escola de cultura de pau

Barometer13

On conflicts, human rights and peace-building

January - March 2007
PROGRAMME ON CONFLICT
AND PEACEBUILDING

ACH: Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
ACP: Asia, Caribbean, Pacific
ADF: Afghanistan Development Forum
AF: Government Armed Forces
AIG: Armed Islamic Group
AMIB: African Mission in Burundi
ANA: Albanian National Army
APHC: All Parties Hurriyat Conference
AU: African Union
AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia)
BICC: Bonn International Centre for Conversion
BONUCA: United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic
BRA: Bougainville Revolutionary Army
CAEMC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CAP: United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process
CARICOM: Caribbean Community
CAR: Central African Republic
CAS: Country Assistance Strategy
CASA: Coordinating Action of Small Arms
CFSP: Common Security and Foreign Policy
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
COAV: Children in Organised Armed Violence
CODHES: *Consultería para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento* (Advisory Council for Human Rights and Displacement)
CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority
CPI: Corruption Perception Index
CPN: Communist Party of Nepal
DAC: Development Assistance Committee
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
Dollars US dollars
DRM: Democratic Republican Movement
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
ECHA: Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ECHO: European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EEBC: Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission
ELN: *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army)
ESCR: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
EUFOR: European Union Forces
EZLN: *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (Zapatista Army of National Liberation)
FAd'H: *Forces Armées d'Haiti* (Haiti Armed Forces)

FAO: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARC: *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FATF: Financial Action Task Force
FDD: *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)
FDLR: *Forces Democratiques de Liberation de Rwanda* Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
FKM: *Front Kedaulatant Maluku* (Moluccan Sovereignty Front)
FLEC: *Frente de Libertaçao do Enclave de Cabinda* (Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front)
FNL: *Forces Nationales de Libération* (National Liberation Force)
GAM: *Gerakin Aceh Merdeka* (Movement for Free Aceh)
GDI: Gender-related Development Index
GPP: *Groupement Patriotique pour la Paix* (Patriotic Grouping for Peace)
GSPC: Salafist Group for Call and Combat
HDI: Human Development Index
HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
IANSA: International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL: International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICC: International Criminal Court
ICO: Islamic Conference Organisation
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IDF: Iraq Development Fund
IDP: Internally Displaced Persons
IEMF: Interim Emergency Multinational Force
IFM: Isatubu Freedom Movement
IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IOM: International Organisation for Migration
IRIN: United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network
IRIS: *Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques* (Institute for International and Strategic Relations)
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
ISDR: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
KANU: Kenya African National Union
LDC: Least Developed Countries
LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE: Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam
LURD: Liberians United for Reunification and Democracy

MAS: Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism)
MDC: Movement for Democratic Change
MDJT: *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad* (Movement for Democracy and Justice in Cahd)
MDF: Meckaunvi Defence Force
MERCOSUR : *Mercado Común del Sur* (Common Latin American Market)
MDG: Millennium Development Goals
MFDC: *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (Casamance Democratic Forces Movement)
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINUCI: United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MJP: *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (Mouvement for Justice and Peace)
MLC: *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (Congo Liberation Movement)
MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front
MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPCI: *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement)
MPIGO: *Mouvement Populaire Ivorien du Grand Ouest* (Ivorian Popular Movement for the Far West)
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSF: *Médecins Sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders)
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Treaty
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDC: National Democratic Congress
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NEPAD: New Economic Partnership for African Development
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation
NLA: National Liberation Army
NLD: National League for Democracy
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
NMRD: National Movement for Reform and Development
NPA: New People's Army
NPP: New Patriotic Party
NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council
NSCN (IM): National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak - Muivah
OAS: Organisation of American States
OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA: Official Development Aid
OECD: Organisation for Economic Trade and Development
ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi
OPM: *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement)
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAC: *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civiles* (Civil Defence Patrols)
PDP: People's Democratic Party
PNA: Palestinian National Authority
PRIO: Peace Research Institute of Oslo
PWG: People's War Group
RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RCD-Goma: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma* (Congolese Rally for Democracy - Goma)
RCD-K-ML: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement pour la Libération* (Congolese Rally for Democracy - Movement of Liberation)
RCD-N: *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National* (Congolese Rally for Democracy - National)
RFTF: Results Focused Transnational Framework
RSM: *Republik Maluku Selatan* (Republic of South Moluccas)
RUF: Revolutionary United Front
SADC: South African Development Community
SFOR: Stabilisation Force
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLA: Sudan Liberation Army
SPLA: Sudanese People's Liberation Army
TNG: Transitional National Government
UAB: *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* (Autonomous University of Barcelona)
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam
UNAIDS: United Nations Programs on HIV/AIDS
UNAMA: United Nations Aid Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMIS: United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone
UNDG: United Nations Development Group
UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNEP: United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UNHCHR: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDIR: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNITA: *União para a Independencia Total de Angola*

UNMA: United Nations Mission in Angola

UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMISET: United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste

UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNMPO: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

UNMOVIC: United Nations Monitoring and Verification of Inspections Commission

UNO: United Nations Organisation

UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

UNOGBIS: United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau

UNOL: United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia

UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

UNOTIL: United Nations Office in Timor-Leste

UNPOS: United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UNPPB: United Nations Political and Peace-Building Mission

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNSCO: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Middle East

UNTOP: United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building

UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

USA: United States of America

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

USCRI: United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants

WB: World Bank

WFP: World Food Programme

WHO: World Health Organisation

WTO: World Trade Organisation

ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front

"**Barometer**" is a quarterly report published in Spanish and English by the Alert Unit at the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona's *School for a Culture of Peace*. The report **analyses the events that have occurred in the world over the course of the previous three months** (**January – March 2007**) under eight main headings: armed conflicts, situations of tension, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, humanitarian crises, disarmament, human rights and gender aspects in peace-building. It serves to update the information contained in the "Alert 2007" annual report and previous issues of "Barometer", using information published fortnightly in "*Semáforo*"[1], an electronic newssheet also published by the Alert Unit.

The following are some of the more important facts contained in this issue of "Barometer" relating to the first quarter of 2007:

Armed conflicts

- The number of armed conflicts increased to 22, due to the deteriorating situation in Myanmar.
- While deployment of a UN peace-keeping mission remained blocked in Darfur (Sudan), the organisation discussed deploying a mission along the country's borders with Chad and Central African Republic to halt the regional spread of the violence.
- The AU began to deploy a mission in Somalia while Mogadishu suffered a further upsurge in violence.
- Violence continued to spiral between the Sinhalese government and Tamil guerrillas in Sri Lanka following the breakdown in the ceasefire during the third quarter of 2006.

Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

- More than a hundred people died in Guinea following a month and a half of protests against President L. Conté's abuse of power.
- The continuing violence in the region of Waziristan underlined the fragility of the agreements reached between local armed militias and the Pakistani government.
- Tensions remained high in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, with a strengthening of the military offensive in the southeast of the country and the arrest of members of the pro-Kurdish political party, the DTP.
- Parliamentary approval for the Yemeni government's suppression of the rebellion in the northern province of Saada resulted in a military offensive that caused thousands of people to be displaced.

Peace processes

- A number of agreements were achieved in Africa. A peace agreement was signed in Côte d'Ivoire that will open the way to the creation of a new transitional government. The government of Chad also reached an agreement with the FUC. Several groups were disarmed in DR Congo, and the government of the Central African Republic reached agreements with the UFDR and the APDR. Several African countries acted as facilitators.
- Armed groups operating in the Sudanese region of Darfur tried to find a unified position for future negotiations.
- The independent Kashmiri groups working together in the APHC coalition are seeking an end to the armed struggle so that a sustainable peace can be achieved.
- The peace agreement with the Maoists in Nepal has highlighted serious tensions among communities in the south of the country. Attempts to resolve them involve the creation of a federal system in the country. Meanwhile, the Philippines government has recognised the right of self-determination for the Bangsamoro people, though as part of an autonomous structure.

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[1] This issue of Barometer includes issues 161-166 of *Semáforo*

Post-war rehabilitation

- The plan proposed for Kosovo by the United Nations Special Envoy was rejected by the delegations from both Pristina and Belgrade.
- The Peace-Building Fund allocated payments to Sierra Leone and Burundi, the two countries that have formed the subject of studies by the Peace-Building Commission.
- The Poverty Reduction Strategy presented by the government of Liberia received support from the international community at a meeting held in Washington.
- The Nepalese parliament modified its interim Constitution to adopt a federal system of government for the country, though it did not specify the exact form that this new system would take.

Humanitarian crises

- Half of all the internally displaced people in the world, 15 million people, can be found in Africa.
- The increasing violence in Chad and the Central African Republic has seriously impeded the work of humanitarian agencies with the rising number of displaced people.
- The intensification of the conflict in Sri Lanka has led to fears that aid services in Batticaloa would break down.
- The lack of agreement on the status of Kosovo continued to impede the return of Serbian refugees.
- In Iraq, the refugee figures originally predicted by UNHCR were vastly exceeded.

Disarmament

- The Control Arms Campaign has begun a People's Consultation to run parallel to the consultation process that the UN Secretary General is carrying out among world states.
- The Oslo Conference, organised by the government of Norway, gained an undertaking from 46 countries to implement an International Ban on Cluster Munitions in 2008.
- The draft arms trading bill in Spain raised criticism from some NGOs that wanted to see greater controls over exports.
- The School for a Culture of Peace presented a comparative analysis of the DDR programmes running in 2006, which involved a total of 1.2 million combatants in 22 countries at a cost of around 2,000 million dollars.

Human rights

- States of emergency were declared in both Guinea and Zimbabwe, with serious consequences for human rights in both cases.
- NGOs called for Guantanamo to be closed and the European Parliament approved a report denouncing the CIA's abuses in Europe in the fight against terrorism.
- The International Criminal Court identified the first two people to be accused of crimes committed in Darfur.
- The International Court of Justice acquitted the state of Serbia of genocide in Bosnia.

Gender and peace-building

- The United Nations introduced its International Women's Day campaign to combat impunity for violence against women.
- A number of United Nations agencies introduced an initiative to bring an end to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and improve assistance for victims.
- The enforced recruitment of children and sexual violence against women was a constant feature in Darfur (Sudan) over the course of the last three months, highlighting the different impact of this armed conflict on women and men.

- Participation by women in the peace process in Aceh, both during the negotiating process and during implementation of the agreement reached, has been very limited according to a report by the Crisis Management Initiative.

Armed conflicts

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> ❑ Violence continued to spiral between the Sinhalese Government and Tamil guerrillas in Sri Lanka following the breakdown in the ceasefire during the third quarter of 2006.

This section contains an analysis of the **22 armed conflicts**[1] that remained active during the first quarter of 2007. The most notable feature of the last three months was the increase in hostilities in 11 contexts, with particularly virulent consequences in **Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Palestine, Sri Lanka and Sudan (Darfur)**. The situation remained at stalemate in a further seven contexts, however, with no great change or perceptible improvement as compared with the previous quarter. Finally, mention should be made of the relative improvement in the situations in the north of **Uganda** and **Kashmir**. The cessation of hostilities between the Government of Uganda and the LRA armed opposition group was respected once it had come into force. At the same time, the cessation of hostilities between the Philippine Government and the MILF armed opposition group remained in place despite several ceasefire violations. However, the continuing breakdown in the ceasefire that was originally agreed in 2002 in Sri Lanka led to a situation of intense violence, while the extension of the armed conflict in Darfur combined with actions by internal rebel groups in Chad and Central African Republic caused a serious upsurge of violence in the latter two countries.

Chart 1.1. Armed conflicts during the first three months of 2007	
Africa	Algeria, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Central African Republic, DR Congo (Kivus and Ituri), Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), Uganda
America	Colombia
Asia	Afghanistan, Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), Philippines (MILF), Philippines (NPA), India (Assam), India (Jammu and Kashmir), Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand
Europe	Russia (Chechnya)
Middle East	Iraq, Israel-Palestine

1.1. Evolution of armed conflicts

Africa

Table 1.1. Evolution of armed conflicts in Africa			
Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	**Armed groups**	**Main causes**	**Evolution 1st quarter 2007**
Algeria (1992-)	Government, GIA, GSPC [2]	Democratic fragility, political exclusion of the Islamist opposition, religious manipulation	Worsening
Central African Republic (2006-)	Government, APRD and UFDR, various militias	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power, influence of the armed conflict in Darfur (Sudan)	Stalemate

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[1] An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving groups of various kinds, such as regular or irregular military forces, guerrillas, armed opposition groups, paramilitary groups or ethnic or religious communities which, using arms and other destructive methods, claims more than 100 victims per year. This figure of 100 deaths is just an indicator, and it should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country.

[2] Following the announcement of the merger between the GSPC and al-Qaeda, this group has become known as the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb.

Chad (2006-)	Government, FUC, SCUD	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power, influence of the armed conflict in Darfur (Sudan)	Worsening
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	Government, *Forces Nouvelles*, pro-Government militias	Marginalisation of some regions, democratic fragility, political exclusion, religious manipulation	Improvement
DR Congo (1998-)	Government, Mai-Mai militias, armed Ituri groups, FDLR	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power and control of natural resources	Stalemate
Nigeria (Niger Delta) (2003-)	Government, Ijaw, Ogoni, Itsereki and Urhobo community militias, private security companies, MEND, MOSOP	Control of political power and natural resources, social and political exclusion	Worsening
Somalia (1988-)	TFG, SICS, Ethiopia, warlords and militias that do not support either side	Absence of practical democracy, struggle for regional political power, confederation v. federation	Worsening
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	Government, pro-Government militias, SLA-Minawi, SLA-Al-Nour, SLA-Qassem Haj, JEM, NMRD, NRF	Regional and political marginalisation	Worsening
Uganda (1986-)	Government, LRA	Messianic religion and regional marginalisation	Cessation of hostilities

a) West Africa

A **new peace agreement** was reached at the beginning of March in **Côte d'Ivoire** between President L. Gbagbo and the leader of the opposition *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) coalition, G. Soro, which could provide a solution to the various disputes that have until now blocked any advance in the peace process.[3] The agreement stipulates the creation of a new transitional Government (though the future role of current Prime Minister C.K. Banny is not clear), joint command of the military by officers from both the Government's own armed forces and the FN, a timetable for the disarmament of combatants, the registration of voters and the holding of elections, and the gradual disappearance of the security zone that separates the north and south of the country, controlled by UNOCI and the French support force LICORNE. The two sides have also promised to implement a new amnesty law, though this excludes war crimes and crimes against humanity. The agreement was broadly supported by political and social organisations in the country. However, **the situation remained extremely fragile**, as underlined by the UN Secretary General's outgoing Special Representative, P. Schori, who warned, before leaving his post in February, that the country was on the brink of disaster due to the lack of any willingness on the part of the political classes to bring an end to the crisis of the last four years, and that the situation in the country continued to deteriorate as regards security and humanitarian, economic and social requirements.

In **Nigeria**, attacks on oil installations continued in the **Niger Delta**, while there was a general **upsurge in violence throughout the country** (though particularly in the Delta region) as a result of the **forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections** due to take place on 21 April.[4] The number of attacks on police stations increased, and people working on oil platforms were also attacked and kidnapped by various armed groups, particularly the MEND. In this regard, the number of kidnappings carried out in the Delta during the month of January alone almost equalled the number reported for the whole of 2006, which according to a number of commentators can be put down to the forthcoming elections, as victims are taken in order to finance electoral activities. At the same time there were a number of inter-community confrontations in several Delta states, some of them also linked with the forthcoming elections.

b) Horn of Africa

The situation in **Somalia** worsened considerably following the fighting at the end of December between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), supported by Ethiopian troops, and the Islamic Courts militias, which resulted in the rapid defeat of the latter. This led to a new phase of

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[3] See the chapter on peace processes.

[4] See the chapter on situations of tension.

violence and insecurity, mainly in the capital Mogadishu, where there were continual attacks on Somali Government forces, political groups and Ethiopian armed forces by militias and other groups opposed to the presence of foreign troops and parties opposed to the TFG. This fighting caused the enforced displacement of around 20,000 people. The approval by the UN Security Council in February of UN Resolution 1744, which gave the go-ahead for the deployment of the AU peace-keeping force (AMISOM) opened the way for the deployment of the force's Ugandan troops, which will be joined by contingents from Nigeria, Burundi and Ghana. However, the number of troops committed total only half of the 8,500 required to complete the task with which they have been charged: protecting the transitional federal institutions, training the security forces, providing cover for humanitarian aid to the civilian population, promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting security and stability in the country. At the same time, TFG President A. Yusuf Ahmed announced, under international pressure, that a reconciliation conference would be held from 19 April, as the situation would continue to deteriorate unless support was found for a proper reconciliation process that brings about a Government of national unity including leaders from the communities that support the Islamic Courts, so that these people can feel involved in the political process and assist the work of the African mission in the country. The mission was deployed amid attacks on the Ugandan troops involved, as they were seen as allies of the TFG and the Ethiopian troops.

Turning to the region of **Darfur** in Sudan, the first three months of the year **failed to bring any progress in the establishment of the hybrid UN/AU mission** beyond the first stage (police support programme) of the three-phase programme agreed between the AU, the United Nations and the Sudanese Government. Any advances were blocked by the Government in Khartoum, a stance supported by China. In line with the Addis Ababa Conclusions Document and the Abuja Statement of November last year, the third phase would mean increasing the mission from its current total of 7,000 troops to the 20,000 suggested by the UN Security Council. As a result, the atmosphere of violence continued to worsen while the humanitarian situation also deteriorated. Around 300,000 have died since the conflict began in 2003, while two million people have been displaced, 230,000 have fled as refugees to Chad and four million are now dependent on humanitarian aid. The United Nations warned of the possibility that humanitarian operations could collapse as a result of the continually worsening violence. Diplomatic initiatives from the United Nations and the AU on the one side and Libya and Eritrea on the other were also unsuccessful.[5] It should nevertheless be mentioned that the **Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court named the first two people to be suspected of having committed war crimes in Darfur** during 2003 and 2004, the current Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, A. Haroun, who was Interior Minister at the time, and A. M. Ali Abd-al Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb, alleged leader of the *Janjaweed* militia and Colonel of the Government's armed forces in Wadi Salih (West Darfur). Both of the accused have worked together in the region, financing and directing the activities of the *Janjaweed*.

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

The situation in **DR Congo** was marked by **persisting political instability and violence in the east of the country**. A new Prime Minister, A. Gizenga, leader of the PALU party, was appointed at the end of last year, an event which eventually led to the formation of a new post-transitional Government in February (which has not been joined by any representative from either the political opposition or the former armed groups) while a climate of violence prevailed as a result of the repression of popular protests. Around 100 people died in the province of Bas-Congo as a result of clashes between security forces and members of the Bundu Dia Kongo religious sect, whose candidates (allies of J.P. Bemba's UN party) were defeated in the election for governor, a result that led to accusations of fraud, the buying of elected posts and corruption. In addition, fighting broke out at the end of March between J.P. Bemba's own security guards and Congolese armed forces over the issue of disarmament and the reduction of the militia entrusted with ensuring the security of the opposition leader. **There was also a continuing atmosphere of insecurity** and violence in the east of the country, mainly in the provinces of north and south Kivu in the Ituri district (Orientale), where child soldiers are still being recruited. There was heavy fighting between the Rwandan FDLR opposition group and

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[5] See the chapter on peace processes.

Congolese armed forces following the deployment of a full battalion in north Kivu. However, troops loyal to renegade General L. Nkunda began to join the unified Government armed forces following the agreement reached with the Congolese Government with facilitation from Rwanda. Furthermore, P. Karim's FNI in Ituri began a DDR process at the end of February following several violations of the November ceasefire and clashes with Government armed forces, the most recent in January, which caused the displacement of thousands of people.

DR Congo: the same faces, the same habits?

The expected announcement of the composition of Prime Minster A. Gizenga's new Cabinet after more than a month of talks following his appointment in December 2006 finally took place in February this year. A number of politicians and media commentators complained that, although A. Gizenga had previously announced that his Cabinet would be notable for its inclusive nature, its honesty and its break with a past filled with corruption and the despoliation of the country's natural resources, allies of President J. Kabila still play an important part, and apart from A. Gizenga and N. Mobutu (son of the former President, M. Sese Seko), there are no representatives from the west of the country, which is where the opposition enjoys majority support. There are also no representatives from the MLC (currently J.P. Bemba's UN) or RCD (led by A. Ruberwa) former armed groups. The Government comprises a team of six Ministers of State and a large Cabinet of 24 Ministers and 20 Deputy Ministers, who include only nine women among their number. It is clear that the main portfolios are held by men who are close to the President, such as Interior Minister D. Kalume (who retains his position), or by his allies, who feature in certain United Nations reports on the plundering of natural resources.

The **Central African Republic** continued to suffer a serious security and humanitarian crisis during the past three months. Fighting continued in the north of the country between Government armed forces and the APRD insurgent group led by former soldier B. N'Djadder, while the climate of insecurity persisted in the western part of the country bordering Cameroon. Nevertheless, **the agreement reached between the leader of the coalition of UFDR groups, A. Miskine, and President F. Bozizé** in Libya, with facilitation from M. Ghadaffi, **raised positive expectations of finding a solution to the many violent conflicts afflicting the country** and the possibility of deploying a UN peace-keeping mission that will ensure the security of the country's volatile borders with Chad and Sudan. However, at the end of March the RFDR was still carrying out military operations in the northeast of the country, which included attacks on the city of Birao and its airport. These were countered by Central African Government forces with logistical and military support from France, which joined the fight against the UFDR after suffering an attack from the insurgent coalition.

The situation in **Chad** continued to worsen during the first three months of 2007. In his last report, the UN Secretary General stressed that the area was facing **a multi-faceted humanitarian and security crisis**. Amnesty International described the impunity with which the Sudanese *Janjaweed* militias were operating in conjunction with their allies in Chad, pointing to the murders, the looting, the destruction of villages and rapes that were being perpetrated and warning that conditions for the civilian population were increasingly deteriorating as a result of the conflict between ethnic groups and attacks from Chadian rebels. There are now 232,000 Sudanese refugees and 120,000 internally displaced Chadians in the east of the country. Given this situation, the UN Security Council indicated that it was in favour of establishing a UN peace-keeping mission comprising between 6,000 and 11,000 soldiers. This mission would be charged with protecting refugees and the displaced population in Chad and the Central African Republic and guaranteeing security along the borders of both countries, in order to slow the spread of the violence coming out of Darfur, given the impossibility of extending the presence or mandate of the UN's personnel in the Sudanese region itself. However, **N'Djamena refused to accept any military presence and instead authorised a smaller civilian deployment** comprising gendarmes and police. In the diplomatic arena, the President of Chad and the leader of the FUC reached a peace agreement in Tripoli.[6] However, all the other groups and certain factions of the FUC refused to accept the agreement. Finally, at a meeting in Cannes, Chad, Central

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[6] See the chapter on peace processes.

African Republic and Sudan reiterated their promise not to support the respective insurgent groups, as they had already done on previous occasions.

Is genocide being perpetrated in Chad?

in the middle of February, UNHCR warned that the violent situation affecting the east of Chad displayed a number of parallels with the **1994 genocide in Rwanda**. In this connection, the organisation pointed out that the guerrilla tactics used in Darfur (Sudan) had been repeated in the east of Chad. As a consequence, representatives of the humanitarian organisation stressed that advantage should be taken of this last opportunity to prevent any repetition of the tragedy that took place in Rwanda more than a decade ago. The **multi-dimensional violence** that is currently afflicting the east of Chad includes fighting between the Chadian Government and rebel groups with bases in Sudan, cross-border attacks on the civilian population by Sudanese militias, operations by Sudanese armed opposition groups inside Chad, ethnic violence, internal displacement, inter-community tensions and criminal behaviour.

The **fragile peace talks** between the Government of **Uganda** and the LRA armed opposition group aimed at bringing an end to the armed conflict affecting the north of the country have been suspended since January as a result of the LRA's demands for the replacement of the mediating team and a change to the place where talks are being held. Until its suspension, the process had been chaired by the Deputy President of South Sudan, R. Machar, in Juba, and a number of local and international initiatives were subsequently adopted in an attempt to break the deadlock. The breakdown in these talks, combined with the **expiry of the cessation of hostilities on 28 February** after more than 6 months, led both sides to threaten a resumption of their military operations if they were attacked, though they maintained the cessation of hostilities beyond the final deadline and promised to restart talks in the middle of April.[7] At a military level, although there were sporadic violations of the cessation of hostilities, both parties broadly respected the agreement, leading to **improved security** in the north of Uganda which in turn allowed between 230,000 and 350,000 of the region's 1.7 million displaced people to return to their homes in 2006, though uncertainty about the peace process and the continuing lack of security meant that initial Government forecasts had to be reduced.

d) Maghreb and North Africa

In **Algeria**, the announcement on 11 September 2006 of an alliance between the GSPC and al-Qaeda, which from now on was to be known as the **al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb**, was accompanied by an upsurge in violence. This situation continued throughout the first three months of 2007, and the conflict began to take on a regional perspective as a result of the increasing presence of members of the GSPC in other countries in the Maghreb region (Mauritania, Tunisia), where they took part in training activities and recruited new members. This led to a wave of attacks and car-bomb explosions in February and March in Cabilia and the area around Algiers. It is estimated that 400 people died in the country last year (compared with 480 in 2005), 63 of them during the last three months of the year (27 of these were soldiers and gendarmes). In addition, a communiqué from GSPC leader A. Mussaab Abdelwadud declared that a great many of the 2,629 people granted amnesty under the terms of the reconciliation process proposed by President A. Bouteflika were joining his group, and he called for attacks on government and foreign targets. At the same time, Government armed forces continued to carry out anti-insurgency operations in several parts of the country, including Algiers itself.

America

Table 1.2. Evolution of armed conflicts in America			
Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	**Armed groups**	**Main causes**	**Evolution 1st quarter 2007**
Colombia (1964-)	Government, FARC, ELN, AUC paramilitaries	History of political exclusion, social injustice, control over natural resources and degradation of the conflict as a result of drug-trafficking	Stalemate

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[7] Ibid.

The last three months in **Colombia** were notable for the "**parapolitics**" scandals, with the **infiltration by paramilitary organisations of various political parties and state institutions**. Nine members of Congress, a former Minister and a former director of the intelligence services were imprisoned, while the Foreign Minister was forced to resign. At the same time, the High Commission for Reintegration announced that it had discovered no further information on the whereabouts of around 5,000 demobilised paramilitaries, while the OAS repeated its warnings about rearmament and the formation of new illegal groups. The national defence budget remained above 5% of GDP and included the acquisition of new aeroplanes and helicopters, along with increased military activity. Nevertheless, a climate of uncertainty prevailed regarding the continuation of military support from the USA, given the criticisms from the Democratic Party following the failure of Plan Colombia to produce any results. As regards guerrilla groups in the country, armed fighting continued between the ELN and the FARC in Arauca and Nariño, which even drew the condemnation of the UN's Human Rights Office in the country following the killing of protected people and the enforced displacement of civilians. The FARC held their 9th Annual Conference, though the results are not yet known. The guerrilla group's urban militias in Cali and the port of Buenaventura suffered a number of losses and military defeats. The ELN kept its military activities to a minimum while the possibility of entering formal talks with the Government was discussed.

Asia and the Pacific

Table 1.3. Evolution of armed conflicts in Asia			
Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution 1st quarter 2007
Afghanistan (2001-)[8]	Government, international coalition (led by the USA), Taliban militias and various groups	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power and ethnic manipulation	Worsening
Philippines (1969-)	Government, NPA	Struggle for power and democratic fragility	Stalemate
Philippines (1978-)	Government, MILF	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Temporary suspension of hostilities
Philippines (1991-)	Government, Abu Sayyaf	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious manipulation	Worsening
India (Assam) (1989-)	Government, ULFA, BJF, NDFB	Autonomy v. independence and control over economic resources	Stalemate
India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989-)	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	Autonomy v. independence and religious manipulation	Improvement
Myanmar (1948-)[9]	Government, armed ethnic groups	Autonomy v. independence	Worsening
Sri Lanka (1989-)	Government, LTTE	Autonomy v. independence and religious manipulation	Worsening
Thailand (south) (2004-)	Government, armed opposition groups	Autonomy v. independence and religious manipulation	Stalemate

a) South Asia

The situation in **Afghanistan** remained characterised by the **rising tide of violence and attacks** by Taliban militias, the operations carried out by Afghan armed forces and US troops against these militias and the increasing number of suicide attacks. There was also an increase in the number of cross-border attacks by Taliban militias operating out of Pakistan. The United Kingdom sent a further 1,500 troops to the NATO mission in the country (ISAF) following a request from the organisation, though other countries seemed reluctant to increase their presence in the country. NATO began a large-scale offensive against Taliban militias in Helmand province in the south of the country. Elsewhere, the *Wolesi Jirga* or lower house of

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[8] The current phase of the Armed conflict in this country began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has actually been in a state of armed conflict since 1979.

[9] Although the beginnings of the armed conflict date back to 1948, this context is included as an armed conflict for the first quarter of 2007 as a result of the upsurge in violence seen in recent months.

Parliament approved a bill calling on all the people who been involved with the many armed groups and militias fighting in the country in recent decades to sign up for the peace and reconciliation process, proposing a wide-ranging amnesty. Following this decision, a group of 58 civilian and human rights organisations began a campaign against the bill, which would guarantee immunity for any war crimes that have been committed.

There are currently two different contexts of violence in **India**. In the state of **Jammu and Kashmir** there were reports of sporadic outbreaks of fighting during the first three months of 2007 between Indian armed forces and Kashmiri independence groups. However, the main coalition of independence parties in Jammu and Kashmir, the APHC, announced in January that it was seeking to abandon the armed struggle, and in February it called on all armed groups to declare a temporary ceasefire that could help the search for a resolution to the conflict.[10] Both sides continued their peace talks, in spite of an attack on the train connecting Lahore and Delhi, which was designed to force a boycott of the peace process and which claimed the lives of 68 people. Between 40,000 and 60,000 people in the region have died since 1989 as a result of this conflict. Elsewhere, in the state of **Assam**, a number of armed groups remain in conflict with the Indian authorities after several decades, claiming independence for the region and protection for the rights of local communities. The ULFA armed opposition group was responsible for several attacks against Hindu markets and oil pipelines during the last three months, leaving scores of people dead. However, the ULFA withdrew its threat to boycott a national championship, and the Prime Minister of Assam renewed his offer of peace to the ULFA.[11]

Turning to the situation in **Sri Lanka**, the open **resumption of the armed conflict** during the third quarter of 2006 has resulted in increasing levels of violence and military operations by both Government forces and the LTTE armed opposition group, which have in turn caused the enforced displacement of more than 200,000 people since April 2006. Military pressure from Sinhalese security forces forced the armed group to withdraw from the majority of the towns and cities that it has controlled during the last ten years (including its main stronghold, Vakarai) and move into the jungle. During the last 15 months, more than 4,000 people have died in the country as a result of the acts of sporadic violence that preceded the breakdown in the ceasefire and the subsequent upsurge in fighting. The end of the ceasefire also coincided with an increase in the number of kidnappings reported. Nevertheless, Norway continued in its attempts to revive the peace process.[12]

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Increased levels of violence were reported in the three different areas of conflict in the **Philippines**. The Government continued the high-intensity military offensive that it launched against the **NPA** back in June of last year, a strategy aimed at bringing about the total defeat of the communist organisation within three years. Although fighting between the two sides has left dozens of people dead and wounded during the last three months, the Government announced at the beginning of February that 165 members of the NPA had given themselves up in the province of Bukindon after a series of negotiations, along with some 80 weapons. The Government also intensified its counter-insurgency operations against the **Abu Sayyaf** armed opposition group in the Sulu archipelago. In January, the Government announced that the organisation's leader, K. Janjalani, had died in fighting during the month of September and that his death had been confirmed following DNA tests in the USA. K. Janjalani was the brother of the leader and founder of Abu Sayyaf, who also died in combat in 1998, and one of the people most sought by the Governments of both the USA and the Philippines. Turning to the fighting with the **MILF** armed opposition group, the last three months saw some of the worst outbreaks of violence since the cessation of hostilities agreement was signed back in 2003, a situation that came close to causing a breakdown in the peace talks. Hostilities increased throughout the early months of the year, culminating in fighting at the beginning of March which caused the displacement of thousands of people in the province of North Cotobato, as well as leaving

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[10] See the chapter on peace processes.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

around twenty combatants from both sides dead. However, in mid-March, the Government came up with a new proposal that was well received by the MILF. As part of the peace negotiations it ordered the withdrawal of its troops from some of the combat zones, a move that led to a substantial reduction in the level of violence.

