

2. Peace negotiations in Africa

- Fifteen peace processes and negotiations were identified in Africa in 2022, accounting for nearly 40% of all peace processes worldwide.
- Various local initiatives were put forth by civil society actors in Cameroon and Canada facilitated contacts to explore the possibility of relaunching a negotiating process between political and military actors and the Cameroonian government.
- The little progress made in implementing the Mali peace agreement of 2015 prompted a coalition of northern armed groups to suspend their participation in mechanisms to implement the agreement.
- The government of Senegal and Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) faction led by Cesar Atoute Badiate signed a peace agreement.
- On 2 November, the federal government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia reached a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement facilitated by the African Union.
- The Doha peace process and the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue in Chad, boycotted by many armed groups and by the political opposition, respectively, concluded with the extension of the mandate of the Transitional Military Council through the creation of a national unity government and the continuity of the presidency of Mahamat Déby.
- The Military Junta and the opposition in Sudan reached a framework agreement to create a civilian transitional government.
- After the general elections were cancelled in Libya in late 2021, the impasse in the negotiations persisted in 2022 and the divisions materialised in the configuration of two parallel governments.

This chapter analyses the peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2022. First it examines the general characteristics and trends of peace processes in the region, then it delves into the evolution of each of the cases throughout the year, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda. At the beginning of the chapter, a map is included that identifies the African countries that were the scene of negotiations during 2022.

Table 2.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2022

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)	Government, political-military secessionist movement formed by the opposition coalition Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, including IG Sako, AIPC, APLM, FSCW, MoRISC, SCARM, SCAPO, SCNC, RoA, RoAN, civil society actors and independent individuals), and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC, including IG Sisiku)	Church, civil society organisations, Switzerland/Swiss Contact Group, Friends of the Swiss Contact Group (EU, USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany, UK), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, USIP, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), Vatican, Canada
CAR	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Séléka coalition, anti-balaka militias	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant'Egidio, ACCORD, OIC, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, China, Russia, Sudan
Chad	Transitional Military Council, 52 armed groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR)	Qatar, AU, UN
DRC	Government of DRC, Government of Rwanda, armed group M23, eastern armed groups, political opposition and civil society	Congolese Episcopal Conference (CENCO), Church of Christ in the Congo, Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue on the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), AU, EU, UN, OIF and USA
Eritrea – Ethiopia	Government of Eritrea and Government of Ethiopia	United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, USA
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Federal Government, political and military authorities of the Ethiopian region of Tigray (Tigray People's Liberation Front)	AU, USA, IGAD

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Libya	Government of National Accord (GNA) / Government of National Unity (GNU), High State Council (HSC), House of Representatives (HoR), LNA/ALAF	Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Mali	Government, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), MNLA, MAA and HCUA, Platform, GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA	Algeria, France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Carter Center, civil society organisations, Mauritania
Morocco – Western Sahara	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)	UN, Algeria and Mauritania, Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
Mozambique	Government, RENAMO	National mediation team, Community of Sant'Egidio, Catholic Church, UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC), AU, EU, Botswana, South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, United Kingdom
Senegal (Casamance)	Government, factions of the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC)	ECOWAS, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde
Somalia	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political military movement Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a, clan and sub-clan leaders, Somaliland	UN, IGAD, Turkey, among others
South Sudan	Government (SPLM), SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others) and SSOMA, faction led by Paul Malong and Pagan Amum (comprising SSUF/A and Real-SPLM) and faction led by Thomas Cirillo (consisting of the SSNDA coalition, including NAS, SSNMC, NDM/PF and UDRA)	"IGAD Plus": the IGAD, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda; AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Community of Sant'Egidio
Sudan	Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions	African Union High Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), Troika (EEUU, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS
Sudan – South Sudan	Government of Sudan and Government of South Sudan	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU


The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.

2.1 Negotiations in 2022: regional trends

There were **15 peace processes and negotiations in Africa** in 2022, accounting for 39% of the 39 peace processes worldwide. This figure is higher than in previous years (12 peace processes in 2021, 13 in 2020), yet below those recorded in 2019 (18) and 2018 (22). Six negotiating processes were located in the Horn of Africa (Sudan, South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Tigray) and Somalia), three in Central Africa (Chad, the CAR and the DRC), another five in North Africa and West Africa (Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), Libya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara and Senegal) and the rest in southern Africa (Mozambique). The increase in 2022 compared to 2021 is due to the inclusion of three new peace processes into the analysis during the year, such as the case of Chad, due to the celebration of the Doha peace process and the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue; the initiatives for dialogue and negotiation in relation to the conflict between the federal government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region; and initiatives for dialogue and negotiation between the government of Senegal and a faction of the armed group MFDC in the Casamance region.

Nine of these 15 peace processes were linked to armed conflicts: those in Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), Ethiopia (Tigray), Libya, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. The remaining six peace processes took place in contexts of socio-political crisis, which in some cases had also included episodes of warfare: Chad, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, Senegal (Casamance) and Sudan-South Sudan. Some of the peace processes corresponded to conflicts that began in the last decade, such as Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest, 2018), Libya (2011) and Mali (2012), while others date back to the previous decade, like the CAR (2006), Sudan (2003), South Sudan (2009) and Sudan-South Sudan. Still other conflicts and crisis situations date back to the 1990s, such as the cases of the DRC and Somalia, so the initiatives and peace negotiations linked to these conflicts have evolved profoundly since their origin in terms of the actors involved and the causes of the disputes. The longest-running peace process studied in Africa, which suffers from structural paralysis, is the one between Morocco and Western Sahara, which began after the 1991 ceasefire

Map 2.1. Peace negotiations in Africa in 2022



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2022

agreement. The last cycle of violence in Mozambique began in 2013, though it dates back to the limited application of the 1992 peace agreement that put an end to the conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO that began in 1974. The conflict in the Senegalese region of Casamance, which began in 1982, achieved its first peace agreement in 2004. Low-intensity clashes continued afterwards, led by factions that rejected the agreement.

In relation to the actors participating in the negotiations, in 2022 **only four cases exclusively involved the governments of the respective countries and armed groups or political-military movements in the negotiations**. These were the cases of Ethiopia (between the Ethiopian federal government and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region, who met in Pretoria, South Africa, as facilitated by the African Union), Mozambique (between the Mozambican government and the opposition group RENAMO), the CAR (between the Central African government and the armed groups that did not abandon the peace process in December 2020) and Senegal (between the government and a faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC)). **In the meantime, eight of the other 15 peace processes were characterised by a more complex map of actors, with governments, armed groups, and political and social opposition groups**. This was the case in Chad, where a dual negotiating track was pursued between the Chadian government and the

political and military groups in Doha, with part of these groups later participating in the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue, along with civil society actors and political parties; Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), where exploratory contacts in Canada have involved different stakeholders from the political and military secessionist spectrum; Mali, where the negotiating process has involved national authorities and many political and armed actors from the Azawad region in recent years; Libya, between political and military actors that control different parts of the country; Somalia, between the Federal Government, the leaders of the federated states and other domestic political and military actors; Sudan, between the government, the political opposition and insurgent groups from various regions of the country; South Sudan, between the government, the armed group SPLM/A-IO and other smaller political opposition and armed groups; and the DRC, where the negotiations involved the Congolese government and the Rwandan government on the one hand and the Congolese government and different armed groups in the country on other. **Other negotiating processes were conducted by the governments of neighbouring countries as part of interstate disputes**. Examples of this were the dialogue between Sudan and South Sudan and the negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Morocco-Western Sahara negotiating process, which has been at a standstill in recent years, involves the Moroccan government and the POLISARIO Front, which proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democratic

Republic (SADR) in 1976. It is considered an international dispute because it is a territory considered pending decolonisation by the UN.

All the peace processes and negotiations in Africa studied had third-party support, whether taking the form of international organisations, regional organisations, states and religious organisations or organisations specialised in mediation and facilitation. Although there are many cases where the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment are publicly known, in other contexts this work is carried out discreetly and away from the public eye. In all cases there was more than one actor performing mediation and facilitation tasks. Most dominant in this regard was the UN, which was involved in nine of the 15 cases in Africa: Libya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Another prominent actor was the AU, which participated in 10 negotiating processes in Ethiopia (Tigray), Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan. Both organisations played the role of observers in the peace talks in Chad, since the mediation was conducted by Qatar.

African regional intergovernmental organisations participated as third parties, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Mali and in Senegal (Casamance); the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in the CAR and DRC negotiating processes; the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC) in the CAR; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Mozambique; and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan; and the East African Community (EAC) in the DRC. In addition to African intergovernmental organisations, other intergovernmental organisations participated as third parties in Africa, such as the EU (in Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan and between Sudan and South Sudan).

States also continued to play a leading role as third parties in peace processes and negotiations in Africa. All the peace processes studied had states leading or supporting initiatives of dialogue and negotiation. Local and international religious actors also played roles as third parties, especially the Community of Sant'Egidio (Vatican) in Mozambique, the CAR and South Sudan; the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the CAR; local religious institutions in Mozambique, the DRC and South Sudan; ecumenical formats such as the Anglophone General Conference (AGC), made up of

Catholic, Protestant and Muslim leaders in Cameroon; and the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC). Organisations specialised in mediation and facilitation also played prominent roles, especially the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Cameroon, Libya, Mali, the CAR and Senegal; the Carter Center in Mali; and the Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN) in Cameroon, among others.

As part of this proliferation of mediators, **the participation of third parties in joint formats continued to be frequent, as in previous years**, such as groups of friends and support groups. This was the case with the Swiss Contact Group and the Friends of the Swiss Contact Group (EU, USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany and the UK) in the conflict in Cameroon; the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia) in the negotiating process between

Morocco and the POLISARIO Front; the international monitoring committee in Libya, in which the Libyan Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU and EU) participate, as well as a dozen countries; the International Support Group (which includes the UN and the EU) and the African Union Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation, which was involved in the CAR and promoted by the AU and the CEEAC, with support from the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad, and coexisted with other mediators in the CAR; the states of the Troika (the USA, United Kingdom and Norway); African Union High Level on Sudan (AUHIP) in the case of Sudan; other coordination formats included the IGAD Plus, which facilitates dialogue

in South Sudan and which consists of the IGAD, the five members of the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria). In Sudan, apart from the peace processes with the armed actors of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, there was a negotiating process between the Sudanese government and the opposition to find a solution to the political crisis that was facilitated by two parallel processes: the Trilateral Mechanism (consisting of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the AU and the IGAD) and the one known as QUAD (which includes the US, UK Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates). At the same time, competition between foreign actors continued, as exemplified in previous years in Libya and the CAR.¹

Regarding **the agendas** of the negotiations, there were **cessations of hostilities and ceasefire agreements** in different contexts, such as Ethiopia (Tigray) and the DRC, in relation to the armed groups in the east of the country and especially M23. **Security sector reform**

All the peace processes and negotiations studied had third-party support, whether taking the form of international organisations, regional organisations, states and religious organisations or organisations specialised in mediation and facilitation

1. See *Peace Talks in Focus 2021. Analysis of Trends and Scenarios*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

was also a recurrent issue, especially the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the reform or creation of new security forces in peace agreements with various types and names, such as mixed units, joint forces or unified national armies. These were found in most of the cases analysed, such as Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mozambique, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. Issues related to **governance** were also discussed in the ongoing negotiations in various contexts, such as in Chad, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. **Degrees of self-government and levels of administrative decentralisation, including independence** for some areas, were discussed in Cameroon, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mali, Senegal, South Sudan, and Morocco-Western Sahara. Unfinished border demarcations, as in the disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between Sudan and South Sudan, were also discussed in negotiations in Africa.

Regarding the **gender, peace and security agenda, women were virtually absent in the negotiating processes under way in Africa**. In most contexts, however, many women's movements and organisations demanded active participation in the peace processes and various local peacebuilding initiatives were launched and led by civil society organisations and especially by women's organisations. Civil society organisations and especially women's organisations in **Cameroon** remained active in promoting peacebuilding initiatives, not just in the two English-speaking regions of Cameroon, but also in other parts of the country. After the success of the National Women's Convention for Peace that took place in Yaoundé in 2021, bringing together a thousand women, women's organisations demonstrated in various cities across the country, mainly in Yaoundé, Bamenda, Buea and Maroua, to mark the International Day for Peace (21 September), protesting their underrepresentation in peacebuilding initiatives and efforts. Various women's organisations also called for a ceasefire before the peace negotiations are formalised. In **Mali**, 15 women joined subcommittees of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (CSA) reached in 2015 between the government and the main parties to the conflict (excluding the jihadist groups), which the Carter Center, the main observer of the agreement, described as a positive step forward in the incorporation of the women, peace and security agenda. The transitional president also appointed 26 new members to the National Transition Council, 10 of which were women, bringing their total number to 42 (28%). Meanwhile, the agreement reached between the federal government of **Ethiopia** and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region included issues related to gender violence perpetrated during the conflict, which shows that all the parties to this conflict have committed atrocities that include massacres of civilians, sexual violence (especially by Eritrea) and the use of hunger as a weapon of war (mainly by Ethiopia). These violations have hardly been monitored due to

the information blackout that the federal government has imposed in the region, according to various human rights organisations. Also of note, former South African Vice President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka was active in the AU mediation team. In **Somalia**, the elections handed women 10 government positions (approximately 13% of the total), slightly more than in the previous government (11.7%), but far less than what was demanded by local activists in coordination with the international community, which had pushed for a quota of 30% female representation. They only obtained 20% of the seats in the lower house (House of the People), which was a dip compared to the 24% achieved in 2016. The number of female MPs reached 26% in the upper house (Senate), a slight increase compared to the 24% in 2016. The total number of female MPs in both chambers of Parliament fell to 67, whereas they had won 80 seats in the 2016 elections. In **Chad**, the Doha peace process only had one female representative, according to the United Nations. Likewise, women's and youth organisations participated in the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS), though their voice, as well as that of the rest of the political and social opposition, had little impact on its results, in line with the interests of the president of the Military Council, Mahamat Déby, and his new government, in which women were represented at slightly less than 30%. In the **CAR**, women's participation in the peace process remained low: two of the 11 members of the Follow-up Committee for the Republican Dialogue were women, comprising only 17% of its participants. In the **DRC**, on 26 April, the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region, co-chaired by the UN Special Envoy for the DRC and the AU Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security, issued a statement calling on states to redouble their efforts to strengthen the rights of women and girls and to ensure that the gender dimension is taken into account in ongoing negotiating processes. In **Sudan**, in early September, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) teamed up with the United Nations Development Programme (UNPD) to facilitate different meetings with 55 Sudanese women involved in political parties, armed movements, civil society, academia and the Women's Rights Group (WRG). These meetings were aimed at building a shared agenda of key principles and provisions from a human rights perspective to examine the gender-related priorities of any future constitutional documents or negotiations based on those principles. This group of women also held meetings with the Trilateral Mechanism, an initiative promoted by UNITAMS, the AU and the regional organisation IGAD to mediate between the Sudanese Military Junta and the civil opposition, to incorporate its agenda into the agreement reached in December. In the dispute between **Sudan and South Sudan** over the sovereignty of the Abyei region, the UN mission in the area (UNISFA) facilitated the participation of women in the Joint Traditional Leaders' Peace Conference that

was held in Entebbe (Uganda) in May, in which three women were involved (10% of the participants). In the agreement adopted, the parties committed to promoting peaceful coexistence by making women the agents of change in ongoing peacebuilding and inter-community dialogues. Finally, in **Libya** women's and civil society organisations continued to demand a greater role in the negotiations and decision-making bodies regarding the country's political future amidst growing threats and hostility towards activists and women working in the public sphere. According to reports, in the last round of the forum for dialogue on constitutional issues in Cairo, in June, the delegations addressed this claim and both chambers agreed to support a 25% quota for women in all elections in the country, even though plans for the elections remained at a standstill. Unfortunately, in September an administrative appeals court in Tripoli upheld a decision to strike down an agreement reached in October 2021 between UN Women and the Libyan Ministry of Women to develop a national action plan for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Developments in the peace negotiations during 2022 included various peace agreements signed in Ethiopia (Tigray), Senegal (Casamance) and Chad, as well as a transitional political agreement in Sudan, though the results were mixed. On 2 November, **the Ethiopian federal government and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia reached a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement facilitated by the African Union**, which sought to end the armed conflict that began in November 2020. The fact that Eritrea, which is responsible for serious human rights violations in the region, did not sign the agreement raised doubts about its effective implementation, and though some violations of the cessation of hostilities were verified, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) handed over part of its heavy weapons at the start of the year, demonstrating its willingness to comply with the agreement. Another positive development was **the signing of a peace agreement between the government of Senegal and the MFDC faction led by Cesar Atoute Badiate**, from the Casamance region on 4 August, under the auspices of ECOWAS. **A peace agreement for Chad was reached in Doha** on 7 August among 34 of the 52 political and military movements thanks to Qatari facilitation, which enabled their participation in the subsequent Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) held in N'Djamena from 20 August to 8 October, together with hundreds of representatives of the government and the political and social opposition. However, the fact that some of the main armed groups in the country did not sign the Doha agreement and that the main political opposition groups boycotted the DNIS, as well as its result, which meant the transition would be prolonged for another 24 months and the president of

Women were persistently absent from negotiating processes in Africa

the Military Council would be appointed the president of the transition, combined with the crackdown on the protests of 20 October, led to a worsening situation in the country. Finally, although there was no progress in the implementation of the 2020 Juba peace agreement in **Sudan** or in the negotiations with armed actors that had not signed the agreement, significant headway was made in the political sphere, such as the **framework agreement reached on 5 December between the Military Junta and much of the political opposition** in which the military promised to give up much of its political power and create a transitional civilian government with elections in two years. The agreement also committed the parties to security sector reforms, including the integration of former rebel groups and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a unified Sudanese Army. However, the signatories to the framework agreement did not include the armed groups that had signed the Juba peace agreement, including those led by the two main former rebel leaders Gibril Ibrahim (now the Minister of Finance) and Minni Minawi (now the Governor of Darfur).

