

Introduction

Peace Talks in Focus 2024. Report on Trends and Scenarios is a yearbook that analyses the peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world in 2024. The examination of the evolution and the dynamics of these negotiations at a global level offers a global view of the peace processes, identifying trends and facilitating a comparative analysis among the different scenarios. One of the main aims of this report is to provide information and analysis for those actors who take part in the peaceful resolution of conflicts at different levels, including those parties in dispute, mediators and civil society, among others. The yearbook also seeks to reveal the different formulas of dialogue and negotiation that are aimed at reversing the dynamics of violence and that aim to channel conflicts through political means in numerous contexts. As such, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts that are aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

With regard to **methodology**, this report draws mainly from on qualitative analysis of studies and information from numerous sources –the United Nations, international organizations, research centres, the media, NGOs, and others–, in addition to experience gained in field research. The report also incorporates the gender perspective in the study and analysis of peace processes in a cross-cutting manner.

The analysis is based on a **definition** that understands **peace processes** as comprising all those political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at resolving conflicts and transforming their root causes by means of peaceful methods, especially through peace negotiations. **Peace**

negotiations are considered as the processes of dialogue between at least two conflicting parties in a conflict, in which the parties address their differences in a concerted framework in order to end the violence and encounter a satisfactory solution to their demands. Other actors not directly involved in the conflict may also participate. Peace negotiations are usually preceded by preliminary or exploratory phases that define the format, place, conditions and guarantees, of the future negotiations, among other elements. Peace negotiations may or may not be facilitated by **third parties**. The third parties intervene in the dispute so as to contribute to the dialogue between the actors involved and to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict. Other actors not directly involved in the dispute may also participate in peace negotiations. Peace negotiations may result in comprehensive or partial **agreements**, agreements related to the procedure or process, and agreements linked to the causes or consequences of the conflict. Elements of the different type of agreements may be combined in the same agreement.

With respect to its **structure**, the publication is organized into six chapters. The first presents a summary of those processes and negotiations that took place in 2024, and offers an overview of the main trends at a global level. The following five chapters detail the analysis of peace processes and negotiations from a geographic perspective. Each addresses the main trends of peace negotiations in Africa, America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, respectively, and describes the development and dynamics of each of the cases present in the regions, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda.

Negotiations in 2024: global overview and main trends

- During 2024, there were 52 peace processes and negotiations around the world, seven more than the year before. Most cases were found in Africa (20), followed by Asia and the Pacific (12), Europe (seven), the Americas (seven) and the Middle East (six).
- More than half of the 37 armed conflicts in 2024 (57%) involved dialogue and negotiating processes.
- Most dialogue and negotiating processes faced difficulties, deadlock and even setbacks, such as those in Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Tigray), Ethiopia (Oromia), Mali, Somalia, the CAR, the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, North Korea-South Korea, Myanmar, Russia-Ukraine, Yemen and Israel-Palestine.
- At least one third party participated in 45 of the 52 peace processes (86%), a slightly smaller proportion than in recent years (89% in 2023 and 90% in 2022).
- Many states became involved as third parties in negotiations, often to project their national interests in an international scenario disputed between powers.
- Specific mechanisms were not designed for women to participate in most of the negotiations and gender issues and recognition of the rights of women and the LGBTIQ+ population were left out of many negotiating agendas.

During 2024, a total of 52 peace processes and negotiations were identified on a worldwide level. The analysis of the different contexts reveals a wide variety of realities and dynamics, a result of the diverse nature of the armed conflicts¹ and socio-political crises² that the negotiations are linked to. Without losing sight of the need to consider the specific characteristics of each case, it is possible to draw several conclusions and offer reflections on the general panorama of peace processes and negotiations, as well as to identify some trends. Several conclusions are presented below regarding the geographical distribution of the negotiations, those actors involved in the negotiation processes, the third parties who participated, the main and recurrent issues in the negotiation agendas, the general development of the processes, inclusiveness and the gender dimension in these peace negotiations.

Table 1.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in 2024

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)	Government of Cameroon; four interim governments (IGs) proclaiming themselves representative of the people of Ambazonia: IG Sisiku (Sisiku Ayuk Tabe, first President of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia, and Vice President Dabney Yerima); the other three IGs are derived from IG Sisiku, each created after the previous IG refused to give up power: IG Sako (Samuel Sako); IG Marianta (Iya Marianta Njomia); IG Chris Anu (ally of Leke Olivier Fongunueh's Red Dragons armed group); the Ambazonia Governing Council coalition (AGovC, led by Cho Ayaba, armed wing Ambazonia Defence Forces, ADF); other political, military and social movements, and religious groups: Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT), which includes APLM/SOCADEF, FSCW, MoRISC, SCARM, SCAPO, SCNC (North America faction) and RoAN; Southern Cameroons Stakeholder Platform (SCSP), which includes political movements, civil society, armed groups, religious groups: IG Sisiku, SCNC (except the North America faction), Consortium, Global Takumbeng, SCAWOL, SCEW, SNWOT, SCCOP, AIPC, AYC, SCYC, SCCAF, WCA, DAC, CHRDA, CHRI, Reach Out, prisoners organisations, displaced population and refugee organisations, traditional leaders and others.	Church, civil society organisations, USIP, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), Vatican, Canada, USA

- 1 The School of the Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau, ECP) defines armed conflict as any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible in which the continuous and organised use of violence a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. wounded or displaced population, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services) and aims to achieve objectives that are different than those of common delinquency and are normally linked to a) demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues; b) the opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of the government, which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power; or c) control over the resources or the territory.
- 2 A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by different actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control of resources or territory.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
Chad³	Doha process: Transitional Military Council, 52 armed groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) DNIS: Transitional Military Council, civil society organisations, 34 of the 52 armed groups that signed the Doha process The 18 armed groups that did not sign the Doha agreement formed the Cadre Permanent de Concertation et de Réflexion (CPCR), including the FACT and the CCSMR	Qatar; AU and UN, among others; Community of Sant'Egidio, ECCAS
DRC	Government of the DRC, government of Rwanda, armed group M23, armed groups from the eastern part of the country, political opposition and civil society	AU, SADC, ICGLR, EAC, EU, UN, OIF, USA, Angola, Qatar
Eritrea – Ethiopia	Government of Eritrea and government of Ethiopia	United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, USA
Ethiopia	Government, political parties, political and social opposition, citizens	UNDP, EU, Germany, Norway, Berghof Foundation
Ethiopia (Oromia)	Federal government, armed group Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)	IGAD, Kenya, Norway and Tanzania
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Federal Government, political and military authorities of the Ethiopian region of Tigray (Tigray People's Liberation Front)	AU, USA, IGAD
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan	AU, World Bank (WB), UAE, EU and USA
Ethiopia – Somalia (Somaliland)	Ethiopia, Somalia	Türkiye, Qatar
Libya	Government of National Unity (GNU), Government of National Stability (GNS), Presidential Council, High State Council (HSC), House of Representatives (HoR), LNA/ALAF	UN; Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Türkiye, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia (Berlin Process)
Mali	Government, Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) that brings together Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) –MNLA, MAA and HCUA–, Platform –GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA	Algeria, France, ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, civil society organisations, Mauritania, Carter Center (Independent Observer of the Peace Agreement)
Morocco – Western Sahara	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)	UN, Algeria and Mauritania, Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
Mozambique	Government, RENAMO, RENAMO military junta	AU, National mediation team, Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, United Kingdom, EU, Community of Sant Egidio (Vatican), Catholic Church, UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Senegal (Casamance)	Government, factions of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)	ECOWAS, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sub-regional Coordinator for Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Casamance (COSPACE)
Somalia	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, South-west), political military movement Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a, clan and sub-clan leaders, Somaliland	Turkey, Norway
Somalia – Somaliland	Federal Government of Somalia, Republic of Somaliland	Türkiye, Norway
South Sudan⁴	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)(2018): Government (SPLM), SPLM/A-in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others), two independent factions of the SPLM-IO: the Kitwang faction led by Simon Gatwech Dual and the faction headed by General Johnson Olony. Peace talks in Rome: Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Groups (NSSSOG, previously SSOMA): National Salvation Front (NAS), South Sudan United Front (SSUF), the Real SPLM, South Sudan People's Patriotic Movement (SPPM).	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018): IGAD Plus (Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda), AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Rome negotiations: Community of Sant'Egidio

