

3. Peace negotiations in America

- In the Americas, there were seven negotiating processes in 2025, accounting for 13% of the world total.
- In Colombia, the group Comuneros del Sur agreed to hand over war materiel and begin to demobilise.
- Negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government were officially suspended in January as a result of the resurgence of violence in Catatumbo and were not resumed for the rest of the year.
- The Colombian government and the armed group Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano reached more than 10 partial agreements at the negotiating table.
- The main coalition of armed gangs in Haiti, Viv Ansanm, expressed its desire to enter into some form of dialogue with the government regarding the political transition in the country.
- Caracas continued to insist on bilateral negotiations to resolve the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region, whilst Georgetown insisted on arbitration by the International Court of Justice.

This chapter provides an analysis of the main peace processes and negotiations in the Americas in 2025, both the general characteristics and trends of the negotiations and the development of each case on both continents throughout the year, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda. In addition, at the beginning of the chapter there is a map identifying the countries in the Americas that hosted peace negotiations during 2025.

Table 3.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in America in 2025

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Colombia (Comuneros del Sur)	Government, Comuneros del Sur	Netherlands, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, Episcopal Conference of Colombia
Colombia (ELN)	Government, ELN	Guarantor countries (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile); permanent supporters (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, Episcopal Conference of Colombia); supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Colombia (EMBF)¹	Government, Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF)	Permanent supporters (Episcopal Conference of Colombia, World Council of Churches, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia), guarantor countries (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Venezuela)
Colombia (FARC)	Government, Comunes	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute), OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia
Colombia (CNEB)²	Government, Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Guarantor countries (Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland, Venezuela and Uruguay); permanent supporters (UN Verification Mission and the Episcopal Conference of Colombia)
Haiti	Government, political and social opposition	CARICOM (Eminent Persons Group), United Nations (BINUH and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General), OAS (including the Group of Friends of Haiti)
Venezuela – Guyana	Venezuela, Guyana	CELAC, CARICOM, Brazil, United Nations Secretary-General

1. The negotiations between the Colombian government and the armed group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) shifted to involve the Government and the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF, which arose from EMC).
2. The negotiations between the Colombian government and the Segunda Marquetalia insurgency evolved in 2025 into negotiations between the government and the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB, a group that originated from Segunda Marquetalia).

Map 3.1. Peace negotiations in America in 2025



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in America in 2025

3.1 Negotiations in 2025: regional trends

There were seven negotiating processes in the Americas in 2025. This is the same number as the previous year, but not the same negotiations. Colombia was the scene of five processes, the highest number in the region. Three resulted from previous processes that evolved as a consequence of the fragmentation of armed groups and the appearance of new factions. This was the case with the negotiations with Comuneros del Sur, which emerged from the process with the ELN, with Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF), which arose from negotiations with Estado Mayor Central (EMC), and with Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB), which originated from Segunda Marquetalia. Moreover, the negotiating process between Venezuela and Guyana over the disputed Essequibo region remained active. Finally, talks in Haiti continued to try to usher in a completed transition process. The Norwegian-facilitated political dialogue that the Venezuelan government had held with part of the opposition through the Unitary Platform in recent years was interrupted following the presidential election of July 2024, in which the opposition denounced massive fraud and claimed a decisive victory for opposition candidate Edmundo Urrutia. Meanwhile, Norway's facilitation of the dialogue gradually faded until, in September, it issued a statement openly criticising the political and human rights situation in Venezuela. Shortly after opposition figure María Corina Machado won the Nobel Peace Prize in October,

Caracas closed Norway's embassy in the country. Thus, the seven negotiating processes that took place in the Americas accounted for 13% of the total worldwide.

All the peace processes in 2025 involved national governments as one of the negotiating **actors**. Nevertheless, the negotiations in the region were characterised by the great diversity of the actors that led them. Active armed groups were involved in four, all in Colombia: Comuneros del Sur, the ELN, EMBF and CNEB. These four groups were represented at the negotiating table by delegations. Three of these groups (Comuneros del Sur, the ELN, EMBF and CNEB) sat for peace talks with the Colombian government as a result the splitting and fragmenting the Colombian insurgency, which added complexity to the negotiating scenario and demonstrated the serious obstacles faced by the Total Peace policy. In the negotiations over the implementation of Colombia's 2016 peace agreement, the Colombian government's counterpart was the Comunes party, which emerged from the transformation of the armed group FARC-EP. The remaining negotiating processes involved different social and political actors and the governments of different states. Three dialogue processes took place in Haiti: the internationally-supported intra-Haitian dialogue between political actors in the country; international negotiations regarding UN support to address the country's humanitarian and security situation; and attempts at a process with armed gangs seeking recognition and legitimacy to play some role in negotiations on Haiti's political future. Finally,

the governments of Venezuela and Guyana engaged in international dialogue. Alongside these processes, Colombia also approached criminal and narco-paramilitary armed groups.

Third parties were involved in all the peace processes that took place in the Americas, performing support, facilitation and mediation roles, among other tasks. The mediating actors enjoyed continuity with those of previous years, meaning that most facilitating actors were international. Their main task was to bring the disputing parties closer together, favouring negotiating processes to end the different active conflicts. A significant number of international actors were other Latin American countries. With the exception of Haiti, other Latin American governments facilitated all the negotiating processes in the Americas, including Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile and Uruguay. In Haiti, this facilitation was not carried out by individual states, but through regional organisations such as CARICOM and the OAS. Several European states also provided support, like Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Norway, Ireland and the Netherlands. Some countries participated in several peace processes simultaneously, such as Norway, Switzerland, Brazil and Venezuela.