Various **local agreements** were also reached during the year that helped to ease inter-community tensions. Notable among them was the agreement reached in the Abyei region (Sudan-South Sudan) mediated by UNISFA, where traditional Dinka Ngok and Misseriya authorities signed a peace agreement in Uganda that sought to reduce intercommunal violence. Moreover, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue reported various processes and initiatives under way since 2018 in border areas between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger that could lead to new agreements that might help to change regional dynamics of violence and instability.

Meanwhile, there were also some **positive developments in Mozambique, Cameroon and South Sudan, as well as between Sudan and South Sudan**. In **Mozambique**, progress was made during the year in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former RENAMO combatants (DDR) provided for in the 2019 peace agreement, as 90% of the former RENAMO combatants involved in the DDR programme demobilised. In **South Sudan**, some progress was made during the year in the implementation of the 2018 South Sudan Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS), with the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction also signing it, while peace negotiations in Rome with the groups that had not signed the peace agreement failed to move forward. The dynamics of rapprochement that began in 2019 between the governments of **Sudan and South Sudan** continued during the year, deepening and strengthening their diplomatic relations. Both governments made progress on border security agreements amidst a rise in intercommunity violence in the Abyei region. Although the mediation efforts conducted by the Swiss Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) in conjunction with

the Swiss government since 2019 were terminated in **Cameroon** and armed violence persisted in the two English-speaking provinces, there were contacts in Canada in October between representatives of the Cameroonian government and various Anglophone separatist groups as part of a new initiative to promote a peace process.

There was no progress in the rest of the peace processes, which in fact experienced many problems, standstills and crises. In **Mali**, little progress was made during the year in the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement in an atmosphere characterised by political instability in the country and the continuation of the dynamics of violence by groups that had not signed the agreement. In the **CAR**, the offensive launched by the armed groups that backed out of the 2019 agreement in December 2020 continued in 2022 and the political situation in the country worsened due to the polarisation resulting from the process to try to reform the Constitution. In addition, the Republican Dialogue did not meet the expectations raised by the absence of the political opposition and the armed actors who had abandoned the peace agreement in December 2020. As a result, the implementation of the 2019 peace agreement remained at a standstill. The Nairobi process was launched in the **DRC**, an inter-Congolese dialogue promoted by the EAC that involved around 50 armed groups from the eastern part of the country. However, the main armed group, M23, which is chiefly responsible for the escalation of violence in the region, did not participate. Added to this was the serious tension between the DRC and Rwanda, stemming from Rwandan support for M23. Legislative and presidential elections were held in **Somalia** as part of the implementation of the electoral agreement reached on 27 May 2021. The presidential election was won by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and put an end to the serious strain between parts of the government and the federated states and opposition sectors. However, the armed activities of the al-Shabaab insurgents persisted, as did the military operations of the federal government, which enjoyed international support and backing by the AU mission in the country amidst a severe drought and famine.

There were also **some processes that remained totally deadlocked throughout the year, such as the negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, in Libya and in Morocco on Western Sahara.** Three years after the historic peace agreement was signed between **Eritrea and Ethiopia**, the process to implement the agreement remained at an impasse as a result of the armed conflict between the Ethiopian government and the regional state of Tigray, in which Eritrea has supported the Ethiopian federal government. The EU noted that the implementation of the 2000 Algiers agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the 2018 peace agreement was essential to

Developments in the peace negotiations in 2022 included the signing of various peace agreements in Ethiopia (Tigray), Senegal (Casamance), Chad and Sudan, though the results were mixed

building peace and stability in the Tigray region.² Impasse persisted in the political negotiations on the political future of **Libya**, amidst deep divisions that materialised once again in the establishment of two parallel governments. The political deadlock continued to contribute to economic instability and insecurity in the country, though generally and compared with previous years, the trend of decreasing violence held up since the ceasefire agreement was signed between the main contending parties in October 2020. Finally, the conflict around the **Western Sahara** remained characterised by chronic deadlock and paralysis of the diplomatic channels, although unlike in previous years, the United Nations expended new efforts in 2022 to promote dialogue after the appointment of a new special envoy, Staffan de Mistura, in November 2021.

2.2. Case study analysis

Great Lakes and Central Africa

CAR	
Negotiating actors	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Seleka Coalition, Antibalaka militias
Third parties	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant Egidio, ACCORD, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; Russia, Sudan
Relevant agreements	Republican pact for peace, national reconciliation and reconstruction in the CAR (2015), Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (June 2017), Khartoum Political Accord for Peace and Reconciliation (Bangui, 6 February 2019)

Summary:

Since gaining independence in 1960, the situation in the Central African Republic has been characterized by ongoing political instability, leading to numerous coups d'état and military dictatorships. After the 2005 elections won by François Bozizé, which consolidated the coup d'état perpetrated previously by the latter, several insurgency groups emerged in the north of the country, which historically has been marginalized and is of Muslim majority. In December 2012 these groups forced negotiations to take place. In January 2013, in Libreville, François Bozizé's Government and the coalition of armed groups, called Séléka, agreed to a transition Government, but Séléka decided to break the agreement and took power, overthrowing Bozizé. Nevertheless, self-defence groups ("anti-balaka), sectors in the Army and supporters of Bozizé rebelled against the Séléka Government, creating a climate of chaos and generalized impunity. In December 2014 a new offensive brought an end to the Séléka Government and a transition Government led

2. Ashenafi Endale, EU reckons Algiers agreement crucial for North Ethiopia peace, *The Reporter*, 24 December 2022.

by Catherine Samba-Panza was instated. Regional leaders, headed by the Congolese Denis Sassou-Nguesso facilitated dialogue initiatives in parallel to the configuration of a national dialogue process, which was completed in May 2015. Some of the agreements reached were implemented, such as the holding of the elections to end the transition phase, but the disarmament and integration of guerrilla members into the security forces is still pending, and contributing to ongoing insecurity and violence. The various regional initiatives have come together in a single negotiating framework, the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation launched in late 2016, under the auspices of the AU and ECCAS with the support of the UN, which established the Libreville Roadmap in July 2017 and that it contributed to reaching the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation of February 2019, in the implementation phase, despite the difficulties. However, in December 2020, representatives of six of the country's most powerful armed groups, including the main groups that signed the 2019 peace agreement (the anti-balaka factions led by Mokom and Ngaïssona, the 3R, a faction of the FPRC, the MPC and the UPC), denounced its breach by the government, withdrew from the process and created the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), after which hostilities resumed throughout the country.

During 2022, the armed groups that withdrew from the 2019 peace agreement in December 2020 continued their armed attacks and the political situation in the country deteriorated due to the polarised process to try to reform the Constitution. The Republican Dialogue fell short of the expectations raised due to the absence of the political opposition and the armed groups that had abandoned the peace agreement in December 2020. As a result, the 2019 peace agreement remained unimplemented. After multiple delays, the national dialogue process known as the Republican Dialogue was held between 21 and 27 March. It had originally been announced after the coup attempt in January 2021. In February 2022, the opposition parties decided to return to the organising committee of the Republican Dialogue after they withdrew in October 2021 due to the president of the National Assembly's cancellation of the procedure to retract the immunity of three opposition leaders accused of collaborating with the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC). The CPC is a coalition formed by several armed groups that withdrew from the peace agreement in December 2020 due to the government's non-compliance. The momentum created by the Rome process in which representatives of the political and social opposition participated, facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio in September 2021, did not bear fruit. The rejection of the opposition parties' demands ahead of holding the Republican Dialogue, such as the inclusion of the armed groups that had not signed the 2019 agreement, equal numbers of government, civil society and opposition representatives in the organising committee and mechanisms to ensure transparency in the electoral system for the municipal elections of September 2022, culminated with the main opposition parties boycotting the Republican

Dialogue. These parties included the opposition party platform COD-2020, the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC, the historical party in power, led by former President Ange-Félix Patassé) and the African Party for Radical Transformation and Integration (PATRI). The Republican Dialogue brought together around 450 representatives of the government and part of the opposition and civil society. Around 600 recommendations arose from it, most of which had already been formulated at the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation in 2015, whose follow-up committee had expressed difficulties in implementing them.³ The recommendations adopted were quite general and included reviewing bilateral and multilateral agreements (with France and MINUSCA), strengthening the Central African Army, reforming electoral institutions and finding new sources of income for public finances. A monitoring body attached to the presidency was created, but no timetable was specified.⁴ In August, the president appointed the members of the Republican Dialogue follow-up committee, which was formed by representatives of the presidential majority opposition parties, including Gabriel Jean-Edouard Koyambounou as the coordinator to lead the committee, civil society organisations and religious leaders. Koyambounou was later kicked out of the opposition party MLPC. The only thing that generated controversy was withdrawn: a possible amendment to the Constitution that would lift the limits of a third term of office for President Touadéra. The Republican Dialogue recused itself and referred the issue to the presidency and to the National Assembly. Since then, the issue has dominated discussions and created serious political and social polarisation between supporters and detractors.⁵

No notable progress was made in the implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic. In August, the national authorities adopted a timetable of priority activities to speed up implementation of the peace agreement through the joint road map for peace in the CAR that was adopted at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICRGL). According to the timetable, the government collaborated with representatives of armed groups that remain committed to the political agreement (the main armed groups in the country withdrew from the agreement in December 2020) so they could completely dissolve. On 4 June, the government organised a meeting in Bangui to drum up regional and international support for the peace process. The meeting was attended by the mandated mediators of the ICGLR: the Angolan foreign minister and the Rwandan foreign minister. The meeting was also attended by other national and international actors, including AU and ECCAS representatives as guarantors of the political agreement, and by international organisations and diplomatic

3. Radio Ndeke Luka, *Dialogue républicain : plus de 600 recommandations formulées par les participants*, 28 March 2022.

4. RFI, *Centrafrique: que retenir du dialogue républicain?*, 28 March 2022.

5. See in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

missions. The participants agreed to meet quarterly to monitor progress in the implementation of the joint road map and the president appointed the prime minister to coordinate its implementation. The prime minister convened coordination meetings in August and September to review the timetable of priority activities and expedite implementation of the road map. Following the meetings, which were attended by representatives of the countries of the region, regional organisations and international partners, a schedule was approved for the period between August and December 2022. In accordance with the schedule, on 14 September, the government met with representatives of 11 of the armed groups that signed the political agreement to dissolve them. On 3 October, at a fourth coordination meeting, the progress achieved in the implementation of the schedule was reviewed. According to the UN Secretary-General's report, most of the mechanisms for the local application of the political agreement were inactive during various months of the year due to a lack of government funding.

Gender, peace and security

Women continued to be mostly excluded from decision-making and from political negotiation initiatives and processes. Women's participation in the peace process remained low: two of the 11 members of the Republican Dialogue follow-up committee were women and they made up only 17% of the participants in the dialogue. The establishment of the National Parity Observatory to apply the Gender Parity Law has been pending since 2020 due to the lack of political commitment and resources for its implementation.

Chad	
Negotiating actors	Transitional Military Council, 52 armed groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR)
Third parties	Qatar (mediation), AU, UN, others (observers)
Relevant agreements	Doha Peace Agreement and the Participation of the Politico-Military Movements in the Chadian National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (2022), National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (2022)

Summary:

Frequently classified as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change, Chad has faced a wide, complex and interrelated range of challenges and sources of fragility and instability in recent decades, and has also been the scene of attempts at dialogue and political negotiation. The unstable atmosphere worsened with the death of President Idriss Déby in April 2021 and the subsequent coup d'état by a military council that installed his son, Mahamat Idriss

Déby, as the new president, suspended the Constitution and replaced it with a transition charter and the promise of free elections in 18 months following the holding of a national dialogue. The Transitional Military Council (CMT) promised to promote a national dialogue in December 2021, in which the different insurgent groups active in the country were expected to participate. However, the National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS) was postponed to facilitate a peace agreement between the CMT and the insurgent groups as a step prior to their participation in the DNIS. Between March and August 2022, peace negotiations were hosted in Doha (Qatar) under Qatari mediation and an agreement was reached on August 7 with most of the insurgent groups, which led to the DNIS being held between 20 August and October 8. The Doha peace process and the DNIS ended with the CMT's mandate being extended for another 24 months under the image of a new government, described as of one national unity, and the continued presidency of Mahamat Déby, who may run in the 2024 election, which has only prolonged the break from the Chadian Constitution that began in April 2021. The survival of Mahamat Déby's regime was rejected by the political and social opposition and the subsequent crackdown by the security forces at the end of the transition on 20 October 2022 caused dozens of deaths, which indicated the authoritarian drift of the government and the silencing of the political and social opposition.

The Doha peace process and the National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS) ended up extending the mandate of the Transitional Military Council (CMT), creating a national unity government and keeping President Mahamat Déby in power, which has also prolonged the break from the Chadian Constitution that began in April 2021. The mandate of the CMT was extended for a new period of 24 months, after the which an election will be held in which Mahamat Déby may run. The survival of the Mahamat Déby regime was rejected by the political and social opposition. The subsequent crackdown by the security forces, which caused dozens of deaths, indicated the authoritarian drift of the government and the silencing of the political and social opposition.

The Committee for the Organisation of the National Inclusive Dialogue (CODNI) was established in June 2021 to prepare for the national dialogue, which was to start in December 2021. However, it was delayed due to disagreements over the members of the CODNI, the inclusiveness of the national dialogue, the interference of the CMT, the participation of the different insurgent groups, the agenda of the subjects for discussion and other issues. Its delay was justified by the desire to make it easier for the insurgent groups to get involved, for which a prior peace agreement between them and the CMT was sought. Formal negotiations began in March 2022 in Doha (Qatar) under Qatari mediation, and after various rounds of negotiations, a peace agreement was reached on 7 August between dozens of insurgent groups in the country and the government. This agreement was the prior step and condition to participate in the National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS) that the government had been promoting with different civil society groups, which was held between 20 August and 8 October 2022.

