

Introduction

Peace Talks in Focus 2025. Report on Trends and Scenarios is a yearbook that analyses the peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world in 2025. The examination of the evolution and the dynamics of these negotiations at a global level offers a global view of the peace processes, identifying trends and facilitating a comparative analysis among the different scenarios. One of the main aims of this report is to provide information and analysis for those actors who take part in the peaceful resolution of conflicts at different levels, including those parties in dispute, mediators and civil society, among others. The yearbook also seeks to reveal the different formulas of dialogue and negotiation that are aimed at reversing the dynamics of violence and that aim to channel conflicts through political means in numerous contexts. As such, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts that are aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

With regard to **methodology**, this report draws mainly from on qualitative analysis of studies and information from numerous sources –the United Nations, international organizations, research centres, the media, NGOs, and others–, in addition to experience gained in field research. The report also incorporates the gender perspective in the study and analysis of peace processes in a cross-cutting manner.

The analysis is based on a **definition** that understands **peace processes** as comprising all those political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at resolving conflicts and transforming their root causes by means of peaceful methods, especially through peace negotiations. **Peace**

negotiations are considered as the processes of dialogue between at least two conflicting parties in a conflict, in which the parties address their differences in a concerted framework in order to end the violence and encounter a satisfactory solution to their demands. Other actors not directly involved in the conflict may also participate. Peace negotiations are usually preceded by preliminary or exploratory phases that define the format, place, conditions and guarantees, of the future negotiations, among other elements. Peace negotiations may or may not be facilitated by **third parties**. The third parties intervene in the dispute so as to contribute to the dialogue between the actors involved and to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict. Other actors not directly involved in the dispute may also participate in peace negotiations. Peace negotiations may result in comprehensive or partial **agreements**, agreements related to the procedure or process, and agreements linked to the causes or consequences of the conflict. Elements of the different type of agreements may be combined in the same agreement.

With respect to its **structure**, the publication is organized into six chapters. The first presents a summary of those processes and negotiations that took place in 2025, and offers an overview of the main trends at a global level. The following five chapters detail the analysis of peace processes and negotiations from a geographic perspective. Each addresses the main trends of peace negotiations in Africa, America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, respectively, and describes the development and dynamics of each of the cases present in the regions, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda.

1. Negotiations in 2025: global overview and main trends

- 53 peace processes and negotiations were identified worldwide in 2025, one more than the previous year. The highest number of cases was reported in Africa (19), followed by Asia and the Pacific (12), the Middle East (eight), the Americas (seven) and Europe (seven).
- There were dialogue and negotiating processes in 55% of the active armed conflicts in 2025, a slightly smaller proportion than the previous year (57%).
- Most dialogue and negotiating processes faced difficulties, stagnation and setbacks, including most cases in Africa, the Middle East and the Americas.
- At least one third party was involved in 48 of the 53 peace processes (90.5%), more than in 2024 (86%).
- Many states became involved as third parties in negotiations, often in a context of the projection of national interests.
- No specific participation mechanisms were designed for women in most peace negotiations, and a gender approach and the recognition of the rights of women and the LGBTIQ+ population were left out of the negotiating agendas.

Fifty-three peace processes and negotiations were identified worldwide in 2025. The analysis of the different contexts reveals a wide variety of realities and dynamics, resulting from the diverse nature of the armed conflicts¹ and sociopolitical crises² to which the negotiations are linked. Without losing sight of the need to consider the specific characteristics of each case, it is possible to draw several conclusions and offer reflections on the general panorama of peace processes and negotiations, as well as to identify some trends. Several conclusions are presented below regarding the geographical distribution of negotiations, those actors involved in negotiating processes, the third parties involved, the main and recurrent issues in the negotiating agendas, the general development of the processes, inclusiveness and the gender dimension in these peace negotiations.

