

2. Peace negotiations in Africa

- Throughout 2021, 12 peace processes and negotiations were identified in Africa, which accounts for 32% of the 37 peace processes worldwide.
- There were various local initiatives by civil society actors, including women's organisations, and by political-military groups to relaunch the dialogue process with the government in Cameroon.
- Amid the impasse in negotiations and increased tension after the ceasefire ended in 2020, the appointment of a new UN envoy for Western Sahara in late 2021 encouraged mild expectations that talks would resume.
- The postponement of the elections scheduled for 24 December exacerbated the climate of uncertainty regarding the political future of Libya.
- Progress was made in Mozambique during the year in implementing the DDR programme provided for in the 2019 peace agreement.
- Political instability and disagreements between the parties in Mali prevented progress in implementing the clauses of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement.
- Sudan suffered a new coup in October 2021 that threatened the transitional process and peacebuilding efforts in the country.
- In South Sudan, progress was made in implementing the peace agreement, as well as peace talks with the armed groups that did not sign the 2018 agreement. However, internal struggles and fragmentation within the SPLA-IO threatened the fragile peace in the country.

This chapter analyses the peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2021. First it examines the general characteristics and trends of peace processes in the region, then it delves into the evolution of each of the cases throughout the year, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda. At the beginning of the chapter, a map is included that identifies the African countries that were the scene of negotiations during 2021.

Table 2.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2021

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)	Government, political-military secessionist movement formed by the opposition coalition Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, including IG Sako) and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC, including IG Sisiku)	Church, civil society organisations, Switzerland, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), the Vatican
CAR	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Séléka coalition, anti-balaka militias	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant'Egidio, ACCORD, OIC, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, China, Russia, Sudan
DRC	Government led by the Union Sacrée coalition (led by Félix Tshisekedi and made up of different political actors, including dissidents of former President Joseph Kabila's Front Commun pour le Congo coalition), political opposition (such as Front Commun pour le Congo and Lamuka) and social groups and armed groups from the eastern part of the country	Congolese Episcopal Conference (CENCO), Church of Christ in the Congo, Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue on the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), AU, EU, UN, OIF and USA
Eritrea – Ethiopia	Government of Eritrea and government of Ethiopia	United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, USA
Libya	Presidential Council and Government of National Accord (GNA), House of Representatives (HoR), National General Congress (NGC), LNA/ALAF	Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Mali	Government, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), MNLA, MAA and HCUA, Platform, GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA	Algeria, France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Carter Center, civil society organisations, Mauritania
Morocco – Western Sahara	Government, Coordinator of Azawad Movements (CMA), MNLA, MAA and HCUA, Platform, GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA	Algeria, France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Carter Center, civil society organisations, Mauritania

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Mozambique	Government, RENAMO	National mediation team, Community of Sant'Egidio, Catholic Church, UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC), AU, EU, Botswana, South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, United Kingdom
Somalia	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political military movement Ahlu Sunna WaJama'a, clan and sub-clan leaders, Somaliland	UN, IGAD, AU, Turkey, among others
South Sudan	Government (SPLM), SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others) and SSOMA, a faction led by Paul Malong and Pagan Amum (which includes SSUF/A and Real-SPLM) and a faction headed by Thomas Cirillo (made up of the SSNDA coalition, which includes NAS, SSNMC, NDM/PF and UDRA)	"IGAD Plus": the IGAD, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda; AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Community of Sant'Egidio
Sudan	Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions	African Union High Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), Troika (EEUU, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS
Sudan – South Sudan	Government of Sudan and government of South Sudan	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU

The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.

2.1 Negotiations in 2021: regional trends

Throughout 2021, there were **12 peace processes and negotiations in Africa**, accounting for 32% of the 37 peace processes identified worldwide. This figure is lower than that of previous years: 13 peace processes in 2020, 19 in 2019 and 22 in 2018. Five negotiations took place in the Horn of Africa (Sudan, South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan, Eritrea-Ethiopia and Somalia), three in Central Africa (Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), the CAR and the DRC), another three in North Africa and West Africa (Libya, Mali and Morocco-Western Sahara) and the rest in the Southern Africa (Mozambique). The decrease in 2021 compared to 2020 is because recent peace initiatives were considered completed in Burundi.

Eight of these 12 peace negotiations were linked to armed conflicts in Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), Libya, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. The remaining four processes were related to socio-political crises that in some cases in the past had also suffered episodes of war: Eritrea-Ethiopia, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique and Sudan-South Sudan. Some of the peace processes corresponded to conflicts that began in the last decade, such as Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest, 2018), Libya (2011) and Mali (2012), while others date back to the previous decade, like the CAR (2006), Sudan (2003), South Sudan

(2009) and Sudan-South Sudan. Still other conflicts and crisis situations date back to the 1990s, such as the cases of the DRC and Somalia, so the initiatives and peace negotiations linked to these conflicts have evolved profoundly since their origin in terms of the actors involved and the causes of the disputes. The


longest-running peace process studied in Africa, which suffers from structural paralysis, is the one between Morocco and Western Sahara, which began after the 1991 ceasefire agreement. The last cycle of violence in Mozambique began in 2013, though it dates back to the limited application of the 1992 peace agreement that put an end to the conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO that began in 1974. In this sense, the United Nations recently pointed out in a report¹ that, among the different causes and factors of instability and violence in Africa, which are of a complex and multidimensional nature, one of the issues to consider was the **lack of clarity and inclusiveness in the peace agreements and their inadequate implementation, the divisions of the signatory parties and the unfinished**

transformation of the economies linked to the conflicts tended to perpetuate and reactivate them. It added that the participation of youth and women was essential for the implementation of the peace agreements, especially through the agendas on youth, peace and security and women and peace and security.

The United Nations highlighted that the lack of clarity and inclusiveness in the peace agreements in Africa and their inadequate application, the divisions of the signatory parties and the unfinished transformation of the economies linked to the conflicts tended to perpetuate and reactivate them

1. UN Secretary-General, *Promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*, A/75/917-S/2021/562, 11 June 2021.

Map 2.1. Peace negotiations in Africa in 2021



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2021

The armed conflicts and socio-political crises² had serious consequences for the civilian population and the work of peacekeeping missions and the humanitarian response continued to be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, according to various analysts. Although Africa was not as affected by the pandemic as initially feared, it had very serious economic, political and social consequences. The pandemic also broke out in a previous international context of fragility and instability linked, among other factors, to armed conflicts and socio-political crises in Africa that have worsened in recent years. **The security situation in many of these scenarios has deteriorated in recent years, made worse in various cases by the response to the COVID-19 pandemic (the establishment of states of emergency and exception that in many cases led to violations human rights and the use of these states of emergency by some governments for the purpose of clinging to power) and the previous governance challenges and shortcomings,³ all of which have affected the development of the different negotiations and peace initiatives under way.** According to the African Union's (AU) Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), more than 10 million cases were reported on the continent by the end of 2021, of which more than 235,000 people have died. Africa CDC also estimated that less than 10% of the African population would have received the full

dosage of the vaccine by late 2021, almost two years after the start of the pandemic.⁴

In relation to the actors participating in the negotiations, in 2021 **only two cases exclusively involved the governments of the respective countries and armed groups or political-military movements in the negotiations.** These two cases were in Mozambique between the government and the opposition group RENAMO and in the CAR between the government and the different groups making up the former Séléka coalition and the anti-balaka militias. **Seven of the 12 peace processes were characterised by a more complex map of actors, with governments, armed groups and the political and social opposition involved.** This was seen in Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), where meetings have involved political actors linked to insurgencies; Mali, where the negotiating process has involved national authorities and many political and armed actors from the Azawad region in recent years; Libya, between political and military actors that control different parts of the country; Somalia, between the Federal Government, the leaders of the federated states and other domestic political and military actors; Sudan, between the government, the political opposition and insurgent groups from various regions of the country; South Sudan, between the government, the armed

2. Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

3. Josep Maria Royo, *Conflicto, África y COVID-19, Apunts ECP de Conflictes i Pau*, no. 14, November 2021.

4. Data updated on 10 January 2022. Africa CDC COVID-19 Dashboard [online]. Last viewed on 10 January 22.

group SPLM/A-IO and other smaller political opposition and armed groups; and the DRC, where the negotiations involved the government and opposition parties and coalitions on the one hand and the government and different armed groups from the eastern part of the country on the other. **Other negotiating processes were conducted by the governments of neighbouring countries as part of interstate disputes.** Examples of this were the dialogue between Sudan and South Sudan and the negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Morocco-Western Sahara negotiating process, which has been at a standstill in recent years, involves the Moroccan government and the POLISARIO Front, which proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976. It is considered an international dispute because it is territory considered pending decolonisation by the UN.

All the peace processes and negotiations in Africa studied had third-party support, whether taking the form of international organisations, regional organisations, states and religious organisations or organisations specialised in mediation and facilitation. Although there are many cases where the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment are publicly known, in other contexts this work is carried out discreetly and away from the public eye. All cases had more than one actor involved in mediation and facilitation, with the UN playing the predominant role, as it participated in nine of the 12 processes in Africa (Libya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan). Another prominent actor was the AU, which was involved in nine processes (Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan).

African regional intergovernmental organisations participated as third parties, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Mali; the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in the CAR and DRC negotiating processes; the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC) in the CAR; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Mozambique; and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan. In addition to African intergovernmental organisations, other intergovernmental organisations participated as third parties in Africa, such as the EU (in Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan and between Sudan and South Sudan) and the International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF) (in the CAR).

States also continued to play a leading role as third parties in peace processes and negotiations in Africa.

All the peace processes and negotiations studied had third-party support, whether taking the form of international organisations, regional organisations, states and religious organisations or organisations specialised in mediation and facilitation

All the peace processes studied had states leading or supporting initiatives of dialogue and negotiation

All the peace processes studied had states leading or supporting initiatives of dialogue and negotiation. Local and international religious actors also played roles as third parties, especially the Community of Sant'Egidio (Vatican) in Mozambique, the CAR and South Sudan; the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the CAR; local religious institutions in Mozambique, the DRC and South Sudan; ecumenical formats such as the Anglophone General Conference (AGC), made up of Catholic, Protestant and Muslim leaders in Cameroon; and the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC). Organisations specialised in mediation and facilitation also played roles, especially the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Cameroon, Libya, Mali and the CAR the Carter Center in Mali and the Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN) in Cameroon.

As part of this proliferation of mediators, **the participation of third parties in joint formats continued to be frequent, as in previous years,** such as groups of friends and support groups. This was the case with the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, the United Kingdom and Russia) in the negotiating process between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front and the International Support Group (which includes the UN and the EU) and the African Union Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation, which was involved in the CAR and promoted by the AU and the CEEAC, with support from the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad, and coexisted with other mediators in the CAR; the Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU) in the case of Libya; the states of the Troika (the USA, United Kingdom and Norway); African Union High Level on Sudan (AUHIP) in the case of Sudan; other coordination formats included the IGAD Plus, which facilitates dialogue in South Sudan and which consists of the IGAD, the five members of the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria). At the same time, competition between third parties continued, as exemplified by the peace process in Libya, where Russia and Egypt support actors opposed to other actors backed by Turkey, or the case of the CAR with the intervention of Russia alongside multilateral initiatives promoted by the AU and the CEEAC.

Most of the negotiating processes studied tackled the subject of **security sector reform**, especially disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes for former combatants and the reform or creation of new security forces following peace agreements. This was true in Mozambique, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan and Libya. The new security forces came in many different types with just as many names, whether mixed units, joint forces or unified

national armies. **Governance** issues were also discussed in the ongoing negotiations in various contexts, such as Mali, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. Issues related to the **degree of self-government and the degree of administrative decentralisation, including independence** for territories, were discussed in Cameroon, Mali, South Sudan and Morocco-Western Sahara. Unfinished border demarcations, as in the disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between Sudan and South Sudan, were also discussed in negotiations in Africa.

With regard to the **gender, peace and security agenda, women were practically absent from the ongoing negotiating processes in Africa**. Nevertheless, in most contexts, various women's movements and organisations demanded to actively participate in peace processes and many local peacebuilding initiatives were led by civil society, especially by women's organisations. In **Mali**, progress was reported in the integration of women in the Agreement Monitoring Committee (CSA) and its subcommittees. The Carter Center report noted that since November 2020, nine women have joined the CSA, in what was considered an important step in implementing the commitment to mediation and building a more inclusive process. At the CSA meeting held in Kidal in February, the parties repeated their commitment to fully include women in their deliberations, as well as to add three more women to the CSA, along with another 12 to be included in the subcommittees. In **Libya**, throughout 2021 the challenges for Libyan women's more substantive involvement in decision-making and discrimination in spheres of power remained clear. Women's groups, activists and United Nations agencies denounced the breach of commitments by failing to include women in the new unity government and demanded more women in negotiations on economic issues and security issues, including in the mechanisms monitoring the ceasefire.

