

3. Peace negotiations in America

- In America there were seven negotiations during 2024, 13% of the world total.
- The peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and the ELN underwent a major crisis that led to their suspension for several months and the breakdown of the ceasefire, though they were resumed at the end of the year.
- The peace process between the Colombian government and EMC was hindered by the division of the armed group.
- Peace negotiations began between the Colombian government and the armed group Segunda Marquetalia, though the process was fragmented by internal divisions among the insurgents.
- CARICOM facilitated an agreement between several Haitian political forces on the political transition in Haiti.
- Trust between the parties in Venezuela was seriously weakened by the political crisis set off by the results of the presidential election held in July.

This chapter provides an analysis of the main peace processes and negotiations in the Americas in 2024, both the general characteristics and trends of the negotiations and the development of each case on both continents throughout the year, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda. In addition, at the beginning of the chapter there is a map identifying the countries in the Americas that hosted peace negotiations during 2024.

Table 3.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in America in 2024

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Colombia (ELN)	Government, ELN	Guarantor countries (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile); permanent supporters (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, Episcopal Conference of Colombia); supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Colombia (EMC) ¹	Government, Estado Mayor Central (EMC)	Permanent supporters (Episcopal Conference of Colombia, World Council of Churches, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia), guarantor countries (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Venezuela)
Colombia (FARC)	Government, Comunes	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute)
Colombia (Segunda Marquetalia)	Government, Segunda Marquetalia	Guarantor countries (Venezuela and Norway); permanent supporters (Delegate of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Episcopal Conference of Colombia)
Haiti	Government, social and political opposition	CARICOM Eminent Persons Group
Venezuela	Government, social and political opposition	Norway, Russia, the Netherlands
Venezuela – Guyana	Venezuela, Guyana	CELAC, CARICOM, Brazil, United Nations, Cuba

3.1 Negotiations in 2024: regional trends

There were seven negotiating processes in the Americas in 2024, one more than the previous year, when a peace process with the armed group Segunda Marquetalia

began in Colombia. This new process joined the six that were already active in 2023, consolidating an upward trend in the Americas, since two new negotiating processes had also begun the previous year. Colombia had the most peace processes in the Americas, with four, as well as several initiatives to reach out to other armed groups. These were talks with the active armed groups

¹ In July, the peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and the armed group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) were reclassified as negotiations with the EMC blocs Comandante Jorge Suárez Briceño, Comandante Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio and Frente Comandante Raúl Reyes de las FARC-EP after some EMC factions pulled out of the negotiations.

Map 3.1. Peace negotiations in America in 2024



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in America in 2024

ELN, EMC and Segunda Marquetalia and a dialogue focused on implementing the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the former armed group FARC-EP signed in 2016. In Venezuela, two negotiating processes remained active: one focused on talks with the country's political and social opposition and one between the Venezuelan government and the Guyanese government over the disputed region of Essequibo. Finally, the negotiating process in Haiti continued, aimed at completing a transition in the country. Thus, the seven negotiating processes that took place in the Americas accounted for 13% of the total worldwide.

All the peace processes that took place in 2024 had governments of the different countries as one of the negotiating **actors**. However, the negotiations in the Americas were characterised by the great diversity of the actors involved. Active armed groups participated in three of the negotiating processes, all of them in Colombia (the ELN, EMC and Segunda Marquetalia). These three groups established negotiating delegations that represented them at the table. However, there were splits within these insurgent groups during the year and their internal fragmentation had important consequences for the different negotiating processes,

There were seven negotiating processes in the Americas in 2024, one more than in 2023, consolidating an upward trend in the region

causing serious crisis episodes. In the negotiations over the implementation of the 2016 Colombian peace agreement, Bogotá negotiated with the Comunes party, which emerged from the transformation of the FARC-EP armed group. The other negotiating processes involved different types of actors, including political and social actors and different state governments. The negotiating process in Haiti brought together different political and social actors to promote the country's political transition. Thus, at different times and in different formats, the actors included the interim government, which during the year had three different prime ministers, and the Transitional Presidential Council, which brought together representatives of seven political forces and civil society. In Venezuela, there were some meetings between the government and the political and social opposition, represented by the Unitary Platform, in a negotiating process beset by serious obstacles. The dialogue between the governments of Venezuela and Guyana, the only international negotiating process in the Americas, also continued with great difficulties. There were some attempts at dialogue and rapprochement with armed criminal groups in Colombia and Haiti, such as the Clan del Golfo in Colombia (a narco-paramilitary group) and some of the armed gangs operating in Haiti.

All the peace processes that took place in the Americas involved external actors playing supporting, facilitating or mediating roles, among other activities. There was continuity in the mediating actors compared to previous years, meaning that most of the facilitating actors were international. Their main efforts were exerted to bring the parties in dispute closer together, supporting peace processes to put an end to the different active conflicts. As in previous years, the international actors were governments, such as Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico, Chile, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Ireland, Russia and the Netherlands, and international or regional organisations, such as the UN, OAS, CELAC and CARICOM. In the line of continuity mentioned above, several governments remained involved in more than one process. Norway was once again the most active country, as it was involved in four negotiating processes, one more than the previous year: Colombia (ELN), Colombia (EMC), Colombia (Segunda Marquetalia) and Venezuela. Cuba and Brazil continued to support the negotiations with the ELN and the dialogue between Venezuela and Guyana, whilst Venezuela continued to support the negotiating processes with the ELN and EMC. The most active international organisation was the UN, which was involved in all the peace processes in Colombia (the ELN, EMC, Segunda Marquetalia and the FARC). The UN also participated in the talks between Venezuela and Guyana. There was a wide variety of formats for third parties participating in the negotiating processes in the Americas, playing different roles, coordinating as guarantor countries (in the negotiations with the ELN, EMC and Segunda Marquetalia), supporting countries (talks with the ELN) and acting as permanent companions (conversations with the ELN, EMC and Segunda Marquetalia), in addition to CARICOM's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) in Haiti and the international component to verify implementation of the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia.

