

# Introduction

**Peace talks in Focus 2020. Report on Trends and Scenarios** is a yearbook that analyses the peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world in 2019. The examination of the evolution and the dynamics of these negotiations at a global level offers a global view of the peace processes, identifying trends and facilitating a comparative analysis among the different scenarios. One of the main aims of this report is to provide information and analysis for those actors who take part in the peaceful resolution of conflicts at different levels, including those parties in dispute, mediators and civil society, among others. The yearbook also seeks to reveal the different formulas of dialogue and negotiation that are aimed at reversing the dynamics of violence and that aim to channel conflicts through political means in numerous contexts. As such, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts that are aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

With regard to **methodology**, this report draws mainly from on qualitative analysis of studies and information from numerous sources –the United Nations, international organizations, research centres, the media, NGOs, and others–, in addition to experience gained in field research. The report also incorporates the gender perspective in the study and analysis of peace processes in a cross-cutting manner.

The analysis is based on a **definition** that understands **peace processes** as comprising all those political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at resolving conflicts and transforming their root causes by means of peaceful methods, especially through peace negotiations. **Peace**

**negotiations** are considered as the processes of dialogue between at least two conflicting parties in a conflict, in which the parties address their differences in a concerted framework in order to end the violence and encounter a satisfactory solution to their demands. Other actors not directly involved in the conflict may also participate. Peace negotiations are usually preceded by preliminary or exploratory phases that define the format, place, conditions and guarantees, of the future negotiations, among other elements. Peace negotiations may or may not be facilitated by **third parties**. The third parties intervene in the dispute so as to contribute to the dialogue between the actors involved and to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict. Other actors not directly involved in the dispute may also participate in peace negotiations. Peace negotiations may result in comprehensive or partial **agreements**, agreements related to the procedure or process, and agreements linked to the causes or consequences of the conflict. Elements of the different type of agreements may be combined in the same agreement.

With respect to its **structure**, the publication is organized into six chapters. The first presents a summary of those processes and negotiations that took place in 2019, and offers an overview of the main trends at a global level. The following five chapters detail the analysis of peace processes and negotiations from a geographic perspective. Each addresses the main trends of peace negotiations in Africa, America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, respectively, and describes the development and dynamics of each of the cases present in the regions, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda.



# 1. Negotiations in 2019: global overview and main trends

- Fifty (50) peace processes and negotiations were identified around the world in 2019. The largest number of cases were reported in Africa (19), followed by Asia (12), Europe (seven), the Middle East (seven) and the Americas (five).
- Five new negotiating initiatives were identified in 2019 in Cameroon, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Iraq and Iran.
- Central governments and armed opposition groups or politico-military movements were the main negotiating actors in most of the processes analysed.
- Third parties were involved as mediators and facilitators in most (80%) of the processes and negotiations studied, except in Asia.
- The UN was present in almost half the cases where a third party was involved. The international organisation participated in these negotiating processes through various formats, including special envoys.
- One of the issues that came up the most in the negotiating agendas was the search for truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities, following the trend of previous years.
- The analysis of the different processes in 2019 confirmed the difficulties and obstacles that women face in participating meaningfully in formal peace processes and in incorporating a gender perspective in negotiations.

During 2019, a total of 50 peace processes and negotiations were identified on a worldwide level. The analysis of the different contexts reveals a wide variety of realities and dynamics, a result of the diverse nature of the armed conflicts<sup>1</sup> and socio-political crises<sup>2</sup> that the negotiations are linked to. Without losing sight of the need to consider the specific characteristics of each case, it is possible to draw several conclusions and offer reflections on the general panorama of peace processes and negotiations, as well as to identify some trends. Several conclusions are presented below regarding the geographical distribution of the negotiations, those actors involved in the negotiation processes, the third parties who participated, the main and recurrent issues in the negotiation agendas, the general development of the processes, inclusiveness and the gender dimension in these peace negotiations.

Table 1.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in 2019

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
<b>Africa</b>		
<b>Burundi</b>	Government, political and social opposition grouped in the National Council for the Respect of the Peace Agreement and the Reconciliation of Burundi and the Restoration of the Rule of Law (CNARED)	East African Community (EAC), UN
<b>Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)</b>	Government, political opposition (SDF, MRC) and sectors of separatist political opposition	Church, Civil Society Organizations, Switzerland, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
<b>CAR</b>	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Seleka Coalition, Antibalaka militias	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Saint Egidio, ACCORD, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, China, Russia, Sudan

1. The School for a Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau, ECP) defines armed conflict as any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible in which the continuous and organised use of violence a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. wounded or displaced population, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services) and aims to achieve objectives that are different than those of common delinquency and are normally linked to a) demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues; b) the opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of the government, which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power; or c) control over the resources or the territory.
2. A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by different actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control of resources or territory.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
<b>Africa</b>		
<b>DRC</b>	Government, Alliance for the Presidential Majority, political and social opposition grouped in the Rassemblement coalition (Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), the Dynamic Opposition and the G7, among others), Union for the Congolese Nation and other political parties	Congolese Episcopal Conference (CENCO), Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue on the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), EU, UN, International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF), USA
<b>Eritrea – Ethiopia</b>	Government of Eritrea, Government of Ethiopia	United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, USA
<b>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</b>	Government, ONLF military political movement	Kenya, United Arab Emirates and Sweden
<b>Ethiopia (Oromia)</b>	Government, OLF military political movement	--
<b>Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram)</b>	Government of Nigeria, Boko Haram (Abubakar Shekau branch), Boko Haram (Abu Musab al-Barnawi branch)	--
<b>Libya</b>	Presidential Council and Government of National Agreement (GAN), House of Representatives (CdR), National General Congress (CGN), LNA	Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Italy, France, Germany, Russia and Turkey
<b>Mali</b>	Government, Coordinator of Azawad Movements (CMA) – MNLA, MAA and HCUA–, Platform –GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA–	Algeria, France, ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Carter Center, Civil Society Organizations, Mauritania
<b>Morocco – Western Sahara</b>	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and River of Gold (POLISARIO)	UN, Algeria and Mauritania (observers), Group of Friends of the Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
<b>Mozambique</b>	Government, RENAMO	National mediation team, Community of Sant Egidio (Vatican), Catholic Church, UN, SADC, AU, EU, Botswana, South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, United Kingdom
<b>Nigeria (Niger Delta)</b>	Government, Pan-Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF), NIGER Delta Consultative Assembly, (NIDCA), Pan Niger Delta Peoples' Congress (PNDPC), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)	--
<b>Rep. of the Congo</b>	Government, Ninja militias and the National Council of the Republicans (CNR) of Frédéric Bintsamou (Pastor Ntouni)	--
<b>Senegal (Casamance)</b>	Government of Senegal, the different factions of the armed group Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Community of Sant Egidio, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau
<b>Somalia</b>	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political-military movement Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama'a, clan leaders and sub-clans	UN, IGAD, Turkey, among others
<b>South Sudan</b>	Government (SPLM), SPLM / A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others)	IGAD Plus: IGAD (Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda); AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches
<b>Sudan<sup>3</sup></b>	Government of Sudan, the opposition coalition "Sudan Call" formed by national opposition parties and Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Troika (USA, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, UNAMID, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda
<b>Sudan - South Sudan</b>	Government of Sudan and Government of South Sudan	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), UNISFA, Egypt, Libya, USA, EU
<b>America</b>		
<b>Colombia (ELN)</b>	Government and ELN	Guarantor countries (Brazil, Norway, Cuba and Chile), accompanying countries (Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands and Italy)
<b>Colombia (FARC)</b>	Government and FARC	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Monitoring Mechanism (Technical Secretary of the Notables, Kroc Institute of Notre Dame University)
<b>Haiti</b>	Government, political and social opposition	--

