

Introduction

Peace Talks in Focus 2023. Report on Trends and Scenarios is a yearbook that analyses the peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world in 2023. The examination of the evolution and the dynamics of these negotiations at a global level offers a global view of the peace processes, identifying trends and facilitating a comparative analysis among the different scenarios. One of the main aims of this report is to provide information and analysis for those actors who take part in the peaceful resolution of conflicts at different levels, including those parties in dispute, mediators and civil society, among others. The yearbook also seeks to reveal the different formulas of dialogue and negotiation that are aimed at reversing the dynamics of violence and that aim to channel conflicts through political means in numerous contexts. As such, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts that are aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

With regard to **methodology**, this report draws mainly from on qualitative analysis of studies and information from numerous sources –the United Nations, international organizations, research centres, the media, NGOs, and others–, in addition to experience gained in field research. The report also incorporates the gender perspective in the study and analysis of peace processes in a cross-cutting manner.

The analysis is based on a **definition** that understands **peace processes** as comprising all those political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at resolving conflicts and transforming their root causes by means of peaceful methods, especially through peace negotiations. **Peace**

negotiations are considered as the processes of dialogue between at least two conflicting parties in a conflict, in which the parties address their differences in a concerted framework in order to end the violence and encounter a satisfactory solution to their demands. Other actors not directly involved in the conflict may also participate. Peace negotiations are usually preceded by preliminary or exploratory phases that define the format, place, conditions and guarantees, of the future negotiations, among other elements. Peace negotiations may or may not be facilitated by **third parties**. The third parties intervene in the dispute so as to contribute to the dialogue between the actors involved and to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict. Other actors not directly involved in the dispute may also participate in peace negotiations. Peace negotiations may result in comprehensive or partial **agreements**, agreements related to the procedure or process, and agreements linked to the causes or consequences of the conflict. Elements of the different type of agreements may be combined in the same agreement.

With respect to its **structure**, the publication is organized into six chapters. The first presents a summary of those processes and negotiations that took place in 2023, and offers an overview of the main trends at a global level. The following five chapters detail the analysis of peace processes and negotiations from a geographic perspective. Each addresses the main trends of peace negotiations in Africa, America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, respectively, and describes the development and dynamics of each of the cases present in the regions, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda.

Negotiations in 2023: global overview and main trends

- During 2023, there were 45 peace processes and negotiations around the world, six more than the year before. Most cases were found in Africa (18), followed by Asia and the Pacific (10), Europe (six), America (six) and the Middle East (five).
- Negotiations were under way in 19 of the 36 armed conflicts active during 2023, accounting for 53% of all cases.
- Third parties were involved in 89% of the negotiating processes and the UN participated in 60% of the processes that had at least one third party.
- There were serious setbacks to the prospects for dialogue in various contexts due to the resumption or escalation of violence, such as in Mali, Sudan, Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and Israel-Palestine, while the vast majority of negotiating processes faced obstacles and difficulties.
- The rise in global polarisation and division and geopolitical confrontation hindered peacebuilding efforts and increased military approaches to the crises.
- Specific mechanisms were not designed for women to participate in most of the negotiations and gender issues and recognition of the rights of women and the LGBTIQ+ population were left out of many negotiating agendas.

During 2023, a total of 45 peace processes and negotiations were identified on a worldwide level. The analysis of the different contexts reveals a wide variety of realities and dynamics, a result of the diverse nature of the armed conflicts¹ and socio-political crises² that the negotiations are linked to. Without losing sight of the need to consider the specific characteristics of each case, it is possible to draw several conclusions and offer reflections on the general panorama of peace processes and negotiations, as well as to identify some trends. Several conclusions are presented below regarding the geographical distribution of the negotiations, those actors involved in the negotiation processes, the third parties who participated, the main and recurrent issues in the negotiation agendas, the general development of the processes, inclusiveness and the gender dimension in these peace negotiations.

Table 1.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in 2023

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)	Government of Cameroon; four interim governments (IGs) proclaiming themselves representative of the people of Ambazonia: IG Sisiku (Sisiku Ayuk Tabe, first President of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia, and Vice President Dabney Yerima); the other three IGs are derived from IG Sisiku, each created after the previous IG refused to give up power: IG Sako (Samuel Sako); IG Marianta (Iya Marianta Njomia); IG Chris Anu (ally of Leke Olivier Fongunueh's Red Dragons armed group). The Ambazonia Governing Council coalition (AGovC, led by Cho Ayaba, armed wing Ambazonia Defence Forces, ADF). Other political, military and social movements, and religious groups: Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT), which includes APLM/SOCADEF, FSCW, MoRISC, SCARM, SCAPO, SCNC (North America faction) and RoAN.	Church, civil society organisations, USIP, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), Vatican, Canada, USA

1. The School of the Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau, ECP) defines armed conflict as any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible in which the continuous and organised use of violence a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. wounded or displaced population, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services) and aims to achieve objectives that are different than those of common delinquency and are normally linked to a) demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues; b) the opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of the government, which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power; or c) control over the resources or the territory.
2. A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by different actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control of resources or territory.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
	Southern Cameroons Stakeholder Platform (SCSP), which includes political movements, civil society, armed groups, religious groups: IG Sisiku, SCNC (except the North America faction), Consortium, Global Takumbeng, SCAWOL, SCEW, SNWOT, SCCOP, AIPC, AYC, SCYC, SCCAF, WCA, DAC, CHRDA, CHRI, Reach Out, prisoners organisations, displaced population and refugee organisations, traditional leaders and others.	
CAR	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Séléka coalition, anti-balaka militias	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant'Egidio, ACCORD, OIC, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, China, Russia, Sudan
Chad	Doha process: Transitional Military Council, 52 armed groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) DNIS: Transitional Military Council, civil society organisations, 34 of the 52 armed groups that signed the Doha process The 18 armed groups that did not sign the Doha agreement formed the Cadre Permanent de Concertation et de Réflexion (CPCR), including the FACT and the CCSMR	Qatar; AU and UN, among others; Community of Sant'Egidio, ECCAS
DRC	Government of the DRC, government of Rwanda, armed group M23, armed groups from the eastern part of the country, political opposition and civil society	AU, SADC, ICGLR, EAC, EU, UN, OIF, USA, Angola, Qatar
Eritrea – Ethiopia	Eritrea and Ethiopia	United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, USA
Ethiopia (Oromia)	Federal government, armed group Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)	IGAD, Kenya, Norway and Tanzania
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Federal Government, political and military authorities of the Ethiopian region of Tigray (Tigray People's Liberation Front)	AU, USA, IGAD
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan	AU, World Bank (WB), UAE, EU and USA
Libya	Government of National Unity (GNU), Government of National Stability (GNS), Presidential Council, High State Council (HSC), House of Representatives (HoR), LNA/ALAF	UN; Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Türkiye, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia (Berlin Process)
Mali	Government, Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) that brings together Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) –MNLA, MAA and HCUA–, Platform –GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA	Algeria, France, ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, civil society organisations, Mauritania, Carter Center (Independent Observer of the Peace Agreement)
Morocco – Western Sahara	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)	UN, Algeria and Mauritania, Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
Mozambique	Government, RENAMO, RENAMO military junta	AU, National mediation team, Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, United Kingdom, EU, Community of Sant Egidio (Vatican), Catholic Church, UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Senegal (Casamance)	Government, factions of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)	ECOWAS, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sub-regional Coordinator for Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Casamance (COSPAC)
Somalia	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political military movement Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a, clan and sub-clan leaders, Somaliland	UN, IGAD, Türkiye, AU
Somalia – Somaliland	Federal Government of Somalia, Republic of Somaliland	Türkiye, Norway
South Sudan	Revitalised Peace Agreement (2018): Government (SPLM), SPLM/A-in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others), two independent factions of the SPLM-IO: the Kitwang faction led by Simon Gatwech Dual and the faction headed by General Johnson Olony. Peace talks in Rome: Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Groups (NSSSOG, previously SSOMA): National Salvation Front (NAS), South Sudan United Front (SSUF), the Real SPLM, South Sudan People's Patriotic Movement (SSPPM).	Revitalised Peace Agreement (2018): IGAD Plus (Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda), AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches Rome negotiations: Community of Sant'Egidio

