the two candidates met to discuss security issues prior to the second round of voting, which will now be held on 29 October. In the rest of the country, election's day passed off without any serious incident, and particular mention should be made of the fact that **the MRC armed group laid down its weapons** after holding talks with the Congolese government with mediation from the United Nations. Elsewhere, the last weeks of September saw the **rearmament of soldiers taking part in the DDR programmes** in the Ituri region as a result of the pressures placed on the armed groups still active in the area, mainly the FRPI and the FNI.

The government of **Uganda** and the LRA armed opposition group signed a **temporary cessation of hostilities agreement** on 26 August after several months of negotiations in Juba, in southern Sudan. Among other things, the agreement provides for the regrouping of LRA forces in two neutral camps close to the Sudanese border, so that peace talks can then be continued from there³. There are currently a number of obstacles hindering progress in talks between the two sides after 20 years of armed conflict, though particular mention should be made of the **accusations of war crimes that the ICC have levelled against LRA leaders**, including the group's commander, J. Kony, and his deputy, V. Otti. These people have demanded that the international warrants against them be withdrawn as a prerequisite for reaching any peace agreement, though the Ugandan government has so far only offered them an amnesty. According to some humanitarian agencies, **the LRA still has 3.000 women and children under its control**, many of whom have suffered sexual abuse or been used as slaves. Under the agreement they must be allowed to return to their families. In mid-August, a number of military operations by Ugandan armed forces left several members of the LRA dead, including one of the group's leaders, R. Lukwiya. This did not hinder the advance of the process however.

d) Maghreb and North Africa

There were continuing **armed attacks in Algeria, attributed by the authorities to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)**. These left five guards dead in an area close to Tipasa, to the east of the capital, along with two policemen who died when a bomb exploded in a market in Tidjelabine, while a further three people were wounded in an attack on the state electricity company in Ben Yamina. In addition, at the end of June, the authorities indicated that at least 19 people had died on the hands of the rebels since the beginning of the month, saying that the response by government armed forces to these attacks had ended with 10 of the suspects being killed. The country was still in the middle of an **amnesty**, which had been decreed in February and was due to end in August. According to the authorities, **only 250 to 300 rebels had taken advantage of the amnesty out of a projected figure of 800**. This amnesty, which until now had resulted in the release of 2,200 Islamists, was not accepted by the **GSPC, which furthermore announced that it was joining forces with al-Qaeda**, reiterating its loyalty to the organisation (first announced back in 2003) and declaring that it would continue its Jihad in Algeria under O. Bin Laden's leadership.

America

Table 1.2. Evolution of armed conflicts in America			
Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 3 rd quarter of 2006

³ Ibid.



Colombia (1964-)	Government, FARC, ELN, AUC paramilitaries	History of political exclusion, social injustice, control over natural resources and degradation of the conflict as a result of drug-trafficking	Stalemate
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Turning to the situation in **Colombia**, at the end of August the government announced the names of 2,695 demobilised members of the AUC paramilitaries who could be tried under the Justice and Peace Act. This list includes the names of 15 leaders whose extradition for drug-trafficking crimes has been requested by the USA. Paramilitary leaders have been very reluctant to gather in areas designed by the government while awaiting the application of transitional justice measures. In addition, the ELN guerrilla group held its 4th Congress during August, debating its future strategy and the way that talks with the government should continue. Members of the FARC guerrilla group on the other hand continued to pursue their strategy of withdrawal with sporadic offensive actions, which on several occasions affected the civilian population. Their current priority is to clear all public forces from two towns in the south of the country which it can then use as a base to negotiate with the government over the exchange of hostages for detained guerrillas. **Fighting between the two guerrilla groups in the province of Arauca would seem now to have spread to other parts of the country.** For their part, government armed forces were involved in a series of serious scandals which included the murder of civilians, links with drug-trafficking and the arrangement of attacks and raids that had been assumed to have been carried out by the FARC. The level of harassment faced by civilians and human rights defenders in Colombia remains alarming.

Asia and the Pacific

Table 1.3. Evolution of armed conflicts in Asia			
Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 3rd quarter of 2006
Afghanistan (2001-) ⁴	Government, international coalition (led by the USA), Taliban militias and various groups	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power and ethnic manipulation	Increase in hostilities
India (Assam) (1989-)	Government, ULFA, BJF, NDFB	Autonomy v. independence and control over economic resources	Reduction in hostilities
India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989-)	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	Autonomy v. independence and religious manipulation	Stalemate
Nepal (1996-)	Government, CPN	Control of political power and democratic fragility	Reduction in hostilities
Philippines (1969-)	Government, NPA	Struggle for power and democratic fragility	Stalemate
Philippines (1978-)	Government, MILF	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Stalemate
Philippines (1991-)	Government, Abu Sayyaf	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Increase in hostilities
Sri Lanka (1989-)	Government, LTTE	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation	Increase in hostilities
Thailand (2004-)	Government, Muslim community militias	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation	Stalemate

a) South Asia

The situation in **Afghanistan** was marked by two main events during the last three months. Firstly, **NATO troops were deployed in the south of the country** after the USA had handed over control of military operations in the region to the organisation in its first land deployment outside Europe. Secondly, while this troop deployment was taking place, there was a **considerable upsurge in violence** that left **hundreds of people dead**, including international troops, Taliban fighters and civilians. According to AIHRC, 600 civilians died during the first half

⁴ The current phase of the armed conflict in this country began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has actually been in a state of armed conflict since 1979.



of the year, while NATO reported that 400 Taliban fighters had been killed during Operation Medusa. The last three months saw numerous attacks and armed confrontations between Taliban militias and both international and Afghan forces. The **province that saw the greatest deterioration was Helmand**, a circumstance that led humanitarian organisations to reduce their activities. One example of this deterioration and the growing military strength of the Taliban militias was the takeover of two cities by these militias for two days. Control was subsequently recovered by Afghan and international armed forces.

As far as **India** is concerned, the peace process⁵ initiated by the Indian government and the ULFA armed opposition group in relation to the armed conflict affecting the state of **Assam** would seem to have gained in strength. Nevertheless, rumours are growing about a **possible resettlement of the operational bases** that the armed group was using in neighbouring **Bhutan**, three years after the military operation by the latter country's armed forces had caused a major setback for the armed group. As regards the armed conflict affecting the state of **Jammu and Kashmir**, there were sporadic outbreaks of violence during the course of the last three months, though none of them led to incidents of any great note.

The **peace and democratisation process** initiated by the alliance of democratic parties and the CPN Maoist armed opposition group continued in **Nepal**. Although there were some isolated episodes of violence and reports that the Maoists were continuing to engage in kidnappings, the terms of the ceasefire were broadly adhered to, leading to predictions of a **hopeful future in which the cessation of armed violence will be respected by all sides**.

Turning to the situation in **Sri Lanka**, there were a number of serious episodes during the course of the quarter which left hundreds of people dead and led to the **practical resumption of open armed conflict**. The most serious incidents occurred around Trincomalee, where **government armed forces attacked LTTE positions**, after the armed group closed the sluices of a canal supplying water to the region. Between 2,000 and 3,000 soldiers were deployed, leading to a further upsurge in violence. Elsewhere, **around 20 employees of the French humanitarian organisation Action Contre la Faim were murdered**, a crime that the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) blamed on the security forces. The **Deputy Secretary of the Government's Peace Secretariat**, K. Loganathan, who had become well known for his active role in the search for peace in Sri Lanka, was also murdered. Although the LTTE did not claim responsibility for this incident, a number of signs point to this murder forming part of the armed group's policy of eliminating well-known Tamils who oppose the LTTE, a category into which K. Loganathan fell. Prior to his job with the Secretariat he had worked in civilian organisations engaging in duties of parallel diplomacy. However, the quarter ended rather surprisingly with **announcements from both sides that new talks would be held in Oslo in October without any pre-conditions**, though the government subsequently denied that such talks would be restarted unconditionally.

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

In the **Philippines**, the situation in all three armed conflicts was marked by a lack of progress towards any kind of negotiated peace. On the one hand, fighting between the **NPA** armed opposition group and government armed forces intensified, leaving dozens of people dead in several provinces. The CPP, political wing of the NPA, declared that it was not willing to negotiate with a government led by G. Macapagal Arroyo, though it did hold a meeting with the Norwegian government, which is acting as mediator. Elsewhere, the **government intensified its military offensive against the Abu Sayyaf armed opposition group**, stating that it was close to achieving a military victory over the rebels. More than 6,000 soldiers were deployed on the island of Jolo with the aim of defeating approximately 200 Abu Sayyaf militants who were using the centre of the island as a stronghold. Thousands of people were displaced from their homes as a result of the fighting. Finally, **the peace talks between the government and the MILF armed opposition group came to a standstill** over the issue of rights to ancestral lands. The MILF threatened to return to arms if no progress was made on this question, and the government finally announced that it would be presenting new proposals in October. Fighting

⁵ See the chapter on peace processes.



was also reported between government armed forces and the MILF, and investigations are to be carried out in order to ascertain who was responsible.

There was a continuing climate of violence in the southern provinces of **Thailand**, where a **series of attacks on banks and businesses was reported, along with attacks on members of the civilian population** attributed to the Muslim armed opposition. The violence once again claimed the life of a member of the teaching profession, the group that has now seen 30 people killed since the armed violence first broke out in 2004. However, while the demand from the head of the armed forces, General S. Boonyaratglin, that the government change its approach to the situation in the south of the country and seek ways of making contact with separatist leaders did not produce any results, it did raise questions about the way that the government was handling the conflict. Following the subsequent coup d'état (led by S. Booyaratglin, a Muslim, though not linked with the communities in the South) the new Prime Minister, S. Chulanot (who had previously criticised his predecessor's policy in relation to the conflict in the southern provinces) expressed his intention to make great efforts to resolve the problem during the course of the coming year.

Europe

Table 1.4. Evolution of armed conflicts in Eastern Europe			
Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 3 rd quarter of 2006
Russian Federation (Chechnya) (1991-)	Russian Government, pro-Russian regional government, Chechen armed opposition groups	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate

In the Republic of **Chechnya** (Russian Federation), a communiqué from the Foreign Minister of the separatist Chechen government, A. Zakayev, announced that **the Chechen resistance was willing to enter peace talks** with Moscow and called for the opening of talks with no pre-conditions. This Manifesto for Peace in Chechnya, which Zakayev claims is supported by the rebel President and all the leaders of the resistance, was sent to delegates at the G8 meeting being held in Russia. Meanwhile, the **leader of the independence movement and Vice President, S. Basayev, died in an explosion** in July in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia, an incident for which the Russian authorities claimed responsibility, though independence leaders also claimed that the cause was an accidental detonation of explosives. After Basayev's death, an **amnesty was introduced for any armed opposition members** who were willing to lay down their weapons. According to the government in Grozny, this led to the disarmament of dozens of militants (although it was criticised for its use of threats). On a more general note, the level of violence remained in Chechnya, with more than 120 civilians kidnapped in the region as a result of the armed conflict so far this year. Of these, 45 still remain unaccounted for, according to the human rights organisation *Memorial*. In addition, displaced Chechens who have settled in Ingushetia are being forced to return by the Chechen authorities, according to the IDMC.

Middle East

Table 1.5. Evolution of armed conflicts in the Middle East			
Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution during the 3 rd quarter of 2006
Iraq (2003-)	Transitional Government, US/United Kingdom coalition, internal and external armed opposition groups	Struggle for political power and opposition to the presence of foreign troops, access to oil resources and US military strategy	Increase in hostilities



Israel – Palestine (2000, 2 nd Intifada) ⁶	Israeli Government, settlement militias, PNA government, armed wings of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organisations, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP, DFLP	Occupation, colonisation and control over land, religious manipulation, security problems and political recognition	Increase in hostilities
Israel – Lebanon (2006)	Israeli government, armed wing of Hezbollah	Territorial dispute, impact of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, social and political fragility	Increase in hostilities

Very high levels of sectarian violence are still being reported in **Iraq**, and have actually shown a slight increase on previous months. Numerous executions and attacks have been reported in both the capital and other cities around the country, resulting, according to some sources, in **more than 6,000 violent deaths during the months of July and August**. Attempts by the Iraqi government to stem the violence, including support for the National Reconciliation Plan presented at the end of June (a plan that includes the offer of an amnesty to some insurgents) had little effect. The Iraqi authorities identified a total of 25 insurgent groups around the country. Elsewhere, **the growing influence of the Shiite cleric M. al-Sadr, and his al-Mahdi army**, which was blamed for one of the attacks carried out in Baghdad at the beginning of July, led a number of analysts to warn that his political importance should not be underestimated. Indeed, the attack by Iraqi and American forces on Sadr City, the stronghold of M. al-Sadr, was strongly criticised by Prime Minister N. al-Maliki. In this connection, the **violence perpetrated by American troops** was also brought into sharp relief with the opening of the trial of US soldiers for killing an Iraqi girl and her family. The lack of security also continued to result in **many people being displaced, a large number of them travelling to parts of Kurdistan in the north of the country**. This movement of people towards a majority Kurdish area **set the alarm about a new focal point for conflict**, given the rich oil resources in the area and the ethnic rivalry between the two communities.

Israel's bombing of **Lebanon** on 12th of July marked the beginning of a conflict that would last **33 days until the signing of a permanent ceasefire** on 11 August, under UN Security Council Resolution 1701. In spite of frequent incidents in the region the increase in hostilities in July was caused, according to Israeli sources, by the launching of rockets against northern parts of Israel and the **kidnapping of two of its soldiers by the Lebanese Hezbollah group**, which both Iran and Syria are accused of supporting. The conflict, which broke out shortly after the Israeli offensive in Gaza, **cost the lives of around 1,200 Lebanese, most of them civilians, with the destruction of a lot of strategic structures and many homes** in the south of the country and parts of the capital. Around one million Lebanese were also forced to abandon their homes. On the other side, following attacks from Hezbollah (which was demanding that Lebanese prisoners be released in exchange for the soldiers), around 150 Israelis died, the majority of them soldiers, while more than 300,000 people were displaced. The most intense fighting occurred during the 48 hours prior to the commencement of the ceasefire, according to the United Nations, which also reported violations of the ceasefire by the Israelis during the days after it came into force. Resolution 1701 demanded, among other things, the **deployment of Lebanese and UNIFIL forces throughout the south of the country and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the region**. It also demanded an end to the Israeli blockade and the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. Hezbollah declared that it would accept Resolution 1701, though it viewed it as unfair. The conflict had inevitable repercussions on **Syria**, which **stated that it did not want to see any international deployment along its border with Lebanon** and that it was offering its political and moral support to the Hezbollah Shiite movement.

⁶ Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report only examines the most recent phase of the conflict relating to the 2nd Intifada, which began in September 2000.



Lebanon, back to square one

Resolution 1701⁷, approved by all the members of the UN Security Council in August 2006, brought an end to the armed fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. The text of the Resolution **provides for an increase of 15,000 in the number of international UNIFIL troops**, of which only 7,000 have so far been offered by EU countries. The fact that the UN Secretary General would not publish the rules of engagement⁸ for these international troops until the beginning of October, coupled with the high levels of tension in the region, represented the main reasons why individual governments were unsure about deploying their troops in the region, which in turn sent a rather negative message to the other countries involved. According to the rules governing the conduct of United Nations forces, they may use force to protect United Nations personnel, facilities and equipment, to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of both UN and humanitarian personnel, and to protect civilians found to be under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas in which UN troops are deployed.

Once again, the undertakings made using **intentionally ambiguous language** have meant that the deployment of an international mission has been compromised from the outset. The delay in deploying international troops acts as a prelude to a period of post-war rehabilitation that will be beset with difficulties. This is a clear and timely reminder (given that the next few months will see the introduction of the Peace-Building Commission) that the lessons learned and best practices acquired will actually be useless unless they are accompanied by a clear political will and commitment towards building and maintaining peace.

Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah lasted for 33 days and the cost of repairing the damage caused in Lebanon has been estimated at around five thousand million dollars. It should be pointed out that the country already had a national deficit of around forty thousand million dollars as a result of its reconstruction efforts following the last war.

The United Nations made an **initial appeal for more than 96 million dollars in aid, through its Flash Appeals process**. Of this, around 88 million dollars has now been offered, and it is clear that this initial appeal for funds will subsequently be increased by the organisation. A **donor conference** was held in Stockholm at the end of August, and the target set was 500 million dollars. In the end, this figure was doubled, as the 60 donor countries and organisations who attended the conference ended up promising 940 million dollars. The European Commission announced that it would be contributing 42 million dollars, which would break down into 10 million dollars to support the Lebanese government in assessing the damage, four million to strengthen security and respect for the rule of law, 18 million to reactivate the private sector and 10 million for other needs. This amount will be added to the funds already donated by the EU, making a total of 100 million dollars.

During the course of the last three months, the armed conflict between **Israel and Palestine** experienced **one of its most violent episodes in six years**. The capture of an Israeli soldier at the end of June by a number of armed Palestinian groups demanding the release of prisoners led to a **large-scale response against Gaza from the Israeli army**. Israel also cited the launch of rockets from the Palestinian territories as justification for its offensive, closing down the border to both goods and people and **detaining around a hundred members of the Palestinian government and parliament**. According to data from the United Nations, **more than 200 Palestinians died during these attacks, including 44 children**. At an international level, the EU classified the Israeli action as disproportionate, while the USA took a stance in favour of Israel's right to defend itself, thus preventing approval condemning the Israeli action in the UN Security Council. For his part, in mid-September Israeli Prime Minister E. Olmert said that he was willing to meet Palestinian President M. Abbas, once the soldier had been released, with Egypt acting as mediator. The attack on Gaza marked a change in Israeli strategy towards the occupied territories, since the **plan for partial withdrawal from the West Bank was temporarily halted**. The unfolding crisis, which has had serious humanitarian consequences for a population already suffering from an international aid embargo since the beginning of the year and a blockade by Israel, forced a partial understanding between **Hamas and Fatah, who agreed to form a Government of National Unity**.

⁷ See the complete Resolution at:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/06/PDF/N0646506.pdf?OpenElement>


⁸ A military term that determines when, where and how force is to be used. These rules may be made public, but they are generally made known only to the armed forces to whom they are to apply.



Situations of tension and high-risk dispute¹

- ❑ Senegalese armed forces launched a new offensive in the Casamance region which led to a rise in the number of displaced people heading for Gambia.
- ❑ The number of kidnappings for ransom in Haiti rose as the general lack of security worsened.
- ❑ In Baluchistan, the assassination of the leader of the BLA armed opposition group further added to the already high levels of tension.
- ❑ The Thai army carried out a coup d'état following three months of crisis due to financial scandals and complaints of corruption.
- ❑ An attack in the southeast of Turkey, which was condemned by armed Kurdish groups, left 10 people dead.

This section contains a detailed analysis of **20 situations of extreme tension** in which events that are notable for their particular seriousness have taken place during the last three months. It also refers to a further **38 contexts in which tensions have not been especially pronounced during this period**.



Of the 20 contexts of extreme tension listed in the following table, **10 are in Africa, four in Latin America and the Caribbean, three in Asia, two in Europe and Central Asia, and finally one in the Middle East.**

2.1. Evolution of situations of tension

Chart 2.1. Contexts of extreme tension during the last three months

¹ Contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political tension and polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the State, which involve alterations in the operation of the State's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and states of emergency), and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. In some areas there is a strong possibility that a situation of armed conflict will emerge. Moreover, these tensions may not occur within the geographical territory of the State in question, but the extent to which the State's own interests or stability are directly affected is taken into account, as well as the fact that these tensions may lead to specific attacks on the territory of another country. Finally, any areas currently experiencing serious difficulties in implementing peace agreements (in the event that they exist) are also included.



Africa Chad – Sudan Central African Republic Eritrea and Ethiopia Ethiopia Great Lakes Region (DR Congo – Burundi – Rwanda – Uganda)	Liberia Nigeria (north and centre) Senegal (Casamance) Sudan (SPLA) Zimbabwe	America Bolivia Ecuador Haiti Peru Asia Pakistan Thailand Timor – Leste	Central Asia and the Caucasus Georgia Turkey Middle East Iran
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Africa

a) Southern Africa

Country	Main causes
Zimbabwe	Democratic fragility (political and economic crisis)

The last quarter saw no let-up in the political crisis affecting **Zimbabwe**, with protests ranging from civilian demonstrations in favour of constitutional reform during June to the **general strike** called by the main Zimbabwean union, the ZCTU, in September. This was **eventually called off as a result of severe political pressure and the detention of several union members**. A number of individual organisations and bodies made calls on the different factions of the MDC democratic opposition party to join forces against the repressive policies and poor economic management of the Government of R. Mugabe and offer the potential for some kind of democratic transition in the country. **UN Secretary General K. Annan cancelled his visit to Zimbabwe** after giving his approval to attempts by **Tanzanian President B. Mkapa to mediate** in the search for a resolution to the crisis.

b) West Africa

Country	Main causes
Liberia	Control of natural resources, ethnic manipulation and struggle for political power, impact of regional crises
Nigeria (north and centre)	Control of natural resources and religious manipulation
Senegal (Casamance)	Autonomy v. Independence, marginalisation of a minority group

The progress achieved by the Government of E. Johnson-Sirleaf actually made it possible to see the short-term peace dividends in **Liberia**, with a **lifting of the embargo on timber production**, though the embargo on diamond production still remains in place. However, the **high levels of criminality affecting Monrovia**, where weapons used during the war are now in the hands of criminal gangs, has led to fears over stability and the safety of the civilian population. **The Government succeeded in regaining control over several rubber plantations** which had until recently been occupied and exploited by former LURD combatants, increasing security concerns among the communities living close to the timber producing areas. Furthermore, the **partial lifting of the arms embargo** to allow supplies to reach the armed forces and police has led to questions about whether the existing controls are effective in preventing the illegal trafficking of weapons. In the meantime, in **Senegal**, Government armed forces launched a **new offensive in the Casamance region** after increased fighting had been reported among the different factions of the MFDC along the border with Gambia. Military sources said that the aim of this action was to guarantee the free movement of local people and protect both them and their property. Nevertheless, the result was an increase in the number of displaced people heading towards Gambia.

In **Nigeria** there were **violent confrontations in the states of Rivers and Anambra**, in the south of the country, allegedly perpetrated by armed groups financed by politicians who are using terror as a strategy to frighten their opponents and intimidate the electorate. The violence was particularly serious in the city of Onitsha (Anambra), where the Government imposed a curfew after fighting between the police and the Biafran independence group MASSOB. Since



then, more than 20 people have died and MASSOB has denounced extra-judicial executions being carried out against its members by the security forces. **Pre-electoral violence** has become a serious problem for the country, and at least **three candidates for governor have been assassinated**. Fighting also continued over control of land in the state of Kwara (central Nigeria), between the Erinle and Offa communities.

c) Horn of Africa

Country	Main causes
Eritrea and Ethiopia	Territorial disputes
Ethiopia	Democratic fragility and governance problems
Sudan (SPLA)	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation, control of resources

As regards cross-border tensions between **Eritrea and Ethiopia**, the basic situation remained at a standstill, though there was a certain deterioration in the antagonistic stance taken by both parties. At the end of June, Eritrea abandoned the talks being hosted between the parties by the border Commission (EEBC) and announced that it would not accept any changes in the border demarcation established by the EEBC in 2004. Furthermore it also gave notice of its refusal to participate in any talks aimed at discussing possible changes. Elsewhere, the **Ethiopian police and armed forces reported that they had killed 111 people**, wounded 18 and detained 107. All of them were from Eritrea, and they included six members of the Eritrean secret services who were, according to Ethiopian sources, attempting to destabilise the country. The situation along the border between the two countries (known as the Temporary Security Zone and monitored by UNMEE) remained tense.

In **Ethiopia** itself, tensions remained high as a result of the political crisis and problems of governance affecting the country. Around **150 soldiers deserted and fled over the border into Eritrea, joining up with the Ethiopian armed groups** based in the neighbouring country. These groups criticise the Government for failing to resolve the crisis situation that followed the elections of 2005, accusing it of resorting solely to violent means in order to resolve the problem. The Ethiopian authorities themselves decreed an amnesty for 237 prisoners and reduced the sentences of a further 26 for good behaviour. However, those released did not include the group of more than one hundred people detained in November after being accused of attempting to overthrow the Government. These people have been described by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience, and the international community has called for their release.

In the **south of Sudan**, tensions remained between Sudanese armed forces and the SPLM/A. The most recent incident between the two sides in Unity State cost the lives of 28 people, 17 of them civilians. Meanwhile, in Lakes state, the **conflict between different clans belonging to the Dinka ethnic group left 71 people dead**, giving an indication of the large number of weapons that remain available to the civilian population following the end of the armed conflict. Elsewhere, the different communities in Akobo county in the state of Jonglei, which have been involved in a number of clashes over herds and pasture land, **voluntarily handed over 1,300 weapons** to United Nations representatives.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Country	Main causes
Chad - Sudan	Reciprocal allegations of support for armed opposition groups
Central African Republic	Democratic fragility, problems of governance
Great Lakes region (DR Congo – Burundi – Rwanda – Uganda)	Control of natural resources, search for border security

Significant advances have been made during the last three months in relations between **Chad and Sudan**, in spite of the recurring violence along their shared border. The Presidents of both countries met during the AU summit in Banjul, with mediation from Libyan President M. Gadafi, leading to the **signing of an agreement on cross-border monitoring of the rebels based in their respective territories**. Under this agreement, Chad detained six members of the JEM



that it found within its borders and handed them over to the AU as a gesture of goodwill towards Sudan. Finally, both countries signed a framework agreement celebrating the **normalisation of their relationship as friends and good neighbours** and re-establishing diplomatic relations and cooperation in issues relating to their joint security and the economy. Nevertheless, Chadian President I. Deby came out in favour of the deployment of a UN mission in Darfur, believing it to be a necessary part of the search for peace and security in the region, thus contradicting the statements made by his Sudanese counterpart.

As far as the situation affecting the **Central African Republic** is concerned, mention should be made of the **warnings raised by important members of the international community**, particularly the UN Secretary General and his representative in the country, L. Cissé. These warned of the **fragility** of the current situation, in which **violence and political tensions**, both internal and regional, were giving rise to a **humanitarian crisis and an increase in human rights violations**. One of the most important events of the last three months was the life sentence imposed on armed opposition leader J. J. Larmassoum, accused among other things of threatening state security. Mention should also be made of the sentencing *in absentia* of former President A. F. Patassé to 20 years imprisonment with forced labour and a fine of 10 million dollars for the formation of phantom companies. The former President was accused on many occasions of supporting rebel movements in the country.