In keeping with the variety of conflicts and tensions they were trying to address, as well as the characteristics and types of both the actors and the processes, the negotiating agendas were also characterised by heterogeneity. Thus, the issues addressed ranged from possible ceasefires and cessations of hostilities to electoral issues and others related to political transitions, as well as interstate agreements to address disputed territories. The negotiations in Haiti were related to the possibilities of a political transition in the country and the governability of this transition amidst intense violence and enormous governmental fragility. Even though most negotiations in Colombia were with

The peace processes in the Americas underwent crises and were beset by serious obstacles that endangered their continuity

Women were involved in and played leading roles in most negotiating processes in the Americas, but transformative agendas for gender equality were not consolidated

active armed groups and were pursued as part of the Colombian government's public policy known as Total Peace, which helps us to identify some similarities between the different processes, each process had peculiar features. The most unique process was the dialogue for implementing the 2016 peace agreement, as it was related to the application of an agreement that had already been signed. The issue of the ceasefire was central to the negotiations with the ELN, though kidnappings and the participation of civil society were also significant matters that occupied a central place on the agenda. The ceasefire was also fundamental in the negotiations with EMC, to which were added the issues of deforestation and the environmental agenda. A five-point agenda was created for the negotiations with Segunda Marquetalia: de-escalation of the conflict and the preparation of peace territories; the construction of peace territories; victims as a transformative social subject; conditions for peaceful coexistence; implementation and verification. Later, when the process changed after some factions left, a new agenda was agreed upon: territorial transformation; security in territories and for communities; measures and routes of legal security for members of guerrilla structures; and political participation. In the negotiations between the Venezuelan government and the opposition, the central issue was related to different aspects of the elections (registration, observation and timetable), though no agreement was reached on the matter. Finally, the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana revolved around the status of the territory of Essequibo. Both countries claim sovereignty over the region, which is currently being administered by Guyana.

Most negotiating processes trended rather negatively, with serious crisis episodes in several and various obstacles hindering continuity and the achievement of agreements between the parties. Although all the processes were still active at the end of the year, some had transformed significantly and there were fears that they would not continue in 2025. One factor that hampered the positive development of the different negotiating processes in Colombia was the fragmentation and division of the armed actors. This was the case of the ELN and the Comuneros del Sur front, which demanded its own process. The same happened with EMC, whose splintering led the talks to continue with the Comandante Jorge Suárez Briceño, Comandante Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio and Frente Comandante Raúl Reyes de las FARC-EP blocs, whereas the groups under the command of Iván Mordisco pulled out of the process and resumed the armed conflict. Segunda Marquetalia also split and

the process continued only with the factions grouped under the name *Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano*. Thus, many of the actors involved in the peace processes abandoned them at different times of the year. Two steps were taken to ensure continuity and positive outcomes in the negotiations to implement the peace agreement with the FARC: the approval of a shock plan for implementation and a bill to extend the implementation period until 2038, lengthening it by eight years. No progress was noted in the negotiations in Venezuela. In fact, the dialogue was interrupted for most of the year, with no prospects for resuming it as a result of tensions over holding elections. No headway was made in the negotiations between Venezuela and Guyana either and there was hardly any contact between the parties. Finally, although an agreement was reached to form a Transitional Presidential Council in Haiti that would make the appointment of a new prime minister possible, the violence in the country curbed further progress and blocked any resolution of the political and security crisis there.

Regarding the **gender, peace and security agenda**, women participated in and played leadership roles in most of the peace processes that took place in the Americas, but that did not mean that transformative agendas for gender equality were consolidated and it was not a central topic of discussion in the different peace processes. All the peace processes in Colombia included women in the different negotiating delegations of the government and the various armed opposition groups. Vera Grabe stayed on as head of the government delegation in the negotiations with the ELN after her appointment in 2023 and the government delegations in all the negotiations involved women, though the only government delegation with gender equality was the one involved in talks with the ELN. The rest of the delegations were overrepresented by men to the detriment of gender equality. There was a high level of female participation in both the government's and the opposition's delegations in the negotiations in Venezuela. In Haiti, one woman was involved the Transitional Presidential Council as an observer, Régine Abraham. In Colombia, a National Action Plan was approved to implement UNSC Resolution 1325 and the women, peace and security agenda as a result of a participatory process that included women's civil society organisations.

Finally, alongside the negotiating processes analysed in this chapter, the Colombian government announced the beginning of talks with the narco-paramilitary group known as Clan del Golfo as part of Total Peace, a public policy that seeks to build peace in the country by involving all active armed actors.

3.2 Case study analysis

North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Haiti	
Negotiating actors	Government, political and social opposition
Third parties	Core Group (UN, OAS, EU and Germany, France, Brazil, Canada, Spain and US Governments), "Mediation Committee" (made up of three representatives of religious, academic and business organisations)
Relevant agreements	--

Summary:

In recent years, especially after former President Jean Bertrand Aristide left the country in February 2004 and the subsequent deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH), there have been several attempts at consultation and dialogue between various political and social sectors to cope with the institutional fragility, political-social polarisation and economic and security crisis facing the country. Yet none of these initiatives, most of which agreements or have led to permanent or stable spaces or mechanisms for negotiation. Though President Jovenel Moïse's mandate has been controversial since its inception after he was accused of electoral fraud in the 2015 election, his attempts to create a national dialogue in 2019 came in response to the deepening crisis in mid-2018 and the outbreak of protests and episodes of violence in 2019.