Meetings between informal representatives of the CMT and insurgent groups in Togo, Egypt and France, held in 2021, continued with Qatar's offer to facilitate meetings in Doha with the insurgent groups, which the Chadian political-military opposition praised as a step forward in the process. Previously, the CMT had approved one of the insurgents' main demands, the granting of amnesty as a condition for participating in the national dialogue. In November 2021, Mahamat Déby pardoned around 300 imprisoned or exiled insurgent leaders and political opponents.⁶ This gave the CMT an image of openness. As such, the CMT had carried out a policy to win oppositional support by co-opting members of the political and social opposition, including historical opposition leader Saleh Kebzabo (appointed vice chair of the CODNI and prime minister once the DNIS had ended). After various delays, meetings finally began on 13 March 2022 between the representatives of more than 40 insurgent groups and the CMT in Doha, mediated by Qatari Special Envoy Mutlaq bin Majed Al Qahtani.⁷ Among these dozens of armed actors, only four represented a real military threat to the Mahamat Déby regime:⁸ the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR). The two main political-military movements of these four were FACT, led by Mahamat Mahdi Ali, responsible for the death of Idriss Déby, and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR), led by Mahamat Déby's cousins Timan and Tom Erdimi. Both groups are based in Libya, from where they have regularly launched offensives against the country.

The objective of the negotiating process (described as a pre-dialogue in the DNIS) was to get these armed groups to participate in the DNIS. Finally, after five months of negotiations, 34 of the 52 political-military groups, including the UFDD and the UFR, signed an agreement in Doha on 7 August in exchange for the release of prisoners, amnesty and an end to the hostilities between the government and these armed factions, as well as the participation in the DNIS. Sources for the number of armed groups participating in the Doha process vary, since others cite 47, five of which did not accept the agreement, which is why the United Nations' figures are taken as a reference. The signing of the agreement was attended by regional and international actors, such as the AU and the UN. The mistrust between the parties, the suspensions and the constant deadlock, among

other issues, delayed the process. Eighteen armed groups, including the FACT, rejected the agreement,⁹ which was called the Doha Peace Agreement and the Participation of the Politico-Military Movements in the Chadian National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue, and formed a new opposition coalition: the Cadre permanent de concertation et de réflexion (CPCR).¹⁰ The CPCR said that it rejected the agreement due to grievances about the participation quotas in the national dialogue, the failure to release prisoners of war and the transitional authorities' ineligibility to run in the post-transition elections, according to the UN Secretary-General's report in December.¹¹ The FACT said that it feared that the groups participating in the DNIS would not be treated in a similar way and demanded security guarantees, the formation of a new organising committee for the DNIS, the release of the group's prisoners and a commitment from Mahamat Déby to not run in any future presidential elections. Under the agreement, the CMT and hundreds

The national dialogue ratified the break with the Chadian Constitution brought about in April 2021 by Mahamat Déby and his Transitional Military Council

of representatives of the political-military opposition could participate in the DNIS, and the representatives of the rebel groups would have guarantees of access and armed protection. In May 2021, the AU had agreed to support the transition on the conditions that the authorities hold a presidential election within 18 months, that the transition should be completed by October 2022 and that members of the CMT be prohibited from running for election, demanding that the CMT amend the transition charter to include these clauses. However, the CMT did not amend the transition charter as promised, noting that any changes to it should be discussed during the DNIS.

The DNIS was scheduled to take place in December 2021 and the date was later pushed back to February 2022, but it was repeatedly postponed pending the successful completion of the Doha pre-dialogue to facilitate the participation of the armed groups. Finally, the signing of the Doha agreement on 7 August allowed the implementation of the DNIS. On 20 August, more than 1,400 representatives of political-military movements, representatives of the transitional government, representatives of political parties, civil society organisations, including women's and youth organisations, traditional leaders, diaspora figures, provincial authorities, security forces and state institutions and unions launched the DNIS in N'Djamena with regional and international actors attending. The DNIS was scheduled to last three weeks and was expected to discuss the implementation of

6. France24, Chad gives amnesty to hundreds of rebels and dissidents, meeting opposition demand, 29 November 2021.

7. AFP, Qatar takes up mediation role in Chad talks: officials, rebels, al-Monitor, 25 March 2022.

8. Toulemonde, Marie, Chad: Mapping the rebellion that killed Idriss Déby, *The Africa Report*, 29 April 2021.

9. Mills, Andrew, Chad signs peace pact with rebels, but main insurgents stay out, *Reuters*, 8 August 2022.

10. Madjissebaye Ngarindinon, Tchad : les groupes armés non signataires de l'accord de Doha mettent en place un cadre commun de lutte, Tchad Infos, 8 August 2022.

11. UN Security-Council, The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, S/2022/896 of 1 December 2022.

institutional reforms and a new Constitution, which should be submitted to a referendum. The FACT, the Wakit Tama coalition of civil society organisations, the opposition party Les Transformateurs and others boycotted the DNIS. The Episcopal Conference of Chad withdrew from the DNIS because it did not consider the dialogue process real.¹² This announcement stoked the frustration of various political and social actors who viewed the evolution of the DNIS with concern. They staged various peaceful protests against the DNIS that were harshly put down, as reported by Human Rights Watch and others.

However, on 1 October, the participants in the DNIS approved the recommendations on the path to follow for the transition, including steps to dissolve the CMT and appoint the president of the CMT to lead a 24-month “second transition”, to hold a referendum on a modified version of the 1996 Constitution and the form of the state, to double the number of seats in the National Transitional Council and to establish a second chamber of Parliament. In particular, the DNIS recommended that all Chadians who meet the legal requirements be able to run in the next elections (to be held in 2024), including members of the transitional institutions. On 10 October, the president of the CMT, Mahamat Déby, was sworn in as the president of the transition. Days later, he appointed a national unity government headed by former opposition leader and former CODNI Vice Chair Saleh Kebzabo,¹³ which included other opposition figures and members of the political-military groups that signed the Doha agreement, such as Tom Erdimi, the leader of the UFR.¹⁴ Various generals close to Déby in the CMT held strategic portfolios.

The 18-month period ended on 20 October, after which CMT President Mahamat Déby was supposed to return power to the civilian authorities. The political and social opposition called for mass protests on 20 October as a consequence of the extension of the mandate of the CMT and its president. The government banned the protests announced for 20 October.¹⁵ The violent crackdown on the protests killed at least 50 people, including at least 10 police officers, and injured around 100, according to the country’s new Prime Minister Saleh Kebzabo. A curfew was announced in N’Djamena and three other locations and several political parties were ordered to cease activity. Mahamat Déby accused foreign forces of being behind the protests. The international community

condemned the government crackdown and called for respect for human rights and dialogue with the political opposition, but no sanctions were imposed against the Chadian government. According to unconfirmed estimates, more than 100 people may have been killed and hundreds wounded. The violent crackdown on the protests also worsened relations between Qatar and Chad, as Qatar was reluctant to defend the Chadian regime on the international stage.¹⁶ As the main supporter of Mahamat Déby and the main actor in monitoring the implementation of the agreements, Qatar had tried to include the FACT in the agreement, but the events clouded relations between N’Djamena and Doha.

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which had endorsed the recommendations of the DNIS before the events of 20 October, appointed its president, Congolese national Félix Tshisekedi, to facilitate the Chadian transition. This announcement clashed with the position of the African Union, whose chair, Chadian national Moussa Faki Mahamat, presented a report highly critical of the transitional authorities, in which he demanded that the AU condemn the murder, torture, arrest and arbitrary imprisonment of hundreds of civilians, denounce the “bloody repression”, demand “the immediate release of all political prisoners”, open an investigation and take action for breaking the promises made, which would include suspending Chad from the bodies of the AU. Moussa Faki noted that such actions were a requirement consistent with the AU’s ongoing position in relation to the other four cases of unconstitutional changes of government currently under way in Africa (in Sudan, Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso).¹⁷ However, the AU Peace and Security Council, which met on 11 November to study the situation in the country, did not reach the necessary quorum to suspend Chad from the organisation.

The international community’s response to the serious situation in Chad carries a message with serious implications for other countries in the region undergoing processes similar to Chad, such as Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and even Sudan

Gender, peace and security

Regarding the participation of women and the inclusion of the gender perspective, there was only one female representative in the Doha peace process, according to the United Nations. Similarly, though women’s and youth organisations participated in the DNIS, their voice and the voice of the rest of the political and social opposition was silenced by the government’s machinery, which aligned some of the results of the DNIS with the

12. Atemanke, Jude, *Catholic Bishops Withdraw from Chad’s National Inclusive Dialogue, Cite Lack of “dialogue”*, *ACI Africa*, 4 September 2022.

13. Olivier, Mathieu, “Tchad : pourquoi Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno a nommé Saleh Kebzabo Premier ministre”, *Jeune Afrique*, 12 October 2022.

14. Olivier, Mathieu, “Nouveau gouvernement au Tchad : Mahamat Saleh Annadif aux Affaires étrangères, Tom Erdimi à l’Enseignement supérieur”, *Jeune Afrique*, 14 October 2022.

15. RFI, “Le Tchad interdit les manifestations marquant la fin initiale de la transition”, 20 October 2022.

16. Africa Intelligence, *Communications between N’Djamena and Doha break down*, 10 November 2022.

17. Le Journal de l’Afrique, *Chad: between Moussa Faki and Mahamat Idriss Déby, has war been declared?*, 11 November 2022.

interests of Mahamat Déby, perpetuating the regime that emerged from the April 2021 coup, according to analysts. Women accounted for just under 30% of the members of the new government.

DRC	
Negotiating actors	Government of the DRC, government of Rwanda, armed group M23, armed groups from the eastern part of the country, political opposition and civil society
Third parties	Episcopal Conference of the Congo (CENCO), Church of Christ in the Congo, Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), AU, EU, UN, OIF and USA
Relevant agreements	Sun City Agreement, Pretoria Agreement and Luanda Agreement (2002); Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC (2002); Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (2013), Comprehensive, Inclusive Peace Accord in the DRC (2016)

Summary:

The demands for democratization in the nineties led to a succession of rebellions that culminated with the coup d'état carried out by Laurent Desiré Kabila between 1996 and 1997 against Mobutu Sese Seko. Later, what is sometimes called the First African World War (1998-2003), broke out what is sometimes called the First African World War (1998-2003) broke out because of the participation of a dozen countries in the region and numerous armed groups. The signing of a ceasefire in 1999, and of several peace agreements between 2002 and 2003, led to the withdrawal of foreign troops, the setting up of a transitional government and later an elected government, in 2006. However, did not mean the end of violence in this country, due to the role played by Rwanda and the presence of factions of non-demobilised groups and of the FDLR, responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The breach of the 2009 peace accords led to the 2012 desertion of soldiers of the former armed group CNDP, forming part of the Congolese army, citing threats against and the marginalisation of their community and organised a new rebellion called the 23 March Movement (M23), promoted by Rwanda in 2012. In December 2013, the rebellion was defeated and some of its members fled to Rwanda and Uganda. Nevertheless, the violent and unstable atmosphere persisted and the M23 resumed its attacks in late 2021. In 2022, the EAC activated two processes to promote peace in the region: a negotiating process with armed groups from the eastern DRC in Nairobi and the Luanda process between the DRC and Rwanda, as well as the dispatch of a military mission against groups opposed to the Nairobi process, such as the M23. In the meantime, Joseph Kabila revalidated his hold on power (in the elections of 2006 and 2011, riddled with irregularities) and tried to extend his term in violation of the Constitution, but he bowed to domestic and international pressure and reached an agreement with the opposition in

2016 according to which elections were held in 2018 and he was defeated. The new President Félix Tshisekedi had to form a coalition government with Kabila until late 2020, when he managed to rule without Kabila's support.

Two peace processes took place in the DRC. The first initiative consisted of facilitating an inter-Congolese dialogue promoted by the East African Community (EAC) since April, known as the Nairobi process, in which around 50 armed groups, Congolese government representatives and civil society representatives participated. In the meantime, the EAC agreed to deploy a regional force in the eastern DRC to deal with the M23 due to the group's refusal to reach a ceasefire. The second initiative, known as the Luanda process by Angola's leaders, refers to the armed group 23 March Movement (M23) and the tension between the DRC and Rwanda.

During the year, the activities of the EAC-facilitated inter-Congolese dialogue continued. Known as the Nairobi process, it involved representatives of the Congolese government, dozens of armed groups from the east of the country and civil society. The participants reiterated their willingness to respect the cessation of hostilities, continue promoting the release of child soldiers and the facilitate access for humanitarian aid.¹⁸ Thus, three rounds of negotiations were held in Nairobi during the year in which the M23 did not participate (in April, May and December). In the last round, which was held between 28 November and 6 December, decisions were reached on the release of prisoners who had not committed war crimes or other atrocities and on the review of the government's Disarmament, Demobilisation, Community Recovery and Stabilisation Programme (P-DDRCS) for former combatants. It was also decided that the next round would take place in January or February 2023 in Goma or Bunia, in the eastern DRC.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the offensive launched by the armed group M23 in late 2021 worsened during the year. This military offensive may have been supported by Rwanda, according to the UN in August, and together with cross-border bombings and incursions by soldiers of the DRC in Rwanda and of Rwanda in the DRC, led to an escalation of tension between both countries and regional efforts to de-escalate the conflict and to promote meetings that could lead to peace negotiations between the DRC and the M23 and between the DRC and Rwanda.²⁰ Attempts by the countries of the region to de-escalate the dispute and promote dialogue between the parties were constant and led by Angola under the mandate of the AU. In April, the countries of the EAC, including the DRC (which joined the organisation in March) approved the deployment of a military mission in eastern DRC to combat the M23 starting in August and to support the government in putting an end to the violence resulting from the M23's

18. Africa News, *Dr Congo govt, rebels to meet In January- East Africa Bloc*, 6 December 2022.

19. East African Community Communiqué, *The Third Inter-Congolese Dialogue Under The EAC-Led Nairobi Process*, 6 December 2022.

20. Report of the Secretary-General, *Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region*, UN Security Council, 4 October 2022.

resumption of hostilities, a decision ratified in June.²¹ Faced with the escalation of the offensive in October, the Congolese government expelled the Rwandan ambassador and public demonstrations against Rwanda broke out in the eastern part of the country, demanding that the government provide arms to fight the group and the Rwandan government.²² Due to the rising tension, on 30 October the AU called for a ceasefire and negotiations during the third round of the inter-Congolese dialogue promoted by the EAC to be held in Kenya between 4 and 13 November, which was postponed until December and in which the M23 did not participate.²³

The escalation of the offensive by the M23 group, supported by Rwanda, increased tension between the DRC and Rwanda and various regional initiatives attempted to achieve a negotiated solution to the conflict

Faced with this situation, in his position as chair of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), under the African Union's mandate, Angolan President João Lorenço promoted meetings between DRC and Rwanda. In July, a meeting was held between Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Luanda (Angola) to create a road map to de-escalate the conflict. Later, the Congolese president and Rwandan Foreign Minister Vincent Biruta participated in a small summit on peace and security in the eastern DRC in Luanda on 23 November in which they called for the M23's immediate withdrawal from the occupied areas in North Kivu and for a ceasefire to be reached on 25 November. The M23 rejected any cessation of hostilities or withdrawal from the captured territory, noting that it had not participated in the summit. However, on 6 December the M23 changed its strategy by announcing that it agreed to a ceasefire and expressed its willingness to begin withdrawing from the occupied territories. The armed group announced its support for the regional efforts and requested a meeting with the EAC facilitator, with representatives of the organisation's military mission and with the Ad-Hoc Verification Mechanism established by the ICGLR as part of the Luanda process to discuss ways to implement the agreements. It also expressed its willingness to engage in direct talks with the Congolese government to resolve the conflict.²⁴

Gender, peace and security

On 26 April, the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region, co-chaired by the UN Special Envoy for the DRC and the AU Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security, issued a statement calling on states to redouble their efforts to strengthen the rights of women and girls and to ensure that the gender dimension is considered in ongoing negotiating processes. From 12

to 15 July, a joint UN/AU/CI/ICGRL advocacy mission, led by the co-chair of the African Women's Network in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa), Catherine Samba Panza, and facilitated by the Office of the Special Envoy, visited Kinshasa to support efforts to deal with the situation in the eastern DRC and to promote women's participation in the upcoming elections. The delegation included female leaders of the ICGRL Regional Forum for Women, as well as mediators trained with the support of the Office of the Special Envoy in 2021. The delegation held meetings with representatives of the Congolese authorities, who pledged to support efforts to facilitate women's involvement in the Nairobi process. A peer-to-peer capacity-building and experience-sharing workshop on women in election management bodies was held in Lusaka in July, facilitated by the Office of the Special Envoy, in collaboration with the ICGRL, the AU, UN Women and the UNDP. MONUSCO continued to promote the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda through targeted partnerships with national, provincial and local authorities and to promote greater space for women's representation and participation in the Nairobi process. The Office of the UN Special Envoy continued to work with leaders in the region to promote the inclusion of women in political processes.