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
Sudan³	Peace negotiations in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile: Government of Sudan, Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions National crisis peace negotiations: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)	Peace negotiations in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile: African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Troika (USA, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS National crisis peace negotiations: Trilateral mechanism (UNITAMS, AU and IGAD (Ethiopia, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda)); Quad (USA, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates), Egypt
Sudan – South Sudan	Government of Sudan, Government of South Sudan, Ethnic communities of the Abyei region	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU, UNISFA, UN
AMERICA		
Colombia (ELN)	Government, ELN	Guarantor countries (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile); permanent supporters (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, Episcopal Conference of Colombia); supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Colombia (EMC)	Government, Estado Mayor Central (EMC)	Permanent supporters (Episcopal Conference of Colombia, World Council of Churches, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia), guarantor countries (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Venezuela)
Colombia (FARC)	Government, Comunes	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute)
Haiti	Government, social and political opposition	CARICOM Eminent Persons Group
Venezuela	Government, social and political opposition	Norway, Russia, the Netherlands
Venezuela – Guyana	Venezuela, Guyana	CELAC, CARICOM, Brazil, United Nations, Cuba
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC		
North Korea – South Korea	North Korea, South Korea	--
North Korea – USA	North Korea, USA	--
Philippines (MILF)	Government, MILF, Interim Government of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	Malaysia, Third Party Monitoring Team, Independent Decommissioning Body
Philippines (MNLF)	Government, MNLF (factions led by Nur Misuari and Muslimin Sema)	--
Philippines (NDF)	Government, NDF (umbrella organisation of various communist organisations, including the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is the political arm of the NPA)	Norway
India (Assam)	Government, ULFA-PTF, ULFA-I; AANLA, AANLA (FG), BCF, BCF (BT), STF, ACMA, ACMA (FG) and APA	--
India (Nagaland)	Indian government, NSCN-IM, NNPG: GPRN/NSCN (Kitovi Zhimomi), NNC, FGN, NSCN(R), NPGN (Non-Accord) and NNC/GDRN/NA, ZUF	--
Myanmar	Government; armed groups that have signed the ceasefire agreement (NCA): DKBA, RCSS/SSA-South, CNF, KNU, KNLAPC, ALP, PNLO, ABSDF, NMSP and LDU; armed groups that have not signed the NCA: UWSP, NDAA, SSPP/ SSA-N, KNPP, NSCN-K, KIA, AA, TNLA and MNDAA	China, ASEAN
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Government, Autonomous Bougainville Government	United Nations
Thailand (south)	Government, BRN	Malaysia

3 In 2019, the three peace and negotiating processes that had been taking place in Sudan in the previous year were reduced to one due to the end of the national dialogue between the government and the opposition following the formation of a transitional government, as well as the merger of the cases of Darfur and the "Two Areas" (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) into a single peace process. In 2023, the negotiations were focused on resolving the national armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.


Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
EUROPE		
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Armenia, Azerbaijan, representatives of self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	EU, USA, Russia, Iran, Türkiye, Georgia ⁴
Cyprus	Republic of Cyprus, self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	UN, EU, Guarantor Countries (Türkiye, Greece and United Kingdom)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Georgia, representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia ⁵	OSCE, EU, UN, USA, Russia ⁶
Moldova (Transnistria)	Moldova, self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria	OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, USA, EU ⁷
Russia – Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	UN, Türkiye, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ICRC, IAEA, Vatican City, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia ⁸
Serbia – Kosovo	Serbia, Kosovo	EU, UN, USA, Germany, France, Italy
MIDDLE EAST		
Iran (nuclear programme)	Iran, France, United Kingdom, Germany, China, Russia, EU, USA ⁹	UN
Israel – Palestine	Israel, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Authority (PA)	Qatar, Egypt, USA, France, UN, ¹⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Palestine	Fatah, Hamas	Egypt, Türkiye
Syria	Government, political and armed opposition groups, regional and international actors ¹¹	UN (Geneva process); Russia, Türkiye, Iran (Astana process with Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, UN and ICRC as observers); Arab League (Jordanian initiative)
Yemen	Internationally recognised Yemeni government (backed by Riyadh), Houthis / Ansar Allah, Saudi Arabia ¹²	ONU, Oman, CICR

The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.
 -- There are no third parties or no public proof of their existence.

Regarding the **geographical distribution of the peace processes and negotiations** in 2023, most of the cases analyzed were concentrated in Africa, which hosted 18, equivalent to 40% of the total. Asia and the Pacific was the region with the second-highest number of cases, with a total of 10, representing 23% of the negotiations in 2023. The rest of the negotiations were distributed between the Americas and Europe, with six cases each (13%), and the Middle East, with five (11%).

There was a rise in the number of peace processes and negotiations worldwide, in keeping with the upward trend of the previous two years (37 processes in 2021, 39 in 2022), though the levels of 2018 and 2019 were

Graph 1.1. Regional distribution of peace negotiations



4 Iran and Türkiye are included in this table due to their participation in the 3+3 regional platform. This platform was launched in 2021 at Türkiye's behest with the stated objective of promoting peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus. It brings together Türkiye, Russia, Iran, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Though invited, Georgia has not yet participated in this format. In 2020, Russia and Türkiye established a joint monitoring centre for the 2020 ceasefire. However, the status of Türkiye and the 3+3 platform as third parties may be subject to different interpretations. Since 2023, the OSCE Minsk Group has not been included in this table as it has become inoperative. It was co-chaired by Russia, France and the United States; the rest of its permanent members are Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Türkiye. On the other hand, Georgia is included in this table because it facilitated dialogue between the parties in conflict in 2023.

5 Russia's status in the Georgian peace process is subject to different interpretations. Georgia considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

6 Ibid.

7 In 2023, the 5+2 conference format remained inactive. In the 5+2 conference the OSCE was a mediator, Ukraine and Russia were mediators-guarantors, and the US and the EU were observers. The OSCE-facilitated 1+1 format was active and was also attended by participants of the 5+2 format.

8 This table includes actors playing roles of mediation/facilitation and support in any of the areas of dialogue active between Russia and Ukraine in 2023. They are included regardless of the frequency or scope of their involvement. In 2022, the actors playing some role included in this table were: Türkiye, the UN, Israel, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the IAEA, the OSCE, Germany and France. Beyond the actors listed in this table, this chapter analyses and includes other actors that promoted dialogue during the year and are not considered third parties in this yearbook.


9 In 2018 the Trump administration decided to withdraw the US from the nuclear agreement and reimpose sanctions on Iran. The Biden administration has remained indirectly involved in the negotiating process with Tehran.

10 This table does not include the Middle East Peace Quartet - made up of the US, Russia, the UN and the EU - due to its inactivity in the field of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, especially since the increase in tensions between Washington and Moscow over the war in Ukraine. The last statement by the Quartet envoys dates back to the end of 2021. The Quartet Office remains operational in Jerusalem but focuses its activities on the part of its mandate related to supporting Palestinian economic and institutional development

11 Although some regional and international actors present themselves as third parties, in practice they also operate as negotiators and favour understandings to ensure their presence and influence on Syrian soil.