Turning to the situation in the **Great Lakes** region, mention should be made of **DR Congo's** demand that **Uganda pay compensation for the looting of resources and the deaths that resulted from Uganda's invasion of DR Congo**. The amount demanded comes to a total of 10,000 million dollars, and its payment is a pre-condition for authorisation to be given to Ugandan armed forces to enter Congolese territory in order to engage in operations against the Ugandan armed opposition group, the LRA. However, the cessation of hostilities agreed between the Ugandan Government and the LRA may make this military operation unnecessary, one of the aims of which was the capture of the armed group's leader, J. Kony.

America

a) North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Country	Main causes
Haiti	Political and economic breakdown and social polarisation

Haiti continued to experience a certain reduction in tensions from the levels experienced during the previous year, though significant obstacles still remain. A UN report indicated that Haiti is **ready for peaceful development** while, for its part, the Provisional Electoral Council announced that **municipal elections** would be held on 3 December, with support from the USA, Canada, the EU and Japan. These elections will finally bring the complete electoral cycle to a close. The new commission for disarmament has begun work, and a process for the voluntary disarmament of young armed gangs has been introduced. In spite of these advances, significant focuses of tension remain in the country. There are still high levels of **crime and insecurity**, and the number of kidnappings for ransom is on the increase.

b) South America

Country	Main causes
Bolivia	Governance problems
Ecuador	Governance problems
Peru	Governance problems

In **Bolivia**, **friction increased between the Government of President E. Morales and his sympathisers on one side and groups opposing his reforms on the other**, exacerbating the levels of tension felt around the country. **Moves towards a Constituent Assembly**, with a change in the voting rules that would require an absolute rather than a two-thirds majority for any articles in a future Constitution to be approved served to increase tensions, particularly in the Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarjia regions, the richest in the country. In these regions,



protests were called by business organisations, civilian groups and politicians from the right. On the other hand, indigenous groups supporting E. Morales also took to the streets. Nevertheless, the Government and opposition began to examine conciliatory proposals regarding the Constituent Assembly. **Agricultural reform** was another focus for tension. The occupation of a forestry concession in the province of Santa Cruz by 300 armed and landless peasants brought the issue of social demands for the reorganisation of land ownership to the fore, and also increased tensions between the authorities in Santa Cruz (who oppose the reforms) and the country's central Government. The agricultural reform proposals are still awaiting approval from the country's Congress, though the Government has already handed over 2,300 titles to state-owned land. Another focus of tension resulted from the **claims for independence** being voiced by some sectors in Santa Cruz, claims which are strongly criticised by E. Morales, who supports national unity. As far as the **nationalisation of hydrocarbon resources** is concerned, **tensions between Bolivia and Brazil** worsened in relation to talks over the new price charged for gas imported by the latter country.

Ecuador continued to experience similar tensions to those affecting it during the previous quarter. **Negotiations with the US over a Free Trade Agreement remained at a standstill**, having been suspended by the US as a result of Ecuador's earlier cancellation of the contract awarded to US oil company OXY. In addition, some of the country's leading **social and indigenous groups** held a meeting with Bolivian President E. Morales, in which much emphasis was placed on the growing strength in Ecuador of **social demands to nationalise the natural resources** currently being exploited by foreign companies. Elsewhere, Ecuador began to prepare for general elections in October, and the Government promised to assist the OAS mission and guarantee its role as supervisor of the election process. Nevertheless, the run-up to the elections has been marked by an exchange of political accusations, and the candidate currently lying second in the polls, R. Correa, who has been accused of receiving improper financing from Venezuelan leader H. Chávez, criticised what he saw as the beginnings of electoral fraud resulting from links between the Department of Defence and the Christian Social Party.

In **Peru**, the climate of tension experienced during the electoral period of the last quarter has subsided. However, a number of tensions remain. Accusations against defeated candidate O. Humala over alleged human rights violations during the armed conflict against *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) led to **charges being made against the former nationalist soldier** and a ban on his leaving the country. The beginning of A. García's presidential term was also marked by the announcement of a number of **social campaigns aimed at putting pressure on the President to meet his promises** in relation to jobs. Civilian organisations also **protested against the approval by parliament of the Free Trade Treaty with the US**. This agreement now only awaits approval by the US Congress in order to come into force in 2007. The indigenous Achuar community also began a campaign against the Argentinian oil company Pluspetrol over the deterioration of the ecosystem in the Peruvian Amazon.

Asia

a) South Asia

Country	Main causes
Pakistan	Religious confrontation, the fight against terrorism

It should be pointed out that events in the various situations of tension in **Pakistan** have evolved in very different ways. In the case of the province of **Baluchistan**, the continuing episodes of **violence** that have been seen over the course of the last three months were further exacerbated by the **assassination of the leader of the BLA** (the armed group operating in the region), N. Akbar Bugti, who was once the province's Prime Minister. This assassination, which occurred during the **military counter-insurgency operations** being carried out by Pakistani armed forces in Baluchistan, was unanimously condemned by the political opposition, which also repeated its criticism of all the various military operations. It should be added that the Government has made the initiation of any negotiations with the armed Baluchistan opposition conditional on the handover of its weapons. In addition, the **British Government placed the BLA on its list of terrorist organisations** and froze the bank accounts of several of its members. In spite of these measures, popular support for the armed organisation would appear



to be increasing in Baluchistan. However, events in **North Waziristan** and the areas bordering Afghanistan have taken an entirely different turn, as the last quarter ended with the **signing of a peace agreement** between the Pakistani authorities and the tribal militias. The agreement provides for a **cessation of military operations and armed aggression** by both sides, thus consolidating the ceasefire that was announced during the month of June.

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Country	Main causes
Thailand	Democratic fragility, governance problems
Timor-Leste	Mass dismissal of members of the armed forces; economic disintegration and institutional fragility

In **Thailand**, the **army carried out a coup d'état** and overthrew Prime Minister T. Shinawatra while he was out of the country, giving rise to a new situation of tension. The military, led by Lieutenant General and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, S. Boonyaratglin, **suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Government and the Constitutional Court and introduced martial law**. According to its perpetrators, the coup, which was non-violent, was motivated by the need to bring an end to the climate of **government corruption and social division** being suffered by Thai society. Forming the self-proclaimed Council for Political Reform, those who took part in the coup announced that this body would retain control for two weeks, during which retired General S. Chulanot was appointed Prime Minister. He in turn announced the formation of a new short-term Government, saying that elections would be held in October 2007. **The international community and both international and Thai human rights organisations criticised the military for taking power** and called for a rapid return to democracy, though they did not call for the return of T. Shinawatra. The Government of the overthrown Prime Minister had been in crisis for months as the result of financial scandals, complaints from ordinary citizens of corruption, huge street protests, the boycott of the recent elections by the political opposition and their subsequent annulment and, more generally, the democratic fragility of the Shinawatra regime.

In **Timor-Leste**, though the crisis seen in the previous quarter has abated, tensions remain high. UNOTIL warned that **people were fleeing from the displacement camps due to outbreaks of violence** and the general lack of security in these camps. At the same time, tens of thousands of people displaced by the original crisis were still too **afraid to return home**. **Acts of violence, including the burning of homes**, were still being reported in Dili, in spite of the presence of international troops in the capital. Furthermore, A. Reinaldo, the officer who led the 600 soldiers whose expulsion from the armed forces provoked the outbreak of violence in April and May, escaped from prison in Dili along with 56 other prisoners, resulting in a further increase in tensions in the country. Elsewhere, **M. Alkatiri resigned as Prime Minister** due to the many accusations of negligence in the way the crisis had been handled and claims that he encouraged the creation of armed bands to assassinate and intimidate political rivals. In his place, President X. Gusmao appointed J. Ramos-Horta, Nobel Laureate, independence leader and, until his appointment, Foreign and Defence Minister. Elsewhere, **the UN approved the creation of a new and extended mission in the country**. The UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) replaced UNOTIL and incorporates a civilian element, with the inclusion of 1,608 police personnel.

Europe and Central Asia

Central Asia and the Caucasus

Country	Main causes
Georgia	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, independence of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Turkey	Political and social tensions, autonomy v. independence in Kurdistan



Tensions manifested themselves in **Georgia** in two ways. Firstly, **the Government's decision to bring forward the municipal elections led to powerful protests from opposition parties**, as they believed that the establishment of a period of a few hours to complete the registration of candidates represented an obstacle to their democratic rights. At the same time, 13 supporters of the opposition Justice Party were tried following accusations of an attempted coup d'état. Secondly, **the tensions surrounding the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia grew considerably in intensity**, centring around the **sharply differing opinions between the central authorities in both Georgia and Russia**: the Georgian parliament voted to suspend the work of Russian peace-keeping forces in both regions and Georgian sources complained about Russian military exercises in the North Caucasus, while Russia cut off communications with Georgia following the detention of four Russian soldiers accused of spying. In Abkhazia itself, **the Georgian Government confirmed its plans to install a pro-Georgian Abkhaz Government in exile in the upper parts of the Kodori gorge**, after launching police operations at the end of July against E. Kvitsiani, which left one person dead. As regards the authorities in the self-proclaimed autonomous region of **South Ossetia**, they announced that they would be **calling a referendum on independence at the end of the year, a move condemned by Tbilisi**, which viewed it as a destabilising factor.

Turkey has been affected in recent months by a series of **attacks that have spread to both the capital and tourist areas in the south of the country**, leaving 16 people dead and 75 injured since the end of July. The most deadly of these attacks took place at the beginning of September in Diyarbakir in the southeast of Turkey, claiming the lives of ten people of whom seven were children. Although the majority of the attacks were claimed by the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (*Tayrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan* or "TAK"), an armed Kurdish group thought to be linked with the Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*, or "PKK"), the attack in Diyarbakir was condemned by both groups, who accused the state of being behind the incident. In addition, **fighting between Turkish armed forces and Kurdish groups in the southeast of the country also left dozens of people dead on both sides**. According to ministerial sources, Kurdish rebels have killed 91 soldiers and murdered or injured 472 civilians since the beginning of the year. As regards the PKK's presence outside the country, **the Turkish Government repeated its request for help from the USA and Iraq to combat incursions by the group over the border from Iraq**, though it admitted that it had already carried out attacks on the group's camps over the border. In mid-September, an envoy from the US Government visited Turkey to express his Government's willingness to cooperate in this area.

Middle East

Country	Main causes
Iran	International pressure on nuclear policy, national reaffirmation

There were continuing tensions over the last three months between the international community and **Iran over the country's intention to continue its nuclear programme for non-military purposes. The deadline of 30th August**, set out in Security Council Resolution 1696 (aimed at putting an end to the enrichment of uranium under the threat of appropriate measures), **passed without any change in Iran's stance**. Nevertheless, **the international community remained divided over the application of possible sanctions** against M. Ahmadinejad's regime: while the USA was in favour of sanctions, China and Russia opposed them, and the UK and France called for more dialogue. **The armed conflict that broke out between Israel and Hezbollah in the middle of July in Lebanon led to increased international condemnation of Iran**, as it was accused by the USA and the UK of supporting the Lebanese group. In September, the EU's High Representative for the CFSP, J. Solana, held a meeting with the Iranian negotiator for the nuclear issue, A. Larijani, and both of them subsequently agreed that they had cleared up some misunderstandings.

The following chart lists a further **40 situations of lesser tension in which there have not been any serious changes of note over the last three months**.

Chart 2.2. Evolution over the last three months of other situations of tension		
Country	Main causes	Evolution
	Africa	



Angola	Political violence, social frustration	Reduction in tensions
Angola (Cabinda)	Autonomy v. Independence	Stalemate
Congo	Political control over different ethnic groups and democratic fragility	Stalemate
Equatorial Guinea	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)	Stalemate
Ethiopia (Gambella)	Demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Stalemate
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Guinea	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability), governance problems	Reduction in tensions
Guinea Bissau	Autonomy v. independence, search for border security	Stalemate
Mali	Demands for greater autonomy, marginalisation of a minority group	Reduction in tensions
Manu River region (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) ²	Widespread destabilisation due to enforced displacement and the flow of weapons and mercenaries	Reduction in tensions
Mauritania	Democratic fragility	Rise in tensions
Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)	Territorial disputes	Stalemate
Sudan (East)	Marginalisation of the region	Reduction in tensions
Tanzania (Zanzibar)	Struggle for political power	Improvement
Uganda-Kenya (Karamoja-Turkana)	Governance, regional marginalisation, inter-community confrontations over natural resources	Stalemate
America		
Guatemala	Political and historical exclusion, social injustice, failure to comply with peace agreements, impunity and organised crime	Stalemate
Mexico (Chiapas)	Exclusion and economic inequalities	Stalemate
Venezuela	Problems of governance	Stalemate
Asia		
India-Pakistan	Territorial disputes	Reduction in tensions
India (Tripura)	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Indonesia (Moluccas)	Religious differences, democratic colonisation, autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Indonesia (Sulawesi)	Religious differences, democratic colonisation	Stalemate
Indonesia (West Papua)	Autonomy v. independence, religious disputes, demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Stalemate
Myanmar	Democratic fragility and ethnic confrontations	Stalemate
Europe and Central Asia		
Armenia	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Stalemate
Azerbaijan	Inequality in the distribution of resources, democratic fragility	Stalemate
Belarus	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Kazakhstan	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Kyrgyzstan	Democratic fragility, independence of the Ferghana Valley	Rise in tensions
Moldova, Rep.	Democratic fragility, independence of the Dniester region	Rise in tensions
Serbia (Kosovo) ³	Autonomy v. Independence	Rise in tensions
Tajikistan	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Turkmenistan	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Rise in tensions
Uzbekistan	Governance problems, independence of the Ferghana Valley	Stalemate
Ukraine	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Middle East		
Egypt	Political and social tension, repression	Stalemate
Syria	Internal political tension, international pressure	Stalemate
Yemen	Struggle for political power	Rise in tensions

² The Manu River region covers Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire is also taken into account here, given its proximity and its influence on the surrounding area. The situation of tension between the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso will also be analysed within the framework of this region.

³ 'Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)' has now become known as 'Serbia (Kosovo)' due to the formal separation of 'Serbia' and 'Montenegro' following the independence referendum held in the latter territory on 21 May 2006 and the entry to the United Nations of the new State of Montenegro on 28 June 2006.



Peace Processes

- Peace agreements or preliminary undertakings were signed in a number of African countries (Angola, Burundi, Chad-Sudan, Mali, DR Congo (Ituri), Somalia and Uganda), making the continent a focal point for current peace-building efforts.
- The Colombian Government began a rapprochement process with the FARC guerrilla group, aimed at reaching a humanitarian agreement.
- Advances were made in the peace process between the Nepalese Government and the CPN Maoist guerrillas.
- A new technical agreement process was introduced in Cyprus in a further attempt to achieve unification of the island.
- A UN Security Council resolution ended the upsurge in violence between Israel and Lebanon.

This chapter contains an analysis of the armed conflicts and unresolved conflicts which have entered a phase of formal negotiation, or in which a clear peace process is under way or exploratory negotiations have been initiated. Of the **35 processes analysed**, 14 are in Africa, 9 in Asia and another 6 in Europe. 31 of them involve formal negotiations (though these may suffer interruptions), while the possibility of talks is being explored in 4 contexts. A total of 21 sets of negotiations or exploratory talks relate to armed conflicts and 14 to unresolved conflicts¹. This chapter also contains an account on the progress being made in implementing the peace agreements in Aceh (Indonesia).

1. Evolution of peace processes

During the third quarter of 2006, the most notable aspect was the **large number of peace agreements and undertakings achieved across the continent of Africa** (Angola, Burundi, Chad-Sudan, Mali, DR Congo (Ituri), Somalia and Uganda), making it the most active place in the world today as far as peace processes are concerned. Half of all negotiations are progressing reasonably well, particularly where they relate to armed conflicts, while talks relating to unresolved conflicts have encountered serious difficulties. A new exploratory process has been included, involving the Government of Colombia and the FARC.

Table 3.1. Progress in negotiations at the end of the third quarter			
Going well (8)	In difficulty (11)	Going badly (12)	Exploratory stage (4)
Burundi Colombia (ELN) <i>Chad-Sudan</i> Cyprus <i>India (NSCN-IM)</i> Israel-Lebanon Nepal Uganda	<i>Angola (Cabinda)</i> Algeria <i>India (NDFB)</i> India (ULFA) India-Pakistan <i>Mali (Tuareg)</i> Philippines (MILF) RD Congo (Ituri) Somalia Sudan (Darfur) Sudan (East)	<i>Armenia-Azerbaijan</i> Colombia (AUC) Côte d'Ivoire <i>Georgia (Abkhazia)</i> <i>Georgia (South Ossetia)</i> Israel-Palestine <i>Kosovo</i> <i>Myanmar (KNU)</i> Nigeria (Niger Delta) <i>Senegal</i> Sri Lanka <i>Western Sahara</i>	Colombia (FARC) Iraq Philippines (NPA) <i>Spain (ETA)</i>

(The processes shown in italics indicate conflicts which are not in an armed phase or not currently classified as "armed conflicts" but are as yet unresolved. Processes shown in bold are new, though they may have already existed at some time in the past)

¹ In this chapter, the term "unresolved conflict" refers to situations in which high levels of tension, threats of a military nature or armed confrontations have existed in the past but are not currently an issue, though the parties have not yet reached a definitive peace agreement, meaning that negotiations are in progress or being explored.



Africa

a) Southern Africa

The conflict in **Angola** over the region of **Cabinda** entered a new and more encouraging phase during the course of the last three months when, in the first half of July, the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (FCD), comprising separatist groups and civilian organisations from the northern region, announced that they would be willing to sign a ceasefire agreement with the Angolan Government. One of the organisation's spokespeople and an active member of the FLEC, B. Bembe, announced that a delegation from the FCD would meet members of the Luanda Government in Brazzaville in the Republic of Congo to formalise the cessation of hostilities and define the status of the Cabinda region. The meeting would be hosted by the AU, the presidency of which is currently held by Congolese President S. Neguesso. However, some members of the independence movement accused B. Bembe of acting in his own personal interests, claiming that FLEC President N. Tiago was the only person with control over the combatants and the necessary authority to sign any agreement. As a result, during the second half of July, **the Angolan Government and the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (FCD) signed a peace agreement** covering five key points: an amnesty act, a cessation of hostilities, the demilitarization of Cabindan armed opposition groups, a reduction in the number of military troops in the oil-rich region and their gradual deployment in line with normal requirements, and the reintegration of members of the FCD into civilian life. Similarly, the memorandum provided for the delegation of greater economic and political powers to the local Government in Cabinda and special administrative status for the region.

b) West Africa

The peace process in **Côte d'Ivoire**, by contrast, remained in crisis during the last quarter. UN Secretary General K. Annan held a meeting in Côte d'Ivoire with President L. Gbagbo and his Nigerian and South African counterparts in an attempt to provide backing for the peace process that is currently underway. As a result of these talks, the Ivorian President and the head of the **Forces Nouvelles (FN)**, G. Soro, once again set a new date for the disarmament of all armed groups. However, pro-Government militias objected to members of the FN retaining their ranks once they had been demobilised, and **the disarmament programme that these militias had hesitantly begun had to be suspended in August due to the small number of weapons handed in** (89 weapons from 937 demobilised combatants). G. Soro also announced that he would no longer be taking part in disarmament negotiations, in protest against the changes that had been made to the rules established for the electoral registration programme while the programme was actually being implemented. Given this situation, the key players in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire held a meeting in Yamoussoukro at the beginning of September with a view to assessing the current state of the peace process and resolving their differences in respect of a number of issues, such as the allocation of identity and nationality documents and the disarmament process. The meeting ended without any progress being made. As a result, L. Gbagbo failed to attend the meeting arranged by the UN in New York in mid-September to discuss the situation in his country.

In the **Niger Delta region (Nigeria)**, hopes that both the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (**MEND**) and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (**MOSOP**) would begin negotiations with the Nigerian Government came to nothing. On the contrary, MEND accused the police of the extra-judicial execution of three of its members and threatened reprisals against the entire police force in River State. At the end of July, Nigerian President O. Obasanjo presented the Commission for the Development of the Niger Delta with a new UNDP report on human development in the region. The report refers to the situation involving the communities living in the nine states that form this region of Nigeria, with particular emphasis on seven points that combine to form an agenda for development: promoting peace as a source of development; achieving effective local governance that responds to the needs of local people; improving and diversifying the economy; ensuring social inclusion and improved access to services; seeking environmental sustainability and preserving the living resources of these



communities; taking integrated action against HIV/AIDS; and building lasting associations in order to advance human development. In spite of this, at the end of August members of the Nigerian armed forces burned houses in the poorer quarters of Port Harcourt, a city in the Niger Delta region, claiming that residents were offering a hiding place for MEND militants.

The peace process in **Senegal** over the **Casamance** region was once again impeded by constant disputes and in-fighting between different factions of the MFDC, especially those led by S. Sadio (who controls the south) and I. Magne Diéme, leader of the Northern Front and an ally of military commander C. Atoute Badiate, who eventually ended up supporting Guinea-Bissau's armed forces in their struggle with S. Sadio. A number of sources accuse the latter of receiving financial support from the Government of Côte d'Ivoire. Particular mention should also be made of the fact that the Gambian authorities detained I. Magne Diéme, interpreted as an explicit expression of support for S. Sadio's group in its struggle against members of the MFDC's Northern Front. Indeed, as a demonstration of the regional dimension of this conflict, every time there is fighting in the north of Casamance, the people fleeing as refugees to Gambia receive the offer of Gambian nationality. Elsewhere, in August the Senegalese Government created a conflict warning and prevention cell in the Casamance region, through the National Agency for the Reconstruction of Casamance (ANRAC). This initiative is financed by the World Bank and includes support for the demobilisation and reinsertion of members of the MFDC. In addition to the World Bank, which in 2004 awarded a loan of 20 million dollars for the reconstruction of Casamance, USAID has invested 15 million dollars in work aimed at stabilising the region, including action for reconciliation, dialogue and negotiation, some in conjunction with the organisations PADCO and the Karina Centre for Peace-Building.


c) Horn of Africa

As regards the peace process in **Somalia**, it should be mentioned that **delegations from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)**, led by Parliamentary President S. Hassan Sheikh Aden, **and the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (SICS)**, led by its Vice President A. Ali Umar, **reached a peace agreement on 4 September with mediation from the Arab League** and help from Sudanese President O. Al-Bashir, in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. Under this agreement, the parties undertook to form unified armed forces and a new national police force formed from militia members of the TFG, the SICS and other militia groups. They also undertook to respect the ceasefire agreement signed on 22 June (which both parties have been accused of violating) and to bring an end to the external assistance that has been exacerbating the situation both within the country itself and at a regional level (the TFG is supported by Ethiopia while the SICS has support from Eritrea). The agreement does not specify when it is to come into force, and the parties agreed that they would resume talks at the end of October in Khartoum, in order to discuss the country's reconstruction and the role that the international community should play in re-establishing security, including the thorny question of the deployment of an IGAD international peace-keeping force. After the agreement had been signed, TFG President A. Yusuf Ahmed survived an assassination attempt in Baidoa, which was attributed to the al-Qaeda organisation. For its part, the AU adopted a plan for the deployment of a regional peace mission with around 8,000 members (to be known as IGASOM). Its aim will be to support the transitional Government and help bring stability to the country with the introduction of DDR programmes. The SICS has systematically refused to accept this mission. Finally, particular mention should be made of the fact that the main port and airport in the country's capital, Mogadishu, were reopened for the first time in 16 years.

Attempts to reach a peace agreement between all the armed groups in **Darfur (Sudan)** continued over the course of the quarter in spite of a number of setbacks. During the first half of July, the new armed opposition alliance, the National Redemption Front (NRF), attacked a city in the northern region of Kordofan, announcing that the Darfur ceasefire established in April 2004 was now at an end and that it intended to extend its influence as far as the capital, Khartoum. The group includes members of the JEM and a number of dissident commanders from the SLA, the most important opposition group in the region. It also includes members of the political party, the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA). At the same time, Sudanese President O. Al-Bashir continued to refuse to allow UN forces into his country, though he raised no objection to the reinforcement of the peace-keeping mission that the AU is currently operating in Darfur. This stance by the Sudanese leader is causing a split in the Government of



national unity, whose Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the SPLM, S. Kiir, supports the deployment of UN troops in the country as a way of achieving peace in the west of Sudan. Also in July, **the armed opposition groups that refused to sign the Peace Agreement for Darfur during May held a meeting in Libya with President M. Gaddafi**, with the aim of persuading the Libyan leader to intercede on their behalf with the Sudanese Government, which itself appointed M. Minnawi as Presidential Adviser. Minnawi is President and Commander in Chief of the SLA faction that did sign the peace agreements. In August, the Arab League agreed to finance the AU mission for a further six months, while Chad detained seven of the JEM's leaders in a move aimed at further improving the good relations that have recently been resumed between Sudan and Chad. These detainees included the movement's General Secretary and the head of its negotiating team. N'Djamena announced that the detainees would be handed over to the AU. At the beginning of September, the UN Security Council approved a resolution drawn up by the USA and the United Kingdom for the deployment of UNMIS troops in the Darfur region before the first of October, increasing troop numbers with the inclusion of 17,300 new soldiers and 3,300 police officers, with the aim of providing support for the UA mission, which is currently due to remain in the region until the end of the year. This operation will, however, only take effect with the consent of the Sudanese Government. Finally, at the end of September the Deputy Prime Minister of Sudan, S. Kiir, held a meeting in Asmara, Eritrea, with Ahmed Abdelshafi Bassey, the recently appointed leader of the SLA armed opposition group that did not sign the peace agreement. Ahmed Abdelshafi Bassey, who was elected following the expulsion of Al-Nur, expressed a willingness to hold talks and negotiate with Khartoum while maintaining demands for greater representation at national level and individual compensation to the internally displaced and refugees.



