# Introduction

**Peace Talks in Focus 2022. Report on Trends and Scenarios** is a yearbook that analyses the peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world in 2022. The examination of the evolution and the dynamics of these negotiations at a global level offers a global view of the peace processes, identifying trends and facilitating a comparative analysis among the different scenarios. One of the main aims of this report is to provide information and analysis for those actors who take part in the peaceful resolution of conflicts at different levels, including those parties in dispute, mediators and civil society, among others. The yearbook also seeks to reveal the different formulas of dialogue and negotiation that are aimed at reversing the dynamics of violence and that aim to channel conflicts through political means in numerous contexts. As such, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts that are aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

With regard to **methodology**, this report draws mainly from on qualitative analysis of studies and information from numerous sources –the United Nations, international organizations, research centres, the media, NGOs, and others–, in addition to experience gained in field research. The report also incorporates the gender perspective in the study and analysis of peace processes in a cross-cutting manner.

The analysis is based on a **definition** that understands **peace processes** as comprising all those political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at resolving conflicts and transforming their root causes by means of peaceful methods, especially through peace negotiations. **Peace negotiations** are considered as the processes of dialogue between at least two conflicting parties in a conflict, in which the parties address their differences in a concerted framework in order to end the violence and encounter a satisfactory solution to their demands. Other actors not directly involved in the conflict may also participate. Peace negotiations are usually preceded by preliminary or exploratory phases that define the format, place, conditions and guarantees, of the future negotiations, among other elements. Peace negotiations may or may not be facilitated by **third parties**. The third parties intervene in the dispute so as to contribute to the dialogue between the actors involved and to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict. Other actors not directly involved in the dispute may also participate in peace negotiations. Peace negotiations may result in comprehensive or partial **agreements**, agreements related to the procedure or process, and agreements linked to the causes or consequences of the conflict. Elements of the different type of agreements may be combined in the same agreement.

With respect to its **structure**, the publication is organized into six chapters. The first presents a summary of those processes and negotiations that took place in 2022, and offers an overview of the main trends at a global level. The following five chapters detail the analysis of peace processes and negotiations from a geographic perspective. Each addresses the main trends of peace negotiations in Africa, America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, respectively, and describes the development and dynamics of each of the cases present in the regions, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda.

# 1. Negotiations in 2022: global overview and main trends

- Thirty-nine peace processes and negotiations were identified in the world in 2022. The largest number of cases was reported in Africa (15), followed by Asia (10), Europe (six), the Middle East (four) and the Americas (four).
- There were ongoing negotiations in 19 of the 33 active armed conflicts during 2022, accounting for 58% of the cases, while 14 conflicts were not accompanied by negotiating processes between the parties.
- Ninety per cent of the negotiating processes enjoyed third-party participation and the UN was involved in 60% of the processes that included at least one third party.
- The development of many peace negotiations in 2022 was affected by the global consequences of the international crisis set off by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February.
- Specific mechanisms for female participation were not designed in most peace negotiations and gender issues and the recognition of the rights of women and the LGTBIQA+ population was left out of most of the negotiating agendas.

During 2022, a total of 39 peace processes and negotiations were identified on a worldwide level. The analysis of the different contexts reveals a wide variety of realities and dynamics, a result of the diverse nature of the armed conflicts[1] and socio-political crises[2] that the negotiations are linked to. Without losing sight of the need to consider the specific characteristics of each case, it is possible to draw several conclusions and offer reflections on the general panorama of peace processes and negotiations, as well as to identify some trends. Several conclusions are presented below regarding the geographical distribution of the negotiations, those actors involved in the negotiation processes, the third parties who participated, the main and recurrent issues in the negotiation agendas, the general development of the processes, inclusiveness and the gender dimension in these peace negotiations.

Table 1.1. **Summary of peace processes and negotiations in 2022**

| Peace processes and negotiations | Negotiating actors | Third parties |
|---|---|---|
| **AFRICA** | | |
| **Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)** | Government, political-military secessionist movement formed by the opposition coalition Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, including IG Sako, AIPC, APLM, FSCW, MoRISC, SCARM, SCAPO, SCNC, RoA, RoAN, civil society actors and independent individuals), and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC, including IG Sisiku) | Church, civil society organisations, Switzerland/Swiss Contact Group, Friends of the Swiss Contact Group (EU, USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany, UK), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, USIP, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), Vatican, Canada |
| **CAR** | Government, armed groups belonging to the former Séléka coalition, anti-balaka militias | The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant'Egidio, ACCORD, OIC, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, China, Russia, Sudan |
| **Chad** | Transitional Military Council, 52 armed groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) | Qatar, AU, UN |

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1. The School of the Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau, ECP) defines armed conflict An armed conflict is any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible in which the continuous and organised use of violence a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. wounded or displaced population, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services) and aims to achieve objectives that are different than those of common delinquency and are normally linked to a) demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues; b) the opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of the government, which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power; or c) control over the resources or the territory.
2. A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by different actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control of resources or territory.

| Peace processes and negotiations | Negotiating actors | Third parties |
|---|---|---|
| **AFRICA** | | |
| **DRC** | Government of DRC, government of Rwanda, armed group M23, eastern armed groups, political opposition and civil society | Congolese Episcopal Conference (CENCO), Church of Christ in the Congo, Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue on the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), AU, EU, UN, OIF and USA |
| **Eritrea – Ethiopia** | Government of Eritrea and Government of Ethiopia | United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, USA |
| **Ethiopia (Tigray)** | Federal Government, political and military authorities of the Ethiopian region of Tigray (Tigray People's Liberation Front) | AU, USA, IGAD |
| **Libya** | Government of National Accord (GNA) / Government of National Unity (GNU), High State Council (HSC), House of Representatives (HoR), LNA/ALAF | Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue |
| **Mali** | Government, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), MNLA, MAA and HCUA, Platform, GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA | Algeria, France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Carter Center, civil society organisations, Mauritania |
| **Morocco – Western Sahara** | Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front) | UN, Algeria and Mauritania, Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia) |
| **Mozambique** | Government, RENAMO | National mediation team, Community of Sant'Egidio, Catholic Church, UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC), AU, EU, Botswana, South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, United Kingdom |
| **Senegal (Casamance)** | Government, factions of the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) | ECOWAS, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde |
| **Somalia** | Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political military movement Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a, clan and sub-clan leaders, Somaliland | UN, IGAD, Turkey, among others |
| **South Sudan** | Government (SPLM), SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others) and SSOMA, faction led by Paul Malong and Pagan Amum (comprising SSUF/A and Real-SPLM) and faction led by Thomas Cirillo (consisting of the SSNDA coalition, including NAS, SSNMC, NDM/PF and UDRA) | "IGAD Plus": the IGAD, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda; AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Community of Sant'Egidio |
| **Sudan** | Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions | African Union High Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), Troika (EEUU, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS |
| **Sudan – South Sudan** | Government of Sudan and government of South Sudan | IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU |
| **AMERICA** | | |
| **Colombia (ELN)** | Government, ELN | Guarantor countries (Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile) United Nations Verification Mission, Catholic Church, supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain) |
| **Colombia (FARC)** | Government, Comunes | UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute) |
| **Haiti** | Government, social and political opposition | Core Group (UN, OAS, EU and Germany, France, Brazil, Canada, Spain and US Governments), "Mediation Committee" (made up of three representatives of religious, academic and business organisations) |
| **Venezuela** | Government, social and political opposition | Norway, Russia, Netherlands, International Contact Group |
| **ASIA** | | |
| **Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep. of** | North Korea, South Korea | -- |
| Korea, DPR – USA | North Korea, USA | -- |
| **India (Assam)** | Government, ULFA-PTF, ULFA-I; AANLA, AANLA (FG), BCF, BCF (BT), STF, ACMA, ACMA (FG) and APA | -- |
| **India (Nagaland)** | Indian government, NSCN-IM, NNPG: GPRN/NSCN (Kitovi Zhimomi), NNC, FGN, NSCN(R), NPGN (Non-Accord) and NNC/GDRN/NA, ZUF | -- |