3 Regarding Chad, reference is made to two initiatives: The Doha peace agreement between a segment of the Chadian insurgency and the government, and the implementation of the commitments reached in the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS). Furthermore, a consultation process is also underway with the segment of the insurgency that did not sign the Doha agreement, facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio.

4 This negotiating process includes two different forums: 1) negotiations on the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018); and 2) peace negotiations between the South Sudanese government and the armed groups that did not sign the R-ARCSS in Rome – Nairobi. The column of actors specifies who participates in each of them.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
Sudan⁵	Peace negotiations in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile: Government of Sudan, Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions National crisis peace negotiations: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)	Peace negotiations in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile: African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Troika (USA, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS Peace negotiations between the Sudanese Army and the RSF: Trilateral Mechanism (UN, AU, and IGAD (Ethiopia, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda)); Jeddah Mechanism (US and Saudi Arabia), Egypt, Switzerland, Türkiye, UAE and EU
Sudan – South Sudan	Government of Sudan, Government of South Sudan, Ethnic communities of the Abyei region	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU, UNISFA, UN
AMERICA		
Colombia (ELN)	Government, ELN	Guarantor countries (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile); permanent supporters (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, Episcopal Conference of Colombia); supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Colombia (EMC)⁶	Government, Estado Mayor Central (EMC)	Permanent supporters (Episcopal Conference of Colombia, World Council of Churches, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia), guarantor countries (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Venezuela)
Colombia (FARC)	Government, Comunes	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute)
Colombia (Segunda Marquetalia)	Government, Segunda Marquetalia	Guarantor countries (Venezuela and Norway); permanent supporters (Delegate of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Episcopal Conference of Colombia)
Haiti	Government, social and political opposition	CARICOM Eminent Persons Group
Venezuela	Government, social and political opposition	Norway, Russia, the Netherlands
Venezuela – Guyana	Venezuela, Guyana	CELAC, CARICOM, Brazil, United Nations, Cuba
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC		
China (Tibet)	China, Tibetan government in exile	-- ⁷
North Korea – South Korea	North Korea, South Korea	--
North Korea – USA	North Korea, USA	--
Philippines (MILF)	Government, MILF, Interim Government of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	Malaysia, Third Party Monitoring Team, Independent Decommissioning Body
Philippines (MNLF)	Government, MNLF (factions led by Nur Misuari and Muslimin Sema)	--
Philippines (NDF)	Government, NDF (umbrella organisation of various communist organisations, including the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is the political arm of the NPA)	Norway
India (Assam)	Government, ULFA-PTF	--
India (Nagaland)	Government, NSCN-IM, NNPG: GPRN/NSCN (Kitovi Zhimomi), NNC, FGN, NSCN(R), NPGN (Non-Accord) and NNC/GDRN/NA, ZUF	--
India – China	India, China	--
Myanmar	Government; armed groups that have signed the ceasefire agreement (NCA): DKBA, RCSS/SSA-South, CNF, KNU, KNLAPC, ALP, PNLO, ABSDF, NMSP and LDU; armed groups that have not signed the NCA: UWSP, NDAA, SSPP/SSA-N, KNPP, NSCN-K, KIA, AA, TNLA and MNDAA	China, ASEAN

5 This negotiating process includes two different peace processes: 1) peace negotiations in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, to resolve the armed conflicts in both regions; and 2) peace negotiations between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to resolve the armed conflict that began in Sudan in 2023. The column of actors specifies who participates in each of them.

6 In July, the peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and the armed group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) were reclassified as negotiations with the EMC blocs Comandante Jorge Suárez Briceño, Comandante Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio and Frente Comandante Raúl Reyes de las FARC-EP after some EMC factions pulled out of the negotiations.

7 Though no third party facilitating the dialogue between the two governments was named, the president of the Central Tibetan Administration has reported that contacts and dialogue are taking place in a third country. This suggests that some actor is facilitating the process.


Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC		
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Government, Autonomous Bougainville Government	
Thailand (south)	Government, BRN	
EUROPE		
Armenia – Azerbaijan⁸	Armenia, Azerbaijan	EU, USA, Germany, Russia, Iran, Türkiye ⁹
Cyprus	Republic of Cyprus, self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	UN, EU, guarantor countries (Türkiye, Greece and United Kingdom)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Government of Georgia, representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, government of Russia ¹⁰	OSCE, EU, UN, USA, Russia ¹¹
Moldova (Transdniestria)	Moldova, self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria	OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, USA, EU ¹²
Russia – Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	UN, Türkiye, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ICRC, IAEA, Vatican City, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Switzerland ¹³
Serbia – Kosovo	Serbia, Kosovo	EU, UN, EEUU, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy
Türkiye (PKK)	Government, PKK, political parties of Türkiye	--
MIDDLE EAST		
Iran (nuclear programme)	Iran, France, United Kingdom, Germany, China, Russia, EU	UN
Israel – Lebanon (Hezbollah)	Government of Israel, Government of Lebanon, Hezbollah	EEUU, France, UN
Israel – Palestine	Government of Israel, Hamas	Qatar, Egypt, EEUU, France, UN
Palestine	Hamas, Fatah, other Palestinian political groups	Russia, China, Egypt
Syria	Government, political and armed opposition groups, regional and international actors ¹⁴	UN (Geneva process); Russia, Türkiye, Iran (Astana process with Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, UN and ICRC as observers); Arab League (Jordanian initiative)
Yemen	Internationally recognised Yemeni government (backed by Saudi Arabia), Houthis / Ansar Allah, Saudi Arabia	ONU, Oman, Saudi Arabia, ¹⁵ ICRC

The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.
 -- There are no third parties or no public proof of their existence.