MNLF: a decade of peace and conflict

The MNLF emerged at the beginning of the 1970s as the revolutionary vanguard and main ideological reference point for various ethnic Muslim communities in Mindanao, uniting them under the banner of the Moro people and creating a common identity based on Islam, a shared history under the Sultans of Sulu and Maguindanao and resistance against the successive attempts to colonise them by Spain, the USA and subsequently, from the second half of the 20th century, the Philippines. The bitter struggle by the MNLF against the dictator F. Marcos and its defence of the collective rights and self-determination of the Bangsamoro people has made the MNLF one of the principal and largest insurgency groups on the Asian continent and brought its charismatic leader, N. Misuari, recognition from the international community.

After more than 20 years of negotiations, **a peace agreement was signed in 1996**, under the auspices of the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO), which in return for the MNLF's renunciation of independence offered the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), of which N. Misuari was the first governor. During subsequent years, however, both the inexperience and incompetence of some of the new leaders, along with the Philippine Government's explicit refusal to implement some of the provisions of the agreement in full led to a **deterioration in trust between the parties and a growing frustration with the results of autonomy in Mindanao**. All of this culminated in an unnatural alliance between Manila and some of the MNLF's top members aimed at ousting N. Misuari from his position as governor of the ARMM and MNLF leader. Finally, at the end of 2001, hundreds of MNLF members rebelled against the government and N. Misuari was arrested on charges of corruption and rebellion.

Since then, **several factions of the MNLF have remained active**, particularly in the Sulu archipelago, and there have been reports of **periodic fighting with Government armed forces**. This is firstly because the military offensive against Abu Sayyaf in the same region has inevitably led to misunderstandings, unexpected encounters and a desire in some official quarters to link the two groups. Secondly, the MNLF is demanding the release of its original leader and the full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement. Both claims have been supported by the ICO, which suggested a tripartite meeting in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) to tackle these and other issues not dealt with in the 1996 peace agreement, such as the disarmament of the MNLF. Since mid-2006, Manila has been postponing this meeting for a variety of reasons, to the point that, during this last quarter, one of the MNLF's top commanders on the ground held the government team charged with negotiating a review of the peace agreement at a military camp for a number of days. Finally, following diplomatic action from the ICO and social pressure from a number of organisations in Mindanao, it appears that the meeting will finally take place in July of this year, and that N. Misuari will be allowed to attend.

In **Myanmar**, the last three months were marked by repeated calls from the international community and various humanitarian organisations, demanding that the Government firstly allow humanitarian access to the people affected by armed violence in the country, and secondly that it end its **military counter-insurgency operations**. These operations are causing **serious consequences for the civilian population**, particularly in the east of the country. The armed fighting has risen in intensity, principally in Karen state, where **thousands of people have been forced out of their homes** in recent months. The heavy military offensive being conducted by the country's armed forces in this state against the KNU armed opposition group may have caused around 30,000 people to flee their homes. In addition, some NGOs have complained that many Karen women have been the victims of sexual violence perpetrated by members of the state security forces. During February there was also a split in the ranks of the KNU armed group, resulting in the formation of the KNU/KNLAPC.

In the southern provinces of **Thailand**, which have a majority Muslim Malay population, levels of violence increased notably in spite of the fact that the Government formed following the coup d'état of September 2006 has stated on more than one occasion that it wishes to hold talks with insurgent groups and adopt certain measures aimed at recognising the rights of the Muslim minority in the south of the country. In a report published by an academic institution at the end of February, almost 2,100 people have died and a further 3,290 have been injured since the beginning of 2004 as a consequence of the more than 6,200 attacks perpetrated during this conflict, including a coordinated action in which around twenty devices were all blown up

simultaneously, leaving several dead and around 50 injured and causing chaos among the ordinary population. According to this report, in terms of actual numbers there have been more deaths on the Muslim side than among the Buddhists. The state of emergency imposed on the three southern states (Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat) was extended for a further three months, though this most controversial counter-insurgency measure was originally approved while former Prime Minister T. Shinawatra was still in office.

Europe

Table 1.4. Evolution of armed conflicts in Europe			
Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution 1st quarter 2007
Russia (Chechnya) (1991-)	Russian Government, pro-Russian regional government, Chechen armed opposition groups	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate

The conflict in the Russian republic of **Chechnya** was marked by the **end of the amnesty in the middle of January**. **Between 400 and 500 rebels signed up for the process**, which was viewed as a success by the Russian and Chechen authorities, though independence leaders have dismissed this as propaganda. Nevertheless, there were continuing reports of fighting between the security forces and Chechen rebels throughout the first three months of the year, even though Prime Minister R. Kadyrov announced that all rebel armed groups had been crushed. In mid-February there was an important political change with the **resignation of Chechen President A. Alkhanov and his replacement by R. Kadyrov following a decision that was approved by the Chechen Parliament at the suggestion of V. Putin**. The latter's appointment was seen as positive by some independence leaders, though both national and international NGOs have linked him with mass human rights violations perpetrated by the security forces under his control. In this regard, the new President's emphasis on policies of reconstruction, his dismissal of security as a non-priority issue and his claim that Chechnya is at peace have caused unease among the civilian population who are suffering the effects of the armed conflict and institutionalised lack of protection. According to some NGOs, the impunity of the security forces and the practice of kidnapping remain recurring elements in the Republic. The Council of Europe's Human Rights Commissioner also criticised the practice of torture in Chechnya following a visit to the Republic at the end of February.

Middle East

Table 1.5. Evolution of armed conflicts in the Middle East			
Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed groups	Main causes	Evolution 1st quarter 2007
Iraq (2003-)	Transitional Government, US/United Kingdom coalition, internal and external armed opposition groups	Struggle for political power, ethnic and religious manipulation, opposition to the presence of foreign troops, access to oil resources	Worsening
Israel – Palestine (2000, II Intifada-)[13]	Israeli Government, settlement militias, PNA, armed wings of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organisations, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP, DFLP	Occupation, colonisation and control over land, religious manipulation and demand for political recognition	Worsening

Sectarian violence in Iraq during the first three months of the year remained at the same serious levels seen throughout 2006, and February saw the commemoration of the first anniversary of the attack in Samarra that marked the beginning of the sectarian fighting. However, there are many sides to the violence afflicting the country, as sectarian battles combine with the attacks by both Shiite and Sunni insurgent groups (some of whom are Baathists and pro-Saddam) against the occupying forces of the international community and the new Iraqi security forces. Added to this are the acts of violence linked with Sunni groups operating under the banner of al-Qaeda and the security services from various countries now

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[13] Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report only examines the most recent phase of the conflict relating to the 2nd Intifada, which began in September 2000.

operating in Iraq. At the same time there has been an increase in criminal violence involving kidnappings and ordinary criminal acts, the proliferation of which highlights the failure of the occupying forces to meet their promise to guarantee security, governance and the restoration of freedom in Iraq. In an attempt to resolve this complex situation, Prime Minister **N. Al-Maliki announced a new security plan in February** in Baghdad, to be implemented jointly by Iraqi and US forces. President G.W. Bush also announced a new strategy for Iraq at the beginning of the year that included 21,500 troop reinforcements to add to the 132,000 already in the country (against the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group)[14], along with economic measures and political pressures on the Government of N. Al-Maliki. President S. Hussein was executed at the end of the year, and the publication of images of his death caused an upsurge in violence. An international peace conference was held at the beginning of March, bringing leading figures from Syria, Iran and the USA to Baghdad in an attempt to deal with the situation from a regional perspective, underlining the need on the part of the USA to approach this conflict from a new, more plural perspective.

Turning to the armed conflict between **Israel** and **Palestine**, the last three months have been marked by violent confrontations between the militias of the Hamas and Fatah organisations and by parallel attempts to bring an end to the violence and form a Government of national unity to overcome the blockade imposed on the Hamas government by the international community, particularly Israel and the USA. There were increased confrontations, mainly in the Gaza Strip (where Hamas is the dominant party with broad social support), though there were also incidents in the West Bank, where political support for both sides is more balanced, as are the number of militias from both groups. In February, the two sides met in Mecca and reached an agreement to form a Government of unity. This was finally established during March, though Israel and the USA said they would maintain their blockade on any Government in which Hamas played a part, and there were some sporadic outbreaks of violence after the agreement was signed. While this was going on, Israel pursued its policy of making incursions to capture alleged militant members of Palestinian organisations, while continuing with the construction of another 3,000 new homes on Palestinian land, according to the Israeli NGO Peace Now, which pointed out that these settlement blocks are increasingly encroaching on Palestinian territory. Elsewhere, the Israeli human rights organisation *B'Tselem* **reported that Israeli security forces killed 660 Palestinians during 2006**, the majority in Gaza, three times the number of people killed during the previous year. Of these, at least 322 were civilians that had not been involved in any hostile act, and 141 were children. At the same time, the number of fatal attacks on Israelis by Palestinians fell from 50 in 2005 to 23 in 2006. In addition, a total of 9,075 Palestinians were in Israeli jails in November, 345 of them children. Of these, 738 have been detained without trial and without being told the charges on which they are being held.

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[14] VV.A.., The Iraq Study Group Report, Vintage Books, New York, December 2006,
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps76748/iraq_study_group_report.pdf

Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

> ❑ More than a hundred people died in Guinea following a month and a half of protests against President L. Conté's abuse of power.
> ❑ The continuing violence in the region of Waziristan underlined the fragility of the agreements reached between local armed militias and the Pakistani government.
> ❑ Tensions remained high in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, with a strengthening of the military offensive in the southeast of the country and the arrest of members of the pro-Kurdish political party, the DTP.
> ❑ Parliamentary approval for the Yemeni government's suppression of the rebellion in the northern province of Saada resulted in a military offensive that caused thousands of people to be displaced.

This section contains a detailed analysis of **27 situations of extreme tension**[1] in which events that are notable for their particular seriousness have taken place during the last three months. It also refers to a further **32 contexts in which tensions have not been especially pronounced during this period**.

Graph 2.1. Geographical distribution of situations of tension

Middle East 11%
Europe and Central Asia 20%
Africa 41%
Asia 20%
America 12%

2.1. Evolution of situations of tension

Chart 2.1. Contexts of extreme tension during the last three months			
Africa Burundi Chad – Sudan Eritrea and Ethiopia Guinea Guinea - Bissau Nigeria Great Lakes Region (DR Congo –Burundi – Rwanda –Uganda)	Senegal (Casamance) Sudan (south) Zimbabwe **America** Bolivia Ecuador Haiti Peru	**Asia** Indonesia (Sulawesi) Myanmar Nepal Pakistan (Baluchistan) Pakistan (Waziristan) Philippines Timor-Leste	**Central Asia and the Caucasus** Georgia (Abkhazia) Kyrgyzstan Turkey **Middle East** Iran Lebanon – Israel – Syria Yemen

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[1] Contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political tension and polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the State, which involve alterations in the operation of the State's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and states of emergency), and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. In some areas there is a strong possibility that a situation of armed conflict will emerge. Moreover, these tensions may not occur within the geographical territory of the State in question, but the extent to which the State's own interests or stability are directly affected is taken into account, as well as the fact that these tensions may lead to specific attacks on the territory of another country. Finally, any areas currently experiencing serious difficulties in implementing peace agreements (in the event that they exist) are also included.

Africa

a) Southern Africa

Country	Main causes
Zimbabwe	Democratic fragility (political and economic crisis)

In **Zimbabwe**, **social unrest against R. Mugabe's government increased** during the course of the last three months. The Zimbabwean police banned the holding of meetings and demonstrations in the capital Harare for a period of three months after clashes between supporters of the opposition MDC party and the security forces in the city, disturbances that had begun during the meeting called to mark the start of the MDC's electoral campaign. Members of the opposition party claimed that the government was afraid that the meeting, which was attended by more than 50,000 people, might turn into a demonstration against the President. The MDC denounced the arrest of several of its members and the excessive use of force by state officers that left more than 500 people injured. **MDC leader M. Tsvangirai was subsequently arrested** and beaten following a meeting of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign in the capital, in which a member of the public was killed when the police opened fire on the crowd. These events have been strongly condemned by the international community, and both the USA and the United Kingdom have asked for sanctions against the country to be strengthened. Finally, the strike by doctors, which was joined by teachers and nursing personnel, continued for two months, though the government refused to take the required measures and respond to calls for improved salaries.

b) West Africa

Country	Main causes
Guinea	Political and economic crisis, democratic fragility
Guinea-Bissau	Political instability, lack of governance
Nigeria	Natural resources, political disputes, religious manipulation
Senegal (Casamance)	Autonomy v. Independence, marginalisation of a minority group

The greatest tensions in the west of Africa can be found in **Guinea**, a situation that seriously endangers the precarious stability of its neighbours. The **general strike called by the main unions to protest against President L. Conté's abuses of power** and to call for a reduction in the price of basic foods and fuel was harshly put down by the security forces. **More than a hundred people died during a month and a half of demonstrations, most of them unarmed civilians**, bringing condemnation from the United Nations and the international community. There were also reports that former RUF troops in the north of Liberia were moving across the border to fight as mercenaries alongside Guinean armed forces in the event that the conflict worsened.[2] This caused the Presidents of both Liberia and Sierra Leone to pay a visit to their Guinean counterpart. Finally, with mediation from a special group sent by ECOWAS, L. Kouyaté was appointed as the country's new Prime Minister and given broad executive powers, as had been requested by civilian groups.

At the same time, political tensions continued to increase in **Guinea-Bissau** after the country's parliament approved a **motion censuring current Prime Minister** A. Gomes. The motion was filed by an alliance of the PRS and PUSD opposition parties, with support from 15 members who had defected from the governing PAIGC party. President J. B. "Nino" Vieira was forced to choose between appointing someone else to the post or dissolving parliament and calling elections within 90 days. This situation has served to highlight the huge problems that remain in the country in respect of social reconciliation and the lack of good governance.

In **Nigeria**, inter-community and political violence was centred mainly around the Niger Delta region[3] and central parts of the country, where a new wave of political violence between

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[2] For this reason, the list of contexts of lesser tensions at the end of this chapter points to a deterioration in the situation in the Mano River region.

[3] See the chapter on armed conflicts.

supporters of the two main political parties in Nigeria, the PDP and the AC, cost the lives of 10 people in the state of Benue. The latest upsurge in tensions resulted from an argument between militants on both sides regarding the election of a Senator to represent the state in the capital. Faced with an increasing number of incidents such as this one, the government announced the deployment of 200,000 police to take charge of security during the elections. Elsewhere, in the political arena, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) published the list of candidates for the country's presidency. This excluded the name of Vice President A. Abubakar, who is pending trial on charges of corruption. The decisions reached by the INEC have led to eight political parties filing a request with the country's National Assembly for the dismissal of the Commission's Chairman on grounds of his lack of independence.

Finally, there were further population displacements in the Casamance region in **Senegal** following fighting between government armed forces and the MFDC secessionist armed group led by C. Badiate along the border with Guinea-Bissau. At the same time, to coincide with the elections, the MFDC faction led by S. Sadio carried out attacks along the border with Gambia that left two members of another rival faction dead. The death during January of the principal leader of the secessionist group, D. Senghor, led to fears of a new upsurge in the conflict. Finally, the President of the Regional Council of Ziguinchor (capital of Casamance), O. L. Badji, was assassinated in the town of Sindian, an incident in which the MFDC denies any involvement.

c) Horn of Africa

Country	Main causes
Eritrea and Ethiopia	Territorial disputes
Sudan (south)	Autonomy v. independence, religious manipulation, control of resources

Turning to the border dispute between **Eritrea and Ethiopia**, at the end of January the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1741[4], which extended the mandate of the peace-keeping mission in the region (UNMEE) for six months, while **reducing its military component from a maximum of 2,300 troops to 1,700**. It also called on the two countries not to hinder peace-building efforts, given the length of time that this dispute between them has been at stalemate. The UN Security Council also called on Eritrea to withdraw its troops from the security zone. In this connection, UNMEE announced that the situation in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and adjoining areas remained volatile and tense, with reports of routine troop movements on both sides of the TSZ. The UN mission confirmed in March that the Eritrean authorities had imposed **new restrictions on the movements of the peace-keeping force** operating along the border. Since October 2005 the Eritrean government has maintained a ban on helicopter flights by UNMEE within the country's borders, as well as limiting the area in which the mission can carry out its monitoring duties and the routes that it can take in order to cover the whole of the Eritrean side of the border, demanding the expulsion of all western members of the mission and imprisoning any members of the UNMEE with Eritrean nationality. All of this has gradually reduced the mission's effectiveness in the region.

The second anniversary of the signing of the peace agreement between the government and the SPLA saw an increase in political tensions in **southern Sudan**, though there have not been any serious incidents of violence since the grave events in Malakal during December[5]. Sudanese Vice President S. Kiir accused President O. Al-Bashir of having done nothing to ensure the equitable and transparent distribution of Sudanese wealth and resources and of continuing to support the pro-government militias (SSDF) that have not yet signed up to the disarmament process in the south of the country. In response to these claims, the President stated that although some parts of the peace agreement had not yet been implemented, it was also true that the authorities in the south had been very slow in joining the various committees established to implement the peace agreements at a cost of 60 million dollars to the Sudanese government. Elsewhere, **unidentified groups continued their attacks on civilians around the town of Juba**, bring the total number of deaths to 20. Both the SPLA and the Ugandan armed forces have pointed to the LRA as being responsible for these attacks.

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[4] http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc07/scrl07.htm
[5] See the chapter on tensions in Alert 2007.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Country	Main causes
Burundi	Control of political power by an ethnic minority and difficulties in the handover of power
Chad - Sudan	Reciprocal allegations of support for armed opposition groups
Great Lakes Region (DR Congo – Burundi – Rwanda – Uganda)	Control over natural resources, search for border security

In **Burundi**, the **introduction in March of the peace agreement verification mechanism** by the government and the FNL, after months of stalemate in the peace process, along with the implementation of the agreement reached in September may finally signal the end of the period of violence that began back in 1993. However, problems remains as the government only has plans to integrate members of the FNL into the country's armed forces under the DDR process, while the FNL also wants to be granted political responsibilities. it should be mentioned that the Supreme Court finally acquitted former President D. Ndayizeye and four others of any involvement in the alleged coup attempt, though it convicted the leader of the FNL-Icanzo, A. Mugabarabona, and one other person of being responsible for the coup, in order to justify government strategy regarding the real facts of the incident. Elsewhere, political tensions persist as a result of the **replacement of H. Radjabu as president of the ruling CNDD-FDD party** following questions about his heavy-handedness as well as a number of scandals. According to several sources, President P. Nkurunziza wanted to get rid of H. Radjabu due to the considerable power that he wielded within the party's machinery. His replacement is close to P. Nkurunziza, and **this move was therefore perceived as a way of extending and guaranteeing the President's power**, something which has also been seen in other areas, such as the Bank of the Republic of Burundi.

Relations between **Chad and Sudan** continued to deteriorate during the first three months of this year, in spite of regional diplomatic initiatives such as the agreement, signed by these two countries and the Central African Republic during the course of the Africa-France summit in Cannes, aimed at bringing an end to support for **armed opposition groups operating within their territories**. Given Sudan's refusal to accept the deployment of a UN peace-keeping mission on Sudanese soil, the UN Security Council, at the suggestion of the Secretary General, proposed an initiative that would involve deploying a mission along the border between Chad and Sudan in order to stop the armed conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur from spreading over the border into neighbouring Chad. However, Chad imposed limits on the extent of such a mission.[6]

Turning to the **Great Lakes** region, the last three months saw a relative improvement in the situation on a regional level as a result of the pursuit of the peace process in **Burundi**, the peace talks in the north of **Uganda** and, above all, the successful elections and **formation of a new government in DR Congo**, in spite of the climate of tension that followed the repression of protest demonstrations. However, the last three months have seen further fighting between the Rwandan FDLR armed opposition group and Congolese armed forces. It also should be mentioned on a positive note that **Rwanda** acted as mediator between Congolese armed forces and dissident general L. Nkunda, who is a member of the Tutsi Banyamulenge community from the east of DR Congo. This is a positive move given that Rwanda was involved in fighting with the governments of both L. Kabila and J. Kabila between 1998 and 2003. In the end, Rwanda withdrew its troops from the east of the country and withdrew its support (at least, officially) from the pro-Rwandan RCD armed opposition group.

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[6] See the chapter on armed conflict in Alert 2007.

America

a) North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Country	Main causes
Haiti	Political and economic breakdown and social polarisation

In **Haiti**, the **police operations** carried out by **MINUSTAH in Cité Soleil and some districts of the country's capital that have registered the highest levels of violence** culminated with the seizure of a large amount of military material, the opening of new MINUSTAH headquarters, the introduction of some basic services for the civilian population and the detention of around 140 people suspected of belonging to armed gangs, including some of their most high-ranking leaders. Some civilian organisations from the most heavily affected districts complained about the excessive use of force during these operations, which left a number of people dead and injured. Although both the government and the United Nations mission in Haiti have given a positive assessment of the operations, they have also acknowledged that **armed groups are now moving out from the urban area into the countryside, and continue to have access to both weapons and financing**. President R. Préval began an intense diplomatic campaign to combat drug-trafficking, which he sees as the main cause of insecurity and instability in the country. Elsewhere, MINUSTAH's mandate was renewed for a further eight months, in spite of the initial reluctance shown by China, which resents the relationship between the Haitian and Taiwanese governments[7].

b) South America

Country	Main causes
Bolivia	Governance problems
Ecuador	Governance problems
Peru	Governance problems

There were three main focal points of tension in **Bolivia**. Firstly, after a five-month institutional stand-off between the government and the opposition over mechanisms for the approval of the new Constitution, the executive finally accepted the voting system suggested by the opposition, though at the same time it imposed a deadline on the approval of the new document. Secondly, around **20,000 miners arrived in the capital** demanding the withdrawal of recent increases in taxation on private mining, and ended up fighting with state security forces, causing some injuries and a great amount of material damage. Finally, **two people died and a further hundred were injured during clashes between supporters and opponents of the Prefect of Cochabamba** province. His announcement that he intended to join other provinces (such as Santa Cruz, Beni, Tarija and Pando) in their claims for autonomy, thus ignoring the results of the referendum held last July (in which the majority of the population of Cochabamba voted against autonomy), provoked an angry reaction from several groups who, like the coca growers of Chapare, took over the provincial capital, blocking a number of roads and burning the government building.

In **Ecuador**, the **dispute between R. Correa's government and the country's Congress** over a **Constituent Assembly** led to a **constitutional crisis and rising political and social tensions throughout the country**. R. Correa, who has the support of some of the country's main civilian organisations, has argued that it is necessary to seek popular approval for a Constituent Assembly to draw up a new Constitution, in order to overcome the political instability that has affected Ecuador for the past decade. Congress, however, which is led by the opposition, worries that this Constituent Assembly may revoke its powers and bring the country closer to the 'New Socialism' espoused by Venezuelan President H. Chávez. At the end of January, some indigenous organisations announced their intention to start a rebellion like the ones that had brought down two of the country's previous Presidents, unless a popular consultation process was approved, and demonstrations held a few weeks later in Quito in

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[7] See the chapter on post-war rehabilitation.

support of this process evicted Congress from its chamber, leaving a number of people injured. Elsewhere, eight soldiers were wounded in the **Amazon province of Orellana** when they tried to prevent the **occupation of oil facilities** by a group of demonstrators demanding greater investment in the region by the many oil companies operating there.

In **Peru**, A. García's government **intensified its counter-insurgency policy** after eight people (five of them police officers) were murdered in the southeast of the country in December at the hands of a faction of *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) that numbers around 220 soldiers and operates in one of the coca-growing regions in Ayacucho province, the area most affected by the violence of the 1980s and 1990s. The government has repeatedly claimed that some of the remnants of *Sendero Luminoso* remain active and are increasingly engaged in drug-trafficking. Elsewhere, the **Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) handed down two judgements against the state of Peru** within a few days of each other. The first denounced the government's responsibility for the so-called La Cantuta massacre in 1992 (one of the crimes for which Chile has been asked to extradite former President A. Fujimori), while the second ordered the country to pay compensation to the families of 41 members of *Sendero Luminoso* who died in prison in 1992. A. García complained about the financial impact that the more than 1,200 cases currently being heard by the IAHCR could have on the country, criticising his predecessor in the post for agreeing to comply with all the Court's rulings linked with terrorism.

Asia

a) South Asia

Country	Main causes
Nepal	Democratic fragility, autonomy v. independence
Pakistan (Baluchistan)	Autonomy v. independence, control of resources
Pakistan (Waziristan)	The fight against terrorism, democratic fragility

In **Nepal**[8], the year began with an **increase in tensions in the south of the country**, where demonstrations were led by members of the Madhesi or Terai community, which forms the majority ethnic group in the south of the country and represents one third of the entire Nepalese population. These protests led to **several violent incidents which left at least 25 people dead**. Madhesi groups were demanding a change in the Interim Constitution that would establish a federal system and allow them to be better represented in the country's different interim institutions. These groups have highlighted the fact that both the interim legislation and the way the institutions were set up following the peace agreement did not take account of their needs and their past grievances, leading to the perpetuation of the historical exclusion of the Madhesi people. This outbreak of tensions highlights the **fragility of the current post-war rehabilitation process**, in which attempts are being made to design a new, more inclusive state. Nevertheless, the first quarter of the year ended with almost unanimous approval for constitutional reforms that will allow for the establishment of a federal system for Nepal and an increase in the number of electoral districts in the south of the country, aimed at increasing representation in the region.

As regards the continuing situation of tension in the Pakistani region of **Baluchistan**, the last three months saw repeated violent episodes, the most serious occurring during February. A **suicide attack on the courts in Quetta**, the province's capital, left 16 people dead and a further 25 injured. Although the attack was not attributed to any group, the Pakistani authorities indicated that it was a response to the **increase in counter-insurgency operations in the province**. It should be added that, since the very beginning of this latest period of tensions there have been repeated calls for military operations to be ended and for negotiating spaces to be opened up. An example of this was the offer by the head of the Jamali tribe, S.Y. Mohammad Jamali, to mediate between the tribes in Baluchistan and the Pakistani government. However, an assessment of the last three months as a whole shows that there has been a slight fall in the number of attacks by armed opposition groups.

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[8] For more information on Nepal, see the chapter on past-war rehabilitation.

There were repeated incidents of violence in **Waziristan**[9] throughout the last three months, a fact that demonstrates the **fragility of the agreements reached between local armed militias and the Pakistani government**. A number of attacks and armed confrontations with Pakistani security forces left dozens of people dead and led to an increase in troop deployments along the border with Afghanistan. It should be mentioned that this deployment was also motivated by accusations from both Afghanistan and the USA that the Pakistani government was colluding in the continuing incursions into Afghan territory by armed militants from Pakistan. Finally, mention should be made of the announcement by the government of Pakistan that it would build and mine a wall along 2,400 km of its border with Afghanistan.

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Country	Main causes
Indonesia (Sulawesi)	Religious manipulation, demographic colonisation
Myanmar	Democratic fragility
Philippines	Democratic fragility
Timor-Leste	Mass dismissal of members of the armed forces; economic breakdown and institutional fragility

There were two main areas of tension in the **Philippines**. Firstly, the **explosion of three bombs in different cities on Mindanao** left seven people dead and around 30 injured. These attacks had far-reaching international repercussions as they occurred just a few days before the beginning of the 12th ASEAN Summit in the city of Cebu. After the MILF armed opposition group had vehemently denied involvement in the attacks, and bearing in mind the large-scale military operation that was being carried out at the time by government armed forces in the Sulu archipelago, the government focused its suspicions on organisations like Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. The second area of attention centred around the continuing protests and claims that the government of G. Macapagal Arroyo is colluding or even taking an active part in the murders of hundreds of activists, journalists, union members and government opponents. In this connection, the United Nations independent expert declared after completing a visit to the country that a **significant number of extra-judicial executions can be attributed to the state security forces**, who are also protected by the culture of impunity that prevails in the Philippines. Faced with these accusations, which were backed up by organisations like Amnesty International, the government supported the creation of an Investigating Committee and presented a plan that included measures such as the establishment of special courts. However, these measures were considered inadequate by the large majority of civilian organisations.

In **Sulawesi (Indonesia)**, tensions increased substantially in Poso district when two police officers caused the deaths of 18 supposed militant Islamists while trying to capture them. This incident led to protests among the Muslim community and could, according to some reports, lead to the emergence of organisations classified as Jihadist. The situation in the region was already particularly tense after three Christians were executed in September last year, having been accused of instigating the community violence that led to the deaths or enforced displacement of thousands of people between 1998 and 2001. Given this situation, **some civilian groups have requested the partitioning of the district of Poso** (which belongs to Central Sulawesi province) **along religious lines**, with the creation of two new districts, one majority Christian the other majority Muslim. Although this proposal has not been discounted by the regional authorities, the central government, after meeting some of the leaders of both communities on many occasions, declared that the **violent incidents in Poso are not the result of religious conflict but instead spring from a struggle for power in the local administration**.

In **Myanmar**, the widespread **repression of political opposition** continued during the first three months of the year. In spite of the fact that 40 political prisoners were released at the beginning of the year, to coincide with the anniversary of the country's independence, a move that formed part of an amnesty for a total of 300 prisoners, there were **further arrests** during the course of the last three months, and the house arrest of opposition leader T.Oo was extended. In February, a demonstration held to protest against corruption and the country's

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[9] North and South Waziristan are two of the territories that make up the territorial sector known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which are nominally under the control of the Pakistani central government.

economic and social crisis led to a string of detentions. The main opposition and human rights organisations in the country expressed their support for those detained. At an international level, particular mention should be made of the **approval of a resolution by the UN General Assembly in which it denounced human rights violations**, and the veto by China and Russia of a draft Security Council resolution backed by the USA. For his part, South African Nobel laureate D. Tutu called on India to help achieve the release of opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner, A. San Suu Kyi.

Tensions rose once again in **Timor-Leste** as a result of the **violent demonstrations reported in Dili** at the beginning of March, during which buildings were looted (including the homes of relatives of President X. Gusmao). These demonstrations, which caused thousands of people to flee their homes, began a few days after five people had died during a **raid by international forces from the ISF on followers of A. Reinaldo**, a former soldier who had been at the forefront of some of the main episodes of violence during April and May of last year and who subsequently, having escaped from prison together with several dozen soldiers, had begun a rebel campaign against the government that had been gradually gathering support. Both the government of J. Ramos-Horta and the international community have held A. Reinaldo exclusively responsible for the chaos that has reigned at times in Dili, acknowledging that the current violent situation, even though it may be under control, could have a negative affect on the **presidential and parliamentary elections of 9 April**, the first since Timor-Leste gained independence in 2002. Elsewhere, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNMIT for another year. The mission was created in 2006 after the violent events of the first half of the year had caused the enforced displacement of approximately 15% of the population.

Europe and Central Asia

a) Europe

Country	Main causes
Turkey	Social and political tension, demands for self-government in Kurdistan

In **Turkey**, the climate of tension surrounding the Kurdish conflict remained intense. **The PKK ceasefire held during the first three months of the year, though the army intensified its military offensive in the south of the country during January**. The government also continued its diplomatic offensive against the armed group throughout the course of the quarter, demanding more cooperation to combat the PKK from the USA and the Kurdish administration in the north of Iraq, while the Turkish military warned of possible incursions into Iraqi territory in order to dismantle the PKK's bases there. **Given the increasing tensions and the debate regarding the presence of the PKK in Iraq**, in February and March the Turkish government and the Iraqi Kurd authorities expressed a willingness to meet and begin direct talks, in spite of the fact that the latter stress that the conflict with the PKK must remain within Turkish borders. Allegations of the alleged poisoning of PKK leader A. Ocalan in prison in March (allegations that were voiced by his lawyers and denied by the government) added to the uncertainty of the current situation, which was not helped by the **increasing number of arrests of members of the main pro-Kurdish party, the DTP, during February and March**. The murder in January of the well-known Turkish-Armenian journalist H. Dink, allegedly by ultra-nationalist Turks, combined with the pending reform of the criminal code, created further tensions over the course of the last quarter, influenced by what some analysts are indicating is a growing wave of Turkish nationalism.