| Peace processes and negotiations | Negotiating actors | Third parties |
|---|---|---|
| **ASIA** | | |
| **Myanmar** | Government; armed groups that have signed the ceasefire agreement (NCA): DKBA, RCSS/SSA-South, CNF, KNU, KNLAPC, ALP, PNLO, ABSDF, NMSP and LDU; armed groups that have not signed the NCA: UWSP, NDAA, SSPP/SSA-N, KNPP, NSCN-K, KIA, AA, TNLA and MNDAA | China, ASEAN |
| **Pakistan** | Government, TTP | Afghanistan |
| **Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)** | Government, Autonomous Bougainville Government | United Nations |
| **Philippines (MILF)** | Government, MILF, Interim Government of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in- Muslim Mindanao | Malaysia, Third Party Monitoring Team, International Monitoring Team, Independent Decommissioning Body |
| **Philippines (NDF)** | Government, NDF (umbrella organisation of various communist organisations, including the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is the political arm of the NPA) | Norway |
| **Thailand (south)** | Government, BRN | Malaysia |
| **EUROPE** | | |
| **Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)** | Armenia, Azerbaijan | Russia, EU, USA, OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, France and the USA; the remaining permanent members are Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey), Turkey[3] |
| **Cyprus** | Republic of Cyprus, self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus | UN, EU (observer at the Geneva International Conference); Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom (guarantor countries) |
| **Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)** | Government of Georgia, representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, government of Russia[4] | OSCE, EU and UN; USA, Russia[5] |
| **Moldova (Transdniestria)** | Moldova, self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria | OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, USA and EU |
| **Serbia – Kosovo** | Serbia, Kosovo | EU, UN, USA, Germany, France |
| **Russia – Ukraine[6]** | Russia, Ukraine | Turkey, UN, Israel, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, IAEA, OSCE, Germany, France[7] |
| **MIDDLE EAST** | | |
| **Iran (nuclear programme)** | Iran, EEUU, P4+1 (France, United Kingdom, Russia and China plus Germany) | EU, UN |
| **Palestine** | Hamas, Fatah | Algeria |
| **Syria** | Government, political and armed opposition groups | UN, EU, Russia, Turkey, Iran, in addition to Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and ICRC (observers in the Astana process) |
| **Yemen** | Government, Houthis / Ansar Allah, Saudi Arabia | UN, Oman, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) |

The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.
-- There are no third parties or no public proof of their existence.

3. Turkey's status as a third party may be subject to dispute. It is included in this table due to the establishment by Russia and Turkey of a peacekeeping centre for monitoring the 2020 ceasefire. The establishment of the centre was ratified in a Memorandum between Russia and Turkey.
4. Russia's status in the Georgian peace process is subject to different interpretations. Georgia considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.
5. Ibid.
6. The case of Russia-Ukraine is included in this table because Russia and Ukraine held political-military negotiations for several months in 2022. Even though the parties considered the negotiations to have reached a dead end between April and May, talks remained active in other areas, such as humanitarian issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure.
7. This table includes actors that have been involved as third parties in different spheres in 2022 both before the Russian invasion and in the phase following the invasion.

Regarding the geographical distribution of the peace processes and negotiations in 2022, most of the cases analyzed were concentrated in Africa, which hosted 15, equivalent to 39% of the total. Asia was the region with the second-highest number of cases, with a total of 10, representing 26% of the negotiations in 2022. The rest of the negotiations were distributed between Europe, with six (15%), the Middle East, with four (10%) and the Americas, with four (10%).

Slightly more peace processes and negotiations were analysed worldwide than in 2021, when there were 37. However, the number did not reach as high as in previous years, since there were 40 in 2020, 50 in 2019 and 49 in 2018. The largest increase occurred in Africa, which went from 12 to 15 cases due to three new ones: Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray) and Senegal (Casamance). There were also more negotiations in the Americas, with the activation of the dialogue in Haiti. Although the same number of cases was observed in Asia in 2021, the talks in Afghanistan broke down with the rise of the Taliban

*Most of the negotiations in 2022 took place in Africa (39%), followed by Asia (26%), Europe (15%), the Middle East (10%) and the Americas (10%)*

regime in 2021, but a new negotiating process began in Pakistan in 2022, though it broke down by the end of the year. In Europe, Russia's invasion of Ukraine spilled over and amplified the previous conflict in eastern Ukraine and scuttled the previous negotiating process. The case of Russia-Ukraine is included in the yearbook because both countries held political and military negotiations for several months in 2022. Even though the parties considered the negotiations to have reached a dead end between April and May, talks remained active in other areas, such as humanitarian issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure. In Europe, there was one less case than in 2021, the tenth anniversary of the definitive cessation of ETA's armed activity in the Basque Country. Finally, there was one case less than the previous year in the Middle East. The negotiations between Israel and Palestine were not counted given their persistent stalemate for over a decade and the demise of the two-state formula due to Israel's persistent policies of occupation, annexation and apartheid.

Table 1.2. **Armed conflicts and peace processes in 2022**

| Armed conflicts with peace negotiations (19) | Armed conflicts without peace negotiations (14) |
|---|---|
| **AFRICA (10)** | **AFRICA (6)** |
| Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West) (2018) | Burundi (2015) |
| Ethiopia (Tigray) (2020) | Ethiopia (Oromia) (2022) |
| Libya (2011) | Mozambique (North) (2019) |
| Mali (2012) | Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) (2011) |
| CAR (2006) | Western Sahel Region (2018) |
| DRC (east) (1998) | DRC (east – ADF) (2014) |
| Somalia (1988) | **ASIA (4)** |
| Sudan (Darfur) (2003) | Afghanistan (2001) |
| Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) (2011) | India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989) |
| South Sudan (2009) | India (CPI-M) (1967) |
| **AMERICA (1)** | Pakistan (Balochistan) (2005) |
| Colombia (1964) | **EUROPE (1)** |
| **ASIA (5)** | Turkey (southeast) (1984) |
| Philippines (NPA) (1969) | **MIDDLE EAST (3)** |
| Philippines (Mindanao) (1991) | Egypt (Sinai) (2014) |
| Myanmar (1948) | Iraq (2003) |
| Pakistan (2001) | Israel – Palestine (2000) |
| Thailand (south) (2004) | |
| **EUROPE (1)** | |
| Russia – Ukraine (2022)[8] | |
| **MIDDLE EAST (2)** | |
| Syria (2011) | |
| Yemen (2004) | |

8. The case of Russia-Ukraine is included in this table because Russia and Ukraine held political-military negotiations for several months in 2022. Even though the parties considered the negotiations to have reached a dead end between April and May, talks remained active in other areas, such as humanitarian issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure.