In **Cameroon**, what is considered the main initiative to date was held between civil society, political-military movements and independence organisations. Between 29 October and 1 November, civil society representatives, traditional authorities, religious leaders, women's and youth groups and separatist political-military movements met in Toronto (Canada) to find common ground and iron out differences between them to prepare for possible talks with the government. In addition, the National Women's Convention for Peace was held for the first time between 28 and 31 July, gathering a thousand women from all over the country to reflect on violence and ways to build peace in the country. In the **CAR**, women were scarcely involved in decision-making and in political negotiations and processes, though three of the 29 members of the national dialogue's organising committee were women. In **Somalia**, as part of the electoral process under way, the country's women's organisations continued to demand compliance with the minimum quota of 30%

adopted in the agreements of 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021. In **Sudan**, UNITAMS reported on the work carried out with women belonging to the SPLN-N al-Hilu faction to express their demands and opinions on the political process of the peace talks with the government. In **South Sudan**, the Women Leadership Forum was launched, organised under the auspices of South Sudanese Vice President Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior, with the support of UNMISS. The Women Leadership Forum brought together a diverse group of women from the security sector, faith-based organisations, civil society, academia, politics and the private sector with the aim of strengthening women's representation in politics and creating a portfolio of qualified women at the national and sub-national levels.

Regarding the evolution of the peace negotiations, during 2021 no new peace agreements were confirmed in any of the contexts analysed. One notable development is the electoral agreement adopted in Somalia on 27 May, which set in motion indirect parliamentary and presidential elections in the second part of the year. **Despite concrete headway in some contexts, there was no progress in most and the processes were beset by many problems, deadlock and crisis.** There continued to be some **good news out of Mozambique, between South Sudan and South Sudan and**

Sudan, as in recent years. In **Mozambique**, despite the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic had a notable impact on the implementation of the clauses of the 2019 Maputo peace agreement between the Mozambican government and RENAMO, in 2021 progress was made in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants and in dismantling former guerrilla military bases. Contacts and negotiations were also held with the RENAMO Military Junta, a dissident faction opposed to the peace agreement. In **South Sudan**, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) continued to make slow progress in implementing some of the clauses established in the 2018 South Sudan Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS), while peace negotiations were held in Rome with groups that did not sign the peace agreement, amid an intensification of violence in several states. The dynamics of rapprochement between the governments of **Sudan and South Sudan** were maintained during the year, deepening and strengthening their diplomatic relations. Although contacts between the government of **Cameroon** and political-military groups to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict in the two western regions of the country continued to stall and the serious climate of violence persisted, many local initiatives were undertaken by civil society actors and political-military groups to resume the negotiating process with the government. **At the end of the year, it emerged that the Swiss organization HD and the Swiss government were trying to relaunch the mediation initiatives** promoted in 2019. Although the breakdown of the peace process in December 2020 and the resumption of hostilities triggered a serious deterioration of the situation in the

Women were persistently absent from negotiating processes in Africa

CAR, there was some progress in the **national dialogue process** proposed by President Touadéra in March to reverse the situation, making it possible to glimpse their implementation with a view to 2022.

In **most of the processes, little progress was made. On the contrary, there were many obstacles and difficulties.** In **Mali**, there was very little headway in implementing the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement during the year, although **some agreements were reached in the central part of the country** that still failed to stop the violence. In **Somalia**, the Federal Government's delays in holding the elections before February 2021 pushed the election date beyond the current government's constitutional limit, which created a serious climate of tension between groups within the government and the federated states and opposition groups. This led to new negotiations between the different key actors, which came together in the signing of an **agreement on 27 May to relaunch the electoral process**, although the delays were constant and the year ended with a new dispute between President Farmajo and Prime Minister Roble which culminated in Roble's removal, opening a new crisis. In **DRC**, in addition to the difficulties surrounding the formation of the new national government and its subsequent implementation, in the military sphere, **the stagnation of the implementation of the DDR process** stemmed from the 2020 agreement between the government and the armed group FRPI. In **Sudan**, the slow progress in implementing the October 2020 peace agreement was compounded by **the October 2021 coup d'état**, producing a new climate of instability and affecting ongoing peacebuilding processes. Finally, in **Libya**, after the ceasefire agreement signed in October 2020 between the main rival military coalitions (the forces of the internationally recognised government (GAN), based in Tripoli and the forces affiliated with former general Khalifa Haftar (LAN or ALAF), dominant in the east of the country), **it was upheld during the year and fatalities due to clashes fell significantly** compared to previous years. However, some key aspects of the agreement were not implemented and at the end of the year the country's political future was in question, amid a climate of growing tension that was exacerbated by the impossibility of holding the planned elections.

There were also processes that were completely stalled during the year, such as the negotiations between Eritrea-Ethiopia and Morocco-Western Sahara. Three years after signing the historic peace agreement between **Eritrea and Ethiopia**, the process to implement the agreement remained at a deadlock due to the escalating tension and the beginning of the armed conflict between the Ethiopian government and the regional state of Tigray, in which Eritrea supported the Ethiopian federal government. The conflict around **Western Sahara** continued to be characterised by chronic impasse and paralysis of diplomatic channels to address and resolve the dispute, which worsened because of the escalating tension and conflict in 2020. The UN Secretary-General's appointment of a new personal envoy in late

2021 encouraged mild expectations of resuming the dialogue in the future.

2.2. Case study analysis

Great Lakes and Central Africa

CAR	
Negotiating actors	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Seleka Coalition, Antibalaka militias
Third parties	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant Egidio, ACCORD, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; Russia, Sudan
Relevant agreements	Republican pact for peace, national reconciliation and reconstruction in the CAR (2015), Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (June 2017), Khartoum Political Accord for Peace and Reconciliation (Bangui, 6 February 2019)

Summary:

Since gaining independence in 1960, the situation in the Central African Republic has been characterized by ongoing political instability, leading to numerous coups d'état and military dictatorships. After the 2005 elections won by François Bozizé, which consolidated the coup d'état perpetrated previously by the latter, several insurgency groups emerged in the north of the country, which historically has been marginalized and is of Muslim majority. In December 2012 these groups forced negotiations to take place. In January 2013, in Libreville, François Bozizé's Government and the coalition of armed groups, called Séléka, agreed to a transition Government, but Séléka decided to break the agreement and took power, overthrowing Bozizé. Nevertheless, self-defence groups ("anti-balaka"), sectors in the Army and supporters of Bozizé rebelled against the Séléka Government, creating a climate of chaos and generalized impunity. In December 2014 a new offensive brought an end to the Séléka Government and a transition Government led by Catherine Samba-Panza was instated. Regional leaders, headed by the Congolese Denis Sassou-Nguesso facilitated dialogue initiatives in parallel to the configuration of a national dialogue process, which was completed in May 2015. Some of the agreements reached were implemented, such as the holding of the elections to end the transition phase, but the disarmament and integration of guerrilla members into the security forces is still pending, and contributing to ongoing insecurity and violence. The various regional initiatives have come together in a single negotiating framework, the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation launched in late 2016, under the auspices of the AU and ECCAS with the support of the UN, which established the Libreville Roadmap in July 2017 and that it contributed to reaching the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation of February 2019, in the implementation phase, despite the difficulties.

The year 2021 was shaped by the events that occurred as of December 2020, with the breakdown of the peace process and the resumption of hostilities by some of the parties that signed the 2019 peace agreement. In December 2020, the representatives of six of the

most powerful armed groups in the country, including the main signatories of the 2019 peace agreement, including the anti-balaka factions led by Mokom and Ngaïssona, 3R, a FPRC faction, the MPC and the UPC, had signed a joint statement denouncing the 2019 Political Agreement and criticising the government's shortcomings in moving the peace process forward. On 17 December 2020, they announced the formation of the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC). Some of these groups supported the candidacy of François Bozizé for the presidential election. Bozizé was accused of orchestrating an attempted coup. From then on, the CPC began a military offensive against Bangui that was repulsed in January and February 2021 by MINUSCA, the national security forces, with support from Rwanda and Russia. Faced with this situation, Angola tried to promote talks between the government and the rebel coalition, which the government rejected. The presidential and legislative elections were held on 27 December 2020, in a climate of insecurity and violence that caused the closure of many electoral districts, which had to postpone the vote. President Touadéra was declared re-elected. On 18 January 2021, he addressed the nation and expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue and cooperate with all parties to the peace process, except the armed groups linked to the CPC. The Constitutional Court proclaimed the results of the legislative elections on 1 February, stating that 22 of the 140 deputies were elected in the first round, while 61 seats required a second round and elections had to be held for the remaining 57 seats in districts where the elections had not taken place due to security conditions. The main opposition coalition, the Democratic Opposition Coalition (COD-2020), rejected the results and announced it was withdrawing from the elections, highlighting the many irregularities and the prevailing climate of violence. Legislative elections were held on 23 May in constituencies where the elections had not been held. The Constitutional Court announced the final results on 30 August: 18 of the seats went to women, 12 more than in the previous legislature. The ruling United Hearts Movement (MCU) party won a relative majority (41 seats), followed by independents (35), many of them allied with MCU. The Kwa Na Kwa party won 10 seats, with 22 other parties winning 54.

On 30 March, President Touadéra was sworn into office and repeated his adherence to the 2019 Political Agreement, although little progress was made in implementing it, according to the UN Secretary-General's report on the situation in the country dated 12 October. Touadéra appointed Finance Minister Henri-Marie Dondra to be the new prime minister, replacing Firmin Ngrébada, who had been the main architect of the alliance with Russia and the Russian paramilitary contract company Wagner Group. On 23 June, Dondra formed a new government, which created some momentum in the process aimed at organising a "republican dialogue". On 18 March, President Touadéra announced the implementation of a national dialogue process to redirect the situation

The year 2021 was shaped by the events that occurred as of December 2020, with the breakdown of the peace process and the resumption of hostilities in the CAR

with the opposition parties and civil society, although the start of the process was delayed several times. It was rejected by the opposition, mainly the opposition coalition COD-2020, which called for an inclusive process involving armed groups, especially the CPC, and for shielding the process from government attempts to exploit it for its own benefit.

It was not until early September that the Organising Committee of the Republican Dialogue was formed, in charge of launching the political dialogue. The Community of Sant'Egidio used its good offices to facilitate a meeting that would lay the foundations for an agreement to end hostilities and initiate national reconciliation. After the meeting, which was attended by the Secretary General of the Community of Sant'Egidio, Paolo Impagliazzo, the participants signed a joint statement entitled "Towards the Republican Dialogue – for peace and the future of CAR" that urged all key actors to prepare the path of dialogue adopted on 16 September, including a roadmap for peace in the country, calling for inclusive dialogue and for the government to accept a ceasefire with the CPC and revitalise the 2019 peace agreement, which would enable its participation in the dialogue. In compliance with the recommendations of the international community and with the desire to promote the dialogue, on 15 October President Touadéra declared a unilateral ceasefire regarding the armed groups. The CPC agreed to respect the ceasefire if the government committed to doing so. However, in the following two weeks, government security forces supported by the Wagner Group and the armed groups repeatedly violated the ceasefire.

The negotiating process continued to be affected by a fragile situation, as evidenced by the fact that the opposition coalition COD-2020 withdrew from the process on 31 October, accusing President Touadéra of violating parliamentary immunity. This happened after the government lifted immunity from three MPs accused of collaborating with the December 2020 military offensive led by former President François Bozizé, including presidential candidate and former Prime Minister Anicet-Georges Dologuélé, who had been Touadéra's main rival in the 2015-2016 presidential elections. On 11 November, the main opposition parties said that they would only participate in the process if the proceedings against the three MPs were scrapped. Finally, on 2 July the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission was launched with the appointment of the 11 commissioners. This space for reconciliation was part of the recommendations of the 2015 Bangui Forum and the 2019 Khartoum peace agreement.

Gender, peace and security

Women were scarce in decision-making roles and in political negotiations and processes. Only three of

the 29 members of the national dialogue's organising committee were women. There were seven female ministers in the new government, which represented 21.9%, a proportion of women higher than the 14.7% of the previous government, although still below the 35% quota established by the gender parity law. Six ministers came from armed groups that had signed the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and had renounced violence, two came from civil society and two were former presidential candidates. It should be noted, however, that the composition of the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission included 45% women, and a woman was appointed as president of the Commission. Joint UN efforts to support women's participation at all stages of elections, as voters and candidates, helped to increase women's representation in the new Parliament, with 18 women (12.8%) of the 140 seats, 12 more than in the previous legislature. However, as reported by the UN, the electoral process confirmed that there were still socio-cultural barriers that hindered the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in political life, as well as gender bias, a lack of political will and the deterioration of the security situation

DRC	
Negotiating actors	Government led by the Union Sacrée coalition (led by Félix Tshisekedi and made up of different political actors, including dissidents from former president Joseph Kabila's Front Commun pour le Congo coalition), political and social opposition groups (such as the Front Commun pour le Congo and Lamuka) and armed groups from the east of the country.
Third parties	Episcopal Conference of the Congo (CENCO), Church of Christ in the Congo, Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), AU, EU, UN, OIF and USA
Relevant agreements	Sun City Agreement, Pretoria Agreement and Luanda Agreement (2002); Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC (2002); Comprehensive, Inclusive Peace Accord in the DRC (2016)

Summary:

The demands for democratization in the nineties led to a succession of rebellions that culminated with the so-called "African first world war" (1998-2003). The signing of several peace agreements from 2002 to 2003 led to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the shaping of a National Transition Government (NTG) integrating the previous Government, the political opposition and the main insurgent actors, in an agreement to share political power. Since 2003, the NTG was led by President Joseph Kabila and four vice-presidents, two of whom from the former insurgency. The NTG drafted a Constitution, voted in 2005. In 2006 legislative and presidential elections were held and Kabila was elected president in a climate of tension and accusations of fraud. In the 2011 elections, which Kabila also won, there were many irregularities, contributing to fuel the

instability. Since then the political discussion has focused on ending his second mandate. In today's deep crisis, there is a confluence of broken promises of democratization (Constitutional breaches and the holding of elections on the date agreed), ubiquitous poverty and chronic violence, and the Government's control is growingly dependant on security forces that are largely dysfunctional. President Kabila's attempts to hold on to power beyond the end of the second term (the last permitted by the Constitution) which should have ended on 19 December 2016, is squandering over a decade of progress. The governmental majority hopes to retain power by delaying the presidential elections, while the opposition wants to force the start of a rapid transition that will end Kabila's mandate and lead to elections. The AU facilitated a political dialogue between the Government and the main opposition platforms and parties, although it was the Episcopal Conference (CENCO), who managed to bring the Government and the main opposition coalition, Rassemblement, to sit at the negotiating table and reach an agreement on 31 December 2016. Although the agreement stipulated that elections must be held in 2017, they were finally postponed until December 2018. Meanwhile, the actions of various armed groups persisted in the eastern part of the country, some of which negotiated the cessation of their activities with the political and military authorities.