- 8 Starting with the 2024 edition of *Peace Talks in Focus*, this yearbook has stopped using the designation “Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)” to refer to the negotiating process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s military offensive in 2023 resulted in the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan gained full control over the region and the self-proclaimed administration of Nagorno-Karabakh ceased to exist in January 2024. In 2023, Armenia agreed to recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. All this led to the final exclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue from the negotiations between both countries.
- 9 The negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are currently taking place without third-party mediation, but some international actors are facilitating and supporting one or both sides. Russia, Iran and Türkiye are part of the 3+3 regional platform, along with Armenia and Azerbaijan. This platform was launched in 2021 at Türkiye’s behest with the stated objective of promoting peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus.
- 10 Russia’s status in the Georgian peace process is subject to different interpretations. Georgia considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 In 2024, the 5+2 conference format remained inactive. In the 5+2 conference Moldova and Transdniestria were negotiators, the OSCE was a mediator, Ukraine and Russia were mediators-guarantors, and the US and the EU were observers. The OSCE-facilitated 1+1 format was active and was also attended by participants of the 5+2 format.
- 13 This table includes actors playing roles of mediation/facilitation and support in any of the areas of dialogue active between Russia and Ukraine in 2024. They are included regardless of the frequency or scope of their involvement. In addition to the actors included in this table, this chapter analyses and includes other actors that promoted dialogue during the year and are not considered third parties in this yearbook.
- 14 Although some regional and international actors present themselves as third parties, in practice they also operate as negotiators and favour understandings to ensure their presence and influence on Syrian soil.
- 15 Saudi Arabia also plays a role as a mediator/facilitator in disputes between various actors on the anti-Houthi side, and between the internationally recognised government and the Houthis.

Graph 1.1. Regional distribution of peace negotiations

Regarding the **geographical distribution of the peace processes and negotiations** in 2024, most of the cases analyzed were concentrated in Africa, which hosted 20, equivalent to 39% of the total (18 processes and 40% of the total in 2023). Asia and the Pacific was the region with the second-highest number of cases, with a total of 12, representing 23% of the negotiations in 2024 (10 and 23% in 2023). The rest of the negotiations were distributed between the Americas and Europe, with seven cases each, which was equivalent to 13% (six and 13% each in 2023) and the Middle East, with six (12%) (five and 11% in 2023).



There was a rise in the number of peace processes and negotiations worldwide, in keeping with the upward trend of the previous three years (37 processes in 2021, 39 in 2022, 45 in 2023), and beating out the levels of 2018 and 2019 (49 and 50 cases, respectively). However, this increase was not accompanied by lower levels of violence and global armed conflict. On the contrary, the total number of active armed conflicts also increased during the year (37 armed conflicts in 2024, compared to 36 in 2023) and violence got worse in high-intensity conflicts such as Israel-Palestine, Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), Ethiopia (Oromia), the DRC (east), Sudan,


Most negotiations in 2024 took place in Africa (39%), followed by Asia and the Pacific (23%), America and Europe (both 13%) and the Middle East (12%)

South Sudan, Colombia, Haiti, Myanmar, Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hezbollah and Syria. Furthermore, most negotiating processes faced obstacles and difficulties.

The rise in the number of cases was spread across the regions, although it was somewhat more pronounced in Africa and Asia and the Pacific in total terms (two new cases in each of them, and one new case each in the Americas, Europe and the Middle East).

The increase in Africa is due to the addition of two new peace negotiations during the year: the national dialogue

Map 1.1. Peace negotiations in 2024



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in 2024

currently underway in Ethiopia and the negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia, facilitated by Türkiye, to resolve the dispute between both countries regarding the crisis created by the agreement signed in January 2024 between Addis Ababa and the breakaway Somali region of Somaliland to provide Ethiopia with access to the Red Sea. However, in Africa, two peace processes also concluded during the year. First, the peace process in Mali (north) was terminated, paving the way for the resumption of armed clashes in the northern part of the country between the Malian government and the armed groups that had signed the 2015 Algiers peace agreement. Second, the peace process in Mozambique between the government and RENAMO concluded with the end of the implementation of the 2019 peace agreement. There were two new dialogue processes in Asia and the Pacific. One involved informal talks between the Tibetan government in exile and the Chinese government. The other entailed negotiations

In 2024, there were 52 peace processes and negotiations around the world, seven more than the year before

between India and China regarding the border dispute between both countries, which resulted in an agreement and the easing in bilateral tensions. In the Americas, one more case was identified than the previous year, as a new peace process began in Colombia between the government and the armed group Segunda Marquetalia, though the process was fragmented by internal divisions among the insurgents. The number of negotiating processes in Europe increased from six to seven due to the start of exploratory talks between the Turkish government and the Kurdish armed group PKK. There was also a new case in the Middle East due to the inclusion of diplomatic initiatives to achieve a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah amidst escalating regional conflicts and tensions since late 2023.

Peace processes address disputes of varying types and intensity, including socio-political crises and armed

Table 1.2. Armed conflicts and peace processes in 2024

Armed conflicts with peace negotiation (21)	Armed conflicts without peace negotiation (16)
AFRICA (9)	AFRICA (8)
Cameroon (Ambazonia/ North West and South West) (2018)	Burundi (2015)
CAR (2006)	DRC (east – ADF) (2014)
DRC (east) (1998)	DRC (west) (2023)
Ethiopia (Oromia) (2022)	Ethiopia (Amhara) (2023)
Libya (2011)	Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) (2011)
Mali (2012)	Mozambique (North) (2017)
Somalia (1988)	Somalia (Somaliland-SSC Khatumo) (2023)
South Sudan (2009)	Western Sahel Region (2018)
Sudan (2023)	ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (6)
AMERICA (2)	Afghanistan (2001)
Colombia (1964)	India (CPI-M) (1967)
Haiti (2024)	India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989)
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (4)	Indonesia (West Papua) (2024)
Myanmar (1948)	Pakistan (2001)
Philippines (NPA) (1969)	Pakistan (Balochistan) (2005)
Philippines (Mindanao) (1991)	MIDDLE EAST (2)
Thailand (south) (2004)	Egypt (Sinai) (2014)
EUROPE (2)	Iraq (2003)
Russia – Ukraine (2022) ¹⁶	
Türkiye (PKK) (1984)	
MIDDLE EAST (4)	
Israel – Hezbollah (2023)	
Israel – Palestine (2000)	
Syria (2011)	
Yemen (2004)	

*The year the conflict began appears between parentheses

16 Russia-Ukraine is included due to the humanitarian dialogue, Ukraine's talks with international actors about parts of its peace plan and initiatives promoted by various governments, though political-military negotiations between the conflicting parties did not resume in 2024.

conflicts. Dialogue and negotiating processes were under way in 21 of the 37 active armed conflicts during 2024,¹⁷ accounting for 57% of the cases. This was more than the previous year, when negotiations were underway in 53% of the armed conflicts (19 of the 36 conflicts in 2023). The increase in processes related to armed conflicts in 2024 was driven by higher percentages in Europe and the Middle East due to the start of dialogue regarding the armed conflict in Türkiye (PKK) and the armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. In contrast, the percentage fell slightly in Africa and more markedly in Asia and the Pacific. There were negotiations for 53% of the armed conflicts in Africa, less than in 2023 (55%) and 2022 (65%). In Asia and the Pacific, the percentage continued to fall from 55% in 2022 and 44% in 2023 to 40% in 2024. Overall, the high proportion of armed conflicts with negotiations showed that there were many contexts in which the warring parties explored and opened avenues for negotiation alongside the fighting. However, most negotiating processes were protracted and faced obstacles, stagnation or setbacks. Furthermore, in a context of armed conflicts with increasing complexity in terms of the participating actors, negotiations often involved only a portion of the opposing parties.