The most active international organisation was the UN, which was involved in several of the peace processes that took place in Colombia (the ELN, EMBF, FARC and CNEB) and also participated in the dialogues in Haiti and between Venezuela and Guyana. The UN's facilitation work was carried out by the UN Secretary-General in the dialogue between Venezuela and Guyana, by his special representatives in Colombia and Haiti and by the missions deployed on the ground: the Verification Mission in Colombia and the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). Other regional organisations involved were CARICOM, the OAS and CELAC. Finally, other facilitating actors in Colombia included religious ones, such as the Episcopal Conference and the World Council of Churches, in addition to the International Verification Component and the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute from the US. Once again, third parties in the Americas participated and performed different roles in the negotiating processes under a wide variety of formats, including by coordinating as guarantor countries (in the negotiations with the ELN, EMBF and CNEB), as supporting countries (in the talks with the ELN), as permanent supporting countries (dialogues with the ELN and EMBF), the CARICOM Eminent Persons Group (EPG) in Haiti and the international verification component for implementing the 2016 Peace Agreement in Colombia.

In keeping with the variety of conflicts and tensions they were trying to address, as well as the characteristics and types of both the actors and the processes, the negotiating agendas were also characterised by heterogeneity. Thus, the issues addressed ranged from possible ceasefires and cessations of hostilities to electoral issues and others related to political

transitions, as well as interstate agreements to address disputed territories. The negotiations in Haiti were related to the possibilities of a political transition in the country and the governability of this transition amidst intense violence and enormous governmental fragility. Even though most negotiations in Colombia were with active armed groups and were pursued as part of the Colombian government's public policy known as Total Peace, which helps us to identify some similarities between the different processes, each process had peculiar features. The most unique process was the dialogue for implementing the 2016 peace agreement, as it was related to the application of an agreement that had already been signed. The issue of the ceasefire was central to the negotiations with the ELN, though kidnappings and the participation of civil society were also significant matters that occupied a central place on the agenda. The ceasefire was also fundamental in the negotiations with EMC, to which were added the issues of deforestation and the environmental agenda. A five-point agenda was created for the negotiations with Segunda Marquetalia: de-escalation of the conflict and the preparation of peace territories; the construction of peace territories; victims as a transformative social subject; conditions for peaceful coexistence; implementation and verification. Later, when the process changed after some factions left, a new agenda was agreed upon: territorial transformation; security in territories and for communities; measures and routes of legal security for members of guerrilla structures; and political participation. In the negotiations between the Venezuelan government and the opposition, the central issue was related to different aspects of the elections (registration, observation and timetable), though no agreement was reached on the matter. Finally, the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana revolved around the status of the territory of Essequibo. Both countries claim sovereignty over the region, which is currently being administered by Guyana.

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peculiar features. The most unique process was the dialogue for implementing the 2016 peace agreement, as it was related to the application of an agreement that had already been signed. A central pillar of the negotiations with different Colombian armed groups during 2025 was the question of demobilisation and the establishment of Temporary Location Zones, as the sites are called where combatants will transition from military to civilian life. The handover of weaponry by insurgent groups as part of demobilisation processes was also negotiated. Finally, the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana revolved around the status of the territory of Essequibo. Both countries claim sovereignty over the region, which is currently being administered by Guyana.

The **trends of the negotiating processes varied**, although overall progress was limited among widespread deadlock. At the start of the year, the Colombian government officially called off its peace negotiations with the ELN, the main active armed group in the country. The talks were not resumed and the crisis worsened as a consequence of the escalation of violence in the Catatumbo region. Several of the peace negotiations that took place in Colombia underwent a profound transformation due to the fragmentation and division of many armed groups, which gave rise to several negotiations with groups that had split from their parent organisations. This was the case with Comuneros del Sur, which emerged from the ELN, Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF), which arose from EMC, and Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB), which originated from Segunda Marquetalia. All these organisations initiated peace talks with the government, whilst the original organisations either abandoned the negotiations (such as EMC and Segunda Marquetalia) or else the negotiations came to an end due to violence and difficulties encountered during them. Thus, the active peace processes in Colombia mostly involved small groups with limited territorial reach, restricting the positive impacts of the different active processes. The implementation of the 2016 agreement with the FARC moved ahead with great difficulty and significant delays, both in the implementation of the agreement as a whole and especially with regard to the gender perspective, where the delays were most notable. No significant progress was made in the political dialogue in Haiti, which remained stalled and without notable results. Nor did the attempts at dialogue promoted by armed gangs in the country bear any fruit, given the government's refusal to talk with criminals. International progress was made, however, with the approval of the deployment of the new mission known as the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). No progress was observed in the negotiations between Venezuela and Guyana to resolve their dispute over the Essequibo region.