Alongside a coalition of armed gangs' unprecedented rise in violence and expansion of territorial control, **in March CARICOM facilitated negotiations and a subsequent agreement between political parties and civil society organisations to begin a political transition** culminating in elections in late 2025. This would make them the first elections in Haiti since 2016. Meanwhile, the leader of the coalition of armed gangs that de facto controls most of the capital, Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier, offered to start a national dialogue with the government on several occasions, sparking major discussions among Haitian politicians and society on whether or not it was a good idea to enter into negotiations with representatives of armed groups. Intra-Haitian negotiations on a political transition facilitated by CARICOM picked up steam in late February after an alliance between the country's two main armed group coalitions, G9 and G-Pèp, unleashed a massive wave of violence, looting and attacks on police stations, government buildings, shops, ports and airports, hospitals, schools and prisons. This explosion of violence also happened when the prime minister at the time, Ariel Henry, was in Kenya to implement the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS). Despite declaring a state of emergency, the government could not regain control of the situation, which quickly undermined confidence placed in Prime Minister Henry by Haiti's main political forces and members of the international community. Faced with threats of civil war from the main leader of the

armed gangs and the possibility of a transitional government led by former rebel Guy Philippe, who had recently returned to the country after serving a six-year sentence in the US and had direct contacts with the country's armed gangs, CARICOM called on Haiti's main political groups and civil society organisations to convene an emergency meeting in Jamaica. **Following intense negotiations between the parties, they agreed to form a nine-member Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) consisting of representatives of the seven main political forces and two civil society representatives, the latter without the right to vote. The primary functions of the CPT were to appoint a new prime minister and to create suitable conditions to hold new elections and deploy the MSS.** Having assumed the powers and responsibilities of the presidency, which had been officially vacant after the assassination of Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, the CPT will remain active until a new president is elected or until February 2026, whichever comes first. Having declared that the key principles of the transition would be security, constitutional reform and elections, the CPT took office in late April, coinciding with the previously announced resignation of Ariel Henry. In May, the CPT appointed Gary Conille as the new prime minister of Haiti and agreed that its chairmanship would rotate every five months.

CARICOM's Eminent Persons Group (EPG), made up of the former prime ministers of Saint Lucia, Jamaica and the Bahamas, conducted good offices to support the entire political transition process in Haiti throughout the year, guaranteeing implementation of the agreements reached and facilitating negotiations between Haitian actors. There were also meetings between CARICOM's heads of government, the CPT and the prime minister to try to manage the growing tensions between the CPT and Prime Minister Gary Conille, which led Conille to step down in early November. He was replaced by Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.

There was also speculation during the year that the government could strike up talks or negotiations with the armed gangs active in the country. In late March, amidst discussions about the formation of a transitional government after Henry had announced his resignation, Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier, the main leader of Viv Ansanm, the alliance between G9 and G-Pèp, said he was willing to announce a ceasefire and even to lay down part of his arsenal if his group was included in negotiations on Haiti's political future that were not predetermined by the international community. Later, in July, **Chérizier urged Prime Minister Conille to start a national dialogue that would include his group**, said he was ready to let someone from the Haitian diaspora facilitate it and announced that his alliance had written down its strategy to end the violence and lay down its weapons. Chérizier also argued that the armed gangs should be considered rebel groups and not exclusively criminal ones. Conille agreed to these talks soon afterwards, though he also made it clear that justice should be served to the victims of the armed gangs. Meanwhile, the spokesman

and principal rapporteur of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (CND-DR), an agency created by the government to negotiate with the armed gangs to disarm and reintegrate, said that it was urgent and inevitable that the government negotiate directly with the armed gangs to stabilise the country. He also asked the government for resources and clear political guidelines to perform his work, and especially to begin talks in which the demands and proposals of the armed gangs can be heard. However, many political groups and civil society organisations were opposed to any dialogue with the armed groups or to giving them any concessions, such as an amnesty.

South America

Colombia (ELN)	
Negotiating actors	Government, ELN
Third parties	Guarantor countries (Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile) United Nations Verification Mission, Catholic Church, supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Relevant agreements	"Heaven's Door" Agreement (1988)

Summary:

Since the ELN emerged in 1964, various negotiating processes have tried to bring peace to the country. The first negotiations between the Colombian government and the ELN date from 1991 (Caracas and Tlaxcala). In 1998, both parties signed a peace agreement in Madrid that envisaged holding a national convention. That same year, the "Puerta del Cielo" agreement between the ELN and civil society activists was signed in Mainz, Germany, focused on humanitarian aspects. In 1999, the Colombian government and the ELN resumed meetings in Cuba, which ended in June 2000. The government of Álvaro Uribe resumed peace negotiations with the ELN in Cuba between 2005 and 2007, though no results were achieved. At the end of 2012, the ELN showed its willingness to open new negotiations with President Juan Manuel Santos, appointing a negotiating commission, and exploratory meetings were held. Formal peace negotiations began in 2017, which broke off in 2019 after a serious attack by the ELN in Bogotá.

The peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the ELN were plagued by serious problems throughout the year, including their suspension between 18 September and 19 November, when they were resumed. Meanwhile, the ceasefire agreement that had been in force for a year was broken. The year began with a new round of talks in Havana in January and February in which the parties agreed to extend the ceasefire agreement for 180 more days and in which the ELN also pledged to halt its kidnappings for economic purposes (or "economic retentions", as the armed group calls them) for six months. The parties also agreed to create a multi-donor fund for the peace process to finance the agreements reached at the negotiating table. However, following the sixth round of talks, **the process was mired in crisis in March**

when the Colombian government began a dialogue with Frente Comuner del Sur, the name of the ELN branch in Nariño. Though they were initially held as regional peace talks, in which local authorities from Nariño also participated, Frente Comuner del Sur's disengagement from the ELN caused a crisis in the peace process. Frente Comuner del Sur asked Bogotá to formalise their dialogue separately and the Peace Commissioner indicated that they met the requirements to be classified as an Armed Opposition Group, which gave legitimacy to their request. The ELN rejected Frente Comuner del Sur's talks with the government, blasting them as an affront and even accusing them of involving government infiltrators. As a result, the talks with the ELN stalled, though they were not officially suspended. However, the dialogue with Frente Comuner del Sur moved ahead and was formalised with an agreement on a three-point negotiating agenda including the reduction of violence, territorial transformation and the reintegration of Frente Comuner del Sur combatants' into civilian life. Despite the crisis, an agreement was reached between the government and the ELN in May regarding the participation of civil society in peacebuilding.