National governments were involved as one of the **negotiating parties** in all the peace processes and negotiations. These governments negotiated or maintained contact with various kinds of actors directly or indirectly, depending on the characteristics of the context, which in general terms included armed groups (directly or through political representatives, and in some cases through coalitions of armed groups); a combination of armed groups and political and social actors; or representatives of political/military bodies with territorial control; and other state and substate governments and political and social actors. To a lesser extent, attempts at dialogue and rapprochement with criminal armed groups were also identified¹⁸. Overall, an upward trend was observed in the diversity of actors involved in the negotiations.

Parallel or complementary negotiations were conducted in some contexts, linked to armed conflicts and socio-political crises in highly complex scenarios of actors and disputes. The cases of Chad, South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan, the DRC, Yemen, Syria, Cameroon, Libya, Somalia, Myanmar, Venezuela and Haiti stood out as negotiations in which the network of actors involved high complexity in the dialogue. For

Dialogue and negotiating processes were under way in 21 of the 37 active armed conflicts during 2024, accounting for 57% of the cases

Parallel or complementary negotiating channels were active in a significant number of contexts, linked to a global scenario of highly complex armed conflicts

example, in Chad the peace process encompassed dialogue about the implementation of the Doha peace agreement between the government and a part of the Chadian insurgency, the implementation of the commitments resulting from the National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS) and communication channels with some of the insurgent groups that did not sign the Doha agreement. In Sudan, the dialogue in 2024 was focused on addressing the crisis between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which took place alongside the negotiations on the dynamics of conflict in Darfur and the “Two Areas” (South Kordofan and Blue Nile). In the South

Sudan peace process, there were channels of dialogue with actors linked to the 2018 peace agreement, as well as parallel negotiations in Nairobi with groups that did not sign it. The Sudan-South Sudan process encompassed inter-state negotiations as well as forums of dialogue between communities in the Abyei region. There were two separate peace negotiations related to the DRC: between the Congolese government and the Rwandan government (Luanda process) and between the Congolese government and different armed groups in the eastern part of the country (Nairobi process). In Yemen, the dialogue involved intra-Yemeni negotiations and negotiations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, but in 2024 the parties made no progress on the 2023 roadmap in a context influenced by hostilities between the Houthis and Israel and the US (among other actors) centred on the Red Sea. In Syria, the abrupt fall of Bashar Assad’s regime in December opened a new scenario in Syria and paved the way for new approaches for the country’s transition. Prior to this shift, negotiations in the country had involved the Geneva process –promoted by the UN and blocked in 2024– the Astana process – led by Russia, Turkey and Iran, with two meetings in 2024– and an attempt by Arab countries to solve the conflict, which had also not yielded progress during the year.

Regarding the **third parties involved in the peace and negotiation processes**, although in many cases it is possible to clearly identify the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment activities, on other occasions these tasks are carried out discreetly or not publicly. At least one third party was involved in the vast majority of the negotiating processes (45 out of 52, or 86%), a lower percentage than in recent years (89% in 2023 and 90% in 2022) (see Table 1.1 and 1.3.). Two of the seven new negotiating processes did not involve any third parties: India-China and Türkiye

¹⁷ Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2025! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2025.

¹⁸ In 2024 there were some attempts at dialogue and rapprochement with armed criminal groups in Colombia and Haiti, such as the Clan del Golfo in Colombia (a narco-paramilitary group) and some of the armed gangs operating in Haiti. See chapter 3 (Peace negotiations in the Americas).

Table 1.3. Internal and international peace processes and negotiations with and without third parties in 2024

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (4)	Negotiations with third parties (32)	National dialogues without third parties (2)	National dialogues with third parties (1)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (3)	Negotiations with third parties (17)
AFRICA							
Cameroon (Ambazonia/ North West-South West)		x					
CAR		x					
Chad ⁱ		x	x				
DRC ⁱⁱ		x					x
Ethiopia				x			
Ethiopia (Oromia)		x					
Ethiopia (Tigray)		x					
Eritrea – Ethiopia							x
Ethiopia – Egypt –Sudan							x
Ethiopia – Somalia (Somaliland)		x					
Libya		x					
Mali ⁱⁱⁱ		x	x				
Morocco – Western Sahara							x
Mozambique		x					
Senegal (Casamance)		x					
Somalia		x					
Somalia – Somaliland ^{iv}							x
South Sudan		x					
Sudan ^v		x					
Sudan – South Sudan		x ^{vi}					x
AMERICA							
Colombia (ELN)		x					
Colombia (EMC)		x					
Colombia (FARC)		x					
Colombia (Segunda Marquetalia)		x					
Haiti		x					
Venezuela		x					
Venezuela – Guyana							x
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC							
China (Tibet) ^{vii}		x					
India (Assam)	x						
India (Nagaland)	x						
India – China						x	

i. Two previous initiatives are being implemented in Chad: the Doha peace agreement between part of the Chadian insurgency and the government and the commitments made in the National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS). There is also a consultation process for the part of the insurgency that did not sign the Doha agreement facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio.

ii. There are two peace negotiations at the same time in the DRC, involving the Congolese government and the Rwandan government (Luanda process) and the Congolese government and different armed groups in the eastern part of the country (Nairobi process), both with third-party participation.

iii. The table reflects two different processes in Mali: the 2015 Algiers peace agreement mediated by third parties, which the military junta terminated in 2024; and the national dialogue process launched by the military junta in 2024.

iv. Although the Republic of Somaliland is not officially recognised as an independent state, this peace process is considered international because the region enjoys de facto recognition as an autonomous administration independent of Somalia.

v. The three peace processes and negotiations that were underway in Sudan in 2018 were consolidated into just one in 2019 due to the end of the national dialogue forum between the government and the opposition following the formation of a transitional government, as well as the merging of the negotiations over Darfur and the “Two Areas” (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) into a single peace process. Since 2023, the negotiations have focused on resolving the national armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

vi. This dialogue track refers to negotiations to resolve inter-community disputes in the Abyei region and border areas.

vii. Although the Central Tibetan Administration (popularly known as the Tibetan government-in-exile) is based in India, this negotiating process is not considered interstate because no state recognises Tibet as a separate state from China and because even the Central Tibetan Administration itself does not seek independence for the region.

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (4)	Negotiations with third parties (32)	National dialogues without third parties (2)	National dialogues with third parties (1)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (3)	Negotiations with third parties (17)
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC							
North Korea – South Korea						x	
North Korea – USA						x	
Myanmar		x					
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)		x					
Philippines (MILF)		x					
Philippines (MNLF)	x						
Philippines (NDF)		x					
Thailand (south)		x					
EUROPE							
Armenia – Azerbaijan ^{viii}							x
Cyprus		x					
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) ^{ix}							x
Moldova (Transdniestria)		x					
Russia – Ukraine ^x							x
Serbia – Kosovo ^{xi}							x
Türkiye (PKK)	x						
MIDDLE EAST							
Iran (nuclear programme)							x
Israel – Lebanon (Hezbollah)							x
Israel – Palestine							x
Palestine		x					x
Syria ^{xii}		x					x
Yemen ^{xiii}		x					x

viii. International negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the normalisation of relations, territorial integrity, border delimitation, transportation routes and other issues took place in 2024, primarily in the form of bilateral negotiations without external mediation, but some third parties were still involved in facilitating and supporting the talks.

ix. The nature of the peace processes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Russia's role in those conflicts, is subject to interpretation. Georgia considers Russia an actor in the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

x. Russia and Ukraine only maintained dialogue on humanitarian issues in 2024, with third-party support.

xi. The peace process between Serbia and Kosovo is considered international. Although Kosovo's legal status is still controversial, it has been recognised as a state by over 100 countries. In 2010, the International Court of Justice handed down a non-binding ruling stating that Kosovo's independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

xii. In Syria, there are parallel negotiating processes involving third parties, some of which are also considered actors in the conflict and interested parties in the negotiations.

xiii. Several negotiating channels remained open in Yemen. In 2024, the Omani-mediated process between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis was at a standstill, the UN continued its efforts to mediate between the various parties involved in the dispute and Saudi Arabia also became involved in negotiations between the Houthis and the internationally recognised government headed by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).