Table 1.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in 2025

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
CAR	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Séléka coalition, anti-balaka militias	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant'Egidio, ACCORD, OIC, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, China, Russia, Sudan

1. The School of the Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau, ECP) defines armed conflict as any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible in which the continuous and organised use of violence a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. wounded or displaced population, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services) and aims to achieve objectives that are different than those of common delinquency and are normally linked to a) demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues; b) the opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of the government, which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power; or c) control over the resources or the territory.
2. A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by different actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control of resources or territory.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
Chad³	The 18 armed groups that did not sign the Doha Agreement (2022) and that did not participate in the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) formed the Cadre Permanent de Concertation et de Réflexion (CPCR), including FACT and CCSMR. Government and Miski Self-Defense Committee	Community of Sant'Egidio
DRC	Government of the DRC, government of Rwanda, armed group M23, armed groups from the eastern part of the country, political opposition and civil society	AU, SADC, ICGLR, EAC, EU, UN, OIF, USA, Angola, Qatar
Eritrea – Ethiopia	Eritrea, Ethiopia	United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, USA
Ethiopia	Government, political parties, political and social opposition, citizens	UNDP, EU, Germany, Norway, Berghof Foundation
Ethiopia (Amhara)	Ethiopia, Fano militia faction (Amhara Fano Popular Organization, AFPO)	Amhara Peace Council, AU, IGAD
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Federal Government, political and military authorities of the Ethiopian region of Tigray (Tigray People's Liberation Front)	AU, USA, IGAD
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan	AU, World Bank (WB), UAE, EU and USA
Ethiopia – Somalia (Somaliland)	Ethiopia, Somalia	Türkiye, Qatar
Libya	Government of National Unity (GNU), Government of National Stability (GNS), Presidential Council, High State Council (HSC), House of Representatives (HoR), LNA/ALAF	UN, Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Türkiye, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia (Berlin Process)
Morocco – Western Sahara	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia elHamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)	UN, Algeria and Mauritania, Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
Mozambique	Government, social and political opposition	Instituto para Democracia Multipartidária (IMD)
Senegal (Casamance)	Government, factions of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)	ECOWAS, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sub-regional Coordinator for Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Casamance (COSPAC)
Somalia	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political military movement Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a, clan and sub-clan leaders, Somaliland	UN, IGAD, Türkiye, AU
Somalia – Somaliland	Federal Government of Somalia, Republic of Somaliland	Türkiye, Norway
South Africa	Government, social and political opposition	--
South Sudan⁴	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018): Government (SPLM), SPLM/A-in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others), two independent factions of the SPLM-IO: the Kitgwang faction led by Simon Gatwech Dual and the faction headed by General Johnson Olony. Peace talks in Rome-Nairobi (Tumaini Initiative): Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Groups (NSSSOG, previously SSOMA): National Salvation Front (NAS), South Sudan United Front (SSUF), the Real SPLM, South Sudan People's Patriotic Movement (SSPPM).	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018): IGAD Plus (Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda), AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Rome-Nairobi negotiations: Kenya, Community of Sant'Egidio
Sudan	Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)	'Quad' Mechanism or Quartet (USA, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE), Trilateral Mechanism (UN, AU and the IGAD (Ethiopia, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda), Switzerland, Türkiye, EU
Sudan – South Sudan	Government of Sudan, Government of South Sudan, Ethnic communities of the Abyei region	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU, UNISFA, UN
AMERICA		
Colombia (Comuneros del Sur)	Government, Comuneros del Sur	Netherlands, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, Episcopal Conference of Colombia