3. In 2019, the three peace processes and negotiations that were taking place in Sudan in 2018 were merged into one due to the end of the national dialogue space between the government and the opposition after the formation of a transitional government, as well as the merger of the cases of Darfur and the "Two Areas" (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) into a single peace process. Both processes (the transition following the ouster of Omar al-Bashir and the negotiations with the armed groups in Darfur and South Kordofan and Blue Nile) are studied together in the chapter.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
<b>America</b>		
Nicaragua	Government, political and social opposition	Vatican, OAS
Venezuela	Government, opposition (MUD)	Norway, International Contact Group
<b>Asia</b>		
Afghanistan	Government, Taliban insurgents, USA	Pakistan, China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Germany, Norway, UN
China (Tibet)	China, Tibetan government-in-exile	--
DPR Korea – Republic of Korea	North Korea, South Korea	--
DPR Korea – USA	North Korea, USA	--
India (Assam)	Government, ULFA-PTF, NDFB-P, NDFB-RD	--
India (Nagaland)	Government, NSCN-IM, NNPG: GPRN/NSCN (Kitovi Zhimomi), NNC, FGN, NSCN(R), NPGN (Non-Accord) and NNC/GDRN/NA, ZUF	--
Myanmar	Government, armed signatory groups of the cease fire agreement (NCA): DKBA, RCSS/SSA-South, CNF, KNU, KNLAPC, ALP, PNLO, ABSDF, NMSP, LDU; armed groups not part of the NCA: UWSP, NDAA, SSPP/SSA-N, KNPP, NSCN-K, KIA, AA, TNLA, MNDAA	China
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Government, Autonomous Government of Bougainville	UN, Conciliation Resources
Philippines (MILF)	Government, MILF	Malaysia, International Contact Group, Third Party Monitoring Team, International Monitoring Team, Independent Decommissioning Body
Philippines (MNLF)	Government, MNLF (faction led by Nur Misuari)	--
Philippines (NDF)	Government, NDF (umbrella organisation of different communist organisations, among them the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is the political arm of the NPA)	Norway
Thailand (south)	Government, MARA Patani (umbrella organisation representing several armed groups)	Malaysia
<b>Europe</b>		
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabaj)	Armenia, Azerbaijan	OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, France and USA, the remaining permanent members are Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey)
Cyprus	Republic of Cyprus, self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	UN, EU, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom (guarantee countries)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Georgia, representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia <sup>4</sup>	OSCE, EU, UN, USA, Russia <sup>5</sup>
Moldova (Transdniestria)	Moldova, the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria	OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, USA and EU
Serbia – Kosovo	Serbia, Kosovo	EU, UN
Spain (Basque Country)	ETA (dissolved), Government of Spain, Government of the Basque Country, Government of France, Commonwealth of the French Basque Country, political and social actors of the Basque Country, Collective of Basque Political Prisoners (EPPK, for its acronym in Basque)	Permanent Social Forum, Bakea Bidea
Ukraine (east)	Ukraine, representatives of the self-proclaimed popular republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia <sup>6</sup>	OSCE (in the Trilateral Contact Group, where Ukraine and Russia also participate <sup>7</sup> ), Germany and France (in the Normandy Group, where Ukraine and Russia also participate <sup>8</sup> )

4. Russia's status in the peace process in Georgia is subject to different interpretations. Georgia considers it an actor in the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

5. Ibid.

6. Russia's status in the peace process in Ukraine is subject to different interpretations. Ukraine considers it an actor in the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
<b>Middle East</b>		
Iran (north west) <sup>9</sup>	Government, Cooperation Center of Iranian Kurdistan's Political Parties (umbrella organization of Kurdish groups including Komala and KDP factions)	Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF)
<b>Iran (nuclear programme)</b>	Iran, G5+1 (USA, France, United Kingdom, Russia and China plus Germany), EU	UN, France, Japan, Oman
Iraq <sup>10</sup>	Political actors of different sign	UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)
<b>Israel-Palestine</b>	Israeli Government, Palestinian Authority (AP), Hamas, Islamic Jihad	Quartet for the Middle East (USA, Russia, UN, EU), France, Egypt, Russia, Oman
<b>Palestine</b>	Hamas, Fatah	Egypt, Qatar
<b>Syria</b>	Government, sectors of the political and armed opposition	UN, USA, Russia, Turkey, Iran
<b>Yemen</b>	Government of Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, Houthis/ Ansarallah, South Transitional Council (STC), Saudi Arabia	UN, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia

The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.

-- There are no third parties or no public proof of their existence.

**Most of the peace processes and negotiations studied in 2019** were concentrated in Africa, which hosted 19, equivalent to 38% of the total. Asia was the region with the second-highest number of cases, with a total of 12, representing 24% of the negotiations in 2019. The rest of the negotiations were distributed between Europe, with seven (14%), the Middle East, also with seven (14%) and the Americas, with five (10%). The high percentage of negotiations in Africa correlates to the fact that it is also the scene of the highest number of armed conflicts and socio-political crises in the world<sup>11</sup>. There was a slight increase over the previous year in the number of peace processes and negotiations studied worldwide, since 43 were counted in 2017 and 49 in 2018, compared to 50 in 2019. The increase in peace

***Most of the negotiations in 2019 took place in Africa (38%), followed by Asia (24%), Europe (14%), the Middle East (14%) and the Americas (10%)***


processes in 2019 reflected the higher number of them in Asia, the Middle East and the Americas. In Europe, the same number of processes and negotiations was identified as in the previous year, while in Africa the number fell. This drop is due to the normalisation of relations between Djibouti and Eritrea, so their political

negotiations were no longer analysed in the report, and the end of Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo's mediation in the political crisis in Togo. Although far from being resolved, this crisis was channelled within the country's political institutions. Moreover, the three peace processes and negotiations that were taking place in Sudan in 2018 were merged into one in late 2019. This was due to the fact that the national dialogue promoted by the

government of Omar al-Bashir with opposition groups and national armed forces came to an end with the fall of his government after three decades in power. This gave rise to a new negotiating process between the Military Junta and the national opposition, which involved different external actors that pressured for the formation of a civilian-military transitional government that would incorporate the opposition and its demands. Meanwhile, the new transitional government of Sudan merged the peace negotiations in Darfur and the "Two Areas" (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) into a single process in Juba in order to achieve a final and stable peace for the entire region. The three processes (the transition following the ouster of Omar al-Bashir, the negotiations with Darfuri armed groups and the negotiations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile) are analysed together in this report.