Women's participation and leadership was observed in a large part of the peace negotiations in the Americas, though this did not mean that the **gender, peace and security agenda** and its implementation were

especially pre-eminent. Two government negotiating delegations were headed by women: the Colombian government panel in the negotiations with the ELN, led by Vera Grabe since her appointment in 2023, and the government delegation in the negotiations with EMBF, which were headed by Gloria Quiceno following her appointment in 2025. Furthermore, women participated in all delegations and helped to represent some of the international facilitating actors. Nevertheless, most negotiating delegations were overrepresented by men to the detriment of gender equality. Moreover, the partial agreements reached in the different processes incorporated very vague allusions to women's rights and the incorporation of a gender perspective or, in most cases, included no allusion to it whatsoever. Civil society was actively involved in different processes, presenting proposals to enrich the negotiating agendas through the inclusion of a gender and inclusive perspectives.

Finally, alongside the negotiating processes analysed in this chapter, the Colombian government continued the socio-judicial dialogue with the narco-paramilitary group known as Clan del Golfo as part of Total Peace, a public policy that seeks to build peace in the country by involving all active armed actors.

3.2 Case study analysis

North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Haiti	
Negotiating actors	Government, political and social opposition
Third parties	CARICOM (Eminent Persons Group), United Nations (BINUH and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General), OAS (including the Group of Friends of Haiti)
Relevant agreements	--

Summary:

In recent years, especially after former President Jean Bertrand Aristide left the country in February 2004 and the subsequent deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH), there have been several attempts at consultation and dialogue between various political and social sectors to cope with the institutional fragility, political-social polarisation and economic and security crisis facing the country. Yet none of these initiatives, most of which agreements or have led to permanent or stable spaces or mechanisms for negotiation. Though President Jovenel Moïse's mandate has been controversial since its inception after he was accused of electoral fraud in the 2015 election, his attempts to create a national dialogue in 2019 came in response to the deepening crisis in mid-2018 and the outbreak of protests and episodes of violence in 2019.

There were three interrelated dialogue and negotiating processes in 2025. The first was the intra-Haitian dialogue on the country's political transition, which was

facilitated and supported by several international actors. The second process was connected to the international negotiations on UN support to address the dramatic humanitarian and security situation that the country has suffered for years. The third process was linked to attempts by the armed gangs operating in the country to gain a certain degree of political recognition and legitimacy and to play some kind of role in negotiations on the country's political future. **No significant progress was made in the intra-Haitian dialogue, which focused mainly on holding elections, reforming the 1987 Constitution and especially on designing governance structures after the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council expired on 7 February 2026. This dialogue was facilitated primarily by CARICOM, and mainly through its Eminent Persons Group, made up of the former prime ministers of Saint Lucia, Jamaica and the Bahamas. This intra-Haitian dialogue met regularly with Haitian social and political organisations during the year. However, other international actors also supported the negotiating process, including the UN (primarily through the good offices of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative and BINUH), the OAS (including the Group of Friends of Haiti) and the International Contact Group on Haiti. Of particular note was the presentation in August of the Roadmap for Stability and Peace in Haiti by the OAS, a strategic framework for the 2025-2028 period agreed with the Haitian government, the UN, CARICOM, the inter-American system, civil society, international donors and the Haitian diaspora. The roadmap, which recognises CARICOM's primacy in facilitating the political dialogue, is based on five pillars: 1) strengthening security and local capacities to combat gang violence; 2) restoring constitutional order and strengthening democratic institutions; 3) holding fair and transparent elections; 4) responding to the humanitarian crisis; and 5) promoting sustainable economic development. The roadmap also provides for a monitoring and implementation mechanism (the Coordination Group Mechanism, made up of the OAS, the UN, CARICOM, the government, the Group of Friends of Haiti and international donors) and the designation of an OAS Special Representative. The roadmap received considerable support from international organisations and governments, but many civil society organisations were sceptical, wary that any such international intervention could undermine the country's sovereignty.**

After several months of international negotiations that also involved the Haitian government on the widespread violence and humanitarian crisis in the country, on 30 September 2025 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2793, presented by the United States and Panama, which transformed the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS, created in October 2023) into the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). This force will

have greater strength (up to 5,500 military personnel), offensive capability, territorial coverage, funding and operational autonomy from the Haitian authorities. In addition, both the OAS and the UN announced their commitment to become much more decisively involved in the mission's work through the creation of a UN Office of Support in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide logistical and operational support to the GSF and the Haitian government. They also announced the creation of a Standing Group of Partners, comprising countries such as the Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kenya and the United States, to mobilise troops and funds for the mission. Furthermore, in December, diplomat Jacques Christofides was appointed Special Representative for the GSF, a role he will hold alongside the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BINUH, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, who was appointed in August.

Finally, on several occasions during the year **the main coalition of armed gangs in the country, Viv Ansanm, expressed its desire to enter into some form of dialogue with the government and its willingness to participate in negotiations on the political transition in Haiti.** In August, Viv Ansanm even wrote to the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Haiti, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, arguing that the country's crisis could only be resolved through dialogue and by presenting its coalition as a unified negotiating partner. According to some analysts, as their power and territorial control have expanded, some gang leaders have adopted openly political messaging, presenting themselves as actors fighting for local justice and against corrupt elites and oligarchies, appealing to Haiti's history of resistance and appearing in public with their faces uncovered. Along these lines, a Crisis Group report³ noted that the armed gangs are seeking political recognition and amnesty and warned that the country's instability and the expiration of the Transitional Presidential Council's mandate in February 2026 created opportunities for the gangs to expand their influence within state institutions and promote the appointment of people who can protect their interests. However, in December, Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé ruled out any negotiations with these gangs and insisted that the state would take a firm stance against armed groups seeking to destabilise Haiti.

