

# Introduction

*Peace talks in Focus 2019. Report on Trends and Scenarios* is a yearbook that analyses the peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world in 2018. The examination of the evolution and the dynamics of these negotiations at a global level offers a global view of the peace processes, identifying trends and facilitating a comparative analysis among the different scenarios. One of the main aims of this report is to provide information and analysis for those actors who take part in the peaceful resolution of conflicts at different levels, including those parties in dispute, mediators and civil society, among others. The yearbook also seeks to reveal the different formulas of dialogue and negotiation that are aimed at reversing the dynamics of violence and that aim to channel conflicts through political means in numerous contexts. As such, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts that are aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

With regard to **methodology**, this report draws mainly from on qualitative analysis of studies and information from numerous sources –the United Nations, international organizations, research centres, the media, NGOs, and others–, in addition to experience gained in field research. The report also incorporates the gender perspective in the study and analysis of peace processes in a cross-cutting manner.

The analysis is based on a **definition** that understands **peace processes** as comprising all those political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at resolving conflicts and transforming their root causes by means of peaceful methods, especially through peace negotiations. **Peace**

**negotiations** are considered as the processes of dialogue between at least two conflicting parties in a conflict, in which the parties address their differences in a concerted framework in order to end the violence and encounter a satisfactory solution to their demands. Other actors not directly involved in the conflict may also participate. Peace negotiations are usually preceded by preliminary or exploratory phases that define the format, place, conditions and guarantees, of the future negotiations, among other elements. Peace negotiations may or may not be facilitated by **third parties**. The third parties intervene in the dispute so as to contribute to the dialogue between the actors involved and to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict. Other actors not directly involved in the dispute may also participate in peace negotiations. Peace negotiations may result in comprehensive or partial **agreements**, agreements related to the procedure or process, and agreements linked to the causes or consequences of the conflict. Elements of the different type of agreements may be combined in the same agreement.

With respect to its **structure**, the publication is organized into six chapters. The first presents a summary of those processes and negotiations that took place in 2018, and offers an overview of the main trends at a global level. The following five chapters detail the analysis of peace processes and negotiations from a geographic perspective. Each addresses the main trends of peace negotiations in Africa, America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, respectively, and describes the development and dynamics of each of the cases present in the regions, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda.



# 1. Negotiations in 2018: global overview and main trends

- Forty-nine (49) peace processes and negotiations were identified around the world in 2018. The largest number of cases were reported in Africa (22), followed by Asia (11), Europe (seven), the Middle East (five) and the Americas (four).
- Central governments and armed opposition groups or politico-military movements were the main negotiating actors in most of the processes analysed.
- Third-party participation in mediation, facilitation and other efforts was identified in most of the processes and negotiations analysed (80%).
- The UN was present in almost half the cases where a third party was involved. The international organisation participated in these negotiating processes through various formats, including special envoys.
- One of the issues that came up the most in the negotiating agendas was the search for truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities.
- The analysis of the different processes in 2018 confirmed the difficulties and obstacles that women face in participating meaningfully in formal peace processes and in incorporating a gender perspective in negotiations.

During 2018, a total of 49 peace processes and negotiations were identified on a worldwide level. The analysis of the different contexts reveals a wide variety of realities and dynamics, a result of the diverse nature of the armed conflicts<sup>1</sup> and socio-political crises<sup>2</sup> that the negotiations are linked to. Without losing sight of the need to consider the specific characteristics of each case, it is possible to draw several conclusions and offer reflections on the general panorama of peace processes and negotiations, as well as to identify some trends. Several conclusions are presented below regarding the geographical distribution of the negotiations, those actors involved in the negotiation processes, the third parties who participated, the main and recurrent issues in the negotiation agendas, the general development of the processes, inclusiveness and the gender dimension in these peace negotiations.

Table 1.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in 2018

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
<b>Africa</b>		
<b>Burundi</b>	Government, political and social opposition grouped in the National Council for the Respect of the Peace Agreement and the Reconciliation of Burundi and the Restoration of the Rule of Law (CNARED)	East African Community (EAC), UN
<b>CAR</b>	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Seleka Coalition, Antibalaka militias	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant Egidio, ACCORD, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Russia, Sudan
<b>Djibouti – Eritrea</b>	Government of Djibouti, Government of Eritrea	Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Somalia