(PKK). For another year, there was third-party support for processes under different formats, both in internal and international negotiations (See Table 1.3.). At the regional level, while all negotiations that took place in Africa, the Americas and the Middle East had third-party support, only 50% of the processes in Asia and the Pacific involved third parties (the same percentage as in 2023). In Asia, interstate negotiations between North Korea and South Korea, between North Korea and the United States, and between India-China, as well as internal negotiations in the Philippines (MNLF), India (Assam) and India (Nagaland) took place without third-party support.

In practically all the cases that had a third party (at least 41 of the 45, equivalent to 93%) there was more than one actor performing mediation or facilitation tasks. Thus, in the vast majority of cases there was a set of actors engaged in mediation, facilitation and support for the dialogue, in some cases with collegiate, complementary and coordinated formulas, and in others, and increasingly, with fragmentation or problems of coordination or competition. In contrast, only one third party was observed in other cases: Norway in the process in the Philippines (NDF), Malaysia in Thailand

(south) and the UN in the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme, whilst in the unofficial dialogue between China and Tibet, the third parties were unknown.

In an international context of multiplicity of mediating actors, these were of diverse types, highlighting intergovernmental organizations –such as the UN, EU, AU and the IGAD, mainly– and state governments, religious organisations and civil society actors, including specialised centres. Intergovernmental organisations played a predominant role, except in Asia and the Pacific, where comparatively they were hardly involved in mediation and facilitation efforts. In line with the trend established in recent years, the United Nations was the main intergovernmental organisation that participated by supporting peace processes. It was present in different formats (mainly envoys and special representatives and missions) and served various support functions (mediation, co-mediation, verification, ceasefire supervision, assistance, support, the use of good offices and others) in 26 of the 52 processes identified during the year and in 26 of the 45 that involved at least one third party (50% and 58%, respectively). This was a slight dip compared to 2023, in which the UN participated as a third party in 53% of all processes and in 60% of dialogues that had at least a third party. Once again in 2024, the UN was heavily involved in the processes in Africa, where it provided support for 11 of the 20 cases: Chad, Libya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan and South Sudan. UN support for peace processes in Africa increased slightly over the previous year (55% in 2024, compared to 50% in 2023, but well below the 73% in 2022).

Other international and regional organisations also played a prominent role, especially regional organisations in their geographical areas of operation. The EU was the only regional organisation that supported mediation and dialogue outside its regional sphere of action. Thus, the EU carried out third-party functions with varying degrees and types of involvement in 13 negotiating processes (compared to 12 in 2023). The EU provided support in eight African negotiating processes (Ethiopia, Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan), as well as in all European negotiating processes, with the exception of Russia-Ukraine and Türkiye (PKK). The EU was not involved as a third party in Asia, the Americas or the Middle East. The African Union was a third party in 12 African processes (Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan), the same as in 2023 (and slightly higher than 2022, with 11 negotiating processes). The IGAD participated in six processes (Ethiopia (Oromia), Ethiopia (Tigray), Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan),

the same figure as in 2023. Other organisations such as the OSCE, OAS, SADC, Arab League, CARICOM, ECOWAS, ASEAN, ECAAS, ICGLR, EAC, OIC, OIF and CELAC had a reduced role, participating as third parties in one or two processes each (three in the case of the Arab League), but were involved together in 14 different processes: Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Transdniestria), Senegal (Casamance), Colombia (EMC), Colombia (FARC), Mozambique, the DRC, Myanmar, the CAR, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Haiti and Venezuela-Guyana, highlighting regional organisations' potential for supporting dialogue. However, geostrategic divisions limited the OSCE's scope for action in offering mediation and support for dialogue.

The UN was involved in 58% of the processes that had at least one third party

Furthermore, together with intergovernmental organisations, a significant number of states became involved as third parties in negotiating processes, often amidst the projection of national interests in an international dispute for hegemony between powers. In line with the trend seen in previous years, in 2024 Middle Eastern countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman and Egypt played a significant role not only in the region itself, but also in other peace processes in Africa, which was the main stage of their diplomatic efforts beyond their immediate area of influence, as well as in Russia-Ukraine. In 2024, notable roles were played by Türkiye and, to a lesser extent, by Qatar, in the peace negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia. Mention should be made of the role played by Saudi Arabia, the United States, Egypt, the UAE, Switzerland and other states, in facilitation efforts related to the armed conflict between the Sudanese Army and the RSF. In the Americas, in 2024, the facilitating government actors were similar to those in 2023 (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico, Chile, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Ireland, Russia and the Netherlands) and several of them continued to be involved in more than one negotiating process (Norway in four and Cuba, Brazil and Venezuela in two). In 2024 in the Middle East, in addition to the United States and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt were involved in the indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas, France was involved in negotiations between Israel and Lebanon (Paris also facilitated some contact with Gaza at the beginning of the year) and Russia, China and Egypt played roles in the efforts on intra-Palestinian reconciliation. Oman also continued to facilitate meetings as part of the Yemeni negotiating process.

Third parties –local, regional and international– got involved through various formats, including support structures. These had different forms and degrees of complexity. Among them, some included only States grouped in diverse structures. This was the case of the guarantor countries (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela,

Table 1.4. Intergovernmental organisations as third parties in peace processes in 2024

UNITED NATIONS (UN) (26)	
AFRICA	
Chad	Observation of the peace process facilitated by Qatar
CAR	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for the Central African Republic The UN is part of the International Support Group for Central Africa (GIS-RCA)
DRC	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the DRC
Libya	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Libya United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) The UN forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and EU
Mali	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mali UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)
Morocco – Western Sahara	UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Western Sahara United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
Mozambique	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mozambique
Somalia	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)
South Sudan	United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for South Sudan
Sudan	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) ¹⁹
Sudan – South Sudan	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa
AMERICA	
Colombia (ELN)	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Colombia
Colombia (EMC)	UN Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative for Colombia
Colombia (FARC)	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
Colombia (Segunda Marquetalia)	Delegate of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Colombia
Venezuela – Guyana	Secretario General de la ONU
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Peacebuilding Fund Resident Coordinator Office Mediation Support Unit UNDP
EUROPE	
Cyprus	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus and head of UNFICYP Mission of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus Office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus (OSASG) Secretary-General's Personal Envoy on Cyprus
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	United Nations Special Representative in the Geneva International Discussions
Russia – Ukraine	Two UN task forces led by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), involved in the negotiations on the Black Sea Initiative and the Memorandum of Understanding. ²⁰ Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Liaison Office in Kyiv
Serbia – Kosovo	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Kosovo and head of the UNMIK mission
MIDDLE EAST	
Iran	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The UN Secretary-General regularly reports on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which validated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015)
Israel-Hezbollah	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
Israel – Palestine	UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
Syria	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria
Yemen	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Yemen United Nations Mission to Support the Hudeidah Agreement (UNMHA)

¹⁹ Closed on February 24, 2024.