Gender, peace and security

The first edition of the Women's Leadership Forum was held in January, attended by around 800 people representing the Haitian government, civil society and the business community, as well as other governments and international organisations. The aim of the conference was to promote gender equality and greater

3. International Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance*, Report 110, 15 December 2025.

influence for women in Haiti's economic and political spheres, including greater participation in the future constitutional reform and the upcoming elections. Specifically, participants in the forum called for women's full participation in the national dialogue process and the upcoming elections, including those from the diaspora. The forum issued a declaration demanding not only respect for the constitutional precept to guarantee at least 30% of women at all levels of national life, particularly in public administration, but also the achievement of full parity between men and women in any future constitutional reform. Finally, the declaration called for action to combat gender-based violence, including systemic barriers, political violence and the cultural prejudices and stereotypes that keep women away from public affairs or limit their professional ambitions.

South America

Colombia (Comuneros del Sur)	
Negotiating actors	Government, Comuneros del Sur
Third parties	Netherlands, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, Episcopal Conference of Colombia
Relevant agreements	--
Summary: The peace negotiations with the armed group Comuneros del Sur began as part of the peace process between the Colombian government and the ELN that has been under way since 2022. In 2024, whilst the government was negotiating with the ELN, it launched a parallel dialogue with the ELN structure operating in the department of Nariño, known as Comuneros del Sur. This triggered a crisis in the negotiations between the ELN and the government, leading to the split of Comuneros del Sur and the start of a separate peace process.	

The peace negotiations with the armed group Comuneros del Sur (which split off from the ELN) moved ahead positively and several agreements were reached. The peace process with Comuneros del Sur was the most advanced of all those that the government of Gustavo Petro is holding with the different armed groups active in the country, although its scope is limited because it is a regional process confined to the group's area of operations in Nariño and because it is not aimed at reaching a national agreement or at addressing the structural causes of the armed conflict, but rather at finding a way out for the armed group and a means to reduce violence in the territory affected by the insurgency's activity. In February, an agreement was reached to begin the destruction of war materiel and the group's gradual disarmament in Nariño. The destruction of war materiel had initially been scheduled to begin before December 2024, but the agreement was delayed. The protocol for the destruction of war

The armed group Comuneros del Sur agreed to hand over war materiel and begin its demobilisation in Colombia

materiel was signed with the participation of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OAS), representatives of the Netherlands, the Episcopal Conference of Colombia, the Colombian Ministry of Defence, military observers, police observers and the technical teams of the negotiating delegations. Thus, in exchange for handing over their weapons, the approximately 100 members of the armed group began their demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life. Several further agreements were reached during the year related to truth, memory and recognition of victims' dignity; the substitution of illicit crops; the creation of a Temporary Zone for the Co-Construction of Territorial Peace; the comprehensive reintegration of Comuneros del Sur members for peace and territorial transformation; the strengthening of democracy in the territory; and the protection of the rights of children and adolescents. Particularly important was the negotiation on the Temporary Location Zones (ZUTs) intended for members of armed groups to make the transition to civilian life, the design of which affected negotiations with other armed organisations such as the Clan del Golfo, the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB) and Frente 33 of the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente dissident group. The Colombian government held a consultation with more than 1,000 people from the Gran Mallama Indigenous Reservation, where the ZUT agreed with Comuneros del Sur would be located, to ensure that it would not affect either the territory or indigenous self-government.

Gender, peace and security

The negotiating delegations that took part in the peace process included female delegates and signatories of the various agreements reached during the year. There was also female representation among the facilitating actors. Furthermore, some of the agreements reached referred to the gender perspective, though such references were neither exhaustive nor systematic. For instance, the agreement on comprehensive reintegration included an intersectional approach by mentioning the incorporation of differential approaches, with special attention paid to gender, ethnicity, disability and older persons. The agreement on the protection of the rights of children and adolescents included a specific mention of girls, though it did not specifically note the importance of a gender perspective. The agreement on the substitution of illicit crops also included a reference to differential approaches regarding ethnicity, gender and diversity, the life cycle and territorial focus. Alongside the peace negotiations, women's civil society organisations developed a peace agenda as part of the Rumbo a la Paz project, led by UNDP and the Alianza Iniciativa de Mujeres Colombianas por la Paz (IMP), with proposals aimed at contributing to the peace negotiations with Comuneros del Sur and other armed

groups such as Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF) in Catatumbo, Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada in Santa Marta and the ELN.⁴ The framework for the proposals was UNSC Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, and a territorial agenda was built to improve the living conditions of women affected by the armed conflict in areas such as infrastructure, the economy and inclusion in negotiations.