1. The School of the Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau, ECP) defines armed conflict as any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible in which the continuous and organised use of violence a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. wounded or displaced population, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services) and aims to achieve objectives that are different than those of common delinquency and are normally linked to a) demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues; b) the opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of the government, which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power; or c) control over the resources or the territory.
2. A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by different actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control of resources or territory.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
<b>Africa</b>		
<b>DRC</b>	Government, Alliance for the Presidential Majority, political and social opposition grouped in the Rassemblement coalition (Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), the Dynamic Opposition and the G7, among others), Union for the Congolese Nation and other political parties	Congolese Episcopal Conference (CENCO), Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue on the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), EU, UN, International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF), USA
Eritrea – Ethiopia	Government of Eritrea, Government of Ethiopia	United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, USA
<b>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</b>	Government, ONLF military political movement	Kenya, United Arab Emirates and Sweden
<b>Ethiopia (Oromia)</b>	Government, OLF military political movement	--
<b>Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram)</b>	Government of Nigeria, Boko Haram (Abubakar Shekau faction), Boko Haram (Abu Musab al-Barnawi faction)	--
<b>Libya</b>	Presidential Council and Government of National Agreement (GAN), House of Representatives (CdR), National General Congress (CGN)	Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Italy, France
Mali	Government, Coordinator of Azawad Movements (CMA) – MNLA, MAA and HCUA–, Platform –GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA–	Algeria, France, ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU,
<b>Morocco – Western Sahara</b>	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and River of Gold (POLISARIO)	UN, Algeria and Mauritania (observers), Group of Friends of the Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
<b>Mozambique</b>	Government, the RENAMO armed group	National mediation team, Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, United Kingdom, EU, Community of Sant Egidio (Vatican), Catholic Church
<b>Nigeria (Niger Delta)</b>	Government, Pan-Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF), NIGER Delta Consultative Assembly, (NIDCA), Pan Niger Delta Peoples' Congress (PNDPC), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)	--
<b>Rep. of the Congo</b>	Government, Ninja militias and the National Council of the Republicans (CNR) of Frédéric Bintsamou (Pastor Ntoumi)	--
Senegal (Casamance)	Government of Senegal, the armed group Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and its different factions	The Community of Sant Egidio, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau
Somalia	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political-military movement Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama'a, clan leaders and sub-clans	UN, IGAD, Turkey, among others
<b>South Sudan</b>	Government (SPLM), SPLM / A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others)	IGAD Plus: IGAD (Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda); AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches
<b>Sudan</b>	Government of Sudan, the opposition coalition "Sudan Call" formed by national opposition parties and Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur)	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Troika (USA, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany
<b>Sudan (Darfur)</b>	Government, Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions	AU, UNAMID, Chad, Germany, Qatar, USA, United Kingdom, France
<b>Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile)</b>	Government, SPLM-N	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Uganda
<b>Sudan - South Sudan</b>	Government of Sudan and Government of South Sudan	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU
Togo	Government, political and social opposition	Ghana, ECOWAS, AU, UN
<b>America</b>		
<b>Colombia (FARC)</b>	Government and FARC	Guarantor countries (Cuba, Norway), accompanying countries (Venezuela, Chile), UN
<b>Colombia (ELN)</b>	Government and ELN	Guarantor countries (Ecuador, Brazil, Norway, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile), accompanying countries (Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands and Italy), Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (UN, Colombian Episcopal Conference, Government, ELN)

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
<b>America</b>		
<b>Nicaragua</b>	Government, political and social opposition	Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua
<b>Venezuela</b>	Government, opposition (MUD)	Dominican Republic Government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (former president of Spain) and accompanying countries (Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Nicaragua and Bolivia)
<b>Asia</b>		
<b>Afghanistan</b>	Government, Taliban insurgents, USA	Pakistan, China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Russia, UN
China (Tibet)	Government, ULFA-PTF, NDFB-P, NDFB-RD	--
<b>DPR Korea – Republic of Korea</b>	North Korea, South Korea	--
<b>DPR Korea – USA</b>	North Korea, USA	--
<b>India (Assam)</b>	Government, ULFA-PTF, NDFB-P, NDFB-RD	--
<b>India (Nagaland)</b>	Government, NSCN-IM, NNPG: GPRN/NSCN (Kitovi Zhimomi), NNC, FGN, NSCN(R), NPGN (Non-Accord) and NNC/GDRN/NA	--
<b>Myanmar</b>	Government, armed signatory groups of the cease fire agreement (NCA): DKBA, RCSS/SSA-South, CNF, KNU, KNLA, ALP, PNLO, ABSDF, NMSP, LDU; armed groups not part of the NCA: UWSP, NDAA, SSPP/SSA-N, KNPP, NSCN-K, KIA, AA, TNLA, MNDAA	--
<b>Philippines (MILF)</b>	Government, MILF	Malaysia, International Contact Group, Third Party Monitoring Team, International Monitoring Team
<b>Philippines (MNLF)</b>	Government, MNLF (faction led by Nur Misuari)	--
<b>Philippines (NDF)</b>	Government, NDF (umbrella organisation of different communist organisations, among them the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is the political arm of the NPA)	Norway
<b>Thailand (south)</b>	Government, MARA Patani (umbrella organisation representing several armed groups)	Malaysia
<b>Europe</b>		
<b>Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabaj)</b>	Armenia, Azerbaijan	OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, France and USA, the remaining permanent members are Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey)
<b>Cyprus</b>	Republic of Cyprus, self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	UN, EU, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom (guarantee countries)
<b>Spain (Basque Country)</b>	ETA, political and social actors in the Basque Country	International Contact Group (ICG), Social Forum and the Permanent Social Forum, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
<b>Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)</b>	Georgia, representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia <sup>3</sup>	OSCE, EU, UN, USA, Russia <sup>4</sup>
<b>Moldova (Transdniestria)</b>	Moldova, the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria	OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, USA and EU
<b>Serbia – Kosovo</b>	Serbia, Kosovo	EU, UN
<b>Ukraine (east)</b>	Ukraine, representatives of the self-proclaimed popular republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia <sup>5</sup>	OSCE (in the Trilateral Contact Group, where Ukraine and Russia also participate <sup>6</sup> ); Germany and France (in the Normandy Group, where Ukraine and Russia also participate <sup>7</sup> )
<b>Middle East</b>		
<b>Iran (nuclear programme)</b>	Iran, G5+1 (USA, France, United Kingdom, Russia and China plus Germany), EU	UN

3. Russia's status in the peace process in Georgia is open to interpretation. Georgia considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

4. Ibid.

5. Russia's status in the peace process in Ukraine is open to interpretation. Ukraine considers Russia as a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
<b>Middle East</b>		
<b>Israel-Palestine</b>	Israeli Government, Palestinian Authority (AP)	Quartet for the Middle East (USA, Russia, UN, EU), France, Egypt, Russia, Oman
<b>Palestine</b>	Hamas, Fatah	Egypt, Qatar
<b>Syria</b>	Government, sectors of the political and armed opposition	UN, USA, Russia, Turkey, Iran, International Syria Support Group (ISSG)
<b>Yemen</b>	Government of Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, Houthis/Ansarallah	UN, Kuwait, Oman

The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.  
 -- There are no third parties or no public proof of their existence.