There were ongoing negotiations in 19 of the 33 armed conflicts active in 2022,[8] while 14 conflicts did not enjoy initiatives for rapprochement between the parties. In most regions, there were more conflicts in which there were different types of negotiations than there were conflicts in which the parties had not sought rapprochement. Thus, there were negotiations in 63% of the conflicts in Africa, in 100% of the conflicts in the Americas, in 55% of the conflicts in Asia, in 40% of the conflicts in the Middle East and in 50% of the conflicts in Europe.

National governments were involved as one of the negotiating parties in all the peace processes and negotiations. These governments negotiated or maintained contact with various kinds of actors directly or indirectly, depending on the characteristics of the context, which in general terms included armed groups (directly or through political representatives, and in some cases through coalitions of armed groups), as was the case in most negotiations in Asia; a combination of armed groups and political and social actors, prevalent in Africa; or representatives of political/military bodies seeking secession or recognition as independent territories, which was true of most cases in Europe. To

*Most armed conflicts in most regions in the world involved negotiating processes, with 58% of all conflicts worldwide involving negotiations*

a lesser extent, cases involving opposition governments and political and social actors were also identified, such as in the Americas.

Parallel or complementary negotiating channels were active in a significant number of contexts, linked to a global scenario of highly complex armed conflicts in terms of actors and disputes. Thus, for example, in the context of the armed conflict in Yemen, negotiations between the government and the Houthis were held alongside active bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, facilitated by Oman. In Syria, both the UN-backed Geneva process and the Astana process (led by Russia, Turkey and Iran) remained in force. The Syrian government participated in both formats, though with different levels of involvement in each. Examples of negotiating processes that involved a highly complex network of actors in Africa included Cameroon, Chad (with over 50 armed groups involved in the negotiations), Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. In Asia, negotiating processes in different states of India, such as Assam and Nagaland, were also multi-stakeholder, as well as in Myanmar, where the Burmese government met with different armed groups while ASEAN was trying to promote a dialogue with the Burmese government to restore democracy in the country. The negotiations in Venezuela and Haiti also

**Map 1.1. Peace negotiations in 2022**



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in 2022

9. Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

involved different actors in parallel and complementary negotiations.

Several negotiating processes that took place throughout 2022 were international negotiations that involved different governments: Eritrea-Ethiopia, Morocco-Western-Sahara, Sudan-South Sudan, North Korea-South Korea, North Korea-USA, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Serbia-Kosovo, Russia-Ukraine and Iran (nuclear programme). Not all reported the same level of activity during the year and some were even interrupted, as was the case with the implementation of the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia due to the ongoing war in the Ethiopian region of Tigray and the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, which began after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and eventually failed, despite several meetings held, though talks did remain active only with respect to some humanitarian issues such as the exchange of prisoners and grain exports. The Russian invasion of Ukraine had major impacts on different peace processes, especially in Europe, where the negotiating processes between Moldova and Transdniestria and the dialogue between Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were affected. In the Middle East, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the consequent rise in tension between Moscow and the West also had an impact on the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme and on the UN-backed negotiations over Syria in Geneva, given Moscow's alliances with the regimes in Tehran and Damascus. The negotiations between Morocco and Western Sahara were unique, since Western Sahara, a territory that the UN considers pending decolonisation whose possession by Morocco is not recognised by international law or by any United Nations resolution. At the same time, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) proclaimed by the POLISARIO Front has not been internationally recognized by the majority of states.

Regarding the **third parties involved in the peace and negotiation processes**, although in many cases it is possible to clearly identify the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment activities, on other occasions these tasks are carried out discreetly or not publicly. At least one third party was involved in the vast majority of the negotiating processes (35 out of 39, or 90%), in a proportion similar to that of previous years. For another year, there was third-party support for processes under different formats, both in internal (27) and international (eight) negotiations (See Table 1.2.). The vast majority of international negotiations had third-party support, which was true of 80% of all peace processes between states. At the regional level, while all negotiations that took place in Africa, the Americas, Europe and the Middle East had third-party support, only 60% of the processes in Asia involved third parties, while negotiations between the governments of North Korea and South Korea and between North Korea and

*A third party was involved in the vast majority of the negotiating processes studied in 2022 (90%), though there was no such support for 40% of the negotiating processes in Asia*

Graph 1.1. **Regional distribution of peace negotiations**



the United States, as well as internal negotiations in India (in Assam and Nagaland), proceeded without third-party support. These last two cases were the only direct internal negotiations that had no external support. The only case without third-party support in another continent was the national dialogue in Chad, as part of a broader peace process in the country that did enjoy external third-party support.

In practically all the cases that had a third party (30 out of 35) there was more than one actor performing mediation or facilitation tasks. Thus, though one actor led mediation and facilitation efforts in certain contexts, the vast majority had mixed formulas, with actors playing complementary and specialised roles. In contrast, only one third party was observed in other cases, such as Norway in the process in the Philippines (NDF), the United Nations in the process in Papua New Guinea, Malaysia in Thailand (south) and the Taliban government of Afghanistan in Pakistan. In an international context of multiplicity of mediating actors, these were of diverse types, highlighting intergovernmental organizations –such as the UN, EU, AU, OSCE, IGAD, OIC, SADC, EAC, CEEAC, ECOWAS, OIF, GCC– and state governments, religious organisations and civil society actors, including specialised centres. Intergovernmental organisations played a predominant role, except in Asia, where comparatively they were hardly involved in mediation and facilitation efforts.

In line with the trend established in recent years, the United Nations was the main intergovernmental organisation that participated by supporting peace processes. It was present in different formats (mainly envoys and special representatives and missions) and served various support functions (mediation, co-mediation, verification, ceasefire supervision, assistance, support, the use of good offices and others) in 21 of the 39 processes identified during the year and in 21 of the 35 that involved at least one third party