Nicosia and other walled communities

The first part of 2007 saw a variety of unexpected news items about new walls being erected or old ones being opened up. At the beginning of March, the **Greek Cypriot government ordered openings to be made at various points in the cement and wire barrier that has separated the last of Europe's divided capitals, Nicosia, for more than three decades**. This measure, introduced in order to reduce tensions and in the hope that it will lead to a similar gesture on the Turkish Cypriot side, means that the city's inhabitants can once again meet up, offering the opportunity for both political and socio-economic reconstruction.

At the same time, the **Pakistani government announced at the beginning of January that it intended to build a barrier and mine the border with Afghanistan in order to stop incursions by pro-Taliban militants into the neighbouring country**. This measure, the result in part of pressure from the international community in relation to the worsening conflict in Afghanistan, has led to fears among many (including Afghan leaders and Pakistani nationalist groups) that its effectiveness will be questionable and its effects perverse, such as dividing the Pashtun tribes who have historically lived in the region regardless of the territorial boundaries. The financial cost of sealing a 2,640 km border, the political cost of raising the level of tension among neighbouring countries and, above all, the human cost of mining an area in which there has traditionally been a great deal of movement of both people and goods have led many to question this decision.

Finally, in order to try and slow immigration, the **USA announced the forthcoming construction of a double wall along the 700-mile border that separates it from Mexico**. The usefulness of this new barrier for the purposes expressed is probably nil. It is even possible that this could contribute to an increase in tensions and cause an even higher number of deaths (by way of example, the number of people dying along the Mexican border doubled from 1998 when a new police strategy aimed at increasing controls led many to search for more dangerous alternatives). On the other hand, initiatives that seek to bring down walls and remove divisions could contribute to a reduction in tensions and the construction of bases on which peace can be built. Nevertheless, **many walls still exist: the one that stretches 2,700 km across the Western Sahara**, a symbol of an unresolved conflict that has lasted more than 30 years, and **the one built by Israel in Palestine**, which now runs for 400 km and is still under construction, making any prospect of peace in the region impossible.

b) Central Asia and the Caucasus

Country	Main causes
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Autonomy v. independence
Kyrgyzstan	Democratic fragility, governance problems, independence of the Ferghana Valley

In **Georgia**, tensions associated with the *de facto* independent region of **Abkhazia** remained very high. The deaths of several Abkhaz police officers in Gali at the end of December were followed at the beginning of January by the killing of a Georgian policeman in a nearby city, in a **climate in which each side accused the other of initiating offensive actions and reprisals**, though it is not clear whether these deaths were the result of criminal or political violence. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon warned of the **worsening situation on the ground**, and there was also little progress on the diplomatic level. Georgia approached the Abkhaz authorities suggesting the opening of direct talks with no pre-conditions, though this idea was rejected by Abkhazia as it felt that the circumstances were not right. The holding of local and parliamentary elections in the *de facto* independent region and the reaction they elicited merely served to highlight the gulf between the two sides. The first quarter of the year ended with a further **incident involving a missile attack in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge**, a part of Abkhazia controlled by Georgia, strengthening tensions between the parties. According to Georgia, three helicopters coming from Russia fired on several towns, an act it classified as a very serious provocation. Although it did not make any direct accusation, it demanded that Russia respond. For their part, both Russia and Abkhazia denied any involvement in the incident.

There was a continuing **climate of democratic fragility and institutional and political instability** in **Kyrgyzstan**. The amendments to the Constitution that were approved in November were ratified in January, giving the President back some of the powers that had been taken away from him in November and giving rise to criticism from opposition parties and some

human rights groups. The first quarter of the year saw an end to the governmental *impasse* that had arisen at the end of 2006, with the approval by Parliament of the appointment of A. Isabekov as the country's new Prime Minister, at the suggestion of the President, after his previous two requests for the appointment of F. Kulov (who resigned in December) had been rejected. A. Isabekov's reputation as a technocrat and an ally of the President and the departure to the opposition benches of F. Kulov (who is leading a new opposition movement that is demanding early elections) marked the beginning of a year of **fresh polarisation between the President and the opposition**, and institutionally between the Executive and the Parliament, with the two main opposition coalitions calling for popular protests to demand elections and political reforms. Elsewhere, in March the **National Security Committee increased its warnings of possible terrorist attacks in the capital, Bishkek.**

Middle East

Country	Main causes
Iran	International pressure on nuclear policy, national reaffirmation
Lebanon – Israel – Syria	Territorial disputes, impact of the Palestinian / Israeli conflict, social and political fragility
Yemen	Struggle for political power

The tension surrounding **Iran** increased during the first three months of the year due to the approval by the UN Security Council of a resolution imposing sanctions on the country as a result of its nuclear programme.[10] The regime ignored the deadline set out in the resolution for it to stop its uranium enrichment, and the IAEA denounced the lack of transparency and cooperation on the part of the Iranian authorities. At the same time, **the USA accused Iran of supplying weapons to the Shiite militias in Iraq**, and detained five alleged members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who were found on Iraqi soil. Iran denied the USA's accusation and criticised the detention of the five men who it said were members of the Iranian diplomatic corp. Elsewhere, Iran became increasingly involved in the regional security situation, attending meetings with some of the top leaders of other countries in the region like Iraq and Saudi Arabia. **On an internal level, Iranian President M. Ahmadineyad was suffering increasing opposition** in connection with his foreign policy and the country's financial situation. At the same time, clashes along the country's border with Turkey left dozens of Revolutionary Guards and insurgents dead, and an attack claimed by a radical Sunni group in Zahedan, along the border with Afghanistan and Pakistan, led to the deaths of a further 11 Revolutionary Guards.

Tensions remained along **Lebanon**'s borders in spite of the ceasefire signed in August 2006, which brought an end to the fighting between **Israel** and Hezbollah. The United Nations complained about the continuing violations of the country's air space by Israeli forces, and at the end of February the Lebanese army finally responded with anti-aircraft attacks. At the same time, Israel reported that Hezbollah was rearming itself with weapons smuggled in from **Syria**. Elsewhere, other regional agents became increasingly involved in the situation in the area. Given the fierce internal polarisation in Lebanon, representatives of the Arab League put forward negotiating proposals, and Iran and Saudi Arabia, supporters of the parties in the conflict, held talks on the situation. The **continuing demonstrations in the country during the last three months between supporters of F. Siniora's government and his opponents** (led by Hezbollah and Maronite General A. Aoun) left 7 people dead and a further 150 wounded. The explosion of a bomb in a bus in a Christian area of North Beirut, which happened on the eve of the first anniversary of the assassination of former Prime Minister R. Hariri and which caused two deaths, along with the discovery of numerous stashes of explosives in various parts of the country, increased fears of an internal conflict along ethnic lines. Finally, the attempts by Syrian President B. al-Assar to begin peace negotiations were formally rejected by Israeli Prime Minister E. Olmert, who wanted them to be conditional upon the withdrawal of Syria's support for Hamas and Hezbollah.

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[10] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1737 of 23/12/06 <http://iranfocus.com/uploads/UNSC1737.pdf>

The regional spread of the Lebanese problem

Lebanon has been **split and paralysed since a group of opponents of the current government began a series of protests and demonstrations in Beirut in December 2006**. A short while earlier, six Shiite ministers had abandoned the government, denouncing its pro-western policies, mainly during the Israeli invasion of the summer. There were also other issues, such as the formation of an International Court to try those responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister R. Hariri, and the reform of electoral law.

As well as causing more than 1,200 deaths, the majority of them civilians, the **massive attack that Israel mounted on Lebanese soil in July 2006 had two obvious consequences**. The first, which has affected the country's economy, was the creation of a crisis that is still continuing to worsen, the physical manifestations being the destruction of infrastructure and the collapse of tourism. The second and more worrying consequence was the **stimulation of latent political and social tensions in the country**. In this regard, **two individual movements have become clearly crystallised in recent months**, the so-called March 14 Movement" (a reference to the date of the demonstration that preceded the death of R. Hariri), which is seen to be "anti-Syrian", and the "March 8 Movement", seen to be "pro-Syrian".

Despite the existence of these two seemingly tight blocs, **the social and political complexities of Lebanon, the historical effect of past events in the country and, above all, the influence of external agents has meant that the alliance of forces within each of these groups transcends both community and religious barriers**. Thus, in addition to the Sunni parliamentary group of S. Hariri (son of R. Hariri), the pro-government coalition includes the Progressive Socialist Party led by Druze MP W. Jumblatt as well as Christian groups such as the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Phalange. On the other side of the fence, the opposition grouping, led by the Shiite Hezbollah (along with the less representative Amal, led by the parliament's President), has support from Christian General M. Aoun and the country's President, E. Lahoud, a Maronite Catholic.

During recent months, the visible presence of armed forces in the streets of Beirut has highlighted the tensions, with several people dying and a number suffering injuries during the first few months of the year, particularly among Sunni and Shiite groups in the capital. However, there were also clashes in Tripoli between pro-Alauite and Sunni groups, while the Christian region in the mountains saw fighting between the Lebanese Forces and General M. Aoun. Some analysts have talked about sectarian-motivated violence, while others speak of a latent civil war. In any case, it is clear that the special characteristics of Lebanon and its position as a buffer state have seriously hindered the creation of a strong sovereign nation, and led to its **being the battlefield for other regional conflicts whose roots lie further afield. This time, given the current situation in the Middle East (see the roles being played by Iran, Syria, Israel and the USA in the region), the splits and tensions in Lebanon look like having a similar effect.**

There were increasing confrontations in **Yemen** over the course of the last three months after **parliament authorised the government to suppress the rebellion in the north of the country**. In the northern province of Saada, government forces have been fighting supporters of deceased radical Shiite cleric H. al-Houthi, whom they accuse of inciting anti-American feeling and of wanting to install a Shiite regime in a country that is predominantly Sunni. Authorisation to take action against the rebels was given when **supporters of H. al-Houthi threatened at the end of January to kill members of a small Jewish community** in the region if they did not leave the country within 10 days. According to the Yemeni authorities, fighting during the last two months has left 290 rebels and 132 soldiers dead (since the conflict began three years ago a total of 727 members of the armed forces have lost their lives and more than 5,000 have been wounded). Given this situation, several international organisations warned of the serious risk of human rights violations in the Saada region, while a number of humanitarian organisations reported that 8,000 people had been displaced.

The following chart lists a further **32 situations of lesser tension in which there have not been any serious changes of note over the last three months**.

Chart 2.2. Evolution over the last three months of other situations of tension		
Country	Main causes	Evolution
Africa		
Angola (Cabinda)	Autonomy v. Independence	Stalemate
Congo	Political control over different ethnic groups and democratic fragility	Reduction in tensions
Ethiopia (Gambella)	Demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Reduction in tensions
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Ethiopia	Democratic fragility and governance problems	Stalemate
Equatorial Guinea	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)	Stalemate
Mauritania	Democratic fragility	Reduction in tensions
Mali	Demands for greater autonomy, marginalisation of a minority group	Reduction in tensions
Liberia	Control of natural resources, religious manipulation and struggle for political power, impact of regional crises	Reduction in tensions
Mano River region (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone)[11]	Widespread destabilisation due to enforced displacement and the flow of weapons and mercenaries	Rise in tensions
Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)	Territorial disputes	Reduction in tensions
Tanzania (Zanzibar)	Struggle for political power	Reduction in tensions
Sudan (East)	Marginalisation of the region	Reduction in tensions
Uganda-Kenya (Karamoja-Turkana)	Governance, regional marginalisation, inter-community confrontations over natural resources	Stalemate
America		
Guatemala	Political and historical exclusion, social injustice, failure to comply with peace agreements, impunity and organised crime	Stalemate
Mexico (Chiapas)	Exclusion and economic inequalities	Stalemate
Venezuela	Problems of governance	Stalemate
Asia		
India-Pakistan	Territorial disputes	Reduction in tensions
India (Tripura)	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Indonesia (Moluccas)	Religious differences, democratic colonisation, autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Indonesia (West Papua)	Autonomy v. independence, religious disputes, demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Rise in tensions
Pakistan	Inter-community confrontations	Stalemate
Europe and Central Asia		
Azerbaijan	Inequality in the distribution of resources, democratic fragility	Rise in tensions
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Territorial dispute	Stalemate
Belarus	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Rise in tensions
Georgia (South Ossetia)	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
Moldova, Rep.	Democratic fragility, independence of the Dniester region	Rise in tensions
Serbia (Kosovo)	Autonomy v. independence	Rise in tensions
Tajikistan	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Turkmenistan	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
Uzbekistan	Governance problems, independence of the Ferghana Valley	Stalemate
Middle East		
Egypt	Political and social tension, repression	Rise in tensions

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[11] The Mano River region covers Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire is also taken into account here, given its proximity and its influence on the surrounding area. The situation of tension between the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso will also be analysed within the framework of this region.

Peace processes

- A number of agreements were achieved in Africa. A peace agreement was signed in Côte d'Ivoire that will open the way to the creation of a new transitional government. The government of Chad also reached an agreement with the FUC. Several groups were disarmed in DR Congo, and the government of the Central African Republic reached agreements with the UFDR and the APDR. Several African countries acted as facilitators.
- Armed groups operating in the Sudanese region of Darfur tried to find a unified position for future negotiations.
- The independent Kashmiri groups working together in the APHC coalition are seeking an end to the armed struggle so that a sustainable peace can be achieved.
- The peace agreement with the Maoists in Nepal has highlighted serious tensions among communities in the south of the country. Attempts to resolve them involve the creation of a federal system in the country. Meanwhile, the Philippines government has recognised the right of self-determination for the Bangsamoro people, though as part of an autonomous structure.

This chapter contains an analysis of the armed conflicts and unresolved conflicts which have entered a phase of formal negotiation, or in which a clear peace process is under way or exploratory negotiations have been initiated. Of the **39 processes analysed**, 16 are in Asia, 12 in Africa and another 5 in Europe. 33 of them involve formal negotiations (though these may suffer interruptions), while the possibility of talks is being explored in 6 contexts. A total of 18 sets of negotiations or exploratory talks relate to armed conflicts and 21 to unresolved conflicts[1]. This chapter also contains an account of the progress being made in implementing the peace agreements reached earlier in Burundi, Northern Ireland and Nepal, and there are observations on the conflicts in Algeria (OAQMI), Colombia (FARC), the Philippines (NPA) and Turkey (PKK), though negotiations have not yet been initiated with any of these groups.

Evolution of peace processes

Several peace agreements were reached in a number of African countries during the first three months of 2007 (Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, CAR and DR Congo), though there have been splits in the armed groups involved in some of these conflicts. **Many groups suffer splits as the possibility of signing peace agreements approaches**, a situation which hugely complicates the achievement of any final agreement that will bring an end to the violence and offer positive changes for the future of these countries, whether in Africa or in Asia.

Table 3.1. Progress in negotiations at the end of the first quarter			
Going well (11)	**In difficulty (12)**	**Going badly (10)**	**Exploratory stage (4)**
CAR (UFDR-APDR)	*Angola (Cabinda)*	Colombia (AUC)	Iraq
Chad (FUC)	*Armenia-Azerbaijan*	*Georgia (Abkhazia)*	***Lebanon***
Colombia (ELN)	*Burundi (FNL)*	India (ULFA)	***(Hezbollah)***
Côte d'Ivoire	*Georgia (South*	*Kosovo*	***Nepal (DTLF)***
Cyprus	*Ossetia)*	Myanmar (KNU)	***Pakistan***
DR Congo (Ituri-Kivus)	*India (NSCN-IM)*	***Pakistan (Waziristan)***	***(Baluchistan)***
India-Pakistan	***Indonesia (Papua)***	Somalia	*Philippines (MNLF)*
Mali (Tuareg)	***Indonesia (Sulawesi)***	Sri Lanka	Thailand (south)
Myanmar (KNPLAPC)	Israel-Palestine	Sudan (Darfur)	
Nepal (CPN)	***Nepal (Madeshi)***	*Western Sahara*	
Philippines (MILF)	*Northern Ireland*		
	Senegal (Casamance)		
	Uganda (LRA)		

(The processes shown in italics indicate conflicts which are not in an armed phase or not currently classified as "armed conflicts" but are as yet unresolved. Processes shown in bold are new, though they may have already existed at some time in the past)

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[1] In this chapter, the term "unresolved conflict" refers to situations in which high levels of tension, threats of a military nature or armed confrontations have existed in the past but are not currently an issue, though the parties have not yet reached a definitive peace agreement, meaning that negotiations are in progress or being explored.

The last three months have also seen **new possibilities open up in areas of conflict in Asia**, such as Indonesia, Pakistan and Nepal. The peace agreement with the Maoists of the CPN in Nepal has revealed other tensions in the south of the country, forcing a review of the political structure contained in the agreement.

Africa

a) Southern Africa

Although the beginning of the year saw a ceremony to welcome former members of the FLEC secessionist armed group into the regular armed forces in **Angola** and the burning of various items of military equipment handed in by demobilised members of the group, some dissident members continued to carry out attacks against Angolan armed forces. The slow pace of the application of the conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding for Cabinda may also lead to **further** disputes within the **Cabinda Forum for Dialogue** led by A. B. Bembe. According to members of this forum, a new organisation calling itself the Unified Commando of the Armed Forces of Cabinda, made up of soldiers who have been stood down and are awaiting demobilisation and disarmament, has prepared a document containing new demands to be added to the Memorandum and a request for the signing of a cessation of hostilities with the government.

b) West Africa

At the beginning of the year, the military commanders of the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) and government armed forces in **Côte d'Ivoire** resumed their disarmament talks as part of the peace plan adopted by the United Nations in November, which should end in the creation of a new national army with members from both sides. However, dissent arose among the FN and members of pro-government militias, who have not been included in the talks, regarding the way the disarmament process is to be completed. The EU gave 103 million euros to finance the disarmament process and the organisation of elections. FN leader G. Soro met Prime Minister C. K. Banny in Yamoussoukro (the country's political capital), and both men agreed to redouble their efforts to implement the identification process, the DDR programme and the restructuring of the country's armed forces. ECOWAS offered the services of its recently elected President, B. Campaore, leader of the Burkinese government, as mediator. As a result, exploratory talks began in Burkina Faso in February aimed at bringing about a direct meeting between G. Soro and Ivorian President L. Gbagbo. The first meetings were held separately with representatives of both leaders, and their proposals were heard with a view to finding a basis on which they could meet. At the same time, the leader of the paramilitary Young Patriots movement, C. Blé Goudé, who is close to the President's FPI party, began a national campaign for peace with a new message in which he called on Ivorians to renounce violence and work towards social cohesion. **At the beginning of March, Ivorian president L. Gbagbo and FN leader G. Soro signed a new peace agreement in the capital of Burkina Faso** after a month of negotiations. This new agreement stipulates the **creation of a new transitional government with a fair distribution of power**, a joint military command that will unify the armed forces and members of the FN, a timetable for disarmament, voter-registration and the holding of elections, and agreement on the removal of the security zone diving the north and south of the country, which is controlled by UNOCI forces and the French military. It is hoped that the first elections will be held within 10 months. The parties undertook to establish a new amnesty law to cover the period from 17 September 2000 to the date on which the new agreement comes into force, though this will exclude war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as financial crimes. It was also stipulated that a body would be created to monitor implementation of the agreement, along with one to oversee permanent dialogue with opposition groups.

In mid-February, the government of **Mali** and the armed Tuareg group the Democratic Alliance for Change agreed to begin implementing a peace agreement that was signed last year in relation to the Kidal region in the north-east of the country. This agreement sets out a timetable for the disarmament of rebel groups, which are estimated to include some 3,000 troops. The first weapons were handed over in March via the Algerian ambassador.

There was continued fighting during the first quarter of the year between government armed forces in **Senegal** and dissident members of the MFDC, though there was surprise that one of the factions attacked was the one led by C. Badiate, who in March worked with the government of Guinea-Bissau to expel the faction led by S. Sadio from its territory, meaning that **Badiate's forces effectively ended the peace agreement they had with the government**. Mention should be made of the death in Paris at the beginning of the year of the MFDC's senior leader, A. Diamacoune Senghor, who signed the peace agreements with the government in 2004 after a 22-year fight to achieve self-determination for the region of Casamance. At the end of February, President A. Wade, who is 80 years old, won the first round of presidential elections, polling 57% of the votes cast. The faction of the MFDC armed secessionist group led by S. Sadio made a number of attacks in the northern part of Casamance from the beginning of the electoral campaign.

c) Horn of Africa

In **Somalia**, **the forces of the Islamic Courts (SICS) were rapidly defeated** at the beginning of the year as a result of the military superiority of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which had support from the Ethiopian air force. The USA was involved in flushing out and bombing the last of the Islamic militia strongholds. However, several of the European countries that form part of the Contact Group called for a reconciliation process that would include the SICS, and the USA made a point of announcing that all Somalis who renounced violence should be included in the reconciliation talks. Nevertheless, the TFG dismissed the President of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), S. Hassan Sheik Aden, a move which some analysts saw as meaning the end of the dialogue that he had opened up with his opposite number in the SICS in his attempts to build bridges between the two sides. The TFG declared martial law for a period of three months and subsequently began a campaign of enforced disarmament in Mogadishu. Ethiopia began to withdraw its troops from the capital, though it announced that some of them would remain in the country until the AU's peace-keeping mission arrived. TFG President A. Yusuf Ahmed visited Rwanda to hold talks with his Rwandan counterpart with the aim of learning from the Rwandan experience of reconstruction and reconciliation. As a result of international pressure, the TFG said that from the middle of April it would engage in a two-month **process of reconciliation and dialogue** to which it would invite religious groups and leaders of the different clans and communities around the country, though it excluded the leaders of the Islamic Courts who it said should be brought to justice. The TFG appointed former "warlord" A. Mohamed Nur, who had previously been Minister of Justice, to replace S. Hassan Sheik Aden as the new President of the TFP. A few days later, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1744, which established the **deployment of an AU peace-keeping force (AMISOM)** for an initial period of six months, to act under the mandate of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, with a maximum of 8,500 troops. In March, Ugandan President Y. Museveni observed that the AU mission would not get involved in disarming the militias but would instead work on training and educating Somalia's national armed forces.

At the beginning of the year **Sudanese** President O. Al-Bashir sent a letter to outgoing UN Secretary General K. Annan accepting the immediate implementation of the UN plan to reinforce AMIS. He also referred to the mechanism of the Tripartite Committee (the UN, the AU and the Sudanese government), which would meet every 15 days to monitor the new plan. The Sudanese President later told the new Secretary General that he would restrict the movements of any UN forces that were deployed in **Darfur**. The former US ambassador to the UN and current Governor of the state of New Mexico, B. Richardson, announced that the Sudanese government and rebel groups in Darfur had agreed to a 60-day ceasefire, during which peace talks would be held on the ground, hosted by the United Nations and the AU, though the leaders of the JEM armed opposition group announced that they did not agree to the ceasefire. Elsewhere, M. Hussein, the spokesman for the SLA-Minawi (the SLA faction that signed the peace agreement), became the leader of a new faction of the group following the absence of any advances in the peace process and the inability of M. Minawi to stabilise the Darfur region. The **new armed group, which goes under the name of the Great Sudan Liberation Movement (GSLM)**, threatened to extend its action to Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, suggesting that the SLA had lost its legitimacy to represent the people of Darfur. At the beginning of February, the SLA and NRF armed opposition groups agreed to meet in the south

of Sudan in an attempt to create a common agenda that would allow them to negotiate jointly with Khartoum. President O. Al-Bashir travelled to Libya to begin negotiations with the NRF alliance, though the commander of the SLA faction, J. el-Neby announced that he had not been invited to this round of talks, despite having declared that he was willing to begin talking to the Khartoum government. The UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Darfur, J. Eliasson, and his AU counterpart, S. Ahmed Salim, held talks with a number of high-ranking members of the Sudanese government and representatives of the SLA faction led by M. Minawi in Khartoum. Shortly afterwards, M. Minawi was appointed governor of the province of West Darfur. They also travelled to Darfur where they met representatives of the different rebel groups that remain active in the region. After their visit to the region, **the commander of one of the SLA factions, J. el-Neby, promised to respect the ceasefire and take part in peace talks, with meditation from the United Nations and the AU**, once he had held a meeting with the other leaders of the group. However, they encountered difficulties in meeting leaders of the NRF in Chad as the Sudanese government would not undertake not to attack rebel positions while the meeting was taking place, so the conference that was supposed to unify the arguments of the different opposition groups and their factions in Darfur was postponed. At the beginning of March, the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court named the two main people suspected of having committed war crimes in Darfur. However, the Sudanese government replied that it did not recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC and that it would not hand over any of its own citizens. **Various leaders of the NRF and different factions of the SLA eventually met in Tripoli, hosted by the country's President M. Gadaffi, with the aim of creating a common front for negotiations with the Sudanese government**, but some of the principal figures from the rebel groups, such as A. al-Nur (leader of the SLM faction), announced that they would not be attending. Elsewhere, members of the different factions of the SLA met to try and unify their position in advance of eventual talks with the Sudanese government. They had been unable to meet earlier due to attacks by Sudanese armed forces on the places chosen for the meeting. The President of South Sudan, S. Kiir, also announced that rebel groups from Darfur were willing to meet in the south of the country and accept the support of the South Sudanese government in order to unify their position. In March, J. Eliasson declared that he would shortly be holding a meeting in Asmara (Eritrea) with members of the Eritrean government to coordinate efforts to mediate in Darfur. Finally, it should be mentioned that the Chinese government excluded Sudan, Iran and Nigeria from the list of countries in which investment by Chinese businesses would be encouraged. This was interpreted by the US government and many analysts as an attempt to put pressure on Khartoum to adopt measures to resolve the conflict in Darfur.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

At the beginning of the year, following the ceasefire signed in September 2006 by the government of **Burundi** and the FNL, members of the armed group who had been stood down expressed their unhappiness about living conditions in Randa camp, asking to be demobilised more quickly so that they could return to civilian life. The Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) charged with **supervising the ceasefire between the government and A. Rwasa's FNL**, which includes representatives from the governments of Burundi, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda, as well as representatives from the UN and the FNL, began operations in February after five months of inactivity, after a guarantee of amnesty for former combatants and after the government had begun freeing the combatants that remained in jail. The FNL must designate the areas in which its members are to gather and put forward proposals to the government. In February, the United Nations officially replaced its peace-keeping mission in the country (ONUB) with an Integrated Office (BINUB).

At the beginning of January, **Chadian President I. Déby, and the leader of M. Nour's FUC armed opposition group reached a peace agreement in Tripoli with facilitation from Libyan President M. Gaddafi**. The agreement establishes a ceasefire, an amnesty for rebels, a place in the government, the integration of FUC members into the Chadian armed forces and the release of prisoners on both sides. Nevertheless, the climate of uncertainty persisted following the agreement, as the armed group has split into factions. Several sources estimate that before it imploded, the FUC had between 3,000 and 4,000 combatant members, of which around 1,000 were not involved in the peace process. The main **factions that have come out of the FUC** are the coalition known as the Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD), led by the Erdimi

brothers, the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), led by former Ministry of Defence M. Nouri, and the National Chadian Convention (CNT), led by H. Saleh al-Djinedi. These three groups have arrived at a military coordination agreement to unite under one central command. Given the tensions along the border between Chad and Sudan, it is possible that a UN peace-keeping mission will be deployed to protect the civilian population affected by the spread of the armed conflict in Darfur towards Chad. United Nations sources have observed that the mission will not intervene in the conflict between the government and insurgent Chadian groups. The Chadian Deputy Foreign Minister said in this connection that his country would not accept a military-style peace-keeping mission but would instead allow a civilian mission composed of gendarmes and police officers. The government also announced a draft bill that would offer a general amnesty to any militants and sympathisers of the FUC armed opposition group who signed a peace agreement with the government, and it freed more than 400 prisoners from this group, while at the same time filing an international warrant for the pursuit of the leaders of the RAFD and UFDD armed groups. Elsewhere, the leaders of Chad, Sudan and CAR met in February during the Africa-France summit held in Cannes to sign a new agreement in which they undertook not to support the various armed opposition groups. At the end of February, the former leader of the FUC armed opposition group, M. Nour, was appointed as the country's new Minister for Defence as part of a ministerial reshuffle. A further two members of the rebellion, I. Ismael and L. Gong Raoul, were respectively appointed as Secretary of State for Foreign Relations (responsible for African integration) and General Secretary to the Government (responsible for relations with the National Assembly).

At the beginning of the year, **several groups of combatants signed up to the DDR process** in the east of **DR Congo**, the majority in the Ituri district and the province of South Kivu. Of these, 110 belonged to the Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI), 687 were members of the Mai-Mai militias, and at least 62 were soldiers under the command of dissident General L. Nkunda. **The Chief of Staff of the Congolese armed forces, J. Numbi, and dissident General L. Nkunda,** who heads the rebel movement known as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and who has repeatedly stated that he was looking for guarantees for the safety of the Tutsi people living in the east of DR Congo, **reached a peace agreement in Kigali, brokered by the Rwanda government**, a former ally of the rebel General, after first holding talks with the Congolese government. L. Nkunda confirmed that his militia would join the Congolese armed forces and create mixed units. However, the agreement established that the group would have to leave the province of North Kivu. At the beginning of the year there was also fighting between the armed forces and a faction of the FNI armed opposition group led by P. Karim in the Ituri district. Since July 2006, this faction has said that it is willing to join the DDR process and accept the amnesty. In February, **P. Karim ordered the demobilisation of 170 of his troops** (who included 42 child soldiers) in return for the grant of an amnesty for his group, which was operating in the Ituri district. Finally, in mid-March Rwandan President P. Kagame announced that he wanted to meet his Congolese counterpart to discuss the armed incursions being made by the FDLR, some of whose members were responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

In the **Central African Republic**, Pastor I. Zokoe, leader of a group calling for the creation of national dialogue, said at the beginning of the year that all the insurgent groups had expressed a willingness to work for peace and reconciliation. He also said that the APRD was included among these groups and that the UFDR had also agreed to suspend its military operations. At the beginning of February, **the government and rebel leader A. Miskine (FDPC) reached a peace agreement in Syrte (Libya) with mediation from Libyan President M. Gadaffi**. A. Miskine had taken up arms following the coup d'état by F. Bozizé in March 2003, and had first led the Democratic Front for the Liberation of the Central African People (FDPC). He had subsequently been one of the leaders of the Union of Democratic Forces for Reunification (UFDR), which was active in the north of the country, though he ended up being thrown out by his fellow leaders. The peace agreement provides for an immediate ceasefire, the cessation of hostilities, the release of his imprisoned armed colleagues and the settlement inside Central Africa of troops from the FDPC and the UFDR, so that they can either be integrated into the country's armed forces or return to civilian life. In March, Central African President F. Bozizé and his Libyan counterpart M. Gaddafi called on A. Miskine to persuade the other two rebel leaders from the UFDR, M. Detodia and A. Sabone, who were being held in Cotonou (Benin), to sign the peace agreement. Former Minister A. Ringui Le Gaillard, who leads the **APRD**, another movement opposed to President F. Bozizé which is active in the north of the country, **also**

signed up to the peace agreement. A mission from the International Francophone Organisation led by former Burundian President P. Buyoya paid a visit to the Central African Republic to support talks between President F. Bozizé and other armed opposition groups operating in the country following the signing of the peace agreement in Libya. For his part, **deposed President A. F. Patassé, who is in exile in Togo, requested that talks be held** with current President F. Bozizé and former President A. Koulingba.