New peace negotiations in 2019 took place in Cameroon due to the initiatives promoted by Switzerland and

**Graph 1.1. Regional distribution of peace negotiations**



9. Exploratory contacts.

10. Ibid.

11. See Annex 1 (Summary of armed conflicts in 2019) and Annex 2 (Summary of socio-political crises in 2019). For more information on the scenario of armed conflicts and tensions at a global level, see Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2020! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2020.


the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue to send the proposals of some separatist political actors from the English-speaking majority regions of the country the Cameroonian national dialogue; in Haiti, where various initiatives began to promote a national dialogue between the government and the opposition; in Papua New Guinea, where the Papuan government and the Bougainville authorities entered into talks following the self-determination referendum held on the island in late 2019; and in the Middle East, where there were two exploratory and relatively uncertain initiatives related to the tension in Iraq due to anti-government protests and to the tension in northwestern Iran centring on the Kurdish political and armed opposition.

***Five new negotiation initiatives were identified in 2019: in Cameroon, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Iraq and Iran***

Once again, almost all **actors involved in the peace processes and negotiations** were central or state governments in which the conflicts and/or socio-political crises occurred. The governments of the respective states held direct or indirect negotiations with various kinds of actors according to the particular aspects of each context that generally ranged from non-governmental armed groups (individually or as a group) to a more complex combination of armed actors and opposition politicians, opposition groups or political platforms, foreign governments, in the case of interstate disputes, representatives of territories seeking to secede or win recognition as independent and more.

**Negotiations were conducted by governments of states and armed opposition groups or political-military movements in all regions in 2019.** These include several processes in Africa, such as the one between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF in Ogaden and the one between the Ethiopian government and the OLF in Oromia; the one between the government of Mozambique and RENAMO; the one between the government of the CAR and groups of the former Séleka coalition and anti-balaka militias; the one between the Sudanese government and the SPLM-N; and the one between the government of South Sudan and the SPLM-IO and other minor groups. In the Americas, the peace processes in Colombia stood out, due to the talks that the government held with the ELN (suspended during the year) and with the former FARC guerilla group, which was transformed into a political party as part of the implementation of the peace agreement reached in 2016. A number of cases were also identified in Asia, sometimes with direct negotiations between the respective governments and armed groups, such as the MILF and MNLF in the Philippines, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the NSCN-IM in India, the KNPP and KIA in Myanmar and the BRN in southern Thailand. Other peace processes were conducted through political organisations that acted as representatives of armed groups, such as in negotiations between the government of the Philippines and the NDF, which has acted as a

**Map 1.1. Peace negotiations in 2019**



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in 2019



representative of the armed group NPA for decades. In several peace processes in Asia, the armed actors involved in the negotiations gathered in joint platforms or umbrella organisations representing various armed groups, as in the case of the Naga National Political Groups in India (which groups seven insurgent organisations in Nagaland), MARA Patani in Thailand (which groups five armed groups) and the Northern Alliance and the Brotherhood Alliance in Myanmar. In the Middle East, the main example was provided by Yemen, since the negotiations involved the internationally recognised government and the armed group known as the Houthis or Ansar Allah. Other processes were between the respective governments and a broader and more complex range of political and armed actors. This included the processes in Libya, Mali, Syria, Somalia and Sudan. A lower number of processes involved the government and political opposition groups or coalitions, such as in Burundi, Haiti, Iraq, Nicaragua, the DRC and Venezuela.

Another group of peace processes dealt with interstate disputes involving the governments of different countries. There were examples of this in all regions, except for the Americas. The peace negotiations in Africa included the different types of negotiating processes between Sudan and South Sudan, which advanced positively during the year, and between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which descended into a dynamic of stagnation. Asia also offered a remarkable overview in this regard, where the interstate negotiating processes begun in 2018 between North Korea and South Korea (and between North Korea and the United States) continued. In Europe, the emblematic interstate process was between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, while in the Middle East it involved Iran and its nuclear programme.

The negotiations in another significant amount of peace processes involved central governments and representatives of groups seeking secession, a new political or administrative status or independence with full international recognition. These groups, some of which were self-proclaimed states, with territorial control, enjoying limited international recognition and usually external support from some regional or international power, participated in the negotiations in various different ways, sometimes as a consulted party but with the capacity for limited influence, and other times involved as a full party. Europe was the scene of several cases of this type, including the peace process in Cyprus, involving the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is only recognised by Turkey; the peace process in Moldova, involving the self-proclaimed republic of Transdniestria, which is backed by Russia but lacks international recognition; the one in eastern Ukraine, involving the representatives of the secessionist territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, backed by Russia, those of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), which involved the representatives of

***Third-party involvement in the peace negotiations was confirmed in the vast majority of cases analysed in 2019 (80%), except in Asia***

both territories, recognised by Russia, or Kosovo, which is internationally recognised as a state by more than 100 countries and is acting as a negotiating party in the talks with Serbia. In this vein, other processes with unique aspects were related to the conflict over Western Sahara, involving the Moroccan government and the POLISARIO Front, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which deals with the governments of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The UN continues to consider Western Sahara a territory pending decolonisation, whose alleged possession by Morocco is not recognised either by international law or by any UN resolution. Likewise, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) proclaimed by the POLISARIO Front has not received any international majority recognition. Meanwhile, decades of negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian leaders have not led to the full configuration of a Palestinian state. Nevertheless, Palestine has been recognised as such by other states and has been an “observer member” of the UN since 2012.