Table 1.3. **Internal and international peace processes/negotiations with and without third parties in 2022**

| Peace processes | INTERNAL | | | | | INTERNATIONAL | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Direct negotiations without third parties (2) | Negotiations with third parties (27) | National dialogues without third parties (1) | National dialogues with third parties (0) | Other formats (0) | Direct negotiations without third parties (2) | Negotiations with third parties (8) |
| **AFRICA** | | | | | | | |
| Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West-South West) | | x | | | | | |
| CAR | | x | | | | | |
| Chad | | x | x | | | | |
| DRC | | x | | | | | |
| Eritrea-Ethiopia | | | | | | | x |
| Ethiopia (Tigray) | | x | | | | | |
| Libya | | x | | | | | |
| Mali | | x | | | | | |
| Morocco – Western Sahara | | | | | | | x |
| Mozambique | | x | | | | | |
| Senegal (Casamance) | | x | | | | | |
| Somalia | | x | | | | | |
| South Sudan | | x | | | | | |
| Sudan | | x | | | | | |
| Sudan – South Sudan | | | | | | | x |
| **AMERICAS** | | | | | | | |
| Colombia (FARC) | | x | | | | | |
| Colombia (ELN) | | x | | | | | |
| Haiti | | x | | | | | |
| Venezuela | | x | | | | | |
| **ASIA** | | | | | | | |
| India (Assam) | x | | | | | | |
| India (Nagaland) | x | | | | | | |
| Korea, DPR – Korea, Republic of | | | | | | x | |
| Korea, DPR – USA | | | | | | x | |
| Myanmar | | x | | | | | |
| Pakistan | | x | | | | | |
| Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) | | x | | | | | |
| Philippines (MILF) | | x | | | | | |
| Philippines (NDF) | | x | | | | | |
| Thailand (south) | | x | | | | | |
| **EUROPE** | | | | | | | |
| Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) | | | | | | | x |
| Cyprus | | x | | | | | |
| Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)ⁱ | | | | | | | x |
| Moldova (Transdniestria) | | x | | | | | |
| Serbia – Kosovoⁱⁱ | | | | | | | x |
| Russia - Ukraine | | | | | | | x |

ⁱ. The nature of the peace processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia's role in those conflicts and peace processes are open to interpretation. Ukraine considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, whereas Russia considers itself a third party.
ⁱⁱ. The peace process between Serbia and Kosovo is considered interstate because even though its international legal status is still controversial, Kosovo has been recognised as a state by over 100 countries. In 2010, the International Court of Justice issued a non-binding opinion that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

| Peace processes | INTERNAL | | | | | INTERNATIONAL | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Direct negotiations without third parties (2) | Negotiations with third parties (27) | National dialogues without third parties (1) | National dialogues with third parties (0) | Other formats (0) | Direct negotiations without third parties (2) | Negotiations with third parties (8) |
| **MIDDLE EAST** | | | | | | | |
| Iran (nuclear programme) | | | | | | | x |
| Palestine | | x | | | | | |
| Syria[III] | | x | | | | | |
| Yemen | | x | | | | | |

III. There are two parallel negotiating processes in Syria (Astana and Geneva). Third parties are involved in both processes, though some of them directly project their interests onto the negotiations.

(60%). The UN played a prominent role in Africa, where it supported 11 of the 15 negotiating processes: Chad, Libya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan and South Sudan.

Other international and regional organisations also played a prominent role, especially regional organisations in their geographical areas of operation. The EU was the only regional organisation that supported mediation and dialogue outside its regional sphere of action. Thus, the EU carried out third-party functions in 16 processes, including six in Africa (Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan), two in the Americas (Haiti and Venezuela), one in Asia (Philippines MILF) and two in the Middle East (Iran and Syria), in addition to the processes in Europe. The African Union was a third party in 11 African processes (Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan), the OSCE was involved in four processes (Armenia- Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the latter prior to the start of the Russian invasion, while it lost relevance and the power to influence after the invasion) and the IGAD participated in five (Ethiopia (Tigray), Sudan, Sudan South, Sudan-South Sudan and Somalia). Other organisations such as ECOWAS, the OIC, the SADC, the EAC, ECCAS, the OIF, the Arab League and the OAS had a smaller role.

Furthermore, together with intergovernmental organisations, a significant number of states became involved in negotiating processes, often amidst the projection of national interests in an international dispute for hegemony between powers. In line with the trend seen in previous years, Middle Eastern countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman and Egypt played a significant role not only in the region itself, but also in other peace processes in Africa, which was the main stage of their diplomatic efforts beyond their immediate area of influence. Thus, Qatar participated in the negotiating process in Chad, the UAE and Saudi Arabia were involved in the dialogue between Eritrea and Ethiopia and Egypt supported the

*The UN was involved in 60% of the processes that had at least one third party*

peace process in Libya. In Asia, where the role of third parties is not as significant as in other geographical areas, Norway, Malaysia and China became involved in negotiating processes between the Philippine government and the NDF, between the Philippine government and the MILF and in Myanmar. In addition, the Taliban government of Afghanistan became involved in the dialogue between the Taliban of Pakistan and the Pakistani government. Norwegian diplomats continued to play a central role in facilitating different processes such as the peace process between the government of Colombia and the ELN and the talks between the government and the opposition in Venezuela, but they also participated in processes in other regions, such as the negotiations in Sudan and South Sudan. In the Middle East, Algeria played a prominent role in addressing the intra-Palestinian dispute and in encouraging rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas in 2022.

In an international context of serious geographical tension marked by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow tried to maintain a leading role in various peace processes, but its involvement in different negotiating processes had a negative influence at the same time. The impact was especially negative in Europe, where there were delays in the Georgian peace process and a more difficult geopolitical context for Armenia, while international calls for Kosovo and Serbia to move towards normalising their relations increased. Some negotiations in the Middle East were also affected by the spike in tension between Russia and other international actors due to the invasion of Ukraine. This was the case with the negotiations over Syria, since Russia was excluded from some of the EU's diplomatic initiatives and in turn Russia and Syria, which considers Moscow a key ally, demanded that the UN-backed Geneva process relocate after it questioned Switzerland's neutrality because of its position on the invasion of Ukraine. Russia prioritised improving relations between Syria and Turkey, the latter of which became involved as a third party in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. After several months of diplomatic negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme, which involved the Iranian government, the USA, Russia, France, the

United Kingdom, China and Germany, the prospects of closing an agreement in the first quarter of the year were frustrated in part by the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Third parties – local, regional and international – got involved through various formats, including support structures. These had different forms and degrees of complexity. Among them, some included only States grouped in diverse structures, such as the formula of guarantor countries in Colombia (Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile), in Cyprus (Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, although this process remained deadlocked), of supporting countries in Colombia (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain) or the Troika in Sudan (USA, United Kingdom, Norway). Others included a mix of States and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Friends of the Swiss Contact Group in Cameroon (the EU, the USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom), the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU and ECCAS, with support from the UN, the ICGRL, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad), the Core Group in Haiti (UN, OAS, EU and Germany, France, Brazil, Canada, Spain and the US), the International Monitoring Team and Third Party Monitoring Team support structures in the Philippine peace process with the MILF, the OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, France and the US; the rest of the permanent members are Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey; though this format became less important compared to other third parties) and others. In some cases, intergovernmental organisations coordinated through specific structures, such as the Quartet in Libya, made up of the UN, the Arab League, the AU and the EU, and the International Support Group in the CAR, comprised of the UN and the EU, while in other cases they coordinated on a practical level, without specific platforms, like in Venezuela, where in addition to Norway, the main facilitator, Russia and the Netherlands were also involved.