The ceasefire agreement reached between the parties in 2023 was not renewed after it expired on 3 August as a result of the crisis of confidence between the parties arising from Frente Comuner del Sur's split from the ELN and separate negotiations. The ELN said it would give the government 20 days after the ceasefire ended to remove it from the list of Organised Armed Groups (OAG). This is a sensitive issue, since OAG classification establishes the level of lethal force that can be used against these groups under international humanitarian law (IHL). Vera Grabe, the head of the government delegation, said that this was an issue that was on the table, just like other points on the agenda, but that it could not be resolved by an ultimatum. In mid-August, the government negotiating delegation sent the ELN a confidential proposal drafted by Colombian President Gustavo Petro to resume the talks. President Petro later made this proposal public, writing on the social network X that it was intended to "make viable the proposal on economic reform agreed with the ELN, which was signed as the first point of agreement, with the business community and social movement of Colombia to discuss mechanisms for its implementation". The ELN rejected this proposal. Both the United Nations and the Catholic Church had called for the ceasefire to be extended for a few weeks to give time to agree on a solution to the crisis.

A new and more serious crisis erupted in September, when armed attacks by the ELN broke the ceasefire agreement and suspended the negotiations. After

several ELN attacks on oil infrastructure, an assault on a military base in the department of Arauca killed two soldiers and wounded 27 others. The government said that the negotiations had been broken off definitively with these attacks and that any resumption depended on the ELN making "an unequivocal show of its desire for peace".

Finally, at a meeting in Caracas in November, both sides agreed to resume the talks with a new meeting later in the month, to be held between 19 and 25 November.

The meeting in which they agreed to resume the negotiations was their first since May, which had also been their last face-to-face meeting. The ELN said that a new negotiating model was needed, with a mechanism for monitoring and verifying compliance with the agreements and a clause on non-compliance. Bogotá's chief negotiator Vera Grabe proposed reactivating the ceasefire and "humanitarian dynamics" with the ELN. The meeting agreed in Caracas in November finally took place in Cuba and the parties agreed to hold a second meeting in 2025. The Colombian government indicated that this meeting was expected to evaluate the development of the agreements, resume the agenda of the Mexico Agreement, assess and define the continuity of the ceasefire and work on involving society in the peace process.

The peace negotiations with the ELN were plagued by serious problems throughout the year

Gender, peace and security

Women were involved in both negotiating delegations. The government delegation was headed by Vera Grabe and included Senator María José Pizarro, human rights activist Olga Lilia Silva, Presbyterian pastor Adelaida Jiménez, businesswoman Rosmery Quintero, indigenous leader Dayana Domicó and Nigeria Rentería, who has held various public positions and was a negotiator with the FARC. The representation was fully equal in terms of gender. Silvana Guerrero, María Consuelo Tapias, Isabel Restrepo, Vivian Henao, Cataleya Jiménez and Manuela Márquez served on the ELN's delegation.² **The agreement on participation reached by the parties in May was particularly important, as it included a focus on women and gender, acknowledging the importance of the involvement of women and LGBTIQ+ people.** Women's organisations publicly showed their support for the peace process on several occasions during the year. This was the case of the National Women's Summit, consisting of the organisations Alianza Iniciativa de Mujeres Colombianas por la Paz, Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Negras y Indígenas de Colombia, Casa de la Mujer, Colectivo de Pensamiento y Acción "Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad", Conferencia Nacional de Organizaciones Afrocolombianas, Liga Internacional de la Paz y la Libertad, Mujeres por la Paz and Ruta

² For more information on the composition of the negotiating delegations, see Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz and Delegación ELN Diálogos de Paz.

Pacífica de las Mujeres. In August, after the ceasefire agreement between the Colombian government and the ELN was not renewed, the National Women's Summit released a public statement calling on the parties to "maintain dialogue and prolong the ceasefire", thereby expressing its support for the peace process. In September, following the ELN attacks that led to a new crisis in the negotiations, they asked the parties to resume their dialogue and demanded an immediate end to violence against civilians.

Colombia (EMC) ³	
Negotiating actors	Government, Estado Mayor Central (EMC)
Third parties	Permanent supporters (Episcopal Conference of Colombia, World Council of Churches, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia), guarantor countries (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Venezuela)
Relevant agreements	Acuerdo de alto el fuego (2023)

Summary:
El Estado Mayor Central surge como grupo armado integrado por miembros de las FARC liderados por Iván Mordisco y Gentil Duarte, que abandonaron el proceso de paz antes de la firma por el Gobierno de Colombia y las FARC del acuerdo de paz de 2016 y a quienes se unieron otros grupos disidentes que abandonaron las FARC con posterioridad a la firma. El grupo se expandió con el reclutamiento de nuevos integrantes, sin vínculos anteriores con las FARC. Tras la toma de posesión en 2022 de Gustavo Petro como presidente de Colombia se produjo el anuncio del inicio de la Paz Total, una política pública con la que se pretende la construcción de la paz en el país involucrando a todos los actores armados activos. En este marco se inició un proceso de negociaciones de paz con el EMC en 2023.