²⁰ In July 2023, Moscow ended its participation in the Black Sea Initiative (BSI) agreement to export grain and other products through Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Despite its termination, the UN maintained its commitment to supporting exports. For more information, visit the [UNCTAD website](#).

EUROPEAN UNION (EU) (13)	
AFRICA	
CAR	The EU is a member of the International Support Group for Central Africa (GIS-RCA)
DRC	The EU delegation in the DRC The EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region
Ethiopia	The EU has given support to the national dialogue process
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	The EU has given support to AU facilitation efforts
Libya	The EU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and UN
Mali	The EU Special Representative for the Sahel
Mozambique	The EU Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Mozambique
South Sudan	The EU is part of the mediation group
EUROPE	
Armenia –Azerbaijan	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA)
Cyprus	High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia EU Observation Mission in Georgia (EUMM)
Moldova (Transdnistria)	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) EU Delegation to Moldova The EU has an observer role in the OSCE-facilitated 1+1 of the peace process
Serbia – Kosovo	President of the European Council High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues EU Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)
AFRICAN UNION (AU) (12)	
CAR	The AU leads the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU with the support of ECCAS, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad)
Chad	Observation of the peace process facilitated by Qatar
DRC	The AU leads the Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC Facilitation of negotiations between DRC and Rwanda (Luanda process)
Ethiopia (Tigray)	AU mediation team led by the AU Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM)
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	The AU has made facilitation efforts between the three countries
Libya	The AU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the EU, Arab League and UN
Mali	AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel
Mozambique	The AU is the guarantor of the peace agreement
Somalia	AU High Representative for Somalia African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)
South Sudan	The AU is part of “IGAD Plus”
Sudan	AU High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) The AU and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) are part of the mediating group
Sudan – South Sudan	African Union Border Programme (AUBP)
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) (6)	
Ethiopia (Oromia)	The IGAD has facilitated the peace talks
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Participation in the AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM)
Somalia	IGAD delegation
South Sudan	The IGAD, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda, forms part of “IGAD Plus” in South Sudan
Sudan	IGAD is part of the mediating actors
Sudan – South Sudan	IGAD delegation
SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) (2)	
DRC	SADC representation in the DRC SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC)
Mozambique	SADC is the guarantor of the peace agreement
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM) (2)	
Haiti	CARICOM Eminent Persons Group
Venezuela – Guyana	CARICOM presidency

ARAB LEAGUE (3)	
AFRICA	
Libya	The Arab League forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, EU and UN
Sudan	The Arab League is one of the mediating actors
MIDDLE EAST	
Syria	Ministerial liaison committee (interlocution mechanism) with the Syrian government to address the crisis in the country and related challenges in the region
ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) (2)	
Colombia (EMC)	Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)
Colombia (FARC)	Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)
ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE) (2)	
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the South Caucasus
Moldova (Transdnistria)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Transdnistrian Settlement Process OSCE Mission in Moldova
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1)	
Myanmar	ASEAN envoy
EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY (EAC) (1)	
DRC	Facilitation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Nairobi process)
COMMUNITY OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STATES (CELAC) (1)	
Venezuela – Guyana	Presidency pro-tempore of CELAC
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES (ECCAS) (1)	
CAR	ECCAS delegation in the CAR
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) (1)	
Senegal (Casamance)	Facilitator and guarantor
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION (ICGLR) (1)	
DRC	Facilitation of negotiations between DRC and Rwanda (Luanda process)
ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE LA FRANCOPHONIE (OIF) (1)	
DRC	OIF delegation in the DRC
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC) (1)	
DRC	OIC delegation in the CAR

Norway, Mexico and Chile) and the supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain) in the talks between the government of Colombia and the ELN, as well as the guarantor countries in the process between the Colombian government and EMC (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Venezuela) and the QUAD in the negotiations over the Sudanese national crisis (the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). Others included a combination of states and/or intergovernmental organisations and in some cases civil society actors. This was the case of the permanent supporters of the processes of Colombia (ELN) and Colombia (EMC), which brought together representatives of the UN and the Catholic Church, as well as the OAS in the process with EMC. Other cases included the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (AU and ECCAS, with support from the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad) and the Third Party Monitoring Team support structure in the process in the Philippines

Many states became involved as third parties in negotiations, often to project their national interests in an international scenario disputed between powers

(MILF). In some cases, intergovernmental organisations were coordinated through specific structures, such as the Quartet in Libya, formed by the UN, Arab League, AU and EU; the Trilateral Mechanism in Sudan, involving UNITAMS, the AU and the IGAD; and the Group of International Support in the CAR, made up of the UN and the EU. In other cases, the coordination occurred on a practical level, without specific platforms, as in Venezuela, where in addition to Norway as the main facilitator of the dialogue, Russia and the Netherlands were also involved.

Several negotiating processes showcased the ambivalent involvement of some regional and international actors, as in some of the disputes in the Middle East and in other regions. Many of these actors played facilitation and/or mediation roles, whilst also providing significant support to one or more parties in conflict and/or parties directly involved in the hostilities, thereby actively seeking to preserve their interests or spheres of influence. This

was true of the United States, which was one of the mediators in Israel's negotiations with Hamas and the Lebanese government in 2024, whilst at the same time maintaining its policy of providing key political and military support for Netanyahu's government, including through the massive supply of weapons. Syria continued to be another example of this dynamic, as illustrated by the Astana process, shaped by Russia, Iran and Türkiye primarily to establish a status quo and spheres of influence in Syria and to avoid friction between these countries, which are directly involved in the armed conflict. Saudi Arabia also continued to be one of the facilitators and mediators of contact between various parties in the dispute in Yemen – including the Houthis and the PLC– whilst at the same time remaining a key player in supporting the internationally recognised government. Its role in the conflict has prompted it to act as a direct actor in talks with the Houthis, though unlike in 2023, these meetings were not as intense in 2024.

The search for or implementation of truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities was one of the central topics of discussion in several peace processes

With regard to the **negotiating agendas**, one must consider the particular aspects of each case and bear in mind that the details of the issues under discussion did not always become known to the public. Once again, the **search for or implementation of truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities** was one of the central topics of discussion in several peace processes. This was particularly relevant for the Israel-Palestine and Israel-Lebanon (Hezbollah) conflicts. Throughout the year, Hamas insisted on its interest in a permanent ceasefire, whilst Netanyahu's government repeated its limited willingness to merely pause hostilities without hindering the possibility of a new offensive to achieve its goal of "total victory" over Hamas. In this context, a ceasefire in Gaza was not achieved until early 2025. Regarding Israel-Lebanon (Hezbollah), an agreement was reached in November and was being implemented in a fragile context by the end of the year. The cessations of hostilities and ceasefire agreements were topics of discussion in different contexts, like in Libya, in the Ethiopian regions of Oromia and Tigray, Senegal (Casamance), Sudan or the DRC, in relation to the armed groups in the east of the country and especially M23. In the Americas, the ceasefire issue was central to the negotiations with the ELN and EMC. Reducing tensions and levels of violence, including the possibility of cessations of hostilities, was also a key aspect in negotiations in the Asia-Pacific region throughout 2024. Among other negotiating processes in the Asia-Pacific region, in Myanmar, the government and the Three Brothers Alliance coalition of armed groups agreed to a Chinese-brokered ceasefire for northern Shan State and the MNDAA announced a unilateral ceasefire with which it intended to initiate Chinese-brokered negotiations with the government. In Europe, the incipient exploratory dialogue between Türkiye and the PKK indicated an initiative for dialogue

that could lead to an end of armed violence by the opposition group.