Regarding the **third parties involved in peace and negotiation processes**, although in many cases we can clearly identify the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment activities, in others these tasks were carried out discreetly or behind closed doors. Our analysis of the overview of the negotiations around the world in 2019 reveals that third-party involvement was found in the vast majority of cases (40 out of 50, corresponding to 80%), including negotiations with third parties (29), national dialogues with third parties (two), other formats (two) and interstate negotiations with third parties (seven) (see table 1.2). The processes in which there was no third party involved and where contacts were established directly or bilaterally were concentrated in Asia, where six were accounted for: China (Tibet), Republic of Korea-DPR Korea, Korea DPR-USA, Philippines (MNLF), India (Assam) and India (Nagaland). This was one less than in 2018 due to the growing role of China in the Myanmar peace process. In Africa, there were four such cases (Ethiopia (Oromia), Nigeria (Niger Delta), Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) and the Republic of the Congo). Negotiations without third parties were a distinctive feature of the processes in Asia, since they were lacking in half the cases analysed (six of 12). Regarding cases with the presence of third parties, the implication occurred regardless of the format of the negotiations. Therefore, third parties were involved in most internal processes, either in negotiations (29) or national dialogues (two). Most of the interstate negotiations, such as between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Morocco and Western Sahara, Sudan and South Sudan, Armenia and Azerbaijan (over Nagorno-Karabakh), Serbia and Kosovo, Iran (nuclear programme) and Israel and Palestine enjoyed third-party participation (seven of the nine cases).

In nearly all processes with a third party (35 of the 40), more than one actor performed mediation or



Table 1.2. Internal and interstate peace processes/negotiations with and without third parties in 2019

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERSTATE	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (8)	Negotiations with third parties (29)	National dialogues without third parties (3)	National dialogues with third parties (2)	Other formats (2)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (7)
<b>AFRICA</b>							
Burundi		x					
Cameroon (Ambazonia/ North West-South West)		x	x				
CAR		x					
DRC		x					
Eritrea-Ethiopia							x
Ethiopia (Ogaden)		x					
Ethiopia (Oromia)	x						
Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram)	x						
Libya		x					
Mali		x	x				
Morocco – Western Sahara							x
Mozambique		x					
Nigeria (Niger Delta)	x						
Republic of the Congo	x						
Senegal (Casamance)		x					
Somalia		x					
South Sudan		x					
Sudan <sup>12</sup>		x		x			
Sudan – South Sudan							x
<b>AMERICA</b>							
Colombia (ELN)		x					
Colombia (FARC-EP)		x					
Haiti			x				
Nicaragua				x			
Venezuela		x					
<b>ASIA</b>							
Afghanistan					x		
China (Tibet)	x						
Korea, DPR –Korea, Republic of						x	
Korea, DPR – USA						x	
India (Assam)	x						
India (Nagaland)	x						
Myanmar		x					
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)		x					
Philippines (MILF)		x					
Philippines (MNLF)	x						
Philippines (NDF)		x					
Thailand (south)		x					

12. In 2019, the three peace processes and negotiations that were taking place in Sudan in 2018 were merged into one, due to the completion of the national dialogue between the government and the opposition after the formation of a transitional government, as well as the merger of the peace negotiations in Darfur and the “Two Areas” (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) into a single process.

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERSTATE	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (8)	Negotiations with third parties (29)	National dialogues without third parties (3)	National dialogues with third parties (2)	Other formats (2)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (7)
<b>EUROPE</b>							
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)							x
Cyprus		x					
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) <sup>13</sup>		x					
Moldova (Transdniestria)		x					
Serbia – Kosovo <sup>14</sup>							x
Spain (Basque Country)					x		
Ukraine (east) <sup>15</sup>		x					
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>							
Iran (northwest)		x					
Iran (nuclear programme)							x
Iraq		x					
Israel-Palestine							x
Palestine		x					
Syria <sup>16</sup>		x					
Yemen		x					

facilitation tasks. The actors involved in the negotiations were of a diverse nature, highlighting the work of intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, EU, AU, OSCE, IGAD, OIC, SADC, EAC, ECCAS and OIF, foreign governments, religious organisations and NGOs. In only five cases was a single third party involved, such as Norway's participation in the peace process in the Philippines (NDF), Malaysia's involvement in Thailand (south), NOREF's involvement in Iran (northwest), the United Nations mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and China's growing influence in the Myanmar peace process. In other cases, third-party intervention in the negotiating processes was organised in structured formats, such as in groupings of countries or platforms that brought together actors of various kinds. Examples of the former include the Group of Friends of Western Sahara, which brings together France, the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom and Russia; the Troika in Sudan, made up of the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway; and countries guaranteeing and accompanying the Colombian government's processes with the FARC and the ELN. Third-party formats that included several actors included the Quartet in Libya, consisting of the UN, AU, EU and the Arab League; the African Union Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR, involving the AU and CEEAC with support from the

UN, the ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad; the International Contact Group in the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF, made up of four states (Japan, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia) and four NGOs (Muhammadiyah, the Asia Foundation, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Conciliation Resources); the Trilateral Contact Group in relation to Ukraine, including the OSCE, Ukraine and Russia); and the Normandy Group also in relation to Ukraine, involving Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia, with the particular status of Russia and Ukraine in both groups; and the Quartet for the Middle East, made up of the UN, the EU, the USA and Russia in the Palestinian-Israeli context.

Our analysis of the processes and negotiations in 2019 confirms the outstanding role played by the UN in mediation and facilitation. Through different formats, the organisation was involved in 22 of the 50 processes identified during the year and in more than half the processes with third-party intervention (56%), a figure that grew compared to the previous year due to the addition of the processes in Iraq (UNAMI), Papua New Guinea (through the Mediation Support Unit) and Mozambique. The action of the United Nations took shape through different formats. Envoys

13. The nature of the peace processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia's role in those conflicts and peace processes are open to interpretation. Ukraine considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, whereas Russia considers itself a third party.

14. The peace process between Serbia and Kosovo is considered interstate because even though its international legal status is still controversial, Kosovo has been recognised as a state by over 100 countries. In 2010, the International Court of Justice issued a non-binding opinion that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

15. The nature of the peace process in Ukraine and Russia's role in the conflict and peace process are open to interpretation. Ukraine considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, whereas Russia considers itself a third party.

16. There are two parallel negotiating processes in Syria (Astana and Geneva). Third parties are involved in both processes, though some of them directly project their interests onto the negotiations.