Regarding the **geographical distribution of the peace processes and negotiations in 2018**, most of the cases studied were located in Africa, where there were 22 negotiating processes, equivalent to 45% of the total. Asia was the region with the second-highest number of cases, with 11, accounting for 23% of the negotiations in 2018. The remaining peace processes were distributed between Europe, with seven cases (14%), the Middle East, with five (10%) and the Americas, with four (8%). The high percentage of negotiations in Africa correlates with the fact that it is also the continent with the highest number of armed conflicts and socio-political crises worldwide.<sup>8</sup> Compared with the previous year, there was a rise in the number of peace processes and negotiations analysed around the world, since 43 cases were counted in 2003. This increase in 2018 owed to the higher number of cases in Africa, Asia and the Americas, while Europe and the Middle East had the same number of processes and negotiations as in the previous year. The new cases of peace negotiations in 2018 included the processes between Ethiopia


***Most of the negotiations in 2018 took place in Africa (45%), followed by Asia (23%), Europe (14%), the Middle East (10%) and the Americas (8%)***

and Eritrea and between Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as the process between the Ethiopian government and the politico-military movement OLF in Oromia, in Africa; the resumption of dialogue between the Chinese government and Tibetan representatives and high-level talks between North and South Korea and between North Korea and the United States, in Asia; and the process in Nicaragua, which began as a consequence of the serious political and human rights crisis gripping the country, in the Americas.

Once again, almost all **actors involved in the peace processes and negotiations** were central or state governments in which the conflicts and/or socio-political crises occurred. In fact, only one of the 49 cases analysed in 2018 was an exception to this situation. This was the peace process in the Basque Country, the only case in Spain, where the government was not one of the negotiating parties, although other negotiations in the past did involve the Spanish government. The negotiations in the Basque Country were conducted by other political and social actors, and particularly in 2018 the scenario was marked by ETA's unilateral decision to dissolve all its structures definitively. In the rest of the cases studied in 2018, the governments of the respective states held direct or indirect negotiations with various kinds of actors according to the particular aspects of each context that generally ranged from non-governmental armed groups (individually or as a group) to a more complex combination of armed actors and opposition politicians, opposition groups or political platforms, foreign governments, in the case of interstate disputes, representatives of territories seeking to secede or win recognition as independent and more.

Negotiations were conducted by governments of states and armed opposition groups or political-military movements in all regions in 2018. These included several peace processes in Africa, such as those between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF, in Ogaden; between the latter and the OLF, in Oromia;

**Graph 1.1. Regional distribution of peace negotiations**



8. See Annex 1 (Summary of armed conflicts in 2018) and Annex 2 (Summary of socio-political crises in 2018). For more information on the scenario of armed conflicts and tensions at a global level, see Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2019! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2019.

between the Mozambican government and RENAMO; between the government of the CAR and groups of the former Séléka coalition and the anti-balaka militias; between the Sudanese government and the SPLM-N; and between the South Sudanese government and the SPLM-IO and other minor groups, among others. In the Americas, the Colombian government held talks with the ELN and with the former FARC guerrilla group, which has transformed into a political party as part of implementation of the peace agreement reached in 2016. Several processes of this type were also identified in Asia, in some cases with direct negotiations between the respective governments and the armed groups—such as the MILF and the MNLF in the Philippines, the Taliban in Afghanistan and the NSCN-IM in India—and in others through political organisations that acted as representatives of armed groups, such as in the negotiations between the Philippine government and the NDF, which has acted as the representative for the armed group NPA for decades. In several instances in Asia, the armed actors involved in the negotiations were grouped under joint platforms or umbrella organisations representing several armed groups, such as the Naga National Political Groups in India (Nagaland), Mara Patani in Thailand and the Northern Alliance in Myanmar. The main example in the Middle East was


***The higher number of peace negotiations in 2018 compared to the previous year was due to the implementation of new processes in Africa, Asia and the Americas***

provided by Yemen, since the internationally recognised government and the armed group known as the Houthis or Ansarallah participated in the negotiations. Other processes involved the respective governments and a broader and more complex range of political and armed actors. This was the case in Libya, Mali, Syria, Somalia and Sudan. A lower number of peace processes involved the government and purely political opposition groups or coalitions, like in Burundi, Nicaragua, the DRC, Venezuela and Togo.

Another group of peace processes dealt with interstate disputes involving the governments of different countries. There were examples of this in all regions, except for the Americas. The number of interstate negotiations in Africa rose during the year, from one to three. The dialogue between

Sudan and South Sudan was joined by the negotiations between Djibouti and Eritrea and between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the context of positive dynamics in 2018 that provided a chance for peace in the Horn of Africa in the future. Asia also provided a remarkable and unique example in this regard, since two negotiating processes began (between North Korea and South Korea and between North Korea and the United States) that consisted mainly of presidential summits, accompanied a posteriori by political, military and high-level

**Map 1.1. Peace negotiations in 2018**



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in 2018



technical meetings to flesh out the commitments made in the meetings between the respective presidents. In Europe, the emblematic interstate peace process was between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, while in the Middle East it involved Iran and its nuclear programme. The negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme involved several countries and led to a historic agreement in 2015, but implementation of the deal was compromised in 2018 due to the US decision to withdraw from it.