Other important issues were related to **autonomy, self-determination, independence, administrative-territorial set-up and recognition of the identity of different minorities**. This was true of the processes in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Oromia), Ethiopia (Tigray), the DRC, Senegal (Casamance), South Sudan, Morocco-Western Sahara, India (Assam and Nagaland), the Philippines (MILF and MNLF), China (Tibet), Myanmar, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), Thailand (south), Cyprus, Moldova (Transdniestria), Serbia-Kosovo and others.

Most of the negotiations around these issues faced significant obstacles, given many governments' refusal to accept formulas for decentralisation and the recognition of sovereignty. Some negotiations addressed issues related to **border demarcation, state sovereignty and mutual recognition**. This was the case of the negotiating processes over disputes in Africa between Eritrea and Ethiopia, between Sudan and South Sudan, between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Somalia and Somaliland; in

the Americas between Venezuela and Guyana; and in Europe between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Issues related to the **governance** of countries and political transitions, the distribution of power and elections were also addressed. In Africa, governance issues were present in ongoing negotiations in various contexts, including Chad, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. In the Americas, the negotiations in Haiti concerned the possibilities for political transition in the country and the governability of this transition amid intense violence and enormous governmental fragility. In the negotiations between the government and the opposition in Venezuela, the central issue of the dispute was related to various aspects of the electoral process (registration, observation and timetable) without reaching any agreement on the matter.

Other topics in the negotiations included **security sector reform and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants**. These issues were widespread in negotiating processes in Africa, including in Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Senegal (Casamance), South Sudan and Libya. In Mozambique, the conclusion of the DDR process was announced, as provided for in the 2019 peace agreement between the government and RENAMO. DDR processes were also significant in Asia and the Pacific. The Philippine government and the MILF negotiated various issues, including the implementation of the final phase of the process to disarm and demobilise 40,000 former MILF combatants provided for in the 2014 peace agreement. Similarly, as part of the commitments that Manila

made in the 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF, it promoted reintegration programmes for former MNLF combatants and socio-economic development for their communities of origin in several regions of Mindanao. In Assam, the agreement signed in December 2023 between the UFFA-PTF and the Indian central government and the Assam state government began to be implemented. This agreement provided for the dissolution and disarmament of the armed group, as well as the abandonment of the cantonment centres where combatants and their families had remained since the peace negotiations began in 2011, among other issues. Other negotiating issues during the year included **prisoner exchanges**, such as in Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine and Yemen, and other humanitarian challenges, including access to humanitarian aid, as well as procedural issues, especially in Asian negotiating processes.

With regards to the **trends**, most dialogue and negotiating processes faced **difficulties, stagnation and even setbacks** in 2024. In Africa, many processes primarily faced challenges and difficulties, despite some progress. This was the case in Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Tigray), Ethiopia (Oromia), Somalia, the CAR, the DRC, Sudan and South Sudan. Sudan was mired in a complex process that failed to end the armed conflict between the Sudanese Army (SAF) and the paramilitary group RSF. Throughout this period, international mediators, especially from the region, attempted to facilitate dialogue between the conflicting parties, but disagreements between the SAF and the RSF complicated mediation efforts. Diplomatic initiatives failed in the DRC despite Angolan-led AU efforts to reach an agreement between the DRC and Rwanda and to achieve a ceasefire between the DRC and the armed group M23, which is supported by Rwanda and pursued its offensive in 2024. In Ethiopia's Tigray region, the implementation of the Pretoria peace agreement was slow and even stalled for much of the year, alongside rising tensions within the TPLF leadership, which hindered it. Other African negotiating processes, such as those in Cameroon, Mali, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan, Libya, Morocco-Western Sahara and Sudan-South Sudan faced deadlock and blockage. The case of Mali stood out here, as the military junta of Mali definitively suspended the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (the Algiers Agreement) and announced the start of a new national dialogue for peace and reconciliation, though neither the separatist armed groups of the CSP or the jihadist groups and other key political actors who boycotted the dialogue were involved.

In the Americas, although all the processes were still active at the end of the year, some had transformed significantly and there were fears that they would not continue in 2025. One factor that hampered the

positive development of the different negotiating processes in Colombia was the fragmentation and division of the armed actors. Moreover, in Venezuela the dialogue was interrupted for most of the year. In Asia and the Pacific most dialogue and negotiating processes faced difficulties, stagnation and even setbacks. The negotiating process over the Korean peninsula stood out, where there were no meetings or contacts between Pyongyang and Washington regarding the denuclearisation of North Korea, whilst relations between North Korea and South Korea hit one of the lowest points in recent years. Regarding Myanmar, ASEAN failed to facilitate a solution to the political crisis gripping Myanmar since the 2021 coup d'état.

In Europe, the negotiating processes of Serbia-Kosovo, Georgia and Moldova (Transdniestria) remained at an impasse, but amid greater socio-political tension. Furthermore, the political and military negotiations over Russia-Ukraine were not resumed. Regarding the progress of the negotiations in the Middle East, most were deadlocked during the year or faced various kinds of serious obstacles in reaching agreements and addressing the causes of the conflicts in detail. The parties to the conflict in Yemen made no progress on the roadmap outlined by the UN special envoy in late 2023 in a context influenced by hostilities between the Houthis and Israel. The negotiations over Israel-Palestine remained at a standstill, in contrast to the scale of Israel's violence and genocide, and it wasn't until early 2025 that a ceasefire agreement was reached as a first step.

Despite the setbacks and problems experienced in many negotiating processes, some processes enjoyed **rapprochement and progress** (see Table 1.5.). The only negotiating process that made progress during the year was between Ethiopia and Somalia, which culminated in December with an agreement between both countries facilitated by Türkiye. The agreement may help to end the dispute between both countries, which set off a deep crisis throughout the region in 2024. In Asia and the Pacific significant headway was also made in some cases. Perhaps the greatest new development were the alleged exploratory talks between Beijing and the Tibetan government in exile, which were only acknowledged by the latter. Though the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) was sceptical about the course and outcome of these exploratory talks, many analysts confirmed that there had been fresh contact between the parties and recognised their potential importance. Another important development in Asia and the Pacific was the agreement on the historical border dispute between India and China reached in October, which helped to reduce the political and military tensions that had worsened in the region since 2020, after direct clashes that resulted in fatalities. The agreement stipulated