In DRC, a difficult political dialogue process continued within the coalition government that emerged from the controversial 2018 elections. Led by Félix Tshisekedi, this government was affected by many sources of tension and obstacles that caused it to break up at the end of 2020. A new government coalition was then formed that tried to improve the difficult political climate during 2021. In December 2020, Tshisekedi had announced the dissolution of the coalition between the Cap pour le Changement (CACH) and the Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC), stating that he wanted to build a new majority or call new elections if that was not possible. The Constitutional Court allowed MPs to leave their old political groups and join new alliances. This decision gave the deputies the opportunity to change their political alliance without the risk of being fired by their original parties and consequently losing their seats. Thus, Tshisekedi convinced many MPs from Kabila's coalition, the FCC, to join the new majority, the Union Sacrée (Sacred Union), along with opposition leaders Moïse Katumbi and Jean-Pierre Bemba. Tshisekedi then secured a string of additional victories over Kabila, shifting the balance of power in his favour.

Between December 2020 and January 2021, the MPs of the new government majority used successive motions to oust the presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate, as well as Prime Minister Ilunga and his government. On 15 February, after negotiations between different factions of the Union, Tshisekedi appointed Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde as the new prime minister. Originally from Grand Katanga and the former CEO of the country's largest mining company, Gécamines, Lukonde belonged to a small political party without a single seat in the National Assembly, called Avenir du Congo. Lukonde had no real political influence or ambitions for the 2023 elections, making him an ally during the last two years

of Tshisekedi's presidency, according to analysts. Upon his appointment, Lukonde pledged to build a strong government team to address the country's problems. After two months of wrangling over ministerial posts within the new majority, the 57-member government was barely downsized from its predecessor. However, 80% of his ministers were new faces, unlike the previous government, where some ministers had already served under Kabila, under his father and his predecessor Laurent, and even during the dictatorship of Joseph Mobutu. Controlling the various forces within his new coalition became Tshisekedi's most immediate challenge. The difficult negotiations to form the government of the Sacred Union revealed the precariousness of a majority that came together to displace Kabila but lacked a shared political agenda. Cracks began to appear in the coalition almost as soon as the government was proclaimed on 12 April. Nearly 200 of the MPs who had defected from Kabila's FCC formed a "coalition of revolutionary MPs" to protest the imbalance in the new government. Some provinces had several ministries; others had none. They accused Lukonde of failing to reward his "change of allegiance" with a government post. This group threatened to block the inauguration of the Lukonde government. On 26 April, after the prime minister and Tshisekedi met with MPs, the National Assembly expressed confidence in the new government and approved its programme with a decisive majority. Despite the changes and meagre political progress in improving governance and respect for human rights, violence and insecurity persisted in the east.

Furthermore, MONUSCO-supported attempts by the political and military authorities to put an end to the armed groups' activities continued, either through military pressure or through dialogue and negotiations. These initiatives include the political process begun in 2018 that led to a peace agreement between the government and the armed group Patriotic Resistance Force of Ituri (FRPI) in February 2020. Around two years after the peace agreement between the government and the FRPI was signed, and despite the initial optimism, the disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration process remained deadlocked. The FRPI continued to demand compliance with the terms of the agreement, regarding amnesty, the integration of fighters into the Congolese Armed Forces and the payment of benefits.

Gender, peace and security

MONUSCO continued to promote the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda through targeted collaboration with national, provincial and local authorities, while also advocating for greater female representation and participation, especially in decision-making processes related to COVID-19. At a UN Security

Despite the changes and meagre political progress in improving governance and respect for human rights, violence and insecurity persisted in the eastern DRC

Council meeting to discuss the country's situation in December, Marie-Madeleine Kalala, a women's rights activist and member of the African Women Leaders Network, said that the appointment of the Independent National Electoral Commission was a cause for concern, due to its incompleteness and the lack of consensus with the opposition. She stated that it was essential that all parties agree on the process so that it can be truly consensual, transparent and peaceful. At the meeting, Kalala said that insecurity continued to prevail in this part of the country, along with the looting of natural resources, complicity with multinational companies, massacres of populations and the rape of women. Women's rights continue to be violated, she said, noting that the UN Secretary-General's 2021 report said that such violations had increased by 131%. The number of displaced people in the country has exceeded 5.7 million, of which 51% are women. Regarding the discussions surrounding the withdrawal of MONUSCO, Congolese women became involved in the transition plan through the African Women Leaders Network, pointing out that this process must consider the serious security situation and the persistence of violence against women.

South Sudan	
Negotiating actors	Government (SPLM), SPLM / A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others) and SSOMA, including the faction led by Paul Malong and Pagan Amum (which includes SSUF/A and Real-SPLM) and the faction headed by Thomas Cirillo (made up of the SSNDA coalition, which includes NAS, SSNMC, NDM/PF and UDRA).
Third parties	IGAD Plus: IGAD (Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda); AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Community of Sant'Egidio
Relevant agreements	Peace Agreement (2015), Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (2017), Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018)

Summary:

After years of armed conflict between the Central Government of Sudan and the south of the country, led by the SPLM/A guerrilla, South Sudan became an independent State in 2011, after holding the referendum that was planned in the 2005 peace agreement (Comprehensive Peace Agreement –CPA–) facilitated by the mediation of the IGAD. The Peace between Sudan and South Sudan and achieving independence was not achieved, however, were not enough to end the conflict and violence. South Sudan has remained immersed in a series of internal conflicts promoted by disputes to control the territory, livestock and political power, as well as by neo-patrimonial practices and corruption in the Government,

all of which has impeded stability and the consolidation of peace. As part of the peace negotiations promoted in April 2013, the President offered an amnesty for six commanders of the rebel groups, but this was not successful initially. At a later date, in December 2013, tensions broke out among the factions loyal to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to the former Vice-President Riek Machar, leader of the SPLA-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), which gave way to a new escalation of violence in several of the country's regions. In January 2014, with the mediation of the IGAD, the Government and the SPLA-IO launched peace conversations in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). Diplomatic efforts were found against many obstacles to achieve effective ceasefire agreements, after signing nine different commitments to the cessation of hostilities and transitory measures between December 2013 and August 2015, which were systematically violated and have rendered it impossible to lay the foundations for a political solution to the conflict. On 17 August 2015, after strong international pressure and threats of blockades and economic sanctions, the parties signed a peace agreement promoted by the IGAD Plus, although there is still much uncertainty surrounding its implementation, as well as other later agreements. Subsequently, new agreements were reached between the parties, such as the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (2017) and the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018), which open new paths to try to end the violence.

The Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) continued to make slow progress in implementing some of the clauses established in the 2018 South Sudan Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS), while peace negotiations were held in Rome with groups that had not signed the peace agreement, amid an intensification of violence in several states.

After the formation of the RTGoNU in February 2020, the new South Sudanese government continued to make headway in implementing the clauses provided for in the peace agreement amid an increase in domestic criticism and demonstrations during the year that demanded political leaders' resignations due to their failure to implement the peace agreement, the increase in violence and the political stalemate. Early in the year, the UN warned of an escalation of violence, mainly in the states of Central Equatoria, Warrap and Jonglei and the Greater Pibor administrative area, warning that it posed a serious risk of a return to war.⁵

Minimal progress was made during the year to implement the transitional security arrangements, as the objective to create a unified South Sudanese Army failed again. The supervisory body for unifying the armed groups denounced the little progress made in the formation of the unified South Sudanese Army and warned that the poor conditions of the stationing locations and training due to the lack of food and medicine was causing the former combatants to desert. The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) for

the peace agreement also warned on 23 September that the lack of progress in the unification of the South Sudanese Army was aggravating insecurity throughout the country and asked the government to make progress on the matter. In August, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, acting as the IGAD chairman, failed to negotiate an agreement between President Salva Kiir and SPLA-IO leader Riek Machar on the participation of the signatory groups in the unified South Sudanese Army, due to disagreements in the distribution of cash between the parties. Kiir's party proposed a 60-40% split, while Machar's party insisted on a 50-50% deal.

In **terms of governance**, after more than one year of delays regarding the reconstitution of Parliament (originally scheduled for January 2020), on 10 May President Kiir signed the decree for the reconstitution of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA), which includes members of the groups that signed the peace agreement. The new assembly will have 650 legislators, compared to the previous 450. Similarly, on 25 May, work began to draft a new Constitution in a ceremony attended by all the parties that had signed the 2018 peace agreement, along with representatives of the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations. Although the inauguration of the new Legislative Assembly was scheduled for 9 July, it was finally delayed until 2 August. A total of 588 MPs were sworn in during a ceremony presided over by the chief justice of the Supreme Court and not attended by President Kiir. In fact, 62 MPs were absent due to disputes with the government over the power-sharing agreement. On 14 April, the government announced that the general elections scheduled for 2022 would be postponed until June 2023 due to delays in the implementation of the transition agenda, which provoked criticism from the opposition and civil society.

The greatest progress made during the year was linked to the **political and administrative division of the country**. In January 2021, agreement was reached on the distribution of power in the administrative areas of Abyei, Gran Pibor and Ruweng and the process to appoint the 10 deputy state governors that had begun in December was finally concluded. In February and March, the 10 state governments were formed and the ministers of state, county commissioners, state commission chairs and other civil servants were also appointed. On 4 July, the government issued decrees appointing the new members of the Council of States, which will be made up of 92 people, 25 of which are women. In November, it issued decrees for the reconstitution of state legislatures in nine of 10 states, pending that of the state of Western Bahr El Ghazal.

In other aspects related to implementation of the peace agreement, on 22 January the establishment

Internal disputes and fragmentation within the SPLA-IO threatened the fragile peace in South Sudan

5. See the summary on South Sudan in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

of the **Hybrid War Crimes Tribunal** was approved, and on 30 June the consultative process began for the establishment of the **Truth, Reconciliation and Healing Commission**, in accordance with Chapter 5 of the R-ARCSS 2018.

Peace talks were held with groups that had not signed the R-ARCSS during the year, facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio and mediated by the IGAD in Rome. The talks took place separately with each of the two factions of the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA): the one led by Paul Malong and Pagan Amum (comprising SSUF/A and Real-SPLM) and the one headed by Thomas Cirillo (made up of the SSNDA coalition, which includes NAS, SSNMC, NDM/PF and UDRA). After three rounds held in 2020, it was not until July that the fourth round began in Rome, as the government cancelled the planned talks in February due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Subsequently, on 11 March, the government and the SSOMA faction led by Malong and Amum signed the Declaration of Principles after four days of negotiations in Naivasha (Kenya), on which the basis of the political dialogue in Rome was built. In the talks with the faction led by Thomas Cirillo, on 6 May the NAS withdrew from the round of talks scheduled for 8 and 12 May, accusing the government of involvement in the alleged assassination of General Abraham Wana Yoane (leader of the SSNMC/A and ally of the NAS) in Kampala (Uganda), on 20 April. The round of negotiations scheduled for 28 July in Rome was then cancelled, with Cirillo saying that talks could only resume on the condition of receiving security guarantees for his delegates. However, a new round of talks took place in Rome with the faction led by Malong and Amum between 15 and 18 July, where the commitment was renewed to join the Ceasefire and Temporary Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism. A roadmap for the three rounds of talks from September to November was also agreed upon. Attempts to restart talks with the faction led by Cirillo remained stalled. Later, due to attacks on the Juba-Numule road on 17 August, the government suspended the peace talks until hostilities ceased.

In August, there was also fragmentation within the SPLA-IO movement led by Riek Machar, triggering a new crisis in the country. SPLA-IO members announced Machar's dismissal as the leader of the movement and appointed Simon Gatwech Dual as the interim leader in his place, which opened a period of fighting and armed clashes in the state of Upper Nile between forces loyal to Machar and the dissidents commanded by Dual, the self-styled "Kitgwang" faction. The IGAD asked the SPLM-IO to cease their internal hostilities and open a political dialogue. President Kiir began talks with the "Kitgwang" faction in Khartoum, Sudan, on 2 October, which increased tensions within the Transitional Government due to Riek Machar's disagreement. The dissidents, led by Simon Gatwech Dual and General Johnson Olony,

demanded all the government seats currently assigned to Machar's party and tried to negotiate their integration into the South Sudanese Army. Machar rejected these demands, accusing Kiir of fomenting division within the ranks of the SPLM/A-IO. The military coup in Sudan in late October halted the talks in Khartoum and the "Kitgwang" faction refused to continue them in Juba. The coup also weakened the IGAD's ability to guarantee the South Sudan peace deal, as the regional body was chaired by Sudan at the time.