Turning to the peace process in **Sudan (East)**, a second round of talks was held in July between the Sudanese Government and the Eastern Front (EF) in Asmara, Eritrea, though no great progress was made. Talks resumed after both groups had held meetings with the Eritrean Government to negotiate their demands on issues such as power sharing, administration, resources, development and security. However, the talks finally came to a standstill as a result of the EF's demand for 60% of seats in the regional Government, 40% in the Government of National Unity and 20% in the National Assembly, in addition to one of its members being appointed Vice President. The Khartoum Government refused to accept these demands and proposed introducing greater autonomy for the region that would allow the central Government to remain in control. During the second half of August, the resumed talks between the Government and the Eastern Front in Asmara (Eritrea) ended with significant progress on issues relating to development of the region, though no agreement was reached as regards the money that Khartoum would allocate to these projects, or when they would begin. The issues to be discussed during the next round of talks will focus on security and military agreements, while issues relating to governance and political power sharing in the east of the country will be left



until the final round. Presidential adviser M. Osman issued a press statement in which he said that he expected a definitive peace agreement to be reached around the end of October.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Burundi**, after several rounds of talks held in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), **the Government and A. Rwasa's FNL signed a definitive ceasefire agreement on 7 September**, in the presence of South African Interior Minister and Regional Facilitator for Peace in Burundi, C. Nqakula, Ugandan President Y. Museveni, who is chairing the Regional Initiative, his Tanzanian counterpart, J. Kikwete, President of the country hosting the meetings, Burundian President P. Nkurunziza, Kenyan President M. Kibaki, Rwandan President P. Kagame, Congolese President D. Sassou-Nguesso (current President of the AU), President of the AU Commission A.O. Konaré and the UN Secretary General. This definitive agreement, which has the backing of the UN, is based on the Agreement on Principles Towards Lasting Peace and Security signed on 18 June, which established the following: 1) Resolution of the ethnic question, identified as one of the main causes of the conflict; 2) Provisional immunity for members of the FNL and its transformation into a political party; 3) Repatriation of the refugee population and the return of the displaced and resettled population; 4) Review of the composition of the security and defence forces. In this regard, it is expected that the agreement of 7 September will include: 1) an end to hostilities by both parties; 2) the introduction of a programme to repatriate the FNL's leaders in the Great Lakes region and diaspora, including protection for them both while in transit and while they remain in the country; and 3) disarmament of FNL combatants and their transfer to holding areas supervised by the UN. Weeks later, the mediators in the peace process met in the capital to establish exactly how and when the FNL troops would be stood down and disarmed. For its part, the Burundian Government asked the United Nations to replace the UN Secretary General's current Special Representative in the country, N. Satti, for questioning the investigation introduced by the Government following an attempted coup d'état.

Turning to the gradual normalisation in relations between **Chad and Sudan**, a high-level delegation from Chad, led by Exterior Minister A. Allami, visited Khartoum to deliver a goodwill message from Chadian President I. Deby to his Sudanese counterpart O. Al-Bashir, in a further move to promote good relations. The visit came after a meeting between the two Presidents at the AU summit in Banjul, sponsored by Libyan President M. Gaddafi. The two countries signed an agreement aimed at controlling the presence of rebel groups along their common border. A joint military commission is to be created with the aim of preventing the various armed groups from crossing the border and aggravating the different conflicts currently underway in both countries. At the end of August, **Chad and Sudan signed a framework agreement for the normalisation of friendly and neighbourly relations** in N'Djamena, following several working meetings. The two delegations, headed by their respective Foreign Ministers, held their first meeting since the verbal agreement was reached on 25 July. The most notable aspects of the agreement are the re-establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, the reintroduction of areas of mutual cooperation, the establishment of a joint military commission and a mixed force to guarantee border security, the holding of meetings every six months at one of the towns along the border, and the creation of a joint political commission, co-chaired by the two countries' diplomatic heads. Elsewhere, the World Bank and the Chadian Government also reached a new agreement on how and where to use the profits that the country earns from its oil resources. After six months of tensions with the Bank, Chad agreed to pay 79% of its budget to programmes aimed at reducing poverty and improving health, education, agriculture, infrastructure, the environment, mine-clearance and good governance.

As regards efforts to normalise the situation in various parts of **DR Congo**, particularly the **Ituri** district, MONUC announced the disarmament and demobilisation of 4,800 combatants during the months of June and July, along with the collection of 2,400 weapons. These demobilised forces included one of the leaders of the FNI militia, P. Karim, who signed up for the process after having released five members of MONUC. **The three main militias operating in the eastern part of DRC as part of the MRC armed opposition coalition decided to lay down their weapons** and facilitate the free movement of displaced people in the region so that they could exercise their right to vote. They also agreed that they would gradually join the country's armed forces in return for an amnesty for all their members. This agreement was reached with mediation from a UN peace-building team in the region. One week later, however, the head of



the armed forces in the Ituri district reported that demobilised soldiers were rearming in towns close to the capital, Bunia.

Finally, in **Uganda**, after several meetings had been held in Juba (Sudan) with mediation from the Vice President of southern Sudan, R. Machar (though these meetings were questioned over the lack of credibility and political weight of the LRA delegation), **the Government and LRA armed opposition group reached a cessation of hostilities agreement on 26 August**. This came into force three days later for an initial term of three weeks, during which negotiations continued with the aim of achieving a definitive peace agreement. The ceasefire is to be reviewed every two weeks. The agreement was eventually signed by the Ugandan Interior Minister, R. Rugunda, and the head of the LRA delegation, M. Ojul, and the signing ceremony was overseen by the Vice President of southern Sudan, R. Machar.

Agreement between the government of Uganda and the LRA, 26-8-2006

- 1) Both parties are obliged to bring an end to all forms of hostile military action, any kind of action that could affect the talks and all hostile propaganda campaigns using any kind of media.
- 2) The places where the LRA has its bases are designated as sanctuaries, and they will move from here to the appointed settlement camps.
- 3) The areas chosen for LRA settlement camps are Owiny Ki-bul, in East Equatoria state, to the east of the River Nile, and Ri-Kwangba, in West Equatoria state, to the west of the Nile.
- 4) The Ugandan Government will guarantee free passage for all LRA members.
- 5) The settlement camps will be supervised and protected by the Sudanese SPLA and the Government of southern Sudan will provide food aid.
- 6) The agreement guarantees that the LRA can leave the designated areas unchallenged in the event that talks break down.
- and 7) A Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team has been created to keep the mediator informed of events. This will be led by a high-ranking officer of the SPLA, who is to be appointed by the Government of southern Sudan following consultations between all parties including two representatives from the Government and the LRA and two military officers appointed by the AU.

A few days later, hundreds of members of the LRA began to travel from their bases in various parts of north-eastern DR Congo, southern Sudan and the north of Uganda towards the two settlement areas in south of Sudan indicated in the cessation of hostilities agreement. Nevertheless, Ugandan President Y. Museveni announced that he would continue to follow up the accusations of war crimes levelled against LRA leaders until the group signed a definitive peace agreement with the Government, saying that only then would he ask the ICC to withdraw its charges and seek alternative measures, with the application of a system of traditional justice. He also said he would consider extending the deadline set for the signing of the agreement until a further meeting had been held with the armed group in Juba (Sudan).

e) Maghreb and North Africa

As regards the reconciliation process promoted by the Government of **Algeria**, the country's Interior Minister N. Yazid Zerhouni indicated in July that around 200 people accused of terrorism had taken advantage of the opportunity to repent set out in the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation put forward by the President and voted on in last year's referendum. At the beginning of September the government declared that it was willing to extend the amnesty (which had ended on 31 August), which was put down by some analysts to the fact that it had not brought the expected results. The same analysts believed that it had not brought any substantial improvement in security, nor had it provided sufficient encouragement for alleged terrorists to hand themselves in. One of the last actually to do so was H. Hatab, founder of the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (**GSPC**), which has links to al-Qaeda, and the authorities estimate that a further 400 remain at large. These combatants will be hiding in the mountainous region of Cabilia (Tizi Ouzou, Bouira, Boumerdès), the east (Skikda, Jijel and Khenchela), the west (Sidi Bel Abbès), and in the deep south. The GSPC is still very active as a group, a fact that could be explained either by the fact that the number of members was underestimated, or because it continues to recruit members. The amnesty, approved by referendum in September 2005 under the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, has also led to the release of 2,200 Islamicists. If there is to be an extension it will have to be decreed by President A. Bouteflika. The former Commander of the Islamic Salvation Front (**FIS**), M. Mezrag, has said that the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation is merely one part of a reconciliation



process that must lead to a general amnesty. For his part, the former leader of the group's governing delegation, R. Kebir, returned to Algeria in September after 14 years' exile in Germany.

Turning to the low-level conflict that sprung up in **Mali** in May when a group of a few hundred Tuareg attacked army barracks and took weapons and military vehicles, **the Government and the Tuareg rebels, who were operating under the name of the "Democratic Alliance for Change", met in Algeria to sign the "Algiers Agreement"**, otherwise known as the "Agreement for peace, security and development in the Kidal region", which provided for the establishment of a monitoring committee. This was heavily criticised by broad swathes of the country, since it was seen as doing away with the agreements signed back in 1992, granting privileges to northern parts of the Kidal region, offering considerable rewards for demobilisation and failing to resolve the problem of banditry, and it in turn caused further disturbances. Furthermore, the Algiers Agreement was not signed by some of the better known Tuareg leaders.

As far as the conflict in **Western Sahara** is concerned, at the end of August the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy to the region, P. Van Walsum, visited the Moroccan capital and the towns of Aaiun and Tifariti. This visit was made as part of the preparations for a report that the UN Secretary General is to present to the UN Security Council before he leaves office. For his part, UN Special Representative for the Western Sahara, F. Bastagli, came to the end of his mandate, which he had held since August 2005. In his farewell speech, he regretted the fact that the conflict remained unresolved at a political level. Finally, it should be mentioned that at the beginning of September the Moroccan Government, acting at the King's behest, approved a law abolishing military service, which until then had been compulsory for all young men for a period of one year. This happened just a few days after a plot had been foiled within the army and gendarmerie in which ten people were accused of being Islamic terrorists.

America

Turning to events in **Colombia**, the Government announced that some 12,000 paramilitaries who did not form part of the armed forces would no longer receive subsidies, an announcement that led to protests from leaders of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (**AUC**). Elsewhere, the first follow-up report on the 35,000 demobilised paramilitary members indicated that 541 of them were in prison, 236 had died and there was no information on a further 141. A Government report also claims that hundreds of demobilised AUC members have formed themselves into ten new armed groups during the last six months and are linked with drug-trafficking, smuggling and extortion. For his part, the People's Ombudsman, V. Perez, said that these criminal groups remained in an embryonic state but were beginning to act in a coordinated fashion, and he called on the authorities to take measures to stop them from gaining further in strength. In August, paramilitary leaders met with the current President of Costa Rica and Nobel Laureate Oscar Arias to ask for his help in the demobilisation process with A. Uribe's Government and also to seek his support for peace efforts among the demobilised paramilitary forces. They also asked him for his help in reviving the Contadora Group to assist the peace process in Colombia. O. Arias promised to discuss these issues with President A. Uribe during his visit to Colombia when the President is sworn in for his new mandate. In September, the Government published the names of the 2,695 demobilised AUC paramilitaries who are to be allowed to apply to be tried under the terms of the Justice and Peace Act. These included 15 ringleaders wanted for extradition to the USA on charges of drug-trafficking. According to Vice President F. Santos, the country's judges will be charged with selecting those who are eligible for trial in this way. The leaders of the AUC have been held under presidential orders in the town of La Ceja (Antioquia) since 16 August, though several have still not handed themselves in to the authorities.

Turning to the exploratory contacts between the government and the **ELN**, the guerrilla group said that it was willing to attend a new round of talks in Cuba at the beginning of October, and it announced the beginning of a Political Campaign for Peace. In September, the ELN announced that it had held its 4th Congress, its most important internal event, attended by commanders and delegates from all levels of the guerrilla hierarchy. The Congress ended with repeated calls for a **political solution to the conflict** so that peace could finally be achieved, this being understood



to mean the settling of the deep differences, the resolution of the humanitarian crisis and the creation of a “new national Government of peace and equality”. Delegates also reiterated that **the political struggle is now the principal focus, including the electoral fight to achieve new forms of local and regional Government**. Congress ratified the proposed National Convention as an inclusive democratic framework for the creation of national consensus aimed at overcoming the serious problems faced by the country. In this regard, delegates invited all revolutionary, political and democratic forces, both political and social, to unite to combat the challenges raised in the creation of peace and social justice in the country, and they recognised the Alternative Democratic Pole as the only opposition alternative to right wing forces in Colombia. They also invited the FARC guerrillas to work with them in the insurgency, taking the issues they had in common as a focus but respecting the individual nature of each organisation. ELN negotiator A. García announced that he would ask the Government for an amnesty for all political prisoners and propose that it create a National Convention, with an agenda that included economic and social issues aimed at tackling the crisis in the country and bringing an end to the war.

However, the most significant event in Colombia was the **beginning of rapprochement with the FARC guerrilla group** towards the end of September, after four years without any kind of negotiation. In July, FARC spokesperson R. Reyes called on the EU to withdraw the group from its lists of terrorists, inviting Europe to assist in the search for ways of achieving peace in Colombia. At the beginning of September, the High Commissioner for Peace encouraged the creation of a single front that would allow a single line of communication with the FARC. The guerrilla group itself took advantage of the Summit of Non-Aligned Countries in Havana to ask for help in resolving the armed conflict, stating that it was willing to send emissaries to any country that was interested, or receive international delegations at its own camps. A few days later, the Colombian Government said it would be willing to authorise a “meeting zone” in Valle Province so that **talks could begin with the FARC, with a view to reaching a humanitarian agreement and beginning political negotiations** with the group.

Asia and the Pacific


a) South Asia

Turning to the various peace processes currently underway in **India**, the Government of **Assam** indicated in July that negotiations with the **ULFA** armed opposition group could include all issues included under the Indian Constitution, and these negotiations could take place as soon as the ULFA had named its negotiating team. The Indian Government also offered secure passage for the ULFA’s leadership. After a meeting with the armed group’s facilitator, the writer M. R. Goswami, the Government called on the armed group to make contact. However, the ULFA sought written guarantees that the negotiations would include the issue of sovereignty, and it once again requested the release of five members of the armed group, along with information on missing combatants. The Government underlined the importance of direct communications with the armed group, as up to now contact has always been made through the facilitator or the People’s Consultative Group (PCG) appointed by the ULFA. In August the Indian Government said that it could not go ahead with the immediate release of the five members of the ULFA’s central committee since it had to follow establish legal procedure, and such a decision could only be taken by the courts. However, the Government expressed satisfaction at the ULFA’s call for restraint and the halting of violence by its militant members (a move which came in response to the suspension of Indian military operations in the area) and hoped that this new situation would assist in leading to a permanent end to the conflict. It is notable that this ceasefire is the first to affect the whole of the ULFA armed opposition group in its 27-year history. In September, the PCG called for intervention from Prime Minister M. Singh in order to bring an end to the stalemate that was impeding the peace process. The ULFA guaranteed that in the event that its imprisoned leaders were released it would see to it that they remained in the country, though it did not accept the preconditions laid down by the Government before they could be released. As regards rapprochement with the **NDFB**, this armed opposition group denied that it was going to form a political party and indicated that it is currently concentrating all its efforts on the peace process with the Government. The NDFB said that the meetings it had held with various political parties were merely an attempt to establish



contact with a view to finding a political solution to the current conflict and obtain support for the peace process.

Meetings continued between the Government and the **NSCN-IM** armed opposition group in the state of **Nagaland**. In August, both reached an agreement in Bangkok to extend their ceasefire for a further year.



Trust-building measures have continued during the last three months between **India and Pakistan**, in spite of the attack in June which claimed the lives of 200 people in the Indian city of Mumbai. India temporarily suspended the process and called on Pakistan to take stronger measures to halt terrorism, while in August each country expelled one of the other's diplomats during a brief political crisis. In a separate move, S. Malik replaced A. A. Khan as Pakistani High Commissioner in India, after the latter's mandate had come to an end. Particular mention should also be made of the fact that at the end of August the **Hizbul Mujahideen armed opposition group stated that it was committed to taking all the measures necessary in order to reach a solution to the Kashmir dispute** that would take the wishes of the Kashmiri people into account. The group also responded to criticisms from other armed groups who had suggested that the real intention of the Hizbul Mujahideen was to make a call to arms and who had said they would not hand over their weapons until the conflict had been resolved. The Hizbul Mujahideen also indicated that any process, including a referendum and the demilitarisation of Kashmir, should take place with international supervision. Finally, the leaders of the two countries agreed in September to resume peace negotiations after their fourth meeting in two years, this time during the Summit of Non-Aligned Countries in Havana.

The peace process in **Nepal** was consolidated during the course of the last three months. The duties of each of the organisations involved were clarified along with the timetable for disarmament. In July, the Government sent a letter to the UN Secretary General inviting him to supervise the process relating to the weapons held by the CPN and the country's armed forces. The CPN announced that it was extending its ceasefire for a further three months in order to facilitate peace talks with the Government, and it reiterated its irreversible commitment to the peace process. **The Government and the Maoists reached an agreement over weapons control through the United Nations**, following a meeting between CPN leader Prachanda and Prime Minister G.P. Koirala. They subsequently agreed that the armed forces would stow their weapons in their barracks. In August, the head of the UN team, S. de Mistura, indicated that a number of areas had been identified in which the international organisation could contribute: the management of weapons and armed participants; help with the electoral process; assistance in monitoring the code of conduct; and the expansion of human rights activities. A Ceasefire Code of Conduct National Monitoring Committee (CCNMC) was also established, along with five other sub-committees aimed at facilitating the peace process. The Government's peace negotiator, K. P. Sitaula, undertook to keep the army confined to barracks while the CPN moved its troops to the settlement camps and until another team had arrived from the UN. However,



the CPN leader said that he would not disarm his members or confine them to the settlement camps until some agreement had been reached with the Government over key political issues. In September, the Government and the CPN accepted a draft interim Constitution which did not include sensitive political issues such as the role to be played by the monarchy. These questions will be dealt with in a separate document. The new Constitution establishes that sovereign rights and executive powers lie with the people, and it proposes the creation of a committee to oversee constituent elections. Finally, it was agreed at the end of September that a meeting would be held between the interim Government and the CPN, with the United Nations in an advisory role, to deal with the issue of weapons, the interim Constitution and the formation of a new inclusive government.

By contrast, the process in **Sri Lanka** remained in a critical condition throughout the course of the quarter, with fighting between the country's armed forces and the LTTE armed opposition group, in spite of the offer extended to the LTTE by President M. Rajapakse in July, inviting the armed group to hold talks on any issue that they wished. The President indicated that he had appointed a group of experts from various sectors of society and charged them with preparing a preliminary plan. However, the LTTE declared that **the members of the ceasefire monitoring mission (SLMM) from Denmark, Finland and Sweden must leave the country before 1 September as they could not be declared neutral after the EU had placed the LTTE on its list of terrorist organisations.** In August, the Assistant Director of the Government's Peace Secretariat, K. Loganathan, died after being shot several times in an attack that remains unclaimed by any side. In September, the Norwegian Ambassador H. Brattskar travelled to Kilinochi to hold a meeting with the LTTE's political leader, S.P. Thamilselvan, in an effort to revive the peace process following the heavy fighting in the east and north of the country. However, the Government refused to enter into unconditional negotiations with the LTTE after the Japanese peace envoy, Y. Akashi, had announced that the Government and the LTTE had expressed a willingness to resume their peace talks. In addition, during the course of a donor meeting, the Norwegian Minister for International Development, E. Solheim, indicated that the parties were preparing for a meeting that could take place at the beginning of October in Oslo. A Government spokesperson indicated that this had not been agreed, nor had the Government been consulted in this regard. In any case, President M. Rajapakse and the leader of the main opposition party (the UNP), R. Wickremesinhe, met after the latter announced that he would offer his support to the Government so that a solution could be reached to the armed conflict affecting the country. After the meeting it was announced that they had agreed to create a committee comprising five members from each party that would create a programme of action aimed at achieving consensus on ways of finding a solution to the armed conflict.

b) Southeast Asia

In the **Philippines**, negotiations between the Government and the **MILF** suffered setbacks while attempts were made to reach an agreement over the ownership of ancestral lands, and a number of confrontations occurred on the island of Mindanao, meaning that it is now unlikely that a final agreement will be reached before the end of the year. Nevertheless, MILF sources indicated that the group would not tolerate ceasefire violations by any of its junior officers. In August, MILF leader E. "al haj" Murad announced that the group was willing to abandon its demands for independence, though it still wanted the Muslim population to decide how it was to be governed. He also pointed out that the region's autonomous structure had been unilaterally created by the Government. He said that he hoped that in the next round of talks, which are due to take place in Malaysia, the Government would make a new offer, adding that the MILF would be asking the Christian colonists to return lands expropriated from the Bangsamor people. In September, the Philippine Government set out new initiatives to resolve the stalemate in its peace talks with the MILF, announcing that the two sides might meet in October. Before this announcement by the Government, the MILF had itself announced that it would return to arms if a new agreement was not reached, criticising the Government for its lack of political will. The last round of talks reached stalemate at the beginning of September over the issue of the right to ancestral lands. In addition, the Regional Council for Peace and Order in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) called on both the central Government and the MILF to involve the local authorities in the peace process. As far as the process involving the **NPA/NDP** is concerned, the only point that is particularly worthy of note is that the Government and the Philippine Communist Party (PCP, the political wing of the NPA) travelled separately to Oslo to



hold meetings with the Norwegian Government, which is acting as mediator and attempting to unblock the negotiations which broke down in 2004. After the meeting, the Presidential Adviser for Peace, J. Dureza, said that there was an opportunity to resume talks if the NPA complied with certain conditions, without actually specifying what they were. Nevertheless, J. Dureza also warned that Manila would continue with its legal and military offensive against the NPA. High-ranking members of the Government also recently denounced the tactics being employed by the NPA in the peace talks.

As regards compliance with the peace agreement reached between the government and the **GAM in Indonesia (Aceh)** in August 2005, after five months of intense debate and considerable delays, the Indonesian parliament unanimously approved the new legislation for Aceh in July, finally giving the contents of the peace agreement the full force of law. Both the GAM and several civilian organisations expressed both disappointment and disagreement with the new legislation, regarding it as contravening the spirit of the peace agreement and seeing it as the result of an agreement between the two main parliamentary parties, both of which are **reluctant to grant broad autonomy to Aceh as they fear that this will lead to mistrust in other parts of the country**. The GAM declared that it would take its disagreement with the new legislation to the bodies charged with resolving disputes between the two sides, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM, which has been supervising implementation of the agreement since 2005) and the Crisis Management Initiative (which acted as mediator in the peace negotiations), although it also stated that it had definitively rejected any return to arms. The main reservations expressed by the GAM and human rights organisations refer to the interference from central Government in the decisions taken by the regional authorities in Aceh, the role of the armed forces, the distribution of profits from the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources and, above all, the fact that the Human Rights Court for Aceh has no competence to try crimes committed prior to its creation, meaning that human rights violations committed during the armed conflict cannot be tried.


In **Myanmar**, the **KNU armed opposition group dismissed any possibility of negotiating with the military Junta in August**, in spite of an informal offer of talks from the Junta. The armed group indicated that attacks against the civilian Karen community would have to cease before it would enter any talks, adding that 20,000 ethnic Karens had been forced from their homes during recent months. At the beginning of September, the United Nations considered the possibility of arranging a further visit to the country by UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, I. Gambari, following his trip to Myanmar in May. This announcement was made after the **US Ambassador to the UN asked the President of the Security Council to hold a formal debate on the worsening situation in the country**. The Military Junta rejected the UN decision to include the Myanmar question on the Security Council agenda at the suggestion of the US. The Myanmar government also expressed its confidence that China, which voted against including Myanmar on the Council's agenda, would eventually veto this decision. Ten countries voted in favour of debating the issue, which was opposed not only by China but also by Russia, Qatar and DR Congo. In addition, the Military Junta announced that it would resume the National Convention process in October, the process that is supposed to be leading to the preparation of a new Constitution.

Europe and Central Asia

Negotiations between **Armenia and Azerbaijan** over the future of the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh remained at a standstill during the last quarter. In July, Azeri President I. Aliyev indicated that the most recent proposals made by the OSCE's Minsk group reflected the stance taken by the mediators but that this stance is rejected by the two sides. These proposals included the withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied Azeri territories, followed by a normalisation of diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries, the deployment of peace-keeping forces in the disputed area and finally a vote to determine the status of High Karabakh. The Azeri President said that the first step towards resolving the conflict should be the restoration of his country's territorial integrity and this was not open to discussion. In August, the President of the OSCE's special representative for the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, A. Kasprzyk, accused Armenia of engaging in a scorched earth policy in border districts with Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, when faced with the return of



Azerbaijanis who had abandoned their homes during 1990 and 1991. In spite of this, the Armenian Foreign Minister, V. Oskanian, announced in September that the talks underway with Azerbaijan had reached a crucial point, with agreement over the basic issues in dispute. He warned, however, that any attempt by the United Nations to mediate in the peace negotiations would bring them to a standstill, referring to the **joint call to the UN General Assembly by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova**, asking the organisation to discuss the conflict.



As regards the peace process in **Cyprus**, during the first half of July, after a meeting hosted by UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, I. Gambari, Greek Cypriot leader T. Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader M. Ali Talat agreed to **begin a process of technical negotiations** on issues affecting the day-to-day lives of both communities at the same time as tackling more substantive issues, with the aim of reaching an integrated agreement over the island's future. A list of principles was also drawn up during this meeting, and these included a **commitment to achieve the unification of Cyprus on the basis of a two zone bi-community federation** and political equality, as set out in the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. Before the meeting with I. Gambari, the two leaders had met during the inauguration of the third member of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, G. Girod of the ICRC. This Committee's duties include the exhumation, identification and return of the remains of people who have disappeared as a result of the conflict during recent decades.

Attempts to resolve the conflict in **Georgia** over the region of **Abkhazia** have deteriorated over the course of the last three months, particularly as regards relations between Georgia and **Russia**, in spite of different peace proposals put forward in recent months. In July, the UN Secretary General appointed J. Arnault as head of the UN's mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), replacing H. Tagliavini. During his last speech, H. Tagliavini said that important advances had been made in talks between the Georgian authorities and Abkhaz separatists, though he stressed the importance of the role being played by the UN police force in the region and the need for this force to be allowed to operate on both sides of the conflict. In August, Georgian President M. Saakashvili said that the pro-Georgian Government which has been in exile since 1990 would be moved to the Tbilisi-controlled Kodori Gorge though without any official Government presence, indicating that Georgian rule would be imposed in the region. The Russian Government warned that these measures could result in armed confrontations, insisting that the Georgian Government withdraw its troops from the border with Abkhazia in order to prevent any conflict. Shortly afterwards, Georgia Foreign Minister G. Bezhuashvili announced that he would present a **report calling for the withdrawal of Russian peace-keeping forces from their positions in Ossetia and Abkhazia**, and requesting a review of the



Sochi agreement that allowed these troops to be deployed in the area. For its part, the Abkhaz Government announced that it would only resume negotiations with Georgia when the Georgian Government undertook to withdraw its troops from the Kodori Gorge Heights and respect the agreements reached in 1994 which excluded the Georgian army from this area.

Turning to Georgia's dispute with the region of **South Ossetia**, this also deteriorated as a result of the poor relations between Georgia and Russia, as the latter carried out military exercises in the Northern Caucasus. Georgia accused Russia of psychological pressure and of supporting the leader of the rebel militia operating in the Kodori Gorge. In September, Tbilisi condemned the announcement by the authorities in the self-proclaimed autonomous region of South Ossetia that they would be holding a referendum at the end of the year, saying that this would only increase tensions and destabilise the situation in the region and warning that the result would not be recognised by the international community. State Minister for Conflict Resolution M. Antadze sought the adoption of a new framework for negotiations with South Ossetia, suggesting that the Russian-led talks between representatives from Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia and North Ossetia should be replaced with bilateral negotiations between delegations from Georgia and South Ossetia, with limited external mediation in order to guarantee implementation of the peace agreements.