With regard to the **negotiating agendas**, one must consider the particular aspects of each case and bear in mind that the details of the issues under discussion did not always become known to the public. Once again, **the search for truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities** was one of the central subjects of discussion in various peace processes. This gained special importance in certain regions, like the Middle East. Specifically, the truce reached in Yemen in April, which remained in force for six months, was particularly significant and had a real impact on lowering violence. The first truce since 2016, it also addressed enormously important humanitarian issues. In Africa, an agreement for a permanent cessation of hostilities in the Tigray region was reached between the government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region. The issue was also important in the negotiating processes with the different armed groups active in the

eastern DRC and especially with the armed group M23. The search for ceasefires was also important in Europe. This was the case in the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and in fact both parties negotiated some humanitarian ceasefires. It was not possible to agree on any general ceasefire and as the year progressed, Ukraine demanded that Russia withdraw its troops from all its territory, including Donbas and Crimea. A ceasefire was also agreed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Asia, the Taliban armed group TTP declared a ceasefire in Pakistan during talks with the Pakistani government, but the ceasefire broke down when the talks failed. The search for a ceasefire was also enormously important to the peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN and although President Gustavo Petro announced a six-month bilateral ceasefire agreement with various armed groups at the end of the year, including the ELN, the insurgent organisation denied that any such agreement had been reached days later.

In a year internationally marked by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, **political and military issues linked to the government's attributes, such as territorial integrity, powers related to state sovereignty and mutual recognition, as well as the status of disputed territories**, were especially important to different negotiating agendas. Thus, before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, by which Russia militarily challenged Ukrainian sovereignty, the political and military negotiations between both countries addressed issues such as territorial integrity, security guarantees for Ukraine and Ukraine's position in NATO. Between April and May, however, these talks were considered to have reached a dead and the parties changed their approaches to the issues in later months. Also important to many negotiating agendas were issues related to territorial cohesion and self-determination in its various forms. In Asia, self-determination, autonomy, independence or territorial cohesion and the recognition of identity were especially important factors addressed in a significant number of negotiations, such as those over the Philippines, India (in Assam and Nagaland) and Papua New Guinea (Bougainville). In Nagaland, no headway could be made on any agreement stipulating the Naga people's demands for recognition and disagreement over the constitutional framework continued. Although a territorial dispute was an issue in many of the conflicts in Europe that were addressed by negotiations, it was missing or blocked in the different levels of dialogue. However, the risk that the conflict in Ukraine could expand led to the stated desire to prioritise dialogue in certain negotiating processes, such as the one between Moldova and Transdniestria, even if no significant progress was achieved. Developments in the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno Karabakh were consolidated when Baku proposed a negotiating framework focused on normalising bilateral relations and disconnected from the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, which it considers an internal matter. The Armenian government did not reject the Azerbaijani proposal. However, it did demand

## Table 1.4. **Intergovernmental organisations as third parties in peace processes in 2022**

| UN (22) | |
|---|---|
| **AFRICA** | |
| CAR | UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA)<br>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic<br>The UN is part of the International Support Group for Central Africa |
| Chad | Observation of the peace process facilitated by Qatar |
| DRC | UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region<br>UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)<br>UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the DRC |
| Libya | UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Libya<br>United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)<br>The UN forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and EU |
| Mali | UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mali<br>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) |
| Morocco – Western Sahara | UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara<br>UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Western Sahara<br>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) |
| Mozambique | UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mozambique |
| Somalia | United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) |
| South Sudan | UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for South Sudan<br>United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) |
| Sudan | United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) |
| Sudan-South Sudan | United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) |
| **AMERICA** | |
| Colombia (FARC) | United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia |
| Colombia (ELN) | United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia |
| Haiti | BINUH<br>UN is part of the Core Group |
| **ASIA** | |
| Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) | Peacebuilding Fund<br>Resident Coordinator's Office<br>Mediation Support Unit<br>UNDP |
| **EUROPE** | |
| Cyprus | United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)<br>UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus<br>Mission of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus<br>Office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus (OSASG) |
| Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) | United Nations Special Representative in the Geneva International Discussions |
| Russia – Ukraine | UN Secretary-General |
| Serbia – Kosovo | United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)<br>United Nations Special Representative for Kosovo |
| **MIDDLE EAST** | |
| Iran | International Atomic Energy Agency<br>The UN Secretary-General regularly reports on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which validated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015) |
| Syria | UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria |
| Yemen | UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Yemen<br>United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA) |
| **EU (16)** | |
| **AFRICA** | |
| CAR | EU is a member of the International Support Group for the CAR |
| DRC | EU delegation in the DRC<br>EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region |
| Libya | The EU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, UN and Arab League |
| Mali | EU Special Representative for the Sahel |
| Mozambique | EU Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Mozambique |
| South Sudan | The EU forms part of the IGAD Plus mediation group |

| | |
|---|---|
| **AMERICA** | |
| Haiti | EU forms part of the Core Group |
| Venezuela | The EU forms part of the International Contact Group |
| **ASIA** | |
| Philippines (MILF) | The EU forms part of the International Monitoring Team and has lent support to the Third Party Monitoring Team |
| **EUROPE** | |
| Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) | EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia<br>EU Monitoring Capacity to Armenia (EUMCAP). It ended on 19 December 2022. |
| Cyprus | High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission |
| Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) | EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia<br>EU Observation Mission in Georgia (EUMM) |
| Moldova (Transdniestria) | EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)<br>The EU has an observer role in the 5+2 format of the peace process |
| Serbia – Kosovo | High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission<br>European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues<br>EU Office in Kosovo<br>EU Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) |
| **MIDDLE EAST** | |
| Iran | The EU coordinates the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme (Viena process) |
| Syria | The EU organises the annual international conference on the future of Syria and the region |
| **AU (11)** | |
| **AFRICA** | |
| CAR | The AU leads the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU with the support of the ECCAS, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad) |
| Chad | Observation of the peace process facilitated by Qatar |
| DRC | The AU leads the Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC |
| Ethiopia (Tigray) | AU mediation team led by the AU Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa |
| Libya | The AU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the Arab League, UN and EU |
| Mali | AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel<br>The AU participates in the Mediation Team, which supports implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali |
| Mozambique | The AU is a guarantor of the peace agreement |
| Somalia | AU High Representative for Somalia<br>AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), ended on 31 March 2022, replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) on 1 April |
| South Sudan | Integrated into IGAD Plus, represented by Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria |
| Sudan | AU High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) |
| Sudan – South Sudan | African Union Border Programme (AUBP) |
| **IGAD (5)** | |
| **AFRICA** | |
| Ethiopia (Tigray) | Participation in the monitoring and implementation committee of the peace agreement |
| Somalia | IGAD delegation |
| South Sudan | The IGAD, which consists of Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda, is part of "IGAD Plus" in South Sudan |
| Sudan | IGAD delegation |
| Sudan – South Sudan | IGAD delegation |
| **OSCE (4)** | |
| **EUROPE** | |
| Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) | Minsk Group<br>Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Conflict Related to the Minsk Conference of the OSCE |
| Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) | Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the South Caucasus |
| Moldova (Transdniestria) | Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process<br>OSCE Mission in Moldova |
| Ukraine | Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group [Despite the dismantling of the Trilateral Contact Group in 2022, the OSCE maintained the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office in Ukraine]<br>OSCE Special Observation Mission in Ukraine (SMM). The SMM ended its operations on the 31 March 2022.<br>Coordinator of OSCE projects in Ukraine. Its operations ended on the 30 June 2022. |