Table 1.3. Intergovernmental organisations as third parties in peace processes in 2019

<b>UN (22)</b>	
<b>AFRICA</b>	
Burundi	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Burundi
CAR	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the CAR UN is member of the International Support Group for CAR
DRC	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the DRC
Libya	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Libya United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) The UN forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and EU
Morocco – Western Sahara	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Western Sahara United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
Mozambique	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mozambique
Somalia	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)
South Sudan	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for South Sudan United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
Sudan	United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
Sudan-South Sudan	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
<b>AMERICA</b>	
Colombia	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
<b>ASIA</b>	
Afghanistan	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Mediation Support Unit
<b>EUROPE</b>	
Cyprus	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Mission of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus Office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus (OSASG)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	United Nations Special Representative in the Geneva International Discussions
Serbia - Kosovo	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>	
Iran	International Atomic Energy Agency The UN Secretary-General regularly reports on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which validated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015)
Iraq	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)
Israel-Palestine	The UN participates in the Quartet for the Middle East along with the United States, Russia and the EU to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Special Envoy for the Peace Process in the Middle East
Syria	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria
Yemen	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Yemen United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA)
<b>UE (14)</b>	
<b>AFRICA</b>	
CAR	EU is a member of the International Support Group for the CAR
DRC	EU delegation in the DRC EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region
Libya	The EU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, UN and Arab League
Mali	EU Special Representative for the Sahel
Mozambique	EU Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Mozambique
South Sudan	The EU forms part of the IGAD Plus mediation group
<b>AMERICA</b>	
Venezuela	The EU forms part of the International Contact Group

<b>UE (14)</b>	
<b>ASIA</b>	
Philippines (MILF)	The EU forms part of the International Monitoring Team and has lent support to the Third Party Monitoring Team
<b>EUROPE</b>	
Cyprus	High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, in Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) EU Observation Mission in Georgia (EUMM)
Moldova (Transnistria)	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), in Moldova (Transnistria)
Serbia – Kosovo	High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission, in Serbia–Kosovo EU Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) EU Office in Kosovo / EU Special Representative for Kosovo
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>	
Israel-Palestine	The EU participates in the Quartet for the Middle East along with the United States, Russia and the UN to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy EU Special Envoy for the Middle East
Syria	The EU and the UN co-organised the third international conference on the future of Syria and the region in March 2019
<b>AU (8)</b>	
CAR	The AU leads the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU with the support of the ECCAS, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad)
DRC	The AU leads the Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC
Libya	The AU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the Arab League, UN and EU
Mali	AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel The AU participates in the Mediation Team, which supports implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali
Mozambique	The AU is a guarantor of the peace agreement
South Sudan	Integrated into IGAD Plus, represented by Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria
Sudan	AU High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
Sudan – South Sudan	African Union Border Programme (AUBP)
<b>OSCE (4)</b>	
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Minsk Group Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Conflict Related to the Minsk Conference of the OSCE
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the South Caucasus
Moldova (Transnistria)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Transnistrian Settlement Process OSCE Mission in Moldova
Ukraine	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group OSCE Special Observation Mission in Ukraine (SMM) OSCE Special Observation Mission at the Gukovo and Donetsk Checkpoints Coordinator of OSCE projects in Ukraine
<b>IGAD (3)</b>	
Somalia	IGAD delegation
South Sudan	The IGAD, which consists of Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda, is part of “IGAD Plus” in South Sudan
Sudan – South Sudan	IGAD delegation
<b>ECOWAS (1)</b>	
Mali	ECOWAS in Mali
<b>OIC (1)</b>	
CAR	OIC delegation in the CAR
<b>SADC (2)</b>	
DRC	SADC representation in the DRC
Mozambique	The SADC is a guarantor of the peace agreement

<b>EAC (1)</b>	
Burundi	EAC delegation in Burundi
<b>CEEAC (1)</b>	
CAR	CEEAC delegation in the CAR
<b>OIF (1)</b>	
DRC	OIF delegation in the DRC
<b>OEA (1)</b>	
Nicaragua	OAS Secretary-General's Special Envoy

and special representatives were important in 2019 due to their influence on the development of peace processes, the difficulty in maintaining fairness and the pressure to which the parties subjected them. Thus, the federal government of Somalia expelled UN Special Representative for Somalia Nicholas Haysom, accusing him of meddling in Somalia's internal affairs, since the diplomat had publicly questioned the legal grounds for arresting the presidential candidate for the state of South West and al-Shabaab's former vice-leader, Mukhtar Robow in December 2018. On 30 May 2019, the UN Secretary-General appointed US diplomat James Swan to be his new envoy for Somalia. The resignation of the new special envoy for Western Sahara, Horst Köhler, who had raised expectations by promoting a meeting in late 2018 between representatives of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front after six years without direct contact, caused deadlock in the peace process and frustration in the POLISARIO Front over the failure to appoint a new special envoy by the end of the year. After bringing together the Hadi government and the Houthis in Sweden in December 2018, in the first contact between both sides in over two years, the new UN special envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, was accused of pro-Houthi bias by Hadi, who even temporarily refused to speak to him. In addition to special envoys, the UN was also involved through missions with mandates that included aspects of verification, ceasefire monitoring, assistance, accompaniment, good offices and other tasks (such as missions in Libya, Mali, the CAR, Western Sahara, Colombia, Afghanistan and Cyprus), as well as mechanisms or platforms supporting the search for a solution to various conflicts (such as the Quartet Supporting the Libyan Political Agreement, the Quartet for the Middle East and the IGAD Plus in South Sudan, to name a few).

In addition to the UN, regional organisations also played a role, both in their respective areas and beyond their most direct regional spheres. Thus, for example, the EU played a prominent role in 14 peace processes, particularly in European conflicts, but it was also involved in places beyond Europe, such as in Syria and in several processes in Africa, including Libya, Mali, Mozambique, CAR and the DRC. The African Union participated in eight of the 19 processes in Africa

(Libya, Mali, Mozambique, CAR, DRC, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan), where other regional organisations were also involved, such as ECOWAS (in Mali) and the IGAD (in South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan and Somalia). In Asia, in keeping with the more limited presence of third parties, intergovernmental organisations were less involved in mediation and facilitation activities.

Regarding the work of third-party states in negotiations, several European countries made efforts at different latitudes, traditionally the Nordic countries and Switzerland, in addition to France and the United Kingdom due to their colonial past in certain African contexts. In recent years, the role of German diplomacy has grown in the peace processes in Libya, Sudan, Colombia (ELN), Ukraine (east) and Afghanistan. Also notable is the facilitating work of some Middle Eastern states, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

Emirates (UAE), which is partly linked to their regional struggle to expand their areas of influence, among other issues. Saudi and Emirati efforts came alongside those nations' active involvement in the Yemen armed conflict, where they were interested parties to the conflict. The role of some states as third parties aroused suspicions and mistrust in various processes, where they were perceived as actors with glaring bias for one of the parties in the dispute.