The rounds of talks aimed at defining the eventual status of **Kosovo** failed to show any results during the course of the last quarter. Russia expressed concern at the hasty pursuit of independence for Kosovo, saying that Serbian pride had been hurt by the recent breakaway of Montenegro and that any further division could result in Serbian ultra-nationalists taking power. The Russian Government suggested seeking a solution that would be mutually acceptable to both Belgrade and Pristina, but Serbian leaders continued to argue that Kosovo should remain part of their country. However, **the EU and NATO suggested holding a referendum on independence for the province of Kosovo before the end of the year** and thus reduce the risk of a new outbreak of violence among the Albanian population if the date of the poll continued to be postponed. July saw the first meeting since June 1999 in which leaders from both Serbia and Kosovo held direct talks. The UN intends to find a solution before the end of the year, and M. Ahtisari will therefore be presenting a proposal to the Security Council regarding the status of the province. The Serbian side had requested that all the towns with Serbian inhabitants should remain Serbian territory, a condition that is not consistent with the Albanian offer. For his part, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Kosovo, J. Rucker, came out in favour of the integration of the Serbian minority, instead of its isolation.

In **Russia (Chechnya)**, while there is no ongoing peace process, it should be mentioned that in July the Russian authorities claimed responsibility for the death of Chechen independence leader S. Basayev, after an operation by the security forces in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia. Shortly afterwards, the Foreign Minister of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), A. Zakayev, announced that **the Chechen resistance was willing to take part in peace talks** on the basis of a manifesto adopted in Berlin on 5 July and sent to delegates attending the meeting of the group of industrialised countries (G8 plus Russia) held in Saint Petersburg (Russia).

Middle East

In **Iraq**, in spite of the fact that there was no let-up in the number of deaths over the course of these last three months, attempts continued to seek a way to reduce the violence, though these were unsuccessful. In July, the main Sunni group in the parliament, the National Accord Front (NAF), called on the United Nations to deploy a peace-keeping force made up of troops from Arab and Islamic countries in an attempt to stem the tide of sectarian violence sweeping the country. The NAF also asked for the employment of more police officers from the Sunni minority and their use at control points, calling on Shiite and Sunni leaders alike to halt the fighting. According to Prime Minister N. al-Maliki, **several Iraqi groups, some of them armed, have expressed an interest in the National Reconciliation Plan** presented on 25 June by the Prime Minister as a way of reducing sectarian violence. In a joint communiqué, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey called for a meeting between Iraqi religious leaders as a step towards national unity, along with the transfer of security issues to the Iraqi Government. For its part, Egypt said that it would not mediate with insurgent groups,



following a request to Arab states by some of these groups, according to sources within the Iraqi Government. Iraqi President J. Talabani and Prime Minister N. al-Maliki finally announced the formation of a 30-member Commission to promote national reconciliation.

As regards the conflict between **Israel and Lebanon**, the most recent incident between the two countries began on 12 July 2006, with an attack by **Hezbollah** on Israel using rockets and mortars. Eight Israeli soldiers died and a further three were captured. Israel called the attack an act of war and the military conflict escalated over a period of 33 days. The first initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict began at the G8 Summit in Saint Petersburg on 16 July, where consensus was reached on a joint statement calling for a ceasefire and the release of the captured Israeli soldiers. The EU High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, J. Solana, also visited Lebanon, together with the UN's Special Envoy for the Middle East, T. Rod-Larsen. For his part, Lebanese Prime Minister F. Siniora said that he was willing to deploy Lebanese troops along the border with Israel in order to prevent any action by Hezbollah. The international community also met up in Rome in July in an attempt to find a way to end the crisis, though there was a clear division in positions. While Arab leaders and the UN Secretary General took the line that the way to halt the conflict quickly would be to declare an immediate ceasefire, the USA believed that a more lasting solution was needed that would go beyond the limited context of the conflict itself.


During subsequent days, and in spite of the UN Secretary General's request that the Security Council condemn some of the actions taken by the Israelis, the USA vetoed this possibility. Nevertheless, the moves taken to resolve the conflict remained focused on the UN Security Council, which was highly divided over the issue. The USA and the United Kingdom openly supported the Israeli Government, while France criticised the disproportionate action taken by Israeli armed forces. On 12 August 2006, **the UN Security Council finally approved Resolution 1701, which was to come into force on 14 September, bringing an end to the violence.** The Resolution was based on a total cessation of hostilities, the deployment of Lebanese troops in the south of the country, the strengthening of UNIFIL, the creation of a demilitarised zone, the disarmament of all armed groups and the prevention of any further weapons reaching Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah continued to be engaged in open fighting up to the last moments before the ceasefire set out in the UN Resolution was due to come into force.

After the Resolution had been approved, a number of weeks passed before several countries, particularly from Europe, decided to commit a significant number of troops to UNIFIL. Three EU countries (Italy, France and Spain) contributed the majority of these troops, after reaching an agreement on the rules of engagement that would allow them to provide the necessary protection for their soldiers and clarified the circumstances under which the blue berets could use lethal force. From the outset, one of the most controversial issues was how Hezbollah (regarded by the Lebanese Prime Minister as a "state within a state") could be disarmed, and whether its disarmament would be feasible without finding a global response to the various conflicts in the region. In this connection, during the first half of August the Syrian Government offered to use its influence over Hezbollah's leaders in exchange for the establishment of global peace in the region, a move that was interpreted as meaning that its cooperation would be conditional upon negotiating the return of the Golan Heights with Israel. In addition to setting out their commitment to assist in the reconstruction of Lebanon, the Arab League's Foreign Ministers held talks at the end of August on a Middle East peace plan that they intended to present to the UN General Assembly.

Finally, turning to the conflict between **Israel and Palestine**, the last three months have not seen any significant developments in the peace process, and efforts remain focused on relations between Hamas and Fatah. In August, the leader of the Israeli Meretz opposition party and supporter of the Geneva Initiative, Y. Beilin, called on the EU to hold a second Madrid Conference on the Middle East, similar to the one held in 1991 following the Gulf War. In September, Palestinian President M. Abbas and Prime Minister I. Haniya reached an agreement over the formation of a Government of national unity by their two political parties Fatah and Hamas respectively. Israeli Prime Minister E. Olmert and his Palestinian counterpart M. Abbas said that they were willing to meet as soon as possible and without any pre-



conditions. This announcement, made first by E. Olmert and then by M. Abbas, came after a visit to both leaders by British Prime Minister T. Blair.





Post-war rehabilitation and international involvement¹

- ❑ The date set for elections in Côte d'Ivoire was postponed once again, due to the lack of political will among the different parties involved in the process.
- ❑ The new government elect in Macedonia set out a series of measures aimed at improving the country's economic situation.
- ❑ The UN Security Council approved the terms of reference for the new peace-building fund, aiming to raise 250 million dollars in voluntary donations.


The following chapter analyses **the evolution during the last three months of the 20 countries** regarded as being in a phase of post-war rehabilitation. Given that the nature of the conflict, the way in which a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities is brought about and the contents of such agreements all have a bearing on the way that this process evolves, the countries analysed in this chapter have been **classified** by continent and analysed on the basis of **indicator no. 4**, one of the analytical indicators used during the preparation of the Alert Report². At the end of the chapter is a section dealing with the **most important international initiatives** that have taken place, as seen from the perspective of international involvement.

Chart 4.1. Classification of countries engaged in post-war rehabilitation			
Group	Start	Country	Evolution over the last three months
1	1994	Rwanda	Progress: A policy on foreign aid has been adopted as a frame of reference to identify the country's financing priorities for potential donors.
	1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Progress: Political parties began preparations for the general elections to be held during October.
	1996	Guatemala	Stalemate: Political parties illegally began an electoral campaign in preparation for future elections.
	1997	Tajikistan	Deterioration: The apathy among ordinary people as regards the political situation is benefiting strict controls by the government.
	1999	Serbia (Kosovo) ³	Deterioration: Talks on status continued without any conclusion being reached.
	1999	Timor-Leste	Progress: A new government was elected and will have support from the United Nations, which will act more as a goodwill mission than as an interventionist force.
	2001	Sierra Leone	Progress: Elections have been set for 28 July 2007.
	2001	Macedonia, FYR	Progress: The results of the recent elections have received the blessing of the international community.
	2003	Liberia	Progress: The positive progress seen since the election of new President E. Johnson-Sirleaf has continued.
	2005	Indonesia (Aceh)	Progress: The mandate of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was extended until December.
2	1999	Guinea-Bissau	Stalemate: It was announced that a donor conference was likely to be held in Geneva at the beginning of November 2006.
	2000	Eritrea	Stalemate: The border demarcation issue remained at a standstill and the government continued to restrict the movements of UNMEE.
	2002	Angola	Stalemate: President J. E. Dos Santos still failed to set an election date.
	2003	Congo	Progress: An awareness campaign was launched in relation to the disarmament process at the same time as the DDR programme was introduced.

¹ Post-war rehabilitation is understood to mean the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling the following issues: security of the local population; priority humanitarian requirements and the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees; physical reconstruction and the reinstatement of basic institutional services; the resolution of fundamental incompatibilities (socio-economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); reconciliation, respect for human rights and the fight to combat impunity; regional stability and reincorporation in international bodies and forums; and the empowerment of civilian society and the establishment of good governance through international involvement.

² Indicator no. 4: 1) Countries or territories that have reached a cessation of hostilities or have signed a peace agreement (either as the result of one party emerging victorious or through mediation by third parties) and in which post-war rehabilitation is progressing reasonably well; 2) Countries or territories in which a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities exists but is progressing badly and thus impeding post-war rehabilitation work; 3) Countries or territories that remain in a state of war but which are receiving considerable amounts of post-war international aid, which is often used as an incentive to facilitate the pursuit or fulfilment of an agreement that will allow hostilities to be brought to an end.

³ 'Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)' has now become known as 'Serbia (Kosovo)' due to the formal separation of 'Serbia' and 'Montenegro' following the independence referendum held in the latter territory on 21 May 2006 and the entry to the United Nations of the new State of Montenegro on 28 June 2006.



	2003	Côte d'Ivoire	Deterioration: The disarmament process was halted and there were confrontations during the hearings set up to determine individual citizenship.
	2005	Sudan (South)	Progress: The United Nations set up a radio station in Juba to inform people about the peace-building process.
	2004	Haiti	Progress: Donors once again showed their support for the rehabilitation process at the sixth donor conference held since 2004.
3	2001	Afghanistan	Deterioration: H. Karzai reinstated two former governors accused of corruption in order to fight the Taliban militias in the south of the country.
	2003	DR Congo	Deterioration: The need to hold a second round of elections led to confrontations between supporters of J. Kabila and J. P. Bemba,
	2003	Iraq	Deterioration: The government promoted the International Compact as a way of reaching a new alliance with the international community.

4.1. Country by country analysis

The following sections contain descriptions of the countries regarded as being in a rehabilitation phase, grouped into continents.

Africa

a) Southern Africa


In **Angola**, President J. E. Dos Santos has yet to set a date for **elections** in the country. In spite of this, the international community has not brought any pressure to bear on the government to speed up this decision. This has meant that **donors** have not provided the financing needed to inform and educate the ordinary people about the electoral process. Given the lack of access to information in the provinces and the anxiety among the general populace over the holding of elections, these programmes are of vital importance to the whole process. As regards the **repatriation** of the 29,000 Angolan refugees still living in Zambia, the Angolan government and the USA gave eight million dollars to pay for the process, which was led by the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and finally completed towards the end of September. On the issue of **mine-clearance**, the Minister for Social Affairs, J. B. Kussumua, asked for help from the international community in order to extend the **mine-free** areas in the country and thus facilitate the rebuilding of roads and bridges. According to President J. M. Dos Santos, elections cannot be held until the main roads and railway lines have been cleared of mines, a process that he estimates will end during the second half of 2007. Finally, Angola was chosen to chair the Organising Committee of the UN's Peace-Building Commission⁴ for one year.

b) West Africa

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the process to **register Ivorian citizens** remained at a standstill, and although the **disarmament** process was initiated, it was subsequently interrupted due to the lack of political will from any of the parties involved in the process, in spite of the positive advances that had been seen at the beginning of July. The Task Force appointed by the United Nations to supervise the application of Resolution 1633 indicated that it would be impossible for **elections** to be held as planned on 31 October if there was no advance in these processes. The events of recent months have made it clear that Prime Minister C. K. Banny is still unable to find a way of going ahead with the process that should lead to the holding of elections, in spite of the powers invested in him. He has therefore begun to be seen as an accomplice of President L. Gbagbo, rather than the neutral mediator that he was regarded as when he gained the support of both opposition groups and the international community.

Guinea-Bissau hosted the sixth **meeting of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP)**, at which the country's leader, J. Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, was elected president of the CPLP. During the course of the meeting, the Community's eight member

⁴ See Barometer 9 and School of Peace Culture; *Alert 2006! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building*. Icaria, 2006.



countries made a series of undertakings aimed at helping Guinea-Bissau in its fight to combat poverty and hunger, with a view to achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. The beginning of November 2006 was also suggested as the most likely date for a **donor conference** in Geneva, an event that has been postponed until now due to the stalemate in the post-war rehabilitation process. Finally, the capital Bissau was declared to be **mine-free** following an operation carried out by two NGOs.

A donor conference or “**Partnership Meeting**” was held in **Liberia** in the middle of July, with help from members of the Liberian government and representatives from the donor community, who welcomed the development agenda prepared by President E. Johnson-Sirleaf. This agenda sets out new objectives for the country that go beyond the targets set out in the Accra Agreement, as these have already been reached in the eyes of the international community. This conference therefore served **to underline the achievements of the new government**, which has now been in power for six months, and evaluate its capacity for implementation and the speed with which tangible results can be expected to be felt by the ordinary population. It was finally decided that a larger donor conference would be held in mid-October in Washington, when it was hoped that donors would provide sufficient financial backing to support the President’s agenda.

There were three notable events in **Sierra Leone** during the last three months. Firstly, President A. T. Cava set 28 July 2007 as the **date for the elections**, asking the National electoral Commission to establish the date on which campaigning would begin. In this connection, some parties (including the SLPP, which is currently in power) were accused of having started their campaigns illegally. Secondly, Sierra Leone was **one of the countries selected by the United Nations Peace-Building Commission** for inclusion in its working programme for this year, thus further focusing the attentions of the international community. As a result, UNIOSIL, the government of Sierra Leone and the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum organisation held a conference on Peace-Building Strategy in Sierra Leone. Finally, UN Secretary General K. Annan visited the country for a second time⁵ to talk to the government about the country’s needs in its continuing efforts at peace-building. In this regard, a report prepared by the United Nations highlighted the continuing struggle to combat corruption and unemployment and the need to stimulate economic growth as the **main challenges** to the consolidation of peace in the country⁶.

c) Horn of Africa

In **Eritrea**, the situation of **stalemate** that has dogged the rehabilitation process failed to show any improvement. Negotiations between members of UNMEE and the government of Eritrea have continued throughout the course of the last three months, with a view to finding a solution and making some kind of progress⁷. The UN Secretary General’s Assistant Special Representative, A. Ennifar, took over as acting head of the UN mission after his predecessor as Special Representative left UNMEE.

In **Sudan (South)**, the poor conditions that prevail in the areas to which the displaced are returning have led UN agencies on the ground to focus their activities on issues relating to the reintegration of those returning, rather than trying to encourage the return of more refugees and displaced people. The implementation of the **disarmament process** also increased tensions among the different groups, leading to seven parts of the country being placed on a state of maximum alert due to questions of security. The last three months also saw a debate on the government’s ability to manage **oil revenues** and the international **donations** received by the country, though it should be pointed out that up until now only 56% of the money promised has actually been forthcoming. Elsewhere, South Africa, as the current president of the African Union’s Ministerial Committee for Post-Conflict Reconstruction⁸, began a series of seminars to

⁵ The Secretary General’s first visit took place in 2000.

⁶ See “Second Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone” S/2006/695, 29 August 2006, at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/478/31/PDF/N0647831.pdf?OpenElement>

⁷ For more information, see the chapter on peace processes.

⁸ This Ministerial Committee includes the Foreign Ministers from South Africa, Ethiopia, Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan.



offer some SPLM groups the opportunity to build **good governance and administration skills**. Finally, the United Nations set up a **radio station in Juba** to inform people about all the aspects of the peace deal and its implementation. It should be pointed out that the introduction of a similar initiative in the north of the country was blocked, a demonstration of the current tensions between the United Nations and the government in Khartoum.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Congo**, The Ministry for Social Affairs, Solidarity, Humanitarian Action and Family Affairs signed an agreement with the UNDP to implement a project aimed at facilitating the **socio-economic integration of vulnerable groups**. A total of 21 million dollars will be provided by the African Development Bank for the project, which forms part of the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy. In addition, as the **National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Program**⁹ was launched, an awareness campaign was introduced to publicise the DDR programme among both civilian and government groups. The campaign involves members of parliament, personnel from the country's decentralised authorities, representatives from returning communities and religious leaders, who from now on will be responsible for identifying and trying to resolve any conflict that may arise at a local level during the implementation of the DDR programme. Finally, as regards **regional cooperation**, the Congolese government signed a military cooperation agreement with Angola under which the armed forces of both countries will share their experiences relating to military and security issues along their common border.

Both presidential and parliamentary elections were held in **DR Congo** during the course of the last three months. According to the observer teams present, these went off peacefully and adhered to international standards. Nevertheless, according to some international organisations, various anomalies and irregularities were reported in a number of electoral colleges, which accounted for nearly 70% of the 25 million people who turned out for the polls. However, the announcement that it would be necessary to hold a second round after counting was complete caused fighting to break out between the presidential guard of J. Kabila (who obtained 45% of the vote) and supporters of J. P. Bemba (who obtained 20%). This fighting eventually forced a ceasefire agreement between the parties with verification teams formed from the main security forces present in the capital¹⁰. Some analysts indicated that an eventual victory by one of the candidates could be violently disputed by the loser.

In **Rwanda**, the government adopted the country's **primary policy on external aid**, which included many of the elements of the Paris Declaration¹¹. This policy represents a reference framework which has been set up by the Rwandan government to inform donors of the country's financing priorities and improve the management and organisation of the aid received by the government. The aim of this new system is to strengthen national implementation of development activities in which the more than 400 million dollars that Rwanda receives each year in foreign aid is being invested. However, this new policy still offers no response to the current lack of coordination between the central authorities and local governments (which also receive direct financial contributions from both development agencies and donors). Finally, it should be pointed out that since its foreign debt was cancelled, Rwanda has been unable to ask for any loans, meaning that it is reliant upon unrepayable subsidies if it is to guarantee basic services for its ordinary citizens.


Land ownership rights

During the Great Lakes Regional Conference the countries taking part signed a white paper to regulate the ownership of land and buildings. This document represents a highly positive step towards ending the kinds of dispute over land and property that often arise in countries emerging from periods of armed

⁹ See the chapter on disarmament.

¹⁰ Each verification team includes an officer from MONUC, an officer from the EU military force present in the capital, a representative from the country's army and a member of both J.P. Bemba's and J. Kabila's guard.

¹¹ The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, an international agreement signed in March 2005 in which more than one hundred heads of government, agency chiefs and other officials promoted the appropriation and standardisation of development aid and mutual responsibility [...].



conflict. The aim of the law is to guarantee the ownership rights of people returning after being displaced, as well as to protect property from pillaging, destruction and robbery. It will also serve as a reference point for the various countries in the region that attended the Conference, such as Burundi, DR Congo, Central African Republic, Rwanda and Uganda. The Conference was organised by the United Nations and the African Union together with representatives from Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.

The majority of countries do not have adequate legal provisions governing land ownership and there are many loopholes in the legislation that leave the door wide open to abuse. While this white paper represents an advance, it should be pointed out that these countries are all party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the African Charter for Human Rights which already cover the right to property and housing and legally secure tenure. These countries were therefore already under the legal obligation to enforce these rights and protect victims. Although this initiative sends out a positive signal in dealing with one of the main problems confronted in post-war rehabilitation processes, its existence is no guarantee of success, since its application and implementation will continue to depend on the political will and commitment of the individual countries involved.

America

In **Guatemala** the parties began their pre-electoral campaigns in preparation for the elections which are to be held next year, in spite of the fact that campaigning is forbidden until the formal electioneering period has been determined. The different political organisations disguised these pre-electoral activities as membership recruitment campaigns. Only two of the eighteen parties that are expected to put up candidates during the forthcoming elections failed to reach the minimum 15,220 members required by law. Most of the parties have links with big business and have already been involved in previous administrations. As regards plans by leaders of the Maya indigenous community to form their own party to stand in the elections, the final details will not be known until the 2007 electoral process begins.

The UN Security Council has extended the mandate of its **peace-keeping force** in **Haiti** for a further six months, although the Secretary General had asked for a 12-month extension. The total number of troops remains at 9,000. The persistent **lack of security** in the country remained the main obstacle to the implementation of specific rehabilitation work. The failure to increase the number of security troops did not, however, stop the steady increase in incoming financial aid, which once again demonstrates the lack of coordination between security and development. In this connection, at **donor conference** held this quarter (the sixth since 2004), donors promised to give 750 million dollars, much less than the 7,000 million requested by the government, to finance a five-year development plan for the period from 2006 to 2011. Elsewhere, the European Commission introduced a **budgetary support** programme for Haiti in the amount of 10.2 million euros, aimed at guaranteeing the continuity of the government's macro-economic and financing programme, under which the government must show improved governance, reduce poverty and achieve macro-economic stability. In this regard, the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) declared that Haiti could be included under its Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.

Asia and the Pacific

International organisations continued to take action in **Tajikistan** to promote democratic electoral principles, reform of the legal sector and the development of civil society. In addition, the Freedom House organisation published a report¹² in which it underlined the **apathetic attitude of the ordinary population towards the political situation**, its main concern being the maintenance of peace and stability, while the government continued to adopt an ever more authoritarian approach. The controls adopted by the government that reflect its **growing authoritarianism** include compulsory registration for NGOs, the continued repression of media organisations that are not aligned to the regime itself and the actions taken against potential political rivals in the run-up to the presidential elections planned for November of this year.

¹² Freedom House; Nations in Transit 2006, August 2006. at: <http://www.freedomhouse.hu/nitransit/2006/tajikistan2006.pdf>



In **Timor Leste**, former Foreign Minister J. Ramos Horta was appointed Prime Minister following the resignation of M. Alkatiri, which came as a direct result of the fighting that had broken out during the previous quarter after around 600 soldiers were expelled from the army¹³. It should be pointed out that, according to the latest report by the UN Secretary General¹⁴, the **underlying causes** that led to this **outbreak of violence**, namely the confrontations between the country's armed forces and the police force, the friction between eastern and western parts of the country and the large number of weapons that remain in civilian hands, have yet to be resolved, in spite of the fact that a new government has been put in place. The report also set out the duties to be performed by the new mission, UNMIT, after **the completion of UNOTIL's mandate at the end of August**. The main task of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in the future will be to offer goodwill and support for political dialogue and reconciliation, while also coordinating global aid from the international community, leaving the Timorese themselves to head up any action required to resolve some of the difficulties that have been identified, with support from the international community. The new government will have nine months before the first parliamentary elections since independence are held.

In **Indonesia (Aceh)**, the **mandate of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was extended** through to December. The reason for this was the postponement of local **elections**, which had originally been scheduled for August but will now take place in mid-December. An increased police presence is expected in the region in the run-up to the elections, in spite of the fact that one of the stated aims of the peace agreement was a reduction in police numbers. Finally, the approval by the Indonesian parliament of **new legislation** for Aceh led to criticism from the GAM as well as from some NGOs, as it contravened some of the points included in the peace agreement signed between the GAM and the government. Among other issues they denounced the fact that the Human Rights Court that is to have jurisdiction in the province, as approved by the country's parliament, will not have any power to try crimes committed prior to its creation, meaning that it will not be able to hear crimes perpetrated during the course of the armed conflict.

In spite of the increased lack of security and fighting with Taliban militias in **Afghanistan**, the United Nations opened **new UNAMA offices** in the east, south and southeast of the country. Furthermore, NATO assumed command of military operations by the ISAF, which until that point had been under the command of the international coalition led by the USA. Elsewhere, the government began a **consulting process** with all the key sectors of Afghan society with a view to preparing a National Development Structure for Afghanistan. The government intends to make a hands-on analysis of all the action required in order to reduce poverty and achieve economic growth. This initiative was in sharp contrast to the reinstatement by President H. Karzai of two former governors accused of corruption in the south of the country, who were also granted the power to rearm their illegal militias in order to fight Taliban forces. This infuriated **NATO** high command, along with the Japanese government, which has invested 91 million dollars in the disarmament of 62,000 members of these militias. The UN Secretary General's Representative, T. Koenigs, said that in taking this action the President had ignored parliament, which generally acts as a controlling body over the government in such issues.

Europe

General elections were held in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. According to the early results, H. Silajdzic, who was Foreign Minister during the armed conflict, has taken the Muslim seat on the revolving tripartite presidential body. H. Silajdzic is a fierce proponent of the abolition of the two autonomous regions from which the country is made up. Meanwhile, the preliminary results from the Rep. Sprska indicated that the Serbian seat would be taken by N. Radmanovic, whose party recently proposed that a referendum be held on the issue of the secession of the Serbian part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while I. M. Jovic may be re-elected to the Croatian seat. In this regard it should be pointed out that the result of the referendum on independence for Montenegro, combined with developments in the talks on the status of Kosovo, led to a series of actions

¹³ See the chapters on tensions and rehabilitation in Barometer 11.

¹⁴ See the Secretary General's report on Timor-Leste under Security Council Resolution 1690 (2006), 8 August 2006, at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/448/36/PDF/N0644836.pdf?OpenElement>



directed at seeking a **referendum on the secession** of Rep. Sprska. The main proponent of this initiative was M. Dodik, leader of the SNSD and Prime Minister of the region. It should be pointed out that **the different component parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not federal entities** and under international law have no right to self-determination. Finally the Executive Committee of the **Peace Implementation Council (PIC)** suggested the possibility that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) might finally be withdrawn from the country at the end of June 2007, though such a move would depend on the progress made in the reform process currently underway with a view to being able to join the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Europe.

In **Serbia (Kosovo)**, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative and Head of UNMIK, **S. Jessen-Petersen, completed his mandate** and was replaced by J. Rücker, who has until now been responsible for the economic and reconstruction work being done by UNMIK. There were **further talks** during the course of the last three months between the Contact Group and the authorities in charge of the province, dealing with the region's status and other practical aspects, though no specific result was achieved. Everyone is waiting for the report that the UN Secretary General's Representative M. Ahtisaari is planning to present to the UN Security Council during the last quarter of this year. This report will once again condition the attitude adopted by the international community with regard to the status of the province. It should be pointed out that, as regards the requirements that the parties are supposed to fulfil under the eight standards, there was still no sign that might indicate that minority rights will be guaranteed in any potential future state in the event that this decision becomes final.