Gender, peace and security

The UN Secretary-General's report on the situation in South Sudan reported the launch of the **South Sudan Women Leadership Forum**, organised under the auspices of South Sudanese Vice President Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior with the support of UNMISS. The forum brought together a diverse group of women from the security sector, faith-based organisations, civil society, academia, politics and the private sector, with the aim of strengthening women's representation in politics and creating a portfolio of qualified women at the national and sub-national levels.⁶

Sudan	
Negotiating actors	Government of Sudan, the opposition coalition "Sudan Call" formed by national opposition parties and Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions.
Third parties	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Troika (USA, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS
Relevant agreements	Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) (2006), Road map Agreement (2016), the Juba Declaration for Confidence-Building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation (2019), Juba Peace Agreement (2020)

Summary:

Different armed conflicts (Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan) remain active in the country, as well as tensions between the government and the opposition which have led to different peace negotiations and a de-escalation of violence. In Darfur, amidst peace talks to resolve the historical dispute between the north and south of the country, which ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, various armed groups, mainly the JEM and the SLA, rebelled in 2003 around demands for greater decentralisation and development in the region. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was reached in 2006, which included only one SLA faction, led by Minni Minnawi, while the conflict persisted amidst frustrated attempts at dialogue, mainly promoted by Qatar as part of the Doha peace process,

6. UN Secretary-General, *The situation in South Sudan*, S/2021/784, 9 September 2021.

in which the different parties were involved. Furthermore, in the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), the secession of South Sudan in July 2011 and the resulting national reconfiguration of Sudan aggravated tensions between those border regions and the Sudanese government, since both regions had supported the southern SPLA insurgency during the Sudanese armed conflict. The African Union High Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) has mediated to seek a peaceful resolution between the parties (government and SPLM/N rebellion) that revolve around three main lines in the peace negotiations: the ceasefire model, the type of humanitarian access to the Two Areas and the characteristics and agenda of the National Dialogue. In early 2014, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir asked all armed actors and opposition groups to join the National Dialogue. From the outset, the proposal involved former South African President Thabo Mbeki and the AUHIP to promote peace negotiations and a democratic transformation. After the fall of the al-Bashir regime in April 2019, the different peace processes and scenarios between the new transitional government and the different rebel groups in the Two Areas and Darfur have merged, achieving the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020. However, several armed groups, including the SPLM-N al-Hilu (Two Areas) and the SLM/A-AW (Darfur), refused to sign the peace agreement, holding the talks separately.

During the year, slow progress was made in implementing some of the clauses provided for in the October 2020 Peace Agreement, and peace talks and dialogue initiatives were held in various parts of the country, although the coup d'état of October 2021 once again produced a climate of instability that affected the peacebuilding processes. The UN Secretary-General's report on the situation in Sudan, released in December 2021,⁷ clearly expressed concern about the slow progress in relation to the application of the clauses provided for in the Juba Peace Agreement, as well as the negotiations between the government and the SPLM-N led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu. The report also warned of the challenges for establishing peace posed by the coup d'état of 25 October, stressing that the actions of the coup plotters (the military part of the Transitional Government) undermined the trust of the armed groups that had not signed the agreement, with whom peace talks were being held, increasing the risk of a return to armed violence.

During the year, the implementation of the **provisions related to security provided for in the 2020 Peace Agreement** yielded moderate progress, such as the establishment of the Joint Higher Military Committee for Security Arrangements and the Permanent Ceasefire Committee. However, the formation of the nationwide Monitoring and Evaluation Commission of the Peace Agreement was still pending, as was the creation of the new unified Sudanese Armed Forces. In June, tensions rose between the civilian and military wings of the transitional Government due to the refusal of the Sudanese Army and the paramilitary Rapid Support

Forces (RSF) to integrate the RSF into the regular forces. Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok warned that failure to reform the security sector could lead to a new civil war, imploring the parties to respect the agreement. The armed groups that signed the peace agreement also expressed their frustration at the lack of progress in incorporating their forces into the Sudanese Army.

In terms of governance, at the start of the year the government cabinet was reshuffled, as provided for in the Peace Agreement, which included the integration of the former rebel leaders in the Sovereign Council (three positions), the ministerial cabinet (five portfolios, equivalent to 25% of the Council of Ministers) and the Transitional Legislative Council (25%, equivalent to 75 of the 300 seats). The Sovereign Council of Sudan brought in three members of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebel coalition on 4 February. On 8 February, Hamdok announced a new cabinet incorporating seven former SRF rebel chiefs as ministers, including Jibril Ibrahim, leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur, who was appointed Minister of Finance. The establishment of the Transitional Parliament scheduled for 25 February 2021 did not take place as planned and remained pending. Later, in May, the leader of the SLM, Mini Minawi, was appointed governor of Darfur and a month later Hamdok appointed three new governors from the rebel groups for the states of North and West Darfur and Blue Nile, among them Nimir Mohamed Abdel Rahman (vice president of the SLM) in North Darfur, Khamis Abdallah Abkar (leader of an SLM faction) in West Darfur and Ahmed Alumba (former chief of staff of the SPLA-N Agar) in Blue Nile.

On the regional level, mediation initiatives continued to be maintained in **Darfur** during the year to resolve inter-community tensions in the region. Progress was also made in implementing the National Mechanism for the Protection of Civilians through the deployment of a joint force to maintain security and the provisions included in the Peace Agreement. UNITAMS also reported during the year that it had used its good offices to facilitate inter-community dialogue in the region and with the transitional authorities with a view to building trust and reducing fighting.⁸ In the region of **South Kordofan**, early in the year, the North Sudanese People's Liberation Movement led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N al-Hilu), which had refused to sign the 2020 Peace Agreement, extended the unilateral cessation of hostilities by five months to continue holding peace negotiations with the Transitional Government, stalled by disagreements between the parties regarding the separation between religion and the state. After months of talks, on 28 March the negotiations between the parties culminated in the signing of the **Declaration of Principles between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the SPLM-N**

7. UN Secretary-General, *Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan*, S/2021/1008, 3 December 2021.

8. See the summary on Sudan (Darfur) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

al-Hilu in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. The text was signed by the head of the Sovereign Transitional Council, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and the leader of the SPLM-N, Abdelaziz al-Hilu. It describes the establishment of a federal, civil and democratic state in Sudan, in which freedom of religion, belief and religious practices and worship will be guaranteed to all Sudanese people by separating the identities of culture, region, ethnicity and state religion, principles that will be enshrined in the Constitution. After the Declaration was signed, talks between the parties resumed on 26 May with a view to integrating the rebel group into the Transitional Government. General al-Burhan, Prime Minister Hamdok and SPLM-N leader al-Hilu attended the resumed talks in Juba, mediated by South Sudanese President Salva Kiir. During these talks, the mediation team presented a draft framework agreement to the parties, announcing that the negotiations would resume on 31 May to discuss the document. The talks were suspended in mid-June due to disagreements on aspects relating to the delegation of powers between the central government and the regions and the integration of the country's armed groups into the Sudanese Army.

In the **eastern track of the Peace Agreement**, initiatives continued to be promoted to facilitate an inclusive dialogue to reach a consensus on the pending political issues due to the disaffection of the Beja minority in the Kassala and Red Sea states with the October 2020 Peace Agreement, since the agreement reached with the armed organisations of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile marginalised their communities. Tensions in the region led to the blockade of ports and different key oil pipelines in Port Sudan, the main seaport on the Red Sea, in an attempt to pressure the government to renegotiate the terms of the peace agreement with the region, which called for greater representation.

Finally, the coup d'état on **25 October** revealed and increased tensions between the civil and military wings of the government due to disagreements over reforming the security sector and the unification and integration of all armed groups into the Sudanese Armed Forces. The military coup led to the arrest of the prime minister and several ministers, civil servants and political leaders, as well as the decree of a state of emergency by the president of the Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. It also prompted the effective dissolution of the Sovereign Council, the Council of Ministers and the Transitional Legislative Council (which had not yet been formed), as well as the dismissal of state governors and the restoration of a Transitional Military Council. The coup plotters declared their adherence to the Constitutional Document and the Juba Peace

Agreement. The coup was blasted by the international community, which pressed for a return to constitutional order. Two of the groups that had not signed the Peace Agreement, the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid and the SPLM-N al-Hilu, also condemned the coup. During the following weeks, a dialogue was launched between the Military Junta, the ousted civilian part of the government and other political actors to seek a peaceful and negotiated solution to the crisis. On 11 November, Al-Burhan announced the formation of a reconstituted Sovereign Council in which he would serve as president and Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, commander of the RSF, would serve as vice president. In addition, the same representatives of the military and the RSF participating in the dissolved Council remained, although the civilian members were replaced. The coup triggered a significant fragmentation of the civilian wing of the Transitional Government, the coalition of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which signed a new political statement of unity, joined by the National Umma Party and some members of the RSF (the Sudan Liberation Army-Transitional Council, the Sudan Liberation Forces Alliance and the SPLM-N

Malik Agar faction). However, another parallel faction of the FFC emerged, made up of eight signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement, including the JEM and the SLA-Minni Minawi faction. In eastern Sudan, the High Council of Beja Nazirs supported the coup plotters and requested the repeal of the eastern track of the Peace Agreement. As a result, on 16 December the government announced the suspension of the eastern track for two weeks, opening a period of consultations and negotiations to reach a new agreement with the interested parties in eastern Sudan, which was welcomed by the Beja Nazir community, which rejected the eastern track.⁹ Finally, on 21 November, a political agreement was achieved in the country that **reinstated the ousted civilian Prime Minister Hamdok, although military control was consolidated over the government**. However, various Sudanese political parties, armed organisations and civil society, including the FFC, condemned the attempt to legitimise the coup and demanded that the coup plotters leave the government. Moreover, 12 FFC ministers resigned and a civil disobedience campaign was launched in the country.²

Gender, peace and security

Although the Joint Higher Military Committee for Security Arrangements and the Permanent Ceasefire Committee were established during the year, **the UN Secretary-General's report on the situation in Sudan** noted that efforts were still needed to ensure the

9. The eastern track of the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement was negotiated with members of the opposition Beja Congress and the United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice, who also signed the Peace Agreement. However, the High Council of Beja Naziris did not participate.

10. See the summary on Sudan in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

inclusion of programmes with a gender perspective and the meaningful participation of women at all levels, while work with women's groups had to continue. UNITAMS reported on the work carried out with women belonging to the SPLM-N al-Hilu faction, aimed at incorporating their demands and opinions on the political process of the peace talks with the government. Those consultations led to the planning of a workshop on Resolution 1325 and women's leadership organised jointly by UNITAMS, UN-Women and UNDP. The workshop, which was to be held in Juba on 30 and 31 October, had to be postponed due to the coup.¹¹

Sudan and South Sudan agreed to temporarily reopen the border crossings on 1 October 2021, which had been closed since the south seceded 11 years before

Sudan – South Sudan	
Negotiating actors	Government of Sudan, Government of South Sudan
Third parties	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU, UNISFA
Relevant agreements	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2005); Cooperation Agreement (2012), Joint Boundary Demarcation Agreement (2019)

Summary:

The armed conflict between Sudan and its southern neighbour (South Sudan) lasted for more than 30 years and was marked by a growing complexity, the nature of which covered several dimensions relating to the culture and history of both countries, affected by two civil wars (1963-1972; and 1982-2005). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 led to a referendum in the south of Sudan to ratify the independence of this region. The consultation happened in January 2011 and following a clear victory of those in favour of independence, in July 2011 South Sudan declared independence and became a new State. However, the separation of the two countries did not bring an end to the disagreements between Khartoum and Juba over the many unresolved issues. Among the main obstacles to stability there is a dispute over the oil-rich enclave of Abyei and the final demarcation of the border between both countries, as well as disagreement with regards to the exploitation of oil resources (with oil fields in South Sudan but pipelines for exportation to Sudan). Both countries accuse one another of supporting insurgency movements in the neighbour country and have contributed to further destabilizing the situation and threaten the peaceful coexistence of these two countries.

The dynamics of rapprochement between Sudan and South Sudan that began in 2019 were maintained, deepening and strengthening their diplomatic relations during the year. From 19 to 21 August, a summit was held between Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit, where both parties agreed to temporarily

reopen the border crossings on 1 October 2021, as they had been closed for 11 years, establish free trade zones on the border and reopen river transport. Later, the **Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM)**, the body used by Sudan and South Sudan to discuss security issues of mutual interest, met again in Juba on 8 and 9 September. Co-chaired by the Sudanese and South Sudanese defence ministers, it was the first meeting held by the JPSM since October 2020, when it called on South Sudan to urgently address restrictions on the freedom of movement of staff of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, enforced by local communities in North Aweil county. The parties were also urged to resume the meetings of the Abyei Joint Monitoring Committee, which had not met since late 2017.¹² The JPSM convened again on 21 October to make progress on mutual security issues.