The negotiations in another significant amount of peace processes involved central governments and representatives of groups seeking secession, a new political or administrative status or independence with full international recognition. These groups, some of which were self-proclaimed states, with territorial control, enjoying limited international recognition and usually external support from some regional or international power, participated in the negotiations in various different ways, sometimes as a consulted party but with the capacity for limited influence, and other times involved as a full party. Europe was the scene of several cases of this type, including the peace process in Cyprus, involving the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is only recognised by Turkey; the peace process in Moldova, involving the self-proclaimed republic of Transnistria, which is backed by Russia but lacks international recognition; and Kosovo, which is internationally recognised as a state by more than 100 countries and is acting as a negotiating party in the talks with Serbia. In this vein, other processes with unique aspects were related to the conflict over Western Sahara, involving the Moroccan government and the POLISARIO Front, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which deals with the governments of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The UN continues to consider Western Sahara a territory pending decolonisation, whose alleged possession by Morocco is not recognised either by international law or by any UN resolution. Likewise, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) proclaimed by the POLISARIO Front has not received any international majority recognition. Meanwhile, decades of negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian leaders have not led to the full configuration of a Palestinian state. Nevertheless, Palestine has been recognised as such by other states and has been an "observer member" of the UN since 2012.

Regarding the **third parties involved in peace and negotiation processes**, although in many cases we can clearly identify the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment activities, in others these tasks were carried out discreetly or behind closed doors. Taking this variable into account, our analysis of the negotiations worldwide in 2018 allows us to conclude that third-party participation was confirmed in the vast majority (39 out of 49, corresponding to 80%). The processes where there no third party was involved and where meetings were held directly or bilaterally were concentrated in Asia, with seven cases (China (Tibet),

North Korea-South Korea, North Korea-United States, Philippines (MNLF), India (Assam), India (Nagaland) and Myanmar), and in Africa, with three cases (Nigeria (Niger Delta), Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) and the Republic of the Congo). Negotiations without third parties were a distinctive feature of the peace processes in Asia, since there were none in almost two thirds of the cases studied there. Third-party involvement was independent of the format of the negotiations. Thus, there were third parties in most internal peace processes, whether in negotiations (28) or national dialogues (one), as well as in most interstate negotiations (eight).

In nearly all processes with a third party (35 of the 39), more than one actor performed mediation or facilitation tasks. The actors involved in the negotiations were of a diverse nature, highlighting the work of intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, EU, AU, OSCE, IGAD, OIC, SADC, EAC, ECCAS and OIF, foreign governments, religious organisations and NGOs. In some cases, third parties acted alone, such as Norway in the Philippine peace process (NDF), Malaysia in Thailand (south) and the Episcopal Conference in Nicaragua. In other cases, third-party intervention in negotiating processes was organised in structured formats, in groups of countries or platforms that brought together various kinds of actors. The former include, for example, the Group of Friends on Western Sahara, which brings together France, the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom and Russia; the Troika in Sudan, made up of the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway; and groups of countries that are guarantors or accompany the peace processes between the Colombian government and both the FARC and the ELN. Third-party formats with several different actors included the Quartet in Libya, consisting of the UN, AU, EU and Arab League; the International Contact Group in the negotiating process between the Philippine government and the MILF, composed of four states (Japan, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia) and four NGOs (Muhammadiyah, The Asia Foundation, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Conciliation Resources); and the Quartet for the Middle East, made up of the UN, the EU, the United States and Russia.

Our analysis of the processes and negotiations in 2018 confirms the prominent role played by the UN in mediation and facilitation efforts. The organisation was involved via different formats in 19 of the 49 peace processes identified during the year, and in almost half the processes involving a third party (49%). The United Nations carried out its activity through different formats. Special mention should be made of the work carried out by special envoys and representatives in 2018, some of them recently appointed, whose work combined with other factors to help some processes to resume. Thus, for example, the new Special Envoy for Western Sahara, Horst Köhler, managed to arrange a meeting in late 2018 between representatives of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front after six years without direct contact. After getting around various difficulties, the new Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, managed to get the



Table 1.2. Internal and interstate peace processes/negotiations with and without third parties in 2018

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERSTATE	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (8)	Negotiations with third parties (28)	National dialogues without third parties (0)	National dialogues with third parties (1)	Other formats (2)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (8)
<b>AFRICA</b>							
Burundi		x					
CAR		x					
Djibouti - Eritrea							x
DRC		x					
Ethiopia (Ogaden)		x					
Ethiopia (Oromia)		x					
Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram)	x						
Libya		x					
Mali		x					
Morocco – Western Sahara							x
Mozambique		x					
Nigeria (Niger Delta)	x						
Rep. of the Congo	x						
Senegal (Casamance)		x					
Somalia		x					
South Sudan		x					
Sudan				x			
Sudan (Darfur)		x					
Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile)		x					
Sudan – South Sudan							x
Togo		x					
<b>AMERICA</b>							
Colombia (FARC-EP)		x					
Colombia (ELN)		x					
Nicaragua		x					
Venezuela		x					
<b>ASIA</b>							
Afghanistan <sup>1</sup>					x		
China (Tibet)	x						
India (Assam)	x						
India (Nagaland)	x						
Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea						x	
Korea, DPR – USA						x	
Myanmar	x						
Philippines (MILF)		x					
Philippines (MNLF)	x						
Philippines (NDF)		x					
Thailand (south)		x					