Table 1.5. Main agreements of 2024

Peace processes	Agreements
Colombia (Segunda Marquetalia)	In June, the Colombian government and Segunda Marquetalia reached an agreement on early measures and a comprehensive and gradual de-escalation of the conflict in the territories where the organisation is active. This agreement called for the unilateral cessation of armed activity by the Segunda Marquetalia and included the release of the kidnapped individuals and the formation of a technical subcommittee composed of representatives from both delegations, with escorts and guarantors, to define the georeferencing of the territories where the armed group is active.
Ethiopia – Somalia (Somaliland)	Ethiopia and Somalia reached an agreement known as the Ankara Declaration (named after the capital of Türkiye, the facilitating country where the agreement was signed) on 11 December. Through this agreement, Somalia obtained recognition of Ethiopia's territorial integrity (including the breakaway region of Somaliland) and Ethiopia was granted access to and from the Somali coast. The agreement recognises the potential benefits that could result from Ethiopia's secured access to and from the sea, whilst respecting the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The two countries also agreed to pursue mutually beneficial trade arrangements through bilateral agreements, including contracts, leases and similar formats that would allow Ethiopia to enjoy reliable, secure and sustainable access to and from the sea under the sovereign authority of Somalia. They also decided to launch technical negotiations with these objectives no later than the end of February 2025, facilitated by Türkiye, and with a timeframe planned to last four months.
India – China	China and India reached an agreement on border patrols in October, easing tensions between both countries. The agreement was reached in the days leading up to the BRICS summit and its exact content has not been disclosed. The agreement allows for the resumption of border patrols in the disputed Ladakh region, but it was unknown whether it would entail the withdrawal of thousands of troops deployed on both sides of the border.
Israel – Lebanon (Hezbollah)	Following mediation by the US and France, a cessation of hostilities agreement was reached between Israel and Lebanon on 26 November. The deal stipulates that the Lebanese government must prevent Hezbollah and other armed groups from launching attacks against Israel from Lebanese soil and ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the UN mission in the area (UNIFIL) are the only forces operating between the area south of the Litani River and the Blue Line. Israel pledges to end all offensives in Lebanon and to gradually withdraw its forces from the neighbouring country. The LAF must also dismantle military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, confiscate unauthorised weapons and control the flow of arsenals. The terms of the agreement resemble the provisions set forth in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, but which has not been fully implemented.

confidence-building measures such as troop withdrawal and peaceful patrolling in disputed border areas in the eastern part of the Indian territory of Ladakh.

In Europe, on a positive note, a dialogue was opened in Türkiye to address the 40-year-long armed conflict between the Turkish State and the PKK. The previous negotiating process had ended in 2015. However, by the end of the year, uncertainty and difficulties persisted. Armenia and Azerbaijan made progress on border delimitation, but the overall process continued to face obstacles. Furthermore, the removal of the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh from the negotiations –both the historical political dimension and the humanitarian dimension related to the forced exodus of the Armenian population– was a setback from a human security perspective. In the Middle East, the negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme remained deadlocked in 2024, although at the end of the year Tehran and the European countries involved in the talks resumed direct diplomatic contact for the first time since 2022. The armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah escalated significantly, but at the end of the year a ceasefire agreement was reached, albeit amidst great fragility. The abrupt fall of Bashar Assad's regime in December opened a new scenario in Syria and gave way to new approaches to the transition, though amid uncertainty due to the many different political and security challenges that the country was facing.

Women's civil society organisations from Cameroon, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Myanmar, Cyprus, Yemen and Syria and elsewhere demanded dialogue and inclusion in the negotiating processes

Finally, regarding the **gender, peace and security agenda**, the analysis of the different peace processes in 2024 confirms, like in previous years, the obstacles that women face in participating in formal processes and the difficulties in incorporating a gender perspective in negotiation. The peace processes continued to be characterised mainly by low levels of women's participation in the negotiating and mediating teams. For the most part, **no specific mechanisms of participation were designed for women in most negotiations and gender issues and recognition of the rights of women and the LGBTIQ+ population were left out of much of the negotiating agendas**. Regarding the establishment of participation mechanisms, the AU adopted the Swakopmund Process in 2024 in Africa. Approved after a high-level ministerial seminar in Swakopmund, Namibia, this instrument is designed to strengthen and monitor women's participation in African peace processes, especially track 1 processes. In Europe, only the negotiating process in **Cyprus** had a gender-specific mechanism in the formal negotiating process, the gender equality technical committee, but it moved at a slower pace than other committees, according to the United Nations. Furthermore, beyond formal mechanisms in negotiating processes, some mediating and facilitating actors promoted avenues for participation. In **Papua New Guinea** the United Nations promoted several projects for women's participation in the main forum for negotiations between the central government of

Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government: the Joint Consultative Body (JCB). In terms of informal architectures, the Women's Advisory Board for Sustainable Peacebuilding (WAB), launched by UN Women in late 2022, remained active in **Moldova**, and the facilitator of the peace negotiations, the OSCE, held discussions with the women of the Advisory Council.

There were several processes in which women could participate, though with many limitations. In terms of negotiating actors, the NDF negotiating panel in the **Philippines** continued to be chaired by a woman. Most negotiating processes in the Americas had women as members and leaders, but there were no transformative agendas for gender equality. In **Colombia** Vera Grabe stayed on as head of the government delegation in the negotiations with the ELN after her appointment in 2023 and the government delegations in all the negotiations in that country involved women, though the only government delegation with gender parity was the one involved in talks with the ELN. The highest-level negotiating delegations of the conflicting parties in most negotiating processes in Europe were led by men. **Türkiye** was the exception, with the participation of MP and women's human rights activist Pervin Buldan in the delegation of the pro-Kurdish DEM party that spoke with the PKK leader as part of the new dialogue initiative. The negotiations over **Gaza** were led exclusively by men, both in the negotiating and mediating delegations.

With regards to mediation roles, in 2024, the United Nations mediation efforts in **Libya** were led by two senior women, Stephanie Koury and Rosemary Di Carlo, and the new special representative appointed in early 2025 was expected to join this effort. In Europe, third parties included a higher percentage of women than

the negotiating parties did. In **Moldova**, for example, the OSCE team facilitating negotiations between the chief negotiators was composed of two senior women (head of mission and deputy head of mission) and two to three men from the mission's Political Office. In 2024, women's involvement in co-mediation and facilitation roles was expanded in connection with the process in Georgia. In any case, the limitations of third parties in promoting a gender perspective in negotiations became evident once again this year, as in Moldova, where, according to the OSCE, the mission was not entitled to propose issues on the negotiating agenda of the parties to the conflict.

Civil society women's organisations were highly active in various peace processes and demanded continuity in the negotiations, greater participation or the inclusion of proposals regarding more recognition of women's rights or general suggestions regarding the content of the negotiations. This was the case in Cameroon, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan and elsewhere in Africa. Furthermore, women from across Africa mobilised to support the peace initiatives promoted by Angola in the DRC. The High-Level Regional Forum of Women of the Great Lakes Region was held in Luanda in October, and it focused on strengthening women's participation and leadership in peace and security processes in the region. In Asia and the Pacific, several women's organisations in Myanmar demanded the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. Women civil society activists in all countries with negotiating processes continued to be involved in different areas of peacebuilding. As part of this, a new women's initiative, the Bicomunal Women's Coalition in Cyprus, was created in Cyprus in 2024 to promote an inclusive solution to the conflict. In Yemen, women continued to participate in bottom-up consultation processes, calling for a genuinely inclusive peace process in the country and criticising the obstacles to women's substantive political participation. In Syria, women have been demanding a greater role in shaping the country's future for years.