The political process on the **definitive status of Abyei** was relaunched during the year, though no substantive progress was made. On 11 May, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the **Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)** until November, and later pushed it back again to 11 May 2022. It also extended UNISFA's support for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). The Security Council also told UN Secretary-General António Guterres of the need to establish a viable exit strategy and ordered that Abyei remain demilitarised and free of any force, including armed local community groups. During the year, the Sudanese government repeatedly asked the UN to replace the Ethiopian contingent of UNISFA, whose 3,158 soldiers and seven police officers account for the majority of the mission's 4,190 troops, due to the rise in tension on the Al-Fashaga border area between Sudan and Ethiopia, which gave rise to sporadic fighting.¹³ Finally, a meeting held on 23 August between the Sudanese minister of foreign relations and the UN special envoy for the Horn of Africa led to agreement on withdrawing the Ethiopian contingent within three months and replacing it with forces from other countries. In this regard, the Security Council proposed to reconfigure UNISFA in the near future, shrinking the maximum authorised number of troops from 3,500 to 3,250 until 15 May 2022 and maintaining the maximum authorised police limit at 640 units.

Prominent events during the year included the **mediating role played by the Southern Sudanese authorities in the ongoing peace negotiations in Sudan** that the

11. UN Secretary-General, *Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan*, S/2021/1008, 3 December 2021.
 12. UN Secretary-General, *La situación en Abyei*, S/2021/881, 15 October 2021.
 13. See the summary on Sudan-Ethiopia in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

Sudanese government held with the armed movement SPLM-N's al-Hilu faction in the South Sudanese capital, Juba. The South Sudanese government had already facilitated the mediation and the venue on its soil for the historic signing of the October 2020 peace agreement between the Sudanese transitional government and the Sudanese armed groups Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) and the Sudan Liberation Army led by Minni Minawi (SLA-MM). Similarly, **the Sudanese government offered to host and mediate the negotiations planned between Salva Kiir's government and the "Kitwang" faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO)** that had parted ways with Riek Machar's leadership. However, the coup in Sudan in late October halted the start of the talks.¹⁴

In relation to the security situation on the border areas, there were some armed inter-community incidents concentrated mainly around Abyei during the year, although in general the area remained stable. May saw the worst incident of the year in Abyei, when an inter-community clash in Dunguob left 12 civilians dead. These episodes are part of the historical tensions between members of the Ngok Dinka communities of South Sudan and Sudanese Misseriya nomadic herders who cross into the area in search of pasture. UNISFA has been promoting peace talks between the two groups for some time, although the incidents continue. The May attack prompted the South Sudanese government to set up a committee to start a dialogue with Sudan on the final status of the disputed Abyei region. The South Sudanese committee is headed by Presidential Security Advisor Tut Gatluak and East African Affairs Minister Deng Alor. A peace conference of representatives of the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities had been held in Aweil previously, in February, but failed to reach an agreement. UNISFA helped to organise separate talks with members of the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities in October, with the aim of resuming dialogue between the two communities. On 11 August, demonstrators gathered and stormed the headquarters of Sector 1 in Gok Machar, demanding the withdrawal of UNISFA troops. Two days later, similar protests took place outside the War Abar team site, forcing UNISFA to relocate.

Gender, peace and security

UNISFA reported progress during the year in promoting the rights of women to participate equally in decision-making processes, carrying out awareness-raising activities on gender equality and participation with the local administrations of the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities. UNISFA also worked to strengthen collaboration with women's civil society groups and their networks, as well as with local non-governmental organisations working for women's rights.

Horn of Africa

Somalia	
Negotiating actors	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political-military movement Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama'a, clan leaders and sub-clans, Somaliland
Third parties	UN, IGAD, Turkey, AU
Relevant agreements	Road map to end the transition (2011), Kampala Accord (2011), Provisional Federal Constitution (2012), Mogadishu Declaration of the National Consultative Forum (2015)

Summary:

The armed conflict and the absence of effective central authority in the country have their origins in 1988, when a coalition of opposing groups rebelled against the dictatorial power of Siad Barre and three years later managed to overthrow him. Since 1991, more than 15 peace processes with different types of proposals were attempted to establish a central authority. Of note were the Addis Ababa (1993), Arta (2000) and Mbagathi (2002-2004) processes. The centrality of the Somali state had led to a high degree of authoritarianism during Barre's rule, and the different proposals intended to establish a State that did not hold all of the power, a formula widely rejected by Somali society. However, some clans and warlords rejected the federal or decentralized model because it represented a threat to their power. The resolution of the conflict has been complicated by several issues: the power of some warlords who have turned conflict into a way of life; the issue of representation and the balance of power used to establish the future government between the different stakeholders and clans that make up the Somali social structure in conflict for years during Siad Barre's dictatorship; interference by Ethiopia and Eritrea; and the erratic stance of the international community. The rise of political Islam as a possible governing option through the Islamic courts, and the internationalization of the conflict with the arrival of foreign fighters in the armed wing of the courts, al-Shabaab, as well the Ethiopian invasion and the U.S. role in the fight against terrorism, have all contributed to making the situation more difficult. The Transitional Federal Government, which emerged from the Mbagathi peace process (2004), came to an end in 2012 and gave way to the Federal Government, which was supposed to be in charge of holding the elections in 2016. The National Consultative Forum held in 2015 laid the foundations for the different agreements to be reached on holding the elections in 2016. The elections were held in late 2016 and early 2017. Questioned for its ineffectiveness and corruption, this government managed to hold elections between 2016 and 2017, achieved progress and agreements in implementing the electoral process and the process of building the federation between the different Somali states and organised the elections between 2020 and 2021, although the end of the presidential mandate in February 2021 without the elections having been held opened up a serious crisis between the Government, the federated states and opposition sectors.

The armed group al-Shabaab remained active throughout the year, as did AMISOM, and no contacts were reported between the Federal Government and al-Shabaab.¹⁵

14. See the summary on South Sudan.

15. See the summary on Somalia in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

The main source of tension centred on the end of the president's term of office in February 2021, without having held new elections, sparking a serious crisis.

The Federal Government's delays in implementing the electoral calendar to hold the parliamentary and presidential elections between December 2020 and February 2021 pushed the date beyond the constitutional limits of the current government, causing serious tension to flare among groups within the government and the federated states and opposition groups. The preparation of the postponed elections and the crisis generated involved many negotiations among the different key actors.

In February, the mandate of President Mohamed "Farmajo" Abdullahi expired, which triggered a constitutional crisis by failing to comply with the agreement reached on 17 September 2020 between the Federal Government and the federated states. The opposition group Council of the Union of Presidential Candidates, which brought together 15 presidential candidates and civil society organisations, demanded the formation of a National Transitional Council that would lead to elections, while the president and the government argued that the Federal Government should remain in power until the elections. The different rounds of negotiations between Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble and the opposition bloc, held in February and March to tackle the situation, failed due to the refusal to include the opposition bloc in the National Consultative Council's (NCC) talks on the elections, in which the Federal Government and the federated states are involved. This led to an escalation of violence in February and March and clashes between the security forces and people opposed to Farmajo and his government remaining in power. Clashes even broke out between factions of the federal security forces, with fighting in April between forces loyal to Farmajo and others backing the opposition that killed dozens. In late April, the UN Security Council urged all parties to reject violence and resume political dialogue. UNSOM and other international partners condemned the violence and warned that the fragmentation of the security forces in line with clan divisions could divert them from their main objective, the fight against al-Shabaab. Finally, the international community rejected the proposed two-year extension of the presidential mandate, forcing Farmajo to ask Parliament to annul the extension of the presidential mandate on 28 April and reopen the dialogue with the federal member states to set a new electoral calendar, which was unanimously accepted by Parliament. This eased tension (with the stationing of pro-opposition federal troops) and facilitated the resumption of talks in the NCC on 22 May. An agreement was

The Somali government's delays in implementing the electoral calendar pushed the election date beyond the constitutional limits of the current government, causing serious tension and violence to flare

reached on 27 May, according to which the indirect parliamentary elections would begin within 60 days.

The AU appointed former Ghanaian President John Mahama as its High Representative for Somalia to mediate the electoral crisis, although he resigned days later, after Mogadishu expressed its reservations due to his ties to Kenya, a country with which Somalia has various disagreements. On 29 June, the Federal Government and the federated states agreed on an electoral calendar in which the elections for the Upper House would take place from 25 July and for the Lower House between 10 August and 10 September, after which both chambers would name the new president on 10 October. From then on, the disputes and delays were transferred to the composition of the federal electoral committees and those of the federated states, with multiple delays. On 18 July, the opposition bloc of the 15 presidential candidates expressed concern at the few guarantees of a transparent process and the slowness of the process. In this sense, progress in the application of the agreement of 27 May 2021 on the elections was slow. Elections to the Upper House began on 29 July in all federal member states and 52 of the 54 seats were elected, 14 of which went to women. At 26%, this level of female representation is lower than the minimum quota of 30% women. The National

Consultative Council, composed of the prime minister, leaders of the federated member states, the mayor of Mogadishu and the governor of the Banaadir Regional Administration, continued its regular activities and met in Mogadishu on 21-22 August. Following the meeting, a seven-point statement was issued clarifying procedures for financial administration, the selection of electoral delegates, electoral security and other issues. On 23 August, the opposition group Council of the Union of Presidential Candidates went on record regarding its concern about the role of the federated member states in identifying the elders in charge of selecting the electoral delegates. Finally, the elections to the Lower House began on 1 November. However, some preparations for Lower House elections in some states remained blocked.¹⁶ These elections were supposed to be held on 24 December, but one of the newly elected MPs pointed out on 27 December that only 24 of the 275 MPs had been selected, so the indirect election of the new president of the country was also postponed.

In September, a new dispute arose between President Farmajo and Prime Minister Roble over the failure to deliver a report on the disappearance of one of the agents of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), Ikran Farah Tahlil. On 6 September, Roble fired the director of NISA in response. On 16 September, the

16. UN Secretary-General, *Situation in Somalia*, S/2021/944, 11 November 2021.

president announced the suspension of Roble's powers, specifically with regard to hiring and firing officials. Senior Somali officials mediated, while international partners, including the UN Secretary-General's special representative, contacted all parties to urge them to de-escalate and resolve the dispute. Although the crisis between President Farmajo and Prime Minister Roble seemed to be resolved in October, tensions between them resurged in late December, when the president fired the prime minister on charges of corruption. Roble responded by saying that his firing was unconstitutional and intended to affect the elections under way. The US appealed to both leaders to remain calm and take action to avoid a new escalation of tension and violence between their supporters. Washington also described Roble's dismissal as "alarming" and supported the efforts to hold credible elections.

Gender, peace and security

As part of the electoral process, women's organisations in the country continued to demand compliance with the minimum quota of 30% adopted in the agreements of 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021. Twenty-four per cent of the 329 MPs of the bicameral Somali Parliament were women. Meanwhile, women's safety in guaranteeing their participation in the process, the persistence of sexual violence and the issue of the disappearance of cybersecurity expert Ikran Farah Tahlil, which caused a government crisis, were other reasons for concern.¹⁷ UNSOM, together with UNDP, UN Women and the United Nations Population Fund, remained actively involved in supporting efforts to achieve the minimum quota of 30% female parliamentary representation in the 2021 elections, since no specific mechanism has been implemented yet to ensure that this quota is met. Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed visited Somalia on 12 September, and on 28 September she appeared before the Security Council to report on the situation in the country regarding the women, peace and security agenda, discussing women's participation and fulfilment of the 30% quota, women's safety in the elections and the need to finalise the action plan on women, peace and security.¹⁸ In addition to meeting with female leaders, Amina J. Mohammed met with Somali leaders and clan elders, stressing the urgency of strengthening women's representation and participation in politics. In August and September, goodwill ambassadors established to advocate for the application of the 30% quota carried out six missions to the federated member states and spoke with their leaders, clan elders, civil society, aspiring female politicians and electoral management committees to introduce a mechanism to apply the quota in accordance with the agreements.

Maghreb – North Africa

Libya	
Negotiating actors	Presidential Council and Government of National Agreement (GAN), House of Representatives (CdR), National General Congress (CGN), LNA or ALAF
Third parties	Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU); Italy, France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, The Netherlands, Switzerland, among other countries; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Relevant agreements	Libyan Political Agreement or Skhirat Agreement (2015)

Summary:

After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, Libya has experienced a transition process characterized by multiple political, economic, social, institutional and security challenges and by the presence of numerous armed groups. Since 2014, the North African country has been the scene of increasing violence and political instability, which led to the formation of two major poles of power and authority. Given the developments in the country, mediation efforts led by the UN have tried to find a solution to the crisis. Negotiations have confronted several obstacles due to disputes of legitimacy, the diversity of actors involved, multiple interests at stake and the persistent climate of violence in the country, among other factors. In late 2015, the Libyan Political Agreement or the Skhirat Agreement was signed under the auspices of the UN amidst a climate of persistent divisions and scepticism due to the foreseeable problems in implementing it. In October 2017, the United Nations submitted a new plan to start the political transition and facilitate implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement. As part of the Berlin Process (which began in 2019 with the participation of a dozen countries, in addition to the UN, the Arab League, the EU and the AU), intra-Libyan negotiations were launched around three components in 2020: security issues (the responsibility of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission), political affairs (managed by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, or LPDF) and economic aspects. An International Monitoring Committee was also activated. In late 2020, a permanent ceasefire agreement was made official, and a roadmap was announced that provided for elections to be held in December 2021.