Turning to the peace process in **Uganda**, in a report submitted to the government delegation at the beginning of the year, the LRA said that **the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for the top leaders of the LRA represented the main obstacle to reaching a peace agreement** with the Ugandan government, in spite of the fact that President Y. Museveni maintained that his government had offered an amnesty to LRA leaders if they laid down their weapons and committed themselves to the peace process, as well as recommending the use of the Acholi community's traditional "Mato" reconciliation system (LRA leader J. Kony is a member of the Acholi tribe). The LRA announced that it would walk out of talks and break off the peace process unless the mediating team was replaced and the negotiating venue was moved, following remarks by Sudanese President O. Al-Bashir and South Sudan's President S. Kiir, who said that if no peace agreement was reached the Sudanese government would expel the LRA from their territory. The LRA asked Kenyan President M. Kibaki, who is also currently chairing the regional organisation IGAD, to rescue the process by creating a new space for dialogue in a neutral country such as his own. For his part, the Deputy President of South Sudan, R. Machar, invited South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique to take part in the talks as external observers and guarantors of a future peace, proposing the UN Secretary General's new Special Representative in the north of Uganda and former President of Mozambique, J. Chissano, as a possible mediator. However, the Ugandan President initially rejected the transfer of the peace talks and the removal of the Sudanese mediating team, and Kenya also rejected the proposal for a change of mediator. In March, however, J. Chissano, the leader of the government's negotiating team and Interior Minister R. Rugunda joined other Ministers, religious leaders and community chiefs in several meetings with the leaders of the LRA in their haven in DR Congo for the purposes of reviving the stalled peace process. After a number of meetings had been held, R. Rugunda announced that **the government and the LRA had agreed to resume peace talks with Sudanese mediation supported by representatives from South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya and DR Congo**, and that the contact point would continue to be the Sudanese city of Juba, where the peace talks have been held up to now. Elsewhere, a number of women's groups said that they wanted to participate in the peace talks.

e) Maghreb and North Africa

As regards the reconciliation process that the government of **Algeria** is attempting to implement, a communiqué from GSPC leader A. Mussaab Abdel Uadud announced that a great many of the 2,629 terrorists who had benefited from the amnesty under the reconciliation programme proposed by President A. Bouteflika were joining its ranks. The GSPC even changed its name to the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb. It is estimated that the group has between 300 and 800 combatants in Algeria. In March, an Algerian court handed down the death penalty *in absentia* on GSPC founder H. Hatab, in spite of the fact that he was dismissed as the group's leader in 2003 and has issued a number of communiqués over the last two years supporting an end to the violence.

Turning to the situation in **Western Sahara**, in February a spokesman for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) denounced the decision by the Spanish government to rearm Moroccan forces. A group of supporters of King Mohamed VI of Morocco held a meeting in Madrid with Spanish Prime Minister J. L. Rodríguez Zapatero and his Foreign Minister, M. A. Moratinos, to provide information on and seek support for a Moroccan plan to grant autonomy to the Western Sahara. Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General appointed British diplomat J. Harston as the organisation's new Special Representative for Western Sahara and head of the UN mission for the organisation of a referendum (MINURSO). In March, Algerian President A. Bouteflika said that the Saharan question should not be a *causus belli* between Algeria and Morocco, and that he wanted to find a peaceful solution to the conflict through a referendum on self-determination.

Latin America

In **Colombia**, where 3.5 million people have been displaced as a result of the conflict, the Programme for Humanitarian Assistance for Demobilised Combatants (PAHD) announced that 2,460 members of armed groups had individually joined the programme during 2006. The figures quoted by the Programme recorded the demobilisation of 1,558 members of the FARC, 359 members of the ELN, 470 from the AUC and 73 people from dissident groups. The Spanish government announced that it would give 61 million euros for production projects that would encourage the reincorporation of these demobilised combatants, as well as giving more than 2 million euros to the OAS's Mission to Support the Peace Process. For its part, the European Commission ratified a contribution of 12 million euros for projects in the communities taking in these demobilised soldiers. At the beginning of the year **President A. Uribe authorised further contacts between the FARC and countries classified as friends (Spain, France and Switzerland) in order to return to the issue of a humanitarian agreement**. According to the High Commissioner for Peace, C. Restrepo, the government is willing to move forwards if a workable proposal is made as a gesture of goodwill, and if there are no terrorist acts such as car bombs or similar such incidents. Elsewhere, several Democratic members of the US Congress offered their services as mediators between the government and the FARC in any eventual humanitarian exchange, a proposal that was well received by the government. It also became known that the guerrilla group had held its 9th National Congress, 14 years on from the last one. As far as the Self Defence Forces of Colombia (**AUC**) are concerned, the Public Prosecutor found circumstantial evidence that pointed to 80 members of the military having links with the group, along with a number of politicians and members of Congress, and one of the principal leaders of the AUC said that the members of the paramilitary forces who had been demobilised were reorganising and that these groups had already picked up more than 5,000 combatants. In February, the Minister of Foreign Relations resigned her post when her brother was jailed after being accused of links with the paramilitaries. Her place was taken by F. Araujo, a former Minister who had only two months earlier escaped after being held captive by FARC guerrillas for six years. As regards the process with the **ELN**, F. Galán, the guerrilla group's spokesman for the last 16 years, was released unconditionally, and the government also granted Pablo Beltrán, a member of the guerrilla group's Central Command, the status of Representative Member, giving him freedom of movement so that he could join the ELN's negotiating team , which now has four members. At the beginning of March, **the fifth round of talks between the government and the ELN ended in Havana**. These talks had been assisted by Nobel Literature laureate G. García Márquez, though their contents were not made public. The guerrilla delegation was led by P. Beltran, who replaced its military chief, A. García.

Asia and the Pacific

a) South Asia

As far as the different processes underway in **India** are concerned, it should be mentioned that the state of **Assam** suffered simultaneous attacks from the ULFA armed opposition group in nine different regions at the beginning of the year, leaving 61 people dead, the majority of them civilians, including children. One of the leaders of the Congress Party was also shot dead in an attack for which the ULFA claimed responsibility. After condemning these attacks by the group, the writer and facilitator in talks with the ULFA, M. Raisom Goswami, warned that the people of Assam would not support anyone who engaged in attacks of this type, though she indicated at the same time that the government had not acted honestly in the peace process during the course of the last year. Nevertheless, the government did not discount the possibility of peace negotiations with the ULFA, in spite of the fact that the group stated that it wanted a plebiscite (not a referendum) to be held, under international supervision, on the question of the sovereignty of Assam. The only pre-condition that it is demanding before holding negotiations with the government is that the subject of the restoration of Assam's sovereignty be placed on the agenda for specific discussion. The Indian government has said, however, that it has not received any formal proposal from the ULFA for engaging in direct talks. The People's Committee for Peace Initiatives in Assam (PCPIA) held a two-day convention in March to explore possible ways of restarting the peace process between the government and the ULFA,

which is currently at a standstill. The organisers of this convention include the People's Consultative Group, an organisation set up by the ULFA to negotiate with the government. Leaders of the NSCN-IM armed opposition group, President I. Shisi Swu and Secretary General T. Muivah, came to the state of **Nagaland** from Thailand at the beginning of the year with the aim of pursuing peace negotiations with the government. In mid-February, **the leaders of the NSCN-IM consulted members of the civilian population and religious leaders regarding the possible creation of "Greater Nagaland"** (to incorporate land from other states, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, where some members of the Naga community also live), prior to holding talks with the government.

As regards the process between **India and Pakistan**, both countries confirmed the resumption of the peace process following the visit to Pakistan by Indian Foreign Minister, P. Mukherjee. His visit included meetings with several members of the government, including President P. Musharraf, and March saw the fourth round of the so-called Compact Dialogue. **The coalition of independence parties in Jammu and Kashmir, the APHC, called for an end to the armed struggle in order to clear the way for peace negotiations that might lead to a sustainable settlement**. The AHPC called on the different armed groups to declare a temporary ceasefire that might assist a resolution of the conflict. AHPC President M. Umar Farooq indicated that both the four-point proposal from the Pakistani President and the idea for self-governance were very encouraging. At the beginning of March, both countries were involved in the first meeting of the joint panel to combat terrorism, a few weeks after an attack that had left 68 people dead in India.

On the issue of **Nepal**, the UN Security Council expressed its support for the request from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon for the creation of a **new United Nations political mission in the country, UNMIN**, to oversee the recent peace agreement between the government and the Maoist CPN. As regards the demobilisation of the CPN, 30,000 Maoist former combatants began their transfer to the 7 primary and 21 secondary camps allocated to house them while they were being stood down. However, calculations regarding the total number of CPN combatants range from 35,000 to just 12,000. There was continuing criticism from members of the CPN regarding the poor living conditions and lack of working resources at the settlement camps, and 3,000 former combatants abandoned their camps as a result of poor logistical conditions and bad management. The government was also concerned at the low proportion of weapons handed in by combatants (barely 11%). The CPN named 73 members of parliament who were to take their seats in the interim Parliament after the approval of an interim Constitution. The leader of the Maoists, Prachanda, indicated that the parallel government that had been set up during the years of armed conflict had been formally dissolved, and that the Maoist administration that had effectively governed most of the rural parts of the country had been dismantled. **A faction of the CPN known as the DTLF stated that it was ready to engage in peace negotiations with the government in order to bring an end to the armed conflict in the south of the country**. The leader of the DTLF indicated that the group was willing to talk to the 7-party coalition and the Maoists at the United Nations, so long as a written proposal was drawn up and was approved by Parliament. The DTLF broke away from the CPN in 2004, and subsequently divided into two further factions during 2006.

Elsewhere, there was **fighting between members of the Madhesi and Pahadiyas ethnic groups** in Nepal at the beginning of the year, after members of the Madhesi community attacked a Pahadiyas town because it had not joined in a strike that they had called. At the beginning of February, the eight main political parties (the alliance of seven parties and the CPN) reached an agreement to resolve the political crisis that was unfolding in the south of the country. The agreement will mean an increase in the number of electoral constituencies and the adoption of a proportional representation system, one of the demands made by the Madhesi people in the south of Nepal. The government also named a team to engage in negotiations with the groups involved in the process. The agreement reached by the governing political forces will mean an increase in the number of seats occupied by representatives from the south of the country. Some Madhesi leaders saw the agreement reached as positive but insufficient. The parties indicated that agreement had been reached on the **creation of a federal state (as demanded by the representatives of the Madhesi community)**, but that its specific shape would have to be defined in the Founding Chamber. The United Nations envoy to the country, I. Martin, welcomed the planned **talks between the government and representatives of the Indigenous population living in the Terai region**, which has seen some serious tensions and

violence. These talks will involve a government team and representatives of both the Madhesi and Janajati people. However, an indefinite general strike was called at the beginning of March in the Terai region in the south of the country by an organisation known as the Madeshi People's Rights Forum (MPRF). This group has been involved in confrontations with former Maoist opponents over demands for the establishment of a federal system in the country. The government also renewed its call for talks with the breakaway Maoist faction operating in the Terai region, the JTMM, indicating that all the warrants for the arrest of members of this faction would be suspended while negotiations continued and that the safety of its leaders would be guaranteed. Finally, in March the Nepalese parliament changed the Constitution, establishing the country as a federal state in response to demands from the Madhesi people in the south of the country, who had felt marginalised by state institutions.

As regards the areas of conflict along **Pakistan**'s borders with Afghanistan, the head of the Jamali tribe, S. Y. Mohammad Jamali, offered at the beginning of the year to mediate between the government and tribes in **Baluchistan**, calling for military operations in this Pakistani province to be halted. In February, US Secretary of State C. Rice said that the peace agreement reached last year in the region of **North Waziristan** was not working and had failed to bring a reduction in the violence along the Pakistani border. The USA had initially offered its support for the signing of this agreement, but US armed forces indicated that the Taliban militias had tripled their armed activities since it was signed. It was also hoped that a peace agreement would shortly be signed in the Bajaur region, similar to the one reached in North Waziristan. The Governor of Northwest Frontier Province announced that attempts were being made to gain the support of elders for the agreement. According to the published text, all outsiders must submit to the agreement or leave the region. Finally, the peace agreement signed by the Pakistani government and tribal militias in the region of **South Waziristan** was left in doubt following air attacks by Pakistani armed forces. These attacks were carried out hours after the visit to Kabul by US Defence Secretary R. Gates. In March there was fighting between local tribes who support the Taliban and armed militias made up of Uzbecks.

The peace process in **Sri Lanka** continued to deteriorate as a result of the upward spiral of violence seen in recent months. Germany even announced that it would not give any more aid to the Sri Lankan government until it had seen advances in the peace process. Government armed forces announced that they had taken control of one of the main strongholds of the LTTE armed opposition group in the east of the country, the city of Vakarai, at the same time as the country's Defence Secretary and brother of the president, G. Rajapakse, said that he was in favour of destroying all the LTTE's military installations, including the ones located in the regions controlled by the LTTE under the terms of the 2002 ceasefire agreement. At the beginning of February, the LTTE accused the government of killing 89 civilians during the month of January in the fighting that had occurred in the northeast of the island. Given the current situation, Norway once again offered its support for attempts to revive the seriously damaged peace process, and Norway's envoy for the peace process, H. Brattskar, held a meeting with members of the LTTE in Kilinochchi.

b) Southeast Asia

Turning to the different processes currently underway in the **Philippines**, three bombs were detonated simultaneously at the beginning of January in three cities in Mindanao, leaving seven people dead and around 30 injured. The **MILF** denied any involvement in the attacks, and the police suspected that they had been arranged by people who wanted to interrupt the peace talks between the MILF and the government, talks which had already ground to a halt over the issue of the ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro people. In this regard, the MILF stated that it had already presented a proposal from the Moro people in response to the one put forward by the government in December. The armed group said that it had drawn up its proposal on the basis of historical and moral as well as pragmatic criteria, i.e. that it had taken account of the fact that Mindanao is now populated in the majority by the Christian community. In line with the internal protocols of the negotiating process, both sides have presented their proposals to the government of Malaysia, which is acting as facilitator. Peace Commissioner J. Dureza announced the establishment of a commission charged with resolving the land disputes between the MILF and the civilian population. In March, the MILF gave a positive reaction to the government's latest proposal, as **Manila had for the first time offered the Bangsamoro**

people the right to self-determination, though it discounted any possibility of independence from the outset. The government would be willing to grant the Moro people some kind of formula for self-governance, except in the areas of defence, foreign affairs, currency and postal services. As regards the **NPA** armed group, which broke off talks with the government in 2005, 165 of its members renounced the armed struggle in the province of Bukidon (Mindanao), handing in around 80 weapons. It is estimated that the NPA currently has around 7,000 troops. As regards the process that was restarted with the **MNLF** to review the peace agreement reached back in 1996, at the beginning of February **the government once again insisted that the said group disarm** in order to avoid confrontations with its armed forces in the south of the country, in an amendment to the 1996 peace agreement, as the original agreement had not mentioned anything about disarmament. Both sides are planning to meet in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) during July, to discuss this issue with support from the ICO. It may also be attended by N. Misauri, the group's leader who is currently in jail.

As far as the current conflicts in **Indonesia** are concerned, government armed forces mounted a military offensive against the OPM armed opposition group in the province of Puncak Jaya during the first quarter of the year. In mid-February, **the governors of Papua and West Papua (originally known as West Irian Jaya) signed a cooperation agreement and staged a reconciliation** after several months of tensions arising from the creation of the latter province, which many commentators say violates the Special Autonomy Law granted to Papua. The agreement provides for the recognition of West Papua, the movement of human and material resources from Papua to West Papua and an undertaking to manage some infrastructure items and the public funds provided by Jakarta jointly. In the **Sulawesi** region, Vice President Y. Kalla held a meeting with Muslim leaders in the central district of Poso to assess the situation of tension that had arisen following the deaths of 16 people during police operations aimed at capturing alleged armed Islamic militants who had been involved in several violent incidents in Poso. Y. Kalla, who had already been actively involved in the peace process in 2001 which had supposedly brought an end to the inter-community fighting of previous years, said that this was not a religious conflict but instead a struggle for local government power. Mid-February saw a **public declaration in which a number of members of the public and representatives of social organisations demanded the partition of the district of Poso (Central Sulawesi province) as a way of containing or avoiding tensions between the Christian and Muslim communities**, which spiralled with unusual violence at the end of 1998 and have continued through to the present. The partition plan, which has the support of the province's governor on the condition that it is also accepted by Jakarta, provides for the creation of two new districts, one with a Muslim majority with its capital in Poso, and the other with a Christian majority and its capital in Tentena. This would be the district's second partition, as the districts of Morowali and Tojo-Una-Una were created from the district of Poso back in 1999.

In **Myanmar**, **a delegation from the KNLA Karen armed opposition group (the armed wing of the KNU movement) travelled to Rangoon to negotiate a ceasefire agreement with the Defence Minister**. However, the delegation, which was attempting to negotiate a ceasefire for the whole of the Karen state, travelled to the capital without the consent of the KNU's Central Committee, and the organisation announced that it had not approved the meeting, suggesting that the government of Myanmar was trying to encourage divisions within the opposition movement. In this connection, **a faction led by General H. Maung broke away from the KNU and formed the KNU/KNLAPC, signing a peace agreement with the military junta** that governs Myanmar. The KNU announced that it did not recognise this new group. It should also be mentioned that in January **China and Russia vetoed the draft resolution on Myanmar that the USA had put before the UN Security Council**. The resolution called for the release of political prisoners, wide-ranging national dialogue and an end to the abuses committed by the military against ethnic minorities. South Africa also said that it was against the resolution, and the Indian government promised to increase military aid to Myanmar in exchange for greater cooperation in combating Indian insurgent groups operating along its border with the country. By contrast, South African Nobel Peace laureate D. Tutu called on India to help obtain the release of democratic opposition leader and fellow Nobel Peace laureate A. San Suu Kyi, whose party, the LND, called on the United Nations to appoint a new Special Envoy for the country, a position that has been vacant for more than a year. The government of Myanmar stated that it expected to have completed its draft Constitution by the end of this year.

Turning to the increasing levels of violence in the south of **Thailand**, the government extended the state of emergency in the three southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat for a further three months, under which the military can act with impunity, arrest people without any judicial warrants and detain suspects for up to 30 days. Since the beginning of 2004, some 110 schools have been attacked and around 65 teachers and about 10 students murdered, leading UNICEF to propose that schools be declared "peace zones". The violence has so far cost the lives of 1,800 people since the beginning of 2004. **The government declared that it was considering the possibility of introducing some elements of Sharia law in the three mainly Muslim southern provinces**, as part of its strategy to manage the conflict in the south of the country. However, there was a coordinated attack in February, in which more than 20 explosive devices were detonated simultaneously and several armed attacks left eight people dead and around fifty injured across the three provinces. These incidents occurred just two days after the government had said it was willing to meet the insurgent groups, with assistance from Malaysia, in spite of the difficulties involved in identifying the leaders of these groups.

Europe and Central Asia

At the beginning of the year, the Foreign Ministers of **Armenia and Azerbaijan**, V. Oskanian and E. Mammadyaro, held a number of meetings to discuss the conflict over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, first in Moscow, where the meeting was also attended by US and French diplomats and the Russian Foreign Minister, and then in Geneva. Direct talks between the presidents of the two countries are planned for May. **Armenia and Turkey said they wanted to improve relations**, which have until now been marked by the absence of diplomatic links and the closure of their common border since 1993 as a result of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, since the latter is an ally of Turkey. In mid-February, Azerbaijani President I. Aliyev said that he would prefer to resolve the issue by peaceful means, though he added that his country would never accept the territory's independence or its unification with Armenia, leaving the door open for a possible military option. He also emphasised that Azerbaijan was significantly expanding its military capacity. His statements were in contrast to announcements by the mediators in the OSCE's Minsk Group, who expressed optimism over the progress being made in the negotiations. Among the basic items on the agenda are the eventual holding of a referendum on self-determination following the release of at least six of the seven Azerbaijani districts that surround the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and are currently controlled by Armenian forces. Some 690,000 people from Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding districts remain internally displaced in Azerbaijan. A further 30,000 people, mostly Armenians from other parts of Azerbaijan remain displaced in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Turning to the process in **Cyprus**, in January **the Turkish Cypriot authorities on the island knocked down a controversial walkway in Nicosia, the island's divided capital**, which had been built in 2005 and was criticised by Greek Cypriots, who said that it favoured Turkish Cypriot patrols and encroached on the security zone controlled by the United Nations. It is hoped that the walkway will be replaced by a passageway joining the two communities, to add to the five that have existed since 2003. In mid-February, for the first time since 1974, Greek Cypriot Archbishop Chrysostomos II and Turkish Cypriot leader A. Yonluer met at a session chaired by the President of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, R. van der Linden, who was visiting the island to promote dialogue between the two communities and who had expressed concern over the slowness with which the agreement reached with UN support in July 2006 was being implemented. In March, **the Greek Cypriot government demolished the wall in Ledra street in the capital's historic centre**.

There was a rise in tensions during the last three months in the dispute over the region of **Abkhazia** in **Georgia**, with attacks that left a number of people dead, and UNOMIG resumed its patrols along the Kodori valley after a three year gap. The two sides focused on obtaining more active external support rather than attempting to tackle their respective demands and objectives through mutual agreement. Russia announced several measures to normalise relations with Georgia and overcome the bilateral crisis of the last few months. The leader of the *de facto* independent republic of Abkhazia, S. Bagapsh, stated that he was willing to meet Georgian President M. Saakashvili only if Georgian troops withdrew from the upper part of the Kodori Gorge, an area they have controlled since being deployed in a special operation in July 2006. Earlier, the Georgian Minister for conflict resolution, M. Antadze, had announced that the

Georgian government was willing to arrange a meeting between S. Bagapsh and M. Saakashvili, stating that the main condition for talks was mutual trust. **Georgia's current proposal involves updating and modifying the negotiating mechanisms established at the beginning of the 1990s**, and it has also indicated that the parties should move on to the next stage, with direct talks between the parties with no pre-conditions and the re-establishment of trust, but the Abkhazian authorities have rejected this offer, stating that the conditions are not yet right for talks to begin. The *de facto* independent region held parliamentary elections, viewed by the independent authorities as a further step in the creation of an independent democratic state, though the international community did not recognise the process. On the day of the elections, Georgian President M. Saakashvili said that his country had no intention of accepting the region's separation.

The leader of the area controlled by Georgia within the *de facto* independent region of **South Ossetia**, D. Sanakoyev, regarded as an alternative to the separatist President of the region, E. Kokoiti, announced that he was going to support a campaign of economic development as part of the strategy aimed at reaching a federal agreement between Georgia and South Ossetia. At the beginning of March, Georgian Foreign Minister G. Bezhuashvili said that he intended to **establish direct talks with the secessionist authorities in South Ossetia rather than participating in the four-sided mechanism of the Joint Control Commission (JCC)**, though this would involve balanced mediation from other parties such as the USA, the EU or Russia. The Georgian Minister for conflict resolution, M. Antadze, held a meeting with the Joint Chairman of the JCC for South Ossetia, B. Chochiev, to offer Georgia's new proposals for a solution to the conflict, though no details were forthcoming.

At the beginning of the year, T. Blair announced that the police force in **Northern Ireland** would operate separately and independently from the security services, a condition demanded by Sinn Fein in view of the past cooperation between MI5 and the paramilitaries. **Sinn Fein agreed to support the Northern Ireland police force in an historic vote**, this being an essential condition, along with the distribution of power, for the restoration of the region's autonomy. In mid-February, in a pact between the British government and Sinn Fein, it was agreed that neither IRA fugitives nor members of the security forces accused of complicity with paramilitary groups would be tried, due to what was considered the public interest, as part of the process of devolved autonomy for Ulster. At the beginning of March, elections were held for seats on the new Northern Irish parliament, the Stormont Assembly, an event that marked a step forward in the process to restore autonomy, to be followed by the creation of a power-sharing government with both Unionist and Nationalist members. In March, the British government announced that it would offer additional economic assistance of 53,000 million euros for public spending in Northern Ireland over four years, once autonomy had been re-established.

At the beginning of the year, current OSCE President M. A. Moratinos announced that the organisation intended to remain active in **Kosovo** after the definitive status of the province had been approved. The UN Special Envoy on the future status of Kosovo, M. Ahtisaari, presented his **proposal for final status to the countries of the Contact Group**, before submitting it for debate by the UN Security Council in April. The plan, viewed as one of **independence under international supervision**, would allow Kosovo to have its own constitution and state symbols such as a flag and an anthem, along with the capacity to sign international agreements and an army equipped only with small arms. It was also proposed that the province should have a decentralised regime with broad local administrative powers and that new municipal areas should be created. It was also suggested that there be special relations between Serbia and the Serbian majority towns in Kosovo, with special protection for areas of Serbian cultural and religious heritage. One of the key aspects is the emphasis on guaranteeing minority rights and, in general, human rights, with a view to building a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo. International supervision would be provided by an International Civilian Representative, who would also be the EU's special representative and would supervise the civilian aspects of the plan. NATO troops would also remain in the province. The plan proposes a transition period of 120 days, during which the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) would continue to operate as before. During this period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative, would be charged with approving a Constitution and the legislation required to implement the plan for Kosovo. **M. Ahtisaari's plan was initially rejected by Serbia and supported by Kosovo and the EU**. The round of talks being held in Vienna between Serbia and Kosovo ended at the beginning of March, with Serbia once again

announcing its rejection of the plan as it felt it was opening the way to sovereignty for Kosovo, something that it completely opposes. Russia also asked for M. Ahtisaari to be replaced by another negotiator.

During the first few days of January, the main pro-Kurdish party in **Turkey**, the Party for a Democratic Society (DTP), complained about the Turkish authorities' indifference to the unilateral ceasefire that was announced by the PKK at the end of September and came into force on 1 October last year. Turkish Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan also accused the USA of not involving itself in the fight against the PKK, in spite of the appointment of a US special envoy to combat terrorism in Turkey, and it criticised the USA's lack of action in expelling the PKK from their bases in Iraq and cutting off their finances. PKK leader A. Ocalan, condemned to life imprisonment, once again called on the Turkish government to resolve the Kurdish question, while the country's armed forces increased their offensive in the southeast of the country. **Ocalan put forward a proposal for the creation of a truth and justice commission on the Kurdish conflict** with the aim of moving the peace process between Turks and Kurds forwards. He also indicated that when the moment came to lay down their weapons, they would only do so before a commission of this kind. Former Kurd Member of Parliament, L. Zana, also stated that the great majority of Kurds would choose to live alongside Turks, but only if they were offered equal rights.

Middle East

As part of the attempt to find a way out of the armed conflict in which **Iraq** is immersed, a delegation from the Iraqi parliament, including members of parliament from the main Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish and other minority parties, visited Spain and Germany to learn about the territorial model used in both countries, prior to the debate on constitutional reform in Iraq. At the beginning of March, Iraqi Vice President T. al-Hasehimi held a meeting in Damascus with his Syrian counterpart, F. al-Shara, calling on Arab countries and all the countries in the general region to help resolve the crisis in Iraq. Also in March, the Iraqi Minister for Reconciliation and National Dialogue, S. Al-Muttalibi, indicated that he was holding talks with various insurgent groups without links to al-Qaeda.

Turning to the conflict between **Israel and Palestine**, new measures have been introduced in a number of areas over the last three months in an attempt to relaunch the peace process in the Middle East, such as the revival of the Quartet, the visit by US Secretary of State C. Rice, and the request by Spanish Foreign Minister, M. A. Moratinos, for a repeat of the Conference on the Middle East held 15 years ago in Madrid. According to M. A. Moratinos, a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian Lebanese conflicts will only be possible if the situation in other Middle East countries such as Iraq and Iran is also tackled. A few days after the **official meeting between the Israeli Prime Minister and the Palestinian President**, Israeli Foreign Minister T. Livni held a secret meeting with Palestinian leaders to present a specific and direct peace plan that excluded the traditional pre-condition of combating terrorism, as it had been defined in the Road Map. In a subsequent interview he said that his plan was based on a formula involving two national states, indicating that the Arab League proposal supported by Saudi Arabia contained some positive elements. The Israeli Prime Minister also said that he was willing to take this proposal seriously. For his part, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, M. Sabbah, called for an end to the internal fighting in Palestine and the resumption of the peace process. M. Sabbah is the first Palestinian to have been appointed Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. Several European countries, including Germany (which holds the presidency of the EU for the first half of this year), expressed an interest in the Quartet playing a greater role in the peace process. **Pakistani President P. Musharraf and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia also agreed on the need to relaunch new initiatives** in order to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as a way of bringing harmony to the Muslim world. The Presidents of Pakistan and Indonesia also met to discuss the situation in the Middle East, agreeing on the need for urgent peace initiatives to be implemented. **Palestinian President M. Abbas, Prime Minister, I. Haniya, and K. Meshal, as representatives of Hamas, met in Mecca as the guest of the Saudi King** to try and reach an agreement that would unblock the current situation in the occupied territories. The Quartet, which comprises the USA, the EU, Russia and the UN, also met for the first time in four months in Washington. However, in February, the Palestinian-Israeli summit in Jerusalem that brought together Israeli Prime Minister, E. Olmert, Palestinian

President M. Abbas and, US Secretary of State C. Rice, ended without any agreement. In March, Jordan's King Abdullah II called for greater involvement from the USA, and half-way through the same month, **the Palestinian President and Prime Minister reached an agreement on forming a government of national unity**.

As regards the situation in **Lebanon**, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, N. Nasrallah, whose group had led the demonstrations calling for the overthrow of the government of F. Siniora, declared that he was in favour of any mediation or initiative that would lead to the resolution of the crisis afflicting the country, an announcement that was favourably received by the Prime Minister.

Post-war rehabilitation
and international involvement[1]

> ❑ The plan proposed for Kosovo by the United Nations Special Envoy was rejected by the delegations from both Pristina and Belgrade.
> ❑ The Peace-Building Fund allocated payments to Sierra Leone and Burundi, the two countries that have formed the subject of studies by the Peace-Building Commission.
> ❑ The Poverty Reduction Strategy presented by the government of Liberia received support from the international community at a meeting held in Washington.
> ❑ The Nepalese parliament modified its interim Constitution to adopt a federal system of government for the country, though it did not specify the exact form that this new system would take.

The following chapter analyses **the evolution during the last three months of the 23 countries** regarded as being in a phase of post-war rehabilitation on the basis of indicator no. 4, one of the analytical indicators used during the preparation of the Alert Report[2]. The chapter is based around a number of key generic areas[3]: Security, governance and participation, social and economic welfare, and justice and reconciliation. These three areas cover the different activities involved in a post-war rehabilitation process. The chapter ends with a section dealing with the **most important international initiatives** that have taken place, as seen from the perspective of international involvement.

Chart 4.1. Classification of countries engaged in post-war rehabilitation		
Start	**Country**	**Evolution over the last three months**
1994	**Rwanda**	**Stalemate:** The process for the release of prisoners accused of involvement in the genocide was completed after four years.
1995	**Bosnia and Herzegovina**	**Stalemate:** The mandate of the OHR was extended for a further year due to a failure to advance the pending reform process.
1996	**Guatemala**	**Stalemate:** R. Menchú, Nobel Peace laureate, announced she would stand in the presidential elections planned for September.
1997	**Tajikistan**	**Stalemate:** UNTOP organised a seminar on international codes of conduct for journalists, while the government continued to harass media organisations that were critical of its actions.
1999	**Guinea-Bissau**	**Deterioration:** The institutional crisis and conflict between C. Gomes Junior and J. B. Vieira highlighted the lack of political reconciliation.
1999	**Serbia (Kosovo)**	**Deterioration:** There was continuing disagreement between Belgrade and Pristina over the future of Kosovo, meaning that the decision once more falls to the Security Council.
1999	**Timor-Leste**	**Deterioration:** It was agreed that UNMIT would be expanded in an attempt to ease the continuing climate of insecurity on the island prior to the elections.
2000	**Eritrea**	**Deterioration:** The restrictions imposed by the government on UN mission personnel were hardened, while the situation remained volatile.
2001	**Afghanistan**	**Deterioration:** The continuing violence in the south and east of the country prevented implementation of the programmes set out in the Afghanistan Compact.
2001	**Sierra Leone**	**Progress:** A National Electoral Commission was established and took the first steps towards organising future elections.
2001	**Macedonia, FYR**	**Stalemate:** The Albanian opposition blockaded Parliament, accusing the government of failing to respect the representatives of minority groups.
2002	**Angola**	**Stalemate:** The economic growth forecasts announced by the World Bank and the IMF based on the expansion of the oil sector have still not resulted in any improvement for ordinary people.

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[1] Post-war rehabilitation is understood to mean the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling the following issues: security of the local population; priority humanitarian requirements and the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees; physical reconstruction and the reinstatement of basic institutional services; the resolution of fundamental incompatibilities (socio-economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); reconciliation, respect for human rights and the fight to combat impunity; regional stability and reincorporation in international bodies and forums; and the empowerment of civilian society and the establishment of good governance through international involvement.
[2] See School of Peace Culture, Alert 2006, Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building, School of Peace Culture, Barcelona, April 2006.
[3] Centre for Strategic and International Studies, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Task Framework*. May 2002.