Parliamentary elections were held in **Macedonia**, and according to international observers they met all the proper international standards, though there were reports of intimidation in some isolated areas with a majority Albanian population. The party in opposition before the elections, the VMRO-DPMNE led by N. Gruevski, gained 45 out of a total of 120 parliamentary seats. After forming a coalition with the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA) and the New Social Democrat Party (NSDP) it was able to obtain a total of 65 seats, four more than it needed to form a government. The Albanian party that gained the most votes, the DUI, led by former rebel leader A. Ahmeti, tried to disrupt the results of the elections by threatening inter-ethnic instability, though this did not find any support among the ordinary people, who are more interested in improving economic conditions, as shown by the results of the elections themselves. Such improvements form the main objective of the **executive** formed by Prime Minister N. Gruevski, the former Minister of the Economy (1998 – 2002), as one can see from the programme presented by the recently appointed government. The **international community** declared its support for this new political arrangement, as demonstrated by the announcement from the World Bank of a new four-year strategy to support economic development in the country.

Middle East

The last quarter saw the signing of the **International Compact for Iraq**, put forward by the Iraqi government as a way of establishing a new alliance with the international community that will promote political economic and social development during the next five years. The Compact, which has gained the support of the international community, is intended to reflect the links between political progress and advances in the areas of security and recovery, an essential condition if sustainable regional and international investment is to be obtained. In spite of these supposed advances at an international political level, it is important to mention the high levels of sectarian violence and ethnic rivalry suffered throughout the country, which could be said to be in a state of civil war, with around 3,000 people dying each month according to the United Nations. Finally, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1700, approving the extension of **UNAMI's** mandate for a further 12 months¹⁵.

4.3. Other items on the agenda

¹⁵ See the complete Resolution at:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/462/56/PDF/N0646256.pdf?OpenElement>



This section deals with aspects relating to the theory and analysis of post-war rehabilitation, along with good practices and the lessons learned in this area.

a) Institutional relations within United Nations integrated missions¹⁶

The design and implementation of United Nations operations in post-armed conflict situations in which various aspects of peace-building have to be coordinated is guided by the principle of integration. An understanding of the responsibilities, powers and role of each of the UN officers that may potentially form part of the international response to a complex situation is a key factor when it comes to facilitating coordination between the mission and the United Nations systems already present on the ground.

Potential members of United Nations missions, their duties, responsibilities and powers

Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) – The highest ranking UN representative in a country, the SRSG is in charge of all United Nations activities. He/she represents the Secretary General in the country and speaks for the organisation. He/she also sets out the general framework that must guide the mission's activities and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), ensuring that all the components of the United Nations system that are active in the country in question work in a coordinated and consistent manner. He/she is answerable to the Secretary General via the Assistant Secretary General for Peace-Keeping. The SRSG is assisted by two deputies, one of whom carries out the duties of DSRSG/RC/HC. He/she may be appointed as the Designated Officer and will then be ultimately responsible for the security of all personnel, reporting to the Secretary General via the Assistant Secretary General for Security.

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General / Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC) – The DSRSG acts under the direct supervision of the SRSG, for whom he/she must prepare reports and whom he/she must notify of all communications set up through the other two positions that he/she holds, as described below. The SRSG will also be responsible for informing the DSRSG of all communication with the organisation's headquarters.

As RC, they are responsible for coordinating the work of the UNCT and planning and coordinating United Nations development operations. They are also responsible for coordinating the actions of donors in respect of rehabilitation and development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assists them in any duties they have to carry out as RC, and they must also present reports to the Administrator of the UNDP.

As HC they are responsible for planning and coordinating humanitarian operations and maintaining the links required to this end with governments, donors and the entire humanitarian community. The HC also presents reports to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). Whenever the HC is supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), OCHA will keep a separate office to facilitate access to the wider humanitarian community. Finally, the DSRSG/RC/HC will also maintain contacts with any NGOs operating in the country.

In the event that the SRSG or the RSG are not resident in the country in which the mission has been deployed, the RC/HC will be responsible for keeping the SRSG or RSG up-to-date with the main developments and the operational work being done by the United Nations on the ground. The RSG will consult the RC/HC and the UNCT and keep them up-to-date with his/her own actions. The SRSG will be responsible for providing political guidelines for the RC/HC and the UNCT.

Presence of United Nations Representatives in countries undergoing PWR processes					
Countries involved in PWR	SRSG	DSRSG	HC	RC	RSG
Rwanda (1994)			M. Soumaré, UNDP		

¹⁶ For more information on UN integrated missions, see a summary at: <http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/rehabilitacion/buenas/bp002.pdf> (in Spanish)



Guinea-Bissau (1999)				M. Balima, UNDP	J. Honwana, UNOGBIS
Eritrea (2000)	A. Ennifar (Officer in charge), UNMEE	J. Adechi, UNMEE	M. Nyirongo, UNDP		
Sierra Leone (2001)	J. Victor Da Silva Angelo, UNIOSIL/UNDP				
Angola (2002)	P. Pirlot, UNDP				
Liberia (2003)	A. Doss, UNMIL	J. Ryan, DPKO			
DR Congo (2003)	W. Lacy Swing, MONUC	R. Mountain, MONUC/UNDP			
Congo (2003)					A. Agbenonci, UNDP
Côte d'Ivoire (2003)	P. Schori, UNOCI	A. Mar Dieye, UNDP			
Sudan (South) (2005)	J. Pronk, UNMIS	M. Aranda da Silva, UN			
Guatemala (1996)					B. Rohr, UNDP
Haiti (2004)	E. Mulet, MINUSTAH	A. Guindo, UNDP			
Tajikistan (1997)	W. Paton, UNDP				V. Sotirov, UNTOP
Timor-Leste (1999)	S. Hasegawa, UNMIT	F. Reske-Nielsen, UNDP			
Afghanistan (2001)	T. Koenigs, UNAMA	A. Haq, UNDP			
Indonesia (Aceh) (2005)	B. Asplund, UNDP				
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995)					C. McNab, UNICEF
Serbia (Kosovo) (1999)	J. Rücker, UNMIK	F. Mauring, UNDP			M. Ahtisaari
Macedonia, FYR (2001)					M. Luisa Silva, UNDP
Iraq (2003)	A. Jehangir Qazi, UNAMI	J. M. Fakhouri, UNAMI/UNDP			

b) The Peace-Building Commission¹⁷

The new Peace-Building Fund

The UN General Assembly approved the terms of reference for the new Peace-Building Fund, which was in turn approved in December 2005 under the terms of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions that gave final approval for the creation of a UN Peace-Building Commission.

According to these terms of reference, the fund may be used to finance intervention when it contributes directly to a country's stabilisation and where no other form of financing is available. The aim is to encourage long-term support from other donors. Countries that the fund may be used to finance are those considered appropriate by the Commission, though countries nominated by the UN Secretary General may also receive financing, even where they have not been considered by the Commission. The Commission Support Office will be mainly responsible for administering the fund, while the UNDP will be the official fund manager, using its own procedures and regulations to this end. The initial target for the fund is 250 million dollars, which is to be obtained through voluntary contributions from United Nations member states, the private sector, inter-governmental organisations and other financing sources.

Finally, the meetings originally scheduled for September to discuss the first two countries to be assisted by the Commission, Burundi and Sierra Leone, were eventually postponed until mid-October. No decision has yet been taken as to how civilian groups are to be allowed to participate in these meetings.

¹⁷ A new United Nations inter-governmental organisation created in response to the need, identified by the UN Secretary General, for a forum in which all the parties involved in rehabilitation can meet and coordinate the international response. For more information, see Barometer 10 and School of Peace Culture, *op. cit.*



Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action

- ❑ The humanitarian crisis in DR Congo is leaving 1,200 people dead each day, being classified as the most serious crisis in the world.
- ❑ An alarming increase in violence against the civilian population and humanitarian personnel has been reported in Darfur, what makes the situation worse now than it was at the height of the armed conflict.
- ❑ Both the government and the LTTE prevented aid from reaching the thousands of displaced people in the Jaffna Peninsular and the east of Sri Lanka.
- ❑ The armed forces and the CPN worked together to assist victims of a landslide in the west of Nepal.
- ❑ Israeli attacks on civilian targets in Lebanon led to the displacement of a million people during the height of the conflict.

This section contains a review of the current situation in the different contexts of humanitarian crisis around the world and their recent evolution. It also details the main events that have occurred over the past three months in the area of humanitarian action.

5.1. - Evolution of humanitarian crisis¹

The following is an analysis of the most significant developments which have been reported during the past three months in the different humanitarian crises around the world. **44 countries currently find themselves in this situation²**, 25 of them in Africa, nine in the Asia and Pacific region, five in Europe and Central Asia, two in America and another three in the Middle East. Some of these countries are grouped together in what is regarded as a regional crisis. Particular mention should be made of the **inclusion during this quarter of Lebanon as a context of humanitarian crisis** due to the conflict with Israel and the enforced displacements and humanitarian crisis affecting the civilian population. On the positive side, **Malawi is no longer included**, as the high yields from recent harvests have provided enough food for the population and thus improved food security in the country.

Africa

The impact of floods in the **Horn of Africa and Sahel** regions during the last quarter further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, which has reached chronic proportions in several countries in both regions. At the same time, aid work has been severely reduced in **Darfur (Sudan)** as a result of attacks on NGO personnel and humanitarian agency workers, while the number of people displaced has increased along the border with Chad due to the upsurge in violence that has now reached the highest levels seen since 2004, according to UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, J. Egeland.

¹ In this report, "humanitarian crises" are understood to be situations in which there is an exceptional and widespread threat to human life, health or subsistence. Such crises tend to occur against a background of poverty, state fragility and a lack of food, in which a natural disaster or armed conflict give rise to the occurrence of food emergencies, disease, the enforced displacement of people within the country or outside it, along with a significant mobilisation of international resources in the form of aid.

² Any improvement or deterioration in these crises is judged on the basis of certain specific indicators, such as food safety, access to the population by humanitarian agencies, population displacements and the response to a particular situation by the international community. Nevertheless, the mere fact that these contexts are regarded as humanitarian crises automatically means that they are acknowledged to represent a highly serious problem.



a) Southern Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Angola	Return and resettlement process	Unchanged
Lesotho	Drought, HIV/AIDS	Improved
Madagascar	Natural disasters, HIV/AIDS	Unchanged
Swaziland	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political crisis	Deteriorated
Zimbabwe	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political and economic crisis, international isolation	Deteriorated

In southern Africa, in spite of the good harvests obtained in **Zimbabwe**, the WFP and several other analysts have all indicated that it wouldn't be enough to provide food for the entire population, which has already seen its access to food restricted due to the high price of grain. Meanwhile, the UN's Development Policy Committee classified Zimbabwe as one of the least developed countries in the world, a classification that was strongly rejected by the government. In **Swaziland**, the levels of HIV/AIDS among the ordinary population continue to affect their capacity to provide for themselves, while the government accused humanitarian aid organisations of creating dependency. Meanwhile, the prolonged drought affected the harvest in **Madagascar**. UNHCR warned about the lack of funds for the repatriation of **Angolan refugees** in Zambia, while the WFP indicated that returnees were among those suffering most acutely from food insecurity.

b) West Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Côte d'Ivoire	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Unchanged
Guinea	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements and political crisis	Unchanged
Liberia	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements	Unchanged
Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger)	Drought, plague of locusts	Deteriorated
Sierra Leone	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements	Unchanged

Although the situation remains relatively calm in the Manu River Region (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the WFP warned of an increase in ethnic tensions in the security zone in **Côte d'Ivoire**, a situation that led to the displacement of 120 families, while the situation facing the internally displaced people remains serious. The UNHCR estimated that around 141,600 **Liberian refugees** are still awaiting help from the voluntary repatriation programme, which will be completed by June 2007. Although the return process of the internally displaced was said to have been completed in the country, infrastructure development is still required in order to provide for their basic needs in the places to which they are returning, a fact that has driven many of them to move to the capital Monrovia. **Thousands of people were also forced to move to Gambia** due to fresh outbreaks of fighting between Senegalese armed forces and the MFDC from **Casamance**. Finally, taking account of the change in focus seen in many projects ranging from humanitarian action to rehabilitation in the Manu River Region, OCHA warned that many of the people's basic needs still must be addressed if lasting peace is going to be achieved in the region.

In the **Sahel region**, the United Nations made a call on donor countries to speed up delivery of the funds they had promised to deal with the regional crisis, since it has only received half of the money it requires. Related to this, the government of **Niger** introduced a programme to help 1.8 million people currently suffering severe food shortages, while torrential rains caused flooding in the north of the country (Agadez), further increasing the precarious situation in which the local people are living. It is estimated that around 26,000 people have been affected by the flooding in **Niger and Burkina Faso**.



**The 'Cayuco' crisis: what are we talking about?**

Since the beginning of March, at least 20,000 people turned up on the Canary Islands coast in boats that had originally shipped from Mauritania, Senegal, and even Guinea Bissau. It is estimated that at least 2,000 people may have died during the course of similar journeys. Though the figures themselves are well known, little is mentioned about the reasons that drive these young people to take such a trip, apart from general notion about hunger and poverty on the African continent.

Although there is no exact data, the majority of people arriving in these 'cayucos' or migrant boats come from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali and Gambia, countries that lie on the west coast of Africa and form parts of a region severely affected by humanitarian crises and instability. On the one hand there is the **food crisis** affecting countries of the **Sahel** (mainly Niger, Mali and Mauritania), a crisis that threatens to reach chronic proportions due to the prolonged drought and the cyclical effects of torrential rains on agricultural production. In addition, the conflicts in **Côte d'Ivoire, Casamance (Senegal), the north of Mali and Nigeria, the post-war situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the political instability in Guinea** represent a **secondary factor that must be taken into consideration**. To this one should add the **high levels of unemployment among young people in the region**, where the jobless number as many as **50% of all people under the age of 35** in places like Sierra Leone, according to data from UNOWA³. In addition, the **absence of effective border controls** between these countries and the **high value of the remittances** sent by these migrants to their families (which represents twice the amount of money provided worldwide by ODA) are some of the key factors that let us understand why these people are willing to leave their country at any cost.

However, not all the causes of the 'cayuco' phenomenon are to be found in Africa itself. **Problems with gaining legal entry into Europe**, the low quotas of immigrants coming from African countries who are allowed into the EU, the limited number of embassies in Africa and the high cost of applying for visas (mostly denied) are some of the other reasons why migration, classified as illegal, is seen as the only way out. **The only response that has been seen up to this moment is increased security along southern Spain's coastline and its land borders in Ceuta and Melilla**. This is mooted as a solution to the problem while the root causes behind this kind of migration are still not being addressed. One could also ask why the social alarm bells are ringing quite so loudly in relation to immigrants arriving from Sub-Saharan Africa when they only represent 3.04% of the 3.5 million foreigners who are legally resident in Spain, or when more than 90% of immigrants without legal papers arrive by air from South America or cross over into Spain by land from Eastern Europe.

c) Horn of Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Eritrea	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Ethiopia	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Somalia	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Sudan	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated

Heavy rains caused **flooding** in several parts of the **Horn of Africa**, above all in **Ethiopia**, where at least 136,000 people were forced out of their homes and more than 600 were killed. The rains had a negative effect on crops while failing to end the drought affecting the south of the country. On top of this, **23,000 people were internally displaced** as a result of **violent clashes between neighbouring clans** in the Oromiya region, while Somali refugees in the country continued to endure a worrying situation. Meanwhile, the **reopening of the port in the Somali capital Mogadishu** after 11 years has made possible the delivery of emergency aid to inhabitants of the city affected by the recent fighting and floods.

The humanitarian crisis in **Sudan**, particularly the Darfur region, remained the most alarming in this region as levels of violence increased, with Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator J. Egeland reporting that the conflict was the worst it had been since 2004. In this regard, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called on the government of Sudan to carry out an independent investigation into the attacks perpetrated against the African population in the area around Buram, in the province of South Darfur, by militias from the Arab Habbania tribe, allegedly with government support. These attacks left

³ UNOWA, *Youth Unemployment and regional insecurity in West Africa*. Issue Papers, December 2005. <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/unowa-westafrica-31dec.pdf>



hundreds dead, though the exact number is unknown. The aerial bombardments carried out by Sudanese armed forces against towns under rebel control in the northern part of Darfur have also caused the number of internally displaced people to rise. Elsewhere, there was a serious increase in the number of attacks suffered by humanitarian agencies, and **eight humanitarian workers were killed in just two weeks in July**, more than the total number of deaths among aid organisation workers for the last two years, bringing the total number of deaths in 2006 to twelve. Given these events, J. Egeland warned that the AU mission is no longer seen as neutral by some parties in the conflict, and some organisations operating in the region are thinking of refusing protection from AMIS in order to avoid potential attacks as they continue their duties. Moreover, in spite of the approval of a resolution to deploy the UNMIS force in Darfur, Sudanese President **O. Al-Bashir** continued to refuse the deployment of the UN peace-keeping mission in the region, prompting UN Secretary General K. Annan to warn that he will hold him **responsible for any potential increase in the humanitarian crisis in the region**. In addition, a report from the IDMC stressed that the return process of internal displaced people by the north-south conflict was difficult and slow and that there was a shortage of infrastructure and jobs in southern areas, while Refugees International warned of further displacements due to the establishment of new oil companies in the region. Equally worrying is the situation affecting people from the south of the country living in displacement camps in Khartoum, who are continually being evicted by order of the government.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Burundi	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Improved
Central African Republic	Armed internal disputes, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Chad	Armed internal disputes, regional instability, volume of enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Congo	Armed internal disputes, volume of enforced displacements	Unchanged
DR Congo	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Kenya	Volume of enforced displacements, drought	Unchanged
Rwanda	Impact of regional conflicts, volume of enforced displacements	Unchanged
Tanzania	Volume of refugees, drought	Improved
Uganda	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Improved

The situation in neighbouring Darfur continued to have an adverse effect on Chad and the Central African Republic, while the cross-border fighting between different Chadian armed opposition groups and the country's armed forces, combined with the ongoing attacks on the refugee camps that currently sheltered 220,000 Sudanese, further increased the numbers of IDP'S in the country. It is hoped that the recent agreement between the governments in Khartoum and N'Djamena on strengthening the border between the two countries will help to alleviate the displacement crisis in the region. Elsewhere, various humanitarian and UN organisations pointed to the fact that **a number of armed groups from both Sudan and Chad are recruiting members in refugee camps**. Both the violence and the rains are impeding the provision of aid to 48,000 refugees from the Central African Republic who are currently in Chad.

In the Great Lakes Region, UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, J. Egeland, announced that the **humanitarian crisis in the east of DR Congo is probably the most serious one in the world at present**. In this regard, NGOs estimate that around **1,200 people could be dying every day in DR Congo** as a result of famine and the lack of clean water. Humanitarian workers have also been forced to abandon operations in the Ituri district (eastern DRC) and the Kivus region as they have become a target for the violence. Meanwhile, humanitarian agencies in **Congo** prepared for the potential influx of refugees that could occur while elections are being held in DR Congo. In **Kenya**, the rains failed to improve the food safety problem, though the **mass return of Burundians** to their places of origin (more than 10,000 during the course of the last quarter) helped to alleviate the refugee burden in **Tanzania**.

In **Uganda**, the conditions faced by the internally displaced people remain of special concern in northern parts of the country. However, the signing of a **cessation of hostilities between the**



government and the LRA resulted in some improvement in access by humanitarian organisations to more than a million people in the region who depend to a great extent on support from the WFP for their survival. In **Burundi** in the meantime, there was a **fall in the number of people seeking refuge and asylum in neighbouring countries**, as a result of advances in the peace process, though the flow of people returning has slowed in recent weeks. There was an improvement in the food situation in **Rwanda**, while more than **5,000 people** who had allegedly fled the country in order to avoid being tried by the traditional Gacaca Courts **were repatriated from Burundi**.

America and the Caribbean

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Colombia	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Haiti	Natural disasters, political and economic crisis	Unchanged

Colombia and Haiti remained the two contexts of crisis in the Americas. As far as **Colombia** is concerned, the **UNHCR appealed to all armed groups to leave the indigenous population out of the conflict** after events in Nariño province, where five people belonging to a group of 1,700 internally displaced ethnic Awans were killed by unidentified men. This is the province that has suffered most from the fighting between the armed forces and the FARC over the course of the last three months, leading to the displacement of thousands of people. Elsewhere, the operations to fumigate coca crops in the **Antioquia** region led to a further **mass exodus of peasants from the region**.

In **Haiti**, although the security situation remained relatively stable, UNICEF warned of the **consequences of the violence on children**, while the United Nations indicated that a **strategy of political destabilisation** lay behind the growing number of kidnappings being reported in the capital. This increase in violent incidents led to the **internal displacement** of people living in various districts around the capital, while there was an **increase in the number of people trying to get into the Dominican Republic** in an attempt to flee from the serious situation in which they found themselves in their own country.

Asia and the Pacific

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Afghanistan	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Bangladesh	Floods	Unchanged
DPR Korea	Economic, food and health crises	Deteriorated
Indonesia	Tsunami, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Myanmar	Volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Nepal	Armed conflict	Unchanged
Pakistan	Earthquake	Improved
Sri Lanka	Natural disasters, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Timor-Leste	Civil conflict	Deteriorated

A number of serious situations of crisis were reported in Asia during the last quarter. In **Afghanistan**, NATO operations coincided with further displacements of the population, while humanitarian organisations reduced their activities in the province of Helmand due to the **rising tide of violence that preceded the Atlantic Alliance's arrival**. In this regard the US agency USAID indicated that more than 100 of its workers, most of them Afghans, had died during the last three years of the conflict. The WFP warned that the drought was increasing the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in the country, and it estimated that 2.5 million more people would require aid this year. For its part, the **UNHCR underlined the progress achieved in its operations to return people to their places of origin in the north of the country**, where many families belonging to the Pashtun ethnic community are returning to homes that they abandoned more than 25 years ago following the Russian invasion.



Turning to **Indonesia**, it should be mentioned that another tsunami in the south of the island of Java led to the displacement of more than 74,000 people and left around 600 dead. In **Myanmar** the **KNU called for a halt to the attacks on Karen civilians as a precondition for entering into negotiations** with the Military Junta. In **Nepal**, around 80,000 people were affected by heavy rains in the west of the country, and delays in the arrival of emergency aid placed the lives of these people at serious risk. Elsewhere, the majority of those displaced by the conflict have not yet begun to return to their homes as they still fear attacks from the Maoist armed group, the CPN. Nevertheless, the Nepalese media have made particular mention of the **way that the country's armed forces worked together with members of the CPN in order to rescue victims of the landslide** in Achham, in the west of Nepal. In **DPR Korea**, a **typhoon and monsoon rains** during the month of July caused the worst floods recorded in the country, leaving five people dead and a further 12,500 homeless. In **Pakistan** the majority of those affected by last year's earthquake have returned to their homes, and the UNHCR therefore handed over responsibility for the displacement camps to the Pakistani government.

In **Sri Lanka**, the situation facing those displaced by the fighting in the **Jaffna Peninsular and the east of the country is of particular concern**, and a number of organisations reported that they were being hampered in their attempts to bring emergency aid to people in the area by both the government and the LTTE. Meanwhile, all the European members of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) withdrew after the LTTE demanded that they leave the country following the armed group's inclusion in the EU's list of terrorist organisations. Another event that led to humanitarian personnel leaving the country was the **murder of 17 Tamil members of the NGO Action Against Hunger** in August. The total number of people that have now been displaced rose to 240,000. Elsewhere, increased tensions between the different communities in **Timor-Leste led to an increased lack of security in refugee camps in Dili**, with the camps actually suffering direct attacks, while political pressure increased from groups demanding the closure of IDP centres in the city. In the meantime, the UNHCR promised that all those who had been displaced would be reintegrated voluntarily and within a reasonable period of time.

The new donors: India and China

There have been interesting changes in the roles played by different countries around the world during the course of the last few years. **China**, for example, has taken on a new role, not only in trading terms as a huge Asian power in a full phase of expansion, but also in the area of humanitarian aid. The country **ceased to be a beneficiary of WFP aid programmes** during 2005, and in 2006 **it has become the third most important donor of humanitarian aid**, according to INTERFAIS (International Food Aid Information System). Its huge agricultural surplus has allowed it to send significant consignments of aid, mainly to **DPR Korea, but also to Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Sri Lanka**. According to information from the same organisation, two thirds of the food despatched as humanitarian aid is produced in this donor country.

At the same time, **India** is playing an increasingly important role in providing food safety for countries in its immediate neighbourhood in south Asia, particularly Afghanistan. India moved from being a **net receiver of aid in the year 2000** to being the **WFP's fifteenth largest donor in 2005**, and has actively participated in programmes in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar and Pakistan. The humanitarian assistance that India gives to its neighbours is a key factor in the **maintenance of security in the region**, whose stability is vital to India's own development.

Europe and Central Asia

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)	Volume of internally displaced people, political and economic crisis,	Unchanged
Russia (Chechnya)*	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Serbia (Kosovo) and Montenegro	Internal civil disputes, volume of internally displaced people,	Unchanged

* Neighbouring Republics (Dagestan, North Ossetia and Ingushetia)

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, A. Guterres, visited the **Caucasus** sub-region during the month of August with the aim of strengthening the role of the **UNHCR** as a peace-builder and



generator of dialogue in the region, confident that the **proper resettlement of refugees and displaced people in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan represented the key to achieving peace and stability in the region.** The WFP approved aid for a further two years for the people displaced by the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and it called on the international community not to forget the conditions still faced by the more than 140,000 people in its care and to deliver the funds required for the continuing implementation of its programmes in the region.

In **Chechnya** there were once again fears that the internally displaced would be forced to return to their homes, following **threats and evictions at various camps in and around Ingushetia.** The Russian federal government has always prevented internally displaced Chechens from seeking refuge in other regions and has placed pressure on these people to return to their places of origin, while at the same time offering incentives for those returning, though these have rarely materialised. The United Nations appealed for aid to help **Montenegro** solve the problems relating to large numbers of displaced people and refugees from the Balkans who are in the country, while **Serbs and Kosovo Albanians signed an agreement aimed at speeding up the return of people displaced by the conflict.** The UNHCR also condemned the attacks on Serbian families that had returned to Kosovo. The UN Agency urged all the Balkan countries to implement the agreements reached in respect of the creation of a common return programme, in order to facilitate the return of 500,000 people who are still internally displaced or living as refugees in the region.