This was true of the Israel-Palestine process, where the Palestinian Authority continued to express its dissatisfaction with US policies aligned with Israel's far right interests. It was also an issue in the peace processes in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Ukraine (east), where Russia's role remained subject to different interpretations. Moscow presented itself as a third party in these processes, but both the Georgian and the Ukrainian governments consider it a party to the conflict. Russia's role also continued to arouse suspicion in Syria, given its prominent role in support of the Damascus regime, but also as the promoter of a negotiating process parallel to the one sponsored by the UN. Known as the Astana process, this Moscow-based initiative also involves Iran (an ally of Damascus) and Turkey (a defender of some opposition groups). Russia and China also increased their role as a third party through their involvement in peace processes in Africa, such as in the CAR and South Sudan.

***The UN participated in over half the cases where the involvement of a third party was identified and was involved in negotiating processes through various formats***

With regard to the **negotiating agendas**, we must consider the particular aspects of each case and bear in mind that the details of the issues under discussion did not always become known to the public. That said, our analysis of the various peace processes and negotiations that took place during 2018 identifies recurring themes in the negotiating agendas. **One issue with a greater presence that came up in negotiations in all the continents was the search for truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities**, under various formats and closely linked to scenarios of active armed conflict. In various contexts of violence and conflict in Africa, attempts to establish ceasefires were repeated, in some cases due to the lack of political will to consolidate them and in others due to the difficulties in controlling the many factions involved in the conflicts. This was the case in Ethiopia (both the OLF in Oromia and the ONLF in Ogaden declared ceasefires that were key to advancing a cessation of hostilities, although in Oromia there were various clashes between parts of the OLF and the government after the DDR agreement was signed in January), in Libya (where the various ceasefires, including the one in force in the Libyan capital since September 2018, were systematically violated), in Mali (where groups that had signed the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement clashed in the middle of the year), in the CAR (despite the agreement signed in February between the 14 armed groups and the government, as some groups abandoned the agreement and others violated the ceasefire), in Sudan (where after the ouster of Omar al-Bashir, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) declared a unilateral ceasefire followed by the suspension of hostilities in South Kordofan and Blue Nile by the SPLM-N, although the group was subsequently accused of violating the ceasefire) and in South Sudan (where the parties that had signed the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) upheld the ceasefire, though it was violated several times during the year). In the Americas, the Colombian government continued to demand a ceasefire. In Asia, specifically in Afghanistan, the discussions in the different rounds of negotiations that took place in Doha between the US and the Taliban were focused, among other things, on the withdrawal of US troops, guarantees against terrorism, talks between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan to reach a political agreement and a lasting ceasefire after the one reached in 2018, the first since the US invasion of the country in 2001. The Philippine government and the NDF did not meet to negotiate during the year, though at the end of the year both parties expressed their willingness to resume the process. As usual, in late December the NDF announced a cessation of hostilities between 23 December and 7 January to mark the Christmas holidays, with the government immediately responding in kind.

Also in Asia, the Burmese government met informally with the KNU and the RCSS separately, as it had been

doing since November 2018, to present its proposal for the peace process, with negotiations for more robust implementation of the ceasefire. Meetings with groups that have not signed the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) took place throughout the year with the aim of reaching a bilateral ceasefire agreement between the Burmese government and the armed groups that are part of the Northern Alliance (the KIA, MNDAA, TNLA and AA) as a step towards signing the NCA, although fighting continued throughout the year. In the Middle East, the search for ceasefire agreements was recurrent. This was true for the peace process between Israel and Palestine, where indirect agreements were reported between the Israeli government and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad; in Yemen, where two of the central topics of the year included the difficulties in implementing the ceasefire in the port of Al Hudaydah established under the Stockholm Agreement (2018) and attempts to guarantee a cessation of hostilities between the Hadi government and southern secessionist groups in the second half of the year; and in Syria, where various actors were involved in attempts to establish a ceasefire or to create “safe zones”, but where the dynamics of violence continued to prevail. Prominent in Europe was the peace process in Ukraine, where sturdier new ceasefire agreements were reached and forces were withdrawn from various areas, among other forms of progress.

***One prominent peace process in Europe was in Ukraine, where sturdier new ceasefire agreements were reached and forces were withdrawn from various areas, among other forms of progress***

Another issue in various peace negotiations was the **disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, notably in various African peace processes**, such as in Mali, Mozambique, Ethiopia (Oromia), Ethiopia (Ogaden) and South Sudan. In Mali, 5,000 combatants were incorporated into the DDR programme provided for in the 2015 agreement and 600 combatants and 18 rebel officers were selected for integration into the security forces. Another 420 officers who had deserted during the 2012 crisis announced their return to the Malian Armed Forces. In Mozambique, the disarmament agreement reached between the government and RENAMO in 2018 was staged with the signing of the Maputo Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which represented the culmination of the negotiations started in 2016. In early 2019, two agreements were reached to start the DDR programmes in the Ethiopian regions of Oromia and Ogaden. Difficulties related to the integration of SPLA-IO members into the South Sudanese Armed Forces have continued to affect the creation of the country's transitional government, among other factors. In Asia, the peace process in the Philippines (Mindanao) focused on the institutional development of the new autonomous framework and on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the MILF.

As in previous years, the **status of the various disputed territories** was one of the underlying issues of many of the conflicts and of the peace processes in Europe and



Table 1.4. Main agreements of 2019

Peace processes	Agreements
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West-South West)	Conclusions of the National Dialogue, held between 30 September and 4 October, in Yaoundé. The main separatist political movements and the armed actors boycotted the initiative. One thousand delegates participated, representing political parties, the Catholic Church and civil society. The recommendations that emerged from the conference included changing the name of the country back to the United Republic of Cameroon, granting a special status to the two English-speaking regions, and making all legal texts available in French and English (both languages are currently co-official, but the predominant language is French). In December, the Cameroonian Parliament approved the recommendations of the National Dialogue, though many groups considered them insufficient.
CAR	Khartoum Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, reached in Bangui on 6 February 2019. From 24 January to 5 February, talks were held in Khartoum (Sudan) as part of the African Union Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR under the auspices of the AU, hence its name. The agreement, the eighth in six years, includes the formation of an inclusive government, a truth and reconciliation commission, an investigative commission to determine the crimes committed, the creation of special mixed security units that will integrate members of the insurgencies over the course of a two-year transition period, a commitment to hold free elections and the creation of an executive committee to monitor the agreement, co-chaired by the AU, the government and armed groups.
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	DDR Agreement of 8 February 2019 between the Somali Regional State government and the ONLF. The agreement establishes the procedures for carrying out the disarmament and reintegration of ONLF fighters into the security forces and the public administration.
Ethiopia (Oromia)	DDR and ceasefire agreement. On 24 January, the regional government and the armed group OLF signed a ceasefire agreement according to which the OLF fighters also promised to gather in billeting camps in order to proceed with their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).
Mozambique	Maputo Peace and Reconciliation Agreement signed by the Mozambican government and RENAMO on 6 August. The points of the agreement include guarantees for holding inclusive elections, the decentralisation of the political-administrative system and the launch of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process for RENAMO combatants.
Sudan	Juba Declaration of Confidence Building Measures and the Preparation for Negotiation, signed on 11 September between the Sudanese transitional government and the armed groups SRF, SLM-MM and SPLM-N (Abdelaziz al-Hilu). It serves as an agreed road map for the resumption of the rounds of merged peace talks (Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile) in Juba, South Sudan.
Sudan-South Sudan	Agreement delimiting the shared border between Sudan and South Sudan, reached on 22 October at the close of the 11th Joint Border Commission between both countries, held in Khartoum. Five areas subject to new negotiations remain to be delimited: Dabba al-Fukhar, Jabal al-Muqainis, Kaka, Kefi Kenji and Hofrat Al-Nehass.
Yemen	Riyadh Agreement, signed by the internationally recognised government of Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi and southern secessionist groups united under the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The pact was signed on 5 November after the mediation of Saudi Arabia, with the intention of stopping the escalation of hostilities within the anti-Houthi side. Key points of the agreement include the formation of a government with the same number of representatives from the northern and southern parts of the country, the withdrawal of stockpiles from southern cities, the integration of STC-linked militias in the Ye-meni security forces and the inclusion of STC delegates in UN-backed spaces for dialogue and negotiation.