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERSTATE	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (8)	Negotiations with third parties (28)	National dialogues without third parties (0)	National dialogues with third parties (1)	Other formats (2)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (8)
<b>EUROPE</b>							
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)							x
Cyprus		x					
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) <sup>ii</sup>		x					
Moldova (Transnistria)		x					
Serbia – Kosovo <sup>iii</sup>							x
Spain (Basque Country)					x		
Ukraine <sup>iv</sup>		x					
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>							
Iran (nuclear programme)							x
Israel-Palestine							x
Palestine		x					
Syria <sup>v</sup>		x					
Yemen		x					

- i. No official negotiations have begun in Afghanistan, although various exploratory initiatives have been launched.
- ii. The nature of the peace processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia's role in those conflicts and peace processes are open to interpretation. Ukraine considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, whereas Russia considers itself a third party.
- iii. The peace process between Serbia and Kosovo is considered interstate because even though its international legal status is still controversial, Kosovo has been recognised as a state by over 100 countries. In 2010, the International Court of Justice issued a non-binding opinion that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
- iv. The nature of the peace process in Ukraine and Russia's role in the conflict and peace process are open to interpretation. Ukraine considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, whereas Russia considers itself a third party.
- v. There are two parallel negotiating processes in Syria (Astana and Geneva). Third parties are involved in both processes, though some of them directly project their interests onto the negotiations.

Hadi government and the Houthis to sit down together in Sweden in December in the first meetings between them in over two years. In Libya, the UN Special Envoy tried to get the parties involved in implementing the plan proposed by the UN in late 2017 to reactivate the political process. Regarding the process between Israel and Palestine, the UN Special Envoy for the Middle East worked with Egypt to broker a ceasefire between the Israeli government and Hamas. In other cases, like in Syria, UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura left office after years of unsuccessful efforts to achieve a political solution to the conflict. In addition to special envoys, the UN was also involved through missions with mandates that included aspects of verification, ceasefire monitoring, assistance, accompaniment, good offices and other tasks (such as missions in Libya, Mali, the CAR, Western Sahara, Colombia, Afghanistan and Cyprus), as well as mechanisms or platforms supporting the search for a solution to various conflicts (such as the Quartet Supporting the Libyan Political Agreement, the Quartet for the Middle East and the IGAD Plus in South Sudan, to name a few).

In addition to the UN, regional organisations also played a role, both in their respective areas and beyond their most direct regional spheres. For example, the EU was prominent in European disputes, but it was also involved in other contexts beyond Europe, for example in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and in several

in Africa, including Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR and the DRC. The AU participated in 10 of the 22 peace processes in Africa (Libya, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), Sudan (Kordofan and Blue Nile), South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan and Togo), where other regional organisations were also involved, such as ECOWAS (in Togo and Mali) and the IGAD (in South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan and Somalia). In Asia, in keeping with the more limited presence of third parties, intergovernmental organisations were less involved in mediation and facilitation activities.

Regarding the work of third-party states in negotiations, several European countries made efforts at different latitudes, but so did some states in the Middle East. These included Qatar (involved in the peace processes related to Djibouti-Eritrea, Sudan (Darfur), Afghanistan and Palestine), Saudi Arabia (Djibouti-Eritrea, Eritrea-Ethiopia and Afghanistan) and the United Arab Emirates (Eritrea-Ethiopia and Ethiopia (Ogaden)). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates performed their mediation and facilitation work while actively involved in the armed conflict in Yemen, where they were interested parties to the conflict. The role of some states as third parties aroused suspicions and mistrust in various processes, where they were perceived as actors with glaring bias for one of the parties in the dispute. This was true of the Israel-Palestine process, where the Palestinian Authority continued to express its dissatisfaction with US policies

Table 1.3. Intergovernmental organisations as third parties in peace processes in 2018

<b>UN (18)</b>	
<b>AFRICA</b>	
Burundi	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Burundi
CAR	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the CAR UN is member of the International Support Group for CAR
DRC	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the DRC
Libya	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Libya United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) The UN forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and EU
Mali	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mali United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Somalia	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)
South Sudan	"IGAD Plus" in South Sudan, formed by the IGAD, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda; the AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, the Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway), the EU and the UN UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for South Sudan UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
Sudan (Darfur)	United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
Western Sahara	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Western Sahara United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
<b>AMERICA</b>	
Colombia	UN Verification Mission in Colombia
<b>ASIA</b>	
Afghanistan	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
<b>EUROPE</b>	
Cyprus	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Mission of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus Office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	United Nations Special Representative in the Geneva International Discussions on Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)
Serbia - Kosovo	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>	
Iran	International Atomic Energy Agency The UN Secretary-General regularly reports on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which validated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015)
Israel-Palestine	The UN participates in the Quartet for the Middle East along with the United States, Russia and the EU to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Special Envoy for the Peace Process in the Middle East
Syria	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria
Yemen	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Yemen
<b>UE (10)</b>	
<b>AFRICA</b>	
CAR	EU is member of the International Support Group for CAR
DRC	EU delegation in the DRC EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region
Libya	The EU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, UN and Arab League
Mali	EU Special Representative for the Sahel
Mozambique	EU Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Mozambique
<b>EUROPE</b>	
Cyprus	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, in Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) EU Observation Mission in Georgia (EUMM)
Moldova (Transdniestria)	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)