South Sudan	
Negotiating actors	Revitalised Peace Agreement (2018): Government (SPLM), SPLM / A-inOpposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others) Two independent factions of the SPLM-IO: the Kitwang faction led by Simon Gatwech Dual and the faction headed by General Johnson Olony. Peace talks in Rome: Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Groups (NSSSOG, previously SSOMA): National Salvation Front (NAS), South Sudan United Front (SSUF), the Real SPLM, South Sudan People's Patriotic Movement (SSPPM).
Third parties	IGAD Plus: IGAD (Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda); AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Community of Sant'Egidio
Relevant agreements	Peace Agreement (2015), Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (2017), Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018)

21. Sam Mendick and Claude Muhindo, *East African military force met with scepticism in DR Congo*, *The New Humanitarian*, 25 November 2022.
 22. See the summary on the DRC (east) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) by Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, March 2023.
 23. Reliefweb, *Joint Communiqué of the Chair of the African Union and the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in the East of DRC*, African Union, 30 October 2022.
 24. Security Council Report, *Democratic Republic of the Congo: Briefing and Consultations*, 8 December 2022.

Summary:

After years of armed conflict between the Central Government of Sudan and the south of the country, led by the SPLM/A guerrilla, South Sudan became an independent State in 2011, after holding the referendum that was planned in the 2005 peace agreement (Comprehensive Peace Agreement –CPA–) facilitated by the mediation of the IGAD. The Peace between Sudan and South Sudan and achieving independence was not achieved, however, were not enough to end the conflict and violence. South Sudan has remained immersed in a series of internal conflicts promoted by disputes to control the territory, livestock and political power, as well as by neopatrimonial practices and corruption in the Government, 42 Peace Talks in Focus 2021 all of which has impeded stability and the consolidation of peace. As part of the peace negotiations promoted in April 2013, the President offered an amnesty for six commanders of the rebel groups, but this was not successful initially. At a later date, in December 2013, tensions broke out among the factions loyal to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to the former Vice-President Riek Machar, leader of the SPL/A-inOpposition (SPLA-IO), which gave way to a new escalation of violence in several of the country's regions. In January 2014, with the mediation of the IGAD, the Government and the SPLAIO launched peace conversations in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). Diplomatic efforts were found against many obstacles to achieve effective ceasefire agreements, after signing nine different commitments to the cessation of hostilities and transitory measures between December 2013 and August 2015, which were systematically violated and have rendered it impossible to lay the foundations for a political solution to the conflict. On 17 August 2015, after strong international pressure and threats of blockades and economic sanctions, the parties signed a peace agreement promoted by the IGAD Plus, although there is still much uncertainty surrounding its implementation, as well as other later agreements. Subsequently, new agreements were reached between the parties, such as the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (2017) and the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R -ARCSS) (2018), which open new paths to try to end the violence. Since 2019, the government has held peace talks in Rome with the groups that did not sign the R-ARCSS.

Some progress was made during the year on the implementation of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), with the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction signing it, while peace negotiations in Rome with the groups that did not sign the agreement failed to gain traction. The year began with the announcement of an agreement between the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction, led by General Simon Gatwech Dual, which split from the SPLA-IO, headed by Vice President Riek Machar, in August 2021, and the South Sudanese government headed by Salva Kiir. The result of talks that began in October 2021 and resumed on 11 January 2022 in Khartoum, mediated by the government of Sudan, the agreement was signed on 16 January. Both parties agreed that the Kitgwang faction would sign the 2018 agreement, which includes

In November, the government suspended the peace talks in Rome with the armed groups that had not signed the 2018 peace agreement

amnesty for its combatants, a permanent ceasefire and integration into the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF).²⁵ The Kitgwang faction's signature prompted Vice President Machar to order his forces to cease hostilities with it and he said that the 2018 ceasefire between the SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO now applied to Kitgwang as well.

Regarding progress in the **implementation of the R-ARCSS**, the first quarter of the year was marked by heightened tension between the main parties that signed the 2018 peace agreement, the SPLM headed by President Kiir and the SPLA-IO led by Vice President Machar, which threatened the unity of the transitional government. In late March, the tension between the parties erupted in major armed clashes in the states of Upper Nile and Unity between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, prompting the SPLA-IO to announce that it was withdrawing from the peace monitoring mechanism. In response, Kiir's government announced on 24 March that the SPLA-IO was "officially at war" with the SSPDF. The Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway) expressed concern about the deterioration of the peace agreement and asked the government to safeguard it. The tension eased on 3 April, when both leaders agreed to implement a key provision of the 2018 peace agreement on implementing transitional security arrangements, consenting to the formation of unified South Sudanese Armed Forces. The agreement stipulated that Kiir's forces would get 60% of the key leadership positions in national security institutions, while Machar's SPLA-IO and South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) got the remaining 40%. Following the agreement, Machar announced he would lift the suspension of his faction's participation in the security and ceasefire mechanisms.

In terms on governance, in late July the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU), led by President Kiir and Vice President Machar, announced a controversial proposal to extend its 24-month term beyond February 2023, as stipulated in the R-ARCSS. The announcement drew criticism from civil society activists and political leaders due to a lack of deliberation and they called for a more inclusive process. It also triggered reactions from the Troika, such as Washington's announcement on 15 July that it was withdrawing funds from the peace monitoring bodies. Domestic and foreign criticism of the announcement did not prevent the transitional government from signing a road map on 4 August that extended the transition period to address the pending tasks of the peace agreement, setting the date of the elections for December 2024 and the transfer of power for February 2025. The Council of Ministers approved the road map and submitted

25. See: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2397>

it to Parliament for approval. In response, armed groups that had not signed the agreement, opposition movements and civil society activists created a platform on 6 August to oppose the transitional government and “categorically” rejected extending the deadline. The South Sudan People’s Movement/Army (SSPM/A), led by General Stephen Buay Rolnyang, denounced the violation of the agreement, and began armed activity against the government in the state of Unity in late July. Leaders of armed groups opposed to the government, such as Thomas Cirillo, Paul Malong and Pagan Amum, also announced a broader opposition alliance. The Troika complained that the move lacked legitimacy, as it violated the agreement and did not include all parties in the deliberations on the content of the road map and on extending the transition period. The government’s announcement coincided with fresh fragmentation of the Kitgwang faction, leading to new armed clashes. The split came about as the faction’s leader, General Gatwech Dual, removed General Johnson Olony as his deputy on 9 August, sparking a further escalation of violence between the two factions in the states of Upper Nile and Jonglei and displacing around 27,000 people since 14 August, according to the UN humanitarian office in the country.²⁶

The Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) of South Sudan extended the 24-month transitional period beyond what was stipulated in the peace agreement

After the controversial extension of the transition period, on 1 September the body that oversees the peace process in South Sudan, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), confirmed the road map to extend the transitional government until 2025. In total, 37 of the 43 members that make up the RJMEC voted in favour of the extension, thereby fulfilling Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS, which requires that at least two thirds of the members with the right to vote consent to any amendment to it.²⁷ Meanwhile, the RJMEC urged the transitional government to redouble its efforts and fully implement the agreed road map. Some progress on implementing the clauses of the peace agreement was announced in late September. In particular, with regard to the programme to reform the security sector, it was reported that nearly 7,000 soldiers from the Bahr el Ghazal region and 1,701 soldiers from Bor, the capital of the state of Jonglei, had been integrated into the unified forces.

In early November, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix visited the country and acknowledged the positive steps taken in implementing the peace agreement, though he stressed that they are still insufficient to achieve stability. In late November, the sixth Governors’ Forum

was kicked off in Juba, the capital of the country. It was attended by the governors of the 10 states and the heads of the three administrative areas, who made calls for peace and stability. Nicholas Haysom, the head of the United Nations mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), said that the forum provided an opportunity to reflect on the country’s renewed commitment to the peace agreement and will push forward implementation of the road map.

In October, it was announced that the peace talks between the South Sudanese government and the groups that did not sign the R-ARCSS would restart after their suspension in August 2021. Mediated by the Community of Sant’Egidio, the talks began in Rome in 2019. Meanwhile, the main rebel group leaders, including the head of the National Salvation Front (NAS), Thomas Cirillo, former South Sudanese Army chief Paul Malong and the former secretary-general of the ruling SPLM, Pagan Amum, announced an alliance and the negotiating rebel coalition changed its name from the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOMA) to the Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Groups (NSSSOG). Within this framework, on 19 October, General Stephen Buay Rolnyang, the leader of the SSPM/A, proposed the creation of a unified front among all non-signatory opposition groups to “physically challenge the regime”. This caused the South Sudanese government to pull out of the talks again on 21 November, accusing the rebel groups of using them to “buy time to prepare for war”. Some groups that make up the rebel coalition criticised the government’s decision and urged it to reverse it. Later, on 8 December, a delegation from the Community of Sant’Egidio travelled to Juba to meet with the president of South Sudan and propose resuming the suspended peace talks.

Gender, peace and security

The various reports by the UN Secretary-General on the situation in the country highlighted significant aspects related to gender, peace and security.²⁸ Early in the year, UNMISS facilitated the creation of a network of women in the security sector to improve support for sections of the R-ARCSS that deal with security sector reform. Also in July, UNMISS and UN-Women promoted the creation of three women’s networks in the police, the army and the prison services as part of the Fund for Peace project to incorporate the gender perspective in security sector reform. In September, UNMISS and FAO organised two workshops to develop and finalise the draft national land policy, which were attended by 120 people (25 women).

26. See the summary on South Sudan in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

27. The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), *RJMEC members vote to extend Transitional Period and RTGONU term*, 1 September 2022.

28. The UN Secretary-General submitted several reports to the Security Council on the situation in South Sudan during the year: S/2022/156 on 25 February; S/2022/468 on 9 June; S/2022/689 on 13 September; S/2022/918 on 7 December.

These workshops focused on issues such as women's right to inherit and register land, the elimination of discriminatory customary practices and women's representation in institutions governing land use, all of which are key reforms outlined in the R-ARCSS. Several meetings were also organised during the year in different counties to promote the adoption of action plans for inclusive governance, in line with the 35% quota reserved for women in the peace agreement. UNMISS also reported that a women's network has been launched for the Wildlife Service and the Civil Defence Service, which aims to ensure women's equal participation in the security sector and improve gender sensitivity in services provided by security sector institutions.

Sudan	
Negotiating actors	Government of Sudan, the opposition coalition "Sudan Call" formed by national opposition parties and Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions
Third parties	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Troika (USA, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS
Relevant agreements	Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) (2006), Road map Agreement (2016), the Juba Declaration for Confidence-Building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation (2019), Juba Peace Agreement (2020)

Summary:

Different armed conflicts (Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan) remain active in the country, as well as tensions between the government and the opposition which have led to different peace negotiations and a de-escalation of violence. In Darfur, amidst peace talks to resolve the historical dispute between the north and south of the country, which ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, various armed groups, mainly the JEM and the SLA, rebelled in 2003 around demands for greater decentralisation and development in the region. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was reached in 2006, which included only one SLA faction, led by Minni Minnawi, while the conflict persisted amidst frustrated attempts at dialogue, mainly promoted by Qatar as part of the Doha peace process, 44 Peace Talks in Focus 2021 7. UN Secretary-General, Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, S/2021/1008, 3 December 2021. 8. See the summary on Sudan (Darfur) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022. in which the different parties were involved. Furthermore, in the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), the secession of South Sudan in July 2011 and the resulting national reconfiguration of Sudan aggravated tensions between those

border regions and the Sudanese government, since both regions had supported the southern SPLA insurgency during the Sudanese armed conflict. The African Union High Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) has mediated to seek a peaceful resolution between the parties (government and SPLM/N rebellion) that revolve around three main lines in the peace negotiations: the ceasefire model, the type of humanitarian access to the Two Areas and the characteristics and agenda of the National Dialogue. In early 2014, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir asked all armed actors and opposition groups to join the National Dialogue. From the outset, the proposal involved former South African President Thabo Mbeki and the AUHIP to promote peace negotiations and a democratic transformation. After the fall of the al-Bashir regime in April 2019, the different peace processes and scenarios between the new transitional government and the different rebel groups in the Two Areas and Darfur have merged, achieving the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020. However, several armed groups, including the SPLM-N alHilu (Two Areas) and the SLM/A-AW (Darfur), refused to sign the peace agreement, holding the talks separately.

The negotiations promoted by the Sudanese military junta and part of the political opposition to try to end the political crisis that has shaken the country since the coup d'état in October 2021 monopolised most of the political agenda during the year. This meant that not much progress was made in implementing the 2020 Juba agreement or in negotiations with armed actors that had not signed it. In May, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) launched an intra-Sudanese peace initiative known as the Trilateral Mechanism to mediate between the Military Junta and the political opposition to resolve the governance crisis in the country.²⁹ The tripartite mechanism was launched after months of separate negotiations with the parties that had signed the 2020 Juba peace agreement, civil society organisations and political groups, including factions of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Committees of Resistance in the state of Khartoum. However, the country's main pro-democracy alliance, the Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Command (FFC-CC), boycotted the negotiations of the Trilateral Mechanism due to ongoing police repression. Volker Perthes, the UN special envoy for Sudan, reported that the talks were aimed at achieving a "transition programme" that included the appointment of a civilian prime minister and arrangements to draft a constitution and elections at the end of the transition. Alongside the trilateral mechanism, US and Saudi diplomats launched informal talks between the Military Junta and the FFC-CC in June in what became known as the Quad mediation (which includes the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). This parallel initiative drew criticism from the AU, which denounced its "external interference" in the Trilateral Mechanism, accusing the Quad countries of publicly

29. See the summary on Sudan in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

supporting the trilateral process while undermining it through their parallel negotiating process.

Significant progress was made in September when the Sudanese Bar Association's presented a draft constitution to restore democracy. Prepared by a committee made up of various groups of political parties, civil society organisations and prominent academics, the draft constitution also occasionally involved some groups that had signed the Juba peace agreement, including the Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council and the Sudan Liberation Forces Alliance. However, armed movements that had not signed the agreement repeated their refusal to participate, including the Sudan Liberation Movement Abdel Wahid faction (SLM/AW) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction.

On 5 December, a framework agreement was reached in Sudan between the Military Junta and part of the opposition to create a transitional civilian government

Finally, as a result of the negotiations, **on 5 December a framework agreement was reached between the Military Junta and dozens of civilian leaders in which the military promised to relinquish much of its political power and create a civilian transitional government with elections in two years.** The agreement also committed the parties to security sector reforms, including the integration of former rebel groups and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a unified army.