3. In the case of Chad, there are two processes: firstly, a consultation process involving the faction of the insurgency that did not sign the 2022 Doha Agreement, facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio; and secondly, the negotiations and peace agreement in Miski (Tibesti region) between the Government and the Miski Self-Defence Committee.
4. This peace negotiation process includes two distinct spaces: 1) Negotiations on the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018); and 2) Peace negotiations between the Government and armed groups not signatory to the R-ARCSS in Rome and Nairobi. The actors involved in each of these are specified in the "actors" column.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AMERICA		
Colombia (ELN)	Government, ELN	Guarantor countries (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile); permanent supporters (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, Episcopal Conference of Colombia); supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Colombia (EMBF)⁵	Government, Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF)	Permanent supporters (Episcopal Conference of Colombia, World Council of Churches, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Colombia, OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia), guarantor countries (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Venezuela)
Colombia (FARC)	Government, Comunes	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute), OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia
Colombia (CNEB)⁶	Government, Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB)	Guarantor countries (Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland, Venezuela and Uruguay); permanent supporters (UN Verification Mission and the Episcopal Conference of Colombia)
Haiti	Government, political and social opposition	CARICOM (Eminent Persons Group), United Nations (BINUH and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General), OAS (including the Group of Friends of Haiti)
Venezuela – Guyana	Venezuela, Guyana	CELAC, CARICOM, Brazil, United Nations Secretary-General
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC		
Afghanistan – Pakistan	Afghanistan, Pakistan	Qatar, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia
India (Nagaland)	Indian government, NSCN-IM, NNPG: GPRN/NSCN (Kitovi Zhimomi), NNC, FGN, NSCN(R), NPGN (Non-Accord) and NNC/GDRN/NA, ZUF	--
India – China	India, China	--
Myanmar	Government; armed groups that have signed the ceasefire agreement (NCA): DKBA, RCSS/SSA-South, CNF, KNU, KNLAPC, ALP, PNLO, ABSDF, NMSP and LDU; armed groups that have not signed the NCA: UWSP, NDAA, SSPP/ SSA-N, KNPP, NSCN-K, KIA, AA, TNLA and MNDAA	China, ASEAN
North Korea – South Korea	North Korea, South Korea	--
North Korea – USA	North Korea, USA	--
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Government, Autonomous Bougainville Government	United Nations, Jerry Mateparae
Philippines (MILF)	Government, MILF, Interim Government of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	Malaysia, Third Party Monitoring Team, Independent Decommissioning Body, International Contact Group
Philippines (MNLF)	Government, MNLF (factions led by Nur Misuari and Muslimin Sema)	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
Philippines (NDF)	Government, NDF (umbrella organisation of various communist organisations, including the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is the political arm of the NPA)	Norway
Thailand (south)	Government, BRN	Malaysia
Thailand – Cambodia	Thailand, Cambodia	ASEAN, USA, China
EUROPE		
Armenia – Azerbaijan⁷	Armenia, Azerbaijan	USA, EU ⁸

5. The negotiations between the Colombian government and the armed group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) shifted to involve the Government and the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF, which arose from EMC).
6. The negotiations between the Colombian government and the Segunda Marquetalia insurgency evolved in 2025 into negotiations between the government and the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB, a group that originated from Segunda Marquetalia).
7. Starting with the 2024 edition, this yearbook stopped using the designation “Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)” to refer to the negotiating process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's military offensive in 2023 resulted in the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan gained full control over the region and the self-proclaimed administration of Nagorno-Karabakh ceased to exist in January 2024. In 2023, Armenia agreed to recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. All this led to the final exclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue from the negotiations between both countries.
8. The negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2025 were conducted without third-party mediation at some levels/areas, whilst they received external support in others, including US mediation support in 2025.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
EUROPE		
Cyprus	Republic of Cyprus, self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	UN, EU, guarantor countries (Türkiye, Greece and United Kingdom)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Government of Georgia, representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, government of Russia ⁹	OSCE, EU, UN, USA, Russia ¹⁰
Moldova (Transdniestria)	Moldova, self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria	OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, USA, EU ¹¹
Russia – Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	USA, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ICRC, UN, IAEA, Vatican City, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Switzerland ¹²
Serbia – Kosovo	Serbia, Kosovo	EU, UN, USA, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy
Türkiye (PKK)	Government, PKK, political parties of Türkiye	Political representatives from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq ¹³
MIDDLE EAST		
Iran (nuclear programme)	Iran, France, United Kingdom, Germany, China, Russia, EU, USA	UN, Oman, Qatar
Israel – Lebanon (Hezbollah)	Government of Israel, government of Lebanon, Hezbollah	USA, France, UN
Israel – Palestine	Government of Israel, Hamas, PA	USA, Qatar, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, Arab League, UN
Israel – Syria	Government of Israel, government of Syria	UN, USA, United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, Azerbaijan
Palestine	Hamas, Fatah, other Palestinian political groups	Egypt
Syria	Government, political and armed opposition groups, regional actors	UN, USA, France, Saudi Arabia
Yemen	Internationally recognised Yemeni government (backed by Saudi Arabia), Houthis / Ansar Allah, Saudi Arabia	UN, Oman, ICRC
Yemen (Houthis) – USA	Yemen (Houthis), USA	Oman


The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.
 -- There are no third parties or no public proof of their existence.