Asia, although in Europe these issues were still absent or stagnant, such as the negotiations in Serbia-Kosovo, Moldova (Transdnistria) and Cyprus, which remained deadlocked or slowed down throughout the year. The discussion on status in the peace process in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) continued beyond the scope of the negotiations due to the lack of agreement on how to address it and the strength of reality on the ground, prioritising security issues. Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to disagree fundamentally on resolving the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, while progress was made in other areas related to confidence-building and security measures. There were more developments in Ukraine, however, where the new Ukrainian president announced his support for the Steinmeier formula at the end of the year. Proposed in 2016 by the OSCE chairperson-in-office at the time, the Steinmeier formula simultaneously offers to grant special status to the disputed areas of eastern Ukraine and to hold elections in those areas as a way to move forward on implementing the Minsk agreements and resolving the conflict. In Asia, self-determination, independence, autonomy, land-use and constitutional issues, as well as recognition of the identities of various national minorities, were present in two thirds of the peace

processes. Such cases included those in the Philippines (MILF and MNLF), China (Tibet), India (Assam and Nagaland), Myanmar, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) and Thailand (south). In Africa, they came up in the Oromia and Ogaden peace processes, in Ethiopia, in Mozambique and in Mali, including in some cases issues of territorial and administrative decentralisation. Some border issues between states were addressed during the year with some progress made between Sudan and South Sudan, while the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace process was partially stalled.

Other recurring issues in various peace processes were related to **political power sharing** (in Burundi, the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan, to name a few cases). In others, struggles for political power were reflected in discussions on electoral issues, such as in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Palestine. In yet other contexts, the relevant issues on the negotiating agenda in the region were attempts to produce **unity governments or to integrate disputed factions** (an issue in the negotiations in Yemen and Palestine), discussions on holding elections (as the peace process in Palestine illustrates), discussions on preparing new constitutional texts (in Syria) and more specific issues, such as nuclear

proliferation and the sanctions system in countries involved in the agreement on Iran's atomic programme, or in the negotiations between North Korea and the United States to denuclearise the Korean peninsula.

Regarding the **evolution of the peace processes and negotiations**, it is usually possible to identify a great variety of trends: a good development of meetings leading to draft agreements; the establishment of negotiations where there had been no talks or the reactivation of dialogue after years of standstill; intense exploratory efforts fuelling expectations; rounds of negotiation that make no progress on key points, but keep a channel of dialogue open; situations of serious impasse and an absence of contact despite the efforts of third parties to facilitate negotiations; obstacles and difficulties in implementing agreements; and contexts in which violence and ceasefire violations have a profound impact on the prospects for peace processes. Our analysis of the different cases in 2019 confirms these diverse dynamics. There were also contexts in which significant progress or historic agreements were achieved, or where negotiations were resumed after years of no dialogue. However, there were difficulties, obstacles and setbacks in a significant number of cases, or deadlock persisted in the negotiations that prevented the substantive issues of the disputes from being addressed, among other issues.

**Progress continued to be made in Africa in 2019**, especially in the Horn of Africa (in the Ethiopian regions of Ogaden and Oromia), as well as in Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo, the DRC, the CAR, Sudan and between Sudan and South Sudan. Important agreements were also reached in most of these countries, reflecting the development of the peace negotiations. Due to their importance, two of these processes should be highlighted: **Mozambique and Sudan-South Sudan**. Regarding Mozambique, the government of Filipe Nyusi and the leader of RENAMO, Ossufo Momade, reached a historic peace agreement on 6 August, though it was overshadowed by the creation of a RENAMO splinter group called the RENAMO Military Junta, which resumed hostilities against the government. Although the peace process between Sudan and South Sudan was temporarily mired down during the serious crisis in Sudan, significant progress was subsequently made, which was reflected in a border delimitation agreement in October and in improved diplomatic relations between both countries.

**Real progress was also made in various peace negotiations in Asia**. The two peace processes that developed more positively as a whole were in **Afghanistan and the Philippines (MILF)**. In Afghanistan, there was so much progress in the formal negotiations between the US government and the Taliban that an agreement was almost signed in Camp David in September, but it was cancelled

at the last moment by Donald Trump. Similarly, important achievements were made both in the exploratory phase of possible negotiations between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban and in the intra-Afghan dialogue. In the southern Philippines, the approval by referendum of the Bangsamoro Organic Law ushered in a new phase of the peace process focused on disarming the MILF and especially on the institutional development of the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, temporarily governed by the MILF leader. Partial progress occurred in other cases, such as in the two summits held by Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in Hanoi and in the North Korean part of the Demilitarised Zone; in direct meetings (up to six) between the Philippine president and the leader and founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, to resume talks with such a group; in the resumption of negotiations between Manila and the NDF after many months of deadlock; in the many meetings between the Burmese government and armed groups that did and did not sign the nationwide ceasefire agreement; in the predisposition to dialogue demonstrated by the governments of Papua New Guinea and Bougainville following the referendum on independence; and in the

start of direct talks between the government of Thailand and the main armed group in the southern part of the country. **In Europe, progress was made in relation to Ukraine**, with the resumption of the Normandy negotiating format (Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France) and Ukraine's support for the aforementioned Steinmeier formula, though significant obstacles to resolving the underlying issues remained.