Colombia (ELN)	
Negotiating actors	Government, ELN
Third parties	Guarantor countries (Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile) United Nations Verification Mission, Catholic Church, supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Relevant agreements	“Heaven’s Door” Agreement (1988)

Summary:
 Since the ELN emerged in 1964, various negotiating processes have tried to bring peace to the country. The first negotiations between the Colombian government and the ELN date from 1991 (Caracas and Tlaxcala). In 1998, both parties signed a peace agreement in Madrid that envisaged holding a national convention. That same year, the “Puerta del Cielo” agreement between the ELN and civil society activists was signed in Mainz, Germany, focused on humanitarian aspects. In 1999, the Colombian government and the ELN resumed meetings in Cuba, which ended in June 2000. The government of Álvaro Uribe resumed peace negotiations with the ELN in Cuba between 2005 and 2007, though no results were achieved. At the end of 2012, the ELN showed its willingness to open new negotiations with President Juan Manuel Santos, appointing a negotiating commission, and exploratory meetings were held. Formal peace negotiations began in 2017, which broke off in 2019 after a serious attack by the ELN in Bogotá.

Bogotá officially pulled out of the peace negotiations it had been holding with the ELN on 17 January as a result of the intensification of violence in the Catatumbo region. The negotiations were not resumed for the rest of the year. Colombian President Gustavo Petro announced that the government was leaving the talks following fighting between the ELN and the armed group Frente 33 of Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente, a group that emerged as a dissident faction of the demobilised FARC-EP. Petro described the armed clashes as war crimes that claimed the lives of over 20 civilians and four former FARC combatants who had signed the peace agreement. Both the head of the government negotiating delegation, Vera Grabe, and negotiator Iván Cepeda cited the constant obstacles that the ELN had placed in the way of the negotiations’ progress. Vera Grabe said that the suspension of the negotiations did not mean

that communication channels with the armed group would be closed, and also noted that humanitarian agreements would be maintained, but she did reiterate that the suspension was due to the rise in violence. The negotiations had been deadlocked since May 2024, with no renewal of the ceasefire agreement between the armed group and the Colombian government having been achieved. Several episodes of violence were reported during this period, which made it difficult to resume the talks. On several occasions during the year, representatives of both negotiating delegations made public statements regarding a possible resumption of the dialogue. President Gustavo Petro addressed the issue of a possible resumption of negotiations during an official visit to the Vatican in May, suggesting to Pope Leo XIV that the Vatican could host them, though there was no immediate response from the Holy See in this regard. The ELN’s chief negotiator, Pablo Beltrán, called for the talks to resume in September by releasing a video in which he said that for changes to occur within the armed group, it was necessary to achieve ‘agreements, end the armed conflict, agree on transformations and include society’ in the process and to respect the framework agreements signed with the Santos administration in 2016 and with Petro in 2023. Weeks later, Gustavo Petro made a new call for dialogue through a message on the social media platform X, but armed clashes persisted and the negotiations were not resumed. However, no rapprochement between the government and the ELN was achieved during the year, although in December the armed group published an interview in its media outlet *Insurrección* with the ELN’s First Commander, Antonio García, saying that the group was willing to resume the talks under certain conditions, building on what had already been agreed and continuing with the progress that had been made thus far.⁵ García said that they understood that the agreements had not been made with any particular government, but with the state, which should allow for continuity of issues on which progress had been made.

Colombia (EMBF) ⁶	
Negotiating actors	Government, Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF)
Third parties	Permanent supporters (Episcopal Conference of Colombia, World Council of Churches, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia), guarantor countries (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Venezuela)
Relevant agreements	Ceasefire agreement (2023)

4. Colombia+20, “Los llamados de las mujeres para que sus apuestas lleguen a procesos de paz de Petro”, *El Espectador*, 12 May 2025.
 5. ELN, “Retomar diálogos no puede ‘ser borrón y cuenta nueva’”, *Insurrección* no. 1030, 15 December 2025.
 6. In July 2024, the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the armed group EMC became negotiations with Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF), which includes the EMC factions Comandante Jorge Suárez Briceño and Comandante Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio and Frente Comandante Raúl Reyes de las FARC-EP, following the withdrawal of some EMC factions from the process.

Summary:

Estado Mayor Central (EMC) emerged as an armed group made up of members of the FARC led by Iván Mordisco and Gentil Duarte, who abandoned the peace process before the 2016 peace agreement was signed between the Colombian government and the FARC. The group was later joined by other dissident groups that left the FARC after the agreement was signed, then it expanded further by recruiting new members who had no previous links to the FARC. After Gustavo Petro took office as president of Colombia in 2022, he announced the launch of Total Peace, a public policy aimed at building peace in the country by involving all active armed actors. As part of this policy, a peace negotiating process with the EMC began in 2023. In July 2024, the negotiations with the EMC become negotiations with Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF), which includes the EMC factions Comandante Jorge Suárez Briceño and Comandante Gentil Duarte Magdalena Medio and Frente Comandante Raúl Reyes de las FARC-EP, following the withdrawal of some EMC factions from the process.