An increase was identified in the number of peace processes and negotiations analysed worldwide in 2025. The year saw the highest number of peace processes and negotiations since 2017, when Escola de Cultura de Pau (ECP) began using its current classification of peace processes and negotiations. Following the drop in the number of processes in 2020 and 2021, the years of the COVID-19 pandemic, with 40 and 37 processes respectively, an upward trend ensued, reaching 53 in 2025. However, between 2024 and 2025, the figure increased by only one new peace process (53 in 2025 compared to 52 in 2024), slowing the growth. This rising trend in peace processes since the pandemic years has not been accompanied by lower levels of violence and global armed conflict and has come amid an increase in

armed conflicts and sociopolitical crises worldwide. In fact, 40 armed conflicts were recorded in 2025, three more than in 2024 and the most since 2011. Since 2021, the trend has been one of continued increase in the number of armed conflicts.¹⁴ Furthermore, despite the relative reduction of high-intensity armed conflicts in 2025, the percentage of conflicts of that type continued to be above those observed in any year between 2007, when ECP began using its current definitions of armed conflicts, and 2020. There were dialogue and negotiating processes in 55% of the active armed conflicts (22 of the 40) in 2025 (see Table 1.2.). This proportion is slightly smaller than in previous years, though with some fluctuation (57% in 2024, 53% in 2023, 58% in 2022 and 56% in 2021). In addition

9. Russia's status in the Georgian peace process is subject to different interpretations. Georgia considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.
10. Ibid.
11. Since 2023 the 5+2 conference format has remained inactive. In the 5+2 conference Moldova and Transdniestria were negotiators, the OSCE was a mediator, Ukraine and Russia were mediators-guarantors, and the US and the EU were observers. The OSCE-facilitated format between chief negotiators remained active. At least for a time, it was also attended by participants of the 5+2 format.
12. This table includes actors playing roles of mediation/facilitation and support in any of the areas of dialogue active between Russia and Ukraine. They are included regardless of the frequency or scope of their involvement. In addition to the actors included in this table, this chapter analyses and includes other actors that promoted dialogue during the year and are not considered third parties in this yearbook.
13. The dialogue process in Türkiye does not officially have third parties, but political representatives from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region have played roles in support of the process.
14. See chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 206! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2026.

Map 1.1. Peace negotiations in 2025



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in 2025

to peace processes related to armed conflicts, many other negotiations addressed sociopolitical crises. This is especially significant given the upward trend in the number of sociopolitical crises in recent years, even if slightly reversed in 2025 (113 such crises),¹⁵ as well as the large percentage (42%) of crises that worsened compared to the previous year, alongside only 20% that observably improved.

Nevertheless, this rise in the number of processes analysed takes place in a changing context in the field of ‘peacemaking’. Analysts have identified a falling trend in the number of formally signed peace agreements each year since the early 1990s and a reduction in the scope of agreements. Changes also include more fragmented, non-linear processes and a growing number of ad hoc initiatives rather than formal and structured processes.¹⁶

The variation in the total number of cases between 2024 and 2025 was equivalent to an increase of just one (53 negotiating processes in 2025, against 52 in 2024), but there were changes in relation to the

processes considered as such. In 2025, the Inclusive National Dialogue began in Mozambique to pursue deep constitutional reform following the social and political crisis suffered by the country as a result of the October 2024 general elections. Furthermore, the fragmentation and division of armed groups in Colombia gave rise to transformations in various processes.