12 Saudi Arabia also plays a role as a mediator/facilitator in disputes between various actors on the anti-Houthi side.

Map 1.1. Peace negotiations in 2023



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in 2023

not reached (49 and 50 cases, respectively). However, this increase was not accompanied by lower levels of violence and global armed conflict. On the contrary, the total number of active armed conflicts also increased during the year (36 armed conflicts in 2023, compared to 33 in 2022) and violence got worse in Israel-Palestine and in high-intensity conflicts such as those in Sudan, Mali, Western Sahel, the DRC, Somalia, Myanmar, Pakistan and elsewhere. In addition, there were other conflicts trending similarly in 2023 to the previous year but with high levels of violence, such as in the Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram), Ethiopia (Oromia), Russia-Ukraine and Syria. The increase in the number of processes took place mainly in Africa (18 cases in 2023 compared to 15 in 2022, 12 in 2021 and 13 in 2020). The three new processes in Africa were negotiations between the federal government of Ethiopia and representatives of the armed group Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Tanzania; the resumption of talks between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute; and the relaunch of international contacts and initiatives to promote dialogue and reconciliation between Somalia and Somaliland. In the Americas, two more cases

Most negotiations in 2023 took place in Africa (40%), followed by Asia and the Pacific (23%), America and Europe (both 13%) and the Middle East (11%)

were identified than the previous year, as a new peace process began in Colombia between the government and the armed group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and talks started between the governments of Venezuela and Guyana regarding their territorial dispute over the Essequibo region. Finally, in the Middle East, after the events of 2023 and the crisis in Gaza, we analyse the case of Israel-Palestine again in this edition of the report to address the mediation attempts and diplomatic initiatives to resolve the crisis. The 2022 edition had stopped analysing it due to the chronic standstill of the negotiations, which had been suspended since 2014.¹³

Dialogue and negotiating processes were under way in 19 of the 36 active armed conflicts during 2023,¹⁴ accounting for 53% of the cases. This was a smaller proportion than in the previous year, when 58% of the conflicts had negotiations. The dip was visible in Africa, where the number of conflicts with negotiations fell from 65% in 2023 to 55%, and in Asia and the Pacific, where it decreased from 55% to 44%. In contrast, in the Middle East it rose from 40% to 50%, even if one of the cases, Israel-Palestine, included diplomatic initiatives and attempts at mediation with a brief pause in hostilities in

13 See the chapter on the Middle East in this report.

14 Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2024! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2024.

Table 1.2. **Armed conflicts and peace processes in 2023**

Armed conflicts with peace negotiations (19)	Armed conflicts without peace negotiations (17)
AFRICA (10)	AFRICA (8)
Cameroon (Ambazonia/ North West and South West) (2018)	Burundi (2015)
CAR (2006)	DRC (east – ADF) (2014)
DRC (east) (1998)	DRC (west)
Ethiopia (Oromia) (2022)	Ethiopia (Amhara) (2023)
Ethiopia (Tigray) (2020)	Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) (2011)
Libya (2011)	Mozambique (north) (2017)
Mali (2012)	Somalia (Somaliland-SSC Khatumo) (2023)
Somalia (1988)	Western Sahel Region (2018)
South Sudan (2009)	ASIA (5)
Sudan (2023) ¹⁵	Afghanistan (2001)
AMERICA (1)	India (CPI-M) (1967)
Colombia (1964)	India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989)
ASIA (4)	Pakistan (2001)
Myanmar (1948)	Pakistan (Balochistan) (2005)
Philippines (NPA) (1969)	EUROPE (1)
Philippines (Mindanao) (1991)	Türkiye (southeast) (1984)
Thailand (south) (2004)	MIDDLE EAST (3)
EUROPE (1)	Egypt (Sinai) (2014)
Russia – Ukraine (2022) ¹⁶	Iraq (2003)
MIDDLE EAST (3)	Israel – Hezbollah (2023)
Israel – Palestine (2000)	
Syria (2011)	
Yemen (2004)	

*The year the conflict began appears between parentheses

November, though neither a ceasefire nor a resumption of the formal negotiating process were achieved. Overall, the high proportion of armed conflicts with negotiations showed that there were many contexts in which the warring parties explored and opened avenues for negotiation alongside the fighting. In any case, most armed conflicts were prolonged, in which the similarly long-lived negotiating processes faced serious difficulties in moving towards resolving them.

National governments were involved as one of the **negotiating parties** in all the peace processes and negotiations. These governments negotiated or maintained contact with various kinds of actors directly or indirectly, depending on the characteristics of the context, which in general terms included armed groups (directly or through political

representatives, and in some cases through coalitions of armed groups), as was the case in most negotiations in Asia; a combination of armed groups and political and social actors, prevalent in Africa; or representatives of political/military bodies seeking secession or recognition as independent territories, which was true of most cases in Europe. To a lesser extent, cases involving opposition governments and political and social actors were also identified, such as in some of the processes in the Americas.

Parallel or complementary negotiations were conducted in a significant number of contexts, linked to armed conflicts and socio-political crises in highly complex scenarios of actors and disputes. For example, in Chad the peace process encompassed dialogue about the implementation of the Doha peace agreement between

Dialogue and negotiating processes were under way in 19 of the 36 active armed conflicts during 2023, accounting for 53% of the cases

15 In previous years, two distinct armed conflicts were identified in Sudan: Sudan (Darfur) (2003) and Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) (2012). Both conflicts, characterised as internationalised internal and motivated by issues of self-government, resources and identity, are analysed in this edition together within the Sudan armed conflict (2023). This is due to the fact that the dynamics of the armed conflict that began in April 2023 between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) affect a large part of the country and particularly the regions of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Furthermore, irregular armed actors from these regions are also actively involved in the hostilities.

16 Russia-Ukraine is included due to the humanitarian dialogue, Ukraine's dialogue with international actors about parts of its peace plan and the initiatives promoted by various governments, though political and military negotiations between the warring parties were not resumed in 2023.

the government and a part of the Chadian insurgency, the implementation of the commitments resulting from the National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS) and communication channels with some of the insurgent groups that did not sign the Doha agreement. In Sudan, the dialogue in 2023 was focused on addressing the crisis between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which took place alongside the negotiations on the dynamics of conflict in Darfur and the “Two Areas” (South Kordofan and Blue Nile). In the South Sudan peace process, there were channels of dialogue with actors linked to the 2018 peace agreement, as well as parallel negotiations in Rome with groups that did not sign it. The Sudan-South Sudan process encompassed inter-state negotiations as well as forums of dialogue between communities in the Abyei region. There were two separate peace negotiations related to the DRC: between the Congolese government and the Rwandan government (Luanda process) and between the Congolese government and different armed groups in the eastern part of the country (Nairobi process). In Yemen, the UN-backed intra-Yemeni negotiations continued to be held, although the contacts between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis took centre stage during 2023. In Syria, both the UN-backed Geneva process and the Astana process (led by Russia, Türkiye and Iran) remained in force. The Syrian government participated in both formats, though with different levels of involvement in each. Other examples of processes with more complex forms of dialogue due to the network of actors were those in Cameroon, Libya, Somalia, India (Assam), India (Nagaland) and Myanmar. The negotiations in Venezuela and Haiti also involved various actors in parallel and complementary negotiations.