| ECOWAS (2) | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **AFRICA** | | |
| Mali | ECOWAS in Mali | |
| Senegal (Casamance) | Facilitator and guarantor | |
| **OAS (2)** | | |
| **AMERICA** | | |
| Colombia | OAS | |
| Haiti | OAS is part of the Core Group | |
| **SADC (2)** | | |
| **AFRICA** | | |
| DRC | SADC representation in the DRC | |
| Mozambique | The SADC is a guarantor of the peace agreement | |
| **Arab League  (1)** | | |
| **AFRICA** | | |
| Libya | The Arab League forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, UN and EU | |
| **ASEAN (1)** | | |
| **ASIA** | | |
| Myanmar | ASEAN envoy | |
| **CEEAC (1)** | | |
| **AFRICA** | | |
| CAR | CEEAC delegation in the CAR | |
| **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (1)** | | |
| **MIDDLE EAST** | | |
| Yemen | Facilitation of intra-Yemeni talks | |
| **International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) (1)** | | |
| **AFRICA** | | |
| DRC | Facilitation of negotiations between DRC and Rwanda (Luanda process) | |
| **EAC (1)** | | |
| **AFRICA** | | |
| DRC | Facilitation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Nairobi process) | |
| **OIC  (1)** | | |
| **AFRICA** | | |
| CAR | OIC delegation in the CAR | |
| **OIF (1)** | | |
| **AFRICA** | | |
| RDC | OIF delegation in the DRC | |

guarantees of rights and freedoms for the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, arguing that the conflict was not a territorial issue, but one of rights. In Africa, aspects related to administrative decentralisation or even the independence of certain territories were also topics of discussion in various negotiations, such as in the negotiating processes in Cameroon, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mali, Senegal (Casamance), Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan (on the dispute between both countries over the Abyei region) and Morocco-Western Sahara. Most of the negotiations around these issues faced significant obstacles, given many governments' refusal to accept formulas for decentralisation and the recognition of sovereignty. For example, in the negotiations between Morocco and the Western Sahara, the parties held fast to their positions in the meetings with the new United Nations representative, while Rabat insisted that the negotiations should revolve exclusively around the Moroccan autonomy proposal and the POLISARIO Front repeated its commitment to hold a referendum on self-determination for the Saharawi population.

In completely different contexts in other negotiations, issues related to the governance of countries and political transitions, the distribution of power and elections were also addressed. This was especially important in the Americas, where the negotiating processes in Haiti and Venezuela revolved around the opposition's demands regarding transitional processes and democratic reform, and governance issues such as possible election schedules. Governance issues were also important in

several African negotiating processes, particularly in Chad, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. In Sudan, the negotiations between the military junta and part of the Sudanese political opposition to try to end the political crisis that has gripped the country since the coup d'état in October 2021 monopolised most of the political agenda during the year, which meant that there was not much progress in implementing the 2020 Juba peace agreement or in negotiations with the armed actors that had not signed it. In Syria, one of the central issues of the Geneva process was the contents of a future Constitution for the country, even though no major headway was made. Political and electoral issues were also central to the intra-Palestinian negotiations.

As in previous years, another subject of the negotiations was the **disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants**. In Colombia, the process to reintegrate former FARC fighters continued, as set forth in the 2016 peace agreement, though problems were faced. According to data from the Kroc Institute, 74% of the people involved in the reintegration process, approximately 9,500, were linked to a productive project. However, 42 signatories of the peace agreement (the terminology used to describe former FARC combatants) were murdered in 2022, according to the Colombian organisation Indepaz. DDR and security sector reform were also part of the negotiations in various processes in Africa, such as Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mozambique, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. The reform or creation of new security forces with various types and names such as mixed units, joint forces and unified national armies were negotiated in these processes. In Mozambique, around 90% of all former RENAMO combatants included in the DDR programme demobilised during the year. In Asia, DDR continued to be fundamental in the process to implement the peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF in what is called the normalisation process. Crucially, the third stage of the process to demobilise the 40,000 ex-combatants of the MILF resumed in 2022. During this stage, 14,000 combatants were expected to demobilise, of which 7,200 had done so by October 2022, while another 5,500 combatants were pending demobilisation before the end of the year. However, the process was criticised for being slow. DDR processes in their various modes and names in different regions faced problems related to the slow implementation of the agreements, as well as logistical and security obstacles.

Regarding the **evolution of peace processes and negotiating processes**, it is generally possible to identify a wide variety of trends: a good development of contacts that leads to the achievement of far-reaching agreements; establishment of negotiations where there were none or reactivation of dialogue after years of paralysis;

*The development of many of the peace negotiations during 2022 was shaped by the global consequences of the international crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February*

intense efforts of an exploratory nature that arouse expectations; negotiating rounds that take place without making progress on key points, but that keep a channel of dialogue open; situations of deep blockade and lack of contact despite the efforts of third parties to facilitate a negotiation; obstacles and difficulties already in the phase of implementation of agreements; and contexts in which violence and violations of ceasefire agreements and hostilities have a profound impact on the prospects for peace processes. The analysis of the different cases in 2022 confirms this diversity of dynamics.

The development of many of the peace negotiations during 2022 was shaped by the global consequences of the international crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. Relations between the Russian government headed by Vladimir Putin and many other governments, especially in the West, deteriorated tremendously, which made it difficult to find common ground in different peace processes based on the different international alliances of the actors involved. The impacts of the invasion of Ukraine were especially noticeable in negotiations in Europe, but other regions, such as the Middle East, were also affected by these dynamics that opened gaps between international blocs. However, progress was made in peace processes in different regions, with important agreements, though not without obstacles, in Africa (Chad, Tigray and others). Negotiating processes were restarted in the Americas (Venezuela, Haiti and Colombia) and headway was made in various peace negotiations in Asia (Assam in India, the Philippines (MILF) and Thailand (south)).

Other regions also witnessed rapprochement and even agreements between actors in different countries. Several agreements were especially significant in Africa, such as those reached in Ethiopia, Senegal (Casamance) and Chad. The agreement on the Tigray region in Ethiopia was especially relevant, given the intensity of the conflict, with serious impacts on the civilian population. The federal government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region reached a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement facilitated by the AU, which sought to put an end to the armed conflict that began in November 2020. Though Eritrea's absence from the agreement sowed some doubts about its effective implementation and some violations of the ceasefire were reported, the TPLF handed over part of its heavy weapons, demonstrating its willingness to comply with the deal. The ECOWAS-backed peace agreement between the government of Senegal and the MFDC faction led by Cesar Atoute Badiate, from the Casamance region, was also a positive development. In Chad, a Qatari-facilitated peace agreement was reached between 34 of the 52 political and military movements, which allowed for their participation in the subsequent Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) in