The armed groups that signed the Juba peace agreement did not sign the framework agreement, including those headed by the two main ex-rebel leaders Gibril Ibrahim (currently the finance minister) and Minni Minawi (currently the governor of Darfur). These groups rejected the agreement due to wording that suggested that part of it could be renegotiated, mainly the provisions on governance that distributed 25% of the seats in the civil administration to the signatory organisations, among other concessions. The two largest rebel groups in the country, SLM/A-AW, led by Abdulwahid al-Nur (of the Darfur region), and SPLM-N, led by Abdulaziz al-Hilu (of the South Kordofan region), had not signed the Juba peace agreement and rejected the new agreement. Their refusal (and other notable parties' refusal) to sign the new agreement made it necessary to expand the talks to bring more groups on board. These would begin in January 2023, in the second phase of the negotiations, and were planned to focus on five sensitive issues: transitional justice, security sector reform, the Juba peace agreement, the status of the committee to dismantle the former regime of Omar al-Bashir and the crisis in eastern Sudan.

Little headway was made in the implementation of the **Juba peace agreement of October 2020** during the

year. Mainly, slow progress continued to be made in implementing the security agreements for Darfur. The Permanent Ceasefire Committee continued to engage with civil society organisations and communities to develop their communication and alert networks on alleged ceasefire violations. Despite the progress made since October 2020, the UN Secretary-General's report on Sudan issued in December expressed concern about the pace of implementation, noting that the populations most affected by the conflict in Darfur and the Two Areas had still not benefitted from the 2020 agreement and required the parties to address the root causes of the conflict linked to land rights, the return of internally displaced people and issues of justice.³⁰

Finally, the **peace negotiations with the SPLM-N Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction**, which did not sign the Juba peace agreement, remained at a standstill while waiting for a civilian government to be re-established and constitutional order to be recovered. The negotiations began in Juba in 2021 with the mediation of the government of South Sudan and the facilitation of UNITAMS.

Gender, peace and security

In early September, UNITAMS and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) facilitated meetings with 55 Sudanese women involved with political parties, armed movements, civil society, academia and the Women's Rights Group (WRG). These meetings were aimed at building a shared agenda of key principles and provisions from a women's rights perspective to examine the gender-related priorities of any future constitutional documents or negotiations based on those principles. This group of women also held meetings with the Trilateral Mechanism to incorporate their agenda into the agreement.³¹

Sudan – South Sudan	
Negotiating actors	Government of Sudan, Government of South Sudan
Third parties	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU, UNISFA
Relevant agreements	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2005); Cooperation Agreement (2012), Joint Boundary Demarcation Agreement (2019)
Summary: The armed conflict between Sudan and its southern neighbour (South Sudan) lasted for more than 30 years and was marked by a growing complexity, the nature of which covered	

30. Report of the Secretary-General, *Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan*, Security Council, S/2022/898, 1 December 2022.

31. Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General, 1 December 2022.

several dimensions relating to the culture and history of both countries, affected by two civil wars (1963-1972; and 1982-2005). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 led to a referendum in the south of Sudan to ratify the independence of this region. The consultation happened in January 2011 and following a clear victory of those in favour of independence, in July 2011 South Sudan declared independence and became a new State. However, the separation of the two countries did not bring an end to the disagreements between Khartoum and Juba over the many unresolved issues. Among the main obstacles to stability there is a dispute over the oil-rich enclave of Abyei and the final demarcation of the border between both countries, as well as disagreement with regards to the exploitation of oil resources (with oil fields in South Sudan but pipelines for exportation to Sudan). Both countries accuse one another of supporting insurgency movements in the neighbour country and have contributed to further destabilizing the situation and threaten the peaceful coexistence of these two countries.

South Sudan and Sudan made progress on border security agreements during the year amidst increased inter-community violence in the Abyei region.

The most notable progress in the year occurred in February, when South Sudanese Vice President Hussein Abdelbagi Akol and Sudanese Vice President Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as “Hemeti”) met in Juba and agreed to form a high-level committee to resolve border conflicts involving both countries and promote peace and security between the communities living in these areas. The Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), a body used by Sudan and South Sudan to discuss security issues of mutual interest, was reconvened in May. At the meeting, held in the Sudanese capital, the two countries agreed to set up a joint monitoring committee to oversee security in the disputed Abyei region and agreed to immediately open border crossings and revitalise the river transport sector.

In May, a peace agreement mediated by the UNISFA was reached between traditional Dinka Ngok and Misseriya authorities that seeks to reduce violence in the Abyei region

These agreements were reached amidst a rise in inter-community violence in the region, mainly due to heightened tension between members of the Ngok Dinka communities of South Sudan and Sudanese nomadic Misseriya herders who travel the area in search of pasture. To ease the tension between the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya communities, in May the United Nations Interim Force in Abyei (UNISFA), which has mediated between them to bring an end to the violence since 2021, organised a peace conference in Entebbe, Uganda with traditional leaders and representatives of youth and women from both communities to de-escalate the situation. Held between 17 and 19 May, the conference resulted in the signing of a peace agreement in which the parties committed to: a) promote dialogue between communities that improves the protection of women and children and girls; b) get traditional leaders to see themselves as active promoters of peace; c) support the initiatives undertaken by both governments to resolve

the issue of Abyei; d) hold periodic meetings in search of peace; and e) demand immediate publication of the investigative report on the 2013 massacres. Meanwhile, on 12 May, the UN Security Council renewed UNISFA's mandate for six months and later renewed it again for one year, until November 2023. As part of its mandate renewal, UNISFA will continue to build the capacity of the Abyei police service. The government of South Sudan urged UNISFA to stabilise the Abyei region and threatened to deploy government forces to the area if the violence was not contained. Finally, in late September, the African Union's Peace and Security Council discussed the situation in Abyei and promised to support both countries to determine the final status of Abyei. However, the government of Sudan, which is suspended from the AU and its activities due to the coup, opposed the talks on Abyei being held in its absence.

Gender, peace and security

During the year, UNISFA took several different actions to broaden female participation in decision-making processes related to peace and security, though this remains a great challenge in Abyei, according to the report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei issued in October 2022.³² UNISFA facilitated women's participation in the Joint Traditional Leaders' Peace Conference held in Entebbe in May, in which three women participated (10% of the participants). In the agreement adopted, the parties pledged to promote peaceful coexistence by making women the agents of change in ongoing peacebuilding and inter-community dialogues. The mission also worked with local leaders and communities to establish community protection committees among the Misseriya and advocated for women to participate in them, resulting in the selection of 64 women to constitute the new committees (approximately 15% of the total).

Horn of Africa

Ethiopia (Tigray)	
Negotiating actors	Federal Government, political-military authorities of the Ethiopian region of Tigray (Tigray People's Liberation Front)
Third parties	AU, USA, IGAD
Relevant agreements	Agreement for a Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (Pretoria, 2022), Executive Declaration on the Modalities of Implementation of the Agreement for a Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities (Nairobi, 2022)

32. Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Abyei, United Nations Security Council S/2022/760, 13 October 2022.

Summary:

The region of Tigray (a state in northern Ethiopia, bordering Ethiopia and with a Tigray -majority population) has been the scene of an armed conflict and attempts at dialogue initiatives since 2020. The inauguration of Abiy Ahmed as the new prime minister of Ethiopia in early 2018 brought about important and positive changes internally and regionally in Ethiopia. However, since his rise to power, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) party and the leadership of the Tigray community, once the solid core of the ruling coalition (EPRDF), have seen their government decision-making powers evaporate. Furthermore, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000 had its origin in border disputes between the two countries. As a border state where decisions related to the agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia must be implemented, such as the border demarcation and status of the town of Badme, Tigray was marginalised from the peace process between both governments. Added to this was the gradual marginalisation of the TPLF from central power, contributing to growing tension that culminated in the outbreak of an armed conflict between the Ethiopian security forces and the security forces of the Tigray region. The crisis took on regional dimensions due to the involvement of Eritrea, as well as militias and security forces from the neighbouring Ethiopian region of Amhara. Since the beginning of the armed conflict in November 2020, the international community, and especially the AU, have tried to promote peace negotiations between the parties, which the Federal Government of Ethiopia rejected. Between March and August 2022, a humanitarian truce was in force, after which there was a new escalation of violence. In late October 2022, peace negotiations were formalised in Pretoria (South Africa) under the auspices of the AU, which led to the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement in November.

On 2 November, the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the political-military authorities of the Tigray region, in northern Ethiopia, reached a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement in Pretoria (South Africa).³³

This agreement was preceded by the breaking of the humanitarian truce in force between March and August, after which there was a serious escalation of violence between the parties. Following a series of rounds launched on 25 October at the South African Foreign Minister's Office under the auspices of the AU and with South African support, the agreement was made possible by AU-led regional and international efforts, and particularly by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was appointed the AU's special envoy for the Horn of Africa and had initially been rejected by the TPLF because he was close to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed³⁴ and two other members of the mediation team, former South African Vice President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, supported by US envoy Mike Hammer. The mediation team managed to convince both parties of the need to start a negotiating process and to accept

the AU's invitation for peace talks scheduled in South Africa for 8 October, which was postponed for logistical reasons. Ethiopia and Eritrea may have used this delay to accelerate the military offensive to sit down at the negotiating table in a stronger position, according to some analysts. Pressure from the international community was intense, especially from the US on the TPLF, as highlighted by the Ethiopian representative in the negotiations, Deputy Foreign Minister and National Security Advisor Redwan Hussein.

Two years after the outbreak of an armed conflict that has caused thousands of deaths in the region, displaced more than two million people and stricken almost one million of the six million inhabitants of Tigray with famine, in late August, the fighting escalated again between the militias and security forces of the Tigray region and the Ethiopian federal troops supported by Eritrea and the security forces of the Amhara region.³⁵ The rise in violence was accompanied by an alarming increase in serious human rights violations against civilians and led to an intensification of diplomatic initiatives to convince the parties of the need to reach a ceasefire. However, from March to the end of August, a humanitarian truce had been in force that both sides traded blame for breaking, which led to more clashes and the humanitarian blockade.

The former Nigerian president indicated that the AU will assume responsibility for monitoring, supervising and verifying implementation of the agreement, which will be made up of a small group of no more than 10 people designated by the AU, with a representative of each party and a representative of the regional organisation IGAD, which must report to the mediation panel led by Obasanjo. Meanwhile, the Tigrayan authorities accused the Ethiopian federal security forces of having carried out attacks against civilians in the town of Maychew since the agreement was signed. The official name of the agreement, the "Agreement for a Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front", scored a victory for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, since it did not include the regional government of Tigray, but the Ethiopian federal government and the military political movement TPLF.³⁶ Both parties agreed to the supremacy of the federal Constitution. In addition to the cessation of hostilities, the peace agreement included important concessions by the TPLF, such as a systematic and coordinated disarmament of its security forces. The federal government agreed to remove the TPLF from its list of terrorist organisations and to start (Article 10.2) a political dialogue on the political future

33. AU, Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), 2 November 2022.

34. Africa Confidential, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo takes on mediating role in war as brickbats fly on both sides, 7 September 2022.

35. See chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

36. Alex de Waal, Ethiopia civil war: Tigray truce a triumph for PM Abiy Ahmed, *BBC*, 3 November 2022.

of Tigray, without the agreement defining any kind of supervision or monitoring of the dialogue. Tigrayan forces were required to cede highways and airports to federal control. The Ethiopian government and the TPLF also committed to the restoration of services, unimpeded access to humanitarian supplies and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, in Tigray. Various analysts cited the humanitarian disaster as the main issue that pushed the Tigrayan authorities to negotiate.

Various analysts and others in the Tigray community in Ethiopia and in the diaspora highlighted other issues that could be interpreted as concessions made by the TPLF.³⁷ Details included in the agreement highlight this issue and leave its effective implementation in the hands of the federal government of Ethiopia. First, Eritrea was not a party to the agreement, so it has not been forced to accept any of the provisions established by Addis Ababa. Second, the limited dimensions of the ceasefire supervision mechanism and the exclusion of the UN, the US, the EU and the IGAD from signing the agreement (they were simply observers) sow doubts about its actual implementation on the ground and demonstrates the victory of the Ethiopian strategy of not including the international community, as pointed out by the executive director of the World Peace Foundation, Alex de Waal. Third, the agreement establishes that the federal government of Ethiopia must restore authority in the region until new elections are held (Article 10.1) and that the federal government must propose a nationwide transitional justice policy without mentioning any international investigation mechanism of the serious violations of human rights committed in the region (Article 10.3), as indicated by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.³⁸ Added to this are the violations of the ceasefire by the Ethiopian and Eritrean security forces and the Amhara militias against the TPLF since the agreement was signed, which reveal the difficulties and the fragile political will to implement the agreement, according to some analysts, and which may mean that some TPLF commanders and militias will decide not to accept the very lax terms for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his wide room to manoeuvre. However, on 12 November, the parties signed the Executive Declaration on the Modalities of Implementation of the Agreement for a Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities in Nairobi, which stipulates the combatants' surrender of heavy weapons and the demobilisation, the restoration of public services in Tigray, the reactivation of humanitarian aid and the withdrawal of all armed

Various issues included in the peace agreement show broad concessions from the TPLF to the Ethiopian Federal Government to avoid a humanitarian disaster for its population

groups and foreign forces that fought alongside the Ethiopian Army.³⁹

Gender, peace and security

The agreement includes issues related to gender violence perpetrated during the conflict. Specifically, it urges the parties to condemn any act of sexual violence and gender violence and any act of violence against minors, girls, women, the elderly and the recruitment of child soldiers, while promoting family reunification (Article 4) and calling on the parties to consider the specific needs of what the agreement describes as “vulnerable groups”, which include women, minors and the elderly, in the delivery humanitarian aid (Article 5). According to human rights organisations, all parties to the conflict have committed atrocities that include massacres of civilians, sexual violence (especially by Eritrea) and the use of hunger as a weapon of war (mainly by Ethiopia), violations that have barely been able to be monitored due to the information blackout that Ethiopia has imposed on the region. There is no information available on the participation of women in the delegations of both parties, although it is possible to highlight the active presence in the AU mediation team of former South African Vice President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

Somalia	
Negotiating actors	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political-military movement Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama'a, clan leaders and sub-clans, Somaliland
Third parties	UN, IGAD, Turkey, among others
Relevant agreements	Road map to end the transition (2011), Kampala Accord (2011), Provisional Federal Constitution (2012), Mogadishu Declaration of the National Consultative Forum (2015)
Summary: The armed conflict and the absence of effective central authority in the country have their origins in 1988, when a coalition of opposing groups rebelled against the dictatorial power of Siad Barre and three years later managed to overthrow him. Since 1991, more than 15 peace processes with different types of proposals were attempted to establish a central authority. Of note were the Addis Ababa (1993), Arta (2000) and Mbagathi (2002-2004) processes. The	

37. Rashid Abdi (@RAbdiAnalyst), *It is now clear to me TPLF capitulated. What bothers me is what Addis and Asmara will do with that victory and what happens to the people of Tigray. TPLF scripted its own downfall. It could have capitulated two years ago and saved its people and region*, (Tweet), Twitter, 6 November 2022; Alex de Waal, *Ethiopia civil war: Tigray truce a triumph for PM Abiy Ahmed*, BBC, 3 November 2022.
38. HRW, *Ethiopia: Truce Needs Robust Rights Monitoring*, 4 November 2022; Amnesty International, *Ethiopia: Peace agreement must deliver justice to victims and survivors of conflict*, 4 November 2022.
39. Addis Standard, *Declaration of the Senior Commanders on the Modalities for the implementation of the Agreement for Lasting Peace Through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities*, 12 November 2022.

centrality of the Somali state had led to a high degree of authoritarianism during Barre's rule, and the different proposals intended to establish a State that did not hold all of the power, a formula widely rejected by Somali society. However, some clans and warlords rejected the federal or decentralized model because it represented a threat to their power. The resolution of the conflict has been complicated by several issues: the power of some warlords who have turned conflict into a way of life; the issue of representation and the balance of power used to establish the future government between the different stakeholders and clans that make up the Somali social structure in conflict for years during Siad Barre's dictatorship; interference by Ethiopia and Eritrea; and the erratic stance of the international community. The rise of political Islam as a possible governing option through the Islamic courts, and the internationalization of the conflict with the arrival of foreign fighters in the armed wing of the courts, al-Shabaab, as well the Ethiopian invasion and the U.S. role in the fight against terrorism, have all contributed to making the situation more difficult. The Transitional Federal Government, which emerged from the Mbagathi peace process (2004), came to an end in 2012 and gave way to the Federal Government, which was supposed to be in charge of holding the elections in 2016. The National Consultative Forum held in 2015 laid the foundations for the different agreements to be reached on holding the elections in 2016. The elections were held in late 2016 and early 2017. Questioned for its ineffectiveness and corruption, this government managed to hold elections between 2016 and 2017, achieved progress and agreements in implementing the electoral process and the process of building the federation between the different Somali states and organised the elections between 2020 and 2021, although the end of the presidential mandate in February 2021 without the elections having been held opened up a serious crisis between the Government, the federated states and opposition sectors.