The dialogue remained active between the Colombian government and the armed group Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF), which split off from the group Estado Mayor Central, itself a dissident faction of the FARC-EP. However, at the end of the year, the negotiating process underwent a major crisis that threatened its continuity. In May, the negotiating table agreed to establish a Temporary Location Zone (ZUT) in the rural area of the municipality of Tibú, Norte de Santander, for the members of Frente 33 of the EMBF. The ZUT is the location where combatants of armed groups are stationed to carry out their demobilisation and transition to civilian life. The most significant progress at the negotiating table took place in November, when a set of five agreements was reached between the government and the insurgency. The agreements addressed the following issues: territorial and land transformations; the environment, bioeconomy and revitalisation of the Amazon Rainforest; de-escalation and acts of peace; the Joint Legal Commission; and electoral guarantees. The agreements reached were aimed at de-escalating the conflict and building peace, prioritising the protection of civilians and the commitment not to recruit minors, along with the strengthening of state programmes for their protection. They also included measures for access to land, rural development and the creation of Peasant Reserve Zones, as well as the recognition of territorial rights and environmental conservation, proposing actions to halt deforestation, substitute illicit crops and protect natural parks. In addition, they provided for the reactivation of a commission to address the situation of people deprived of their liberty as a result of the conflict and to guarantee clear democratic conditions for the 2026 elections, ensuring political equality. The agreement included promoting citizen participation in processes promoted by the negotiating table and strengthening public trust in the peace process. However, despite the progress made in the dialogue and the agreements, a scandal broke out in November that threatened the negotiations after the media revealed a series of documents that established links between the

insurgency and a general and an intelligence official. The files had been intercepted from members of the armed group a year earlier at a security checkpoint and indicated links through shell companies, as well as evidence of classified information being shared between the insurgent leader and negotiator Calarcá Córdoba, Colombian Army General Juan Miguel Huertas and Wilmar Mejía, an official of the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI).

Gender, peace and security

In September, the government appointed Gloria Quiceno as the new chief negotiator, putting her in charge of the government delegation in the negotiations with the EMBF. Two other women out of a total of 11 negotiators participated in the government delegation, Geny Calvo Olmos and Luz Dary Landázuri. The armed group's delegation included two women, Erika Castro and Tania Mendoza, out of a total of nine negotiators. The accompanying teams and facilitators also had female negotiators. The agreements did not include specific references to the inclusion of a gender perspective or to the rights of women and LGBTIQ+ people. Alongside the peace negotiations, women's civil society organisations developed a peace agenda as part of the Rumbo a la Paz project, led by UNDP and the Alianza Iniciativa de Mujeres Colombianas por la Paz (IMP), with proposals aimed at contributing to the peace negotiations with the EMBF and other armed groups such as Comuneros del Sur in Nariño, Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada in Santa Marta and the ELN. The framework for the proposals was UNSC Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, and a territorial agenda was built to improve the living conditions of women affected by the armed conflict in areas such as infrastructure, the economy and inclusion in negotiations.

Colombia (FARC)	
Negotiating actors	Government, Comunes
Third parties	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute), OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia
Relevant agreements	The Havana peace agreement (2016)

Summary:

Since the founding of the first guerrilla groups in 1964 there have been several negotiation attempts. In the early 1990s several small groups were demobilized, but not the FARC and the ELN, which are the two most important. In 1998, President Pastrana authorized the demilitarization of a large region of Colombia, around the area of San Vicente del Caguán, in order to conduct negotiations with the FARC, which lasted until 2002 and were unsuccessful. In 2012,

and after several months of secret negotiations in Cuba, new talks began with the FARC in Cuba based on a specific agenda and including citizen participation mechanisms. After four years of negotiations, a historic peace agreement for the Colombian people was signed in late 2016.

Various challenges were identified that hindered the timely implementation of the peace agreement reached with the FARC-EP in 2016. This situation led President Petro to raise the possibility of extending the temporary legal framework to complete the full implementation of the agreement. Various analysts warned of the difficulties and delays in implementing different aspects of the peace agreement, as well as the deterioration of security conditions in many areas of the country following the demobilisation of the FARC and the emergence of new insurgencies. The Kroc Institute's Barometer Initiative continued its monitoring of the implementation of the 578 provisions of the final agreement and noted that, as of November 2024, 34% of the agreed measures had been fully implemented, 19% were at an intermediate stage of implementation, 38% had made minimal progress and 9% had not yet begun implementation.⁷ Some points of concern, highlighted by the UN, included the fact that only around 500,000 hectares of land had been restored to victims out of the 13.2 million hectares envisaged by the 2011 Victims' Law, and that the UN verified 45 murders of former combatants in 2025, an 36% increase compared to 2024.

Furthermore, **the government of Gustavo Petro announced that the Peace Agreement Implementation Unit would once again have the status of a Presidential Advisory Council in order to overcome the institutional deadlock** and thereby provide greater hierarchy to the government institution responsible for guaranteeing compliance with the 2016 agreement. This came in response to a ruling by the Constitutional Court urging a review of the Unit's situation, given the slow pace of implementation. Another obstacle that arose during the year was the reduction of the mandate of the UN Verification Mission, established to monitor compliance with the agreement. Although the mission was extended until 2026, its mandate was reduced due to Washington's vote against, which led to the elimination of two core tasks of the mission: the verification of restorative sanctions imposed by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the monitoring of the ethnic chapter, significantly diminishing the UN's contributions to the implementation of the agreement. In addition, it was noted that funding cuts from USAID would have a serious impact on the implementation of the agreement, as the US had provided 42% of foreign aid for the

agreement's implementation between 2018 and 2024 (approximately 1.26 billion USD), including support for agrarian reform and the transitional justice system.