Several negotiating processes that took place throughout 2023 were negotiations where at least part of their dimension was international, that involved international negotiating actors (see Table 1.2). This was true in 17 cases: Eritrea-Ethiopia, Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan, Morocco-Western Sahara, the DRC (one of whose dialogue channels involves the Congolese government and the Rwandan government), Somalia-Somaliland, Sudan-South Sudan, Venezuela-Guyana, North Korea-South Korea, North Korea-USA, Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Georgia (which also involves Russia as an actor in the negotiations), Russia-Ukraine, Serbia-Kosovo, Iran (nuclear programme), Israel-Palestine,

In 2023, there were 45 peace processes and negotiations around the world, six more than the year before, though the number of conflicts increased and violence intensified in many crises during the year

Parallel or complementary negotiating channels were active in a significant number of contexts, linked to a global scenario of highly complex armed conflicts

Syria¹⁷ and Yemen¹⁸. In any case, international negotiations coexisted with internal dialogue channels in five of these cases (the DRC, Sudan-South Sudan, Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Syria and Yemen). At the same time, some international processes were unique, such as the negotiations between Morocco and Western Sahara, since Western Sahara consists of a territory that the UN considers pending decolonisation whose possession by Morocco is not recognised by international law or by any United Nations resolution. At the same time, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)

proclaimed by the POLISARIO Front has not been internationally recognized by the majority of states. Similarly, in the case of Serbia-Kosovo, though Kosovo proclaimed itself an independent country in 2008 and is recognised as such by 100 countries, the dispute over the status of Kosovo continued. In 2023, there were 34 internal negotiating processes, practically all of which were between the parties in conflict with support of third parties (30), and to a lesser extent without third parties (three cases), while only one national dialogue was reported, Chad’s National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS).

Regarding the **third parties involved in the peace and negotiation processes**, although in many cases it is possible to clearly identify the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment activities, on other occasions these tasks are carried out discreetly or not publicly. At least one third party was involved in the vast majority of the negotiating processes (40 out of 45, or 89%), in a proportion similar to that of previous years (90% in 2022). For another year, there was third-party support for processes under different formats, both in internal (30 of 34, equivalent to 88%), and international negotiations (15 of 17, also equivalent to 88%) (See Table 1.2.). The vast majority of international negotiations had third-party support, which was true of 80% of all peace processes between states. As noted above, internal and international dimensions coexisted in some peace processes (five), all with third-party support.

At the regional level, while all negotiations that took place in Africa, the Americas, Europe and the Middle East had third-party support, only 50% of the processes in Asia and the Pacific involved third parties. Interstate negotiations between North Korea and South Korea and between North Korea and the United States, as well as

17 In Syria, there are parallel negotiating processes involving third parties, some of which are also considered actors in the conflict and interested parties in the negotiations.

18 Intra-Yemeni negotiations remained active in 2023 at the request of the UN, though contacts between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia played a greater role during the year.

Table 1.3. Internal and international peace processes and negotiations with and without third parties in 2023

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (3)	Negotiations with third parties (30)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (0)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (15)
AFRICA							
Cameroon (Ambazonia/ North West-South West)		x					
CAR		x					
Chad ⁱ		x	x				
DRC ⁱⁱ		x					x
Etiopia (Oromia)		x					
Ethiopia (Tigray)		x					
Eritrea – Ethiopia							x
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan							x
Libya		x					
Mali		x					
Morocco – Western Sahara							x
Mozambique		x					
Senegal (Casamance)		x					
Somalia		x					
Somalia – Somaliland ⁱⁱⁱ							x
South Sudan		x					
Sudan ^{iv}		x ^v					
Sudan – South Sudan		x					x
AMERICA							
Colombia (ELN)		x					
Colombia (EMC)		x					
Colombia (FARC)		x					
Haiti		x					
Venezuela		x					
Venezuela – Guyana							x
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC							
India (Assam)	x						
India (Nagaland)	x						
Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep. of						x	
Korea, DPR – USA						x	
Myanmar		x					
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)		x					
Philippines (MILF)		x					
Philippines (MNLF)	x						
Philippines (NDF)		x					
Thailand (south)		x					

i. Two previous initiatives are being implemented in Chad: the Doha peace agreement between part of the Chadian insurgency and the government and the commitments made in the National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS). There is also a consultation process for the part of the insurgency that did not sign the Doha agreement facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio.

ii. There are two peace negotiations at the same time in the DRC, involving the Congolese government and the Rwandan government (Luanda process) and the Congolese government and different armed groups in the eastern part of the country (Nairobi process), both with third-party participation.

iii. Although the Republic of Somaliland is not officially recognised as an independent state, this peace process is considered international because the region enjoys de facto recognition as an autonomous administration independent of Somalia.

iv. In 2019, the three peace and negotiating processes that had been taking place in Sudan in the previous year were reduced to one due to the end of the national dialogue between the government and the opposition following the formation of a transitional government, as well as the merger of the cases of Darfur and the “Two Areas” (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) into a single peace process. In 2023, the negotiations were focused on resolving the national armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

v. This refers to the negotiations to resolve intercommunity disputes in the Abyei region and border areas.

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (3)	Negotiations with third parties (30)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (0)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (15)
EUROPE							
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) ^{vi}		x					x
Cyprus		x					
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) ^{vii}							x
Moldova (Transdniestria)		x					
Russia – Ukraine							x
Serbia – Kosovo ^{viii}							x
MIDDLE EAST							
Iran (nuclear programme)							x
Israel – Palestine							x
Palestine		x					
Syria ^{ix}		x					x
Yemen ^x		x					x

vi. In 2023 the dialogue process had two levels. The first were the international negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on normalising their relations, territorial integrity, the delimitation of borders, transport routes and other issues. The second negotiations were between Azerbaijan and representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh, though they were unsuccessful. Azerbaijan's military offensive in 2023 dismantled the structures of the self-proclaimed republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and provoked the exodus of its Armenian population.

vii. The nature of the peace processes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Russia's role in those conflicts, is subject to interpretation. Georgia considers Russia an actor in the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

viii. The peace process between Serbia and Kosovo is considered international. Although Kosovo's legal status is still controversial, it has been recognised as a state by over 100 countries. In 2010, the International Court of Justice handed down a non-binding ruling stating that Kosovo's independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

ix. In Syria, there are parallel negotiating processes involving third parties, some of which are also considered actors in the conflict and interested parties in the negotiations.

x. Intra-Yemeni negotiations remained active in 2023 at the request of the UN, though contacts between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia played a greater role during the year.

internal negotiations in the Philippines (MNLF), India (Assam) and India (Nagaland) took place without third-party support.

In practically all the cases that had a third party (36 of the 40, equivalent to 90%) there was more than one actor performing mediation or facilitation tasks. Thus, in the vast majority of cases there was a set of actors engaged in mediation, facilitation and support for the dialogue, in some cases with collegiate, complementary and coordinated formulas, and in others, and increasingly, with fragmentation or problems of coordination or competition. In contrast, only one third party was observed in other cases, such as Norway in the process in the Philippines (NDF), the United Nations in the process in Papua New Guinea, Malaysia in Thailand (south) or the UN in the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme.

In an international context of multiplicity of mediating actors, these were of diverse types, highlighting intergovernmental organizations –such as the UN, EU, AU and the IGAD, mainly– and state governments, religious organisations and civil society actors, including specialised centres. Intergovernmental organisations played a predominant role, except in Asia and the Pacific, where comparatively they were hardly involved in mediation and facilitation efforts. In line

with the trend established in recent years, the United Nations was the main intergovernmental organisation that participated by supporting peace processes. It was present in different formats (mainly envoys and special representatives and missions) and served various support functions (mediation, co-mediation, verification, ceasefire supervision, assistance, support, the use of good offices and others) in 24 of the 45 processes identified during the year and in 24 of the 40 that involved at least one third party (53% and 60%, respectively). This was a slight dip compared to 2022, in which the UN participated as a third party in 54% of all processes and in 60% of dialogues that had at least a third party. Once again in 2023, the UN was heavily involved in the processes in Africa, where it provided support for 11 of the 18 cases: Chad, Libya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan and South Sudan. However, it was less involved than in the previous year (it participated in 61% of the processes in Africa in 2023, compared to 73% in 2022). This was due to the increase in the number of processes in Africa in which the warring parties opted for other third parties in 2023, such as those in Ethiopia (Oromia), Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan and Somalia-Somaliland.