2003	Congo	**Progress:** The government called the first round of parliamentary elections for 24 June 2007.
2003	Côte d'Ivoire	**Progress:** A new peace agreement was signed between the parties with the support of all the different political groups and social organisations.
2003	Iraq	**Deterioration:** The government approved new oil legislation, under which multinational companies will acquire the right to exploit up to a maximum of two thirds of the country's reserves of crude.
2003	Liberia	**Progress:** The government presented its Poverty Reduction Strategy, based mainly on revitalising the economy and strengthening security.
2003	DR Congo	**Stalemate:** Implementation of the transitional agenda remains pending in the areas of governance and security sector reform.
2004	Haiti	**Deterioration:** The security situation worsened noticeably, despite increased operations by MINUSTAH, whose mandate was renewed.
2005	Sudan (South)	**Deterioration:** The government of South Sudan did not provide the funds required to begin the electoral census, which will delay the referendum and elections until 2008.
2005	Indonesia (Aceh)	**Progress:** Former GAM leader I. Yusuf took up his position as Governor of Aceh, forming the province's first democratic government.
2006	Nepal	**Progress:** The process began for the preparation of a permanent Constitution, which will replace the interim Constitution following the elections.
2006	Burundi	**Progress:** The country received significant financial support from the Peace-Building Fund and some donors, such as the World Bank.
2006	Lebanon	**Stalemate:** 5,850,000 dollars was collected at the conference held in Paris, though its handover will be conditional upon agreement within the government.

4.1. The different tasks of post-war rehabilitation

We have divided post-war rehabilitation work[4] into four areas that encompass all the activities generally involved in this process. At the end of this chapter we have included a section detailing the activities associated with international involvement, both from the point of view of the framework regulating intervention and as regards financial involvement, since this is regarded as an issue that cuts right across the rehabilitation process.

a) Security[5]

At the beginning of a post-war rehabilitation process, the restoration of security is one of the key aspects, given that the possibility of a return to violence remains long after any peace agreement is signed. Any examination of the security issue must include an analysis of security sector reforms and issues relating to public safety.

Particularly significant during the last three months were the police training programmes in Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as they were some of the most important programmes carried out in this area. In **Afghanistan**, in response to the current lack of security and continuing fighting in the south of the country, several Afghan Ministers, donors and international agents involved in security work formed the Police Action Group (PAG) and set up the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), which will restrict its actions to the southern provinces. The creation of this auxiliary force highlighted the differences between the plans made at national level and the action being taken locally on the ground. In addition, in response to a request from NATO, the EU approved the establishment of a police training mission which will be charged with extending the presence of the Afghan police throughout the country's 19 provinces.

Leaders of the different political parties in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** once again blocked the introduction of a process to reform the police. Elsewhere, the EU announced a reduction in the number of troops deployed in EUFOR from 6,500 to 2,500.

Finally, the security situation in **Timor-Leste** remained extremely fragile[6], leading the UN Security Council to agree to extend the UN Integrated Mission on the island (UNMIT)[7] for a

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[4] Ibid.
[5] This section includes security and demilitarisation, training the police and the army, protecting the population, protecting infrastructure and institutions and re-establishing national security institutions. The key issues in this area include the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, mine clearance and weapons collection, all of which are specifically analysed in the chapter on disarmament.
[6] See the chapter on tensions.
[7] Resolution S/RES/1745 of 22/02/07 en <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

further twelve months, increasing the number of police in the mission, who are there to offer support to the International Security Forces (ISF) during the process to reform the country's police force, particularly in the run-up to the forthcoming elections.

b) Governance and participation[8]

This area includes, among other things, the processes required for the creation or reform of administrative and political institutions and the development of participative processes: in short, the establishment of a representative constitutional structure, the strengthening of management of the public sector, and the guarantee of free and active participation by a country's citizens in the formation of its government.

Over the first three months of this year there were important developments relating to the **formation of a government** in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, where, four months after the general election, Parliament approved the formation of a new government composed of a coalition of seven parties. The tripartite presidency appointed N. Spiric as Prime Minister, to lead a Council of Ministers which has very few women representatives and which, according to some parliamentary critics, lacks the experience required to carry out the tasks of government. The new executive's main challenge will be to implement the agreed reforms of the police, the communications media and the country's Constitution, as well as to hand over alleged war criminals R. Karadzic and R. Mladic to the ICCY, something they must do if they are to be allowed to continue with the Association Process with the EU.

In this same area, the two houses of parliament that have sat until now in **Nepal** were merged to create an interim parliament. This new body approved the interim Constitution and thus made it possible for the Maoist CPN armed opposition group to take part in the political process. According to some analysts, this Constitution centralises executive power too much, as demonstrated by the fact that the Prime Minister has more power than parliament itself. Furthermore, the text of the Constitution refers to the country's different castes, ethnic groups and women, but fails to specify how their representation will be assured in the future Constituent Assembly. As a result, questions as to how the inclusion of certain groups can be guaranteed remains one of the main challenges in Nepal, as became clear during the confrontations that have arisen in the south of the country during the last three months[9]. Given this situation, the coalition of seven parties and the Maoist group adopted an agreement to increase the number of electoral constituencies, and they also decided to adopt a proportional representation voting system. At the end of the quarter, the Nepalese parliament modified the Constitution, adopting federalism as the form of government, though it did not go into any detail regarding the nature of the system to be adopted.

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[8] Building good governance and participation (the process of creating a Constitution, forming a government, sharing power, developing local government, ensuring transparency and measures against corruption, supporting electoral processes, forming and strengthening political parties, ensuring the independence, transparency and plurality of communications media), empowerment of civilian society (the formation of associations, development of social movements, organisation of forums for debate and social skill-building programmes), the regional dimension and (re)insertion into international forums (opening diplomatic missions, entry to the United Nations, entry to regional forums and organisations).
[9] See the chapter on tensions.

The process of drawing up a Constitution following an armed conflict

The process of drawing up a Constitution[10], a set of fundamental legal regulations that recognise the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the ordinary citizen and set out the guarantees that will ensure compliance with these rights, is one of the first tasks to be carried out after an armed conflict has ended, in countries where such a document is regarded as necessary. During the constitutional process, mechanisms are established to guarantee the management of any conflicts through political channels, and a government structure is defined that will regulate access to power and resources in a fair and just way, thus avoiding any potential resurgence of violence[11].

The drawing up of a Constitution in a post-war phase is an exercise that is more political than legal, given that it must reconcile the often opposing interests of all the parties involved. It is therefore closely linked with the design of political and electoral systems, and the ordinary populous must be involved in this process in order to guarantee not only its sustainability but also to ensure a broad approach to the management of state affairs that goes beyond the mere distribution of power and resources among the main parties involved.

The main challenges in this phase are ensuring that the key players in the conflict take part in and are committed to the process and its outcome, and generating inclusive political dialogue that will facilitate the empowerment of the ordinary people. However, in order to achieve public participation one must have an environment that is secure and socially inclusive, with the opportunity for free expression and assembly, conditions which are frequently restricted following an armed conflict. In this situation, interim or transitional constitutions that guarantee the continuation of an inclusive and open process until a final, definitive text has been agreed in the longer term offer an effective solution to the urgent need for a suitable governing framework in a country that has just come out of an armed conflict.

The most recent round of talks between delegations from Belgrade and Pristina on the future status of **Kosovo** ended without any decision being made. As they progressed it became clear that it would be impossible to reach any kind of agreement that would satisfy both sides, so the final decision on the status of the province remains in the hands of the UN Security Council. The international community is also divided over the proposal put forward by UN Special Envoy M. Ahtisaari, which has gained the support of the USA but is opposed by Russia and China. Some EU countries, such as Greece, have also expressed reticence over the proposal.

Some of the more controversial points in the proposed plan for Kosovo[12]

- Kosovo should have the right to negotiate and sign international agreements, including the right to request access to an international organisation.
- Kosovo should adopt a Constitution that sets out institutional and legal mechanisms for the protection and promotion of the human rights of all people in Kosovo.
- Kosovo should have its own national symbols, including a flag, coat of arms and anthem, that reflect its multi-ethnic nature.
- Possession of real estate and moveable property belonging to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia in the territory of Kosovo on the date on which this agreement is signed should pass to Kosovo.
- Unless the agreement states otherwise, Kosovo should be responsible for the rule of law, security, justice, public safety, the intelligence services, civil response to emergencies and control over the borders to its territory.

The stalemate that has prevailed until now in the post-war rehabilitation process in **Côte d'Ivoire** could be resolved as the result of the signing of a new peace agreement[13] that sets out new bases for the process, such as the formation of a new transitional government, a joint military command and a timetable for the currently stalled processes of disarmament, voter-registration and elections.

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[10] The Constitution is at the heart of a country's institutional structure and legal system, defining the relationships between citizens themselves, citizens and the state, and the state and the international legal system.
[11] Samuels, K., "Post-conflict peace-building and constitution making", in C*hicago Journal of International La*w, Vol. 6 No. 2, 2006. at <http://www.kirstisamuels.com/publications/Samuels%20Chicago%20Journal%20Int%20Law.pdf>.
Hart, V., "Democratic constitution making" *Special Report*, no. 107, USIP, July 2003, at
<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr107.pdf>.
[12] The full proposal for the status of Kosovo can be found at
<http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html>.
[13] See the chapter on peace processes.

As regards activities connected with the ongoing **electoral processes** around the world, the cases of Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Angola and Congo particularly stood out during the last quarter. In **Sierra Leone**, the shortfall of seven million dollars required to organise the electoral process planned for July of this year was reduced by three million. Elsewhere, the National Electoral Commission was established, and one of its first moves was to prevent more than 1,000 civil servants from taking part in any activity connected with the July elections, following the accusations of corruption and fraud levelled at them during the local elections held three years ago. Finally, a voter registration process was introduced, along with a number of measures aimed at preventing electoral fraud.

Turning to the other electoral processes, current Prime Minister of **Timor-Leste**, J. Ramos Horta, formally announced that he would be standing in the presidential elections to be held on 9 April, in a volatile security environment. The Prime Minister pointed to the fragility of the legislative system as one of the main causes of this state of insecurity, to which one must unquestionably add the lack of prospects and jobs in a country in which unemployment among young people has reached 85%, with a population that is growing by 3% each year.

In **Angola**, President J. E. Dos Santos still has not set a date for elections, while the Council of the Republic decided unanimously to recommend that they be held between May and August 2008, with presidential elections in 2009. The last three months saw the completion of the first phase of the voter-registration process, despite technical and logistical problems, though the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Electoral Process announced that the full registration process would not be completed until November 2007.

In **Congo**, the Democratic Front for an Independent Electoral Commission (FDCEI), formed by more than a dozen political parties, called on the government to establish an independent electoral commission to take charge of the process after it had set a date for the elections. Elsewhere, the leader of the National Resistance Committee (CNR), Reverend Ntoumi, who led a rebellion against the government at the head of a militia group known as the *Ninjas*, announced that his movement was to transform itself into a political party in order to be able to take part in parliamentary elections. The new party will be known as the National Republican Council (CNR). It is hoped that this political transformation will help to bring peace to the Pool region.

c) Justice and reconciliation[14]

This relates to the need to create an impartial and responsible legal system capable of tackling past abuses and preventing future ones. In short, it means implementing a transparent justice system, fair laws, criminal systems that respect international legislation on human rights and formal and informal mechanisms to resolve grievances that have arisen as a result of a conflict[15].

During the last three months, the lower chamber of parliament in **Afghanistan** approved a law proposing participation by members of armed groups and militias in a process of peace and reconciliation, with the guarantee that they would not be tried for any acts committed during the armed conflict. This law raised objections from 50 civilian organisations and many international bodies, such as the International Centre for Transitional Justice, which pointed out that more than 90% of the population said in 2005 that they wanted to see the accused stand trial. This law, which if passed will mean that war crimes remain unpunished, is still to be voted on in the upper chamber.

Similarly, the new agreement signed in **Côte d'Ivoire** established a new amnesty law that covers the period from 17 September 2000 through to the date on which the new agreement comes into force, though it excludes war crimes and crimes against humanity, along with financial crimes.

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[14] Justice and reconciliation includes transitional justice, international courts, truth commissions, reparation and individual empowerment, strengthening the judicial system, developing a state of law, providing education in human rights and supporting bodies engaging in dialogue and reconciliation.
[15] The chapter on human rights makes a closer examination of aspects of transitional justice, along with all the issues that are directly related to human rights and international humanitarian law.

Finally, the government of **Rwanda** released more than 9,000 prisoners accused of having been involved in the genocide. Those released are mainly children, old people, the acutely sick, prisoners without any form of documentation and people who acknowledge having taken part in the genocide and, under Rwandan law, have been in jail for longer than they should. This most recent prisoner release ends the process that began with a presidential decree in 2003[16]. All those freed were taken to "solidarity camps" where they will follow a programme in which they will learn about the key aspects of current national policy and subsequently be tried by the traditional Gacaca courts.

d) Social and economic welfare[17]

The phases involving humanitarian or emergency aid and rehabilitation are closely connected in this area[18]. It includes all the projects relating to the return and resettlement of refugees or people who have been displaced, food safety, the rebuilding of homes and physical infrastructure, medical assistance, social assistance, the creation of employment and strategies introduced to assist economic development, the legal reform of ownership rights and the development of an effective banking and financial system.

During the last three months there were notable initiatives relating to the exploitation of raw materials in three countries, Côte d'Ivoire, Timor-Leste and Angola, in which the two main international financing bodies, the World Bank and the IMF, were both involved. It should be pointed out however that in the majority of cases the management of profits obtained form the exploitation of these resources has not yet produced any clear direct benefit for the ordinary population.

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the World Bank will monitor the management of cacao and oil in order to see whether the corruption revealed in an inspection it made with the EU in 2005 has been corrected. The aim is to establish whether the income obtained from the exploitation of these raw materials is eventually being allocated to state development programmes and to the improvement of the transparency of state finances.

In **Timor-Leste**, parliament approved an agreement signed a year ago with Australia, which establishes that the profits obtained from exploiting oil reserves in the Timor Sea will be shared between the two countries. It is estimated that the income that Timor-Leste could obtain following the signing of this agreement may amount to some 10,000 million dollars by 2020. The finite nature of these resources underlines the need for the government to develop other sectors in addition to the gas and oil industry, in order to minimise the impact that the country's sole dependence on these resources may have in the future. According to some analysts, the government must at all costs avoid moving from depending on international aid to depending exclusively on income earned from oil and gas revenues.

The government of **Liberia** finished designing its Poverty Reduction Strategy. As the document itself points out, the reduction of unemployment is one of the principle targets set by the government in order, among other measures, to facilitate access to loans.

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[16] Since the decree was enacted, a total of 60,000 prisoners have been released.

[17] Reconstruction of physical infrastructure, programmes to support the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced people, guaranteed public health and educational systems, social security network, strategies for economic support and development, job creation, development of financial markets, legal reform of ownership, employment and commercial rights, support for international trade, development of an investment system and banking and financial systems.

[18] The aspects most closely linked with emergency aid and the restoration of basic services for the ordinary population are examined in more detail in the chapter on humanitarian aid.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)[19]

These documents are prepared by governments to analyse the main causes of poverty in their countries and define the national strategy they are planning to adopt to reduce it. They are prepared in a participative process that involves local and international development agencies, the local population and the IMF and World Bank. A PRSP is required by the IMF and World Bank in order for a country to become part of the **HIPC initiative**, to qualify for debt cancellation and to receive funds from the different initiatives set up by these two international financial organisations.

The IMF and the World Bank are, therefore, the main supporters of PRSPs, which were created in 1999 to replace the old structural adjustment programmes, which had become known for producing poor results, not only in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America, where promised development did not follow the free market reforms and privatisations that were implemented under these programmes.

While these initiatives could be regarded as a positive element in promoting a participative process that helps to identify the root causes of poverty and the potential solutions, one should not forget that it is a process that is dominated by international financial bodies that impose their own conditions (conditions that are very similar to the ones established in the structural adjustment programmes) when handing out loans, a fact that leaves the government of the country in question with little room for manoeuvre. This conditional aid undermines the control exercised by the government and its ability to define policies other than those indicated by the IMF and the World Bank as part of a poverty reduction process.

Elsewhere, the World Bank and the IMF predicted economic growth in **Angola** of more than 30% this year, something made possible by the expansion of its oil industry. It should be pointed out that the lack of transparency in the management of revenues obtained from oil has meant that the benefits have not as yet translated into significant improvements for the ordinary population.

In **Iraq**, the new law governing oil exploitation, which has been approved by the government and awaits ratification by parliament, awards the exploitation of up to two-thirds of the country's known oil reserves to multinational companies for a period of between 15 and 20 years. The agreement also stipulates that in the event of any legal dispute these companies will not fall under the jurisdiction of the country's domestic courts.

e) The framework for international accompaniment and the behaviour of financial institutions and donors

During any rehabilitation process, the number of international agencies that become involved is greater than the number of international agencies taking part in the peace process, and the relationships that develop between all the different sides are much more complex. As a result, strategic coordination has become an increasing political challenge in peace-building processes. This is due to the proliferation of agents with overlapping mandates, competitive stances and fights over scant funds, combined with the fact that the accountability of the system cannot yet be monitored in any practical way beyond the audits carried out by donors themselves. As a result, strategic coordination is becoming an increasingly important political challenge in peace-building and something that is key to the success or failure of the rehabilitation process.

The working plans detailed in the Afghanistan Compact, agreed by the international community and the government of **Afghanistan** at the beginning of last year, remain stalled as a result of the climate of violence in the south and east of the country. Although it is not just the lack of

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[19] For more information see: Caillods, F. and Hallak, J., "Education and PRSP. A review of experiences". Unesco, *International Institute for Educational Planning,* Paris, 2004. Christiansen, K and Hovland, I., "The PRSP initiative: Multilateral policy change and the role of research", *Overseas Development Institute* (ODI), London, August 2003. Ndomo, A., "PRSP rhetoric: sugar-coated structural adjustment reality?", Trocaire, April 2005.

security that has prevented any progress from being made, several analysts[20] have pointed to the fact that the plan sets out a series of ambitious targets in the area of security, development and institutional reform, without actually setting a timetable or providing any real means for their achievement.

At the Liberian Partners Forum in Washington, organised by the World Bank to collect funds to support the ongoing process in **Liberia**, delegates welcomed the Poverty Reduction Strategy presented by the Liberian government. During the meeting, the USA, the United Kingdom and Germany announced that they were cancelling all their debt with the country, and the IMF, the African Development Bank and the World Bank, who between them are due almost half of the money owed, also reached agreements on the reduction of their multilateral debt.

During an AU meeting in Addis Ababa, the UN Secretary General announced that **Burundi** would receive 35 million dollars from the Peace-Building Fund[21] in the form of initial support and as an incentive to encourage subsequent investment. The Norwegian Minister for Development and Cooperation visited Burundi during the first quarter of the year, signing a bilateral agreement with the government to support development and the rehabilitation process. For his part, World Bank President P. Wolfowitz announced a payment of 130 million dollars to support the country's budget, the development of the education and telecommunications sectors and community development.

Sierra Leone will also receive 35 million dollars from the Peace-Building Fund to finance projects aimed at creating employment, improving justice and security, providing basic services and strengthening democracy. The Paris Club also cancelled all of the debt owed by Sierra Leone and some creditors promised bilaterally to guarantee further debt cancellations in the amount of 22 million dollars.

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) extended the mandate of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) for a further twelve months. Though it had been expected that his mandate would end this year, he will now remain in the country until June 2008. The reason for this is that the country's democratically elected politicians have not fulfilled their duties in respect of the agreed reforms, as mentioned earlier.

In **Sudan (South)**, the absence of transparency in the way that some NGOs working in the area are managing funds and carrying out their duties led to protests from the President of the South Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC)[22], J. Kok. Meanwhile, local people still feel that there is a lack of development in the area, even though two years have now passed since the agreement was signed. The slow speed at which funds are arriving from donors is one of the reasons that rehabilitation work in the area has stalled.

Turning to **Iraq**, the World Bank approved a budget of 700 million dollars in reconstruction funds for the country. 285 million will come from the country's own funds while 411 million will come from contributions made by the other donor members of the World Bank.

At the United Nations, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1740[23], establishing a political mission for **Nepal** to be known as UNMIN. The mission's aim will principally be to oversee implementation of the targets set out in the peace agreement reached by the Maoists and the government. The mission, which will be led by I. Martin as the Secretary General's Special Representative, will provide technical support for the elections to the Constituent Assembly (for which it will include an electoral supervision team) as well as assisting with the registration of Maoist combatants and their weapons.

In **DR Congo**, the UN Security Council extended MONUC's mandate for a further two months[24], while it awaited the results of the consultations that the UN Secretary General held at the end of

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[20] International Crisis Group, *Afghanistan's Endangered Compact*, Asia Briefing no. 59, 29/01/07, at
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/b59_afghanistans_endangered_compact.pdf>.
[21] This fund, created at the end of 2006, comprises voluntary contributions and is intended as a response to the peace-building priorities identified by both individual governments and the United Nations.
[22] This Commission was created by presidential decree and its aim is to promote and consolidate the peace established by the APC.
[23] Resolution S/RES/1740 of 23/01/07, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.
[24] Resolution S/RES/1742 of 15/02/07, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.

March with the Congolese authorities to determine the role to be played by this mission in the future.

MINUSTAH's mandate in **Haiti** was extended for a further eight months[25]. During this period, the mission's forces will be increased in order to guarantee security and provide continued support for the process to reform the Haitian National Police, among other duties.

Finally, I. Bambari, who has up until now been responsible for the UN's Department of Political Affairs, was appointed the new Special Adviser for the International Compact, the post-war rehabilitation programme for **Iraq** which was implemented in July 2006 on the initiative of the Iraqi government.

4.2. Other items on the agenda

This section looks at issues ranging from the initiatives aimed at improving the international response during the post-war phase to aspects more associated with theory and analysis, along with examples that could be seen as good practices and lessons learned.

The Peace-Building Commission[26]

A number of meetings were held during the first quarter of the year to discuss the specific cases of **Burundi** and **Sierra Leone**, the first two countries with which this new United Nations body is working directly. Delegates at the meeting on **Burundi** concluded that the promotion of good governance, the strengthening of the state of law and the security sector, and the recovery of a sense of community were the main challenges facing the country in the immediate future. Taking these points as its working reference, the Commission pointed to the strengthening of national dialogue, the inclusion of women in peace-building, regional support and the development of governance skills for the provision of basic services as priority issues in order to build peace in the country. The Commission's immediate plans for **Burundi** are to complete its working plan and begin defining an integrated peace-building strategy that sets out the government's undertakings and the involvement that will be expected from the international community in certain decisive areas. The meeting on **Sierra Leone** made particular mention of the establishment by the Sierra Leonean government of a National Executive Committee for Peace-Building, along with the meetings held to determine the priorities to be financed by the Peace-Building Fund.

During the course of the last three months, members of the Commission have continued to discuss how this new body should operate and the aspects of peace-building in which it should get involved. South Africa's representative warned that the Commission should avoid being confused with the Peace-Building Fund and seen as a new financing agency, and he recommended that the Commission's role should therefore be clearly defined.

In the executive arena, the final appointments to the Support Office were made and a working timetable was fixed up to July of this year. The dates for the first visits to Burundi and Sierra Leone were also arranged during this first quarter of the year, though as this publication went to press the results of these visits had not yet been made public.

Best practices and lessons learned

According to the UN's Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, a "best practice" is "a way of acting whose effectiveness has been proved in one situation and can be applied to another"[27]. In other words, when a completed task is assessed and cross-referenced with the results obtained, within the context of the targets and timetable set and the effort and, on many occasions, money invested, the conclusions that result from this assessment can be regarded as a lesson learned. However, on many occasions, the workers connected with post-war

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[25] Resolution S/RES/1743 of 15/02/07, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm>.
[26] A new United Nations inter-governmental body created in response to the need, identified by the UN Secretary General, for a forum in which all those involved in a rehabilitation process can meet to coordinate the international response. For more information see Barometer 10 and School of Peace Culture, *op. cit.*
[27] At <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>.

rehabilitation tend to classify them as "not learned", a reference to the many occasions on which the same mistakes that have been made in the past are once again repeated. The mere existence of a fund of knowledge that contains best practices and lessons learned from earlier experiences in the same or other contexts does not mean that this knowledge is always passed on. The need to distil and pass on the lessons learned and best practices is a current topic of discussion at the United Nations and one that has also raised concern among other organisations.

Some international initiatives for knowledge management[28]	
Humanitarian Practice Network <http://www.odihpn.org/>	An independent forum in which humanitarian workers, academics, politicians and people connected with the humanitarian sector can share information, analyses and experiences.
Aid Workers Network <http://www.aidworkers.net>	A forum where both humanitarian and development workers on the ground can share ideas, learning and best practices.
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance – ALNAP <http://www.alnap.org>	An international inter-agency forum established in 1997 to improve quality and accountability in humanitarian action.
Knowledge Management for Development <http://www.km4dev.org>	A community of international development workers whose aim is to share knowledge relating to working practices and experiences.
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>	A research tool for people interested in knowing more about peace-keeping, managed by the UN's Department of Peace Keeping Operations.
UN Evaluation Forum <http://www.uneval.org>	A forum to discuss issues relating to evaluation policy and practice and to share methodologies.
Aid Harmonization & Alignment <http://www.aidharmonization.org>	Created on the initiative of multilateral institutions, international organisations and both donor and recipient countries, to help improve efficiency in development.
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance <http://www.jha.ac>	The aim of this "journal" is to facilitate communications between humanitarian workers and analysts. It includes a section devoted to reports and lessons learned, entitled "After Action Reports".
Global Development Learning Network <http://www.gdln.org/>	A global association of learning centres that offers the opportunity to use advances in communications technology to communicate with people working in development around the world.
United Nations Development Group <http://www.undg.org>	An instrument created by the UN Secretary General in 1997 as part of the UN reform process, in order to improve the effectiveness of the work being done by the United Nations on the ground.
Development Gateway <http://www.developmentgateway.org>	A web site that places the Internet at the service of developing nations. It also facilitates access to and exchanges of information, assists skill-building and provides a forum in which humanitarian workers can exchange ideas.
Tools for Change <http://www.lastfirst.net>	A database that contains around 11,000 resources relating to humanitarian aid, peace-building and development practices.
Eldis Gateway to Development Information <http://www.eldis.org>	A knowledge management network whose aim is to promote the exchange of practical knowledge in the development arena.
People in Aid <http://www.peopleinaid.org>	An international network of humanitarian and development agencies whose aim is to help improve the impact that these organisations have by improving the management of both resources and knowledge.

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[28] Excerpt from Redondo, G., "Lecciones aprendidas y buenas prácticas – una aproximación" (Lessons Learned and Best Practices – An **Approach**). April 2006, at
<http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/rehabilitacion/buenas/bp005.pdf>.

Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action

> ❑ Half of all the internally displaced people in the world, 15 million people, can be found in Africa.
> ❑ The increasing violence in Chad and the Central African Republic has seriously impeded the work of humanitarian agencies with the rising number of displaced people.
> ❑ The intensification of the conflict in Sri Lanka has led to fears that aid services in Batticaloa would break down.
> ❑ The lack of agreement on the status of Kosovo continued to impede the return of Serbian refugees.
> ❑ In Iraq, the refugee figures originally predicted by UNHCR were vastly exceeded.

This section contains a review of the current situation in the different contexts of humanitarian crisis around the world and their recent evolution. It also details the main events that have occurred over the past three months in the area of humanitarian action.

5.1.- Evolution of contexts of humanitarian crisis[1]

The following is an analysis of the most significant developments which have been reported during the past three months in the different humanitarian crises around the world. **41 countries currently find themselves in this situation[2]**, 25 of them in Africa, 7 in the Asia and Pacific region, 5 in Europe and Central Asia, 2 in America and another 2 in the Middle East. Some of these countries are grouped together in what is regarded as a regional crisis. During the first three months of 2007, the number of humanitarian crises fell from 44 to 41, with the stabilisation of the situation in Lebanon, which is now in a phase of post-war rehabilitation, and the resolution of the emergency situations in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Africa

During the first three months of this year, **flooding in southern parts of Africa** led to an increase in incidents of **cholera and tuberculosis**, as well as destroying large areas of crops in Angola, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. The humanitarian situation worsened considerably in **central Africa**, particularly in Chad and the Central African Republic, where an increase in inter-community violence and attacks by both government forces and armed groups **has impeded access to the region by aid organisations due to the lack of security**. On an institutional level, important advances were made in respect of the protection of the internally displaced with the signing of the **Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region**. The situation facing the internally displaced was also a key topic at the meeting of AU ambassadors, after it was reported that **51% of all the internally displaced people around the world can be found on the continent of Africa**.

a) Southern Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Angola	Return and resettlement process	Unchanged
Lesotho	Natural disasters, HIV/AIDS	Improved
Madagascar	Natural disasters, HIV/AIDS	Deteriorated
Swaziland	Natural disasters, HIV/AIDS, political crisis	Unchanged
Zimbabwe	HIV/AIDS, political and economic crisis, international isolation	Deteriorated

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[1] In this report, "humanitarian crises" are understood to be situations in which there is an exceptional and widespread threat to human life, health or subsistence. Such crises tend to occur against a background of poverty, state fragility and a lack of food, in which a natural disaster or armed conflict give rise to the occurrence of food emergencies, disease, the enforced displacement of people within the country or outside it, along with a significant mobilisation of international resources in the form of aid.

[2] Any improvement or deterioration in these crises is judged on the basis of certain specific indicators, such as food security, access to the population by humanitarian agencies, population displacements and the response to a particular situation by the international community. Nevertheless, the mere fact that these contexts are regarded as humanitarian crises automatically means that they are acknowledged to represent a highly serious problem.

In the southern part of the continent, heavy rains had a disastrous effect on crops and left a large number of families entirely unprotected, mainly in **Angola and Mozambique**, increasing the risk of food insecurity in the south. Returning Angolans coming across the border from Zambia were seriously affected by this disaster. Elsewhere, the impact of three successive cyclones in **Madagascar** led to the country being placed in a state of emergency. It was estimated that 35,000 people were affected and that the cost of repairing infrastructure and bringing aid to the victims would reach 242 million dollars. In **Zimbabwe**, the doctors' strike during January and February caused chaos in the national health system, on which most of the people in the country who are affected by HIV/AIDS depend, a circumstance that has seriously affected these people according to several NGO. In **Swaziland**, civilian groups headed by the National Committee of NGO called on the government to make use of their knowledge and experience in order to design a plan to combat the humanitarian crisis affecting the country. Finally, the EU began a joint programme with UNICEF to bring aid to orphans and other vulnerable children in **Lesotho**, promoting protection against HIV/AIDS.

b) West Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Côte d'Ivoire	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Improved
Guinea	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements and political crisis	Deteriorated
Liberia	Impact of conflicts in the region, enforced displacements	Improved
Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger)	Natural disasters, political instability	Unchanged
Sierra Leone	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements	Unchanged

In the **Sahel** region, in spite of the good harvests and extensive agricultural surpluses, a large proportion of the population continued to suffer from food insecurity due to a lack of access to food supplies, poor distribution around the markets and low levels of income. At the same time, the Government of **Niger**'s delay in building homes for the people affected by flooding in August meant that these people continued to live in tents in the desert with a significant lack of security and poor access to goods and services.

In the **River Mano** region, refugees continued to return to Liberia, a total of 85,000 during the first three months of this year. The government of **Côte d'Ivoire** also created an inter-ministerial committee to coordinate protection and aid for people who are internally displaced in the country, estimated to total some 75,000 at the present time. However, inter-community violence in the west of the country caused further displacements. The signing of a new peace agreement between the *Forces Nouvelles* armed coalition and Ivorian President L. Gbagbo, which provides for the dismantling of the confidence zone that divides the country and the creation of a programme to assist the return of those displaced by the conflict will perhaps offer the key to a solution to the displacement crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. In **Liberia**, several United Nations agencies reported that there was a danger that they would run out of funds unless a proper strategy was designed for the transfer of duties from humanitarian NGOs to the government before the former left the country. However, the successful negotiations with the Paris Club and the donor conference held in New York have led to hopes that a large amount of resources will be provided for the country's reconstruction in the coming months.