Gender, peace and security

Difficulties and delays persisted in the implementation of the gender perspective provided for in the peace agreement. As documented by the Kroc Institute, at the end of 2024, 17% of the provisions with a gender perspective had not yet been initiated, 51% were at a minimal stage of implementation, 19% were at an intermediate stage and 13% had been fully implemented.⁸ The implementation gap between the agreement as a whole and the provisions with a gender perspective remained, for whilst 34% of the general provisions had been fully implemented, only 13% of the gender provisions had completed their implementation. Furthermore, the work of the Special Body of Women for the Gender Perspective in the Peace Agreement continued, and it released its analysis of the implementation of the peace agreement in a report on outstanding implementation debts and women's diversity⁹ that highlighted the progress made in the application of the agreement, but also the many persistent challenges. These included the failure to guarantee substantive participation or real control by women over rural resources; the fact that women (especially indigenous, Afro-Colombian, rural women and LGBTI people) continue to face structural barriers that prevent them from participating in political decision-making; and the reality that women continue to encounter structural obstacles to accessing land, taking ownership of productive projects, receiving protection from violence and participating effectively in decision-making. Furthermore, an increase in violence was observed in the country, both in rural areas and in semi-urban areas and cities, with significant gender impacts.

Colombia (CNEB)	
Negotiating actors	Government, Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)
Third parties	Guarantor countries (Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland, Venezuela and Uruguay); permanent supporters (UN Verification Mission and the Episcopal Conference of Colombia)
Relevant agreements	--
Summary:	Peace negotiations with the armed group Coordinadora

- Peace Accords Matrix. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, *Navegando las aguas de la paz: avances, retos y oportunidades en el octavo año de implementación diciembre 2023 a noviembre 2024*, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, November 2025.
- Ibid.
- Special Body of Women for the Gender Perspective in the Peace Agreement, *Las deudas de la implementación: balance de las mujeres en sus diversidades. Informe de la Instancia Especial de Mujeres Periodo 2024-2025*, Special Body of Women for the Gender Perspective in the Peace Agreement, 2025.

Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB) began as part of the peace process with the armed group Segunda Marquetalia that the Colombian government has been carrying out since 2022. The armed organisation Segunda Marquetalia emerged after the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC was signed in 2016. Iván Márquez, who had been the FARC's chief negotiator in that process and later became a senator as a result of the peace agreement, announced that he was resuming the armed struggle in 2019, together with several former FARC leaders, creating the group Segunda Marquetalia, which operates in the border area with Venezuela, the country where its bases are thought to be located. In 2022, as part of the Total Peace policy promoted by the government of Gustavo Petro, the group indicated its willingness to begin a negotiating process that was made public in 2024. However, deep internal divisions within the armed organisation hindered the negotiations and the split between the different factions was formalised in November 2024 after Iván Márquez publicly withdrew his support for the process in a letter. The dialogue continued with two other factions of the armed group, Comandos de la Frontera and Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico, grouped under the name Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano. After this split, a new negotiating agenda was agreed, consisting of four points: territorial transformations; security in territories and for communities; measures and pathways to legal security for members of guerrilla factions; and political participation.

After the breakdown of the talks between the Colombian government and Segunda Marquetalia, the **process continued with the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)**, a Segunda Marquetalia dissident group. Segunda Marquetalia had originally been formed as a split from the FARC-EP. The CNEB was formed as a grouping of Comandos de la Frontera and Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico, represented at the negotiating table by a guerrilla leader going by the alias of 'Walter Mendoza'. **During the year, more than 10 partial agreements were reached addressing various issues on the negotiating agenda**, including those relating to the substitution of illicit crops and the creation of Temporary Location Zones (ZUTs) in Nariño and Putumayo. The latter agreement, reached in May, was especially important, as it also provided for the armed group to surrender their weapons. In October, the government announced the temporary and focused suspension of offensive military operations and special police operations in specific areas of up to 25 square kilometres in rural areas of Nariño and Putumayo, with the aim of enabling the armed group to hand over 14 tonnes of war materiel, as agreed between the parties. The suspension took place between 9 October and 3 November, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace was designated as responsible for organising and supervising the handover of war materiel by the armed group, to be subsequently safeguarded by the Colombian Ministry of Defence with international verification from the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OAS). With regard to the ZUTs, it was agreed that recognised members of the CNEB would receive physical, economic and legal security guarantees, and

an agreement was made 'to begin the gradual process of disuse, handover and destruction of weapons, and to begin the transition to full citizenship'. The ZUTs will be temporary and transitional in nature, with no intention of permanence, and their implementation will be carried out gradually and progressively, with monitoring and verification. The armed group pledged to respect the elections scheduled for May 2026. Regarding the role of third parties, in May an agreement was signed on the functions of the guarantor countries and supporting entities, in which the parties defined the role they should play as depositories and witnesses of the agreements, providing support to the general dynamics of the negotiating table and the development of deliberations, and physically accompanying the CNEB delegation on transfers, insertions or extractions, as well as the government delegation if required. In December, it was announced that Uruguay had joined the peace process as a guarantor country.

Gender, peace and security

Women's participation in the peace negotiations was very limited, with the notable exception of civil society spokesperson María Yaneida Arboleda, who signed some of the partial agreements reached. The government included one woman, Gloria Arias, in its negotiating delegation, which consisted of three people in total, and there was also female participation in the international delegations and supporters of the process. On the CNEB side, Olga Ochoa, Luisa Burbano, María Isabel León and Jessica Guerrero were included as facilitators in some sessions. Some agreements included references to a multidimensional and differential approach, without specifying its constituent elements. Civil society also developed proposals as part of UNSC Resolution 1325 to contribute to the negotiating agenda and to demand greater participation for women in the peace negotiations.