Middle East

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Iraq	Armed conflict, drought	Deteriorated
Lebanon	Armed conflict	New
Palestine	Armed conflict, humanitarian isolation of the population	Unchanged

In the Middle East, particular mention should be made of the new context of crisis that has resulted from the war between **Lebanon and Israel**, which led to a serious humanitarian crisis in the region that was further worsened by the UN's delay in taking any decision. **Around a million Lebanese were forced to flee** from the conflict, which particularly affected the south of the country, the capital Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. The majority of these people returned to their homes after UN Resolution 1701 was signed in the middle of August, **though tens of thousands are still awaiting the reconstruction of their homes and improvements in security in the region before returning.** The donor conference held in Stockholm ended with 940 million dollars compromised to assist the reconstruction of the country. Meanwhile, in the occupied **Palestinian** territories, the heavy offensive by the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip which began in June has left more than 226 people dead and caused yet more displacements, while **UNRWA announced that the humanitarian crisis faced by some 800,000 Palestinians has been seriously exacerbated by the financial sanctions imposed on the Hamas government.**

The Lebanese civilian population, target of Israeli attacks.

For five weeks, Israel bombed southern Lebanon and the country's capital, Beirut, as a response to the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and Hezbollah's missile attacks, claiming that it had a right to defend its territory and its population from the terrorist threat posed by its northern neighbour. These attacks were classified as disproportionate from the outset by the EU and some United Nations agencies, and a report by Amnesty International claimed that they were aimed at the country's civilian population. **The devastation caused to civil infrastructure, hospitals, roads and bridges that would have eased the problem of evacuating the population served to further worsen the situation of humanitarian crisis, along with the blockade of all air traffic and shipping.** In addition, the use of highly inaccurate **cluster bombs** in residential areas, of which some **100,000 remain active and are thus impeding the return of the internally displaced,** was another indication of the real target of the attacks. The figures speak for themselves. **A total of 1,200 Lebanese dead, the majority of them civilians, as opposed to 157 Israelis, who for the most part were members of the country's armed forces.** The United Nations complained on a number of occasions about the **absence of a security corridor that would allow access by humanitarian agencies and organisations to the civilian population** trapped by the fighting in southern Lebanon, and condemned the obstruction of UN convoys carrying emergency aid as a violation of international humanitarian law.



The delay in the decision-making process in the Security Council merely served to increase the intensity of the tragedy, with **almost one million Lebanese forcibly displaced from their homes**. Tens of thousands of them have still been unable to return, in spite of the permanent ceasefire declared on the 14th of August as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Finally, the conflict in Lebanon **also meant that the international community averted its gaze from the indiscriminate attacks still being carried out by Israel in the Gaza strip**.

In **Iraq**, the high number of kidnappings and attacks during the last three months has left the country on the verge of collapse, and **OCHA** warned that increasing levels of violence are seriously hindering humanitarian operations as a result of **delays in the arrival of aid and desertion by local personnel**, who are under pressure from constant threats.

5.2. Humanitarian action⁴ during the last three months

The following are some of the relevant events, initiatives and reports that have had an effect on the various activities involved in humanitarian action.

a) OCHA report on the response to humanitarian appeals by mid-2006.

OCHA published its report on the current status of aid and the international response to humanitarian appeals made by the agency up to the month of July⁵. Up to the present, **only 36% of the funds promised by governments have actually been handed over**, and only 1,700 million dollars of the 4,800 million requested in order to bring an end to 31 situations of humanitarian crisis around the world have actually been forthcoming. The report noted that, although much has been achieved, donors must find a way to overcome these delays in the handing over of funds.

Of the 20 appeals made, nine have received less than 32% of the funds needed in order to deal with the severe humanitarian situation. Among the appeals that have not attracted the necessary amount of attention are the regional appeal for the Horn of Africa, which has only received 15% of the required funding, the appeal for Sudan, which has received 24%, and the appeals for Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Congo, which have received less than 30%. The last country in this list is Palestine, which has received only 31% of the funding requested.

In contrast to this situation is the rapid pledging of funds for extraordinary appeals such as those relating to **Lebanon and Timor-Leste, in which more than 90% of funding has already been offered**. Here, a strong media presence or the sudden emergence of a crisis situation has provoked a rapid response from the international community, while the world's long-term crises and the situations regarded as chronic are still suffering from a severe lack of funds which is placing the people affected at serious risk.

Detachment from aid: the story of a predictable crisis.

Since the nineties there has been a particular school of thought on humanitarian aid that has suggested that emergency aid should form the foundation for longer-term solutions for the people affected by a particular crisis. Thus, **a humanitarian crisis would be seen as the visible manifestation of a pre-existing situation of vulnerability in which the structural causes of this vulnerability should be addressed**. Early warning systems currently exist that permit potential crises to be detected before they

⁴ "Humanitarian action" is understood to mean the group of activities aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering in situations of humanitarian crisis. These activities are guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian action also includes the protection of civilians and the provision of basic aid.

⁵ OCHA. *Humanitarian Appeal 2006. Mid-year review*, 20 July 2006.

[http://ochadms.unog.ch/quickplace/cap/main.nsf/h_Index/MYR_2006_Humanitarian_Appeal/\\$FILE/MYR_2006_Humanitarian_Appeal_SCREEN.pdf?OpenElement](http://ochadms.unog.ch/quickplace/cap/main.nsf/h_Index/MYR_2006_Humanitarian_Appeal/$FILE/MYR_2006_Humanitarian_Appeal_SCREEN.pdf?OpenElement)



actually occur. Nevertheless, certain crises (like the one in the Sahel, for example) have once again happened with the same severity as in previous years, in spite of the fact that the United Nations and several NGOs had said in advance that it could happen again. Once again, the response will be sending food and necessary materials as part of an emergency programme while the root causes will remain unchanged. According to a report by Oxfam International, **humanitarian aid is still used as a palliative measure which furthermore increases the cost of the action taken**, since it usually involves buying up agricultural surpluses in western countries instead of attempting to create indigenous agricultural programmes and develop local businesses, moves which would reduce operational costs by up to 50% according to the NGO's own figures⁶.

If emergency programmes were instead **directed towards the resolution of the actual structural causes** and not solely to repairing their effects, the chronic effects of many humanitarian crises could be avoided, and this would furthermore contribute to the development of a society with wider abilities and offer increased support for peace-building in many countries immersed in conflict.

b) Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

The flow of promised funds slowed down considerably over the course of the third quarter of the year. In spite of the fact that nine more countries offered funds for the CERF (there are now 52 donor countries in all), bringing the total amount collected by the CERF to 273 million dollars, this was only 10 million more than had been collected up to June of this year.

In August, OCHA made a second round of fund allocations, paying out a total of 43 million dollars to emergency situations via the CERF. These payments are aimed at countries suffering from a shortfall in their humanitarian budgets, and the beneficiaries on this occasion were **Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Congo, Liberia and the Central African Republic**. The sectors that are suffering most from a lack of funding in these countries are water and sanitation, health and security. Other countries that also received donations included Zimbabwe, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali and Eritrea. The Central Emergency Response Fund was created with the aim of offering a rapid response to situations of crisis caused by armed conflicts and natural disasters. It is also intended to provide a balance between the forgotten crises around the world and those which, for one reason or another, have received much greater funding.

c) The response from donors over the last three months

The following table shows **donor trends on a quarterly basis** both as regards overall humanitarian aid and in relation to the United Nations Humanitarian Appeals process.

Lebanon and Timor-Leste were the two countries that received the highest proportion of funding during the last quarter, occupying the top two places in the table with almost all their appeal budget covered. This also meant that the **economic and infrastructure rehabilitation sector has become one of the most heavily funded within the United Nations**. Elsewhere, West Africa continues to receive an important amount of funding to be used for programmes to aid the return of refugees in countries in the Manu River Region and to assist the humanitarian crisis in the Sahel.

As regards the bodies that actually receive these funds, particular mention should be made of the common fund formed from a percentage of the donations made by various countries in previous financial years and assigned to a number of programmes that are not individually specified. Nevertheless, the WFP remains the body that receives most funds, which in turn is responsible for food being the sector to which the greatest proportion of the total amount of funding is assigned.

Table 5.1 - Response from donors during the last three months

	Main Humanitarian Appeals ¹	Main bodies receiving aid ²	Main sectors receiving aid ³	Main donors ⁴	TOTAL ⁵

⁶ Oxfam International, *Causing Hunger: An overview of the food crisis in Africa*, July 2006. http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/bp91_africa_food_crisis.pdf/download



<p>Aid provided via the United Nations⁶</p>	<p>1.- Lebanon (97%) 2.- Timor-Leste (95%) 3.- Nepal (74%) 4.- Uganda (72%) 5.- West Africa (70%)</p>	<p>1.- WFP 2.- UNHCR 3.- UNICEF 4.- UNRWA 5.- Common Fund</p>	<p>1.- Food 2.- Coordination 3.- Multi-sector 4.- Economic rehabilitation and infrastructure 5.- Not specified</p>	<p>1.- USA (28.9%) 2.- Combined (13.4%)* 3.- United Kingdom (10.4%) 4.- ECHO (8.1%) 5.- UN* (7.1%)</p>	<p>2,472 million dollars</p>
<p>Overall Humanitarian Aid⁷</p>		<p>1.- WFP 2.- UNHCR 3.- UNICEF 4.- ICRC 5.- UNRWA</p>	<p>1.- Food 2.- Multi-sector 3.- Not specified 4.- Health 5.- Coordination</p>	<p>1.- USA (26.7%) 2.- United Kingdom (8%) 3.- ECHO (7.4%) 4.- Non-specified donor transfers (7.2%) 5.- Sweden (6%)</p>	<p>5,229 million dollars</p>

1 Made every year by the United Nations. The percentage shows the ones that have so far attracted the most financing from the international community, regardless of the amount requested.
 2 United Nations agencies or NGOs that have so far attracted the majority of aid.
 3 Main sectors in which agencies or NGOs have decided to focus aid.
 4 Donors who have provided the largest amount of aid, regardless of their GDP.
 5 Total amount provided for humanitarian crises up to 20 September 2006.
 6 Multilateral humanitarian aid.
 7 Humanitarian aid provided outside the United Nations framework.
 * Funds for non-specified programmes

Source: Reliefweb, www.reliefweb.int/fts

As far as individual donors are concerned, the USA was still the country that gave the largest proportion of all funding, though its total donations fell during the quarter by 4% in respect of the figure for June, while total donations from the United Kingdom rose by 2% for the same period. **The European agency ECHO continued to increase in importance** and is now the number three donor worldwide, as a result of its increased donations to crises such as those in Lebanon and Timor Leste, as well as its commitment to the refugee resettlement programmes in West Africa.

Disarmament

- The UN Security Council proposed reducing the arms embargo in Somalia while extending the sanction imposed on DR Congo for one more year.
- The Review Conference for the Programme of Action to Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms ended without reaching consensus on any kind of agreed text.
- Approximately 800,000 small arms are manufactured around the world every year, and half the victims of this kind of weapon, about 100,000 a year, are men aged between 15 and 29, according to the Small Arms Survey Yearbook.
- The DDR programmes in Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo and Uganda were suspended, while the process was completed in Afghanistan.

This chapter contains an analysis of issues relating to disarmament, as seen from the perspective of militarization. On the subject of disarmament, it includes a study of the way in which **small arms have proliferated** over the last quarter, with particular emphasis on the international initiatives implemented within the framework of the United Nations and the more important events that have occurred in the different regional contexts. Special emphasis is also placed on the different aspects of **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)** programs, both from the point of view of international initiatives and in terms of the progress made in the individual contexts in which programmes of this type are being pursued.

6.1. Proliferation of small arms

The first part of this chapter is divided into three sub-sections. The first focuses on the issues relating to small arms that have been discussed at the **United Nations** over the last three months, the second deals with the **most important initiatives implemented at an international level** in respect of studies and projects completed outside the United Nations structure, while the third deals with the **most notable events of the last quarter**, i.e. the way in which contexts affected by small arms issues have evolved.

a) The United Nations

The **United Nations** announced its intention to review the arms embargo imposed on **Somalia** in 1992, with the aim of allowing the transitional federal authorities to develop the country's security sector. However, the leader of the Council of Islamic Courts, S. Aweys, viewed the lifting of sanctions as a mistake that would only lead to more violence in the country. Elsewhere, the Security Council decided to extend the embargo imposed on **DR Congo** for one more year (until 31 July 2007), along with the mandate of the group of experts charged with monitoring the embargo¹. Finally, the mandate of the group of experts monitoring the embargo imposed on **Côte d'Ivoire** was also extended until 15 December of this year².

Another event of note during this last quarter was the **Review Conference for the Programme of Action to Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms**, which **ended** at the beginning of July **without any kind of agreement on a common text**. Surprisingly, **Conference President P. Kariyawasam** from Sri Lanka said that the event had been a success in that it had awakened great hopes among the international community. Nevertheless, the **UN Secretary General** said that he was extremely disappointed at the lack of progress in the fight against the illegal trade in small arms. For its part, the **NGO network IANSA** suggested that the lack of consensus was due to **the intransigence of a small group of countries in respect of certain key issues**. Among the areas in which no agreement was reached, IANSA pointed particularly to the issue of international standards on arms transfers (blocked by **Cuba, India, Iran, Israel and Pakistan**); the strengthening of national legislation (obstructed by the **USA**, at the behest of the lobby calling for the unrestricted acquisition of weapons); the relationship between the impact of small arms and development (USA); assistance for the survivors of armed violence; the

¹ See the full text of the resolution at:
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/84/PDF/N0645084.pdf?OpenElement>

² See the full text of the resolution at:
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/522/75/PDF/N0652275.pdf?OpenElement>

establishment of general principles with a view to achieving an International Arms Trade Treaty (**Egypt** and **Venezuela**); and the creation of global review mechanisms to discuss the Programme of Action (USA).

The lack of consensus could also be explained by other reasons, starting with the weak stance taken by the **President of the Conference**. In addition, **negotiations** on the Programme of Action **did not begin** until the seventh of the nine days for which the Conference lasted, **debate progressed extremely slowly** (amendments on this lengthy text were put forward individually by each country and discussions took a markedly political line), **the few articles on which universal consensus had been reached (13) were disregarded**, and a **proposed declaration** was put forward at the last minute on issues that had not previously been discussed, being offered finally as a presidential declaration.

An additional problem was the **passive approach taken by many world powers**. The fact that the countries of the **EU** did not bring sufficient pressure to bear in order to persuade the minority meant that other important coalitions, such as the **MERCOSUR** countries also refused to act. Meanwhile, other large powers like **China** and **Russia** remained in the background while negotiations took place. In short, the **low degree of consensus** between states and the obstacles that we have already mentioned led to a decision not to approve any document before a minimum agreement had been reached, as had already been suggested during the biennial meetings of 2003 and 2005 and the Preparatory Conference held in January 2006³.

However, the prospects should not be entirely seen as negative. At the end of July, a **coalition formed by seven countries** set out a **proposed resolution for the implementation of an International Arms Trade Treaty**⁴, which set out the common standards to be respected in conventional arms transfers. This proposed resolution, which will be presented to the **UN Assembly General's First Committee** during October, suggests that the United Nations Charter be respected, along with the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. However, the text does not make any reference to respect for human rights. In addition, in the absence of sound review mechanisms within the framework of the United Nations, the **Canadian** delegation suggested the possibility of organising informal meetings from Spring 2007 with countries that support the review and wish to see progress in the Programme of Action. It is initiatives such as this one and the possibility of implementing national and/or regional Action Programmes which deserve to be used as points of reference⁵. Debate from this point must focus on **whether agreements should be reached universally or just made by the countries that are truly committed** to making advances in controlling the trade in small arms.

Finally, the United Nations **Sub-Committee for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights** approved a **resolution**⁶ **calling on governments to adopt measures on the manufacture, possession, transfer and use of small arms** that complies with the principles of international law. It also backed a set of principles aimed at preventing human rights violations caused by the use of small arms. Some key points include:

- Implementing regulations on the **use of firearms** by the police and other state agencies.
- Training **police forces** in areas that include **responsibility for the protection of human rights**.
- Restricting the **lethal use** of firearms by state officers to situations in which this is strictly necessary in order to protect lives.
- Requiring **specific licences** for the possession of firearms by civilians, taking account of factors such as criminal records and domestic violence.
- Prohibiting **international transfers** when it is probable that small arms will be used in serious human rights violations.

³ Berkhol, I, Gramizzi, C.: *La Conférence d'évaluation du Programme d'action des Nations Unies sur les armes légères (26 juin – 7 juillet 2006) : Un non-résultat logique*, GRIP, July 2006, at: <http://www.grip.org/bdg/4604.html>

⁴ These seven countries are Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the United Kingdom.

⁵ Berkhol, I, Gramizzi, C. *op. cit.*

⁶ See the resolution at: http://www.iansa.org/issues/documents/hr_salw_resn_2006.pdf

b) International initiatives

The members of the **“Control Arms”** campaign issued three new reports to mark the opening of the United Nations Review Conference. One pointed to the fact that the AK-47 rifle is the weapon that has been most widely used during the last 20 years⁷. The second reviewed the **five years since the United Nations Programme of Action had been implemented**⁸. This report underlined the fact that **less than half of member states have mechanisms to coordinate action against small arms**⁹, only 37 involve civilian groups in such actions, 68 have reviewed their legislation since the implementation of the Programme of Action, and 37 have specific controls in arms dealing. Among its **main recommendations**, the report calls for agreement on global standards for international transfers. It also proposes that special attention be paid to the link between small arms and development and that activities aimed at preventing armed violence be included as an integral part of poverty reduction programmes. Finally, it calls for increased cooperation and financial assistance between the various initiatives that already exist.

The third and last report warns that the **globalisation of the arms industry** is taking advantage of significant **loopholes in current regulations** on arms exports, allowing weapons to be sold to parties that are **responsible for human rights abuses** and countries on which arms embargoes have been imposed¹⁰. 13 September was also named as a **Global Day of Action for an Arms Trade Treaty**, with activities in more than 30 countries around the world.

For its part, **Small Arms Survey** took the opportunity to publish its **yearbook** including new information on this type of weapon, tackling aspects such as the demand for weapons and security sector reform, among other issues. Among the more important points made by this report are the fact that around **800,000 small arms** are manufactured every year throughout the world, and **half the annual toll of victims of these weapons** (around 100,000) **are men aged between 15 and 29**. It should be particularly noted that **firearms are used in 80% of the homicides recorded in Colombia**. Finally, among its **main recommendations**, the Small Arms Survey indicates the need to reduce access by young people to small arms by combating the social links between weapons, violence, power and masculinity, the introduction of programmes aimed at removing firearms from circulation and the adoption of an approach based on demand and the design, implementation, supervision and evaluation of initiatives to reduce the use of small arms¹¹.

Along with its usual yearbook, **Small Arms Survey** published another report on **ammunition**¹². This reported that the controls relating to the **production, transfer and storage** of this auxiliary element to small arms are extremely lax, leading to a high risk of insecurity and violence among civilian populations. The reason for this absence of proper controls can be traced to the **low priority given to munitions on the international agenda**, in spite of their central role in encouraging conflict and crime, an area in which the international community needs to take fundamental measures. Some of the **more important points** made by the report include the fact that **66 countries have the potential to manufacture munitions**, with 23 of them able to manufacture ammunition of the most sophisticated kind¹³. The transfer of munitions between 1999 and 2003 came to a total of 700 million dollars, and illegal transfers were further encouraged by the legal loopholes that exist in many domestic regulations.

One of the important points made in the yearbook is its **evaluation and comparison of the registers of conventional arms exports** from the main exporting countries. This is shown in the following table, in which points are awarded to various aspects of arms exporting activities. The maximum score is 25, with points awarded for access to information and frequency of this

⁷ Control Arms: *The AK-47: the world's favourite killing machine*, June 2006, at: http://www.controlarms.org/find_out_more/reports/AK_47.pdf

⁸ Biting the Bullet: *Reviewing the Action on Small Arms 2006. Assessing the First Five Years of the UN Programme of Action*, June 2006, at: <http://www.iansa.org/un/review2006/redbook2006/Red-Book-2006.pdf>

⁹ Kytömaki, E.; Yankey-Wayne, V.: *Five Years of Implementing the UN Programme of Action on SALW: Regional Analysis of National Reports*, UNIDIR, June 2006. The data indicates an increasing awareness of the problems of the illegal trafficking of small arms, though levels of implementation from region to region are still uneven.

¹⁰ Control Arms: *Arms Without Borders*, September 2006, at: http://www.controlarms.org/documents/Arms%20Without%20Borders_Final_21Sept06.pdf

¹¹ See the chapter on disarmament in Barometer 10.

¹² Available in electronic format at www.smallarmssurvey.org

¹³ Munitions used in hand-held aerial defence systems (MANPADS) and guided anti-tank weapons.

access, clarity, extent, handover information and the number of licences both granted and refused.

Table 6.1. Barometer of transparency in the Arms Trade								
Country	Total points	Frequency	Access	Clarity	Extent	Handover information	Licences granted	Licences refused
USA	20.5	2	2	3.5	5	4	4	0
Germany	19	1	2	3.5	6	2	4	0.5
Italy	17	2	2	3	5	3	2	0
Canada	16.5	0.5	2	4	6	4	0	0
France	16.5	1	2	3.5	6	4	0	0
Czech Rep.	16	1	2	3	5	3	2	0
Spain	16	1	2	3.5	6	2.5	1	0
Finland	16	1	2	3	6	2	2	0
United Kingdom	15	2	2	3	6	2	0	0
Norway	15	2	2	3	6	2	0	0
Sweden	15	2	2	3	6	2	0	0
Switzerland	14	1.5	2	3	5	2	0	0.5
Portugal	11	0.5	2	2.5	4	2	0	0
Japan	11	0	1.5	2.5	5	2	0	0
China	10.5	0	1.5	2.5	2.5	4	0	0
Turkey	10.5	0	1.5	2.5	4.5	2	0	0
Korea, Rep.	10	0	1.5	2.5	4	2	0	0
Brazil	10	0	1.5	2	4	2	0	0
Austria	9.5	0	1.5	2.5	3.5	2	0	0
Belgium	9	0	1.5	2.5	3	2	0	0
Russian Federation	7.5	0	1.5	2.5	1.5	2	0	0
Romania	4.5	0.5	0.5	1.5	1	1	0	0
South Africa	1.5	0.5	1	0	0	2	0	0
Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Total points (maximum 25 points): Updates refer to information obtained up to 31 January 2006
Frequency (maximum 2 points): during the last 2 years (0.5 points), frequent information (1 point: 0.5 for the following six months, 0.5 for the following 12 months)
Access (maximum 2 points): available on the Internet (0.5 points), available in a UN language (1 point) and free (0.5 points)
Clarity (maximum 5 points): source of information (1 point), small arms differentiated from other weapons (1 point), small arms munitions differentiated from other munitions (1 point), detailed description of weapons (1 point), information on end-user categories (military, police, etc., 1 point).
Extent (maximum 6 points): governmental and industrial transactions (1 point), military and civilian small arms (2 points), small arms parts (1 point), ammunition (1 point), export laws and regulations and international undertakings (1 point).
Handover information (maximum 4 points): types of weapon (1 point), quality of weapons (1 point), weapon type and country of origin (1 point) and number of weapons collected (1 point).
Licences granted (maximum 4 points): types of weapon (1 point), number of licensed weapons (1 point), weapon type and country of origin (1 point) number of licensed weapons (1 point).
Licences refused (maximum 2 points): types of weapon (0.5 points), number of weapons (0.5 points) weapon type and country of origin (0.5 points) and number of weapons for which licences were refused (0.5 points).

In **Africa**, the police in **Angola** announced that they had collected more than 75,000 small arms and 3,000 mines from the civilian population during the month of July. Nevertheless, the number of weapons currently in the hands of civilians remains one of the country's main problems. **Kenya** launched its National Arms Control Programme with a broad range of working areas: the establishment of a national implementation structure, a review of related legislation, the collection and storage of weapons, initiatives aimed at reducing demand, cross-border cooperation and training for the country's security forces. Finally, the police in **Tanzania** began a process to register all weapons held by civilians.

Turning to the continent of **America**, a report by the Children's Defence Fund organisation revealed that the number of children under the age of 20 who were killed by firearms in the **USA** during 2003 was higher than the number of soldiers who had died in **Iraq** during the last three years¹⁴. In **EI Salvador**, the main political parties signed new legislation on firearms that reduced the minimum age required to possess firearms for former members of the security forces, a move that could lead to the validation of licences that have expired. Estimates suggest that there are more than 100,000 unregistered weapons around the country. Finally, the

¹⁴ Children's Defence Fund: *Protect Children Not Guns*, July 2006, at http://cdf.convio.net/site/DocServer/gunrpt_revised06.pdf?docID=1761

government of **Argentina** announced that it was introducing a **monitoring programme to end the illegal trade in small arms**. The main measures to be implemented include the transfer of the National Arms Register to the Interior Ministry, the establishment of a Consultative Council with the involvement of civilian groups and a campaign for the voluntary handover and destruction of small arms.

On the **continent of Asia**, the Ministry of Public Security in **China** announced that the police had closed down 113 illegal weapons factories during the last three months, destroying around 2,500 tonnes of explosives and 117,000 weapons.

In **Europe**, the Arms Task Force in the **United Kingdom** praised the government committee's initiative on the **strengthening of the law on British arms exports**, though it voiced its concerns at the continuing **transfers of arms to countries guilty of human rights violations and regions currently in conflict or suffering from instability**, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. A similar observation could be made regarding the export of weapons by **Spain** during 2005. According to information contained in a government report, weapons were sold to countries currently engaged in conflict, such as Colombia, Israel and the USA. It should also be remembered that the Spanish government undertook to introduce an **Arms Trade Law** at the end of this year that would guarantee greater control and transparency in the export of military, police and security material¹⁵.

Finally, in the **Middle East**, the NGO **Human Rights Watch** (HRW) reported that **Israel** had used cluster bombs in its attacks on civilian areas of **Lebanon**, saying that these weapons could not be used in any area in which civilians might be found due to the inaccuracy of their targeting. **Amnesty International** also called for an immediate arms embargo on **Israel** and the Lebanese **Hezbollah** group, protesting about the fact that arms transfers from the USA were continuing in spite of Israel's armed intervention in the south of Lebanon¹⁶.

6.2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

The following section is subdivided into segments dealing with the main international initiatives and the most important events of the last three months as regards issues relating to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.

a) The most important events of the last three months

The following table shows **how the main countries in which DDR programmes are currently being implemented** have evolved over the last three months:

Table 6.1. Countries that have been the subject of international attention in relation to DDR	
AFRICA	
Country	Remarks
Angola	The Government announced that it was spending 28 million dollars on social reintegration projects for 80,000 former soldiers and their families, including agricultural projects, micro-credits and training programmes. The government also announced that the demobilisation process had reached around 228,000 former combatants . IRSEM Director J. Costa announced that significant progress had been made in the reintegration of former members of UNITA, which had extended to more than 68,000 combatants and their families.
Burundi	ONUB joined forces with the government to destroy 1,958 weapons and 22,544 rounds of ammunition of various calibres as part of the DDR programme. The DDR team's spokesperson, Colonel A. Nzabampema, announced that around 1,907 soldiers and former combatants would be demobilised by the end of September.
Congo, DR	Around 4,000 combatants in the Ituri district handed over 2,100 weapons during July. CONADER subsequently announced the suspension of its disarmament and demobilisation programme due to a lack of funds and closed all its information centres. MONUC , the EU and the CIAT expressed their concern over the growing number of

¹⁵ For more information, go to http://www.controlarms.org/es/ultimas_noticias/pr080306.htm

¹⁶ See the chapter on armed conflicts.