The most notable crisis during the first three months of the year was the one that arose in **Guinea** during the eight-week-long general strike supported by the main unions and the majority of the population. The curfew imposed by the government prevented humanitarian organisations from continuing to provide aid for the large number of people injured as a result of heavy repressive action by state security forces. The two-month strike had a significant effect on the economy, which could in turn have serious consequences for the food security of the ordinary people. 2.35 million dollars was allocated from the CERF in emergency aid to the country.

c) Horn of Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Eritrea	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Unchanged
Ethiopia	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Unchanged
Somalia	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
Sudan	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated

At the beginning of the year, OCHA warned that the cumulative effect of natural disasters, waterborne diseases, conflicts and internal displacement was threatening the lives of millions of people in the Horn of Africa, mainly in Somalia and Ethiopia. In this regard, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) for **Eritrea** pointed to three priority areas to which resources should be allocated in the country: infant mortality, food security and conditions for the internally displaced. The government of **Ethiopia** gave its approval for food aid delivery to be organised on the basis of a prior study of the population's needs, which would thus establish the type and duration of the aid provided, promoted by the WFP.

The people of **Somalia and Sudan** remained at the centre of the most serious humanitarian crises in the region and probably the continent. While the increased lack of security resulting from attacks by both armed groups and regular armed forces and the obstacles imposed by the government in Khartoum on the movement of humanitarian personnel meant that the distribution of aid in Darfur was practically brought to a standstill; in the south of Sudan, the growing number of returning refugees (100,000 to date, according to UNHCR) and internally displaced led to fears of a lack of food security during 2007. Also in southern Sudan, the United Nations announced that it intended to strengthen its ability to respond to the humanitarian crises by forming special emergency response teams, which it intends to use to ensure a proper handover of duties from NGOs to the government of South Sudan. Finally, in **Somalia**, the transitional government prohibited planes carrying humanitarian aid from landing and impeded the movement of aid organisations around the country. After Mogadishu was seized by Ethiopian troops, a large number of people were displaced into Kenya, and the Kenyan authorities subsequently decided to close the border. UNHCR also asked Kenya to suspend its enforced repatriation of Somalis.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Burundi	Post-conflict situation, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Central African Republic	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Chad	Armed conflict, regional instability, enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Congo	Armed internal disputes, enforced displacements	Unchanged
DR Congo	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements	Improved
Kenya	Volume of enforced displacements and refugees, drought	Unchanged
Rwanda	Impact of regional conflicts, enforced displacements	Unchanged
Tanzania	Volume of refugees, drought	Improved
Uganda	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Unchanged

The increased armed fighting between rebel groups and government armed forces in both **Chad** and the **Central African Republic** led to unsustainable conditions for refugees and the internally displaced. The humanitarian crisis in both countries continued to worsen as it was impossible to ensure the safety of the humanitarian personnel working with NGOs and UN agencies, due to the heavy fighting and attacks on the main places of refuge, such as the town of Abeche in Chad, which is also the centre of operations for many of the organisations working in the country. As a result, UNHCR called for an increase in the international presence in Chad, warning of the possibility that the humanitarian crisis in the country would turn into another Darfur. Over the course of the last three months, the number of refugees from Chad rose to around 100,000, while 75,000 refugees from the Central African Republic are now in Chad and Cameroon. The WFP and FEWSnet also warned of the possible emergence of a serious food emergency in the country. The internally displaced in the CAR are caught in an impossible situation, and in spite of the increased presence of international humanitarian organisations (which have risen in number from 2 to 9 in less than a year), many people are still not receiving any assistance.

Burundi and Rwanda were seriously affected by floods during the first two months of the year, and the WFP made fresh calls for increased aid for the people displaced by the flooding. In

Burundi, one in five people has been affected, and there has also been a serious deterioration in the food security situation. Hundreds of people have been arriving in **Uganda** from refugee camps, slowly moving back towards their places of origin in the hope that the LRA and the government will finally sign the peace agreement.

People are still being displaced in **Kenya** as a result of political and territorial disputes, which have increased in the run-up to the forthcoming elections. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, there has been no kind of national or international response directed towards protecting and assisting the people affected by the violence and the systematic human rights violations. An important meeting of the countries in the Great Lakes Region was held in Nairobi, at which the Pact on Security, Stability and Development was signed. This includes a regional protocol to provide protection and assistance for people who have been internally displaced. In **DR Congo**, the WFP was optimistic as regards improvements in stability and security around the country after a new government was formed, and it hopes to be able to provide aid to more people. UNHCR also asked for 62 million dollars for programmes to resettle refugees and help the displaced population, who it estimates number more than a million. However, the prevailing lack of security in the Kivus region continued to impeded humanitarian work in the area. Finally, the number of refugees in **Tanzania** fell significantly to less than 300,000, due to the increased number of voluntary repatriations to Burundi and DR Congo, leading to predictions that three refugee camps will be able to close during the course of the year. Despite this positive development, the Rwandan authorities announced the deportation of 60,000 nationals by the government of Tanzania, accused of being illegal immigrants.

Protocol for the protection of the internally displaced in the Great Lakes: a reality or just fine words?

Two years after the Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region (November 2004), the signatory countries met again in Nairobi in order to draw up a document that would allow them to implement the compromises reached in the Declaration. Thus emerged the Pact on Security, Stability and Development, which includes the Protocol on Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons. This is the **first regional strategy in the world to offer a response to the need to protect the internally displaced** in countries in which the overall number of people affected is estimated at between 10 and 12 million. If it is actually put into practice, it could act as a model for similar instruments in other parts of the world.

The text, which was signed by government representatives from Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo, Kenya, DR Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, places the emphasis on the protection of those who have been displaced by violence, human rights violations and natural disasters, as well as making a **special reference to communities that have been displaced as the result of the execution of development projects**, to whom it devotes a whole chapter. In this case, the Protocol states that they may only be displaced when the project is justified as being for the greater good of national development, as well as having the consent, wherever possible, of the people who are affected, setting out a series of guarantees that allow for the proper resettlement of the people displaced following a participative process.

The Protocol provides for the **adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement** drawn up by the United Nations in 1998, and all countries are obliged to modify their domestic legislation accordingly. They are also obliged to set up specific government bodies that will create strategies and act as a reference point for internal displacement in the country, with the creation of a database listing the people displaced. In this regard, the Protocol **holds the state responsible for guaranteeing the physical protection of the internally displaced, satisfying their material needs, and establishing the mechanisms necessary in order to ensure their participation** in any decisions that may affect them.

However, this thorough text, which if implemented, will offer significant improvements for the internally displaced in the Great Lakes Region, runs the risk of turning into empty words if it is not ratified by its signatory states, and if the **supranational bodies** created to monitor implementation of the Protocol **are not given sufficient power or coercive effect to force compliance with its provisions**.

America and the Caribbean

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Colombia	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Haiti	Natural disasters, political and economic crisis	Improved

The humanitarian crises on the American continent remained centred around **Colombia and Haiti**. The Colombian Congress took a step forward in accepting the principle that all governments have a responsibility to provide protection, when it adopted a bill declaring 2007 as the Year of the Rights of the Displaced, in solidarity with the more than three million internally displaced people living in the country. However, it remains to be seen whether the implementation of this bill will actually improve living conditions for these people, who have as yet not benefited from the promises of reparation for the loss of their lands caused by forced displacement and violence. So far this year there have been eight huge population displacements in the region of Nariño alone. Ten years ago, the government drew up a law to protect those displaced by the conflict, though this progressive legal instrument has still not been implemented. The conditions experienced by Colombian refugees in Ecuador has also made it necessary to send more humanitarian aid to the border region.

Turning to **Haiti**, the National Coordinator for Food Security (CNSA) announced that the recent rains and the joint actions of the Ministry of Agriculture and the FAO in providing seeds and agricultural consumables had led to forecasts of good harvests for the first quarter of 2007. The price of basic food products also stabilised from June 2006, contributing to a significant improvement in food security throughout the country. However, the CNSA remained on alert as a result of the extreme vulnerability of the population, particularly the poorest, to climatological disasters. MSF claimed that the humanitarian crisis in Haiti is one of the 10 most forgotten crises in the world, while the United Nations reiterated the need to improve the humanitarian situation in the country as one way of demonstrating the peace dividend to the population at large.

Asia and the Pacific

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Afghanistan	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought	Deteriorated
DPR Korea	Economic, food and health crises	Deteriorated
Indonesia	Armed conflict, enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Myanmar	State repression, enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Nepal	Armed conflict, enforced displacements	Unchanged
Sri Lanka	Natural disasters, armed conflict, enforced displacements	Deteriorated
Timor-Leste	Civil conflict	Deteriorated

In Asia, the attacks by the Taliban and operations by both NATO and the USA in **Afghanistan** continued to cause further internal displacements, with numbers rising more quickly than last year according to the WFP. The most worrying situation has arisen in the south of the country, where more than 15,000 displaced families have received assistance from the WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR. This last agency expressed concerns that the increased fighting and suicide attacks in the south will probably have an effect on the relative progress seen in other parts of the country. In addition, the Pakistani government's decision to build a wall and create a mined zone along 2,400 kilometres of its border with Afghanistan was strongly criticised by the United Nations and a number of NGOs, who saw it as violating humanitarian regulations since it would impede the entry of Afghan refugees.

In **Nepal**, the United Nations began an awareness campaign to inform displaced people of their right to return, and it asked Maoist groups to halt any activity aimed at preventing the return of the internally displaced. The organisation also called on the government to establish a new policy for the reintegration of these people, as well as strengthening its presence in the areas to which people were returning. In **Indonesia**, at least 5,000 people from Papua were displaced by military operations against the OPM armed separatist group. At the same time, in **DPR Korea**, the WFP warned of the need to resume the delivery of food aid to the country due to the growing risk of another famine that was heightening the humanitarian crisis.

The increasing intensity of the fighting in the east of **Sri Lanka** led to an increase in the number of displaced people in the district of Batticaloa. Up to 127,000 people are moving from areas controlled by the LTTE towards areas that are under government control. The government made an urgent call for food aid, while the regions in which the displaced people are currently housed

are in danger of collapse following the latest arrivals of people fleeing the violence. UNHCR and other agencies oversaw the process for the return of civilians in six districts following several reports that suggested that the displaced population in Batticaloa were being subjected to serious pressure from local authorities to return to their home communities against their will. Elsewhere, around 15% of the population was affected by enforced displacement in **Timor-Leste**, where the improved security seen in recent months was disrupted by new attacks on displacement camps and by violence in the capital Dili, which caused 5,000 more people to flee. Finally, in **Myanmar**, military operations increased the pressure on the displaced population currently hiding in Karen state and led to an increase in the number of human rights violations by members of the armed forces against the civilian population. The movements of humanitarian organisations and their access to the people requiring assistance were increasingly restricted in an attempt by the government to control the work of these organisations and impose their own operational priorities.

Europe and Central Asia

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)	Volume of internally displaced people, political and economic crisis,	Unchanged
Russia (Chechnya)*	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people	Deteriorated
Serbia (Kosovo)	Internal civil disputes, volume of internally displaced people,	Unchanged

* Neighbouring Republics (Dagestan, North Ossetia and Ingushetia)

In the Caucasus, the most recent data on the displacements generated by the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh suggest that 690,000 Azeris from the province have still been unable to begin their return due to constant delays in the search for a solution to this territorial conflict between the governments of **Azerbaijan and Armenia**, in spite of the fact that the ceasefire agreement between them was signed 13 years ago. 30,000 displaced Armenians also remain in Nagorno-Karabakh after being displaced from their homes in Azerbaijan. Elsewhere, the government of **Georgia** set out its strategy for tackling the issue of the internally displaced following a broad consultation process in which organisations representing the displaced and other civilian groups took part.

The UN Secretary General's special envoy for **Kosovo**, M. Ahtisaari, said that the preservation and defence of the rights of minorities was one of the key issues in his proposal relating to the status of the province. However, this was not sufficient to gain approval from the Serbian government, which regarded the proposal as support for the secession of the province of Kosovo.

In Russia, the new President of **Chechnya**, R. Kadyrov, announced that all the camps for internally displaced Chechens would be closed during 2007, and a number of military check-points in the province would be dismantled. In their place, the President announced that 20,000 new homes would be built, though NGOs working in the area do not trust this move and warn that displaced Chechens could find themselves increasingly unprotected.

Nagorno-Karabakh: a territorial solution, a response for the Azeri community

The territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the province of Nagorno-Karabakh, which began in 1988 and supposedly ended in 1994 with the signing of a ceasefire, remains unresolved. The province and several neighbouring districts are still occupied by Armenian armed forces, thus **preventing around 690,000 Azeris from returning to their homes**. These people are currently internally displaced and living in Azerbaijan.

Since the fighting ended, the situation for these displaced Azeris has passed through several stages. In the first few years, the government **did not make improvements to their living conditions for fear that this might lead to their permanent settlement** and prevent their return to Nagorno-Karabakh, seen by the Azeri executive as an abdication of their right to reclaim sovereignty over these territories. In spite of the improvements introduced by the Azeri government from 2001, with the construction of housing and all the basic services required for the relocation of the displaced population, the government's insistence that these communities maintain their own local institutions in order to favour their return and resettlement among their original communities has kept the **displaced population on the fringes, without any contact with the communities that have taken them in**. Furthermore, the location of these new buildings has not taken

account of issues as basic as the need to find work, thus causing further displacements and greater legal problems for the internally displaced Azeris.

One of the **key issues for the future of the province will be the return of the Azeri minority** in the event that the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia finally agree to hold a referendum to determine the province's status. Although the majority of the population in Nagorno-Karabakh is of Armenian origin (76.9% before the conflict began), the opinions of the Azeri minority could be key, depending on the rules determining who will be able to vote. If the eventual solution favours the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, it must be ensured that the **rights of the Azeri minority are respected, with the inclusion of mechanisms that allow them to be represented and participate** in the new state.

Middle East

Country	Causes of the crisis	Evolution over the past 3 months
Iraq	Armed conflict, drought	Deteriorated
Palestine	Armed conflict, humanitarian isolation of the population	Unchanged

The displacement crisis in **Iraq** was classified by Refugees International as the one that had grown most rapidly, as 2.6 million people have now fled from the violence with between 40,000 and 50,000 people abandoning their homes each month. Their situation is complicated in the neighbouring countries in which they have sought refuge, since Lebanon, Syria and Jordan have not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, and none of the three countries allow Iraqis to apply for formal employment. This failure to recognise the contents of the Convention means that UNHCR's work is made much slower and more difficult, since it depends on the statistics provided by the governments themselves in order to calculate the number of people benefiting from its programmes. To date, one in every eight people has been forced to flee the conflict, according to data from UNHCR. The number of refugees has vastly exceeded expectations, which has led the agency to make a fresh call for 60 million dollars in funds. The decision by the Red Cross to suspend its activities in Baghdad has also led to a worsening in the humanitarian situation in the capital.

Finally, the economic blockade against the Hamas government in **Palestine** remained in place, and approval was given at the beginning of the year for a three-month extension of the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) for the provision of funds to the Palestinian population via institutions, agencies and organisations that are not connected with the executive. The EU announced that it would resume its direct aid provision if the new Palestinian government recognised the state of Israel. Prime Minister I. Haniya made a tour of several Arab countries in order to seek funds. The United Nations also made a new appeal for 450 million dollars for humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian population during 2007. Finally, UNRWA completely resumed its operations in the Gaza Strip in February after they had been interrupted by the recent violence between armed factions loyal to Hamas and Fatah, while the European Commission announced that it would allocate 264 million dollars to the UNRWA General Fund over the next four years.

5.2. Humanitarian action during the last three months[3]

The following are some of the relevant events, initiatives and reports that have had an effect on the various activities involved in humanitarian action.

a) UNHCR strategy for the protection of the internally displaced

The latest strategy put forward by UNHCR to improve protection for the internally displaced underlines the agency's desire to become an effective and reliable part of the coordinated response to this issue.[4] The relative increase in the number of internally displaced to whom the

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[3] "Humanitarian action" is understood to mean the group of activities aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering in situations of humanitarian crisis. These activities are guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian action also includes the protection of civilians and the provision of basic aid.
[4] *Policy Framework and Corporate Strategy. UNHCR's role in support of an enhanced inter-agency response to the protections of internally displaced persons.* UNHCR, 27/02/07 <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/45dd5a712.pdf>

agency offers assistance (up by 21.9% in 2005) in comparison with the fall in the number of other beneficiary groups (refugees, asylum-seekers, etc.) has meant that in recent years, UNHCR has introduced a gradual reform of its criteria for action and the kind of intervention and response offered. 25 million people are currently displaced within their own countries, and of these, UNHCR is as yet only providing assistance to 6.6 million (based on data from 2005).

UNHCR's original rules set out much more restrictive criteria when providing assistance for the internally displaced, and these have now been reduced to just three conditions: the agency must have the consent of the government of the country affected, there must not be excessive political and/or military interference in their work and the security situation must be sufficient in order for them to be able to operate. By making this change, UNHCR intends to become more involved in providing assistance for people who are displaced internally in conflict zones, and it sets out eight rules to guide its involvement:

1. *Scope and nature of its participation* – to help bring assistance to displaced people in all countries in conflict using the "cluster" strategy designed by the United Nations,[5] assuming a leadership role in the areas of protection, emergency refuge and the coordination and management of camps.
2. *State responsibility* – to insist that it is the duty of the state to protect its citizens, and therefore to work with institutions so that they can exercise their responsibility and ensure the end of a culture of impunity.
3. *Association* – UNHCR believes it is important to work with local groups and NGOs and improve inter-agency coordination, thus avoiding any overlapping duties and providing a flexible and reliable response.
4. *Protection and human rights* – to combine preventive and reactive strategies to deal with the abuses that the displaced population may suffer, as well as ensuring compliance with International Humanitarian Law and human rights regulations.
5. *Sustainable solutions* – including voluntary return, integration in the area of displacement or voluntary settlement in other countries.
6. *Mainstreaming of gender and age* – to give an adequate response, based on the needs of different groups.
7. *Community participation* – to facilitate the involvement of displaced people in the decisions that affect them, avoiding any discrimination.
8. *The internally displaced and refugees* – to guarantee that the protection and assistance received by the displaced is comparable to that received by refugees, and that the actions taken in response to the problems of the internally displaced do not work to the detriment of the actions taken in relation to refugees in the same country. Likewise, to ensure that the right of the displaced to seek refuge and apply for asylum in another country is respected.

This strategy also emphasises the close relationship that exists between the pursuit of peace and the conditions facing those displaced by the conflict, to the extent that a conflict is not over until a complete and integrated solution has been found that allows those affected by displacement to return to their homes and receive compensation. The organisation also warns that the response provided to this type of situation up to the present has merely offered partial and unsystematic solutions.

b) The response from donors over the last three months

The following table illustrates the **trends shown by donors on a quarterly basis** both as regards overall humanitarian aid and in relation to the United Nations Humanitarian Appeals process.

The United Nations appeal seeking a response for the people affected by the severe floods in Mozambique (140,000 people displaced, 285,000 affected by the loss of harvests in central provinces, the risk of a food crisis) succeeded in gathering almost all the funds requested in just a month, accounting for 38% of the total aid promised by donors. After this emergency appeal

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[5] United Nations strategy designed to improve the coordination of the work being performed by different agencies and coordination between agencies and the NGOs present on the ground, in order to avoid overlapping and to improve the quality of the response offered in humanitarian emergency situations.

come the serious humanitarian crises in Central Africa (Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic), along with Burundi.

	Main Humanitarian Appeals[1]	Main bodies receiving aid[2]	Main sectors receiving aid[3]	Main donors[4]	TOTAL[5]
Table 5.1 - Response from donors during the last three months					
Aid provided via the United Nations[6]	1.- Mozambique Flash Appeal (38%) 2.- Sudan (23%) 3.- Chad (22%) 4.- Burundi (16%) 5.- CAR (16%)	1.- WFP 2.- Common Fund 3.- UNICEF 4.- FAO 5.- UNHCR	1.-Food 2.- Agriculture 3.- Coordination 4.- Refuge and non-food assistance 5.- Multisector	1.- USA (51.6%) 2.- Transfer[8] (10.3%) 3.- Sweden (9.7%) 4.- CERF (7.4%) 5.- Holland (5.8%)	556 million dollars
Overall Humanitarian Aid[7]		1.- WFP 2.- UNHCR 3.- Common Fund 4.- UNICEF 5.- ICRC	1.- Food 2.- Not specified 3.- Multisector 4.- Coordination 5.- Health	1.- USA (40.4%) 2.- Holland (11.4%) 3.- Sweden (8.6%) 4.- Transfer[8] (7.3%) 5.- Ireland (6.9%)	791 million dollars
1 Made every year by the United Nations. The percentage shows the ones that have so far attracted the most financing from the international community, regardless of the amount requested. 2 United Nations agencies or NGOs that have so far attracted the majority of aid. 3 Main sectors in which agencies or NGOs have decided to focus aid. 4 Donors who have provided the largest amount of aid, regardless of their GDP. 5 Total amount provided for humanitarian crises up to 15 March 2007. 6 Multilateral humanitarian aid. 7 Humanitarian aid provided outside the United Nations framework. 8 Funds made available by donors during last year and carried over to this year					

Source: Reliefweb, www.reliefweb.int/fts

In terms of the main recipients, the WFP remains at the top of the list both in terms of overall aid and as regards the aid managed by the United Nations. This is a clear illustration of the importance of food aid as part of the humanitarian response. Although it has been demonstrated that the simple provision of food aid does not help to provide a sustainable solution to people in a situation of vulnerability, this sector continued to receive the largest percentage of funds. Particularly notable is the fact that agriculture is one of the areas that has received most funding during the last three months, a fact that may have resulted from the programmes run by the FAO aimed at improving food security in several countries and recovering agricultural land affected by natural disasters.

Finally, as far as donors are concerned, the USA is still the country that donates the largest amount of funds both overall and through the United Nations, though particular mention should be made of the increasingly important donations being made by countries such as Holland, Ireland and Sweden, which are among the five largest donors in the world in spite of their much lower GDPs. As regards the amounts paid in bilateral arrangements or through financial institutions, we should mention that these donations or loans are frequently subject to compliance with certain requirements by the recipient country, which can take the form of adopting measures to liberalise their markets (IMF poverty reduction strategies) or implementing government reforms. Humanitarian aid is therefore used, on occasion, as a strategy aimed at achieving political and economic results that are a long way removed from the ultimate aim of protecting the lives of people affected by a crisis situation, and subsequently becomes just another means of exerting pressure.

Disarmament

> ❑ The Control Arms campaign has begun a People's Consultation to run parallel to the consultation process that the UN Secretary General is carrying out among world states.
> ❑ The Oslo Conference, organised by the government of Norway, gained an undertaking from 46 countries to implement an International Ban on Cluster Munitions in 2008.
> ❑ The draft arms trading bill in Spain raised criticism from some NGOs that wanted to see greater controls over exports.
> ❑ The School of Peace Culture presented a comparative analysis of the DDR programmes running in 2006, which involved a total of 1.2 million combatants in 22 countries at a cost of around 2,000 million dollars.

This chapter contains an analysis of issues relating to disarmament, beginning with a study of the way in which small arms have proliferated over the last quarter, with particular emphasis on the international initiatives implemented within the framework of the United Nations and the more important events that have occurred in the different regional contexts. Particular attention is also paid to the different aspects of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programs, both from the point of view of international initiatives and in terms of the progress made in the individual contexts in which programmes of this type are being pursued.

6.1. Proliferation of small arms

The first part of this chapter is divided into three sub-sections. The first focuses on the issues relating to small arms that have been discussed at the **United Nations** over the last three months, the second deals with the **most important initiatives implemented at an international level** on the basis of studies and projects completed outside the United Nations structure, while the third deals with the **most notable events of the last quarter**, i.e. the way in which contexts affected by small arms issues have evolved.

a) The United Nations

The opening of the **United Nations Conference on Disarmament** for 2007 coincided with the initial restructuring proposal from the UN Secretary General, under which the **Department for Disarmament Affairs** (DDA) would play a less important role within the UN structure and fall under the control of the **Department of Political Affairs**. However, this proposal led to a great many protests, particularly among the Non-Aligned Countries Movement and many civilian groups, and was therefore eventually modified so that DDA will become the responsibility of the **Secretary General's Office**.

Elsewhere, according to a report from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (**UNIDIR**), around 660 million dollars were invested in the implementation of 600 programmes in 94 countries as part of the **Action Programme** on small arms between 2001 and 2005.[1] **Two thirds of these funds were invested in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes** for former combatants. The report recommended that a National Commission or a National Action Plan be created to implement each Action Programme, report on the activities carried out, support the most affected states through donor contributions, create international mechanisms to centralise information and clearly define the resources necessary, and take a multi-faceted approach to problems associated with small arms. Likewise, another study carried out by UNIDIR and the Swiss research centre **Small Arms Survey** found that an **international instrument to prevent the illegal broking of small arms deals** could significantly reduce the illegal trade in this kind of weapon.[2]

These reports underlined the need for increased **efforts** and greater **resources** in order to eradicate the serious effects of the uncontrolled use of small arms, which should include not only the approval and implementation of an **International Arms Trade Treaty** but also the implementation of a wide range of

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[1] Maze, K.; Parker, S.; *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. Findings of a Global Survey.* UNIDIR, 2006, at <http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-ouvrage.php?ref_ouvrage=92-9045-006-B-en>.
[2] UNIDIR: *Developing a Mechanism to Prevent Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons. Scope and implications.* UNIDIR; 2007, at <http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-ouvrage.php?ref_ouvrage=978-92-9045-188-4-en>.

measures with a variety of aims: the **reduction of demand** (identifying the reasons that give rise to a need to possess weapons, creating sustainable alternatives, etc.), the **control of stocks** (laws restricting the use and carrying of small arms, etc.) and the **rationalisation of surpluses** (the collection, storage and destruction of weapons).

b) International initiatives

After the approval of the initial research into an **International Arms Trade Treaty** at the United Nations[3], the "**Arms Control**" campaign began a **Worldwide People's Consultation** on the Treaty, which will run parallel to the UN Secretary General's consultation process among world states. The aim of the Control Arms Consultation is to ensure a high level of response to the Secretary General from individual states and guarantee that the opinions of all the different people involved, not just politicians, will be heard during the process to draw up the Treaty. The Consultation will be carried out at community, national and worldwide level in around 40 countries and will serve to counter the political dimension in the debate over the importance of implementing a Treaty of this kind. In order to reinforce this People's Consultation, the Arms Trade Treaty Managing Committee published a policy document on the treaty to assist national governments in preparing the observations that they are supposed to submit to the UN Secretary General by 30 April.[4]

The government of **Norway** organised an international conference to support an International Treaty to ban the use of cluster munitions from 2008. The Conference was attended by representatives from 49 countries and more than 100 civilian organisations. At its close, 46 of the 49 participating countries signed a **Treaty** governing the implementation by the end of 2008 of an **international instrument banning the use, production, transfer and storage of cluster munitions** and compelling each country to take the steps required to get rid of these weapons. The conference was not attended by some of the world's main arms producers, such as China, the USA, Israel and Russia. Other countries such as Australia, India and Pakistan were also absent, arguing that this issue should be dealt with in other fora, such as the UN's Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). More specifically, the government of the **USA** defended the use of cluster bombs as a military option, even though it knows that this is an issue of grave concern in humanitarian circles. Furthermore, the country argued that it had already taken measures to prevent the threat that could be posed by this kind of weapon, such as the inclusion of better technology and clear rules on how they should be used. In short, both the characteristics of the cluster bombs themselves and the process being pursued for their eradication bear certain parallels with the **anti-personnel mine** issue.

What are cluster munitions?

Cluster bombs are a type of device comprising a "container" which can be launched from land, air or sea and which opens in flight, spreading several dozen or several hundred smaller munitions over broad areas which then detonate on contact with the ground. This kind of weapon has an indiscriminate impact that particularly affects the civilian population, given the wide areas over which they spread their contents and the high percentage (between 5 and 30%) of smaller munitions that fail to explode on impact, in spite of the security devices that theoretically deactivate them immediately. At the present time, **34 countries are manufacturing cluster bombs and 73 retain stores** of these weapons. They have been used since the 1960s in a number of armed conflicts and have been more recently deployed in the conflicts in **Afghanistan** and **Iraq** and in the **attacks by Israel on the south of Lebanon** in August 2006. There is currently no specific ban on these weapons, even though they represent a clear violation of International Humanitarian Law, which prohibits indiscriminate attacks, i.e. attacks on the civilian population.[5]

Examining issues region by region, and beginning in Africa, the first consultative conference on the implementation of the **ECOWAS Small Arms Programme** was held in **Ghana** and attended by political and civilian representatives from all the organisation's member states. A package of measures was agreed that could serve as a guide for member states when drawing up common policy on controlling the millions of small arms circulating in the region. A similar initiative took place in **Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region**, where members of parliament and civilian organisations met in Ethiopia with a common undertaking to implement the **Nairobi Protocol** for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms. More specifically, participants at the Conference undertook to formalise legal structures to

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[3] For more information, see School of Peace Culture, *Alert 2007! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building*, Icaria, 2007.
[4] Control Arms; Assessing the Feasibility, Scope and Parameters of an Arms Trade Treaty: the NGO Perspective, March 2007, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGACT300032007?open&of=ENG-390
[5] Greenpeace, *Bombas de Racimo, la lluvia de acero. Razones para la prohibición* [Cluster bombs, steel rain. Reasons for a ban] (in Spanish), Greenpeace, 2006, en <http://www.greenpeace.org/espana/reports/informe-bombas-de-racimo-la-l>.

implement the protocol, underlining the need to provide resources and alternatives for the improvement of domestic measures through the systematisation of negotiating mechanisms and collaboration between individual states. In **Guinea Bissau**, the armed forces announced their intention to launch an operation to seize any small arms being carried illegally in order to prevent the outbreak of more violent incidents and further insecurity. In **Rwanda**, the government ended an investigation into private security agencies that it had begun as the result of growing concerns over the uncontrolled use of munitions by these companies. This investigation led to the imposition of a veto on several companies, which were required to provide greater guarantees that weapons would be used in accordance with domestic legislation.

Although UN member states were unable to reach a consensus on the measures that should be implemented worldwide, a certain degree of progress was seen at national level. A good example of this can be seen among countries in the Americas, particularly Argentina and Brazil.[6] The Congress in **Argentina** approved a new arms control law that established a number of incentives to dissuade ordinary members of the public from carrying weapons. The project was drawn up on the basis of lessons learned in Mendoza province, and will focus on three main areas: restructuring the system to control activities in which firearms are used, intensifying efforts to combat the illegal arms trade and reducing the number of weapons in civilian hands. In this connection, a recent poll carried out in **El Salvador** showed that 96% of people regarded firearms as dangerous and 69% supported a ban on carrying such weapons. Initiatives such as these will serve to remedy the loopholes in the general legislation governing this area in **Latin America** and **Central America**. These regions, which according to the Swiss organisation Small Arms Survey account for 40% of all homicides committed with firearms in the world, were the first to adopt a definition of what constitutes a firearm and approve regional arms control instruments.

In Asia, a study by Cambodia's Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR) revealed a reduction of 17.5% in armed incidents in **Cambodia** during 2006 as compared with the previous year. The WGWR attributed this fall to improvements in national arms legislation in 2006 and other arms control strategies. The Electoral Commission in the **Philippines** announced that more than 2,000 people were exempt from the strengthened laws that had applied since the beginning of the year on the use and carrying of weapons, in order to prevent violence during the forthcoming elections of 14 May. The police also announced that they had confiscated almost 500 firearms as a result of the application of this legislation.

In the **Middle East**, the UN Secretary General's Special Adviser, M. Williams, informed Lebanese officials of the Israeli government's concerns over the possible smuggling of weapons, specifically bombs, from Syria to Lebanon. He called on all countries in the region to make a strict undertaking to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which requires the dismantling of all operating militias and the prevention of weapons smuggling into Lebanon.