Alongside the persistence of al-Shabaab's activities and the severe drought and famine affecting the country, the legislative and presidential elections were finally held as part of the implementation of the electoral agreement reached on 27 May 2021. The presidential election was won by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, which dissolved the serious tension between parts of the government and of the federal states and opposition groups, triggering different negotiations to overcome the dispute. Meanwhile, the AU mission in Somalia ended its mandate on 31 March 2022 and was succeeded by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which was established on 1 April. The mission aims to strengthen both the military and institutional autonomy of the Somali government as it proceeds with its withdrawal from the country. The mission's mandate will end on 31 December 2024, when Somali security forces are expected to fully assume responsibility for the security of the country, guided by the Somali Transition Plan. The first ATMIS troop drawdown to facilitate the end of the peacekeeping mission took place in December 2022.

The elections concluded with the formation of the Somali Parliament and the election of Hassan Sheikh

Mohamud as the 10th president of the Republic of Somalia on 15 May. The election of MPs in the different regions, an essential step for the presidential election, was plagued by delays, conflicts and consultations to resolve the different disputes, such as in Jubaland, where two lists of MPs were chosen, each considering itself legitimate. The presidential election was indirect and voted by the MPs in three rounds in a single day held in the hangar of the Somali Air Force located in the Aden International Airport area, protected by ATMIS and enjoying the technical and operational support of the UN. Six candidates withdrew shortly before the vote began, leaving 33 candidates, including one woman.⁴⁰ Incumbent President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as "Farmajo", acknowledged his defeat and incoming President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took the oath of office immediately. The presidential election was considered transparent and was widely accepted by the country's stakeholders. **President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud assumed full presidential powers on 23 May and was inaugurated on 9 June.** After his election, the new president intensified contact with the leaders of the federal states, especially with the presidents of South West State and Galmudug State, since both had been close allies of former President "Farmajo". Thus, with the clear desire to build a good climate of relations with the federal states, according to the president, from his inauguration until the end of the year, he met three times with the leaders of the federal states to analyse and resolve the conflicts that had arisen between administrations, mainly in terms of financing. Hamza Abdi Barre, an MP from Jubaland, was unanimously confirmed as the new prime minister on 25 June. On 3 August, the formation of the government was announced, made up of 26 ministers, 24 state ministers and 25 deputy ministers and was ratified by Parliament. **Mohamud said that he intended to weaken al-Shabaab militarily, economically and ideologically.** In line with the president's determination to fight al-Shabaab with methods other than just military ones, the new government appointed al-Shabaab's former second-in-command, Mukhtar "Abu Mansour" Robow Ali, who defected from al-Shabaab in 2017, as the new Minister of Religious Affairs after weeks of negotiations. "Abu Mansour" had been threatened for being critical of the organisation and for advocating for peace negotiations with the Somali government. He was arrested in December 2018 when he was running for the presidency of South West State and imprisoned without trial until his appointment. Previously, on 15 June, and contrary to previous public statements, the second-in-command of al-Shabaab and head of its intelligence services, Mahad Karate, told the British media outlet Channel 4 that the group could consider negotiations with the government when the time was right.⁴¹ In an interview with *The Economist* published days earlier, President Mohamud stated his intention to push back al-Shabaab and then start peace talks.

40. UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*, S/2022/665 of 31 August 2022.

41. Jamal Osman, *Inside Al Shabaab: The extremist group trying to seize Somalia*, Channel 4, 15 June 2022.

Gender, peace and security

Women held 10 government posts (approximately 13% of the total), slightly more than in the previous government (11.7%), but well below the joint demands of local activists and the international community, which had demanded compliance with a quota of 30% female representation. They only obtained 20% of the seats in the lower house (House of the People), a drop from the 24% achieved in 2016. The number of female MPs reached 26% in the upper house (Senate), slightly increased over the 24% in 2016. The total number of female MPs in both chambers fell to 67, when they had won 80 seats in the 2016 elections. A two-year joint programme on women and peace funded by the Peacebuilding Fund and the Somalia Joint Fund and implemented by UNDP, UN Women and UNSOM remained active in capacity-building efforts and in preparing to implement the National Action Plan (NAP) on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)⁴² and in September the prime minister approved the NAP for the 2022-2026 period. In an event commemorating the 22nd anniversary of the approval of the resolution held in Mogadishu, Federal Minister for Women, Human Rights and Development Khadija Mohamed Diriye stressed her ministry's wish to work together with all other federal states and civil society organisations in implementing it and in getting all stakeholders involved. Meanwhile, UN Women supported the creation of women's networks for peace in all federal member states.

UNSOM also launched a series of consultations with women who lead civil society organisations to move the women, peace and security agenda forward. The Somali Women's Study Centre (SWSC) and the Somali Women Development Centre (SWDC) have been working together with the international organisation Saferworld to promote women's participation in political and peacebuilding processes in the states of Jubaland and South West. In this vein, SWDC Chief Executive Director Mama Zahra highlighted the need to deepen awareness of women's rights agendas in communities and grassroots organisations, involve women and young people and build women's capacities as human rights activists and women's activists and the capacities of civil society organisations and link them to national mechanisms.

Maghreb – North Africa

Libya	
Negotiating actors	Government of National Accord (GNA) / Government of National Unity (GNU), High State Council (HSC), House of Representatives (HoR), LNA/ALAF
Third parties	Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Relevant agreements	Libyan Political Agreement or Skhirat Agreement (2015), Ceasefire agreement (2020)

Summary:

After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, Libya has experienced a transition process characterized by multiple political, economic, social, institutional and security challenges and by the presence of numerous armed groups. Since 2014, the North African country has been the scene of increasing violence and political instability, which led to the formation of two major poles of power and authority. Given the developments in the country, mediation efforts led by the UN have tried to find a solution to the crisis. Negotiations have confronted several obstacles due to disputes of legitimacy, the diversity of actors involved, multiple interests at stake and the persistent climate of violence in the country, among other factors. In late 2015, the Libyan Political Agreement or the Skhirat Agreement was signed under the auspices of the UN amidst a climate of persistent divisions and scepticism due to the foreseeable problems in implementing it. In October 2017, the United Nations submitted a new plan to start the political transition and facilitate implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement. As part of the Berlin Process (which began in 2019 with the participation of a dozen countries, in addition to the UN, the Arab League, the EU and the AU), intra-Libyan negotiations were launched around three components in 2020: security issues (the responsibility of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission), political affairs (managed by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, or LPDF) and economic aspects. An International Monitoring Committee was also activated. In late 2020, a permanent ceasefire agreement was made official, and a roadmap was announced that provided for elections to be held in December 2021.

At the end of 2022, **the negotiations over the political future of Libya remained at an impasse amidst deep divisions that materialised once again in the establishment of two parallel governments.** The political deadlock continued to produce economic instability and insecurity in the country, though overall and compared to previous years, violence continued to ebb, consistently with the trend observed since the ceasefire agreement was signed between the main contending parties in October 2020.⁴³ The UN-sponsored negotiating process, which is supported by various countries, was partly shaped by disagreements over the deadlines for renewing the mandate of the UN mission in the North African country, UNSMIL, and over the designation of

42. UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia*, S/2022/665 of 31 August 2022.

43. See the summary on Libya in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

the special representative for Libya, who was not named until the last quarter of the year.

The suspension of the general elections scheduled for 24 December 2021 due to disagreements among the main actors in the country on how to conduct them cast tension and uncertainty over Libya at the start of 2022. The political divide became more acute in February when, given the failure to hold the elections, the House of Representatives (HoR) - a legislative chamber based in the eastern city of Tobruk, established in 2014 and aligned with the interests of General Khalifa Haftar-, decided to appoint former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha as acting prime minister. Bashagha appointed his own government, ratified in a contested vote amidst intimidation and threats against members of the HoR. This parallel Tobruk-based government coexisted throughout the year with the Tripoli-based government led by Abdul Hamid Mohamed Dbeibeh, the acting prime minister of the Government of National Unity elected in February 2021 by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), a body of 75 representatives from different political, social and geographical sectors of the country established as part of the UN-backed peace process. The Government of National Unity was scheduled to lead the country until the December 2021 elections, but as the vote did not take place, Dbeibah insisted that he would remain in office until it was held.

In this context of power struggles, the UN continued to use its good offices and do mediation work to promote political, economic, and security-related aspects of the negotiating process, with the support of international actors. Some of these efforts were exerted amidst escalating tension and violence, which in May and August led to clashes over Bashagha's attempts to enter Tripoli and install his parallel government in the Libyan capital. US diplomat and Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General for Libya Stephanie Williams (whose appointment as special representative was vetoed by Russia after the previous envoy, Jan Kubis, resigned in November 2021) met and maintained constant communication with Bashagha and Dbeibah, who announced road maps for the elections. Bashagha proposed elections within 14 months, while Dbeibah proposed them and a constitutional referendum for 24 June 2022, coinciding with the end of the transition period planned and approved by the LPDF in November 2020.

At the same time, the United Nations promoted dialogue between the House of Representatives and the High State Council, a Tripoli-based institution established by the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement to propose political measures and recommendations to reach a consensus on a constitutional framework for elections and thereby speed up the voting process. Representatives of both chambers held three rounds of meetings in Cairo in April, May and June. In late June,

the speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh Issa, and the president of the High State Council, Khaled al-Mishri, agreed to a high-level meeting with Williams in Geneva. During the forum meetings in Cairo, agreements had reportedly been reached on several key issues, such as the role, powers and characteristics of the future president, Parliament and government of the country, as well as decentralisation mechanisms.⁴⁴ However, **deep differences persisted over eligibility to run for president, one of the thorniest issues that led to the suspension of the December 2021 elections** due to controversies over the nomination of Haftar, Dbeibah and one of Muammar Gaddafi's sons, among other candidates. Issa and al-Misri met again in Turkey and Egypt in August and in Rabat in October. A new meeting scheduled for December in the northern Libyan city of Zintan was cancelled for "logistical reasons". In his last annual report on Libya, published in December, the UN Secretary-General noted "minimal progress" in agreeing on a path for holding elections.

The power struggle and political divisions also affected the economic and security-related negotiating tracks established by the UN-sponsored process. In the economic sphere, attempts to implement reforms and unify the Central Bank remained stagnant from May until the end of the year. In the field of security, the political crisis affected the work of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, made up of five representatives of the Government of National Accord (the predecessor of the Government of National Unity) and another five representatives of General Haftar's Libyan National Army, renamed the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (known as LNA or LAAF). In April, members of the commission linked to Haftar announced that they were pulling out and even called for confidence-building measures established under the ceasefire agreement to be overturned. The move was attributed to the Government of National Unity's problems paying the salaries of LAAF members, but it was also interpreted as an attempt to pressure the handover of power from Dbeibah to Bashagha. A workshop held in Spain in May on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, organised by the Spanish government and the Toledo International Centre for Peace with the support of UNSMIL, allowed the first contact between the members of the Commission. Meetings of the Joint Military Commission resumed at the end of October in Sirte, after the appointment of the **new UN special representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL, Abdoulaye Bathily**, and resulted in the establishment of a DDR subcommittee. UNSMIL also continued to support the commission to implement an action plan for the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces from the country during the year, as stipulated in the truce agreement. Although the ceasefire was maintained, at the end of the year there were some reports of intensive recruitment by both sides.

44. UNSC, *Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Support Mission in Libya*, S/2022/632, 19 August 2022.

Another notable development was the appointment of Senegalese diplomat Abdoulaye Bathily as the UN's highest representative in Libya in September after months of debate. After his appointment, Bathily travelled to Libya in mid-October, where he met with various political and social stakeholders. Like his predecessor, the special representative held meetings with many actors with interests in the conflict and/or involved in the negotiating process in the weeks that followed and until the end of the year. After several renewals of the UNSMIL mandate for short periods, due to disagreements since late 2021 about its scope of action and mission structure, among other issues, the UN Security Council agreed to extend the mission for one more year in late October (UNSC Resolution 2656). The international monitoring committee was also active throughout 2022. Formed as part of the UN-sponsored negotiating process, it involved the Libyan Quartet (the UN, Arab League, AU and EU) and a dozen countries. The four working groups of the committee continued to meet during the year: the working group on politics, co-led by the UN, Algeria, Germany and the Arab League; the one on security, co-led by the UN, France, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the African Union; the one on the economy, co-led by the UN, Egypt, the EU and the US; and the one on human rights and international humanitarian law, co-led by the UN, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

Gender, peace and security

Libyan women continued to demand greater involvement in the negotiations and decision-making on the country's political future amidst growing threats and hostility towards activists and women who work in the public sphere. The United Nations warned of propaganda and hate speech, which has been affecting officials of the Ministry for Women and civil society activists who demand more substantive female participation in the political process and the implementation of the international women, peace and security agenda. In meetings with senior UN officials, representatives of Libyan women's organisations emphasised the importance of reaching a 30% representation threshold in decision-making spaces. According to reports, in the last round of the forum on constitutional issues in Cairo in June, the delegations addressed this claim and both chambers agreed to support a 25% quota for women in all elections in the country. Political-electoral issues as a whole, however, remained stagnant due to disagreements about presidential candidacies. Women's participation in politics was also addressed in a meeting with Williams in March that involved delegates from political parties, including the National Charter Party, the only one headed by a woman. Bathily, meanwhile, met with some of the parliamentary candidates for the suspended elections in December 2021. As part of the efforts of

the working group on human rights and international law (on the international monitoring committee), which launched a national dialogue initiative in December 2021, Libyan women human rights defenders also presented their vision on the challenges in this area. In this area, experiences of international reconciliation and the lessons on the importance of including women were also analysed. Finally, in September, an administrative appeals court in Tripoli ratified the decision to annul an agreement reached in October 2021 between UN Women and the Libyan Ministry of Women to develop a national action plan for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.⁴⁵

Morocco – Western Sahara	
Negotiating actors	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)
Third parties	UN, Algeria and Mauritania, Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
Relevant agreements	Ceasefire agreement (1991)

Summary:

The attempts to mediate and find a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara conflict led to a cease-fire agreement in 1991. Since then, and despite the existence of a formal negotiations framework under the auspices of the UN, the Western Sahara peace process has failed. The successive proposals and the many rounds of negotiations has not lead to an agreement between the parties, all of which maintain their red lines: Morocco insists on its territorial claims and is only willing to accept a status of autonomy, whereas the POLISARIO Front claims there is a need to hold a referendum that includes the option of independence. Negotiations on Western Sahara –recognised as a territory which is yet to be decolonised- have been determined by the large asymmetry between the actors in dispute, the inability of the UN to set up a consultation on the future of this territory, and regional rivalry between Morocco and Algeria –a key support for the POLISARIO front- and by the support given to Rabat by some key international actors, such as the USA or France. This, in real terms, has meant a prevalence of the Moroccan thesis when approaching the conflict.