	<p>weapons in Kinshasa and the effect that this could have on the second round of elections, requesting that the process for the demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers be speeded up as a potential way of encouraging the disarmament of the civilian population.</p>
Congo, Rep.	<p>The High Commission for Reintegration set out plans for around 30,000 former combatants to take part in DDR programmes. The Commission collected and destroyed 11,776 weapons and reintegrated 17,459 former combatants from the various militias that had operated in the country. The new DDR programme will benefit from around 25 million dollars from the World Bank and the EU over the remainder of the year. For its part, the Congolese government has also contributed 4.5 million dollars to the programme.</p>
Côte d'Ivoire	<p>The bases for agreement between the UN Secretary General, the Government and the <i>Forces Nouvelles</i> centred around the beginning of the disarmament of the militias from the end of July. However, the process had to be suspended at the beginning of August due to the small proportion of weapons collected in comparison with the number of combatants who had been demobilised. At the same time, the <i>Forces Nouvelles</i> armed coalition opposition force announced that it was withdrawing from disarmament negotiations in protest against the change in the rules governing voter identification and registration.</p>
Liberia	<p>The government retook control of the Guthrie rubber plantation, which had been under the control of 500 former members of the LURD for the previous three years. A period of training also began for the country's new armed forces, with the eventual aim of preparing them to take over from UNMIL. This was also helped by the partial lifting of the arms embargo, which allowed weapons to be supplied to the new security forces.</p>
CAR	<p>The process for the demobilisation of the last 2,050 former combatants was introduced. The DDR programme originally began in 2003, and it is calculated that around 5,515 former combatants have signed up for the process.</p>
Somalia	<p>The UNDP announced the introduction of settlement projects in the Bay region, an area in the south of the country that has been inaccessible since 2002 due to high levels of insecurity. These projects involve aid being brought to 3,000 militia members who will be housed in settlement camps for six months and provided with social assistance, healthcare, food and education, as well as being registered for a subsequent DDR process. The process has been allocated a budget of seven million dollars and is financed by the United Kingdom.</p>
Sudan	<p>The DDR Commission in the north of the country and the Council of Shara Arab Tribes reached agreement over a Memorandum of Understanding relating to the handover of weapons in the region. Elsewhere, 242 child soldiers belonging to the SPLM/A armed opposition coalition joined the DDR programme at a ceremony held in Warab State. The SPLA had begun a disarmament campaign in the region which the local population felt was being forced on them, leading to further confrontations. The deployment of UNMIS in the region led to the communities feeling safer, and they agreed to hand over their weapons in a joint move in order to support new attempts at peace.</p>
Uganda	<p>The UNDP announced the suspension of its disarmament operations in the Karamoja region due to the investigations being carried out by the government into accusations of abuses during these operations. The Minister of State for Defence, R. Nankabirwa, announced that if these accusations were verified and the aggressors identified they would be placed on trial.</p>

AMERICA	
Country	Remarks
Colombia	The country's police force published its first report on the monitoring of demobilised paramilitary and guerrilla fighters since 2003, estimating them to number around 41,000. Of these it is estimated that some 7,000 have permanent jobs and around 20,000 have entered some kind of educational programme. However, the main worry is the course chosen by hundreds of these former combatants, who have formed themselves into armed gangs and become involved in drug-trafficking, smuggling and extortion. The NGO Human Rights Watch said that the Colombian government could legitimise the demobilisation of paramilitary groups and dismantle their criminal and financial networks if it implemented the recent decision by the Constitutional Court . This decision offers demobilised paramilitary members reduced sentences if they admit their crimes and make reparation to the victims.
Haiti	President R. Préval said that his government was willing to discuss disarmament conditions with the different armed groups during the course of the visit to the country by the UN Secretary General. In response to this announcement, several armed groups called on the government to offer certain guarantees before going ahead with the disarmament process. In spite of these conciliatory messages, R. Préval called for the use of violence against any person found in possession of an illegal weapon who would not sign up to the DDR process. The government , the PNH , MINUSTAH and those responsible for the DDR programme introduced a voluntary disarmament process at the beginning of September, aimed at reducing violence in the country. The aim is to collect between 10 and 25% of the more than 200,000 weapons in circulation in the country and achieve the social rehabilitation of around one thousand young people.
ASIA	
Country	Remarks
Afghanistan	The ANBP announced completion of the DDR programme within the planned timetable without any additional cost. The main problems encountered included the poor relations between former commanders and their soldiers , a situation which has represented a serious threat to security. The programme also paid attention to more vulnerable groups such as women and children. In spite of everything, the ANBP and the PNUD made an undertaking, with the Afghan Government's consent, to remain until December 2007 in order to continue monitoring the Reintegration Support Projects. The process for the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) continued in Takhar province with the destruction of more than 200,000 mines , at a total cost of 16 million dollars.
Nepal	Prime Minister G. Prasad announced that the most important issue in the government's talks with Maoist guerrillas was the handling of the armed opposition coalition's weapons, which must be resolved at all costs. For his part, the leader of the CPN Maoist armed opposition group , Prachanda, announced that he would not confine his members to settlement camps or begin disarming until agreement was reached with the government over key political issues. Elsewhere, the Nepalese Friendship for Peace organisation and the British body International Alert arranged a national seminar on the disarmament process in the country.

b) Reintegration models in DDR programmes

It is accepted that the reintegration phase is one of the most complex parts of any **DDR Programme**. While the disarmament and demobilisation phases involve particular actions that take place over shorter and more transitional time periods, there is much debate as to whether reintegration represents the consolidation of this transition or whether it should be further extended to the development and rebuilding of society in a post-war context. Where **reintegration** is regarded merely as the transition from military to civilian life, a strategy of **short-term stabilisation** is adopted, ensuring that combatants do not resort to crime while a peace-keeping mission is being deployed and political or security sector reform is taking place. In such cases, *rapid* support is given for the transitional process, offering resettlement and the creation of opportunities to generate *short-term* income for all combatants who might otherwise contribute to a situation of insecurity. This approach can be applied in contexts in which it is assumed that former combatants will reintegrate via their own networks, or where there are resources for reintegration (social capital, access to land) and/or the people being reintegrated do not represent any threat to peace. However, these conditions are almost never found in a post-conflict context.

However, **the most widespread approach to reintegration** is not based on a transitional security strategy but instead takes the form of a **long-term commitment to transformation**

and growth¹⁷. This phase is fundamental in guaranteeing a country's reconstruction following conflict, and it is for this reason that elements of **reconciliation, recovery and development** must all be combined. For this to happen it is essential that former combatants are accepted by the communities in which they settle, and community reintegration formulas may therefore represent the best solution. When taking this approach, reintegration may centre on either the former combatants or the community in which they are to settle or both.

Reintegration that focuses on individual former combatants is characterised by the need to develop individual solutions for long-term reintegration. This approach is particularly suitable when former combatants are seen as a continued threat to security in the long term and their sustainable reintegration is therefore crucial if security is to improve and peace is to be consolidated. This kind of reintegration follows more classical DDR programme models as it is preceded by individual-based disarmament and demobilisation phases and takes a variety of forms: access to land, working in the public sector, vocational training, formal education and micro-credits, among other measures¹⁸.

On the other hand, **community-based reintegration** is understood to mean the allocation to *communities* of tools and skills that can be used to support the reintegration of former combatants¹⁹. Disarmament and demobilisation are directly linked to a broader recovery strategy that is based around the community, and former combatants cease to be the specific target of support²⁰. This approach is more suitable in situations in which former combatants do not represent a threat to the security of their communities, or at least, no more of a threat than all the other groups that have been affected by contexts of war, such as armed conflicts fought in a nation's defence or to achieve its liberation. This type of strategy has been adopted more recently and is seen as an alternative or complement to methods that have been put forward in the past²¹.

Graph 6.1. Community-based reintegration in Indonesia

The World Bank's study of the **reintegration requirements in the programme for the Indonesian region of Aceh** identified the community that would be accepting demobilised combatants as being of the highest priority²², in order to ensure benefits for the communities affected by the conflict, prevent tensions and facilitate peace-building efforts and the reduction of inequalities. In general terms, **the level of acceptance of former combatants in the community is very high** (around 90%). The report recommends the **provision of community benefits in the form of public assets**: the rehabilitation of small- and medium-size infrastructure, improvements in public and private development, market relations and credit systems, and the implementation of short-term projects managed by the community itself in regions affected by the conflict. The following diagram shows the interaction between individual and community support programmes, distinguishing between the types of beneficiary and types of goods. These reintegration programmes, which are implemented by the IOM, are still the subject of debate.

¹⁷ International Peace Academy. *Transforming War Economies: Challenges for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Report of the 725th Wilton Park Conference*. IPA, 2003.


¹⁸ United Nations: *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment. Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*. UN, 1999.

¹⁹ Support for reintegration also involves other groups, such as IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups.

²⁰ It may be the case that other specific support services are required, particularly in relation to physical and mental health provision.

²¹ UNDP: *DDR of Ex-Combatants. Practice Note*. UNDP, 2005.

²² World Bank: *GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment. Enhancing Peace through Community-level*. March 2006, at <http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org/>



Source: World Bank: *GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment. Enhancing Peace through Community-level.* March 2006

The **success of reintegration** will depend to a great extent on the support that former combatants receive from their families and communities. Combatants frequently find themselves returning to extremely difficult social contexts where it is highly probable that they will be perceived simply as murderers and an additional burden for the community, instead of people who can offer added value. Activities that are directed particularly towards former combatants without offering any obvious benefit to the rest of the community could endanger the local group environment.

In short, any society that is emerging from a conflict has **little opportunity to generate income and therefore a limited ability to absorb people in its job market**. In such cases, activating the local economy through public works programmes aimed at rebuilding infrastructure damaged during the conflict and thus creating jobs can be a particularly effective measure, both for former combatants themselves and for their families and communities. For this reason it is necessary to **support measures directed towards conflict prevention and resolution and engendering trust between former combatants, communities, local authorities and security forces** in order to create a more secure environment, though issues of transitional justice such as truth, justice and reparation must also be taken into account. The participation of the community itself in community-based DDR activities can also play a key role in the transition period that follows a conflict.

By way of **conclusion** it could be said that the **ambivalence of the international community's commitment to the fight against the illicit trade in small arms** has once again been demonstrated by the lack of progress recorded during the United Nations process for the review of the Programme of Action. This situation should be compared with the enthusiasm shown by a small number of countries for an International Treaty in this area, and the various activities carried out on a more local level. In **DDR** processes, the different problems associated with various programmes (further financing, suspension of the programme or security and justice issues) should not become an obstacle to the search for different kinds of programmes that could contribute to better peace-building, such as reintegration models that are adapted to suit each individual context.



- ❑ International NGOs mainly focused their attention on the situation in Lebanon, Darfur (Sudan) and DR Congo.
- ❑ The AU launched the African Court on Human and People's Rights.
- ❑ There were important regulatory advances in respect of the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
- ❑ The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights held a period of sessions that was marked by uncertainty over its future in the context of the reform of the Human Rights Council.

This chapter includes an analysis of the situation relating to human rights and basic freedoms, based on the monitoring of violations by non-governmental human rights organisations (mainly Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and international and inter-governmental organisations, particularly within Europe and the United Nations. Special attention has been paid during this third quarter to the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which met in Geneva in August.

7.1. Violations of human rights and basic freedoms

The following section includes information on the areas in which the efforts of NGOs have been focused, and an account of the main events and developments reported by international human rights organisations around the world.

a) Events reported by non-governmental organisations

During the last three months, the majority of non-governmental organisations, including Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) placed particular emphasis on the humanitarian crisis unfolding in **Darfur (Sudan)**, the rising tide of human rights violations in **Burundi** (extra-judicial executions, kidnappings and illegal and arbitrary arrests) and the abuses being committed in various parts of **DR Congo**. In its latest report, Amnesty International reiterated its concerns about human rights defenders in the Horn of Africa and eastern parts of the continent, where the lives of those who denounce human rights violations are at risk. On the American continent, both organisations make particular mention of the responsibility of the Colombian government for attacks against human rights activists and the increase for the fourth year running in the number of women murdered in **Guatemala**, due in part to widespread impunity in the country. In Asia they mention the political murders in the **Philippines** and the continued repression of lawyers defending human rights in **China**. In **Nepal**, the National Coalition for Children as Zones of Peace denounced the fact that certain armed groups are still using schools as military camps. Finally, a large number of non-governmental organisations denounced the situation endured by civilians in **Lebanon**, while in relation to the war on terror, AI made particular mention over the course of the last quarter of the case of people accused under anti-terror legislation in **Turkey**. These people are still being subjected to torture and trials without any of the proper guarantees.



Table. 7.1. Main countries accused by NGOs of serious human rights violations over the course of the last three months			
	Country	Main group affected	Current situation
Africa	Darfur (Sudan)	Civilian population	Conflict/humanitarian crisis
	Burundi	Civilian population	Conflict/humanitarian crisis
	D.R. Congo	Civilian population	Conflict/humanitarian crisis
America	Colombia	Defenders of human rights	Conflict/humanitarian crisis
	Guatemala	Women	Tension
Asia	Philippines	Political opposition	Conflict
	China	Defenders of human rights	-
	Nepal	Children	Conflict/humanitarian crisis
Europe and Central Asia	Turkey	Supposed terrorists	Tension
Middle East	Lebanon	Civilian population	Conflict/humanitarian crisis

A particularly significant event during the last quarter was the publication by the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) of a study of the economic, social and cultural causes of violence, which examines the innovative means of torture that are being used. Based on the work carried out by its 280 members over the course of 20 years, the OMCT concludes that for **torture** and other forms of violence to be eradicated, it is essential to provide effective protection for all economic, social and cultural rights.

Finally, a revision of the 2005 annual reports published by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch indicates that **very serious human rights violations** took place during the year in **57 different countries around the world**, including systematic and widespread abuses of the right to life and the safety of the individual as a result of either the actions or omissions of individual states, such as extra-judicial executions, enforced disappearances, deaths in custody, torture, arbitrary detentions and widespread impunity. The reports also state that this type of abuse was also reported in a further 31 countries, along with sporadic violations of civil and political liberties.

b) Events reported by international and inter-governmental organisations

In **Europe**, the Council of Europe expressed deep concern about Poland's proposed reintroduction of the death penalty. The total abolition of the death penalty is one of the Council's central objectives, along with a guarantee that none of the continent's 46 states will make any exception to the total prohibition of torture. In this regard, the Council announced that its experts would be visiting detention centres in Kosovo to check that prisoner conditions were in line with the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment.

In **Africa**, particular mention should be made of the effective introduction by the AU of the African Court on Human and People's Rights, which was formally set up in 1998. Taking the 1982 African Convention on Human and People's Rights as its starting point, the new court will examine cases of human rights violations raised by the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, and will even hear individual cases after the internal appeals process has been exhausted.

With regard to the **United Nations**, one important event was the official visit to the **Horn of Africa** by the organisation's High Commissioner for Human Rights, L. Arbour, during which some of the points highlighted included the failure of the Sudanese authorities (Darfur) to comply with many of its commitments, the need for the international community to pay attention to the current situation in Somalia and the illegal nature of the laws imposed on members of the opposition in Ethiopia. A report by the UN Secretary General on children and the armed conflict in Sudan revealed that all



the armed groups are continuing to abuse the rights of children (violation of human rights include murder, mutilation, forced recruitment, rape and other sexual violence, abduction and denial of access to humanitarian aid).

The UNHCR also paid an official visit to **Guatemala**, where she became a spokesperson for the people's growing frustrations in respect of security, equity and justice, and set out her particular concerns at the delays in providing justice and reparation for the victims of the armed conflict.

During the course of the last quarter L. Arbour also made a statement about the situation in **Nepal**, expressing concern over the increased use of force by members of the security forces during recent demonstrations. The Special Rapporteur on Torture, M. Nowak, reported that Nepal is the only country he has visited to date in which torture is applied systematically. As regards **Sri Lanka**, L. Arbour expressed her concern over the murder of civilians in the country, calling on all parties to take immediate measures to reduce the climate of violence, resume talks and strengthen the measures taken to protect against potential abuses.

Finally, L. Arbour roundly condemned the murder of civilians, including a large number of children, as the result of bombing in **Lebanon** by Israeli armed forces. She called on all sides to respect international law.

Another striking feature of the last three months has been the work done by the special procedures. Following the suicide of three prisoners in **Guantanamo**, the Rapporteur for the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, L. Zerrougui, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, L. Despouy, the Special Rapporteur on torture, M. Nowak, the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of religion and belief, A. Jahangir, and the Special Rapporteur on the right of all people to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, P. Hunt, said that the suicide of these three prisoners was something that ought to have been foreseen, and indicated that this fact underlined the importance of the recommendations contained in the report they had presented during the previous quarter and the need that these recommendations be applied as a matter of urgency. All the experts once again called for the immediate closure of Guantanamo's detention centre.

For his part, the Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial executions, P. Alston, welcomed the announcement by the President of **Sri Lanka** that he would be inviting an international commission to look into the murders, disappearances and kidnappings which this country has recently endured.

There have also been a number of visits by special procedures, including one by the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Y. Ertürk, to **Turkey**, where there has been a very high number of suicides among women as a result, according to the Special Rapporteur, of forced marriages, domestic violence and the denial of reproductive rights.

On the subject of individual issues, the Special Rapporteur for the protection of human rights and basic freedoms in the fight against terrorism, M. Scheinin, made a statement on the forthcoming anti-terrorist law in Jordan and its impact on human rights. He also called on the government of Bahrain to reconsider its new anti-terrorist legislation and expressed his satisfaction at the fact that the white paper adopted by the Israeli Knesset included many of the criticisms raised by various groups, including the civilian population.

Another particularly striking event was the study by the **Human Rights Committee** of the report presented by UNMIK on the human rights situation in **Kosovo** since 1999, which marked the first time that a UN mission had reported to one of the organisation's treaty bodies. In its conclusions, the Commission welcomed the enactment of a Provisional Criminal Code, warning against the lack of independence of the human rights body that examined the complaints presented by UNMIK and expressing concern over the UN mission's lack of cooperation with the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia. The UN Human Rights Committee also published a series of recommendations after examining the report presented by the **USA**, expressing concern over the



practice of detaining people and keeping them in custody in secret locations for long periods of time.

Finally, the **UN Human Rights Council** held an extraordinary session to discuss the worsening of the situation in Lebanon, after which a resolution was passed which firmly condemned Israel's serious human rights violations and called on all sides not to use violence against civilians.

The Human Rights Council: the politicisation of human rights continues

The second extraordinary session of the Human Rights Council held on 11 August illustrated the difficulties involved in overcoming the much-mentioned politicisation of inter-governmental groups dealing with the protection of human rights. The resolution on the human rights situation in Lebanon called on all sides in the conflict to respect international law and refrain from the use of violence against the civilian population. However, it only condemned the excesses and human rights violations committed by Israel. Although all the countries that voted against the resolution (members of the EU, Japan and Canada) criticised the text's lack of balance, the fact that they had already voted against the resolution condemning the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories raises doubts as to their motives at the moment of voting, which would seem to conceal political tendencies rather than involve a proper assessment of the human rights situation. Some states such as Canada announced that the Council should be used for constructive purposes, appealing for objectivity rather than selectivity when considering the issue of human rights. This argument was countered by the African group, represented by Algeria, which said that none of the states that voted against the resolution would in the future be able to justify intervention in any other country. Although it is true that the text of the resolution was not balanced and omits mention of the human rights violations committed by Hezbollah, it is also true that the proportion of these attacks does not bear any comparison, and violations by a state should be subject to a different legal consideration from violations by an armed group. Particular mention should be made of the position taken by Mexico, which argued for voting in favour while also expressing a preference for a more balanced text.

Particularly worrying is the USA's reference to the way in which the Human Rights Council's examination of a situation that is already being examined by the Security Council may slow the process, which it said was potentially counter-productive to the work of the latter.

In short, this session of the Council showed that the criticism of politicisation that hung over the old Commission is going to be a difficult burden for the Council to shake off, since discussions had more to do with political alliances between states than with specific human rights considerations, which ended up being marginalised. A valuable opportunity was also missed to implement the Council's power to promote coordination and incorporate human rights as part of the UN's general activities, including discussion in the Security Council. It remains to be seen how the Council will implement this function and whether individual states will support the positioning of human rights as a fundamental part of all the action taken by the UN, particularly as regards the decisions of the Security Council.

Several special rapporteurs took advantage of **World Press Freedom Day** to underline the vital role played by the press in promoting democracy and human rights. These special experts denounced the high levels of violence directed at the media and said that more cases of violence had been recorded in 2005 than in any other year.

Finally, particular mention should be made of the adoption by the General Assembly of the **International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities**, which is mainly aimed at putting an end to discrimination against people with disabilities. It should also be noted that in an historic vote, which drew a rousing ovation from all those present, the UN Human Rights Council approved the text of the **Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples**, which has been debated for more than 20 years. The draft document will shortly be the subject of a vote by the United Nations General Assembly.



7.2. UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights

The recent disbandment of the old Human Rights Commission and subsequent uncertainty over the future of its subsidiary, the Human Rights Sub-Commission, have led us to devote this complete section to this forum. The section includes a description of the Sub-Commission's duties and working methods, along with the specific characteristics that make it essential for it to continue to be part of the international system for the protection of human rights.

a) Definition, duties and working methods

The Sub-Commission was created by the Human Rights Commission in 1947 and comprises 26 independent experts representing five regional groups. The experts are proposed by individual states and elected by the former Human Rights Commission. However, countries have sometimes put forward government officers, thus endangering the so-called independence of the Sub-Commission. It is for this reason that one of the proposed reforms involves the Commission refusing the candidature of any member of the Sub-Commission who does not clearly match the profile of an independent human rights expert.

What are the duties of the Sub-Commission?

The main duties of the Sub-Commission so far have been to undertake studies of human rights issues, make recommendations on the prevention of discrimination of any kind, protect racial, national, religious and linguistic minorities and perform any other duties entrusted to it by the old Commission. The studies it has undertaken have centred around issues such as the administration of justice, the fight against discrimination and the protection of the human rights of minorities, indigenous people and other vulnerable groups. In recent years, the Sub-Commission has specifically chosen to study issues including terrorism, globalisation, bilateral and multilateral economic agreements, the activities of transnational companies, intellectual property rights and the responsibilities of international members of peace-keeping operations. All the decisions adopted by the Sub-Commission in relation to these issues were forwarded to the Commission which gave its own pronouncement on the matter.

In order to perform its duties the Sub-Commission charges a **number of special rapporteurs and working groups** with carrying out investigations and preparing recommendations on specific human rights issues. Due to their reduced size and the flexibility of their procedures, working groups represent a particularly useful tool for dialogue between governments, UN bodies, inter-governmental organisations and civilian groups. The mandates of the different working groups are briefly described below.

The working group on **minorities**, which monitors compliance with the Declaration on the rights of people belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, makes recommendations in this area and is currently examining issues such as religious intolerance, conflict-prevention and the right of minorities to take part in public and political life, among other topics. The working group on the rights of **indigenous people** is one of the most successful of the Sub-Commission's mechanisms and is one of the United Nations forums that enjoys the greatest level of participation from indigenous peoples. The main issue discussed at its most recent session was the use of indigenous lands by non-indigenous authorities, groups or individuals for military purposes. Other Sub-Commission working groups have been designed to discuss the **administration of justice**, **transnational companies** and the design of principles and directives relating to the promotion and protection of human rights in the fight against **terrorism**.

The Sub-Commission also deals with the issue of **contemporary forms of slavery**, both from the point of view of the implementation of conventions on this subject and as regards the actual prevention of forms of slavery. Contemporary forms of slavery are understood to include sexual and



economic exploitation, forced labour and trafficking of people.

The Social Forum on **economic, social and cultural rights**, known simply as the 'Social Forum', was created in response to concerns about the impact of globalisation on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. This forum is intended to provide room for debate and the development of new ideas, and the central issues this year are the fight to combat poverty and the right of women to participate and play a role in society.

b) Main features

The features that make this body one of the most essential elements in the international system for the protection of human rights spring from its composition and its working methods.

What are the Sub-Commission's main contributions?

The Sub-Commission has contributed to the adoption of International Covenants on Human Rights and is responsible for the legislative initiatives introduced by a number of regulatory instruments, such as the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance and basic principles and directives on the right to remedy and reparation for victims of serious violations of international law and human rights. One of its most recent achievements at a regulatory level was the adoption of the Norms on the Responsibility of Business with regard to Human Rights. However, instead of approving these norms, the Commission appointed a special rapporteur, which was seen by many groups as a demonstration of the lack of political will to acknowledge the responsibility of business corporations by preparing the text of an international convention.

Another interesting feature of the Sub-Commission is the attention it has devoted to economic, social and cultural rights, thus strengthening the unquestionable link between human rights and an analysis of the situation faced by various groups in vulnerable positions. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the selection of new issues to be examined by this think tank is determined not by political interest but by the needs identified in the field of international human rights. Throughout its existence, the Sub-Commission has been plugging the loopholes in international human rights law, identifying aspects that are as yet unregulated and thus contributing to the **development of international human rights law**.

It has also turned its gaze on new agents, particularly those non-state entities whose increasing power and impact in areas affecting human rights issues may have either a positive or negative influence on the enjoyment of such rights, like transnational corporations. Equally important is its role in identifying new groups who find themselves in a situation of vulnerability. In this regard, the Sub-Commission reacted quickly to the need to study the human rights of immigrants in irregular administrative situations.

The Sub-Commission as a model for international regulation

The Sub-Commission sets out one of the characteristics that should be displayed by international legislation in the field of human rights: an international legal system that is in a constant state of alert and looking ahead to new challenges, new agents that may be in a position to commit violations and new groups of people subject to situations of vulnerability. Thanks to the work of the Sub-Commission, the international regulations have remained continually receptive to the demands of civil society, both at a practical and a theoretical level, since one of its main contributions has been to design new regulatory instruments for the protection and defence of human rights.