The peace negotiations with the armed group known as Estado Mayor Central (EMC) underwent a major crisis and transformation during 2024. The main change that took place was the **abandonment of the peace process by the leader of the armed group, known as Iván Mordisco or Iván Losada, and the fragmentation of the process.** However, talks remained active with the EMC blocs Comandante Jorge Briceño Suárez, Comandante Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio and Frente Comandante Raúl Reyes de las FARC-EP, with which negotiations continued during the year, including several rounds of meetings. The ceasefire agreement signed in 2023 remained in force for these blocs, which operate in parts of the departments of Bolívar,

The peace process with EMC fragmented when the factions led by Iván Mordisco withdrew from the negotiations

Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Meta, Huila, Putumayo and Caquetá. The Comando Conjunto de Oriente, Bloque Occidental Jacobo Arenas, Bloque Central Isaías Pardo and Bloque Amazonas Manuel Marulanda Vélez blocs were excluded from the ceasefire agreement for having abandoned the negotiations.⁴ The withdrawal of several blocs from the negotiating process revealed the truth about the armed group, a collection of factions from the former FARC-EP with little unity of command and different ways of operating. This lack of internal coordination made the talks difficult from the start, even though the Colombian government had recognised their political status to begin the peace negotiations.

The year began with an agreement signed on 16 January to extend the ceasefire in force until 15 July. However, in April the crisis in the process was clear. The parties met in an extraordinary meeting in San Vicente del Caguán to try to get the talks back on track. In mid-March, President Gustavo Petro had ordered the suspension of the ceasefire in the departments of Nariño, Cauca and Valle as a result of the attacks that had been carried out by factions of the Bloque Occidental against the indigenous population of the department of Cauca, including the killing of indigenous leader Carmelina Yule Paví. The offensive military operations and police operations were ordered to resume. In April, the Colombian government confirmed that it was no longer negotiating with Iván Mordisco, the head of the factions with which the ceasefire was no longer in force. This showed the internal divisions within EMC, which is more a hodgepodge of factions than a genuine group with a unified command. In July, the negotiating process was finally confirmed to have ended with the factions under the command of Iván Mordisco and the ceasefire agreement was renewed exclusively with EMC blocs Comandante Jorge Briceño Suárez, Comandante Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio and Frente Comandante Raúl Reyes de las FARC-EP, as the negotiating process was officially called. The ceasefire agreement will remain in force until 15 April 2025.

One of the main issues of the peace process was deforestation in the Amazon, given the enormous impact of logging in the areas under EMC's control. Deforestation decreased after Gustavo Petro was elected president of Colombia and the group expressed it was willing to begin talks. After the ceasefire with part of EMC was broken, the factions of the armed group that abandoned the peace process sent the message that they would again ease up on their demands to cut back on deforestation in the areas affected by logging. Some analysts said that

3 In July, peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the armed group EMC became negotiations with EMC blocs Comandante Jorge Suárez Briceño, Comandante Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio and Frente Comandante Raúl Reyes de las FARC-EP, following the withdrawal of some EMC factions from the process.
4 See the [Infographic](#) of the High Commissioner for Peace for the details of all the blocs and fronts still involved in the peace process and those that have abandoned it, as well as the areas in which they operate.

this issue allowed the armed group to exert pressure on the government in the negotiations, especially since the division had weakened its ability to negotiate and given the importance of environmental issues for Petro's government.

Gender, peace and security

Regarding the inclusion of the women, peace and security agenda, some women participated in the negotiating process. The Colombian government's delegation included three women out of a total of 11 negotiators: Gloria Quiceno Acevedo, a former congresswoman and human rights activist, Genny Calvo Olmos, a retired national police colonel and Luz Dary Landázuri, an advocate for the rights of victims of the conflict. Erika Castro participated on behalf of the EMC blocs, representing the Carolina Ramírez front. Issues related to women's involvement were addressed during the talks as part of the participation of civil society. This was reflected in the V agreement, signed in January.

Colombia (FARC)	
Negotiating actors	Government, Comunes
Third parties	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute)
Relevant agreements	The Havana peace agreement (2016)
Summary: Since the founding of the first guerrilla groups in 1964 there have been several negotiation attempts. In the early 1990s several small groups were demobilized, but not the FARC and the ELN, which are the two most important. In 1998, President Pastrana authorized the demilitarization of a large region of Colombia, around the area of San Vicente del Caguán, in order to conduct negotiations with the FARC, which lasted until 2002 and were unsuccessful. In 2012, and after several months of secret negotiations in Cuba, new talks began with the FARC in Cuba based on a specific agenda and including citizen participation mechanisms. After four years of negotiations, a historic peace agreement for the Colombian people was signed in late 2016.	

The process to implement the peace agreement reached in 2016 between the government of Colombia and the FARC-EP remained bogged down by difficulties. According to the implementation data made public by the Kroc Institute in 2024, by the end of 2023, 49% of the provisions of the peace agreement had been implemented at a minimum level or no process had been initiated for their implementation. Nearly one third (32%) of the clauses of the peace agreement had been fully implemented and 19% were at an intermediate stage of implementation. Some action was taken during the year

to address these significant problems in implementing the peace agreement eight years after it was signed. In July, the president appointed Juan Fernando Cristo to be the new Minister of the Interior, a position he had already held during the Santos administration. Cristo's duties were directly related to implementing the peace agreement. When he was sworn in, he said his objective was to achieve "greater efficiency and effectiveness, clearly defining the institutional framework for implementing the post-conflict period". Cristo was in charge of some of the legislative reforms that paved the way for the agreement to be signed with the FARC in 2016. **In October, Bogotá announced a shock plan to implement the agreement, which it presented to the UN Security Council.** The plan establishes six strategic areas that aim to speed up the implementation of the peace agreement: territorial deals for transformation, with specific agreements for the PDET subregions; comprehensive rural reform, with the accelerated delivery of land to peasants, indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians, with a goal of three million hectares; a legislative agenda for peace, identifying regulatory reforms to improve the implementation of the agreement; the building of security in the territory, strengthening the Comprehensive Security System for Exercising Politics and improved inter-ministerial coordination; a national agreement for a political agreement, including political parties, unions, social organisations, ethnic communities and other key actors to ensure peace and political stability; and the governance of the shock plan led by the Ministry of the Interior, the National Planning Department and the Office of the Commissioner for Peace. The Colombian government has indicated that this plan does not cover the entire 2016 agreement, but just the most critical points. **The government also announced a draft bill that would lengthen the period to implement the peace agreement until 2038.** Initially, the peace agreement was expected to be implemented by 2030. This project was agreed by the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI), made up of representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC-EP. The creation of a National Reincorporation System was also announced to help former FARC combatants who signed the peace agreement to make the transition to civilian life. Beginning eight years after the agreement was signed, this plan aims to coordinate all groups working on the ex-combatants' social and economic reintegration.