Throughout 2021, negotiations continued as part of the peace process promoted by the United Nations, with the support of various external actors to address the increasingly internationalised armed conflict in Libya, where violence escalated significantly in 2019 and 2020. **The ceasefire agreement signed in October 2020 between the main rival military coalitions (the forces of the internationally recognised government (GAN), based in Tripoli, and the forces affiliated with former General Khalifa Haftar (LAN or ALAF), dominant in the eastern part of the country) was honoured throughout 2021 and the number of people killed in clashes fell significantly compared to previous years, although many other forms of violence persisted in the country.**¹⁹ At the

17. UN Secretary-General, *Situation in Somalia*, S/2021/944, 11 November 2021.

18. Security Council Report, "Somalia: Briefing by the Deputy Secretary-General on Women's Political Participation", 28 September 2021.

19. For more information, see the summary on Libya in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

same time, intra-Libyan negotiations continued in three areas: security, politics and the economy, which faced various obstacles and deadlock. In the second quarter, tensions and divisions in the country began to intensify, as well as uncertainties related to the presidential election scheduled for 24 December, which was finally postponed. Along with the intra-Libyan negotiations, facilitated by the UN mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the International Monitoring Committee remained active throughout the year, also as part of the UN-sponsored process, in which the members of the Libyan Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU and EU) participated together with more than a dozen countries. The committee organised its action into four working groups: security, economics, politics and human rights and international humanitarian law.²⁰ After taking up his post as UN special envoy in February, former Slovak Foreign Minister Jan Kubis also held numerous meetings with all Libyan and international actors with an interest in the conflict.

Regarding the evolution of the negotiations and implementation of the security agreements reached in October 2020, despite the general compliance with the ceasefire and the limited progress beset by obstacles, such as the reopening of a strategic coastal road, other key **aspects of the ceasefire agreement were not put into practice. One of the most important was the departure of mercenaries and foreign forces from the North African country.** According to the agreement, these forces had to leave Libyan air space, land and sea within three months after it was signed, meaning January 2021. However, this withdrawal did not take place despite repeated appeals from the United Nations, which asserted that the departure of foreign troops from the country was an essential step for peace and security in Libya. Along these lines, the breach of the arms embargo imposed since 2011, considered “totally ineffective” by a UN expert report published in March, was also questioned. It was not until October 2021 that the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, which is responsible for intra-Libyan negotiations on security matters, with GAN and ALAF representatives participating, agreed on an “action plan” for the withdrawal of the foreign forces “in balanced and synchronised stages”. However, details of the timetable of the deal were not made public and the proposal was pending consideration by the international actors involved in Libya.²¹ By the end of the year, thousands of foreign fighters remained in Libya, including Turkish troops and mercenaries coming mainly from Russia, Syria, Chad and Sudan. In April, the UN approved the deployment of a team of 60 observers to monitor the ceasefire,

The postponement of the elections planned for 24 December exacerbated the climate of uncertainty about Libya's political future

especially in Sirte, with the first arriving in Libya in October. During the year, this team insisted on the need to prioritise a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process for combatants, reform of the security sector (SSR) and unification of the military forces in Libya. In this vein, as part of the measures aimed at national reconciliation in Libya, hundreds of prisoners (combatants and political detainees) were also released in March, May and September 2021 in different locations around the country.

Despite the difficulties observed in the political negotiations in the previous months, **in early 2021 the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) managed to agree on a mechanism to choose the new national unity government, in charge of leading the country until the national elections on 24 December 2021,**

according to the roadmap defined by the LPDF in late 2020. In February, the LPDF designated Mohamed Younes Menfi to be president of the Presidential Council and Abdul Hamid Mohamed Dbeibah to serve as prime minister. The new unity government (the first in seven years, after the co-existence of two different administrations in the eastern and western parts of the country) was inaugurated in March, after

being approved by the House of Representatives. The cabinet of 35 ministers included five women (17%), despite Dbeibah's promises that women would account for 30%. Starting in the second quarter, however, tensions between various actors began to become apparent, especially regarding the roadmap for the elections. The deliberations within the LPDF revealed deep differences over whether the president should be elected via direct vote or indirectly through the newly elected Parliament; whether a referendum should be held on the draft Constitution before or after the elections; whether the presidential election should be held first and then the legislative elections or vice versa; what the eligibility criteria for candidates should be, especially candidates for president; and other issues. In this context, the second edition of the Berlin Conference on Libya was held on 23 June (the first having taken place in January 2020), with the new Libyan government attending. At the conference, the international actors involved in the process repeated the importance of holding presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2021, as planned in the roadmap. Despite holding meetings in June (Switzerland) and August, the LPDF was unable to agree on a regulatory framework for the elections. **Negotiations on economic issues remained at an impasse for much of the year, especially regarding the unification of the two branches of the Central Bank and the budget.** One of the main issues that blocked the debates was the financing of the forces affiliated with Haftar.

20. The security working group is led by France, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the AU; the economic one by Egypt, USA and the EU; the political one by Algeria, Germany and the Arab League; and the one on human rights and IHL by the Netherlands and Switzerland.

21. UNSMIL, *United Nations welcomes the JMC's signing of Action Plan for the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces*, 8 October 2021.

Starting in September, tensions intensified. The differences between the unity government and the House of Representatives led to a motion of censure against the Libyan executive branch due to problems arising from budget management. In September and October, the House of Representatives (based in the eastern city of Tobruk) unilaterally approved regulations to regulate the presidential and legislative elections. This framework, which was ratified by House leader Aghila Saleh, an ally of Haftar, without consulting rival forces, was immediately questioned by the authorities and political forces based in the western city of Tripoli, particularly the High Presidential Council. Some criticised the move on the grounds that it violated the schedule set out in the roadmap by establishing that the presidential election would be held before the legislative ones. During the last quarter of the year, tensions and fractures were evident in the unity government, particularly between Prime Minister Dbeibah and ministers from the eastern part of the country, who accused him of marginalising them. In November, the registration of candidates for the presidency added new elements of tension and controversy, including the registration of divisive figures such as Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, one of the sons of Muammar Gaddafi, recently released from prison; former General Haftar, who publicly declared a year ago that Libya was not ready for democracy; and Prime Minister Dbeibah himself, despite his previous promises not to run in the election. Due to the filing of judicial appeals against the various candidates amid mutual accusations of intimidation and bribery, the final list of candidates was still not known one week before the elections. Meanwhile, various actors, including mayors, MPs and members of the military coalition opposed to Haftar, made allegations against the electoral regulations approved by the House of Representatives. Observers and analysts put forth disparate interpretations about whether it was advisable to hold the elections. Some stressed that the vote could have destabilising effects and return the country to war, considering that the internal divisions were too deep for its results to be accepted. Other analysts argued that postponing the elections also carried risks, since a de facto extension of the mandate of the unity government led by Dbeidah could encourage the formation of a new administration in the eastern part of the country.

In this context of uncertainty about the Libyan process, the divisions between the international actors involved also became more apparent. In November, France promoted a new meeting on Libya, where some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, stressed the need to have a consensual normative framework for the elections; while others, such as France and Egypt, were satisfied with the framework in place following the regulations approved by the House of Representatives. Fractures were also seen among United Nations diplomatic staff. The UN Secretary-General urged Libyan representatives to define consensus legislation for the elections and,

just one month before the crucial Libyan vote, accepted the resignation of UN Special Envoy Jan Kubis, who had been criticised for validating the electoral laws ratified by the Libyan Parliament. Moscow then vetoed the appointment of Stephanie Williams as the new UN special envoy, but the US diplomat was appointed by António Guterres as his special advisor. Difficulties also emerged in renewing the UNSMIL mandate, especially due to Russia's reticence about the language used in the resolution to refer to the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters. **Finally, just two days before the elections, the Libyan authorities postponed them amid growing political uncertainty and tension in the country** aggravated by the deployment of vehicles and armed men belonging to different forces in Tripoli. The body in charge of organising the vote, the High National Electoral Commission, failed to publish the final list of candidates amid the various disputes and recommended that the House of Representatives postpone the vote for a month. By the end of the year, however, no agreement had been reached on how to resolve the crisis resulting from postponing the elections, nor on the new election date. Another controversial issue was the continuity of the mandate of the unity government, which expired on 24 December, coinciding with the elections. In this context, Stephanie Williams reached out to many different Libyan actors in search of consensus to outline a roadmap that could help to put the situation back on track.

Gender, peace and security

After making their demands for greater participation in the negotiations on the future of Libya in 2020,²² the challenges facing Libyan women's more substantive involvement in decision-making and discrimination against them in arenas of power remained visible throughout 2021. Thus, for example, although a minimum quota of 30% female representation had been required for the new government, the national unity government appointed in March only had five women in the 35-minister cabinet (14%). Political negotiations as part of the LPDF continued to have 23% women. In public statements, the female members of this organisation reminded the government of its unfulfilled commitments. Given the concern expressed by Libyan women's groups, female involvement in the economic aspect of the negotiations was increased (though still limited) from four to seven representatives out of a total of 34 members. In a meeting with the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace and Security in April, the UN special envoy for Libya underlined the need to include women in security-related negotiations as part of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, which continued to be made up exclusively of men. The special envoy also insisted on the need for significant female participation in the ceasefire monitoring mechanisms. In the preparations for the elections, the electoral commission received applications from 98 candidates

22. See the summary on Libya in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Peace talks in focus 2020: report on trends and scenarios*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2021.

for the presidency, including two women, although the final list of candidates was not known. Calls were made to the UN Security Council to promote the participation of women and young people in politics, to take action to avoid retaliation, intimidation and coercion against voters and candidates in the elections and to introduce the gender perspective in security sector reform. It was also reported in 2021 that both UNSMIL and UN Women continued to support the Ministry of Women's Affairs in the development of a national action plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325 in Libya.

Morocco – Western Sahara	
Negotiating actors	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)
Third parties	UN, Algeria and Mauritania (observers), Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
Relevant agreements	Ceasefire agreement (1991)

Summary:

The attempts to mediate and find a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara conflict led to a cease-fire agreement in 1991. Since then, and despite the existence of a formal negotiations framework under the auspices of the UN, the Western Sahara peace process has failed. The successive proposals and the many rounds of negotiations has not lead to an agreement between the parties, all of which maintain their red lines: Morocco insists on its territorial claims and is only willing to accept a status of autonomy, whereas the POLISARIO Front claims there is a need to hold a referendum that includes the option of independence. Negotiations on Western Sahara –recognised as a territory which is yet to be decolonised- have been determined by the large asymmetry between the actors in dispute, the inability of the UN to set up a consultation on the future of this territory, and regional rivalry between Morocco and Algeria –a key support for the POLISARIO front- and by the support given to Rabat by some key international actors, such as the USA or France. This, in real terms, has meant a prevalence of the Moroccan thesis when approaching the conflict.

Negotiations to address the conflict in Western Sahara remained at an impasse during the year amid growing tension after the ceasefire ended in late 2020 and the intensification of hostilities in 2021. Despite the deterioration of the situation, which included acts of violence that caused the death of around 30 people in 2021, an increase in Moroccan repression in the occupied Sahara and bilateral escalation between Morocco and Algeria, among other dynamics,²³ the UN Secretary-General's appointment of a new personal envoy at the end of the year raised some mild expectations about the possibility of reactivating

the political dialogue, paralysed since May 2019 after the resignation of the previous personal envoy for Western Sahara.

After remaining vacant for nearly two and a half years, and after Morocco and the POLISARIO Front rejected 13 candidates, the position of the UN Secretary-General's personal envoy for Western Sahara was filled by the Italian-Swedish veteran Staffan de Mistura, with his 40 years of background and experience in contexts such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. The POLISARIO Front gave its approval for De Mistura in May, but Rabat did not do the same until September. Morocco's initial reticence regarding De Mistura was widely attributed to the diplomat's experience in high-intensity wars, as Rabat has tried to lower the profile of the escalation of hostilities in relation to Western Sahara. Others suggested that Rabat was only seeking to delay the nomination. The new personal envoy took on the task of displaying his good offices and working with all relevant interlocutors, including the parties to the conflict, neighbouring countries and other actors. In late October the UN Security Council also approved a one-year renewal of the mandate of the UN mission for Western Sahara (MINURSO), expressing its concern over the violation of the ceasefire and urging a resumption of UN-sponsored negotiations. UN Resolution 2602, approved with Russia and Tunisia abstaining, called on the parties to resume dialogue “without preconditions and in good faith” and asserted the need to reach a “realistic, practicable, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution”.²⁴

The text called for restoring the “round table” format used by previous UN Personal Envoy Horst Köhler, who managed to hold two meetings with this approach in December 2018 and March 2019. Algeria and Mauritania participated in these meetings as observers, in addition to Morocco and the POLISARIO Front. However, the format of possible future negotiations was anticipated as a point of disagreement. According to reports, parts of the POLISARIO Front preferred a return to bilateral negotiations to underline the fact that it is a national liberation struggle.²⁵ **Amid intense tension between Morocco and Algeria, which took shape in various episodes throughout 2021 and led to severing their diplomatic relations in August, Algiers also took a position against restoring Köhler's format. In mid-October, Algeria publicly declared its “formal and irreversible” rejection of the round table format.**²⁶ Meanwhile, Rabat sought to maintain this format to bolster the idea that the POLISARIO Front's position requires Algerian validation. Another point of disagreement was related to the role of the African Union (AU) in the mediation efforts. Some

23. See the summary on Morocco – Western Sahara in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

24. UN Security Council, *Resolution 2602*, S/RES/2602 (2021), 29 October 2021.

25. International Crisis Group, *Relaunching Negotiations over Western Sahara*, Middle East and North Africa Report no.227, ICG, 14 October 2021.