Finally, it should be emphasised that within the United Nations system the Sub-Commission represents a space in which NGOs enjoy a high level of proactive participation from a more equal position than they are offered by the Council. The close contact between the Sub-Commission and civilian groups has traditionally been very important in this regard. Bodies which are independent of



the protection system tend to be more inclined to seek ways of working closely with NGOs, and for their part, civilian groups have unquestionably shown greater trust when working with bodies with an independent agenda such as this one.

c) The most recent session of the Sub-Commission

The following are some of the more important resolutions adopted this year. In the area of the **administration of justice**, the Sub-Commission reaffirmed the importance of combating impunity, underlining the urgent need to re-establish justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations as well as in contexts in transition, in order to guarantee justice, promote reconciliation and re-establish trust in state institutions. It also requested a new study of human rights and the sovereignty of states, along with a study of transitional justice and investigation mechanisms for truth and reconciliation purposes, placing particular emphasis on South America. Finally, it appointed a special rapporteur to carry out a study of the responsibility of international officers taking part in peace-keeping operations.

As regards **economic, social and cultural rights**, the Sub-Commission urged the Human Rights Council (HRC) to approve its guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights and submit them to the General Assembly. These principles represent the first regulatory moves in the new approach to human rights which is to be implemented as part of cooperation policy and which is currently being introduced in the main by the governments of the Scandinavian countries. In this same connection it also decided to ask the HRC to approve its draft directives for the creation of a **right to water**. It stressed that the right to water was a human right, reaffirming that access to water could not be subject to any kind of restriction and should be regulated and controlled by public authorities. The Sub-Commission also recommended that the Council approve the Norms on the Responsibilities of **Transnational Corporations** and Business Enterprises, and discussed the possibility of establishing a monitoring body. As regards the issue of corruption, the Sub-Commission called on states to establish independent national mechanisms to prevent and combat this problem by applying specific laws to halt the practice, recommending that the HRC submit the questionnaire prepared by the Rapporteur on this issue to both state and civilian organisations.

As regards **discrimination**, the working group on the rights of minorities decided to approve a two-year working plan that would include seminars and themed studies on the rights of minorities, urging the office of the UNHCR and the independent expert on minority issues to persuade both the UN's own agencies and international financial institutions to recognise the importance of including minority issues in their programmes and policies as an instrument that would ensure equal rights.

The working group on **Indigenous Peoples** recommended that the subject of "indigenous issues" be included automatically in the HRC programme, underlining the need for this body to continue its work. It also called on individual states to pay particular attention to the promotion and protection of traditional knowledge and to ensure that consent is given freely, in advance and on the basis of proper information. Finally it agreed that the main topic for next year will be "The impact of private sector initiatives on the rights of indigenous people".

On specific issues like **contemporary forms of slavery**, the Sub-Commission recommended that the Council strengthen the mandate of the working group dealing with this issue and that it create a special rapporteur. As regards systematic rape, sexual slavery and similar practices during armed conflicts, it urged states to set out effective criminal punishments and make those convicted offer compensation, in order to put an end to impunity.

On the subject of **terrorism and human rights**, the working groups charged with examining the issue underlined the importance of respecting humanitarian law and the international rules governing human rights and refugees while pursuing the war on terror.



On the issue of the **protection of civilians during armed conflicts**, the Sub-Commission recommended that States hold meetings of regional experts in order to inform the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention about the lessons learned during recent conflicts, both nationally and internationally, and to suggest ways that gaps in the process can be filled and the protection of civilians monitored. It also asked for the creation of directives based on the experiences of recent investigative commissions and recommended that this issue be followed up by any body that may replace the Sub-Commission.

d) What does the future hold for the Sub-Commission?

Back in 1999, the **Human Rights Commission presented a series of recommendations** aimed at halving both the length of the Sub-Commission's period of sessions, from four weeks to two, and the number of experts, from 26 to 15. It also recommended removing the Sub-Commission's power to approve resolutions on individual countries, and even on issues that referred to specific countries. This was a clear attempt to diminish the Sub-Commission's importance and end the work of a body that has served as a counterbalance to the more politicised efforts of the old Commission¹.

As part of the current reform of the international system for the protection of human rights, the Human Rights Council asked the Sub-Commission to present a report on the way it saw itself being reformed². The Sub-Commission therefore presented a series of recommendations, among which it proposed that it should continue to perform duties relating to the promotion and development of human rights (completing studies) and the protection of human rights (playing some role in the universal periodic review mechanism). It also suggested that it should take the initiative in attending to the concerns of NGOs, governments, national institutions, etc. and retain its working groups. As regards its composition, it proposed maintaining its number of members at 26³.

However, Resolution 60/251, under which the Council was created, consciously omitted any mention of the need for the maintenance of the Sub-Committee when referring to the reform of the bodies answerable to the Commission. There is only a generic formula which sets out that the Council will retain "specialised advice", which in itself does not guarantee the survival of the Sub-Commission.

As regards the future duties of the Sub-Commission, certain states propose that this body should bring its expert knowledge to the universal periodic review mechanism, though very few voices can be heard in the international community advocating that the Sub-Commission should retain its power to create regulatory initiatives. In fact more than a few states would like to see the Sub-Commission disappear altogether⁴.

It remains to be seen whether the Sub-Commission will be allocated powers that will allow it to behave as a mechanism with the capacity to react, or whether it will merely be granted residual powers to protect human rights. The Sub-Commission requires urgent reform in order to maintain its relevance, though this must be of the kind that strengthens its powers and should never be used as an excuse for disbanding it.

¹ Villán Durán C. *Curso de Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos*. Trotta, 2002, Page 169.

² Decision 2006/102 of the Human Rights Council.

³ Document code: A/HRC/Sub.1/58/CRP.13.



Gender issues in peace-building

- ❑ A number of international and local groups have denounced the endemic violence against women in Afghanistan in all its forms.
- ❑ Nepalese women's organisations have called for a greater role in the peace and democratisation process that has begun in the country.
- ❑ A women's alliance including Palestinians, Israelis and representatives from the international community has called for the immediate resumption of peace talks in order to put an end to the violence in the Middle East.
- ❑ Half the world's migrant population are women, according to a report by the United Nations Population Fund.

This section contains an analysis of the different initiatives being pursued by the United Nations and various international organisations and movements in relation to peace-building as seen from a **gender perspective**¹. Viewing events from this perspective provides a picture of the different levels of impact that armed conflicts have on both women and men, the different ways and degrees in which women and men participate in peace-building and the real contribution offered by women in these processes. The section is divided into two main sub-sections: the first contains a review of the different impacts of armed conflicts, while the second analyses different initiatives in peace-building as seen from a gender perspective.

9.1. The gender dimension in the impact of armed conflicts

This section deals with the way in which the gender dimension can be seen in the impact of today's armed conflicts, with particular reference to violence against women.

a) Violence against women

Over the course of the last three months, various organisations operating in **Afghanistan** have published information on the **widespread violence against women** throughout the country. UNIFEM presented its report entitled *Uncounted and Discounted*², based on a three-year study on the impact of violence against women in the country. This study represents an attempt to obtain more detailed information on the nature of the violence affecting Afghan women, with the aim of correcting the design of policies that are supposed to eliminate this kind of violence and improve the services available to women who have survived such treatment. The report also represents a first step in filling the statistical vacuum affecting women³, as demonstrated by the lack of available data, which further impedes the creation of specific policies and the provision of services. The conclusions set out in the study reveal the **endemic proportions that violence against women in the country has reached**, with figures exceeding those seen in the rest of the world in this regard. While overall figures show that one in five women around the world

¹ The gender perspective, according to N. Vázquez, a Mexican feminist and researcher into the impact of war on women, is a *conceptual operational instrument that makes it possible to see what is really happening from a new perspective which transcends the biological explanation of what is different between the sexes, concentrating on the identification of cultural, historical and social factors, among other things, that differentiate men from women and generate conditions and positions of inequality between them, thus allowing us to intervene effectively in order to change these unequal positions*. The definition offered by the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women indicates that *gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with the fact of being a man or a woman, and the relationships between men and women, boys and girls, as well as the relationships among women and relationships among men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and learned during the socialisation process. They are specific to both context and time and can change. Gender determines what is expected, permitted and appreciated in both women and men in a given context [...]*.

² http://afghanistan.unifem.org/PDF_Documents/Uncounted%20Discounted.pdf

³ For more information on the issue of the statistical invisibility of women and the inclusion of the gender perspective in data collection processes, see Barometer 10.



have been the victim of rape or attempted rape, **one in four women in Afghanistan have suffered some form of sexual violence**. Likewise, the proportion of Afghan women who have been subjected to some form of physical violence may be as high as 43%, while the worldwide figure for women who have been beaten, forced to have sexual relations or suffered some other kind of abuse during their lives is 33%.

Finally, the study reveals that **the majority of these incidents of abuse are not reported**, or in the event that they are, the person or persons responsible remain immune and unpunished. Particular mention should also be made of another of the conclusions reached, which points to the fact that although **the majority of these incidents of violence against women are committed within the victims' family environment**, it is state representatives who are in some cases behind the violence. This shows that the Afghan authorities are not just guilty by omission as a result of their failure to protect women, but are in fact directly involved in some ways. This state responsibility therefore represents yet another obstacle to the fight against impunity which, like the violence itself, seems to have acquired endemic proportions.

Elsewhere, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) reported that the **practice of honour killings**, i.e. the murder of women accused of having brought dishonour to their families, **has increased notably during the course of the last year**. The AIHRC reported that so far this year around 200 women have died as a result of honour killings, though this official figure could be much lower than the real number, given that the majority of these murders are not reported. The majority of these women die because they have refused to enter into marriages that have been arranged by their families.

Violence against women

The **Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women**, approved by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 48/104, contains a definition of violence against women which provides a framework for the analysis and creation of policies intended to lead to national and international action to eradicate this kind of violence. Under Article 1 of the Declaration, the term **violence against women is understood to mean any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life**. Article 2 explains that *violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, within the general community and perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs*. Some examples of what currently constitutes violence against women are domestic violence, traditional harmful practices, sexual violence as a weapon of war and the trafficking of women and young girls.

These facts and figures show the seriousness of the situation facing women in Afghanistan, a situation which has hardly changed at all since the fall of the Taliban regime. The persisting levels of violence are a clear indication of the **failures of the international intervention in the country**, given that one of the arguments used to justify this intervention in the first place referred to the serious human rights violations being suffered by women. At the very least, it shows that **improvement of the situation faced by Afghan women did not form one of the priority issues on the international agenda**, since this has barely seen any improvement. It should also be noted that the quarter ended with the murder of S. Annajan, Director of Women's Affairs in Kandahar and defender of the rights of women, who had assisted in the clandestine teaching of women during the Taliban regime. Her murder represents a severe reversal in efforts towards the institutionalisation and formalisation of women's rights.

Elsewhere, denunciations of persisting violence against women have been repeated during the last three months, specifically in respect of sexual violence in **DR Congo**. Evidence of this was given in statements made by UN Emergency Aid Coordinator J. Egeland, who said that sexual violence had become a cancer in Congolese society⁴ and that thousands of women had fallen victim to this form of violence.

⁴ For more information on this issue, see the chapter on Humanitarian Crises.



These two cases provide a clear example of how **violence against women is exacerbated in countries that are in the course of or emerging from an armed conflict** and the difficulties involved in eradicating such violence, particularly in contexts with fragile judicial systems, which in the majority of cases leads to a prevailing atmosphere of impunity which in turn causes the perpetuation of the cycle of violence.

9.2. Peace-building from a gender perspective

This section contains an analysis of the way that both women and men have participated in the different aspects of peace-building, including post-war rehabilitation processes.

a) Peace negotiations

During May 2006, the armed conflict that has affected **Nepal** for the last decade entered a new phase with the introduction of peace talks between the CPN Maoist armed opposition group and the recently created government, formed by people from what until that point had been the democratic opposition parties. After several weeks of intense social protest, the alliance formed by the political parties and the Maoists began a process of dialogue. However, this unexpected coalition between the political opposition and the armed opposition, which succeeded in bringing about the end of a despotic monarchic regime, has followed the usual patterns as regards the inclusion of women and the gender perspective in current peace negotiations: a significant absence of women from the negotiating teams, vague and formal declarations to satisfy the international community and little specific action aimed at improving the lot of women and offering them greater political weight. Many commentators have remarked that **Nepalese women have not received any recognition, in spite of the important role they played during the weeks of protest that led to the fall of the old monarchic regime and their participation in the opposition movement organised in recent years** following the serious reverses in democracy in Nepal and the suspension of the country's parliament.

For this reason, since the government and the Maoists began their peace talks aimed at bringing the armed conflict to an end, **Nepalese women's organisations, working together with representatives from the international community, have called for the opportunity to participate in this peace process**. Once again, Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security has become a point of reference for Nepalese women, who are using this Resolution's recognition of the importance of their participation as the basis for their demands.

The importance of this moment lies not only with the fact that this could mean the end of the armed conflict in Nepal but also with the fact that both political and armed groups have agreed to reshape the regime that has until now been running the country with the preparation of a new Magna Carta. The absence of women from this process could have serious consequences for the future, since the legislation currently in force in the country is highly discriminatory against Nepalese women. However, some of the changes seen recently would seem to indicate that there is a certain amount of room for manoeuvre that could lead to the way being opened towards greater equality, at least at a legislative level. If these improvements are to occur, it is essential that women be allowed to contribute and participate. If they are not, it will be difficult for the gender perspective to be incorporated.

It should be pointed out that when talks on constitutional reform began only one woman had been appointed by the Maoists to the committee charged with engaging in consultations and negotiations with the government, while the government delegation was entirely made up of men, as is the norm in the majority of peace processes and negotiations. However, pressure from women's organisations and the United Nations itself led the government to make an undertaking that two women would be included on the committee. A number of statements in a similar vein were made by different political representatives, underlining the importance of women being offered more opportunity to participate in the political arena. However, words have not yet been converted into deeds, and these statements have not led to the introduction of any practical measures.



The claims of Nepalese women, which have mainly been led by women activists in civilian organisations belonging, for the most part, to groups fighting for the defence of women's rights, have received support from various bodies within the United Nations like UNIFEM.

The challenges facing women peace-builders

The majority of women involved in peace-building in their own individual countries find they have to face similar obstacles and challenges, in spite of the obvious differences between the contexts and armed conflicts from which these processes have sprung. This was recognised in a recent report published by the International Crisis Group⁵, which examined the work done by women in Sudan, DR Congo and Uganda. A better analysis of these common difficulties and challenges could lead to the improved design of policies aimed at supporting peace-building initiatives led by women and alleviate the consequences of armed conflicts. It is worth remembering that UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security⁶ refers to many of the issues mentioned. The main challenges referred to in the International Crisis Group report are as follows:

- **Lack of access to justice:** this means that the majority of crimes against women, particularly those of a sexual nature, go unpunished both while an armed conflict remains ongoing and after it has ended.
- **Lack of access to reproductive health services.**
- **HIV/AIDS:** the growing impact of the pandemic, particularly in areas affected by violence, is having serious consequences on the lives of women, condemning many of them to stigmatisation and marginalisation.
- **Limited information:** in spite of the difficulty that many women experience in obtaining information, some organisations are introducing initiatives to spread their peace work to many countries. The translation of Resolution 1325 into local languages has become one of the more useful tools in this regard.
- **Cross-border issues:** many women find themselves forced to move to neighbouring countries, thus increasing their vulnerability. In addition, regional women's networks are both few and not formally organised.
- **The role of men:** high levels of male violence are undermining many women's efforts. As well as putting a stop to this kind of violence, it is essential that new roles and changes are undertaken after an armed conflict has ended.
- **Small arms:** disarmament and the fight to combat gender violence should be more closely linked. Women should also enjoy greater involvement in DDR processes.

Another notable initiative seen during the last quarter was the meeting of the various high-level delegations that form the International Women's Commission for a Just and Sustainable Israeli-Palestinian Peace (IWC), which is made up of women representatives from Palestine, Israel and the international community and was created as the result of an initiative from the Executive Director of UNIFEM, N. Heyzer, with the aim of ensuring that Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security has an impact on the resolution of the conflict in the Middle East. This meeting represented the crystallisation of a year-long process in which repeated calls have been made for a resumption of talks between all sides, accompanied by a cessation of hostilities. It should be pointed out that Israeli and Palestinian women have been pioneers in the joint work done by women in the search for peace between opposing communities⁷. Thus, the creation of this high-level group, which mainly comprises women from the political and academic spheres, represents the crystallisation of all the efforts invested by pacifist women's organisations in this region over the course of many years.

⁵ International Crisis Group, *Beyond Victimhood Women's Peacebuilding in Sudan, Congo and Uganda*, Africa Report No. 112, 28 June 2006 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4186&l=1>

⁶ For more information on the contents of this Resolution, see School of Peace Culture, *Alert 2005! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building*, pub. Icaria.

⁷ The Women in Black Network, which brings together women from a number of countries in defence of pacifism and against militarism and war has its origins in Israel and Palestine, where women from both communities united to protest against the Israeli invasion of Palestinian territories and the human rights violations committed by the Israeli army. Israeli and Palestinian women also called for a negotiated end to the armed conflict. The work of this network has since been imitated in other situations of armed conflict, with similar movements springing up in places like the Balkans in the 1990s and Colombia.



Principles agreed by the IWC

- The lives of the civilian population cannot be the subject of negotiation.
- Negotiation and mutual agreement represent the only ways of reaching a sustainable solution. Unilateral initiatives undermine the potential for the existence of two states and will never allow peace to be achieved.
- The 2002 initiative by the Arab League provides a suitable framework for the resolution of the conflict between Israel and Palestine and a solution for the entire region.
- There is an urgent need for an international conference that will allow the initiation of permanent negotiations.
- The international community must insist on the complete cessation of hostilities and the protection of the people of both Lebanon and the Occupied Territories, in accordance with the terms of international law.

The cases of both Nepal and the Middle East are a clear example of **two of the trends** that would seem to be **repeated in the majority of peace processes** taking place around the world at the moment. The first is the **systematic marginalisation of women by both governments and armed opposition groups**. It would seem that these parties are only willing to provide women with a space to participate after social pressure has been brought to bear. This means that pressure from women must be constant and repeated, so that the issue can remain both on the political agenda and in the public consciousness. Secondly, **pressure is much more effective when the demands made by women come not only from local women's groups but also from a network of alliances in which other, fundamentally international organisations are involved**, such as the United Nations and even some individual governments. This has occurred in both of the above cases and these alliances have served to raise the visibility of both the demands of Nepalese women and the joint initiative by Israeli and Palestinian women and representatives from the international community.

This is just one of the resulting benefits, since without this collaboration the direct participation of women in other peace negotiations such as Sri Lanka and Burundi would have been much more difficult. Furthermore, thanks to the existence of these alliances, the demands of women receive much more attention and enjoy greater legitimacy among groups that are reluctant to allow women to play a decisive role in the processes underway in each of the different contexts. This was acknowledged by UNIFEM itself in the recommendations that it prepared with a view to persuading the international community to intervene to ensure effective participation by women in peace processes⁸. If the international community perhaps increased the level of pressure on the main parties involved in peace negotiations in a way that did not damage the negotiating process, once these negotiations had been consolidated and passed the point of no return, there could be greater participation by women in these negotiating teams.

9.3. Other items of interest

a) The migration of women

Half the 95 million migrants currently recorded in the world are women. In spite of the fact that migration has traditionally been regarded as a mainly masculine phenomenon, the most recent report on world population by UNFPA, entitled *State of World Population 2006. A Passage to Hope. Women and International Migration*,⁹ reveals the growing feminisation of the phenomenon of migration. This not only involves more women migrating, it also gives rise to a whole series of singular circumstances.

⁸ For more information on these recommendations, see School of Peace Culture, *Alert 2006! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace Building*, published by Icaria, or the document prepared by UNIFEM entitled *Securing the peace. Guiding the International Community towards Women's effective participation throughout Peace Processes*. October 2005, http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/peaceprocess/Securing_the_Peace.pdf

⁹ The complete report can be found at <http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2006/english/introduction.html>



The migration of women results in a **significant contribution to the world economy** in two basic ways. The first relates to the money that they send back to their own countries. Although the total amount of money sent back by women is less than the amount sent by men, women devote a larger proportion of their salaries to the maintenance of their families in their country of origin, and they also spend proportionally higher amounts on both health and education. However, this contribution by women to the social welfare and economic growth of both the communities to which they move in search of better living conditions and the communities from which they originally came is not often acknowledged. This happens particularly because women often work in the informal economy, and although the jobs they do are of fundamental importance they are often not taken into account when the official figures are prepared.

The grant of asylum for reasons of gender

The reasons why people in general and women in particular move from one country to another are currently very varied and not just based on financial considerations. Some women move in order to rejoin their families, or to seek new financial and job opportunities, or to flee from patriarchal societies in which they cannot fully realise their capabilities, or to improve their education. In addition to all these reasons there is another, namely **enforced displacement**, i.e. situations in which women are forced to flee their countries as a result of **armed conflict** or because they have become **victims of persecution by both state and non-state organisations**. In spite of the fact that women represent a very high proportion of the people forced to move to other countries, the international response directed specifically at women has been notable by its absence, and it was only very recently that the UNHCR set out international directives aimed at providing a response to enforced displacement on grounds of gender. It should be mentioned that neither the 1951 Convention on the status of refugees nor the 1967 Protocol acknowledge the fact that there may be specific gender-based motives for fleeing one country and seeking refuge in another. However, the reality is very different, and there are more than just a few examples to illustrate this point. The persecution of women by the Taliban regime and the suppression of Afghan women's rights, the sexual violence during the genocide in Rwanda and the armed conflicts in the Balkans, the practice of arranged marriages, female genital mutilation, etc. are just some of the situations that women have had to face and that have led them to flee their places of origin and seek new opportunities.

In addition, the phenomenon of migration cannot be separated from another very serious phenomenon, namely people trafficking, a practice to which women fall victim in disproportionate numbers. Some international organisations such as the ILO estimate that at least 2.45 million victims of people trafficking are working in exploitative conditions and that this number is increasing by 1.2 million a year. For its part, the US State Department has indicated that between 600,000 and 800,000 people are clandestinely transported across international borders each year, the majority of them for the purposes of exploitation in the sex trade, according to information included in the UNFPA report.



Appendix 1.1. UN Security Council Resolutions		
Country	No	Content
Burundi	S/RES/1692 (2006)	The situation in Burundi
RD Congo	S/RES/1693 (2006)	The situation in Democratic Republic of Congo
Liberia	S/RES/1694 (2006)	The situation in Liberia
UN Security Council	S/RES/1695 (2006)	Letter dated 4 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2006/481)
	S/RES/1696 (2006)	Non-proliferation
Middle East	S/RES/1697 (2006)	The situation in the Middle East
DR Congo	S/RES/1698 (2006)	The situation in Democratic Republic of Congo
Sanctions	S/RES/1699 (2006)	General issues relating to sanctions
Iraq	S/RES/1700 (2006)	The situation in Iraq
Middle East	S/RES/1701 (2006)	The situation in the Middle East
Haiti	S/RES/1702 (2006)	The situation in Haiti
Timor-Leste	S/RES/1703 (2006)	The situation in Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste	S/RES/1704 (2006)	The situation in Timor-Leste
ICT Rwanda	S/RES/1705 (2006)	International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994
Sudan	S/RES/1706 (2006)	Secretary General report about Sudan
Afghanistan	S/RES/1707 (2006)	The situation in Afghanistan
Côte d'Ivoire	S/RES/1708 (2006)	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire
Sudan	S/RES/1709 (2006)	Secretary General reports about Sudan
Eritrea and Ethiopia	S/RES/1710 (2006)	The situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia
RD Congo	S/RES/1711 (2006)	The situation in Democratic Republic of Congo
Liberia	S/RES/1712 (2006)	The situation in Liberia
Sudan	S/RES/1714 (2006)	Secretary General reports about



Appendix 1.2. Reports by the Secretary General to the Security Council

No.	Date	Content
S/2006/430	21/06/06	Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur
S/2006/435	26/06/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia
S/2006/441	27/06/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic
S/2006/478	29/06/06	Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolutions 1653 (2006) and 1663 (2006)
S/2006/487	06/07/06	Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country
S/2006/532	17/07/06	Ninth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
S/2006/580	21/07/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (For the period from 21 January 2006 to 18 July 2006)
S/2006/580	26/07/06	Report of the Secretary-General on justice and reconciliation for Timor-Leste
S/2006/591 S/2006/591/Add.1	28/07/06	A regional-global security partnership: challenges and opportunities
S/2006/592	28/07/06	Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur
S/2006/628	08/08/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
S/2006/662	17/08/06	Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security Council resolution 1690 (2006)
S/2006/670	18/08/06	Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan
S/2006/695	29/08/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) - Lebanon
S/2006/706	01/09/06	Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
S/2006/707	02/09/06	Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004)
S/2006/727	11/09/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
S/2006/728	12/09/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security
S/2006/730	12/09/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
S/2006/743	12/09/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)
S/2006/749	19/09/06	Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia
S/2006/759	21/09/06	Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea
S/2006/764	26/09/06	Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
S/2006/770	27/09/06	Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur
S/2006/771	28/09/06	Report of the Secretary-General on women, peace and security
S/2006/783	29/09/06	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia
S/2006/430	21/06/06	Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in that country



The School of Peace Culture (*Escola de Cultura de Pau*) was formed in 1999, with the aim of organising various academic and research activities relating to peace culture, the prevention and transformation of conflicts, disarmament and the promotion of human rights.

The School is essentially financed by the Government of Catalonia, through its Department for Universities, Research and the Information Society, and through its Foreign Relations Secretariat. It also receives support from other departments of the Catalan Government, as well as from local councils, foundations and other institutions. The School is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Peace and Human Rights Chair at *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*.

The main activities of the School of Peace Culture are as follows:

Teaching
Diploma course in Peace Culture (230-hour post-graduate course with 70 places).
Elective subjects "Peace culture and conflict management" and "Educating for peace and in conflicts".
Programmes
Initiatives for awareness and intervention in conflicts, to facilitate dialogue between the parties involved.
Programme Colombia , dedicated to raising awareness of the peace initiatives in this country.
Educating for Peace Programme. The team that run this programme aim to encourage and develop the knowledge, values and skills needed in order to Educate for Peace.
Human Rights Programme, aimed at encouraging human rights culture through the analysis, promotion and defence of human rights on both a local and an international scale.
Disarmament Programme, which acts as a specialist advisory service for the campaigns carried out by various NGOs for the control of small arms and as an advisory body for international organisations.
Alert Unit Programme on Conflicts, Peace and Human Rights . This programme involves the day-to-day monitoring of the international situation, particularly as regards conflicts and the human rights situation in all countries, the movement of displaced people and refugees, the peace processes currently under way, the different phases of post-war rehabilitation and the dynamics of development, for the purposes of preparing annual, quarterly and weekly reports.
Peace Processes Programme, which monitors and analyses the different countries currently pursuing peace processes or formal negotiations, along with countries in which negotiations are at an exploratory stage.
Post-war Rehabilitation Programme, which monitors and analyses international aid in terms of peace-building in contexts of conflict and post-war environments.



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