The government of Colombia announced a shock plan to speed up the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement

Gender, peace and security

The Colombian government approved the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security enshrined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 after a participatory process that included different women's civil society organisations. The plan has seven strategic lines: women guardians of peace; health and wellbeing for women and girls in their diversity; a life

free of violence against women; access to justice for women and girl victims; protection of the land from the actions of illegal armed groups and extractive industries that generate violence; economic autonomy for women; and the humane mobility of displaced women, refugees and migrants. Regarding the implementation of the peace agreement, challenges and delays were faced in applying provisions related to integrating the gender perspective in the text. In his reports monitoring the situation of the different peace processes active in the country, the UN Secretary-General noted that key institutions for implementing the gender approach were still underfunded, such as the Ministry of Equality's Vice Ministry of Women. The report found that between 2017 and 2023, only eight of the 54 indicators established to assess compliance with the gender provisions of the peace agreement had been fully achieved. Twenty-six indicators had reached a high level of compliance, 13 indicators were implemented at a medium level and seven at a low level.

Colombia (Segunda Marquetalia)	
Negotiating actors	Government, Segunda Marquetalia
Third parties	Guarantor countries (Venezuela and Norway); permanent supporters (delegate of the special representative of the UN Secretary-General and the Episcopal Conference of Colombia)
Relevant agreements	--
Summary: The armed organisation Segunda Marquetalia emerged after the peace agreement was signed between the government of Colombia and the FARC in 2016. In 2019, Iván Márquez, who had been the FARC's lead negotiator in the peace process and later became a senator as a result of the peace agreement, announced that he was resuming the armed struggle against the government. Together with several other former FARC leaders, he created the Segunda Marquetalia group, which operates in the border area with Venezuela, the country where its bases may be located. In 2022, as part of President Gustavo Petro's Total Peace policy, the group said it was willing to begin talks, which would be made public in 2024.	

Peace talks between the Colombian government and the armed group known as Segunda Marquetalia began in 2024. In February, Bogotá announced that a negotiating process was being initiated with dissident armed groups connected with the FARC and led by Iván Márquez. Exploratory negotiations were held between February and June, which finally concluded with a first round of talks in late June. The Colombian government appointed a negotiating team headed by former judge Armando Novoa that also included a former Minister of Justice and former governor of Nariño, Parmenio Cuéllar; retired Colonel Jaime Joaquín Ariza; an anthropologist, María Camila Moreno; Gloria Arias Nieto of the Defendamos la Paz movement; and Gabriel Bustamante, the deputy general director of the Land Restitution Unit (URT).

The negotiating team was also supported by Tulio Gómez, a businessman and the majority shareholder of the América de Cali football team. The negotiating delegation of the Segunda Marquetalia was led by Walter Mendoza. This first round of negotiations was used to agree on a five-point agenda that would serve as the core of subsequent meetings: the de-escalation of the conflict and preparation of peace territories; the construction of peace territories; victims as a transformative social subject; conditions for peaceful coexistence; and implementation and verification. The first round concluded with an agreement for a unilateral ceasefire by Segunda Marquetalia, with the commitment that its members would not be armed or wear uniforms in the main towns or urban areas or on land or river routes, as well as the safe delivery of kidnapped persons and guarantees for the civilian population. The ceasefire initially agreed upon was unilateral and established that the “constitutional and legal powers of the country’s security agencies could not be limited”. However, both sides agreed that it would come into effect once a presidential decree had been issued to suspend offensive military operations in agreed areas. It was also agreed that the governments of Venezuela and Norway would act as guarantor third parties and that the delegate of the special representative of the UN Secretary-General and the Episcopal Conference of Colombia would be permanent supporters. Despite the initial agreements, the stark internal divisions within the armed organisation were a major hurdle to the negotiations in the months that followed. In November, the split between Segunda Marquetalia’s different factions was made official after its leader, Iván Márquez, released a letter rejecting the talks. However, the head of the negotiating delegation said that the negotiating process would go on, since two other factions of the armed group, Comandos de la Frontera and the Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico, wanted to pursue it under the name Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano. After this split, a new negotiating agenda was agreed, made up of four points: territorial transformation; security in territories and for communities; actions and pathways for legal security for members of guerrilla factions; and political participation. The new peace process was to take place in Colombia with rotating headquarters in Tumaco (Nariño), Puerto Asís (Putumayo), Bogotá and Popayán (Cauca).

Gender, peace and security

The negotiating delegations included women, though representation was far from equal. The government panel included two women, María Camila Moreno, the head of the Colombian office of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, and Gloria Arias Nieto, a doctor and journalist, in addition to five men. The Segunda Marquetalia delegation included one woman, Yurleni Guerrero, and five men. Guerrero had previously been appointed as a negotiator during the exploratory phase that began in 2022. A woman named Estefanía Ciro was also appointed to be part of the High-Level Advisory

Committee designated to provide technical support to the government panel in the negotiations. In June, the National Women's Network blasted the level of women's participation as unacceptable, as there was only one female delegate on Segunda Marquetalia's panel and two female delegates on the government panel.