<b>UE (10)</b>	
Serbia - Kosovo	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission, in Serbia–Kosovo EU Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>	
Israel-Palestine	The EU participates in the Quartet for the Middle East along with the United States, Russia and the UN to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy EU Special Envoy for the Middle East
<b>UA (9)</b>	
CAR	The AU leads the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU with the support of the ECCAS, CIRGL, Angola, Gabon, Rep. of the Congo and Chad)
DRC	The AU leads the Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC
Libya	The AU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the Arab League, UN and EU
Mali	AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel / The AU participates in the Mediation Team, which supports implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali
Sudan	AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP)
Sudan (Darfur)	United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
Sudan (Kordofan and Blue Nile)	AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP)
Sudan – South Sudan	African Union Border Programme (AUBP)
Togo	UA Delegation
<b>OSCE (4)</b>	
Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Minsk Group Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Conflict Related to the Minsk Conference of the OSCE
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the South Caucasus
Moldova (Transdniestria)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process OSCE Mission in Moldova
Ukraine	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group OSCE Special Observation Mission in Ukraine (SMM) OSCE Special Observation Mission at the Gukovo and Donetsk Checkpoints Coordinator of OSCE projects in Ukraine
<b>IGAD (3)</b>	
South Sudan	“IGAD Plus” in South Sudan, formed by the IGAD, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda; the AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, the Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway), the EU and the UN
Sudan – South Sudan	IGAD Delegation
Somalia	IGAD Delegation
<b>ECOWAS (2)</b>	
Mali	ECOWAS Delegation
Togo	ECOWAS Delegation
<b>OIC (1)</b>	
CAR	OIC Delegation
<b>SADC (1)</b>	
DRC	SADC Delegation
<b>EAC (1)</b>	
Burundi	EAC Delegation
<b>ECCAS (1)</b>	
CAR	ECCAS Delegation
<b>OIF</b>	
DRC	OIF Delegation

aligned with Israeli interests. It was also an issue in the peace processes in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Ukraine (east), where Russia's role remained subject to different interpretations. Moscow presented itself as a third party in these processes, but both the Georgian and the Ukrainian governments consider it a party to the conflict. Russia's role also continued to arouse suspicion in Syria, given its prominent role in support of the Damascus regime, but also as the promoter of a negotiating process parallel to the one sponsored by the UN. Known as the Astana process, this Moscow-based initiative also involves Iran (an ally of Damascus) and Turkey (a defender of some opposition groups). The peace process in Syria also illustrated the role that actors working as mediators or facilitators can play, since Russia and Turkey directly negotiated a truce between Syrian armed actors in 2018. Parallel processes, like those in Syria, can generate mistrust and risk incoordination. A similar situation was observed in the CAR in 2018, where Russia and Sudan promoted a facilitation process parallel to the multilateral initiative backed by the African Union.

With regard to the **negotiating agendas**, we must consider the particular aspects of each case and bear in mind that the details of the issues under discussion did not always become known to the public. That said, our analysis of the various peace processes and negotiations that took place during 2018 identifies recurring themes in the negotiating agendas. **One issue that came up in negotiations in all the continents was the search for truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities**, under various formats and closely linked to scenarios of active armed conflict. In Africa, this issue was key in Ethiopia (where in response to confidence-building measures taken by the government, both the OLF in Oromia and the ONLF in Ogaden declared ceasefires that were essential stepping stones to a cessation of hostilities), in Sudan (where the government extended its ceasefire declaration in the Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile regions and some armed groups did the same) and in South Sudan (where the ceasefire between the government and the SPLM/A-IO was decisive for achieving a global peace agreement). In the Americas, the ceasefire issue came up in the talks between the Colombian government and the ELN, while it was also significant in several processes in Asia. In the Philippine government's negotiations with the NDF, the opposition group's refusal to declare a ceasefire before the authorities agreed to some of their demands was one of the main obstacles to making headway in the negotiations. In Afghanistan, the government and the Taliban agreed to the first ceasefire since the US invasion of the country in 2001. In Thailand, the government and Mara Patani agreed to create ceasefire areas called "safety zones", an issue that was part of the substantive agenda of the negotiations in the last three years. In the Middle East, attempts to stop the violence were an issue in the negotiations in Yemen, leading to

*The UN participated in almost half the peace processes involving a third party and took part in negotiating processes through various formats*

an agreement for a limited ceasefire at the end of the year. In Syria, it was agreed to establish a demilitarised zone around Idlib to prevent clashes between the Syrian government and armed opposition groups and ceasefire agreements were made between other armed actors involved in the conflict. In Israel-Palestine, the Israeli government and Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad reached specific ceasefire agreements, despite not being involved in a negotiating process to resolve the substantive issues of the conflict. In Europe, several ceasefire agreements were reached in Ukraine, but then were systematically broken.

**Another subject that came up in various peace negotiations was the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants.** DDR processes were significant in Africa, in Mozambique, Ethiopia (Oromia), the Republic of the Congo, Mali and Sudan (Darfur). In other contexts, negotiations addressed the release or exchange of prisoners, as illustrated by the peace processes in Yemen and Syria. This was also an issue in non-active armed conflicts. In the Basque Country, for example, prisoners continued to be a key issue pending resolution.

Comparing cases at the global level also reveals issues related to the distribution of political power (Burundi, the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan, to name a few), including territorial and administrative decentralisation in some processes, such as in Mozambique and Mali. In other cases, struggles over political power were reflected in debates on electoral issues, such as in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Palestine. Elsewhere, the emphasis was on self-determination, independence, land use or recognition for the identity of national minorities, as in the case of the Moro people in the Philippines, the Tibet region in China, several minorities in Myanmar and the Naga of Nagaland, in India. Substantive discussions on the status of disputed territories usually remained at an impasse, despite being a key issue in various processes, such as those in the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine, the Serbia-Kosovo process, Cyprus and Western Sahara. However, some border issues between states were addressed during the year, leading to some progress in Eritrea and Ethiopia and in Sudan and South Sudan. Finally, in Iran and North Korea, denuclearisation was one of the key issues on the agenda.