Other international and regional organisations also played a prominent role, especially regional organisations

in their geographical areas of operation. The EU was the only regional organisation that supported mediation and dialogue outside its regional sphere of action. Therefore, the EU performed a third-party role in 12 processes, including seven in Africa (Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan) and all in Europe with the exception of Russia-Ukraine. It was not involved as a third party in Asia and the Pacific, the Americas or the Middle East. The African Union was a third party in 12 African processes (Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan), similarly to 2022 (11 processes). The IGAD participated in six processes (Ethiopia (Oromia), Ethiopia (Tigray), Sudan, South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan and Somalia). The OSCE was active as a third party in two processes (Georgia and Moldova), though it had declined compared to previous years as a consequence of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the resulting divisions within the organisation. Other organisations such as the OAS, SADC, Arab League, CARICOM, ECOWAS, ASEAN, ECAAS, ICGLR, EAC, OIC, OIF and CELAC had a reduced role, participating as third parties in one or two processes each, but were involved together in 11 different processes: Senegal (Casamance), Colombia (EMC), Colombia (FARC), Mozambique, the DRC, Myanmar, the CAR, Libya, Syria, Haiti and Venezuela-Guyana, highlighting regional organisations' potential for supporting dialogue. New developments in 2023 included CARICOM's involvement in the Haitian crisis and CARICOM and CELAC's involvement in the crisis between Venezuela and Guyana.

Furthermore, together with intergovernmental organisations, a significant number of states became involved as third parties in negotiating processes, often amidst the projection of national interests in an international dispute for hegemony between powers. In line with the trend seen in previous years, in 2023 Middle Eastern countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman and Egypt played a significant role not only in the region itself, but also in other peace processes in Africa, which was the main stage of their diplomatic efforts beyond their immediate area of influence. In 2023, Qatar played a prominent role in contacts between Hamas and Israel that led to a partial one-week truce, exchanges of hostages and prisoners and the temporary lifting of obstacles to accessing humanitarian aid; Egypt, involved in Israel's truce with Islamic Jihad, in the meeting between Hamas and the PA to address intra-Palestinian reconciliation, in the attempts to achieve a permanent ceasefire in Gaza and in the new mechanism established by the Arab league to talk with the Syrian regime. Türkiye was active in several

The UN was involved in 60% of the processes that had at least one third party

Many states became involved as third parties in negotiations, often to project their national interests in an international scenario disputed between powers

negotiating processes in different regions, such as the intra-Palestinian dialogue, the Astana talks in Syria (a conflict in which it is a third party but also an actor and, in practice, a negotiating actor), the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan through the Caucasus 3+3 platform and the processes in Libya, Somalia and Somalia-Somaliland. Norwegian diplomats continued to play a central role in facilitating different processes such as the peace process between the government of Colombia and the ELN and between the Colombian government and EMC, and the talks between the government and the opposition in Venezuela, but they also participated in processes in other regions, such as the negotiations in Sudan and South Sudan and between Somalia and Somaliland. The United States remained involved as a third party with varying degrees of involvement in multiple scenarios, including eight processes in Africa and four in Europe.

Third parties –local, regional and international– got involved through various formats, including support structures. These had different forms and degrees of complexity. Among them, some included only States grouped in diverse structures. This was the case of the guarantor countries (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile) and the supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain) in the talks between the government of Colombia and the ELN, as well as the guarantor countries in the process between the Colombian government and EMC (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Venezuela) and the QUAD in the negotiations over the Sudanese national crisis (the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). Others included a combination of states and/or intergovernmental organisations and in some cases civil society actors. This was the case of the permanent supporters of the processes of Colombia (ELN) and Colombia (EMC), which brought together representatives of the UN and the Catholic Church, as well as the OAS in the process with EMC. Other cases included the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (AU and ECCAS, with support from the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad) and the Third Party Monitoring Team support structure in the process in the Philippines (MILF). In some cases, intergovernmental organisations were coordinated through specific structures, such as the Quartet in Libya, formed by the UN, Arab League, AU and EU; the Trilateral Mechanism in Sudan, involving UNITAMS, the AU and the IGAD; and the Group of International Support in the CAR, made up of the UN and the EU. In other cases, the coordination occurred on a practical level, without specific platforms, as in Venezuela, where in addition to Norway as the main facilitator of the dialogue, Russia and the Netherlands were also involved. In 2023, the dynamics of international

Table 1.4. Intergovernmental organisations as third parties in peace processes in 2023

UNITED NATIONS (UN) (24)	
AFRICA	
Chad	Observation of the peace process facilitated by Qatar
CAR	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for the Central African Republic. The UN is part of the International Support Group for Central Africa (GIS-RCA)
DRC	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the DRC
Libya	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Libya United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) The UN forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and EU
Mali	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mali United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Morocco – Western Sahara	UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Western Sahara United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
Mozambique	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mozambique
Somalia	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)
South Sudan	United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for South Sudan
Sudan	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)
Sudan – South Sudan	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa
AMERICA	
Colombia (ELN)	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Colombia
Colombia (EMC)	UN Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative for Colombia
Colombia (FARC)	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
Venezuela – Guyana	UN Secretary-General
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Peacebuilding Fund Resident Coordinator Office Mediation Support Unit UNDP
EUROPE	
Cyprus	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus Mission of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus Office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus (OSASG)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	United Nations Special Representative in the Geneva International Discussions
Russia – Ukraine	Two UN task forces led by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), involved in the negotiations on the Black Sea Initiative and the Memorandum of Understanding
Serbia – Kosovo	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Kosovo and head of the UNMIK mission
MIDDLE EAST	
Iran	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The UN Secretary-General regularly reports on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which validated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015)
Israel – Palestine	UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
Syria	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria
Yemen	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Yemen United Nations Mission to Support the Hedaydah Agreement (UNMHA)
AFRICAN UNION (AU) (12)	
AFRICA	
CAR	The AU leads the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU with the support of ECCAS, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad)
Chad	Observation of the peace process facilitated by Qatar
DRC	The AU leads the Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC
Ethiopia (Tigray)	AU mediation team led by the AU Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM)

Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	The AU has made facilitation efforts between the three countries
Libya	The AU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the EU, Arab League and UN
Mali	AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel The AU participates in the Mediation Team, which supports the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali
Mozambique	The AU is the guarantor of the peace agreement
Somalia	AU High Representative for Somalia African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)
South Sudan	The AU is part of “IGAD Plus”
Sudan	AU High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) The AU and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) are part of the mediating group
Sudan – South Sudan	African Union Border Programme (AUBP)
EUROPEAN UNION (EU) (12)	
AFRICA	
CAR	The EU is a member of the International Support Group for Central Africa (GIS-RCA)
DRC	The EU delegation in the DRC The EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	The EU has given support to AU facilitation efforts
Libya	The EU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and UN
Mali	The EU Special Representative for the Sahel
Mozambique	The EU Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Mozambique
South Sudan	The EU is part of the mediation group
EUROPE	
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	President of the European Council EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA)
Cyprus	High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia EU Observation Mission in Georgia (EUMM)
Moldova (Transdnistria)	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, in Moldova (Transdnistria) (EUBAM) The EU has an observer role in the 5+2 format of the peace process
Serbia – Kosovo	President of the European Council High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues EU Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) (6)	
Ethiopia (Oromia)	The IGAD has facilitated the peace talks
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Participation in the AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM)
Somalia	IGAD delegation
South Sudan	The IGAD, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda, forms part of “IGAD Plus” in South Sudan
Sudan	The IGAD (Ethiopia, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda)
Sudan – South Sudan	IGAD delegation
ARAB LEAGUE (2)	
AFRICA	
Libya	The Arab League forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, EU and UN
MIDDLE EAST	
Syria	Ministerial liaison committee (interlocution mechanism) with the Syrian government to address the crisis in the country and related challenges in the region
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM) (2)	
Haiti	CARICOM Eminent Persons Group
Venezuela – Guyana	CARICOM presidency (government of Dominica)
ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE) (2)	
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the South Caucasus
Moldova (Transdnistria)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Transdnistrian Settlement Process OSCE Mission in Moldova

ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) (2)	
Colombia (EMC)	Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)
Colombia (FARC)	Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)
SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) (2)	
DRC	SADC representation in the DRC
Mozambique	SADC is the guarantor of the peace agreement
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1)	
Myanmar	ASEAN envoy
COMMUNITY OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STATES (CELAC) (1)	
Venezuela – Guyana	Presidency pro-tempore of CELAC (government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)
EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY (EAC) (1)	
DRC	Facilitation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Nairobi process)
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES (ECCAS) (1)	
CAR	ECCAS delegation in the CAR
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) (1)	
Senegal (Casamance)	Facilitator and guarantor
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION (ICGLR) (1)	
DRC	Facilitation of negotiations between DRC and Rwanda (Luanda process)
ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE LA FRANCOPHONIE (OIF) (1)	
DRC	OIF delegation in the DRC
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC) (1)	
CAR	OIC delegation in the CAR

division and confrontation between powers continued to have a negative impact on joint structures supporting dialogue. Thus, in 2023, for yet another year, platforms such as the OSCE Minsk Group and the Middle East Peace Quartet remained inactive in supporting peace negotiations between Armenia-Azerbaijan and Israel-Palestine, respectively. In Moldova, the 5+2 platform (which involved the parties in conflict, the OSCE as mediator, Ukraine and Russia as mediators-guarantors and the US and the EU as observers) remained inactive as a result of the war between Russia and Ukraine, though its members attended 1+1 format meetings facilitated by the OSCE.

With regard to the **negotiating agendas**, one must consider the particular aspects of each case and bear in mind that the details of the issues under discussion did not always become known to the public. Once again, **the search for truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities** was one of the central subjects of discussion in various peace processes. It was a crucial issue in the Palestinian-Israeli context in the first half of the year, then after the significant escalation of violence starting in October, which activated several different diplomatic initiatives as the weeks passed and alarms about the serious humanitarian crisis and the commission of genocide in Gaza. A ceasefire was also important in the discussions about the future of Yemen, where a de facto cessation of hostilities was maintained during 2023, despite the breakdown of the UN-backed truce agreement. The ceasefire agreements were central to the negotiating

In 2023, the dynamics of international division and confrontation among powers continued to have a negative impact on joint structures supporting dialogue

processes with both the ELN and EMC. These agreements then led to the establishment of mechanisms to verify compliance. The ceasefire agreements were central to the negotiating processes with both the ELN and EMC. These agreements then led to dialogues for the establishment of mechanisms to verify compliance. In

Africa there were cessations of hostilities and ceasefire agreements in different contexts, like in the Ethiopian regions of Oromia and Tigray, Senegal (Casamance), Sudan or the DRC, in relation to the armed groups in the east of the country and especially M23. In contrast to 2022, in the second year of Russia's invasion, the governments of Russia and Ukraine did not resume negotiations regarding a possible ceasefire and remained at loggerheads.

Other important issues were related to **autonomy, self-determination, independence, administrative-territorial set-up and recognition of the identity** of different minorities. This was true of the processes in Cameroon, Ethiopia (Oromia), Ethiopia (Tigray), Mali, Senegal (Casamance), South Sudan, Morocco-Western Sahara, India (Assam and Nagaland), the Philippines (MILF and MNLF), Myanmar, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), Thailand (south), Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Cyprus, Moldova (Transdnestrria), Serbia-Kosovo and others. Most of the negotiations around these issues faced significant obstacles, given many governments' refusal to accept formulas for decentralisation and the recognition of sovereignty. Some negotiations addressed issues related to border demarcation, state sovereignty and mutual

recognition. The outbreak of the armed conflict in Sudan made it difficult to make progress in the negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, especially in resolving the dispute over the Abyei region. Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to encounter obstacles in their negotiations regarding border delimitation and mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The talks between Venezuela and Guyana were focused on establishing confidence-building, communicating and easing tension to address the territorial dispute between both countries after Venezuela held a referendum on annexing the Essequibo region, which is under the sovereignty and administration of Guyana and claimed by Venezuela.

Issues related to the **governance** of countries and political transitions, the distribution of power and elections were also addressed. In Africa, governance issues were present in ongoing negotiations in various contexts, including Chad, Mali, the CAR, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. In the Americas, the negotiating agendas in Haiti and Venezuela were notably linked to elections, considered key for moving ahead in their respective transitions.

As in previous years, other topics in the negotiations included **security sector reform and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants**. These were widely present in negotiating processes in Africa, such as in Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mozambique, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Senegal (Casamance), Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. In Sudan, disagreements between the military parties over reforming the security sector, especially regarding the deadlines for integrating the RSF into the unified national army and establishing the command structure, spiked tensions and led to fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF paramilitary group. In contrast, in Mozambique, the disarmament and demobilisation of former RENAMO combatants provided for in the 2019 agreement was completed. In Asia and the Pacific, there was related progress in the Philippines (MILF). In the Philippines, the MILF and the government oversaw the third phase of the disarmament and demobilisation of former MILF combatants, which began in 2015 and has so far included 26,145 of the 40,000 former combatants included in the 2014 peace agreement. Other negotiating issues during the year included prisoner exchanges, such as in Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine and Yemen, and other humanitarian challenges, including access to humanitarian aid, as well as procedural issues, especially in Asian negotiating processes.

There were setbacks in 2023 in Mali, Sudan, South Korea-North Korea, Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and the crisis in Gaza

In Africa, the processes in Eritrea-Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Oromia), Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan, Libya, Morocco-Western Sahara, the DRC, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan were beset by many difficulties, impasse and crises

Regarding the **evolution of peace processes and negotiating processes**, it is generally possible to identify a wide variety of trends: a good development of contacts that leads to the achievement of far-reaching agreements; establishment of negotiations where there were none or reactivation of dialogue after years of paralysis; intense efforts of an exploratory nature that arouse expectations; negotiating rounds that take place without making progress on key points, but that keep a channel of dialogue open; situations of deep blockade and lack of contact despite the efforts of third parties to facilitate a negotiation; obstacles and difficulties already in the phase of implementation of agreements; and contexts in which violence and violations of ceasefire agreements and hostilities have a profound impact on the prospects for peace processes. The analysis of the different cases in 2023 confirms this diversity of dynamics.

In 2023, most dialogue and negotiating processes suffered setbacks and serious difficulties. The setbacks were largely due to escalations in violence, especially in Mali and Sudan in Africa. In Mali the resumption of clashes in the north of the country between the Malian Armed Forces and the armed groups that signed the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement put its continuity at risk. In Sudan the start of a new armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) broke off the negotiations aimed at achieving a political transition and establishing a civilian government in the country. Furthermore, hopeful initiatives conceived during months of discreet effort for the cases of Cameroon and Somalia-Somaliland failed a few days after their announcement. Constitutional referendums were held in Chad and the CAR as part of the implementation of previous agreements, but they were controversial and represented significant setbacks in democratic governance. In Asia and the Pacific relations between South Korea and North Korea deteriorated significantly during the year, to the point that both countries suspended the 2018 agreement in which both countries had committed to improving their bilateral relations and actively negotiating in favour of reunification. In Europe there was a great setback when Azerbaijan's military offensive eliminated the option of a negotiated solution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, forced the exodus of the Armenian population from the enclave and added a new regional and global benchmark for the use of force to settle disputes. In the Middle East, various initiatives to resolve the crisis in Gaza, which witnessed an unprecedented level of violence, failed to achieve

a permanent ceasefire by the end of the year and the situation continued to deteriorate in December.