In **Europe**, the British research centre Saferworld published two reports on the controls on arms transfers in **Romania** and **Bulgaria** when the two countries became full members of the EU at the beginning of 2007. There have been clear improvements in these controls over the last 10 years, but there is still a certain degree of concern over the lack of transparency in arms sales by both Bulgaria and Romania to countries in which continuing armed conflicts and human rights violations are reported.[7]

The **Spanish government**'s Council of Ministers approved a draft arms trading bill. In general terms, the draft bill included consideration of human rights violations when authorising the export of weapons and dual-purpose materials.[8] However, the text proposed that a hard line should not be taken as regards compliance with the EU Code of Conduct. In response to this, the NGOs **Amnesty International, Greenpeace and Intermón Oxfam** published a report in which they declared that, while the elevation of the rules on arms trading to the status of law represented an important step forward, it did not substantially improve the transparency of the official information available in this regard, and it also failed to clarify the criteria to be used when granting or refusing authorisation.[9] The three NGOs called for greater controls on the foreign trading of defence and dual-purpose material (taking account of the best practices followed by other countries), with an increase in the degree of transparency of official information, a limit on the discretionary powers of the Inter-Ministerial Regulatory Board on Foreign Trade in the Area of Defence and Dual-Purpose Material, and the creation of new parliamentary control

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[6] For more information on the instability in Venezuela and human rights violations in Morocco, see School of Peace Culture, *Alert 2006! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building*, Icaria, 2006.

[7] See the complete reports at <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/newslist.php?lang=en&id=331>.

[8] Dual-purpose material is understood to mean items that can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

[9] Amnesty International, *Greenpeace* and Intermón Oxfam; *Comercio de Armas en España: una ley con agujeros* [Arms Dealing in Spain: A Law with Loopholes] 2007 (in Spanish), at <http://www.controlarms.org/es/descarga/informe15.htm>.

mechanisms to allow the export of weapons to the wrong location to be stopped, where appropriate, before it has actually taken place. A further example of the lack of transparency and controls can be seen in the fact that the most recent statistics on exports that are available refer to the first half of 2006.

A brief analysis of Spanish arms sales during the first half of 2006

At the end of February this year, the Spanish government published a report on **arms exports** during the **first six months of 2006**, i.e. more than seven months after the sales had been completed, thus preventing **any analysis of the figures from having a preventive effect**. The total value of exports during this period was **438.9 million euros**, i.e. **greater than the figure for the whole of 2005**. This spectacular increase is accounted for by the delivery of a frigate to **Norway**.

If we make a more detailed analysis for each buyer country, although the majority of sales went to countries within the EU with which Spain has specific joint weapons programmes, there are two cases in which the exports that have been made (or are about to be made) have raised questions regarding compliance with the **EU Code of Conduct**:[10] Morocco and Venezuela. In the case of **Morocco**, (which took delivery in the first half of 2006 of 135 all-terrain vehicles and signed an order for 2,000 further vehicles), doubts over compliance with the Code arise from the regional instability that may be caused by the arms trade, particularly in the Western Sahara and the process for determining the status of this territory. Spain also sold 3.2 million euros worth of small arms munitions and is due to deliver eight patrol vehicles (the sale of which was agreed in 2005) to **Venezuela**, a country that is still suffering underlying tensions due to several governance problems.[11]

6.2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

The first part of the following section contains an analysis of the advances made (or the current stage reached) in the main international initiatives seen during the last twelve months, and this is followed by a list of the most important events of the last three months in the area relating to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.

a) Comparative analysis of DDR programmes during 2006

According to a study by the **School of Peace Culture**, in 2006 **around 1,250,000 former combatants** were taking part in one way or another in one of the stages of a DDR programme in the 22 countries analysed.[12] 40% of these had signed up to programmes to reduce the number of regular armed forces, while the rest formed part of programmes for the disarmament and demobilisation of armed opposition or paramilitary groups (around 780,000). The number of **children in the armed groups** being demobilised is frequently very high, it being common for them to represent around **8%** of the total number of combatants. **More than half of the combatants awaiting demobilisation** are found in just seven African countries, in which 16 of the 22 current DDR programmes are taking place, making this the preferential area for these processes. To date, no DDR programme has given exclusively positive results, and **deficiencies have been observed in a variety of areas**, whether as a result of defective planning, the failure to take sufficient account of the most vulnerable groups or ineffective monitoring and assessment mechanisms.

In order to **implement these programmes**, it has been decided in the majority of cases (13) to create a **National DDR Commission (NDDRC)** or some similar body in which the military component plays a predominant role, either because the Commission itself is coordinated by the country in question's Defence Ministry, or because it includes a military Sub-Commission. More specifically, responsibility for the operational bodies falls in 13 cases to a combination of national and international bodies, while in a further seven cases power is solely in domestic hands.

International bodies are frequently involved in the implementation of DDR programmes. The **World Bank**, **UNDP** and **UNICEF** are the agencies that most frequently take part in this type of programme. **United**

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[10] The Code of Conduct on arms exports is a set of regulations approved by the Council of Europe in 1998, which includes the implementation of eight criteria intended to govern policy on the export of arms between member states. Among other things, these criteria fundamentally establish that arms will not be exported to countries engaged in armed conflict or countries with a record of human rights violations.

[11] For more information, see School of Peace Culture, *Alert 2007! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-Building*, Icaria, 2007.

[12] School of Peace Culture; *Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in the World during 2006*, March 2007, at <http://www.escolapau.org/castellano/programas/ddr.htm>.

Nations agencies were also found to be involved in the processes in all the countries analysed. With an **overall average of three international agencies per country, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire** and **Uganda** are the countries in which the largest number of international bodies are involved in DDR, with five in each process, while **Colombia** and **Chad** are the ones with the lowest level of international involvement. **Seven** of the cases examined involved a **United Nations peace-keeping mission**. At the end of 2006, these missions included 65.700 United Nations personnel, 1,300 fewer than in 2005. These were mostly military personnel, and the total budget for all these missions combined was 4,223 million dollars for the year, 446 million more than the previous year. The **cost of peace-keeping operations** in the countries in which DDR programmes have been implemented is **more than double the total cost of DDR** for the countries analysed in this study, and some **five times more than the cost of DDR** in the seven countries in which this kind of mission operates.

It is estimated that the total cost of the 22 DDR programmes amounts to **2,000 million dollars**, at an average of **1,570 dollars per demobilised person**, **three times higher than the average per capita income in these countries**. The initial stages of **disarmament and demobilisation** cost around **10% of the total budget**, while the **reinsertion and demobilisation** stages generally account for as much as **75%**. The percentage allocated to the **most vulnerable groups** (children, women and the disabled) is generally **between 10 and 15%**. As regards individual organisations, the **World Bank** is the body that has made the greatest investment in 12 DDR programmes, either through regional funds or through direct aid to specific countries. **UNDP** comes second in the financing league table with investment of around 75 million dollars, and the investments made by the **EU** come a close third. As far as individual state involvement is concerned, **Japan** is the country that has assisted with most aid, particularly in Afghanistan and the Philippines and to a lesser extent in another five countries, followed by the **USA**, which has also made a particular contribution to the processes in the Philippines.

Table 6.1. Main figures relating to DDR programmes DDR				
Country	**Total cost (million $)**	**Combatants**	**Cost of DDR / person ($)**	**Per capita income ($)**
Afghanistan	140.9	63,380	2,238.1	217
Angola	255.8	138,000	1,853.6	1,350
Burundi	84.4	78,000	1,082.0	100
Cambodia	42.0	30,000	1,400.0	380
Central African Rep.	13.3	7,565	1,758.1	350
Chad	10.0	9,000	1,111.1	400
Colombia (AUC)	302.6	31,761	9,567.1	2,290
Côte d'Ivoire	150.0	45,000	3,120.8	840
DR Congo	200.0	150,000	1,333.3	120
Eritrea	197.2	200,000	986.0	220
Guinea-Bissau	26.0	12,595	2,064.0	180
Haiti	15.8	(6,000)	(2,625.0)	450
Indonesia (Aceh)	(35.0)	5,000	7,000.0	1,280
Liberia	71.0	119,000	596.6	130
Nepal	5.9	12,000	491.6	270
Niger	2.4	3,160	759.5	240
Philippines (Mindanao)	254.0	25,000	(10,160.0)	820
Rep. Congo	25.0	42,500	588.2	950
Rwanda	57.3	45,000	1,273.3	230
Somalia	32.8	53,000	618.8	-
Sudan	69.4	178,500	388.8	640
Uganda	6.0	15,310	440.3	280
TOTAL (22)	**1996.8**	**1,268,010**	**1,574.7**	**546.6**

Note: the figures shown in brackets are estimates of either the number of combatants involved or the budget allocated.

Finally, with very few exceptions, DDR programmes generally come about as the result of undertakings made during the signing of a peace agreement between warring factions or accommodations reached shortly before a peace agreement is signed. Despite this, **around 15 months can often elapse before they actually begin**, due to a lack of the necessary planning, the failure to set up the bodies charged with running the programme or the lack of the financing necessary to begin the process. Nevertheless, the speed with which a DDR programme is begun has not been shown to have any effect on the way it evolves or the actual duration of the disarmament and demobilisation phases. Indeed, with the exception

of Indonesia and Angola, where the programmes' rapid commencement was followed by the equally rapid completion of the demobilisation phase (less than four months), most countries have had to overcome many difficulties over a period that can stretch to a year and a half and sometimes exceeds two years. **DDR programmes will generally last for an average of three and a half years**, though it is sometimes necessary to extend them due to problems that develop as they progress through the different stages, such as a lack of financing.

b) The most important events of the last three months

The following table shows **how the main countries in which DDR programmes are currently being implemented** have evolved over the last three months:

Table 6.2. Countries that have been the subject of international attention in relation to DDR	
AFRICA	
Country	**Remarks**
Angola	The Institute for Social and Economic Rehabilitation **(IRSEM)** announced the reintegration of **633 former combatants** into the jobs market in Ujie province, in the northeast of the country. According to the Institute, around **2,900 resettlement packages** had been handed over to demobilised troops in the region.
Burundi	Fighting broke out at the Randa settlement camp, where former combatants belonging to the FNL have been engaging in acts of looting in protest against the poor living conditions in the camp.
Central African Republic	**PDF** leader A. Miskine called on his combatants to hand over their weapons and demobilise after reaching an agreement with President F. Bozizé in Libya at the beginning of February. A. Miskine warned these troops, which are also based in Chad, Cameroon, DR Congo and Sudan, to expect serious consequences if they failed to comply with this call.
Congo, DR	**MONUC** began the demobilisation process in several parts of the country. In **Ituri**, around 114 members of different militias signed up to the process for a short while, and the leader of the **FNI** militias, P. Karim, announced that he had ordered the demobilisation of 170 of his troops (including 42 child soldiers) in return for an amnesty for his armed group. Elsewhere, MONUC announced the rapid success of the disarmament campaign carried out in **North Kivu**, where it was calculated that around 1,000 former combatants from DR Congo and Uganda would be demobilised. As part of the reintegration process, it was estimated that between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers would join the regular **armed forces** in the region, and it was announced that, as part of the restructuring of these armed forces, **14 of the 18 planned brigades had already been formed**. However, regret was expressed that some 200 former child soldiers had been integrated into these brigades.
Congo, Rep.	**Japan** and the **UNDP** signed an agreement under which the Japanese government would provide 2 million dollars to finance the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants. This disarmament process forms part of the **Weapons Handover Project** which has to date seen the handover of around 1,000 weapons with the number expected to total 15,000 by the end of 2008. The project had already obtained financing of 17 million dollars from the **World Bank** and a further 2.6 million from the **European Commission**.
Côte d'Ivoire	The leaders of the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) and the country's **armed forces** resumed their disarmament talks as part of the new peace plan adopted by the United Nations in November. The two sides discussed the **preliminary steps in the disarmament process**, which should culminate in the creation of a new national army that includes soldiers from both sides. However, further disagreements arose between the FN and the **pro-government militias** that had not taken part in the talks, over the shape that the disarmament process should take. Finally, the FN deployed their first **police and gendarme patrols** in the northern capital of Bouaké. A total of 533 members of the FN have been trained by UN police officers in order to ensure that progress is maintained in the demobilisation and disarmament of the FN, in accordance with the agreement signed by the warring parties in Pretoria in 2005.
Liberia	**UNMIL** expressed concern over the **39,000 former combatants who have not yet taken part in any training programme**, two years after completion of the disarmament process, thus placing their effective reintegration at risk. In particular, it is feared that these former combatants will be recruited as mercenaries in neighbouring countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone. However, UNMIL said that it was confident that by the middle of this year they would all have been enlisted in one of the educational programmes. One event that gave grounds for concern was the confirmation by the former head of the dismantled Liberian armed group, the **LURD**, A. Conneh, that former combatants from his group had been recruited to support the armed forces loyal to L. Conté in the context of the potential civil war in **Guinea**. Another was the demonstration by hundreds of demobilised soldiers in Monrovia over delays in the payment of aid following demobilisation. This protest was broken up by the Liberian police with help from members of UNMIL, and at least four former combatants were detained for involvement in the

	disturbances. Finally, the **UNDP** successfully conclude a **small arms collection campaign** in 125 places in two provinces in the interior of the country, with help from a company of local artists.
Mali	The government and the Tuareg armed group **Alliance for Change** agreed to begin implementing the peace agreement for the Kidal region (northeast), which includes a **timetable for the disarmament of rebel groups**, who are estimated to number around 3,000.
Sudan	**Sudanese armed forces** and the **SPLA** army finally reached an agreement over the formation of the Joint Integrated Units (**JIU**) with which it intends to unify the country's armed forces. However, in spite of the fact that the people who would be joining the JIU had been chosen, none of the troops had actually received any joint training. The creation of the JIU is also supposed to help build trust between the two sides, in order to bring an end to the violent skirmishes in which they have been involved, even after the signing of the peace agreements that marked the end of the war between north and south Sudan. Elsewhere, the authorities in **Lagos state**, in the south of the country, launched a **large-scale campaign to collect weapons from the civilian population**, with the aim of containing the inter-tribal fighting that had been reported in the region. At the same time, officials from the Eastern Front , which is now regarded as a political party, announced that former combatants in the east of the country would soon be demobilised as part of the peace agreement signed last October. It is estimated that around 1,800 troops will be demobilised in five settlement camps. Finally, the United Nations Special Envoy for Children in Armed Conflict, R. Coomaraswamy, reported that **child soldiers** in the region were not being returned to their homes and were being rearmed to go back into battle.
Uganda	**Defence Minister** C. Kiyonga announced the intensification of the disarmament programme in the Karamoja region in the northeast of the country with an increase in the number of troops deployed. This decision had the support of both the Uganda People's Defence Force (**UPDF**) and regular armed forces commander A. Nyakairima. It is calculated that between 500 and 800 combatants are still active in the armed violence throughout the region.

AMERICA	
Country	**Remarks**
Colombia	The head of the **Self-Defence Units of Colombia** (AUC), S. Mancuso, said that around 5,000 paramilitaries who had been demobilised were beginning to regroup once again. These new armed groups, known as the Black Eagles, have been seen in 226 towns and cities in 24 of the country's provinces, and they are particularly strong in Valle, Cauca and Nariño. Colombia's **High Counsellor for Reintegration** toured Europe with the aim of explaining the reintegration programme that his office has planned. This centres around **three basic elements**: the design and implementation of a long-term policy, participation by the ordinary public as an integral part of the solution and a sustainable plan that removes dependence on aid and encourages employment solutions among the people being demobilised themselves. The High Commissioner for Reintegration, F. Pearl, therefore announced the **creation of 30 service centres** around the regions to attend to all the people demobilised before 15 May. However, certain areas remain to be defined in the formulas for the reintegration of medium-ranking AUC personnel, and there is a danger that this approach may be too technocratic and not pay sufficient attention to the influence that paramilitary structures have in the political arena, quite apart from the singular difficulties of carrying out a DDR process within a context of armed conflict. The **Secretary General of the OAS**, J.M. Insulza, called for this reintegration strategy to be strengthened. Subsequently, the **European Commission** ratified the provision of 12 million euros for projects in the communities that were taking in demobilised troops, while the government of **Germany** promised to continue supporting Colombia in both its mine-clearance and reintegration programmes.
Haiti	As part of the DDR programme being run by **MINUSTAH**, it was announced that reinsertion packages had been distributed to former members of the **Haitian armed forces** who had demobilised voluntarily in March 2006. The **Canadian** Foreign Ministry announced that it would contribute **10 million dollars** for programmes to **reform the National Police** and ensure **security in the community**. The money will be split equally between both programmes and forms part of the 15 million dollars donated for the country's Global Peace and Security Fund.

ASIA	
Country	**Remarks**
Nepal	The **UN Secretary General's Special Representative**, I. Martin, announced the end of the process to register combatants and weapons throughout the country, with around **30,850 former combatants and 3,420 weapons** registered. Referring to these figures, both I. Martin and the Nepalese armed forces expressed concerns over the low proportion of weapons collected per combatant (barely 11%). I. Martin also expressed his concern over the **abandonment** (or threat of abandonment) of the **settlement camps** by some former combatants due to **poor living conditions**. As a result, the **Nepalese government** announced as a preliminary measure that it would be giving **700,000 dollars every month** in the form of food and other essential elements. In response to this move, the majority of former combatants returned to the camps in compliance with the peace process, though they were still calling for improved living conditions. Several international agencies and local groups demanded the rapid demobilisation of child soldiers among the ranks of the **CPN** who were "concealed" at the settlement camps and whose existence

	was denied by the armed group. As a result, the age of former combatants is being verified in a second registration process. At the same time, criticisms were raised about the status of women combatants, since it was complained that they had been marginalised and excluded from the whole process.
Philippines	The **government** insisted on the need for the **MNLF** to disarm in order to avoid any confrontations with the country's **armed forces** in the south of the country. The agreement reached makes no actual reference to disarmament, and it has therefore been suggested that a review be carried out at a meeting between the two parties planned for the coming month of July.

Human rights

> ❑ States of emergency were declared in both Guinea and Zimbabwe, with serious consequences for human rights in both cases.
> ❑ NGOs called for Guantanamo to be closed and the European Parliament approved a report denouncing the CIA's abuses in Europe in the fight against terrorism.
> ❑ The International Criminal Court identified the first two people to be accused of crimes committed in Darfur.
> ❑ The International Court of Justice acquitted the state of Serbia of genocide in Bosnia.

This chapter contains an analysis of the situation relating to human rights and basic freedoms, based on the monitoring of violations reported by non-governmental human rights organisations and inter-governmental organisations. The first section deals with human rights violations, the second with transitional justice, and the third includes an analysis of one of the most important issues of recent times, the recent judgement by the International Court of Justice in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia and the application of the Convention on Genocide.

7.1. Human rights violations

The following section contains information on the areas in which the efforts of NGOs have been focused and the work carried out by inter-governmental organisations around the world. Issues are analysed in order of the importance of the different events reported during the last three months.

a) States of emergency and abuses of power

During the last quarter, several states continued to resort to the imposition of a state of emergency as a response to political dissent or social protest. Particularly notable among the countries affected in this way were Guinea and Zimbabwe, where the respective governments imposed states of emergency in response to the strikes seen in both places, though in the case of Zimbabwe the effect was one of a *de facto* and undeclared state of siege. In **Guinea**, the violent response by the police and the armed forces against demonstrators left more than 120 people dead, with many arrests among union leaders, events that were heavily criticised by the UNHCHR and several NGOs, who called for an independent investigation of these crimes in order to prevent them from being treated with impunity, a call which the Guinean government ignored. In **Zimbabwe**, the *de facto* state of siege allowed the security forces to violate the freedom of movement and assembly of the inhabitants of Harare, and the subsequent response to the general strike led to the detention of union members and left more than 5,000 people injured. MONUC condemned the use of violence following the disturbances reported in **DR Congo**, which left 134 people dead as a result of the excessive use of force by the security forces during the various demonstrations held in the western province of Bas Congo.

Violent consequences were also reported during the last quarter as a result of action taken by the security forces in various countries. The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) reported that under the state of emergency in **Bangladesh**, 19 people (including a child) were killed by the security forces and the army, and that the country's armed forces had been given permission to enter any place and detain people on suspicion without any kind of detention order. For its part, the UNHCHR express deep concern at the violence reported in the Terai region in **Nepal**, which left more than 20 people dead after UN personnel on the ground had observed the excessive use of force by security agents. After making a visit to the **Philippines**, P. Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary and arbitrary executions remarked that a significant number of the extra-judicial executions committed in the Philippines could clearly be attributed to the armed forces.

> ### Exceptional measures and human rights
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> While resorting to exceptional states of order has generally been the recourse of the more authoritarian governments around the world, we have lately seen an abuse of the adoption of exceptional measures by many states under the guise of the fight to combat terrorism.
>
> The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights authorises states unilaterally and temporarily to suspend some of the obligations by which they are bound under the Covenant, i.e. to decree states of exception. However, two fundamental conditions must be met: the situation must be exceptional and one that places the life of the population at risk, and the state must officially declare the state of exception in question. Although international law recognises the legality of a state of emergency, it imposes certain strict restrictions that require that any measures adopted as part of such an action are exceptional and temporary and must never override the right to life or the right not to be subject to torture or mistreatment.[1]
>
> States of emergency involve the creation by the state of an exceptional legal framework which generally means that the power of the executive, the security forces and the armed forces is increased, while judicial power, and with it control over the actions of government in respect of the law, is seriously weakened.
>
> This increase in the number of states of exception represents a new interpretation of criminal law as a state instrument that can be used to respond to political or social demands that are beginning to assume particular importance in a given country. It also represents an attempt by certain states to create exceptional legislation that will justify actions which under the ordinary regulatory framework of a state of law would constitute serious human rights violations.

b) Independence of the judiciary and access to justice.

In Europe, the Council of Ministers of the European Council turned down the request for a new trial by Kurdish leader Ocalan, finding that his trial in Turkey had respected international standards, thus contradicting the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, which had ruled in 2005 that his trial had not offered the necessary guarantees for the accused. This decision was criticised by M. Karayilan, one of the leaders of the PKK, who said that it was prejudicial to the democratic Kurdish movement. At the same time, the Council called on Montenegro to fight corruption and deal with the lack of independence in its judicial system.

In Africa, various NGOs made calls in favour of the independence of the judiciary as a guarantee of the required protection. The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders complained about irregularities in the legal proceedings brought in **Ethiopia** against 131 people who had been detained as a result of the protests against the outcome of the elections and who had been accused of conspiracy and uprising[2]. In **Uganda**, the International Commission of Jurists called on the authorities to respect the independence of the judiciary and stop the intimidation to which judges and lawyers were being subjected. The ICJ also complained about the failure by the police to implement the judgements handed down by the Supreme Court and demanded the release of the people whom the courts had ordered be freed.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, L. Despouy, paid a visit to Asia and presented his preliminary conclusions on the **Maldives**. He stressed his concerns over the powers that the Constitution afforded the country's president in controlling jurisprudence, as well as expressing disquiet over a number of other issues, such as the fact that the majority of people detained in the country are tried without any assistance from legal counsel.

In Latin America, particular mention should be made of the report published by the UNHCHR's Office, which indicated that indigenous people in **Mexico** have problems in gaining access to justice

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[1] General notes relating to Article 4 of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, relating to states of emergency.
[2] For more information, see http://www.omct.org/pdf/Observatory/2006/report/ethiopia_obs463-2_1106_eng.pdf?PHPSESSID=f959eb42944a2aae4ce7545dc2138c1f

and called for the rules and customs of these communities to be taken into account when justice is applied.

c) The fight against terrorism and human rights

Action by NGOs in this area started at the beginning of the year with calls for the closure of the **Guantanamo** detention centre and an end to five years of torture and detention. The NGOs involved recalled that in spite of repeated calls from the United Nations, the EU and other organisations demanding that the centre be closed, more than 400 people are still being held there indefinitely. Human Rights Watch classified the treatment received by the people detained by the CIA as "enforced disappearance", calling on the US government to provide information on all the disappeared detainees who had at some point been in CIA custody. The NGO confirmed that these people may have been transferred to prisons in other countries, where they may continue to be under the effective control of the CIA, or that they may have been returned to their places of origin, including Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria, where terrorism suspects are routinely tortured[3]. During the course of the last three months, the USA accepted the solution offered by the Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Human Rights in the fight against terrorism, so that the treatment of detainees could be monitored.

During the last quarter, the **European Parliament approved the report denouncing CIA abuses in Europe in the fight against terrorism**. It called for an independent investigation and said that it did not believe that certain European governments did not know about the flights carrying illegal detainees that had stopped over at some of their airports. The report, which included a number of amendments aimed at easing criticism of the actions of the governments of Germany, Romania and Poland, pointed out that several European governments were violating one of the basic principles for the protection of human rights, the principle of *non-refoulement*, which prevents anyone from being sent to a country in which they could suffer serious human rights violations. Some NGOs indicated this as a first step in Europe becoming accountable for its complicity in these serious acts.

In **Russia**, the human rights organisation *Memorial* and the Moscow-based think tank *Demos* denounced the serious human rights violations caused by the Russian authorities' anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya and the rest of the northern Caucasus. Russian and international NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Moscow Helsinki Group, boycotted a human rights conference organised by the Chechen government in Grozny, a stance that was criticised by the authorities who described it as unconstructive and politically biased. The Council of Europe's Human Rights Commissioner, T. Hammarberg, expressed concern over the human rights situation in the Republic and criticised the inability of the Chechen authorities to determine the whereabouts of thousands of disappeared people, along with the systematic use of torture as a way of obtaining false confessions. The Commissioner proposed the creation of a truth commission to determine responsibility for these abuses.

In Asia, the government of the **Philippines** approved a Human Security Law[4] which is due to come into force in June. Its excessively vague definition of terrorism (as is frequently the case in this kind of legislation) could lead to abuses by the authorities. Among the provisions that most endanger respect for human rights are the discretionary powers granted to the police, who will be able to detain people without a warrant, send people to other countries in the event that their evidence is required as part of a terrorist investigation and commit people to 40 years' imprisonment without any form of parole.

In **Latin America**, particular mention should be made of the OAS's adoption of the Declaration of Panama on Protection Against Terrorism and the judgement handed down by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordering **Peru** to pay 20 million dollars to the families of 41 members of the

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[3] For more information, go to http://hrw.org/reports/2007/us0207/
[4] For more information, go to http://philippines.ahrchk.net/pdf/HumanSecurityActof2007.pdf

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) organisation accused of terrorism. The Court found the country responsible for the extra-judicial executions carried out during a rebellion organised by the government itself in 1992. The Peruvian government heavily criticised the judgement and, in a public attempt to evade responsibility for these serious acts, recalled that the victims were members of a terrorist group. It even threatened not to recognise the court's jurisdiction in the future.

d) Freedom of expression and opinion

During the last three months, NGOs operating in Central Asia and Europe called on the authorities in **Turkmenistan** to put an end to their persecution of political opponents and free all political prisoners. The NGOs also suggested that the deteriorating situation as regards the freedom of expression in **Azerbaijan**, along with the risk of detention and the reprisals being carried out against journalists who are critical of the government or who report cases of corruption, could be an indication of the government's fear that the country is about to undergo the kind of political change seen recently in Georgia and Ukraine.

Some NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), called on the EU not to lift its sanctions against **Uzbekistan**, claiming that the internal state of repression is deteriorating as a result of the amendments to legislation governing the communications media, which increases official control over the sector. This request takes on particular importance if one bears in mind that it is the first time that the EU has partially suspended a partnership and cooperation agreement due to failure to comply with human rights[5]. In **Turkey**, civilian groups and the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of opinion and expression expressed their serious concerns over the killing of H. Dink, a respected journalist and intellectual, known for his critical pieces about a specific period in the country's history.

In Africa, Amnesty International denounced the legal problems faced by B. Sabbar, Secretary General of the Saharawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the State of Morocco and another member of the same association, due to their reports of human rights violations in the **Western Sahara** and their public support for the right to free determination. In **Eritrea**, some of the journalists detained during the wave of arrests that began at the beginning of November were released, though NGOs have warned that dozens of journalists remain in secret prisons enduring torture and inhumane conditions, a circumstance that caused the deaths of several of them last year. These organisations also complained that the journalists who have been freed are still subject to police surveillance in an attempt to stop them fleeing the country.

In Asia, dozens of journalists demonstrated in **Sri Lanka** to protest against the kidnapping and murder of people working in the country's media. They claim that Sri Lanka is one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists.

e) Economic, social and cultural rights

On the African continent, the dangerous working conditions in the medical sector in Zimbabwe led to an exodus of doctors and a four-week strike which in turn caused a crisis in terms of access to healthcare. It should be pointed out in this regard that decent working conditions for employees in sectors such as education, health, etc. represent a fundamental component in a state's obligation to comply with the social rights of its people, and this is therefore an area which should be paid particular attention by individual governments.[6]

A new legislative development that should be noted is the repeal by **South Africa** of the law prohibiting refugees and asylum-seekers from taking jobs in the country, a move that finally brings an end to the discrimination such people have suffered until now.

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[5] K. Roth, *Light and Shade in the Defence of Human Rights in 2005*, in Papers on International Issues. CIP, 2006
[6] General remarks of the United Nations Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the right to health and the right to education.

In Asia, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlighted the conditions suffered by around 2.6 million domestic workers in **Indonesia**, who are forced to put up with very poor payment conditions, working days of up to 22 hours, sexual violence and enforced seclusion, while the country's government does nothing to stop this. These two organisations also denounced the discrimination faced by internal migrant workers in **China** in relation to the right to housing, health and education, as well as the serious working conditions they have to endure. As regards the most serious problem in the area of employment, forced labour, mention should be made of the agreement adopted by the ILO and the government of **Myanmar**, under which victims who have been subjected to this kind of work will be entitled to seek compensation. Finally, FIAN published a report in which it set out the violations of the right to food and the right to water that peasants were suffering in **India.**

In **Europe**, mention should be made this quarter of the publication of a report by the EU's European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia, which denounced the discrimination that many European Muslims are experiencing in the areas of employment, education and housing. The report includes the important conclusion that the sense of exclusion is greater among the third generation than among the first.[7]

Economic, social and cultural rights, second degree rights: the case of Iraq

UNDP and the Iraqi government published a joint report in which they revealed some alarming figures. One third of all Iraqis are living in poverty and around 5% are living in conditions of extreme poverty[8]. The report stresses that living conditions for Iraqis have deteriorated considerably in comparison with the 1970s and 1980s, particularly as regards their social rights (fresh water, electricity, health services, employment, housing and access to quality education), and it emphasises the fact that the erosion of living conditions is contributing to the civil war in the country. The report also identifies differences in standards of living depending on region, with poverty greater in the south, followed by the centre and then the north of the country. It also reveals that poverty is three times worse in rural areas than in the cities.

This report demonstrates the consequences that the outbreak of a conflict has for social rights and the breeding ground that this creates for an upsurge in violence. Violations of social rights should be treated as violations of international law and a breach of a state's obligations. Treating civil and political rights as the only human rights violated in a conflict, and thus relegating violations of social rights to the level of one of the inevitable consequences of violent conflict implies a failure to respect one of the fundamental characteristics of human rights, i.e. that they are indivisible and inter-related and cannot be organised into any hierarchy. Referring to access to social services as a right assists strategies aimed at obtaining social justice and provides the opportunity to require states to comply with the legal obligations that they have contracted voluntarily at an international level. What is more important, it represents an instrument by which victims can enforce these rights.

7.2. Transitional justice

The concept of transitional justice refers to the inter-related processes of trial and accountability, the disclosure of the truth, compensation and institutional reform, all of which arise after a large-scale conflict and which contribute to the re-establishment of social relationships in the long term. The

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[7] The document entitled "*Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia*", published at the end of December, includes information on incidents of xenophobia and the general situation facing Muslims based on research carried out in all EU member states between December 2005 and January 2006.
http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/index.php?fuseaction=content.dsp_cat_content&catid=1
[8] For more information, see http://www.iq.undp.org/ubn/ubn.htm

following section lists the most significant events that have occurred in this area over the last three months.