Regarding the **evolution of the peace processes and negotiations**, it is usually possible to identify a great variety of trends: a good development of meetings leading to draft agreements; the establishment of negotiations where there had been no talks or the reactivation of dialogue after years of standstill; intense exploratory efforts fuelling expectations; rounds of negotiation that make no progress on key points, but keep a channel of dialogue open; situations of serious

impasse and an absence of contact despite the efforts of third parties to facilitate negotiations; obstacles and difficulties in implementing agreements; and contexts in which violence and ceasefire violations have a profound impact on the prospects for peace processes. Our analysis of the different cases in 2018 confirms these diverse dynamics. There were also contexts in which significant progress or historic agreements were achieved, or where negotiations were resumed after years of no dialogue. However, there were difficulties, obstacles and setbacks in a significant number of cases, or deadlock persisted in the negotiations that prevented the substantive issues of the disputes from being addressed, among other issues.

Some of the cases that evolved in the most positive direction took place in Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa region. The coming to power of a new prime minister in Ethiopia gave a boost to a series of actions that enabled progress in negotiating processes both with internal insurgencies and at the interstate level. Thus, historic agreements were reached between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF and OLF groups in the Ogaden and Oromia regions, respectively in 2018. Progress was also made in the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, also under the impulse of Addis Ababa, which led to the signing of agreements on the unresolved border dispute between both countries since the war between 1998 and 2000 and to the re-establishment of bilateral relations in multiple areas. The agreements between Ethiopia and Eritrea also facilitated the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti, though the dispute over the border area of Ras Doumeira remained unsolved, and between Eritrea and Somalia, countries whose bilateral relations improved. Important agreements were signed elsewhere that aroused certain expectations, but the record of mistrust between the parties involved and/or the history of violations of previous agreements caused scepticism among observers and experts about whether they could be implemented. This was true of the agreement between the South Sudanese government and the SPLM/A-IO in September and the deal between the Yemeni government and the Houthis in December, as a result of the first contact between the parties since 2016.

Though the results are not yet final, positive developments in some contexts were mainly due to a resumption of negotiations after a long period of standstill, as in the case of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front in the dispute over Western Sahara, which held the first direct talks since 2012 in 2018, and in the process between the Chinese government and Tibetan representatives, which maintained exploratory meetings after almost a decade without speaking. In other peace processes, the positive trend was linked to the openness and good development of meetings, as happened between North and South Korea and between North Korea and the United States in 2018, which together could favour the stabilisation and denuclearisation of the Korean

peninsula. Though formal negotiations were not initiated in Afghanistan, meetings and declarations throughout the year meant that the situation was significantly different than in previous years, including all the actors' willingness to negotiate without conditions and the first ceasefire between Afghan security forces and the Taliban insurgents since 2001. Elsewhere, progress was linked to implementing agreements. This was true of the process between the Philippine government and the MILF, which in 2018 was marked by approval of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, a key milestone to continue with implementation of the agreement reached in 2014 and to facilitate the demobilisation of thousands of the armed group's fighters. This was also the case of Moldova, where progress continued in implementing the confidence-building measures package agreed in late 2017.

In other cases, however, difficulties were observed in implementing the agreements. This was true in Mali and Libya, for example, as a consequence of the disagreements between the actors involved in the respective peace processes, among other factors, and the context of persistent violence. In both cases, new implementation schedules were being considered in late 2018. In Colombia, implementation of the agreement between the government and the FARC advanced amidst many problems and mutual accusations of non-compliance. Efforts to implement the agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme were affected by the US decision to withdraw from the agreement. Other cases provided examples of deadlock in the negotiations or deterioration and setbacks amidst intensified tension and/or violence. These included Burundi, where the dialogue remained at a standstill despite regional initiatives to try to promote negotiations; the Philippines (NDF), where the deadlock in the negotiations was accompanied by a significant rise in hostilities between the NPA and the Philippine Armed Forces; Colombia (ELN), where the end of the ceasefire agreement and the change of government resulted brought a halt to the negotiations; Ukraine, where difficulties persisted in moving forward in discussing the substantive issues; Israel-Palestine, where the chronic impasse of the negotiations between the parties remained with no short-term prospects for a change in the dynamics; and Syria, where the negotiations failed to move the discussion forward on substantive issues, while the Damascus regime seemed determined to impose its will by military means. Although the particular aspects of each case must be considered, generally speaking it is possible to identify some crisis factors in the negotiations, including the impact of the dynamics of violence, the distrust between the parties and the influence of other political processes (like holding elections).

Finally, regarding the **gender, peace and security agenda**, our analysis of the different peace processes in 2018 confirms the obstacles that women face in participating in formal processes and the difficulties in incorporating a gender perspective in negotiations.