**Other peace processes faced numerous difficulties and obstacles, such as those in the Americas**. For the third consecutive year, the development of all the negotiating processes that took place in the Americas was marked by the fragility produced by

the various crises. All the negotiations faced serious obstacles and were suspended at times, without attempts at reactivation to positively change course. The processes continued to be affected by serious mistrust between the parties and towards the facilitating actors, once again affecting attempts to overcome the different crises. They also took place in contexts of violence and even repression against the opposition, as happened in Nicaragua. **In Africa, various processes underwent numerous obstacles and difficulties, such as Burundi, Cameroon, Mali, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan**. These include the development of the processes in Burundi and Libya. In Burundi, regional initiatives to promote inclusive political dialogue failed and divisions appeared within the opposition coalition. Attempts to promote a political solution to the conflict in Libya were hampered by the escalation of violence and the internationalisation of the conflict.

**The peace negotiations in Europe and the Middle East were characterised by deadlock and little or no progress**

**in general terms.** The year 2019 was one of impasse in the peace process in Moldova (Transdniestria), which was affected by the political upheaval in the country; in Serbia-Kosovo, paralysed since late 2018 with uncertain prospects for resuming due to each side's demands and positions; and in Cyprus, where no formal meetings were held in 2019, although there were informal meetings amidst rising tensions between Cyprus and Turkey over gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. In the different negotiating processes in the Middle East, dynamics of persistent stagnation prevailed, as in Israel-Palestine; rounds of meetings between the parties continued without results or with very limited results in terms of agreements or implementation pacts, as in Syria and the negotiations between the Hadi government and the Houthis in Yemen to implement the Stockholm Agreement; and parties directly and gradually distanced themselves from the agreements they had made previously, as illustrated by the Iranian nuclear programme, with continuous Iranian violations of the agreement reached in 2015 during the year following the US decision to withdraw from the agreement in 2018. In this context, Tehran gradually distanced itself from some of the commitments it had made in the deal in 2019. As the US extended its policy of imposing unilateral sanctions against Iran, a series of incidents occurred in the Gulf area, in Yemen and in Iraq, among other places, that led to a volatile scenario dangerously supportive of military escalation between Washington and Tehran. **Other processes in Africa were also affected by deadlock,** such as the negotiations between Eritrea-Ethiopia and Morocco-Western Sahara. Implementation of the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia was partially blocked during the year as a consequence of many factors linked to internal political developments in both countries.

Finally, regarding the **gender, peace and security agenda**, our analysis of the different peace processes in 2018 confirms, like in previous years, the obstacles that women face in participating in formal processes and the difficulties in incorporating a gender perspective in negotiations. **Despite this general observation, some formats and mechanisms have been designed to favour or guarantee greater female involvement in negotiating processes and integrating a gender perspective** in the agreements and their implementation. In this sense, the case of Colombia is paradigmatic. Colombian women's organisations continued to play a very important role in implementing the 2016 peace agreement. The CSIVI Special Advisory Group on Gender was active and presented its evaluation report on implementation, which criticised the blurring of gender as its central line. Civil society organisations also contributed to the report. Another one of the few examples of direct participation in a formal negotiating process was in Cyprus and its technical committee on gender equality. While it remained at a standstill in 2018,

*The development of all the peace processes that took place in the Americas was marked by the fragility produced by the various crises*

the resumption of its activity was announced in 2019, focusing on issues of equality and climate change, although the committee provided very little information during the rest of the year. Other examples in 2019 included the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network (MWMN), which features female diplomats and civil society activists and announced the establishment of a network representation branch in Cyprus in 2019. The MWMN also established an office in Turkey, a country involved in armed conflict but one that currently lacks an open peace process.

**In some cases, progress was even made, such as in Afghanistan and Papua New Guinea, which may lead to the formal participation of women in peace negotiations.**

In Afghanistan, the government announced the inclusion of three women (out of a total of 12 members) in the negotiating team for future peace talks, while the Taliban declared that its delegation in Qatar would include women. Consisting of representatives from 20 countries, the Group of Friends of Women in Afghanistan was also created to guarantee women's rights in possible negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban.

In Papua New Guinea, the president of the Autonomous Bougainville Government guaranteed the presence of women in the team that must negotiate with the central government over the political status of the island of Bougainville. Likewise, the process in Mali highlighted the difficulties in truly implementing the commitments made in this area. UN Security Council Resolution 2480 urged the signatory parties to develop a road map to included the full participation of women in the peace process, although the version revised by the parties in July excluded female involvement once again.

**Another notable element is the emergence of parallel or indirect spaces and mechanisms for participation in formal negotiating processes to facilitate women's involvement,** although their ability to influence formal schemes was limited. Examples of this were initiatives in Venezuela, Syria, Yemen and Georgia. In Venezuela it was announced that one of the complementary tables to the National Dialogue Roundtable would be made up of women's organisations and other actors. In Syria and Yemen, the mechanisms created via the impetus of the UN special envoys in order to guarantee female participation in the processes beyond their involvement in the negotiating tables also continued to operate. Thus, the Yemeni technical advisors who participate in the Technical Advisory Group carried out various activities during the year and the Syrian Women's Advisory Group also remained active. Georgia had institutionalised mechanisms for indirect female participation in the peace process. Thus, in 2019 the government of Georgia maintained its practice of organising meetings between Georgian government representatives in the negotiations and representatives of civil society and the population affected by the conflict, including women. This was

supported by UN Women, which promoted the practice until it was internalised by the government and reflected in Georgia's national action plan on Resolution 1325.

**In most contexts, including the examples above, whether alone or with the support of other local, national and international organisations, especially UN Women, women's organisations played an important role in advocating and lobbying for the start, continuation or resumption of peace processes, leading demonstrations, holding debate forums, carrying out awareness initiatives, presenting proposals to the negotiating parties and criticising the lack of women in formal political negotiations. Spaces organised or supported by the UN and the EU were used by female activists to convey demands, including calls for greater participation in negotiating processes, such as in Kosovo. In Myanmar, UN Women promoted different meetings to promote the implementation of Resolution 1325 and the women,**

***Most of the international peace processes continued to be characterised by the lack of gender architecture in 2019***

peace and security agenda. In Sudan, women played a central role in the popular protests that led to the overthrow of the al-Bashir government. After the fall of the regime, dozens of feminist organisations in the country continued to demand structural changes related to the rights of women in the country, including the expansion of their participation in the executive and legislative bodies, Sudan's accession to CEDAW and a greater female presence in peace processes. In Cameroon, the South West / North West Women's Task Force (SNWOT) promoted the #CeaseFireNow campaign and noted that any conflict resolution initiative in the two regions should include them, both in national dialogue and in Parliament, where the proposal for a special statute for the regions was discussed. In Nicaragua, women's and feminist organisations continued to play a prominent role in the opposition movement and also showed their support for different initiatives, such as the national dialogue.