## Table 1.5. **Main agreements of 2022**

| Peace processes | Agreements |
| --- | --- |
| Chad | The government of Chad and 34 of the 52 political and military movements participating in the negotiations reached an agreement in Doha (Qatar) under Qatari mediation on 7 August, which enabled their participation in the subsequent National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS), held in N'Djamena between 20 August and 8 October together with hundreds of representatives of the government and the political and social opposition. |
| Ethiopia (Tigray) | The Ethiopian government and the military and political authorities of the Tigray region reached a peace agreement on 2 November under the auspices of the African Union. The agreement establishes a cessation of hostilities that will be monitored, supervised and verified by the AU through a unit composed of a maximum of 10 people designated by the AU, with a representative from the regional organisation IGAD, who must report to the mediation team led by former Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo. On 12 November, the parties signed the Declaration of the Senior Commanders on the Modalities for the Implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Nairobi, which stipulates the delivery of heavy weapons and the demobilisation of combatants, the restoration of public services in Tigray, the reactivation of aid and the withdrawal of all armed groups and foreign forces that fought alongside the Federal Ethiopian Army. |
| Senegal (Casamance) | The government of Senegal and the faction of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) led by Cesar Atoute Badiate signed a peace agreement on 4 August. The agreement, which remains confidential, describes the road map for laying down arms and reaffirms the parties' commitment to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. |
| South Sudan | On 16 January, the government of South Sudan and the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction, led by General Simon Gatwech Dual, which broke off from the SPLA-IO headed by Vice President Riek Machar in August 2021, signed an agreement that integrates the Kitgwang faction into the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Signed in Khartoum under the mediation of the government of Sudan, the new agreement includes amnesty for Kitgwang fighters, a permanent ceasefire and its integration into the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF).[3] |
| Haiti | The National Consensus Agreement for Haiti, signed with various political groups and civil society organisations and the private sector for an inclusive transition and transparent elections, lays out a 14-month transition that includes elections held before the end of 2023, the inauguration of the new government on 7 February 2024 (the date until which Ariel Henry will remain in office as prime minister) and the formation of a High Transition Council made up of a representative of civil society, a representative of political parties and representative of the private sector, as well as a Control Body for Government Action. Much of the opposition rejected the agreement. |
| India (Assam) | Tripartite peace agreement between the central government of India, the government of the state of Assam and eight Adivasi armed groups (All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), AANLA (FG), Birsa Commando Force (BCF), BCF (BT), Santhal Tiger Force, Adivasi Cobra Militant of Assam (ACMA), ACMA (FG) and Adivasi People's Army (APA)) involves the demobilisation of the combatants and their acceptance of current Indian legislation. The Indian government pledged to protect and preserve the social, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic identity of the Adivasi groups; to ensure the development of tea plantations in the Adivasi villages of Assam; to establish an Adivasi welfare and development council; to rehabilitate armed actors and guarantee the welfare of tea plantation workers; and to provide a special development package to improve infrastructure in Adivasi villages. |
| Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) | The Era Kone Covenant on the Finalisation of the Bougainville Referendum on Independence, signed by the prime minister of Papua New Guinea and the president of the Autonomous Bougainville Government, stipulates that the results of the 2019 referendum and the conclusions and agreements of the consultations and negotiations held since then will be submitted to the Parliament of Papua New Guinea before the end of 2023. When the Parliament has voted on the proposed political settlement for Bougainville that the two governments reach, it should be implemented no earlier than 2025 and no later than 2027. After its ratification by both governments, the agreement provides for writing the drafts of the constitutional regulations necessary to advance on the road map described therein. |
| Palestine | The Algerian Document for inter-Palestinian Reconciliation was signed by Fatah, Hamas and 12 other Palestinian organisations in Algiers on 13 October. The agreement recognises the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and commits to a national dialogue to ensure the involvement of all groups. It also provides for presidential and legislative elections to be held within a year, including for the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament) and the Palestinian National Council (the PLO's legislative body in which Palestinians and Diaspora Palestinians also participate). Also known as the "Algeria Declaration", the document establishes that an Arab-Algerian team will supervise the implementation of the agreement. |
| Russia – Ukraine | An agreement on the export of grain and other food products, known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, was reached in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 in the form of two identical documents, one signed by Russia and the other by Ukraine, with Turkey and the UN Secretary-General also signing, the latter as an observer. The agreement establishes a mechanism for the safe transport of grain, other food products and fertiliser from Ukrainian ports to global markets. The agreement also includes the export of Russian food and fertiliser to global markets through the Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the United Nations Secretariat. The Black Sea Grain Initiative was facilitated by Turkey and the UN. As part of the agreement, the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) was established in Istanbul, in which representatives of Ukraine, Russia, Turkey and the UN participate, under the auspices of the UN. On 17 November, the agreement was extended for another 120 days. |
| Yemen | A nationwide truce agreement was signed by the internationally recognised government and the Houthis for a cessation of hostilities starting on 2 April, coinciding with the start of Ramadan. The five-point agreement included a halt to all types of military offensives inside and outside Yemen and the maintenance of existing military positions; the entrance of ships with fuel to the port of Al Hudaydah; the resumption of commercial flights to and from the capital, Sana'a, towards Jordan and Egypt; the start of talks to agree on the opening of roads in several governorates, including Ta'iz, to facilitate the movement of the civilian population; and the commitment to continue working with the UN special envoy to take steps to end the armed conflict. The agreement was signed for an initial period of two months and renewed twice, in May and August. Starting in October, the agreement formally ended, though full-scale hostilities between the parties had not resumed by the end of the year and some of the elements of the truce remained in force. |

N'Djamena, along with hundreds of representatives of the government and the political and social opposition. However, the absence of some of the main armed groups, the boycott of the DNIS by the main actors of the political opposition and the outcome of the dialogue hampered further progress in the transition. Important progress was made in the political sphere in Sudan, with the signing of a framework agreement between the military junta and much of the political opposition, with the commitment to establish a transitional civilian government.

In the Middle East, some positive developments were also noted, especially in Yemen, where a nationwide truce was achieved that allowed for a decrease in hostilities and consequently a drop in both the number of victims and people displaced by violence, as well as less food insecurity, in a conflict that has led to a very serious humanitarian crisis in recent years. However, the fragility of the agreement, which was only in force for six months, led to great concern about a possible resumption of violence during 2023. The negotiating processes in the Americas developed positively, despite the problems, with crucial progress in Colombia like the start of a formal peace process with the ELN and the reinstatement of key institutions to implement the 2016 peace agreements. Progress was also observed in other countries, even in more politically fragile environments such as Haiti and Venezuela. Thus, negotiations began between the Haitian government and the opposition and talks resumed between the opposition and the government in Venezuela. Asia was also the scene of some positive events, such as the beginning of a negotiating process in Pakistan, though it was later cut short, the restart of negotiations in Thailand with the BRN after years of impasse and the progress made in the implementation of the agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF, especially with regard to DDR.

However, many negotiating processes had to face significant obstacles and some remained deadlocked. In addition to the aforementioned dynamics, resulting from an international context marked by the invasion of Ukraine and the consolidation of international political blocs, there were local political and social problems and dynamics of mistrust between the negotiating parties that made comprehensive or partial agreements difficult. In Africa, negotiating processes in Mali, the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan and Somalia were challenged by violence. The offensive of the armed groups in the CAR that had withdrawn from the 2019 agreement and the continued armed activity of groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia and the M23 in the DRC are examples of how dynamics of conflict hindered the partial progress that had been made in all these peace processes in the absence of solid ceasefire agreements. Other processes remained at a standstill, such as the negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, where no progress was made in the implementation of the peace agreement. There were no positive developments in the negotiations in Libya in 2022 either and the political impasse in the country had negative impacts despite the significant drop in violence compared to previous years due to the current truce agreement, signed in late 2021. The negotiations between Morocco and Western Sahara also remained deadlocked, despite the expectations generated by the appointment of a new United Nations special envoy. Some negotiating processes in Asia particularly took turns for the worse. For example, the rise to power of the new president of South Korea led to a notable deterioration of the relations between the two Koreas and a growing gulf between their respective positions. In Pakistan, despite the start of talks and rapprochement between the government and the Taliban insurgency, the year ended with a breakdown in the talks and a rise in violence. In Myanmar, the situation remained stagnant amidst a rise in violence and the military junta's lack of motivation to put into practice the points agreed with ASEAN to find a solution to the country's political crisis.