Venezuela	
Negotiating actors	Government, political and social opposition
Third parties	Norway, Russia, the Netherlands
Relevant agreements	--

Summary:
Faced with the worsening political and social crisis that Venezuela experienced after the death in 2013 of President Hugo Chávez, the leader of the so-called Bolivarian Revolution, his successor Nicolás Maduro's narrow victory in the presidential election of April 2013 and the protests staged in the early months of 2014, which caused the death of around 40 people, in March 2014 the government said it was willing to accept talks with the opposition facilitated by UNASUR or the Vatican, but categorically rejected any mediation by the OAS. Shortly after Pope Francis called for dialogue and a group of UNASUR foreign ministers visited Venezuela and held many meetings, preliminary talks began between Caracas and the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) in April 2014, to which the Secretary of State of the Vatican, the former Apostolic Nuncio to Venezuela, as well as the foreign ministers of Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, were invited as witnesses in good faith. Although the talks were interrupted in May 2014 due to developments in the political situation, both UNASUR and the Vatican continued to facilitate through Apostolic Nuncio Aldo Giordano. In May 2016, shortly after a visit to Venezuela by the former leaders of Spain (Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero), Panama (Martín Torrijos) and the Dominican Republic (Leonel Fernández) at the request of UNASUR, the Venezuelan government and opposition met in the Dominican Republic with the three aforementioned ex-leaders and UNASUR representatives. After a meeting between Maduro and Pope Francis in October, both parties met again in Venezuela under the auspices of the Pope's new special envoy, Emil Paul Tscherrig. In late 2017, both sides decided to resume the talks in the Dominican Republic starting in December, accompanied by several countries chosen by both parties (Chile, Mexico and Paraguay by the opposition and Nicaragua, Bolivia and San Vicente and the Grenadines by the government). Although some agreements were reached during the several rounds of negotiations that took place between December 2017 and February 2018, Maduro's unilateral call for a presidential election for 2018 brought them to a standstill and caused the withdrawal of several of the accompanying countries designated by the opposition to facilitate them.

No significant negotiations between the Venezuelan government and the Unitary Platform were facilitated by Norway during the year and no significant headway was made in implementing the Barbados Agreement of October 2023, but the trust between the parties was seriously shaken by the political crisis unleashed

by the results of the presidential election held in July. In January, a grave crisis broke out between the Venezuelan government and the opposition after the Supreme Court, which is controlled by the ruling party, upheld the disqualification of opposition leader María Corina Machado from running in the presidential election. Machado had won more than 92% of the votes in the primary elections. The ruling unsettled several actors in the international community and sparked protests by the Unitary Platform, which considered it a flagrant violation of the Barbados Agreement, as it stipulated the parties' ability to freely designate their election candidates. The Unitary Platform complained to the Norwegian government about the ruling and tried to get France, Brazil and Colombia to intercede so President Nicolás Maduro would overturn Machado's disqualification. The Venezuelan government was willing to continue negotiations and said that the agreements signed in October 2023 did not pardon crimes committed or justify violations of the Constitution. In response to Machado's disqualification resulting from this decision, the Norwegian government issued a statement repeating its commitment to facilitating the process, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Mexico City in 2021.

Under such circumstances, in February **the respective leaders of the government's and the opposition's negotiating delegations, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde, met at the National Assembly. No agreement was reached** and the opposition made several demands, such as opening the electoral register and inviting various election observation missions. Shortly thereafter, **Jorge Rodríguez declared that from then on, meetings with the Unitary Platform should take place in Venezuela and not abroad, saying that there had been up to 14 meetings between the parties in Caracas in the previous eight months.** Rodríguez also said that he had formally invited the Unitary Platform to the talks and consultations promoted by the government and the National Assembly with several political parties and business, trade union and civil society organisations regarding the conditions and dates of the presidential election. Rodríguez said that the document being drafted with these political and social organisations was more inclusive and complete than the Barbados Agreement of October 2023 and that the opposition could sign it without hesitation because it included the main demands and proposals that had been raised so far. The Unitary Platform refused to participate in this dialogue, arguing that it was a clear violation of the signed agreements and that the political and social organisations participating in it were close to the government and were less representative than the Unitary Platform. The Unitary Platform also said that the imposition of holding the negotiations in Venezuela and not abroad was another violation of the agreements reached and did not provide the necessary guarantees of security

and integrity. Nevertheless, the **Caracas Agreement (National Agreement on General Principles, Calendar and Expansion of Electoral Guarantees)** was signed on 28 February. This agreement served as the basis for the National Electoral Council to establish the election calendar. The opposition indicated that the Barbados Agreement provided for the joint submission of proposed dates to the electoral authority.

Following the Caracas Agreement, and in light of the tensions stirred up by the election, the negotiations and the relationship between the negotiating parties were interrupted for months. In April, the US government reported that Caracas had failed to comply with many of the commitments of the Barbados Agreement and announced that it was restoring part of the financial sanctions that it had lifted following the agreement with the Unitary Platform in October 2023. Along the same lines, María Corina Machado sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Norway criticising a wave of repression from the Venezuelan government, citing as an example her disqualification and the disqualification of the person she had named as her substitute presidential candidate, as well as the categorisation of her party as a terrorist organisation, in complete violation of the agreements signed and facilitated by Norway. In April, Norwegian State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Andreas Motzfeldt Kravik visited Venezuela and met with both sides to try to resume the negotiations. Kravik said he had floated the creation of a commission to monitor and verify the agreements, but he also said that it was up to the negotiating parties to decide and agree on the next steps. The negotiations were not resumed for the rest of the year.