26. Security Council Report, “Western Sahara: MINURSO Mandate Renewal”, 29 October 2021.

within the POLISARIO Front would like a greater role for the regional organisation, while Morocco rejects its intermediation because it thinks it is favourable to the Sahrawi cause and has refused to meet with the AU high representative for Western Sahara.²⁷ In this regard, after agreeing in 2018 that it would limit its activity to supporting UN initiatives, in late 2020 the AU decided to revitalise its role in negotiating the Saharawi issue. In March 2021, the AU Peace and Security Council decided to take specific action, including reopening the AU office in Laayoune, organising a field visit and requesting a legal opinion from the UN on opening various consulates representing African countries in the Moroccan-occupied Sahara. However, opinion was divided on the issue of Western Sahara within the AU. In fact, several African countries (Senegal, Sierra Leone and Malawi) opened diplomatic delegations in Moroccan-controlled Saharawi territory during the year as part of Rabat's policy to consolidate its claim on the area.

Negotiations to address the Western Sahara conflict remained at an impasse amid growing tension after the ceasefire ended in late 2020

Regarding the position of other external actors, particularly the United States, after the Trump administration recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in December 2020 in exchange for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, the new Biden administration maintained an ambiguous position. Although at first a series of changes in US foreign policy were anticipated that would include the Saharawi issue, in practice Washington did not reverse Trump's decision and focused its diplomatic activity on the appointment of the UN Secretary-General's new personal envoy. Apparently, Washington played a decisive role in Rabat's acceptance of De Mistura. The EU maintained its position to support UN actions, without launching its own initiatives. **Throughout 2021, however, the effects of the conflict on relations between Europe and Morocco became clear. Rabat was involved in diplomatic tensions with Germany due to Berlin's decision to promote a meeting on the Sahrawi issue in the UN Security Council in late 2020, as well as with Spain, following the hospitalisation of POLISARIO Front leader Brahim Ghali to be treated for COVID-19.** In retaliation for the Sahrawi leader's entry into Spain, Morocco used immigration as a tool of pressure, allowing more than 9,000 migrants and refugees in Ceuta to enter Spain in May. The crisis prompted the European Parliament to pass a motion against Rabat's policy. Later, in September, the European Court of Justice again rejected (for the fifth time) the EU's agricultural and fisheries agreement with Morocco for including Western Saharan territory.

Despite the decision, top European and Moroccan diplomats were quick to point out that they would continue to seek formulas to strengthen bilateral cooperation. Given these developments, some analysts argued that the EU has subordinated its policy on the issue of Western Sahara to its desire to maintain good relations with Morocco for its role in controlling migratory flows, rooting out terrorism and providing gas from North Africa. However, the European Court of Justice's ruling was interpreted as an endorsement of Sahrawi demands, especially after the Trump administration's statement on Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara.²⁸

In this context, various analysts identified challenges and recommendations for the UN mediation efforts to be led by De Mistura. The challenges identified included Morocco's more defiant attitude after receiving support from the Trump administration and the disillusionment of broad swathes of Sahrawi society regarding the diplomatic track after decades of deadlock and their interest in armed struggle as an alternative to challenge the status quo. Thus, for example, sources from the POLISARIO Front ruled out any new ceasefire as a precondition for negotiations.²⁹ In his annual report on Western Sahara, published in October, the UN Secretary-General also warned of a crisis of confidence between the parties, exacerbated by unilateral and symbolic actions.³⁰ Suggestions to address the dispute included the need to promote de-escalation, implement confidence-building measures aimed at restarting the peace talks and consider action to prevent tensions between Morocco and Algeria from affecting any possible dialogue. **Various analysts agreed on the risks of ignoring the conflict and its potential destabilising effects and on the importance of external actors committing and supporting the United Nations' mediation efforts.** Some in the EU and the UN argued that a new approach would require countries such as France and the US to give up their diplomatic cover for Morocco.³¹

Gender, peace and security

In general terms, the UN upheld its rhetorical commitment to the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda in its declarations on Western Sahara. In 2021, the MINURSO mission had 196 troops, of which 43 were women. This represented 24% and was an increase compared to the 5% of women in MINURSO five years ago.

27. ICG (2021), op. cit.

28. Hugh Lovatt, *Western Sahara, Morocco, and the EU: How good law make good politics*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 30 September 2021.

29. ICG (2021), op. cit.

30. UN Secretary-General, *Report of the secretary-general – Situation concerning Western Sahara*, S/2021/843, 1 October 2021.

31. Hugh Lovatt and Jacob Mundy, *Free to choose: A new plan for peace in Western Sahara*, 26 May 2021.

Southern Africa

Mozambique	
Negotiating actors	Government, the RENAMO armed group
Third parties	National mediation team, Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, United Kingdom, EU, Community of Sant Egidio (Vatican), Catholic Church
Relevant agreements	Rome peace agreement (1992), Maputo Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2019)

Summary:

The coup d'état against the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 and the guerrilla warfare carried out by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) Marxist-Leninist insurgency took Mozambique to Independence in 1975. Since then, the country has been affected by a civil war between the FRELIMO Government and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) armed group, supported by the white minorities that governed in the former Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) and South Africa during the apartheid, in the context of the Cold War. In 1992 the parties reached a peace agreement that was considered an example of reconciliation. This was mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio and ended a 16-year long war that caused one million fatalities and five million displaced persons, and gave way to a period of political stability and economic development, albeit high levels of inequality. In parallel, growing accusations of fraud and irregularities in the electoral processes that followed, some of which were confirmed by international observers, have gone hand-in-hand with a growing authoritarianism and repression of the opposition, and FRELIMO taking over the State (and the communication media and economy). In 2013, RENAMO conditioned its continuation in political life to a series of changes, mainly the reform of the national electoral commission and an equitable distribution of the country's wealth. It threatened to remove its signature from the 1992 peace agreement, and indeed this did happen, throwing the country back into armed fighting in 2013 and the subsequent launch of a new agreed peace negotiation process in August 2014. RENAMO's declaration of a truce in 2016 and the progress made in the peace process during 2017 caused a notable drop in armed actions, achieving the signing of a new peace agreement in August 2019, though sporadic clashes persist with the dissident faction of RENAMO calling itself the RENAMO Military Junta.

After a year marked by the health restrictions provoked by COVID-19, which had a significant impact on the implementation of the clauses of the 2019 Maputo peace agreement between the Mozambican government and RENAMO, progress was made in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme (DDR) for combatants and in dismantling former guerrilla military bases in 2021. Meetings and negotiations were also held with the RENAMO Military Junta, a dissident group that had opposed the peace agreement. While the DDR process provided for in the peace agreement began in July 2019, with plans to demobilise 5,221 former RENAMO guerrilla fighters and close the 17 military bases in the centre of the country, the impact of the pandemic and the lack of funds delayed its goals. In 2020, only around 10%

During the year, significant progress was made in implementing the 2019 peace agreement in the central region of Mozambique

of former combatants had been demobilised and only one military base had been closed. The impossibility of pursuing the activities planned in the DDR due to the restrictions imposed during the pandemic not only extended the planned timetable, but it also increased the logistical costs of the programme, since the former RENAMO combatants had to spend more time on their bases. This led Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi to announce in the first half of 2021 that the demobilisation and reintegration process would not conclude in August, as planned, due to the lack of funds. In June, RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade reported that demobilised former RENAMO combatants in the provinces of Sofala, Manica and Inhambane had not received the subsidies provided for in the agreement for three months. Even with all these drawbacks, in mid-August the UN special envoy for Mozambique and president of the Contact Group for the peace talks in Mozambique, Mirko Manzon, reported significant progress during 2021. He said that 2,708 former combatants (156 women, 2,552 men) of the 5,221 planned (52%) had been demobilised and that 10 of the 17 former insurgents' bases had been closed. In early December, Manzon said that the demobilisation process would continue in the Murrupula district, in northern Nampula province, hoping that approximately 63% of the ex-combatants would be demobilised by the end of the year.

Furthermore, as part of the development measures provided for in the Peace Agreement, the **Programme for the consolidation of local development for peace (DELPAP)** was launched in July. It has a budget of 26 million euros and will run for four years. DELPAZ aims to improve economic opportunities in communities affected by the conflict in the central provinces of Sofala, Manica and Tete, with a special focus on women, youth and other disadvantaged groups, including ex-combatants and their families.

During the first half of the year, RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade announced that he had not been in contact with the **RENAMO Military Junta (JMR)** led by Mariano Nhongo, a RENAMO dissent splinter group that refused to recognise the peace agreement of August 2019, and so was unable to bring them to the negotiating table. Although Nhongo had announced a unilateral ceasefire by the JMR on 23 December 2020 to facilitate negotiations with the Mozambican government, in January the truce was broken when a JMR faction attacked a truck convoy in Sofala province. The government continued to offer amnesty to JMR members who demobilised. However, Mariano Nhongo ruled out amnesty as a first step towards negotiations with the government and threatened to make governance impossible in the northern and central provinces if the authorities continued to ignore the JMR's demands. Meanwhile, prominent members of the JMR deserted at different times of the year and demobilised, highlighting the existing tensions within

the RENAMO dissident faction. On 11 October, Nhongo was killed in fighting between the Mozambican Army and the JMR in the district of Cheringoma, in the eastern province of Sofala. The death of the JMR leader prompted RENAMO to once again invite all dissident members to lay down their arms and return to the party, opening new horizons for demobilising the JMR members. At the end of the year, Mirko Manzoni announced that more than 85 members of the JMR had deserted during the year, joining the DDR process provided for in the 2019 Maputo Agreement and describing it as a significant step towards peacebuilding in the central region.

Finally, in relation to the armed conflict affecting the country in the northern **province of Cabo Delgado**, although there are no known negotiations between the government and the rebels, **President Nyusi offered amnesty to the jihadist insurgents at various times of the year, promising that there would be no reprisals taken against those who laid down their arms.**

Gender, peace and security

From 24 to 26 May, the Executive Director of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, officially visited Mozambique to promote women's leadership in the women, peace and security agenda. During her visit, Mlambo-Ngcuka met with the Mozambican Minister of Gender, Children and Social Actions, Nyelete Mondlane Brooke, as well as with different actors and civil society organisations, to analyse the challenges that women face in implementing the women, peace and security agenda in the country and their participation in the ongoing peace process in the central region and in the response to the humanitarian crisis in the north. Mlambo-Ngcuka also participated in a high-level dialogue on the 1325 agenda and humanitarian action in Mozambique, demanding greater political leadership for women. She also called for action to guarantee the security and rights of women and girls at high risk in the province of Cabo Delgado.

West Africa

Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)	
Negotiating actors	Government, political-military secessionist movement formed by the opposition coalition Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, including IG Sako) and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC, including IG Sisiku)
Third parties	Catholic Church, civil society organisations, Switzerland, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Relevant agreements	Buea Declaration (1993, AAC1), ACC2 Declaration (1994), National Dialogue (30th September-4th October, 2019)

Summary:

After Germany's defeat in the First World War, Cameroon came under the mandate of the League of Nations and was divided between French Cameroon and British Cameroon. In 1961, the two territories that made up British Cameroon held a referendum limiting their self-determination to union with the already independent Republic of Cameroon (formerly French Cameroon) or union with Nigeria. The southern part of British Cameroon (a region currently corresponding to the provinces of North West and South West) decided to join the Republic of Cameroon, whereas the north preferred to join Nigeria. A poorly conducted re-unification in the 1960s based on centralisation and assimilation has led the English-speaking minority of what was once southern British Cameroon (20% of the country's population) to feel politically and economically marginalised by state institutions, which are controlled by the French-speaking majority. These movements demand a return to the federal model that existed between 1961 and 1972. In 1972, a referendum was held in which a new Constitution was adopted that replaced the federal state with a unitary one and granted more powers to the president, so the southern part of British Cameroon (known as Southern Cameroons) lost its autonomy and was transformed into the two current provinces of North West and South West. In 1993, representatives of the English-speaking groups held the All Anglophone Conference (AAC1) in Buea, which resulted in the Buea Declaration (which demanded constitutional amendments to restore the federation of 1961). The AAC2 was held in Bamenda in 1994, which concluded that if the federal state were not restored, Southern Cameroons would declare independence. Begun over sectoral issues in 2016, the conflict worsened in late 2017, with the declaration of independence on 1 October 2017 and the subsequent government repression to quell the secessionist movement, there was an escalation of insurgent activity. Government repression of the demands of a majority of the population of the region, which demanded a new federal political status without ruling out secession, has led to an escalation of violence and the demand for negotiated solutions to the conflict. None of the initiatives to date (the Anglophone AAC3 general conference to be held since 2018, the Swiss track with HD facilitation started in 2019 and the National Dialogue promoted by Paul Biya's government in 2019) has made substantive progress.