Table 1.4. Main agreements of 2018

Peace processes	Agreements
Afghanistan	Ceasefire agreement (June) initiated unilaterally by the government, coinciding with the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr and followed later by the Taliban.
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Agreement between the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan to create a direct communication channel between the ministries of defence to prevent incidents. The agreement was reached in September at an informal meeting during a summit of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and began to be implemented in October.
Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep. of	The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, signed by the leaders of North Korea and South Korea on 27 April in the Peace House of the Joint Security Area, inside the Demilitarised Zone. Both governments pledge to start a new stage of peace and stability in the peninsula, to end the Korean War (which ended with an armistice and not a peace treaty) and to denuclearise the Korean peninsula. Leaders of both countries met again in May and September, ending the last meeting with the Pyongyang Joint Declaration.
Korea, DPR – USA	Joint statement by the leaders of the United States and North Korea following the summit held in Singapore on 12 June, in which both commit to establishing new relations and guaranteeing peace in the Korean peninsula, with the United States offering security guarantees to North Korea and North Korea affirming its willingness to conduct complete denuclearisation.
Eritrea – Ethiopia	Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship, of July 9, by which both countries put an end to 20 years of war, and which includes the agreement on implementation of the border decision, the re-establishment of diplomatic, economic and communications agreements and other issues. Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation, reached on 16 September in Jeddah and facilitated by Saudi Arabia. Appended to the Joint Declaration of 9 July, this agreement provided for the creation of investment projects, including the establishment of Joint Special Economic Zones, collaboration in the fight against terrorism and human, drug and weapon trafficking, and a committee and subcommittees to monitor implementation of the agreement.
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	Framework agreement between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government signed in Asmara (Eritrea) on 21 October, which includes the establishment of a joint committee intended to continue working to address the root causes of the conflict.
Ethiopia (Oromia)	Reconciliation Agreement reached on 7 August between the Ethiopian government and the OLF in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea.
The Philippines (MILF)	Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, approved by Congress and ratified by the president in July, which mainly establishes the creation of a new autonomous region to replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Libya	Modified road map of the UN plan to implement the Libyan Political Agreement (2015), which establishes a new timetable for holding elections and a dialogue conference, presented to the UN Security Council in November.
Mali	Pact for Peace, signed in October by the signatories of the 2015 peace agreement as a way to reaffirm the desire for early implementation of the commitments made therein. After winning a new term of office in the presidential election, the new government of Ibrahim Boubakar Keita signed this agreement with the head of MINUSMA, while the CMA and the Platform signed separately.
Moldova (Transnistria)	Rome Protocol, signed in May by Moldova, Transnistria, the OSCE, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, whereby the parties to the conflict undertake to reach an agreement on the outstanding issues of the Vienna Protocol (2017), such as the sphere of telecommunications. The parties also propose to make progress on implementing the agreements reached.
Mozambique	Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on security aspects, reached on 6 August, which establishes the steps to proceed to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants in the security forces and in society, and the creation of four working groups to implement the MoU: a military affairs commission and three joint technical groups.
South Sudan	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) of 12 September, signed in Addis Ababa by President Salva Kiir and the rebel leader and former vice president, Riek Machar, who heads the SPLM/A-IO, as well as the rest of the parties to the conflict.
Yemen	Stockholm Agreement, reached on 13 December between the government of Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the Houthis/Ansarallah at the request of the UN. The agreement addresses three key issues: an immediate cease-fire in the port city of Al Hudaydah and in the ports of Salif and Ras Issa and the creation of a mechanism for exchanging prisoners and a memorandum of understanding for the city of Ta'iz. The parties also agree to avoid any action, escalation or decisions that may affect the prospects of implementing the agreement.

Despite this general observation, some formats and mechanisms have been designed to favour or guarantee greater female involvement in negotiating processes and integrating a gender perspective in the agreements and their implementation. This was true of the process in Colombia after the agreement with the FARC in 2016, which led to the setting up of a Special Body on Gender to advise the CSIVI, the body in charge of monitoring implementation of the peace agreement. This evaluation report and those issued by other organisations revealed that the gender provisions of the agreement were being implemented slowly, indicating that multiple challenges in this area remain.

A greater role for women in political decision-making was observed in some cases, although it did not always

guarantee the creation of a gender perspective in peace processes and negotiations. In the talks on Western Sahara, one woman participated in the delegations of both Morocco and the POLISARIO Front. In Myanmar, there was a notable increase in female participation in the Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong, although the proportion of participants (17%) was still far from women's organisations goal to have 30% representation. The Syrian Women's Advisory Board remained active during the year as part of the negotiations promoted by the UN, and the Yemeni Women's Technical Advisory Group was created to advise the UN Special Envoy in Yemen on strategies to address the conflict. A gender mechanism continued to exist in the peace process in Cyprus, but it remained stagnant for most of 2018. Meanwhile, civil society promoted

the creation of the Network of Women Mediators of the South Caucasus, which joins other similar networks created in recent years.<sup>9</sup>

In many contexts, groups of women recalled the gender impact of conflicts and socio-political crises and tried to give visibility to their exclusion from the negotiations, demanding an end to their marginalisation. This was true of the peace processes in Mali, Libya, Myanmar, Thailand, Israel-Palestine, Syria and Yemen. In many cases, women's initiatives were aimed at promoting dialogue between opposing parties, guaranteeing or promoting the establishment of ceasefire agreements and identifying priorities in the relevant political and security sphere from a gender perspective. In India (Nagaland), for example, women's organisations were key to the decision of the armed group NSCN-K to rejoin the ceasefire through direct negotiations with

the leaders of the insurgency and demands that the government lift the ban on the group. In the Philippines, women's organisations maintained an active role during the processing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law for the purpose of ensuring the participation of women in the future Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In Mali, women's meetings resulted in a proposal to design a gender strategy for implementing the 2015 peace agreement. In Libya, civil society organisations with support from international NGOs identified issues that should have a much more significant role in negotiations from the perspective of women's security needs and concerns. In Cyprus, women's organisations tried to reinvigorate the peace process given the stalemate in the negotiations. Meanwhile, Yemeni women expressed their priorities to the new UN Special Envoy and demanded effective participation at all levels of the peace process.

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9. See Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Peace Talks in Focus. Report on Trends and Scenarios*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2018.