Finally, regarding the gender, peace and security agenda, the analysis of the different peace processes in 2022 confirms, like in previous years, the obstacles that women face in participating in formal processes and the difficulties in incorporating a gender perspective in negotiation. Twenty-two years after the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, many challenges to its implementation remained and most peace processes continued to exclude women. **No specific mechanisms of participation were designed for women in most negotiations and gender issues and recognition of the rights of women and the LGTBIQA+ population were left out of much of the negotiating agendas**. A significant example of the obstacles that women continue to face in peace processes was what happened in the negotiations between Morocco and Western Sahara, where the special envoy's decision not to visit Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara in July was partly due to the realisation that it would not be possible to meet with representatives of civil society and women's organisations due to the restrictions imposed by Rabat. This was stated in the UN Secretary-General's annual report on Western Sahara, noting that Staffan de Mistura's visit was postponed "in consistency with the principles of the United Nations and, in particular, due to the importance given to women's equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security". However, women's activism persisted, demanding greater recognition of the proposals of women's organisations and the feminist movement and demanding spaces for participation at the negotiating table.

**There were several processes in which women had the opportunity to participate, though with many limitations.**

In **Mali**, 15 women joined the subcommittees of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (CSA) and the transitional president appointed 10 more women to the National Transition Council, bringing their total number to 42 (28%). The peace agreement in Mali was reached between the government and the main warring groups (excluding the jihadist groups) in 2015. There was only one female representative in the peace process for **Chad** in Doha and although women's and youth organisations participated in the DNIS, they did so with little chance of impacting its results. In addition, women constituted slightly less than 30% of the new government. Women's participation in the peace process in the **CAR** remained weak: two of the 11 members of the Republican Dialogue Follow-up Committee were women and they accounted for only 17% of the participants in the dialogue. In early September in **Sudan**, UNITAMS worked in conjunction with the UNDP to facilitate meetings with 55 Sudanese women from political parties, armed movements, civil society, academia and the Women's Rights Group (WRG). These meetings were aimed at building a common agenda of key principles and provisions from a women's rights perspective to examine the gender-related priorities of any future constitutional documents and negotiations based on those principles. This group of women also held meetings with the trilateral mechanism, an initiative promoted by UNITAMS, the AU and the regional organisation IGAD to mediate between the military junta and the civilian opposition to incorporate its agenda in the agreement reached in December.

In the dispute between **Sudan and South Sudan** for sovereignty over the Abyei region, the UN mission in the area (UNISFA) facilitated women's participation in the Joint Traditional Leaders' Peace Conference that was held in Entebbe (Uganda) in May, in which three women were involved (10% of all participants). In the negotiations between the government of **Ethiopia** and the political and military authorities of **Tigray**, former South African Vice President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka played a leading role in the AU mediation team. In the Americas, women's participation in negotiations was especially notable in **Colombia**. In the Colombian government's talks with the ELN, both delegations included many women at the table. The government panel achieved parity for the first time, prioritising equal participation over a specific mechanism for female involvement. The Women's Body for a Gender and Peace Focus continued to work on implementing the peace agreement with the FARC. In **Thailand (south)**, the government appointed Rachada Dhnadirek as its special representative, tasked with promoting the role of women in the peace negotiations. In the negotiations between the government of **Papua New Guinea and Bougainville**, women's participation was

*Although women's direct participation in several peace processes was verified, they had to face many obstacles and barriers*

limited to four MPs in the Parliament of Bougainville who acted as observers during the meetings of the Joint Supervisory Body, though their participation is planned in different bodies such as the Bougainville Leaders Consultation Forum, created so that civil society can present demands and proposals on post-referendum negotiations; the Independence Preparation Mission, a body to promote preparations for independence at the internal, national and international levels; and the Bougainville Constitutional Planning Commission (BCPC), created to draft the Constitution of a possible independent Bougainville. In **Cyprus**, the technical committee on gender equality, a mechanism established to include the participation of women and the gender perspective in the negotiations, adopted an action plan to promote female participation in the process, with recommendations that include a ceiling of two-thirds representation of any gender in all delegations, as well as in the members and co-chairs of the working groups and technical committees of the peace process. In **Moldova**, a new body in the negotiating process was on the verge of being approved, an Informal Advisory Council of Women aimed at issuing recommendations. For yet another year, the number of women in formal peace negotiations in **Yemen** continued to decline, as it has since 2015, and Yemeni activists pointed out that participation levels are well below the 30% representation quota for decision-making spaces agreed on in 2014. Women's participation in different spheres was improved in the intra-Yemeni talks sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which bring together actors from the anti-Houthi camp, but women were still excluded from discussions on security and anti-terrorism and one of the five members of the government's team in the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission was a woman. Finally, the Women's Advisory Board remained active in the negotiations in **Syria.** Composed of 15 Syrian women of different sensibilities, the consultative body met periodically with the United Nations envoy.

**A gender approach, specific clauses on gender equality or the recognition of women's rights was included in various peace agreements** reached during 2022, though admittedly in a very limited way. Thus, in their agreement, Sudan and South Sudan pledged to foster peaceful coexistence by making women the agents of change in ongoing peacebuilding efforts and intercommunal talks. The agreement reached for the conflict in the Ethiopian region of Tigray included issues regarding gender violence and urged the parties to the conflict to condemn any act of sexual or gender violence, any act of violence against minors, girls, women and the elderly and the recruitment of child soldiers. The agreement also encouraged the parties to promote family reunification and to consider the specific needs of what it describes

as "vulnerable groups", which include women, minors and the elderly, in providing humanitarian aid.

**Civil society women's organisations** were highly active in various peace processes and demanded continuity in the negotiations, greater participation or the inclusion of proposals regarding more recognition of women's rights or general suggestions regarding the content of the negotiations. Thus, among many others, women's organisations in Cameroon led several different initiatives and demonstrations linked to the peace process and issued the statement Women's Negotiations for Peace in Cameroon. Initiatives led by women in Armenia included anti-war protests in the capital and a statement from the Feminist Peace Collective, created in 2020 in response to the war that year, to protest Azerbaijan's military offensive in September. The statement was also critical of the male-dominated and elitist negotiations led by both government panels and appealed to unity, citizen diplomacy and peacebuilding. The Kosovo Women's Network expressed concern to the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue about its exclusion from the peace process in Kosovo. In India, the women's organisation Naga Mother's Association demonstrated to demand the repeal of anti-terrorism legislation and complained of human rights violations committed against the Naga population by security forces under its cover.