Current status of areas of transitional justice	
Africa	
Burundi	The government and the UN are discussing the future National Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Burundi.
Congo	The French High Court has invalidated the legal ruling of 2004 that annulled the case of the Brazzaville Beach disappeared, confirming the competence of the French courts to pursue and punish the perpetrators of the Brazzaville Beach massacre in 1999.
Liberia	The Truth and Reconciliation Commission postponed the opening of the trials planned for January in order to continue the public awareness process, to ensure that the people are properly informed before taking part in these trials.
Rwanda	Rwanda has freed more than 9,000 prisoners who were originally detained as a result of the 1994 genocide. This is the last wave of prisoners to be released under the presidential decree of 2003, since when around 60,000 prisoners have been released. The International Court for Rwanda confirmed the life sentence imposed on former finance minister E. Ndindabahizi for the crimes of genocide and extermination.
Sierra Leone	According to the prosecutor at the Sierra Leone High Court, the death of S. H. Norman, former Foreign Minister and leader of the militia suspected of war crimes in Sierra Leone deprives the country of its right to see justice done. The UN Special Court for Sierra Leone announced that the trial of C. Taylor would begin on 4 June.
Sudan/Darfur	The Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court has named the first two people suspected of committing war crimes in Darfur. They are the current Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, Ahmed Haroun, who in 2003 and 2004 was Interior Minister, and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb, alleged leader of the Janjaweed militias and Colonel of the armed forces in Wadi Salih (West Darfur).
Sudan/Chad	The government announced a draft bill granting a general amnesty to militants and sympathisers of the FUCD armed opposition group, which has recently signed a peace agreement with the government.
Uganda	The LRA armed opposition group, which is taking part in peace negotiations with the Ugandan government, said that the charges brought against the heads of the LRA by the International Criminal Court were hindering a peace agreement with the Ugandan government.
America	
Colombia	S. Mancuso, the highest-profile and most investigated leader of the AUC paramilitary groups (Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) confessed to having ordered 15 massacres and is attributed with responsibility for the murder of 336 persons. This pronouncement was made as part of the application of the provisions of the Justice and Peace Act, though court sources and the families of the victims say that the acknowledged murders are just a fraction of those committed. Furthermore, the murder of a peasant leader who had denounced the appropriation of land by the paramilitaries raises serious questions over the guarantees that will allow victims to enforce their rights. Y. Izquierdo had no protection in spite of having asked for it on repeated occasions after receiving threats.
Haiti	A federal court in Miami ordered Colonel C. Dorélien, a former member of the Military High Command, to pay 4.3 million dollars for human rights violations including torture, extra-judicial executions and crimes against humanity.
Asia and the Pacific	
Afghanistan	The lower house of parliament approved a resolution on "National Stability and Reconciliation" which involves an amnesty for a large number of people responsible for human rights violations.
Cambodia	National and international organisations urged the extraordinary chamber of the Cambodian courts responsible for judging the Khmer Rouge to adopt internal procedural regulations that respect international standards and ensure the independence of the judiciary and the protection of both victims and accused.
Timor-Leste	The Truth and Friendship Commission has begun the first public trials in relation to the events that occurred in Timor-Leste before and after the independence referendum in 1999. Forum ASIA and Yayasan Hak complained that the working procedures used by the Truth and Friendship Commission could become an aid to impunity.
	The National Human Rights Commission created during the armed conflict has submitted a

Nepal	report on the failure by both the government and the Maoists to implement the human rights provisions mentioned in the peace agreement. The Commission indicated that neither of the parties has provided information on the laying or storage of mines, the whereabouts of those they are detaining, the difficulties faced by displaced people trying to return to their homes and the lack of initiatives on either side as regards the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as set out in the peace agreement.
Philippines	In response to the Melo Commission and the initial results published by the Special Rapporteur, the government presented a plan which included the creation of special courts to speed up the trials of the accused. However, not a single guilty verdict has been handed down to date, and the main obstacle to bringing an end to the political executions is the absence of any effective mechanism to protect witnesses from threats and intimidation.
Europe and Central Asia	
Serbia	The prosecutor at the International War Crimes Court for the former Yugoslavia, C. del Ponte, called on the EU to refrain from resuming talks with the government of Serbia until it hands over the people accused of responsibility for crimes against humanity.
Russia	An end was called to the amnesty announced in July by the Russian government for militants in Chechnya and the rest of the north Caucasus who had not committed serious crimes. The number of people who signed up to the amnesty is estimated at between 400 and 500, according to official sources. Some analysts have questioned the effectiveness of the amnesty as they believe that the people who responded were minor militants who performed support and maintenance roles, rather than key members of the armed resistance.

7.3. An important judicial ruling. The ICJ's judgement in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia.

The following section contains an analysis of one of the most important international judgements published during the last three months. This was the judgement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina versus Serbia, over the application of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which finally ended 14 years after Bosnia filed the action against Milosevic's government as a result of the campaign of ethnic cleansing carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This analysis sets out the legal findings of the Court which led to the acquittal of the state of Serbia for the crime of genocide. It is interesting to note that in the event that the ICJ had found Serbia guilty, this would have been the first time that a state had been declared guilty of genocide rather than an individual or a group.

a) Facts

The facts examined by the Court related to an action filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which it accused Serbia, as the legal successor to the former Yugoslavia, of genocide by committing extra-judicial executions, torture, kidnappings and arbitrary detentions during the Balkans War, the victims being mostly Muslims and Croats.

b) Jurisdiction

Before giving its findings on the merits of the case, the Court announced that it had the necessary jurisdiction under Article IX of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, which regulates its power to try cases between states relating to the interpretation, application and performance of the Convention, including those relating to state responsibility in cases of genocide. It should be recalled that the International Court of Justice only hears cases between states and that, in the year in which it was created (1945), the only subject for whom international responsibility was recognised was the state, and individual persons could not therefore be either plaintiff or defendant.

c) A state's obligations under the Convention on Genocide

The Court explained that the obligations arising for states under the terms of the Convention consist of the obligation to prohibit and prevent genocide and the obligation to try people accused of

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genocide (which includes the obligation to cooperate with the competent courts). One of the arguments put forward by Serbia was that in order for a state to be found responsible, it is essential that the responsibility of the individual perpetrator or perpetrators from which the state responsibility springs has first been legally proven. However, the Court found that it had the necessary competence to establish a state's responsibility directly, without needing prior judgements confirming the individual responsibility of the perpetrators, where the crimes have been committed by bodies, people or groups whose actions can be attributed to the state itself.

d) Serbia's responsibility for the crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Court found that "ethnic cleansing" can only be a form of genocide if it corresponds with one of the categories prohibited under the Convention on Genocide, and it began the process by examining whether the crimes committed constituted genocide, i.e. whether there was an intentional desire to destroy a particular group, in this case, Bosnian Muslims.

Given the seriousness of the charges faced by someone who is accused in a trial for genocide, the Court recalled the need for **high standards of evidence**. The evidence filed by Bosnia referred to a great extent to the decisions and documentation of the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICCY), which were accepted by the court. Bosnia also alleged that there were documents from the Serbian Supreme Defence Council that would have offered clarification as regards the issues of intention and responsibility. However, Serbia refused to hand these over to the Court. It is interesting to note here that, in its final judgement, the Court only mentioned Bosnia's request that the documents be produced and at no time mentioned Serbia's refusal to hand them over or the Court's request that a copy be provided.

As regards **intention**, the Court acknowledged that the victims of the mass murders in specific regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in detention camps were mainly Muslims and Croats, a fact that might suggest that they had been made a systematic target. However, the Court found that these acts did not constitute genocide because there was no evidence to show the intention behind these crimes, i.e. the desire to destroy the community as such. However, the Court did accept that these could be classed as crimes against humanity or war crimes, but it said that it lacked the necessary jurisdiction to determine this.

This reasoning is greatly at odds with the arguments contained in other judgements handed down by international criminal courts in which, in the absence of any explicit evidence, the proof required to determine whether or not the crime of genocide has been committed can be inferred from a set of facts and circumstances, the general context, the systematic targeting of victims based on their membership of a particular group and the seriousness and frequency of the crimes. The Vice President of the ICJ, Judge Al-Khasawneh, included a number of cases that illustrate this stance in a statement in which he expressed his disagreement with the judgement[9].

However, the Court decided that intent could not be inferred solely from a pattern of atrocities committed against the same group, and it must therefore be proved through the use of facts or evidence that there was a deliberate plan. The Court also rejected one of the arguments put forward by Bosnia that the Strategic Objectives for the Republic set out by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted evidence of the intent to commit genocide when seen together with the persistent patterns of behaviour.

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[9] In a number of cases (Akayesu, Rutaganda and Musema, among others), the International Court for Rwanda used the argument that it is possible to infer the intention of genocide in a particular act from a general context in which acts are systematically committed against the same group. The International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia and its Appeals Chamber maintained in the Jelisis and Krstic cases that the persistent description of behaviour as *ethnic cleansing* represents evidence of an element of genocide and that, in the absence of any proof, this constitutes direct evidence of the intention of committing genocide. The Court found that intent must be inferred from the *de facto* circumstances of the crime.

The Court also backed up its decision by the fact that the ICCY had not established that the crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (with the exception of those committed in Srebrenica) constituted genocide. However, it should be mentioned that the jurisdiction of this court only covers individual criminal responsibility and that the ICJ was examining the whole series of events, meaning that its area of investigation was broader, placing it in a better position to examine a persistent pattern of behaviour that was not limited to the actions of a single individual.

This refusal by the Court to find that genocide had been committed represents an implicit lack of recognition of the proceedings brought against Milosevic and the actions for genocide filed with the International Court for the former Yugoslavia.

e) Serbian responsibility for the crimes committed in Srebrenica.

The Court referred to the cases heard by the ICCY and defined the Srebrenica massacre as genocide, accepting on this occasion that the intention was to destroy a particular group. However, the Court found that Serbia was not responsible for committing acts of genocide and had only violated its obligation to prevent such acts.

The Court also found that there was no evidence that Serbia had taken an active part in the planning or execution of the massacres. In spite of this statement, the ICJ accepted that in the years running up to the events in Srebrenica, Serbia joined Bosnian Serbs in joint military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it also acknowledged that there had been financial support for some officers in the army of the Republika Srpska (VRS). However, it found that this did not automatically grant it the status of a body belonging to the former Yugoslavia. It was on this point that the Court based its finding that Serbia had violated its obligation to prevent the genocide because it had failed to use its influence to prevent the crimes.

Nevertheless, it is not very convincing to argue that the state is responsible because it did not influence the decisions of the Republika Srpska, and then to fail to cite this same power and influence as evidence of Serbia's participation or at least complicity in the events that followed.

Finally, the Court also found that Serbia had violated its obligation to cooperate with the international criminal courts, demanding that it hand over both Mladic and Karadzic to the ICCY.

Evidence presented by Bosnia

In addition to numerous reports from the United Nations, the International Court for the former Yugoslavia and NGOs, all aimed at providing evidence of Serbia's responsibility, Bosnia presented two pieces of evidence that deserve particular attention.

Bosnia presented a document in which a police officer from the Republika Srpska referred to the **scorpions (Serbian paramilitary groups) as a unit of the Serbian Interior Ministry**. Bosnia argued that there were close political and economic links between the Serbian government and the authorities in Republika Srpska and that in this case there was a unified and common ethnic and ideological objective. Serbia replied that this was a copy and not an original document. The Court carried out an examination to establish the relationship between the scorpions and the state of Serbia and found that it could not confirm that they were a legal Serbian body. Once again, the Court decided not to base its findings on the decisions handed down by the ICCY in the Tadic and Celebici cases, which found that a state may have control over a group or armed force, even in the event that the armed force acting in the name of the "controlling state" forms its own independent decisions and tactics, so long as they both take part in a common strategy.

Another piece of evidence filed by Bosnia was a TV broadcast made by the scorpions showing the execution of Muslims, and the subsequent **statement from representatives of the government of Serbia** that what had happened in Srebrenica was the responsibility of the former regime, which it classified as anti-democratic. The court regarded this statement as political, and found that one could not use it to infer Serbia's responsibility for the massacres in Srebrenica. In setting out this argument, the Court once again made a U-turn and failed to respect its own earlier decisions, such as the judgement handed down in the Nicaragua v. USA case, in which the Court found that statements made by high-ranking political officials have a high evidentiary value when they

acknowledge facts that are prejudicial to the state they represent, and may represent a form of admitting such facts. In this case, the intention of the statement in question was to distance the current regime from acts committed by the former regime, implying an implicit acknowledgement of guilt for crimes committed in the past.

f) Conclusions

The judgement handed down by the International Court is one whose arguments cheapen the interpretation of the international rules on the prohibition of genocide. Faced with the seriousness of these events (more than 8,000 people murdered and systematic patterns of human rights violations), the Court opted for an entirely sterile interpretation of the law, choosing to shelter behind an absence of the element of intent in order to avoid describing the atrocities committed in Bosnia as genocide. Even though it acknowledged that these events could be classified as crimes against humanity or war crimes (which do not require this element of intent), the Court argued that it had no jurisdiction and chose to avoid making any pronouncement on the consequences of this classification as far as Serbia's responsibility was concerned.

The only obligation that Serbia violated, according to the Court, was its obligation to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica, but even then it did not require Serbia to pay any compensation. The absence of any charges relating to this violation turns this judgement into a mere pronouncement, and the Court would seem to have forgotten that a state's responsibility by omission has the same legal value and is equally serious as violation by commission[10].

The result is a selective interpretation of the law that ignores the rights of the victims and makes use of a strictly technical legal argument that leaves a state unpunished for acts that should at least have been classified as crimes against humanity. More seriously, it opens up an even wider gulf between victims and the international courts charged with administering justice.

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[10] Chapter III of the Draft Articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, adopted by the International Law Commission in its 53rd period of sessions (A/56/10) and attached by the General Assembly to its Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001.

Gender issues in peace-building

> ❑ The United Nations presented its International Women's Day campaign to combat impunity for violence against women.
> ❑ A number of United Nations agencies established an initiative to bring an end to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and improve assistance for victims.
> ❑ The enforced recruitment of children and sexual violence against women was a constant feature in Darfur (Sudan) over the course of the last three months, highlighting the different impact of this armed conflict on women and men.
> ❑ Participation by women in the peace process in Aceh, both during the negotiating process and during implementation of the agreement reached, has been very limited according to a report by the Crisis Management Initiative.

This section contains an analysis of the different initiatives being pursued by the United Nations and various international organisations and movements in relation to peace-building as seen from a **gender perspective**[1]. Viewing events from this perspective provides a picture of the different levels of impact that armed conflicts have on both women and men, the different ways and degrees in which women and men participate in peace-building and the real contribution offered by women in these processes. The section is divided into two main sub-sections: the first contains a review of the different impacts of armed conflicts, while the second analyses different initiatives in peace-building as seen from a gender perspective.

8.1. The gender dimension in the impact of armed conflicts

This section deals with the way in which the gender dimension can be seen in the impact of today's armed conflicts, with particular reference to violence against women.

a) Violence against women

To mark **International Women's Day** on 8 March, the United Nations launched its campaign to **combat impunity in situations of violence against women**. It is repeatedly reported that crimes against women, especially those involving sexual violence and domestic violence, are rarely punished.

Recently appointed UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, indicated that one of the UN's priorities must be the devotion of effort and the allocation of resources to overcome the current gulf between international standards and domestic practice in relation to violence and discrimination against women. Although there has been much international public discourse condemning violence against women, it still persists and is frequently concealed behind certain cultural practices.

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[1] The gender perspective, according to N. Vázquez, a Mexican feminist and researcher into the impact of war on women, is a *conceptual operational instrument that makes it possible to see what is really happening from a new perspective which transcends the biological explanation of what is different between the sexes, concentrating on the identification of cultural, historical and social factors, among other things, that differentiate men from women and generate conditions and positions of inequality between them, thus allowing us to intervene effectively in order to change these unequal positions*. The definition offered by the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women indicates that *gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with the fact of being a man or a women, and the relationships between men and women, boys and girls, as well as the relationships among women and relationships among men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and learned during the socialisation process. They are specific to both context and time and can change. Gender determines what is expected, permitted and appreciated in both women and men in a given context [...]*.
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsanddefinitions.htm

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Some facts and figures on violence against women

- Between 113 and 200 million women are "demographically disappeared", having been the victims of selective abortion or feminine infanticide or having been deprived of the same amounts of food and medical attention as their brothers and fathers.
- Between 700,000 and 4,000,000 women around the world are forced into prostitution or sold for this purpose, while the profits from sexual slavery vary between 7,000 and 12,000 million dollars.
- At least one in every three women has been beaten, forced to have sexual relations or mistreated in some other way during their lives. The perpetrator of the violence is generally a member of the woman's family or someone she knows. Domestic violence is the most common way in which women are mistreated throughout the world, regardless of ethnic origin, education, social class or religion.
- More than two million women are subjected to genital mutilation every year.
- On a global scale, women aged between 15 and 44 are more likely to be mutilated or die as a result of male violence than from causes such as cancer, malaria, traffic accidents or war all put together.

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Source: United Nations, *International Women's Day 2007, Ending impunity for violence against women and girls*, at: http://www.un.org/events/women/iwd/2007/background.shtml

At the end of 2006, following the presentation by the UN Secretary General of an *in-depth study on all forms of violence against women*,[2] the General Assembly approved a **Resolution on the intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women**.[3] By approving this resolution, the United Nations intends to ensure that individual states take action to eliminate violence against women in a more systematic and integrated way, with a continuous, multi-sector approach and with a sufficient level of institutional and financial resources. The resolution is directed not only at individual states and their governments but also at certain international organisations, particularly the World Bank and the IMF, along with other institutions that play a central role within the United Nations, such as ECOSOC, the Human Rights Council and the Peace-Building Commission.

The measures suggested in order to contribute to the elimination of violence against women include the repeal of discriminatory laws, regulations and practices, the encouragement of measures to empower women, particularly those with scant financial resources, and the adoption of measures to combat structural violence against women and end impunity. International organisations are called on to incorporate the gender perspective in all their cooperative plans and poverty eradication programmes, improve the collection of gender-specific data and increase their financial funding of activities aimed at preventing violence, among other measures.

b) Sexual violence as a weapon of war

Nine United Nations agencies[4] presented the initiative "UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict", aimed at highlighting the fact that not only is **the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war** one of the **least punished crimes** in the world today, but furthermore, it has reached very high levels and is showing **epidemic proportions in some of today's conflicts**.

UNIFEM and UNICEF have reported that rape is only classified as a crime in 104 of 192 countries, and that even in cases in which it is punished, the law is applied in a very loose way. This situation is further exacerbated while an armed conflict is underway.

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[2] The full report can be found at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/index.htm
[3] The full text of Resolution A/RES/61/143 can be found at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r61.htm
[4] UNDP, UNHCR, OCHA, UNIFEM, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, UNHCHR and the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.

Sexual violence as a weapons of war

- An average of 40 women are raped every day in South Kivu (DR Congo).
- Between 20,000 and 50,000 women were raped during the 1990s in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Between 50,000 and 64,000 women who have been internally displaced in Sierra Leone could have been the victims of sexual violence perpetrated by the warring parties.
- Between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

With this initiative, the United Nations intends to improve and increase its assistance to victims of sexual violence, tackle the long-term consequences that such violence has for the immediate victims, their communities and development in general, bring an end to impunity for these crimes and, finally, increase public awareness of the issue and design strategies for prevention.

c) The impact of armed conflicts on children and young people

The last three months saw further reports of the **enforced recruitment of children and sexual violence in the armed conflict in Darfur**. The UN Special Representative on children and armed conflicts denounced the growing risk that children face of being recruited by the different armed groups, highlighting the potential dangers that particularly affect young male children in today's armed conflicts.

Although sexual violence is one of the phenomena that specifically affect women more than men (though there are examples in which males have become the victims of such violence, however infrequent), **other strategies of war are directed principally at men**, and more specifically at **young men**. Thus, young men have more frequently been the victims of mass murder and massacres in cases of genocide, and at the same time have been the main parties responsible for such acts[5]. In the case of the recruitment of children, although there are hardly any figures for the recruitment of young girls, it would seem that this phenomenon mainly affects young boys[6], and the case of Darfur (which is specifically mentioned by the Special Rapporteur) is a clear example of this. It should also be said that the duties carried out by boys within an armed organisation are in many cases (though not always) combat-related, while girls tend to be subjected more to sexual slavery, though they have also been known to be directly involved in the violence.

In recent years, the incorporation of the gender perspective in the analysis of armed conflicts and violence has meant that great pains have been taken to highlight the ways in which armed conflicts have an impact on women. The desire to highlight this issue springs from the traditional invisibility of the experiences of women in armed conflicts, since the experiences of men have always been taken as the universal reference point when making any analysis. Given that such efforts have led to women's experiences being incorporated, to a certain (though insufficient) extent, in some more recent analyses, it is important to supplement this process by taking increasing account of the specific impact that armed conflicts have on men, though without regarding them any longer as a universal reference point.

One of the examples that best illustrates this specific violence against men comes from the former Yugoslavia, where tens of thousands of young men disappeared after being detained on the grounds of gender (i.e. because they were men of fighting age).[7] Another example of this gender-based impact relates to the transformation of gender roles that generally occurs during armed conflict and that can remove certain men from the spaces in which they have traditionally

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[5] Jones, A., "Gendercide and Genocide", in *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2:2, June 2000.
[6] In its report, *Forgotten Casualties of War. Girls in Armed Conflict*, the *Save the Children* organisation maintains that 40% of the 300,000 children who are estimated to be involved in today's armed conflicts are girls, around 120,000. However, this figure is an estimate and there is no consensus regarding the real number of girl soldiers.
[7] Jones, A. "Gender and ethnic conflict in ex-Yugoslavia" quoted in Byrne, B. "Towards a gendered understanding of conflict", at *Gender and Peacekeeping Training Course*, DFID/DFAIT, 2002.

taken the lead, thus eroding their authority in the event that they are unable, for example, to provide for their family, particularly where this role is then taken by a women.

8.2. Peace-building from a gender perspective

This section contains an analysis of the way that both women and men have participated in the different aspects of peace-building, including negotiating processes.

a) The participation of women in peace processes

The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) organisation, in conjunction with UNIFEM, presented a report on **participation by women in the Aceh peace process**, entitled *The Aceh Peace Process. Involvement of Women*,[8] which focused in particular on the implementation of the peace agreement reached in 2005. The CMI played a particularly important role during the pursuit of this agreement, acting as mediator between the Indonesian government and the former armed opposition group, the GAM.

The report maintains that **although the peace agreement contains basic conditions that should guarantee active participation by women, women have barely been seen during the course of the peace process and their involvement has been highly limited**. This limited involvement, in terms of both the negotiating process and the subsequent implementation of the conditions agreed, highlights the enormous democratic deficit in the process.

Women's organisations in Aceh have on several occasions said that they were willing to play a greater role in the peace process, calling on both the government and the GAM to provide a space in which women can become involved. Some examples of the way that women have organised themselves in the region include the Women's Peace Network, which was established with the aim of facilitating joint action by women's organisations in respect of the peace process, the Second All Acehnese Women's Congress, which was attended by more than 400 women demanding a voice in the peace process, the Women's Policy Network, which has been focusing on the involvement of women in the new legislative design for Aceh, and the Aceh Inong League (Lina), a more activist organisation that is aimed at encouraging political involvement by women. The existence of such organisations is proof that if there were sufficient political will to foment and facilitate greater political participation by women, there is already a whole series of groups willing to become involved.

However, the opinions of various women included in the report indicate that despite the importance that the different women's organisations have given to the peace process, they do not feel involved in it, nor have they been kept sufficiently informed. The report also records that there has not been sufficient funding to support these organisations.

b) The feminist debate on security.

Since the 1990s, the concept of security has gradually evolved from a purely militarist issue into a more global one that involves more than just a state providing protection against external aggression. The understanding now is that security, and therefore the lack of security, is closely linked with the lives of individual citizens. Many contemporary threats have a direct effect on people: ethno-political conflicts, poverty, domestic violence, the degradation of the environment.[9] This gradual evolution of the approach to security was crystallised in the concept of Human Security, a term coined by the UNDP towards the end of the 20th century. Human security, as defined by the UNDP in 1994, involves protection against chronic threats such as

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[8] http://www.cmi.fi/files/Aceh_involvement_of_women.pdf

[9] Tickner, A. J., *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992.

hunger, disease and repression, and protection from sudden and damaging disruption to one's daily life at home, at work or in the community.

It should be pointed out that the coining of this phrase in the 1990s was the result of intense debate during preceding years. However, less systematically and under a different name, various feminist groups had since the beginning of the 20th century been referring to other forms of security that differed greatly from the traditional militarist standard. At the beginning of the century, as the First World War broke out, J. Addams spoke of disarmament as the best way of guaranteeing security for a country's citizens, bearing in mind the indiscriminate nature of contemporary warfare.[10] In the 1980s, women's organisations defined security as freedom from the threat of war and financial crises caused by external debt and unemployment, and the ability to work in conditions of security, stressing the fact that security means nothing if it is created at the cost of a lack of security for others.[11]

However, let us look at the main criticisms that the feminist movement has raised against the traditional view of security and how have these contributed to enriching the concept of human security and the debate that has arisen around this subject.

The traditional view of security, both in academic circles and in the military and political arena, has centred on the protection of state borders against outside threats, or the protection of the state's authority in the event of internal conflict, seeing security as meaning the absence of threats or violent conflict. Thus, the state prioritises the defence of its territorial integrity above all else. This can be illustrated by referring to the different way in which the majority of national budgets are divided up between national defence on the one hand and all the different elements involved in human security (education, health, social assistance, the prevention of domestic violence, etc.) on the other. This is a militarist approach which reinforces the monopoly of the use of force by individual states.[12]

Feminist academics have pointed out, however, that the primacy traditionally afforded to political and military security has led to the exclusion of other security issues that are nevertheless highly important, such as, for example, gender issues. The feminist approach is, therefore, that it is necessary to extend the concept of security, taking the reference point beyond the state so that it includes individual, regional and global insecurity.[13] Feminist security analysts have also pointed out that the very existence and nature of individual states may help to increase insecurity, rather than reduce it[14]. This represents a complete subversion of the prevailing view of security that has been put forward until now, since it completely reverses the role of the state as the subject to be protected from insecurity, turning it into an agent that actually generates insecurity. Thus, for feminist academics, the main reference point when it comes to security issues must be the person rather than the state, a view that is consistent with the proposals set out in the debate on Human Security.

Other critics refer to the way in which the social divisions between the public space (which is the space to be protected in the traditional approach to security and whose protection guarantees the state of law) and the private space leave the latter outside the realm of state protection, thus creating serious consequences for the security of women. One of the main contributions to the extension of the concept of security from a feminist point of view has been the questioning of the domestic space as a secure space *per se*, given that most of the threats and aggression endured by women take place there, meaning that it should also form part of any security concerns.[15]

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] VVAA, "Discourses in Transition: Re-imagining Women's Security", in *International Relations*, 2006, Vol. 20, pp. 488

[13] Hansen, L. and Olsson, L., "Guest Editor's Introduction", in *Security Dialogue Special Issue on Gender and Security*, vol. 35, no. 4, December 2004

[14] VVAA, *op. cit.*

[15] For more information and detailed figures on insecurity and violence against women in the home, see the report by the Un Secretary General entitled "*In-depth study on all forms of violence against women*", published in July 2006 and available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/419/77/PDF/N0641977.pdf?OpenElement

Once the concept of human security began to be extended to and incorporated in the programming of many international organisations (particularly those linked with the United Nations system), feminist commentators began to make certain observations regarding its actual scope and limitations. The concept of human security has habitually been used as a complement to, rather than substitute for, the more traditional approaches to security, which has meant that the state has continued to play a central role. Furthermore, as M. Caprioli has pointed out, when talking about the so-called universal nature of human security, one should not forget that certain central issues such as democracy and human rights (both of which form part of the central core of human security) have differing impacts on men and women.[16]

Seen from this point of view, incorporating the gender perspective into the issue of security involves "an approach capable of centralising gender in analyses of what have been termed 'traditional' security concerns -such as violent conflict- and what have become termed as 'non-traditional security concerns -such as health, economic empowerment and political participation. The gender security empowers men and women to re-imagine security in ways which can then inform bottom-up, contextualised approaches".[17]

Some authors have suggested that following events like 9-11, which itself marked the recent consolidation of the issue of global insecurity as one that has become central to international relations during the early years of the 21st century, gender stereotypes become accentuated and a central issue in international relations.[18] As a result, the images of the Islamic world shown in the west, and vice versa, images which are aimed at consolidating the view of the other part of the world as a source of insecurity, have followed sexist patterns. Women in the Muslim world are shown as defenceless and passive victims who represent the subject of protection for liberal western democracies, while western women are shown in the Islamic world to be the symbol of moral depravity that could become the norm if the process of westernisation were successful. Furthermore, thousands of young Arab men were detained in the USA following the attacks of 9-11, solely because they belonged to this demographic group, and they remain under continual suspicion even though there is no evidence of any links between them and the attacks. In other words, stereotypes are not only reinforced in one sense, they affect the entire population.

As A. Tickner has indicated, the prevalent use of gender images in the post 9-11 international context to threaten or undermine the legitimacy of the enemy appears to be a more central part of the process than it has been in past armed conflicts.[19] Other authors have underlined the fact that behind the militarization of the foreign policy of countries like the USA lies a patriarchal ideology that promotes the perpetuation of masculinised policies.[20] This is illustrated by a phenomenon that is increasingly characterising the country's politics: the ever-increasing presence of politicians who have previously held important high-ranking positions in the armed forces and who equate their experiences on the battlefield with those of political leadership.[21] It should also be pointed out that this militarization of US politics has been accompanied by regressive policies in the area of women's rights (particularly as regards sexual and reproductive rights) and by the progressive reduction of importance on the political agenda of policies aimed at achieving human security, such as education, social welfare and healthcare, among others.

Taking the current international context into account, it would seem that we need to build a vision of security that incorporates the gender perspective and the contributions offered by feminism in a way that counteracts the prevailing militarist view, which has not only shown itself to be highly ineffective in guaranteeing global security but has actually represented a source of insecurity *per se*.

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[16] Caprioli, M., "Democracy and Human Rights versus Women's Security: a Contradiction?', in *Security Dialogue Special Issue on Gender and Security*, vol. 35, no. 4, December 2004.

[17] VVAA, *op. cit.*

[18] Tickner, J. A., "Feminist Perspectives on 9/11", in *International Studies Perspectives*, no. 3, 2002.

[19] A. Tickner argues that stereotypical gender images have been central to both the reasoning given by the US government to defend its military action and the statements of al-Qaeda and its fervent criticisms of gender relationships in the western world. Ibid.

[20] Enloe, C. "Masculinity as a Foreign Policy Issue", in *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Vol. 5, No. 36, 2000; Enloe, C. "Macho, macho militarism", in *The Nation*, March 2006

[21] Ibid.

The School of Peace Culture (*Escola de Cultura de Pau*) was formed in 1999, with the aim of organising various academic and research activities relating to peace culture, the prevention and transformation of conflicts, disarmament and the promotion of human rights.

The School is essentially financed by the Government of Catalonia, through its Department for Universities, Research and the Information Society, and through its Foreign Relations Secretariat. It also receives support from other departments of the Catalan Government, as well as from local councils, foundations and other institutions. The School is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Peace and Human Rights Chair at *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*.

The main activities of the School of Peace Culture are as follows:

Teaching
Diploma course in Peace Culture (230-hour post-graduate course with 70 places).
Elective subjects "Peace culture and conflict management" and "Educating for peace and in conflicts".
Programmes
Initiatives for awareness and intervention in conflicts, to facilitate dialogue between the parties involved.
Educating for Peace Programme. The team that run this programme aim to encourage and develop the knowledge, values and skills needed in order to Educate for Peace.
Human Rights Programme, aimed at encouraging human rights culture through the analysis, promotion and defence of human rights on both a local and an international scale.
Disarmament Programme, which acts as a specialist advisory service for the campaigns carried out by various NGOs for the control of small arms and as an advisory body for international organisations.
Programme on Conflicts and Peacebuilding. This programme involves the day-to-day monitoring of the international situation, particularly as regards conflicts and the human rights situation in all countries, the movement of displaced people and refugees, the peace processes currently under way, the different phases of post-war rehabilitation and the dynamics of development, for the purposes of preparing annual, quarterly and weekly reports.
Peace Processes Programme, which monitors and analyses the different countries currently pursuing peace processes or formal negotiations, along with countries in which negotiations are at an exploratory stage. This programme includes the project on Colombia, dedicated to raising awareness of the peace initiatives in this country.
Post-war Rehabilitation Programme, which monitors and analyses international aid in terms of peace-building in contexts of conflict and post-war environments.

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