Although contacts between the government and political-military groups to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict in the country's two western regions remained deadlocked,³² many civil society initiatives were launched by civil society actors and political-military groups to relaunch the talks with the government. Organisations like the Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), the Southwest/Northwest Women's Task Force, the Cameroon Women's Peace Movement (CAWOPEM), the Cameroonian Catholic Church and the Justice and Peace Service (JPS), to name a few examples, were very active in promoting local peacebuilding initiatives, despite the risks of being arrested and detained by the security forces or kidnapped and tortured by separatists. According to various analyses, the international efforts led by Switzerland and the Swiss think tank HD were hampered by deep divisions within the separatist movement and by the government's denial, as it argues that the conflict is an internal matter. This has made it

32. Bone, R. Maxwell, "Cameroon's elusive peace: Rivals, rifts, and secret talks", *The New Humanitarian*, 29 March 2021.

difficult for external mediators to intervene, so it has not been possible to give continuity to the dialogue channels opened in 2020.³³ In this sense, in early January the Vatican sent Secretary of State and Cardinal Pietro Parolin to the Anglophone regions in the first visit by a foreign authority since the beginning of the crisis in 2016, according to the host, Archbishop Andrew Nkea Fuanya in the Bamenda Cathedral (northwestern region), from where he launched a call for dialogue between the warring parties to put an end to the conflict.³⁴

In January, the US Senate agreed on a resolution demanding that the parties end the violence, respect human rights, establish sanctions and seek political dialogue. Washington was also supposed to raise the issue to the UN, but did not do so until late 2021. In addition to this resolution, in March a Canadian parliamentary committee urged its government to promote multilateral initiatives to achieve a cessation of hostilities, while announcing that it would provide funding to the Swiss government's initiative with the support of HD, stalled since 2020.³⁵

As he took office, new US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken voiced his concern about the violence in Cameroon. In May, during the G7 summit in London, Blinken met with his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian to discuss the issue. On 7 June, Blinken announced the restriction of visas on the individuals responsible for undermining a peaceful solution to the conflict. Previously, in April, the UN Secretary General said that sexual violence had been used as a weapon on war in the conflict, citing the case of 24 women raped during a military operation in February 2020. However, although France expressed discomfort with the situation in the country, it did not take any official steps and the AU remained silent on the issue, giving the leading role to CEMAC, a regional organisation that includes other members like the CAR, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and the Republic of the Congo, which have militarily tackled their own internal problems.

In what is considered the main event held to date between civil society and independence organisations, between 29 October and 1 November, representatives of civil society, traditional authorities, religious leaders, women's and youth groups and political-military separatist movements met in Toronto (Canada)³⁶ to find common ground and iron out the differences between them so they can prepare for potential talks with the

government. The parties agreed to collaborate within a context of respect for human rights, free access to education and humanitarian aid. The discussion took place according to the rules of Chatham House, so it was not publicly revealed who attended or what the different actors present said. The leaders attending the meeting, which was organised by the CDN,³⁷ repeated their firm determination to fulfil the aspirations of the population of the English-speaking regions through dialogue and negotiations with international mediators to address the root causes of the crisis there. Also attending the event were leading peace and conflict resolution practitioners from renowned institutions in Ireland, Canadian and US universities. Months earlier, in March, in an interview with *Jeune Afrique*, the imprisoned Sisiku leader Julius Ayuk Tabe, of the IG Sisiku faction, explained the conditions for relaunching the peace process, which should include the quartering of troops, amnesty for members of separatist movements and talks with international mediators held in a neutral location.

Meanwhile, on 21 September, the International Day of Peace, thousands of people demonstrated in the main cities of the English-speaking provinces and in other parts of the country, such as the capital, Yaoundé, demanding peace and the establishment of a ceasefire between the government and the armed groups.³⁸ The demonstration in Yaoundé was organised by Esther Njomo Omam, the director of the NGO Reach Out Cameroon, which in turn is part of the international network Women Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL), Therese Abena Ondo, who made a call for peace, and civil society activist Rose Mary Etakah. Finally, in November it was made public that the Swiss organisation HD and the Swiss government were trying to relaunch the mediation initiatives promoted in 2020.³⁹

Gender, peace and security

Faced with the stagnation of the peace talks between the government and the armed groups and the persistence of violence, many local peacebuilding initiatives were launched, not only in the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon, but also in other areas of the country, led by civil society, local human rights organisations and the Church. Most of these initiatives were led by women. An example of this was the Women's National Convention for

33. Craig, Jess, "Caught in the middle: Peace activists in Cameroon try to end a brutal war", *The New Humanitarian*, 1 June 2021.

34. Vatican News, "Cardinal Parolin in Cameroon: 'Faith is greater than intimidation'", *Vatican News*, 2 February 2021.

35. See Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Peace Talks in Focus 2020: Report on Trends and Scenarios*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2021.

36. Esono Nwenfor, Boris, "Cameroon: Southern Cameroonians Want Swiss-Led Mediation Process To Be Multilateral After Toronto Retreat", *Panafrican Visions*, November 2021

37. The *Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation* (CDN) is an international non-governmental organisation that aims to facilitating dialogue and negotiations to end the war in the Anglophone south of Cameroon. The CDN is made up of more than 20 partner organisations around the world that advocate for an end to the war.

38. Kindzeka, Moki Edwin, "Cameroonians Call for Cease-Fire in Conflict Zones on Peace Day", *VOA*, 21 September 2021.

39. Africa Intelligence, "CAMEROON : Swiss mediators relaunch stalled peace talks with anglophone separatists", *Africa Intelligence*, 8 November 2021.

Peace that took place at the Yaoundé Conference Centre between 28 and 31 July.⁴⁰ For three days, a thousand women from all over the country met for the first time to reflect on the violence suffered in the country and the ways to build peace. A committee of 38 Cameroonian civil society organisations working for peace and human rights in Cameroon was responsible for the convention. Backing the convention were organisations such as the Cameroon Women's Peace Movement (CAWOPEM), active in all 10 regions in the country and chaired by Yvonne Muma. International experts such as Rosa Emilia Salamanca (CIASE), from Colombia, and high-ranking politicians such as the Minister of Women and Family, Marie Abena Ondo, also participated in the convention. A result of the convention was the *Women's Call for Peace*,⁴¹ which demanded that key actors end hostilities in line with the AU Silencing the Guns initiative, promote dialogue and ensure equal female participation in the peace process in compliance with Resolution 1325.

Mali	
Negotiating actors	Government, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) –MNLA, MAA and HCUA–, Platform –GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA
Third parties	Algeria, France, ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Carter Center, civil society organisations, Mauritania
Relevant agreements	Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2015)

Summary:

The armed conflict affecting Mali since early 2012 resulted in an institutional crisis –which materialized in a military coup– and Tuareg and jihadist groups progressively taking control of the northern part of the country. Since the conflict started, several international actors, including ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, have promoted initiatives leading to re-establishing the constitutional order and recovering Mali's territorial integrity. In parallel with the militarist approaches to face the crisis, exploratory contacts were held with some armed groups (MNLA and Ansar Dine) to find a negotiated way out of the crisis. Despite the announcement of a commitment to the cessation of hostilities from these insurgent groups, at the start of 2013 an offensive by Ansar Dine precipitated an international military intervention led by France. In May 2014 a new negotiation process was started, led by Algeria, where the Mali Government negotiated on both sides with the two coalitions created by the armed groups: the Coordination of Azawad Movements (groups favourable to a federalist/secessionist formula), and the Platform (groups supporting the Government). In July 2015 the signing of a peace agreement was made possible between the Government, the CMA and the Platform, in

Algiers. The jihadist groups were left aside in the negotiation table, which kept alive the hostilities from these groups in the new context of implementing the clauses present in the peace agreement.

During the year, very little headway was made in the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement. Though some agreements were reached in the central region of the country, they failed to stop the violence. With regard to the **2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali**, the Carter Center, which acts as an independent observer of the implementation of the agreement, released its first follow-up report of the year, covering the period between January and July 2021 and indicating that six years after it was signed, the efforts of the signatory parties to relaunch it in the first half of 2021 had produced few tangible results.⁴² Along the same lines, the UN Secretary-General released his report on the situation in Mali in 2021.⁴³ The events that shaped implementation of the agreement during the year included the assassination of Sidi Brahimi Ould Sidat, president of the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and a key figure in the peace process since 2015 on 13 April; and the coup d'état on 24 May that ousted the first transitional government presided over by Bah N'Daw and led by Prime Minister Moctar Ouane. The coup was led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, who until then had served as transitional vice president and had led a coup d'état in August 2020. Goïta proclaimed himself the new president of the country and appointed Choguel Kokalla Maïga as prime minister. Added to the uncertainty of these events were the disagreements between the parties on key notable issues, such as the reorganisation of the reconstituted security and defence forces, including the quotas and ranks of the movements' ex-combatants to be integrated into the national forces; the next steps to take in the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process; the form that decentralisation will take and greater representation for the northern population in national institutions; and the implementation of the first development projects (specific peace dividends of the agreement) in the north and other regions of Mali.

Although the disagreements and the climate of instability shaped how the peace agreement was implemented, there was also **some progress during the year**. The parties made progress on several interim measures, including the appointment of interim authorities at the communal level in the Taoudeni and Menaka regions. The planned phase of the DDR programme was also completed with the integration of 422 ex-combatants, for a total of almost 1,750, which means that the goal of integrating 1,800 former combatants, established in

40. ICAN Peace Network, "Cameroon's First Women's National Peace Convention: "We Build Peace, Piece by Piece", *ICAN Peace Network*, 12 August 2021.

41. Esuwono Nénfor, Boris, "Cameroon: Women Want Greater Role in the Peace Process", *Panafrikan Visions*, August 2021.

42. The Carter Center, *Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Resulting from the Algiers Process*, August 2021.

43. UN Secretary-General, *The situation in Mali*, S/2021/844, 1 October 2021; UN Secretary-General, *The situation in Mali*, S/2021/1117, 4 January 2022.

November 2018, has practically been met. Likewise, in June the Reconstituted Armed Forces Battalion (BATFAR) was formally created in Kidal. BATFAR has already begun to operate in the regions of Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and Ménaka. The parties also made headway in implementing the Special Development Strategy for the Northern Regions of Mali (SSD-RN), which will be financed through the Sustainable Development Fund (FDD). In April, the FDD steering committee met for the second time since its creation in 2018, approving 16 development projects with a budget of around 69 million dollars. Nine of these projects will be developed in the northern regions, four in the centre and three in the south. On 21 October, the Minister of Economy and Finance presided over a signing ceremony for its implementation, which heralded an important step forward in the application of Chapter Four of the agreement, related to socioeconomic and cultural development. Other aspects to highlight during the year were the reactivation of the Agreement Supervision Committee (CSA), which had been inoperative since 2015, and the creation in June of a working group for the agreement, called “G-5”, which brings together the four ministers of the armed movements that signed the agreement under the auspices of the Minister of National Reconciliation, Peace and Social Cohesion.

In the central region of the country, different measures were put in place to try to mitigate the violence, such as inter-community ceasefire agreements in Mopti and Ségou, **and to create spaces for dialogue.** In March, Minister of National Reconciliation Ismaël Wagué met with Youssouf Toloba, the leader of the Dogon self-defence group Dana Ambassagou, in hopes of easing inter-community tensions and reducing clashes. On 15 March, Donso community militias, linked to the armed organisation Katiba Macina, and Bambara militias, affiliated with JNIM, reached a ceasefire agreement in Ségou, which was broken on 3 July. In mid-June, MINUSMA reported the implementation of a UN plan in the central region, which included good offices initiatives, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, reconciliation between communities and the promotion of trust in state institutions to help to stabilise the region. On 6 August, after several peace initiatives supported by MINUSMA, representatives of the Fulani and Dogon communities agreed to establish local mechanisms to resolve conflicts amicably. In October, the communities of Ogosagu Peulh and Ogosagu Dogon, where two major attacks in 2019 and 2020 killed 192 civilians, and 10 other Peulh and Dogon communities in the municipalities of Bankas and Dimbal, signed a local

reconciliation agreement. However, even though the various efforts managed to reduce violence at some times and in some contexts, they were insufficient and violence continued in the central region throughout the year.

The peace process faced major challenges, including increased instability in the central region; the coup d'état in May; the predictable sanctions after the violation of the transition, as both ECOWAS and the AU suspended Mali from their organisations and threatened sanctions; uncertainty about the continuation of anti-terrorist operations after France announced the end of Operation Barkhane and suspended joint military operations with Malian forces after the coup d'état; and the arrival of Russian soldiers, allegedly paramilitaries of the Wagner Group, although the Malian government denied this.⁴⁴

Gender, peace and security

In terms of gender, peace and security, progress was reported in the inclusion of women in the Agreement Monitoring Committee (CSA) and its subcommittees. The Carter Center's report noted that since November 2020, nine women have joined the CSA, in what was considered an important step towards implementing mediation and building a more inclusive process. At the CSA meeting held in February in Kidal, the parties repeated their commitment to fully include women in their deliberations, as well as to add three more women to the CFS, along with another 12 to be included in the subcommittees. However, the Security Council report on the situation in Mali indicated that these 15 new nominations had not yet been made due to disputes between the two factions of Platform. The report also noted that work continued on the creation of an independent observatory for women in order to monitor their participation in political and peace processes and assess the repercussions of the application of the agreement on vulnerable populations. At the end of the year, however, it had still not been established. On 28 October, “women's situation rooms” were launched, with the participation of 200 women from civil society organisations and political parties. This mechanism seeks to help to establish peace, providing a physical space and a framework to work with communities, especially with women and young people, to promote equal access and female participation in political and electoral processes during the transition period. By the end of the year, eight rooms had been created, one in Bamako and others in seven regions of Mali.

The situation of political instability in Mali and disagreements between the parties prevented progress in implementing the clauses of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement

44. See the summary on Mali in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.