Venezuela – Guyana	
Negotiating actors	Government, political and social opposition
Third parties	CELAC, CARICOM, Brazil, United Nations Secretary-General
Relevant agreements	Joint Declaration of Argyle for Dialogue and Peace between Guyana and Venezuela

Summary:

Essequibo is a territory formally controlled and administered by Guyana, but whose sovereignty is historically disputed by Venezuela. Covering almost 160,000 km² and rich in minerals and other natural resources, this territory was part of the Captaincy General of Venezuela and was integrated into the new state of Venezuela once it obtained independence from the Spanish Crown in the 19th century.

The British Empire later colonised the region, establishing British Guiana, now Guyana. Given the lack of agreement on defining the border between the British Empire and Venezuela, an Arbitration Award issued in Paris in 1899 handed the disputed territory to the British Empire. This decision was not recognised by Venezuela, which argued that there had been bias and cartographic manipulation during the judicial process. In the early 1960s, the United Nations decided to admit Venezuela's territorial claim, opening the door to the 1966 Geneva Agreement between Venezuela and the United Kingdom (in consultation with the government of Guyana, which gained independence from the United Kingdom that same year). Under this agreement, the parties undertook to resolve the dispute through friendly negotiations. Although Venezuela viewed the Geneva Agreement as annulling the Paris Award, it also maintained the status quo of the territory (administered by Guyana) until the final resolution of the dispute. In 2018, Guyana raised the resolution of the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Venezuela does not recognise its jurisdiction or competence to resolve the dispute, alleging that the Geneva Agreement is the only valid mechanism to deal with it. In 2020, the ICJ declared itself competent to resolve and hand down a ruling on the merits of the issue. It ratified its position in 2023, but at the same time it did not prohibit (as Guyana had requested) the referendum on Essequibo organised by Caracas in December 2023 shortly after the government of Guyana granted several companies concessions to explore for hydrocarbon deposits in waters disputed with Venezuela.

Political, diplomatic and military tension between Guyana and Venezuela simmered over the disputed Essequibo region in 2025 and no significant progress was made in the process to resolve the dispute. As in previous years, both countries held opposing views regarding the mechanism for resolving the conflict. The Guyanese government maintains that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) must issue a binding ruling validating the borders approved by the 1899 Arbitral Award. In contrast, the Venezuelan government insists that the only valid legal instrument for reaching a practical and satisfactory settlement for both parties is the 1966 Geneva Agreement, which was signed before Guyana gained independence from the United Kingdom and laid the foundations for a negotiated solution. Although both countries remained steadfast in their positions in 2025 and military tension in the region intensified, both Caracas and Georgetown showed a certain predisposition towards cooperation. Despite emphasising on several occasions that Guyana's territorial integrity would not be negotiated outside the ICJ, Guyanese President Irfaan Ali expressed his

Although Venezuela and Guyana remained steadfast in their positions in 2025 and military tension in the region intensified, both countries showed a certain predisposition towards cooperation

willingness to keep communication channels open to avoid an escalation towards war. Similarly, despite not recognising the ICJ's jurisdiction to issue a binding ruling on the dispute, in August Venezuela's vice president at the time, Delcy Rodríguez, submitted 50 volumes of 'proof and evidence' of Venezuela's rights to the ICJ as the final document of the written phase of the litigation. Guyana welcomed Caracas' decision, as it allows the court to have all the arguments before its final ruling. Previously, in May, the ICJ ordered Venezuela to refrain from holding regional elections in Essequibo on 25 May, rejecting Caracas' unilateral alteration of the status quo in the disputed territory.

Alongside the legal proceedings within the ICJ, both governments continued to meet bilaterally as part of the Joint Commission of Foreign Ministers and Technicians, established following the 2023 Argyle Declaration.

These meetings were facilitated and supported by the government of Brazil, CELAC, CARICOM and the UN Secretary-General. Although no progress was made on the substantive resolution of the dispute between the two countries in 2025, the Joint Commission discussed issues such as border security and the exploitation of resources in undelimited areas; the prevention of military escalation arising from minor border incidents; and technical issues related to the final hearings at the ICJ, scheduled for May 2026. Regarding this latter issue, Venezuela confirmed its participation in those hearings to present its historical arguments.

In addition to CELAC's support for the implementation of the Argyle Declaration and bilateral dialogue between Guyana and Venezuela, it also held several meetings and summits during the year to ensure that Latin America and the Caribbean remains effectively a 'zone of peace', committing its 33 members to resolving disputes diplomatically and renouncing the use of force, among other things. On several occasions, such as the Ninth CELAC Summit in April, the Extraordinary Meeting of Foreign Ministers in September and the Fourth EU-CELAC Summit in November, the regional body urged Guyana and Venezuela to avoid any action that could escalate the conflict. Finally, in April, China's chargé d'affaires in Guyana, Huang Rui, publicly appealed for both countries to resolve the dispute through 'friendly consultations and negotiations'. The Guyanese described these statements as interference and recalled that the case is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICJ, stressing and that it would not accept dialogue outside that framework.