Attempts to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict over Western Sahara did not produce results, though unlike in previous years, the United Nations redoubled its efforts to promote dialogue in 2022 after the appointment of a new special envoy, Staffan de Mistura, in November 2021. The Swedish-Italian diplomat resumed trips to the region and meetings with various actors to restart the negotiating process, but the main contending parties held to their positions. At the same time, violence continued to be reported, though there were less hostilities compared to what was observed in 2021, after the ceasefire between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front ended in late 2020.⁴⁶ The dynamics of the conflict

45. UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations Support Mission in Libya*, S/2022/932, 9 December 2022.

46. See the summary on Morocco-Western Sahara in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

continued to be affected by worsening regional tensions between Morocco and Algeria since 2021. Also relevant in 2022 was the change in Spain's official position, as it openly aligned itself with Morocco's approaches.

After two and a half years in which the post of UN special envoy for Western Sahara remained vacant, following the resignation of former German President Horst Köhler in May 2019, the new envoy toured the region twice in 2022. Staffan de Mistura's first trip lasted from 12 to 20 January, a period during which he met with Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, in Rabat; the secretary-general of the POLISARIO Front, Brahim Ghali, in Rabouni (in the refugee camps located in southern Algeria); and the president of Mauritania and the Algerian foreign minister. De Mistura conducted a new round of meetings on the ground in the second half of the year aimed at exploring the possibilities of moving towards a political process and with the declared intent of following in the footsteps of the special envoys who preceded him in office. In July, he held meetings in Rabat and declined to visit occupied Western Sahara. Although the reasons for the cancellation of his visit to Laayoune were not initially revealed, the UN later reported that it was due to the restrictions imposed by the Moroccan authorities on any meeting with representatives of civil society and women's organisations in what would have been his first visit to the area. In early September, De Mistura went to Rabouni for new meetings with leaders of the POLISARIO Front. During his visit to the Saharawi refugee camps, the UN special envoy was in contact with women's and civil society groups, including young people, to hear about their impressions of the conflict.

In their meetings with Staffan de Mistura and throughout the year, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front repeated their stances. Rabat insisted that the starting point for the negotiations should be exclusively the Moroccan proposal of autonomy and was in favour of resuming the round table format, explored by previous Special Envoy Köhler, with the participation of Morocco, the POLISARIO Front, Algeria and Mauritania. The POLISARIO Front, reiterated its commitment to holding a referendum on self-determination for the Saharawi population. According to the UN report, various POLISARIO Front representatives hoped that the process might resume at the request of the United Nations and that confidence-building measures could have a positive impact on the ground. Algeria, the main supporter of the POLISARIO Front, was opposed to the round table format and said that it intends to present the conflict as a regional one, and not as a matter of decolonisation. Algiers stressed the need for direct negotiations without preconditions between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front and advocated revitalising the 1991 plan, which would include holding a referendum with the Saharawi people. Mauritania, meanwhile, insisted that its position is one of "positive neutrality".

The POLISARIO Front said that the reality on the ground and the lack of international attention to the issue of Western Sahara had made returning to hostilities the only option possible, which had become a reality with the abandonment in 2020 of the ceasefire agreement in force since 1991. De Mistura expressed his hope to resume the ceasefire to lower tension and to create a more conducive environment for a political process. During his visits to the region, the special envoy also said he was concerned about the intensification of regional tension between Morocco and Algeria, though both countries assured him that they had no intention of escalating militarily.

Staffan de Mistura also consulted with other international players in 2022, including countries that are members of the UN Security Council and the states that make up the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (consisting of France, Spain, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA); senior officials from the EU, Italy, Germany and Sweden; and various international representatives at the Munich Security Conference. One notable development was the change in position of Spain, which governed Western Sahara until 1975 and is still formally the administrative power of the territory, which is considered "pending decolonisation" under international law. In 2022, the Spanish government abandoned its traditional official position of "active neutrality" to give express support to Morocco's stance. On 14 March, Spanish President Pedro Sánchez sent a letter to King Mohammed VI stating that Spain considered the autonomy initiative presented by Morocco as "the most serious, credible and realistic basis for resolving the dispute". This option excludes independence to satisfy Saharawi aspirations for self-determination. The POLISARIO Front condemned the change in Spain's position, describing it as contrary to international law and said that it invalidated Spain as a mediating actor. Algeria also rejected it and called its ambassador to Madrid for consultations in March. In July, Algiers announced the suspension of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation signed with Spain in 2002. Some analysts said that although the change in Spain's position in 2022 is formally significant, it was implicitly aligned with Rabat's interests beforehand, and that in practice, Madrid and other international actors' lack of political will to press for a solution to the Western Sahara issue has promoted control of the territory by Morocco and its policy of *fait accompli*.⁴⁷

Spain's change in position helped to resolve a bilateral crisis that has existed between it and Morocco since 2021, when the leader of the POLISARIO Front was welcomed in Spain to be treated for COVID-19. This sparked a diplomatic crisis that prompted Morocco to recall its ambassador to Spain in May 2021. In what was interpreted as retaliation, an act of pressure and

47. Pamela Urrutia, "La política espanyola de fets consumats al Sàhara", *La Directa*, 28 March 2022.

the cynical use of migratory flows, Rabat also relaxed controls on border crossings at the time, which led to the arrival of more than 10,000 people in Ceuta in May 2021. As such, Spanish support became aligned with France's traditional support for Moroccan interests. In May 2022, the Dutch government also publicly expressed its support for the Moroccan autonomy plan. In the United States, President Donald Trump said he recognised Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara in December 2020. His successor, US President Joe Biden, has not officially overturned this recognition. In 2022, Morocco made its policy of making its relations with third countries conditional on their position on Western Sahara even more explicit. In a speech in August, King Mohammed VI called Western Sahara "the simplest and clearest benchmark by which Morocco measures the sincerity of friendship and the efficiency of association agreements". In this context, Morocco asked the Tunisian government for explanations for having invited the leader of the POLISARIO Front to a conference on development held in Tunisia. In September, new Kenyan President William Ruto made a controversial post on Twitter stating that his country would no longer recognise the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) proclaimed by the POLISARIO Front in 1976. Media outlets said that Ruto wanted to seal an agreement to purchase fertiliser from Morocco. Ruto's tweet, which marked a reversal in Kenyan politics and came a day after Ghali's participation in Ruto's inauguration, was later deleted from the president's account and the country reaffirmed its commitment to the UN-sponsored solution to the conflict.

In October, the UN Security Council renewed MINURSO's mandate for another year through UNSC Resolution 2654. The document emphasises the need to reach a "realistic, practicable, lasting and mutually acceptable" political solution to the issue of Western Sahara, "strongly encourages" Morocco, the POLISARIO Front, Algeria and Morocco to get involved in the process promoted by the special envoy in "a spirit of realism and commitment" and calls on the parties to resume negotiations "in good faith and without preconditions". As has been the case since 2017, the renewal failed to get unanimous support and though it was approved, Russia and Kenya abstained. In recent years, Moscow has said that the resolution does not make an explicit reference to the right of self-determination and has asked why the text alludes to the need to reach a "realistic" solution. Analyses of the text of the resolution approved in 2022 stressed that attempts had been made to give De Mistura more room for manoeuvre in his attempts to promote a political process and to respond to the different views on which actors should be considered

involved in the conflict. Thus, language was introduced highlighting the importance of "all concerned parties", expanding their positions to move towards a solution.⁴⁸

Gender, peace and security

Though the negotiating process remained at a standstill throughout the year, some events in 2022 did indicate that women and their participation in efforts to reach a political solution to the conflict were receiving greater attention. For example, the special envoy's decision not to visit Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara in July due to the restrictions imposed by Rabat was partly due to his realisation that it would not be possible for him to meet with representatives of civil society and women's organisations. The UN Secretary-General's annual report on Western Sahara explicitly states that De Mistura's trip was suspended in keeping with "United Nations principles, in particular the importance of women's equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security". According to the UN, the special envoy would continue efforts to arrange meetings with women's organisations and civil society groups from occupied Western Sahara on future visits to the region. During his visit to the Saharawi refugee camps in September, De Mistura met with civil society groups and women's organisations, which expressed their frustration at the lack of a political solution and expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in the camps, especially aggravated in recent years due to food insecurity.

Additionally, UNSC Resolution 2654, which approved a new extension of the MINURSO mandate, repeated the commitments made as part of the international Women, Peace and Security agenda. As part of the text drafting process, several countries asked to insert a more explicit commitment to women's participation. At the request of the government of Ireland, which was supported by other member countries of the Security Council such as Mexico, Norway and Kenya, the document was changed to call for "total, equal and meaningful" female participation, whereas it had previously urged "full, effective and meaningful" participation. The UN has also tried to embody its commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda through greater female participation in the MINURSO contingent. At the end of 2022, the UN mission for Western Sahara was made up of 227 people, 74 of which were women. As such, the proportion of female observers rose to 33%, the highest among field missions and above the 19% target defined in the gender parity strategy for UN missions for the 2018-2028 period.

48. Security Council Report, "Western Sahara: Vote on Resolution to Renew Mandate of MINURSO", *What's in Blue*, 26 October 2022.

Southern Africa

Mozambique	
Negotiating actors	Government, the RENAMO armed group
Third parties	AU, National mediation team, Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, United Kingdom, EU, Community of Sant'Egidio (Vatican), Catholic Church, UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Relevant agreements	Rome peace agreement (1992), Maputo Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2019)

Summary:

The coup d'état against the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 and the guerrilla warfare carried out by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) Marxist-Leninist insurgency took Mozambique to Independence in 1975. Since then, the country has been affected by a civil war between the FRELIMO Government and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) armed group, supported by the white minorities that governed in the former Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) and South Africa during the apartheid, in the context of the Cold War. In 1992 the parties reached a peace agreement that was considered an example of reconciliation. This was mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio and ended a 16-year long war that caused one million fatalities and five million displaced persons, and gave way to a period of political stability and economic development, albeit high levels of inequality. In parallel, growing accusations of fraud and irregularities in the electoral processes that followed, some of which were confirmed by international observers, have gone hand-in-hand with a growing authoritarianism and repression of the opposition, and FRELIMO taking over the State (and the communication media and economy). In 2013, RENAMO conditioned its continuation in political life to a series of changes, mainly the reform of the national electoral commission and an equitable distribution of the country's wealth. It threatened to remove its signature from the 1992 peace agreement, and indeed this did happen, throwing the country back into armed fighting in 2013 and the subsequent launch of a new agreed peace negotiation process in August 2014. RENAMO's declaration of a truce in 2016 and the progress made in the peace process during 2017 caused a notable drop in armed actions, achieving the signing of a new peace agreement in August 2019, though sporadic clashes persist with the dissident faction of RENAMO calling itself the RENAMO Military Junta.

Progress was made during the year in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former RENAMO combatants provided for in the 2019 peace agreement. In August, Mirko Manzoni, the UN special envoy for Mozambique and president of the International Contact Group for the Mozambique peace talks, confirmed the closure of a new RENAMO military base in the district of Montepuez, in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. Manzoni reported that with its closure, 13 of the 17 RENAMO bases had been closed and the remaining ones were expected to close by the end of the year. He also congratulated the parties on the progress made to date in the DDR process for ex-combatants and reported that 77% of the beneficiaries had been reintegrated out of the 5,221 initially expected. In October, President Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leaders

reaffirmed their commitment to complete the DDR programme by the end of the year, announcing that another 800 former fighters began the demobilisation process on 12 October in the central province of Zambezia. However, the demobilisation process could not be completed at the end of the year since on 19 December the last group of approximately 350 ex-combatants refused to demobilise in Gorongosa district, in the province of Sofala, accusing the government of delaying the payment of pensions and the integration of eligible combatants into the security forces. About 4,700 ex-combatants, representing around 90% of the estimated total, had demobilised by the end of the year. Meanwhile, in later March, the Mozambican Defence and Security Forces (FDS) announced that the self-proclaimed RENAMO Military Junta (the RENAMO armed dissident splinter group that refused to sign the 2019 peace agreement, but which was in negotiations with the government to sign it) had chosen a new leader to succeed its founder, Mariano Nhongo, who was killed in combat in October 2021 in Sofala. However, Mozambican Defence Minister Cristóvão Chume denied the reports and said that the government had no information that the group was still operating. RENAMO also disputed the news and accused the FDS of promoting false information about the resurgence of the Military Junta to justify the persecution of RENAMO members under the pretext that they collaborate with the Military Junta.

West Africa

Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)	
Negotiating actors	Government, political-military secessionist movement formed by the opposition coalition Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, including IG Sako, AIPC, APLM, FSCW, MoRISC, SCARM, SCAPO, SCNC, RoA, RoAN, civil society actors and independent individuals), and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC, including IG Sisiku)
Third parties	Church, civil society organisations, Switzerland/Swiss Contact Group, Friends of the Swiss Contact Group (EU, USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany, UK), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, USIP, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), Vatican, Canada
Relevant agreements	Buea Declaration (1993, AAC1), ACC2 Declaration (1994), National Dialogue (30th September-4th October, 2019)

Summary:

After Germany's defeat in the First World War, Cameroon came under the mandate of the League of Nations and was divided between French Cameroon and British Cameroon. In 1961, the two territories that made up British Cameroon held a referendum limiting their self-determination to union with the already independent Republic of Cameroon (formerly French Cameroon) or union with Nigeria. The southern part of British Cameroon (a region currently corresponding to

the provinces of North West and South West) decided to join the Republic of Cameroon, whereas the north preferred to join Nigeria. A poorly conducted re-unification in the 1960s based on centralisation and assimilation has led the English-speaking minority of what was once southern British Cameroon (20% of the country's population) to feel politically and economically marginalised by state institutions, which are controlled by the French-speaking majority. These movements demand a return to the federal model that existed between 1961 and 1972. In 1972, a referendum was held in which a new Constitution was adopted that replaced the federal state with a unitary one and granted more powers to the president, so the southern part of British Cameroon (known as Southern Cameroons) lost its autonomy and was transformed into the two current provinces of North West and South West. In 1993, representatives of the English-speaking groups held the All Anglophone Conference (AAC1) in Buea, which resulted in the Buea Declaration (which demanded constitutional amendments to restore the federation of 1961). The AAC2 was held in Bamenda in 1994, which concluded that if the federal state were not restored, Southern Cameroons would declare independence. Begun over sectoral issues in 2016, the conflict worsened in late 2017, with the declaration of independence on 1 October 2017 and the subsequent government repression to quell the secessionist movement, there was an escalation of insurgent activity. Government repression of the demands of a majority of the population of the region, which demanded a new federal political status without ruling out secession, has led to an escalation of violence and the demand for negotiated solutions to the conflict. None of the initiatives to date (the Anglophone AAC3 general conference to be held since 2018, the Swiss track with HD facilitation started in 2019 and the National Dialogue promoted by Paul Biya's government in 2019) has made substantive progress. In 2022, Cameroon certified the completion of the Swiss track.

Although the government of Cameroon terminated the mediation effort jointly conducted since 2019 by the Swiss organisation Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) and the Swiss government during the year, **in October, there were meetings in Canada between representatives of the Cameroonian government and various English-speaking separatist groups as part of a new initiative to promote a peace process.** In addition, various meetings took place between the different Anglophone political-military movements during the year to try to agree on a common position. Cameroonian civil society also took action and made appeals in favour of peace during the year, especially the demonstrations of thousands of people, most of them women, between 30 September and 4 October.