Many negotiating processes also faced serious problems and in some cases ran aground in 2023. In Africa, the processes in Eritrea-Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Oromia), Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan, Libya, Morocco-Western Sahara, the DRC, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan were beset by many difficulties, impasse and crises. Five years after a historic peace agreement was signed between Eritrea and Ethiopia, alarms were raised due to troop movements on their shared border and there was no contact between the parties alongside reports of possible Eritrean support for the Amhara Fano militias, which were fighting against the Ethiopian security forces after having been their allies months before. Talks began between the Ethiopian government and the armed group OLA to settle the high-intensity conflict in the Ethiopian region of Oromia, but no specific agreements were reached. Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan also agreed to resume talks on the dispute over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), but no progress was made in the various rounds. In Libya, there continued to be no agreement to hold elections, initially scheduled for 2021, and obstacles to the negotiating process persisted overall. In the DRC, regional initiatives for a negotiated solution failed due to the escalation of the M23's offensive and tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. In South Sudan, despite some progress made at the beginning of the year, new tensions arose later between the parties that had signed the 2018 agreement, threatening the unity of the transitional government. Similarly, no significant progress was reported in the peace talks in Rome that the South Sudanese government is holding with the armed groups that had not signed the 2018 peace agreement, though the negotiations were resumed after having been called off in late 2022. In Asia and the Pacific, there were major disagreements between Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government, while the negotiating process in India (Nagaland) reached a standstill and no headway was made between the US and North Korea.

In the Americas, the negotiating process in Haiti hit significant snags, despite some progress in attempting to reach some mutual understanding, such as the appointment of the CARICOM Eminent Persons Group. Europe continued to deal with entrenched and aggravated difficulties since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, highlighted in the negotiating processes in Georgia and Moldova. Even though an agreement was reached at the beginning of the year to advance the normalisation of

relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the process faced underlying difficulties amidst the deteriorating situation in northern Kosovo. In the Middle East, the negotiating process in Syria continued with no prospects for a political solution to the armed conflict, which reported an escalation in violence at the end of the year. Furthermore, the situation in Gaza had regional repercussions, spreading uncertainty and greater difficulties in other contexts. Thus, by the year's end, the relatively positive prospects in the Yemeni negotiating process were in question due to the regional impact of the crisis in Gaza and the escalation in the Red Sea. The situation in Gaza also affected the intra-Palestinian reconciliation process, which raised very few expectations before the events of October, and negatively influenced the context of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme. Overall, it was not possible to reactivate high-level negotiations in the scenarios in Morocco-Western Sahara, Russia-Ukraine and Cyprus during the year.

In this landscape of obstacles, the rise in polarisation, division and geopolitical confrontation worldwide hampered peacebuilding efforts and increased military approaches to the crises. Conflicts with a great capacity for spillover that were also caught in dynamics of geopolitical confrontation, such as the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts, as well as the responses to them, revealed challenges such as growing global militarism, double standards, international divisions in responses, the increasing use of force to settle disputes and the weakening of the multilateral system.

Despite the setbacks and problems experienced in many negotiating processes, others enjoyed rapprochement and progress. In Africa, this was true of the cases of Mozambique, where the disarmament and demobilisation of former RENAMO combatants provided for in the 2019 peace agreement was completed; Senegal (Casamance), where a peace agreement was signed between the government and one of the MFDC factions that provides for the disarmament and reintegration of combatants, development projects in the region and action to allow the refugee population to return; and Ethiopia (Tigray), due to the progress in implementing the 2022 peace agreement between the federal government and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region, which in 2023 included the almost complete withdrawal of all armed groups and Eritrean forces and beginning of the effective disarmament of Tigrayan combatants. However, this progress in Ethiopia (Tigray) was accompanied by fragility and violence against civilians and was also

The rise in polarisation, division and geopolitical confrontation worldwide hampered peacebuilding efforts and increased military approaches to the crises

Despite the setbacks and problems in many negotiating processes, others enjoyed rapprochement and progress, such as in Mozambique, Senegal (Casamance), Ethiopia (Tigray), the Philippines (NDF, MILF, MRLF), Thailand (south) and India (Assam)

Table 1.5. Main agreements of 2023

Peace processes	Agreements
Colombia (ELN)	In June, the government of Colombia and the ELN reached a temporary bilateral nationwide ceasefire agreement by which they committed to putting an end to offensive actions. The agreement was initially valid for 180 days and was planned to begin on 3 August 2023. The agreement also provided for the formation of a Monitoring and Verification Mechanism.
Colombia (EMC)	In October, the government of Colombia and EMC reached a temporary bilateral nationwide ceasefire agreement that allowed peace negotiations to officially begin. The ceasefire was initially agreed to be valid from 16 October 2023 to 16 January 2024 and the protocols of the Oversight, Monitoring and Verification Mechanism were also agreed.
Philippines (NDF)	After six years of impasse in the negotiating process, in late November the government of the Philippines and the NDF signed the Oslo Joint Communiqué by which they committed to resolving the armed conflict peacefully and to establishing a negotiating framework that would lead to a peace agreement.
Israel – Palestine	After Qatar’s mediation, supported by Egypt and the USA, the Israeli government and Hamas reached an agreement to temporarily suspend hostilities that remained in force between 24 and 30 November 2023. The initial agreement was planned to last for four days, during which the release of 50 hostages captured by Hamas was scheduled to occur in exchange for the release of 150 Palestinian prisoners. The mechanism, which was designed to encourage an extension of the agreement beyond this initial period, also provided access to humanitarian aid and fuel in the Gaza Strip. The agreement was extended, first for 48 hours, then for another 24, and led to the release of over 100 people held by Hamas (86 Israelis and 24 foreigners) and the release of nearly 240 Palestinian women and children, many of them detained by Israel under the controversial label of “administrative detention”. The exchange was assisted by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Senegal (Casamance)	In May, a peace agreement was signed with a faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance MFDC faction, called the Diakaye faction. The signing ceremony was attended by the envoy of President Macky Sall; the mayors of Ziguinchor, Bindiona and Douloulou, the commander of the Diakaye faction, Fatoma Coly; and members of the international community. For the past three years, civil society organisations based in Ziguinchor devoted to peacebuilding in the Senegambia region under the Sub-regional Coordinator for Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Casamance (COSPAC) have been mediating between the parties. The agreement provides for the disarmament and reintegration of combatants, the implementation of development projects in the Casamance region, the delivery of birth certificates to people who did not have access to them due to the instability and measures to ensure the peaceful return of all refugees.
Serbia – Kosovo	The president of Serbia and the prime minister of Kosovo gave verbal support to the Agreement on the Path towards the Normalisation of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia on 27 February, as well as its implementation annex (Ohrid Agreement) of 18 March, both proposed by the EU and supported by Kosovo and Serbia as part of the dialogue process facilitated by the EU. The February agreement, with 11 articles, included issues such as the parties’ commitment to mutual recognition of their respective national documents and symbols, without requiring Serbia to formally recognise Kosovo as a state; Serbia’s non-objection to Kosovo’s entry into international organisations; both parties’ pledge to establish ways to ensure an “appropriate level” of self-government for the Kosovo Serb community; an obligation to implement previous agreements; and the continuation of EU-facilitated talks to reach a legally binding agreement for the comprehensive normalisation of relations. The March annex included content and procedural aspects. Despite the verbal support for the agreement and the annex, difficulties arose very quickly, hand in hand with disagreements on substantive issues.
Sudan	The warring parties (SAF and RSF) agreed to and signed the Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan on 11 May. It was the result of the “pre-negotiation talks” promoted and mediated by the US and Saudi Arabia in the city of Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) on 6 May. However, despite the achievement of this declaration, the parties to the conflict continued to commit violence against the civilian population.
Sudan – South Sudan	At the intercommunity level, agreements were reached between communities in the Abyei region during the year. First, the Dinka Ngok and Dinka Twic communities agreed to an end to hostilities, a ceasefire, the deployment of security forces in the disputed areas to create a buffer zone and freedom of movement between the areas affected by tensions in the southern part of the Abyei area and the northern part of Warrap State (South Sudan). Second, the Dinka Ngok and Miseriya communities signed an agreement that included a cessation of hostilities, freedom of movement, the need to reactivate the joint community peace committee and the continuation of the peace talks. The agreement was reached as part of a peace conference between the parties between 20 and 23 March in Todach (Abyei area).
Venezuela – Guyana	In mid-December, shortly after the escalation of the diplomatic crisis that was caused by the Venezuelan referendum on the disputed territory of Essequibo, the presidents of both countries met in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and signed the Joint Declaration of Argyle for Dialogue and Peace, by which they committed not to threaten each other or use force against each other, to refrain from escalating the conflict and to cooperate to avoid incidents on the ground (and, if they occur, to immediately communicate with each other, and also with CARICOM, CELAC and the president of Brazil). President Maduro and President Ali also committed to establishing a joint commission of foreign ministers to address mutually agreed upon issues, to continue the dialogue on the dispute and to meet again in Brazil in the next three months. Finally, it was agreed that any dispute between the two countries would be resolved in accordance with international law, including the 1966 Geneva Agreement. At the same time, however, Guyana clearly expressed its commitment to the process and procedures of the International Court of Justice to resolve the border controversy.