Gender, peace and security

In addition to the participation of several women in the negotiating delegations of the Venezuelan government and the Unitary Platform and the leading political role played in the dialogue by Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and opposition leader María Corina Machado, the group Women for Dialogue and Peace in Venezuela remained active during the year. The group was created in 2022 by Venezuelan women connected to civil society organisations and political parties to include the gender perspective in the dialogue between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. Promoted by Asociación Cauce, the group works to involve all social groups in the country into the negotiations between Caracas and the Unitary Platform, especially women, people of African descent, indigenous peoples and women with disabilities. The group is also working to create a working group to monitor the agreements with equal participation and representation across various social groups and the funding of projects implemented by women in defence of their human rights, especially the right to health and food.

Venezuela – Guyana	
Negotiating actors	Government, political and social opposition
Third parties	CELAC, CARICOM, Brazil, United Nations, Cuba
Relevant agreements	Joint Declaration of Argyle for Dialogue and Peace between Guyana and Venezuela

Summary:

Essequibo is a territory formally controlled and administered by Guyana, but whose sovereignty is historically disputed by Venezuela. Covering almost 160,000 km² and rich in minerals and other natural resources, this territory was part of the Captaincy General of Venezuela and was integrated into the new state of Venezuela once it obtained independence from the Spanish Crown in the 19th century. The British Empire later colonised the region, establishing British Guiana, now Guyana. Given the lack of agreement on defining the border between the British Empire and Venezuela, an Arbitration Award issued in Paris in 1899 handed the disputed territory to the British Empire. This decision was not recognised by Venezuela, which argued that there had been bias and cartographic manipulation during the judicial process. In the early 1960s, the United Nations decided to admit Venezuela's territorial claim, opening the door to the 1966 Geneva Agreement between Venezuela and the United Kingdom (in consultation with the government of Guyana, which gained independence from the United Kingdom that same year). Under this agreement, the parties undertook to resolve the dispute through friendly negotiations. Although Venezuela viewed the Geneva Agreement as annulling the Paris Award, it also maintained the status quo of the territory (administered by Guyana) until the final resolution of the dispute. In 2018, Guyana raised the resolution of the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Venezuela does not recognise its jurisdiction or competence to resolve the dispute, alleging that the Geneva Agreement is the only valid mechanism to deal with it. In 2020, the ICJ declared itself competent to resolve and hand down a ruling on the merits of the issue. It ratified its position in 2023, but at the same time it did not prohibit (as Guyana had requested) the referendum on Essequibo organised by Caracas in December 2023 shortly after the government of Guyana granted several companies concessions to explore for hydrocarbon deposits in waters disputed with Venezuela.

Not only was no significant progress made to resolve the historic dispute during the year, but political and military tension between both countries continued and Caracas and Georgetown disagreed profoundly about the appropriate channels to do so. However, both governments met twice and both Venezuela and Guyana presented the documentation required by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The first meeting between the delegations of both governments, led by their respective foreign ministers, took place in late January in the presidential palace of Brazil. The meeting was facilitated by the Brazilian government through its foreign minister and CELAC (through the government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which is serving as the president pro tempore of the regional organisation) and was attended by the UN Secretary-General through the

Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs as an observer. During the meeting, the first of the Joint Commission of Foreign Ministers, a mechanism created by the Joint Declaration of Argyle for Dialogue and Peace in mid-December 2023, both countries repeated their commitment to the declaration, pledged to continue the dialogue and presented their proposed agendas for the Joint Commission's work. **Although the Commission was supposed to meet later in Brazil, there were no further meetings for the rest of the year.** At the January meeting, Guyana stressed the need to cooperate with the ICJ as the main forum for resolving the dispute, while Venezuela advocated for the primacy of the Geneva Agreement and direct talks between both countries, demanded that foreign powers not intervene in the dispute and asked for Guyana's actions and decisions to be examined in what it considers an undelimited maritime area. Later, in late February, during the CELAC summit in Georgetown, Brazilian President Ignacio Lula da Silva met with the president of Guyana and, according to Brazilian government sources, said he wanted to do the same with the Venezuelan president. However, there is no public record of any further direct meetings between the governments of Venezuela and Guyana during the rest of the year or between them and the actors facilitating the negotiating process and the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Argyle, in which, among other issues, Guyana and Venezuela promised not to threaten or use force against each other, pledged to refrain from escalating the conflict in word or deed and vowed to cooperate to avoid incidents on the ground that could lead to tensions between them.

The Venezuelan government submitted documentation on its position on the dispute to the ICJ in early April, as Guyana had done previously in April 2023. In Decem-

ber, Guyana submitted its reply to Venezuela's report and its final written submission on its position on the dispute. Venezuela will be able to respond to Guyana's final written submission in August 2025. The ICJ is expected to set the dates for the oral hearings in the proceedings later on. In June, **the governments of Venezuela and Guyana participated in a meeting convened by ICJ President Nawaf Salam** to agree on the next steps to resolve their historic conflict over the Essequibo region. Despite attending the meeting and submitting the required documentation, several times during the year the Venezuelan government repeated its position that it did not recognise the ICJ's jurisdiction to resolve the dispute and would ignore any resolution or decision it issued. Caracas also argued that the normative and legal framework for resolving the dispute was the Geneva Agreement of 1966, which provided for negotiations between the parties to achieve an acceptable and satisfactory settlement and clearly stated its commitment to defend Venezuelan territorial integrity and sovereignty over the Essequibo region, in accordance with the mandate resulting from the referendum held in December 2023. The Guyanese government maintains that the status of the Essequibo region is not subject to discussion, negotiation or deliberation, and that the territorial dispute between both countries must be resolved exclusively within the ICJ. Guyana, a former British colony, bases its position on an Arbitration Award issued in Paris in 1899 in response to the lack of agreement on the delimitation of the border between Venezuela and the British Empire, which granted the Essequibo region to the latter. Guyana also believes it has the right to exploit resources, issue licenses and grant concessions on its sovereign territory and has repeatedly criticised the permits that Caracas has granted to Venezuelan oil companies to explore and exploit oil, gas and minerals in Essequibo.