In late 2021, it emerged that the Swiss government and the Swiss organisation HD had tried to relaunch the mediation initiatives begun in 2019, though they remained at a standstill during 2022 and in September the Cameroonian government publicly revealed that it had third-party mediation to resolve the conflict

in the English-speaking regions for good.⁴⁹ After a meeting held on 13 September between the coalition of separatist groups Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, which includes political-military movements and civil society organisations) and Swiss special envoy Ambassador Gunther Bachler, the ACT revealed that Cameroonian President Paul Biya reportedly informed Swiss President Ignazio Cassis in September that a military solution was on the table and that Swiss mediation efforts were being rejected. In a meeting with ACT and USIP representatives in March 2022, the Swiss mediation team reportedly demanded that the government of Cameroon clarify its mandate. Yaoundé rejected the Swiss initiative and asked Switzerland to support the negotiating process promoted by Cameroon, the National Dialogue (held between 30 September and 4 October 2019), which the separatist coalition considered a farce and the Cameroonian government regarded as the only valid process. The position of the international community, led by Switzerland, is to get the Cameroonian government to commit to dialogue without preconditions to end the violence. In July, French President Emmanuel Macron visited the country, met with Paul Biya and told him that a decentralisation process and greater dialogue could resolve the conflict in the English-speaking regions. On 4 August, the Cameroonian government convened the follow-up committee of the National Dialogue in Yaoundé. However, alongside Switzerland's withdrawal from mediation, representatives of the government and various Anglophone separatist groups met in Toronto (Canada) between 10 and 14 October as part of a new initiative to relaunch peace negotiations between the parties. The Canadian federal system may have been taken as an example by the participants. They met under strict security and confidentiality to prevent possible leaks that could affect peacebuilding efforts.⁵⁰

The United Nations tried to promote meetings with the separatist movement, as highlighted in the UN Secretary-General's report in December.⁵¹ On 2 June, the UN Secretary-General's former special representative for Central Africa, François Louncény Fall, met in Yaoundé with Cameroonian President Paul Biya and updated him on the progress made in his efforts to foster dialogue between the government of Cameroon and the separatist movement in the English-speaking regions. He encouraged the government to build on the momentum to resolve the crisis peacefully and promised continued United Nations support in that regard. There were also changes in the Anglophone political leadership during the year. Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, the historical leader of the pro-independence political Interim Government (IG), who is serving a life sentence in prison, was replaced as president by Iya Marianta Njomia on 5 March, who was in turn replaced by former IG spokesman Chris Anu in

49. David Atangana, *Anglophone Crisis: Government finally rejects Swiss mediation, hangs on military option*, *Mimi Mefo Info*, 15 September 2022.

50. Cameroon Intelligence Report, *Southern Cameroons Crisis: Talks in Canada end in key agreement*, 17 October 2022; International Crisis Group, *Crisiswatch October Cameroon*, October 2022.

51. UN Security Council, *The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa*, S/2022/896 of 1 December 2022.

September. Following the UN Secretary-General's report in December and a communiqué from the government of Cameroon to the UN Security Council that trumpeted the results of the National Dialogue and rejected the Swiss route, the IG Sisiku (in December led by Chris Anu, hereinafter IG-Chris Anu) stressed the need to support third-party mediation, as had been the position of the international community, and regretted that the Swiss route had been ruled out by the government of Cameroon, which holds that the main agreement is the one reached through the National Dialogue of 2019, while the IG-Chris Anu described it as a smokescreen.⁵²

English-speaking military-political movements also intensified efforts to coordinate objectives. Many rounds of meetings were held between different groups. From 11 to 13 March, delegates from six groups met in Germany to discuss refugees, internal displacement and human rights violations. Other groups held meetings to promote unity within the coalition. Among these, Ayabo Cho of AGovC (armed wing: Ambazonia Defence Forces) and Ebenezer Akwanga of the African People's Liberation Movement (armed wing: South Cameroons Defence Forces, SOCADEF) met in Ireland on 11 and 12 February, where they discussed a common approach to armed activities and political negotiations. In February, the AGovC met with representatives of the African People's Liberation Movement (APLM, a member of the ACT coalition) and announced an agreement to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict and seek independence. The IG faction based in Maryland (USA), headed by Samuel Sako tried to relieve its leader in February, but he refused to resign.⁵³

Gender, peace and security

Cameroonian civil society, and especially women's civil society organisations, continued to exert effort in promoting peacebuilding initiatives, not only in the two English-speaking regions of Cameroon, but also in other parts of the country. After the success of the National Women's Convention for Peace that took place in Yaoundé in 2021 and brought together a thousand women, it should be noted that, like every year, as part of the International Day for Peace (21 September), women's organisations demonstrated in various cities of the country, mainly in Yaoundé, Bamenda, Buea and Maroua, protesting their underrepresentation in peacebuilding initiatives and efforts.⁵⁴ One of these activists was Muma Bih Yvonne, a co-founder of the Cameroon Women's Peace Movement, who noted that women accounted for less than 15% of the attendees of the government-sponsored National Dialogue. Her organisation recommended the continuation of the

dialogue to promote negotiated solutions to the conflict in the southwest of the country, where the United Nations has estimated that at least 3,500 people have died and over half a million people have been displaced since it began in 2017. Various women's organisations issued a statement known as the Women's Negotiations for Peace in Cameroon on 19 September. One of its organisers, Sonkeng Rachel, called for a ceasefire before the peace negotiations are formalised. The initiative was supported by Germany's Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Meanwhile, the organisation Women for Permanent Peace and Justice (WPPJ, a member of ACT) regretted the end of Switzerland's mediation efforts. During the four days to commemorate the third anniversary of the government-backed National Dialogue (between 30 September and 4 October 2019), thousands of women staged demonstrations throughout the country, calling for peace in the English-speaking regions.⁵⁵

Mali	
Negotiating actors	Government, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) –MNLA, MAA and HCUA–, Platform –GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA
Third parties	Algeria, France, ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Carter Center, civil society organisations, Mauritania
Relevant agreements	Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2015)

Summary:

The armed conflict affecting Mali since early 2012 resulted in an institutional crisis –which materialized in a military coup– and Tuareg and jihadist groups progressively taking control of the northern part of the country. Since the conflict started, several international actors, including ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, have promoted initiatives leading to re-establishing the constitutional order and recovering Mali's territorial integrity. In parallel with the militarist approaches to face the crisis, exploratory contacts were held with some armed groups (MNLA and Ansar Dine) to find a negotiated way out of the crisis. Despite the announcement of a commitment to the cessation of hostilities from these insurgent groups, at the start of 2013 an offensive by Ansar Dine precipitated an international military intervention led by France. In May 2014 a new negotiation process was started, led by Algeria, where the Mali Government negotiated on both sides with the two coalitions created by the armed groups: the Coordination of Azawad Movements (groups favourable to a federalist/secessionist formula), and the Platform (groups supporting the Government). In July 2015 the signing of a peace agreement was made possible between the Government, the CMA and the Platform, in Algiers. The jihadist groups were left aside in the negotiation table, which kept alive the hostilities from these groups in the new context of implementing the clauses present in the peace agreement.

52. Interim Government Official Site, *Response to LRC Letter to the UN*, Federal Republic of Ambazonia, 9 December 2022.

53. International Crisis Group, *Crisiswatch February-March Cameroon*, February and March 2022.

54. Moki Edwin Kindzeka, *Cameroonian Women Say They Are Underrepresented in Peace Talks*, VOA, 20 September 2022.

55. Moki Edwin Kindzeka, *Cameroon: Marchers Call for Peace in Cameroon, but Warring Sides At Odds On Talks*, VOA, 3 October 2022.

Little progress was made during the year in the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, as the climate in the country remained characterised by political instability and dynamics of violence perpetrated by actors that had not signed the agreement. In June, the Carter Center, an independent observer of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali resulting from the 2015 Algiers Process, published its first follow-up report of the year on the progress of its implementation.⁵⁶ Covering the period from September 2021 to June 2022, the report described unprecedented obstacles in implementing the agreement, noting that dialogue between its signatory parties (the Malian government, the Coordination of Azawad Movements and the Platform) has become increasingly difficult since October 2021 and little headway has been made. This impasse coincided with a rise in instability in the country, produced by tension between the transitional government and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the withdrawal of stabilisation support (troops and funds) by some of Mali's traditional international partners, mainly France; and a rise in violence in the centre and north of the country. The report stated that the impasse was also due to a controversy over the review of some clauses of the agreement, as well as the deterioration of relations between the irregular movements that signed it and the new transitional authorities. On a positive note, the Carter Center pointed out that the Malian parties continued to reiterate their commitment to the agreement.

The political crisis in Mali and the disagreements between the parties prevented progress in the implementation of the clauses of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement

In its second annual report, which covered the period between July and October 2022, the Carter Center analysed the progress made in the clauses of Title V of the agreement, dedicated to “Reconciliation, Justice and Humanitarian Affairs”, due to the fact that the Commission for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (CVJR) would end its mission in December 2022.⁵⁷ The Carter Center welcomed the fact that the CVJR's work on transitional justice has been relatively successful. For instance, it has taken important steps in favour of the victims and reparations, organised public hearings and developed a material and symbolic reparation policy by proposing the creation of two bodies to promote transitional justice activity: the Reparations Agency and the Centre for the Promotion of Memory, Unity and Peace. However, different critical aspects of transitional justice have not been addressed with the same attention, such as the support provided to victims filing appeals in criminal courts, nor has it been established how the CVJR's mission will be monitored

after its completion, which is worrisome in a context in which serious human rights violations persist. The report also asserted that too little attention was being paid to the provision of Title V regarding reforms of the justice system and support for humanitarian actions.

Meanwhile, progress made during the year included the Malian government's launch of the National Strategy for Reconciliation and Social Cohesion and the headway made in strengthening the status of the traditional authorities, including the promulgation of a national day for traditional authorities. Progress was also made on defence and security issues after the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) denounced the authorities' abandonment of the peace agreement in mid-July, which led Bamako to convene a meeting between 1 and 5 August with the leaders of the armed

groups that had signed the agreement to move forward with its implementation. During the meeting, the parties reached an agreement on the reintegration of 26,000 former combatants under the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme, either into the security forces or civilian life over the next two years. They also agreed to launch the Commission for the Drafting of the New Constitution (CRNC), which involved the parties that signed the peace agreement so progress could be made on the issue. Earlier, on

3 July, ECOWAS had held an extraordinary summit in which it agreed to lift some sanctions on Mali after the transitional authorities presented a new transitional timetable. On 11 October, the CRNC presented a draft of the new Constitution that, if approved, will pave the way for the implementation of other provisions of the peace agreement, since it enshrines the importance of the cultural diversity of the country and the role of traditional authorities in contributing to social cohesion. The Agreement Monitoring Commission (CSA), which had been inactive since October 2021, resumed regular meetings, starting with a ministerial session on 2 September, and the meetings of the subcommittees resumed in October.

This progress was overshadowed on 22 December when a coalition of armed groups in northern Mali known as the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) announced that it was suspending its participation in the mechanisms to monitor and implement the peace agreement.⁵⁸ The coalition, in which almost all the Malian armed groups that signed the peace agreement are involved, including the CMA, complained about the little progress made in implementing the agreement due to what it described

56. The Carter Center, *Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Resulting from the Algiers Process*, June 2022.

57. The Carter Center, *Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Resulting from the Algiers Process*, November 2022.

as the transitional military authorities' "lack of political will". They added that they would only return to the negotiating table if the talks were resumed in a neutral country and under international mediation led by Algeria. The CSP-PSD denounced the transitional authorities' "inertia" in the face of security challenges and the serious deterioration of security during the year in the Ménaka and Gao regions (north of the country) due to the violence perpetrated by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) against civilians, the Malian Armed Forces and the movements that signed the peace agreement, as well as clashes with the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).⁵⁹

Gender, peace and security

In line with the implementation of the peace agreement, no significant progress was observed in terms of gender, peace and security. Neither of the two semi-annual reports issued by the Carter Center in 2022 included any mention of progress on the matter. Nor was gender, peace and security taken into account in the seminar organised by the Carter Center between 16 and 17 February in Bamako that brought together the key parties in the peace agreement implementation process (more than 90 people), including representatives of the parties that signed the peace agreement, the bodies of the implementation process, international mediation and the interested ministries, where observations and recommendations on the implementation of the agreement were addressed.⁶⁰ However, 15 new women were incorporated into the CFS subcommittees, which the Carter Center highlighted as a positive sign for implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. Regarding the programme for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants provided for in the peace agreement, the Malian government agreed with the World Bank to extend the deadline for financing the socioeconomic reintegration of 900 women affiliated with armed groups until 30 June 2023. In terms of governance, on 28 October, the transitional president appointed 26 new members of the National Transitional Council, 10 of which were women, bringing their total number to 42 (28%).

A coalition of armed groups in northern Mali known as the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) announced that it was suspending its participation in the monitoring and implementation mechanisms of the peace agreement

Senegal (Casamance)

Negotiating actors	Government, factions of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)
Third parties	ECOWAS, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde
Relevant agreements	General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the MFDC (Ziguinchor Agreement) (2004)

Summary:

Casamance is a southern Senegalese region geographically separated from the rest of the country by the Gambia River, which is surrounded by the nation of The Gambia. The Casamance region has a distinct culture and language because it was under Portuguese administration during part of the colonial period. Since 1982, the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) has demanded its independence. Clashes between the Senegalese Armed Forces and the MFDC became most violent during the 1990s, concluding in 2004 with the signing of peace agreements by the MFDC's top leader, Diamacoune Senghor. Following Senghor's death in January 2007, the MFDC split into three main armed factions, led by Salif Sadio, César Badiate and Mamadou Niantang Diatta, respectively. Since then, low-intensity fighting has continued between the different factions that do not recognise the agreement reached with the government and are vying to increase their control over the territory. In the meantime, efforts are under way to conduct peace negotiations with these actors to put an end to the violence.

The government of Senegal and a faction of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) signed a peace agreement. On 4 August, the government of Senegal, represented by Admiral Papa Farba Sarr, and César Atoute Badiate, the leader of a faction of the MFDC calling itself the Provisional Committee of the Political and Combatant Wings of the MFDC, signed a peace agreement in Guinea-Bissau after two days of low-key talks under the auspices of Umaro Sissoco Embaló, the president of Guinea-Bissau and current chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The agreement, which was kept confidential, described the road map for surrendering weapons and reaffirmed the parties' commitment to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. Senegalese President Macky Sall welcomed the agreement and ratified his commitment to establish a lasting peace in Casamance. Robert Sagna, a mediator and former Senegalese cabinet minister, also stressed that the agreement was an important step towards final peace and asked the other factions of the MFDC to sign it.

58. Al Jazeera, *Armed Groups in Northern Mali Pull Out of Algiers Peace Talks*, 23 December 2022.

59. See the summary on Mali in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

60. The Carter Center, *Report on the seminar on the independent observer's observations and recommendations*, 16-17 February 2022.

The agreement came after seven negotiating meetings in Senegal, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau over the last three years facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD). As part of these negotiations, in April 2021 the parties released a joint declaration after a meeting held in Praia, Cape Verde, in which they agreed on the lines to guide the negotiations: 1) solemn proclamation of the will of the two parties (State of Senegal and Provisional Committee) to resolve the conflict in Casamance through dialogue; 2) full confidentiality in the negotiations, except for mutually agreed general communication; 3) establishment of mutual trust through respect and courtesy, without aggressive language during exchanges, negotiations and other forms of contact between the two parties; and 4) work to promote constructive conduct, avoiding any criminal activity on the ground that could create tension.⁶¹ Later, in November 2021, another declaration of intent was produced to resolve the conflict between the government of Senegal and the southern fronts of the MFDC.

The peace agreement came after a year marked by various incidents in the region. The conflict in the Casamance region had largely simmered until Senegal launched a major offensive to drive out the rebels in 2021. In January 2022, there was a clash between the MFDC and Senegalese soldiers operating as part of the ECOWAS mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) in which four soldiers were killed and seven captured. The MFDC subsequently handed over the prisoners to officials of the Gambian government and ECOWAS. Later, on 13 March, the Senegalese Army launched a military operation aimed at dismantling the bases of Salif Sadio's MFDC faction near the border with The Gambia, which displaced 6,000 civilians towards The Gambia. On 13 June, César Atoute Badiate and two other men were sentenced to life in prison in absentia for murder and armed rebellion for a massacre that claimed 14 lives in January 2018 in a protected forest near Ziguinchor, though the MFDC denied its participation.

61. See: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2380>