overshadowed by the serious escalation of violence in the neighbouring Ethiopian region of Amhara. Major progress was achieved in various negotiating processes in Asia and the Pacific. For example, the Philippine government and the NDF signed a joint communiqué in which they pledged to try to resolve their armed conflict through dialogue after a six-year hiatus in the negotiations. Other developments in the Philippines involved the completion of the third phase of the

demobilisation of former MILF combatants, as well as the resumption of talks with the two main factions of the MNLF regarding the full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement. The negotiating processes in Thailand (south) and India (Assam) also benefited from important progress. The processes in Colombia (ELN and EMC) and Venezuela ranged between progress with the achievement of important agreements and moments of crisis and serious problems.

Finally, regarding the **gender, peace and security agenda**, the analysis of the different peace processes in 2023 confirms, like in previous years, the obstacles that women face in participating in formal processes and the difficulties in incorporating a gender perspective in negotiation. The peace processes continued to be characterised mainly by low levels of **women's participation in the negotiating and mediating teams** and by a lack of integration of the gender perspective in designing the processes. For the most part, no specific mechanisms of participation were designed for women in most negotiations and gender issues and recognition of the rights of women and the LGBTIQ+ population were left out of much of the negotiating agendas. There were setbacks in some negotiating processes during the year. The peace process in Mali, one of the few that had women participating in the monitoring mechanisms of the peace agreement (in this case the 2015 Algiers peace agreement), was endangered by the resumption of fighting in the northern part of the country between the parties that had signed it. Even though the peace agreement in South Sudan included a 35% quota for women in all executive and transitional institutions and processes, the requirement was not met in most cases, in most of the commissions created to implement the agreement or in the current government or Parliament. In the bodies created in 2023, the agreed quota of women's representation was only respected in the Council of Political Parties (40%), but not in the National Constitutional Review Commission (32%) or in the National Electoral Commission (22%).

Even so, there were several processes in which women could participate, though with many limitations. In Africa, in the process of Somalia-Somaliland, the former minister of Somaliland, Edna Adan Ismail, was appointed Somaliland's envoy for the talks. In the CAR, the proportion of women in local peace and reconciliation committees has increased since the 2019 agreement was signed and stood at 35% in 2023, according to the UN. In the Philippines, in the peace process between the Philippine government and the NDF, the group's negotiating panel was headed by a woman (Juliet de Lima) and the Norwegian government's facilitation work was led by Kristina Lie Revheim. Several women played significant roles in different peace processes in the Americas. In the negotiations between the government of Colombia and the ELN, a woman was appointed the chief negotiator of a delegation for the first time when Vera Grabe became the head of the government's team. Both parties' negotiating delegations were practically equal (seven women out of 15 in the government's delegation and three out of eight in the ELN's delegation). LGBTIQ+

There were setbacks in the gender dimension of the peace processes in Mali and South Sudan in 2023

Women's civil society organisations from Sudan, Serbia-Kosovo, Cyprus, Yemen and elsewhere demanded dialogue and inclusion in the negotiating processes

organisations were involved in efforts to channel the participation of civil society alongside the negotiating process with the ELN. Women also participated in the delegations of the government of Colombia and EMC. The Special Women's Instance for the Implementation of the Gender-Based Approach, which was defined by the 2016 peace agreement between Colombia and the FARC, continued to be active in implementing it. Senator Mirlande Manigat was appointed president of the High Transition Council of Haiti, tasked with promoting national dialogue and advising the prime minister in promoting and managing the transition in the country. In Europe, only the negotiating process in Cyprus had a gender-specific mechanism in the formal negotiating process, the gender equality technical committee. However, some analyses during the year highlighted

the lack of implementation of the action plan adopted by the equality committee in 2022 in Cyprus. In Georgia, government representatives participating in the negotiating process continued to hold meetings with civil society representatives, including women's organisations, though female civil society activists had identified gender limitations in the negotiating process in previous years. The Women's Advisory Board on Sustainable Peacebuilding (WAB) was active in Moldova. Established in late 2022 by UN Women, this informal body is composed of 14 experts and civil society representatives, including seven from the right bank of the Nistru/Dniestr River and seven from the left. However, there were no meetings between the OSCE, the mediating actor in the negotiating process, and the WAB in 2023, according to the OSCE. In the Middle East, women's participation in Syria continued to be affected by the deadlock in the negotiations, particularly the UN-backed Geneva process, where they had achieved 30% participation in the Constitutional Committee.

Regarding the **inclusion of a gender approach, specific clauses on gender equality and recognition of women's rights in peace agreements**, some references were made to the women, peace and security agenda in the ceasefire agreement between the Colombian government and EMC. References were also made to the inclusion of diversity in the agreement with EMC. New national action plans on women, peace and security were approved during the year, such as in the Philippines (2023-2033) and in South Sudan and Moldova (in the latter two cases, these are second-generation action plans, for the period 2023-2027). Moreover, South Sudan ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (known as the Maputo Protocol).

Civil society women's organisations were highly active in various peace processes and demanded continuity in

the negotiations, greater participation or the inclusion of proposals regarding more recognition of women's rights or general suggestions regarding the content of the negotiations. For example, since the outbreak of armed clashes between the SAF and the RSF in Sudan, different initiatives led by women emerged that called for a ceasefire, highlighted humanitarian needs and condemned sexual violence related to the conflict. They also demanded the participation of women in the ceasefire negotiations and any future political process and denounced the failure to include women in these spaces. Furthermore, Sudanese women's rights groups participated together with other civil society organisations in issuing the Declaration of Principles of

Civil Actors for Ending the War and Restoring Democracy in Sudan in July 2023, which brought together 75 organisations. In Europe, women's organisations and activists from Serbia, Kosovo, Cyprus and elsewhere engaged in confidence-building initiatives, called for dialogue and demanded more female participation in the respective negotiating processes. Yemeni women continued to complain of their exclusion from these areas and demanded to participate in discussions about the future of their country as a right, as they continued to be involved in mediating local disputes, reintegrating child soldiers, opening humanitarian corridors and documenting abuses, while taking the gender perspective into account.