In 2025, the negotiations between the government of Colombia and the armed group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) became negotiations between the government and the splinter group Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF), which left the EMC. Also in 2025, the negotiations between the Colombian government and the Segunda Marquetalia insurgency transformed into negotiations between the government and the Coordinadora Nacional del Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB), a group that originated from Segunda Marquetalia, and negotiations began between Bogotá and Comuneros del Sur, a group that emerged from the ELN. Thailand and Cambodia conducted negotiations over the armed conflict that erupted in 2025 over their longstanding border dispute. Another process that emerged during the year was the dialogue between the

53 processes were reported in 2025, in a scenario also characterised by an increase in armed violence around the world


15. See chapter 2 (Socio-political crises) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 206! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2026.

16. Badanjak, S., Wise, L., Farquhar, A., Henry, N., Guichardaz, H., Wilson, R. and Eppler, T. (2026). *Changing Peacemaking Practice: PA-X Key Findings (Policy Brief)*. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh.

Graph 1.1. Trend in the annual number of peace processes since 2017¹⁷



Graph 1.2. Regional distribution of peace negotiations



Yemeni armed group the Houthis and the US, as part of the broader armed conflict that began in 2025: Yemen (Houthis) – Israel, US, UK. Furthermore, Israel and Syria initiated contacts in 2025 to address the crisis between them in relation to Israel's attacks on and occupation of territory in southern Syria.

In contrast to these new processes, or those resulting from previous ones, other peace negotiations ceased to be analysed as such in 2025: Mali, Cameroon, the Ethiopian region of Oromia, Mozambique (Renamo), Venezuela, China (Tibet) and India (Assam). In Mali, the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (known as the Algiers Accords) was not reactivated, having been suspended in 2024 following the resumption of armed clashes. In Cameroon, contacts between the government and the secessionist political and military movements of the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions were not resumed and the climate of violence and instability persisted. In Ethiopia (Oromia), there were no negotiations between

the federal government and the Oromo armed group OLA, whilst counterinsurgency operations, irregular violence and inter-communal conflicts predominated. The peace process between the Mozambican government and the former armed group Renamo ceased to be analysed as such due to the formal ending of implementation of the 2019 peace agreement. The political dialogue held in recent years between the government of Venezuela and part of the opposition, facilitated by Norway, which was interrupted following the July 2024 presidential election, was not resumed in 2025. Furthermore, there was no public record of meetings or approaches between the Chinese government and the Tibetan government-in-exile. Finally, talks in the Indian state of Assam took place through ordinary political channels there, and not through peace negotiations, as a result of the dissolution of the armed group ULFA-PTF in the 2023 peace agreement.

As regards the **geographical distribution of processes and negotiations in 2025**, the majority of the cases analysed were concentrated in Africa, which hosted 19 negotiation processes, accounting for 36% of the total (20 processes and 39% of the total in 2024). Asia and the Pacific was the region with the second-highest number of cases, with a total of 12, representing 23% of the negotiations in 2025 (the same figure and percentage as in 2024). The rest of the negotiations were distributed across the Middle East (eight processes and 15% of the total, compared to six cases and 12% in 2024), and the Americas and Europe, with seven cases each, equivalent to 13%, the same as the previous year.

There were dialogue and negotiating processes in 55% of the active armed conflicts (22 of the 40) in 2025, a slightly smaller proportion than in previous years

In all cases, one of the **actors involved in the peace processes and negotiations** was a state government. The state governments involved in dialogue negotiated or maintained contacts directly or indirectly with various kinds of actors, depending on the characteristics of the context, but which generally included armed groups (directly or through political representatives, and in some cases through coalitions of armed groups); a combination of armed groups and political and social actors; representatives of political and military organisations with territorial control; other state and sub-state governments; and political and social opposition groups. To a lesser extent, attempts at dialogue and rapprochement with criminal armed groups were also identified.¹⁸ Overall, the upward trend in the diversity of actors involved in negotiations was maintained.

In 2025, the number of international peace processes rose slightly, involving two or more governments from

17. The year 2017 was when ECP began to use its current classification system for peace processes and negotiations, collected in the first edition of this report, *Peace Talks in Focus: Report on Trends and Scenarios*.

18. In 2025, the dialogue process in Haiti involved three tracks, including attempts at a process with armed gangs seeking recognition and legitimacy to play some role in negotiations over the country's political future. Furthermore, Colombia continued a socio-legal dialogue with the narco-paramilitary group known as the Clan del Golfo, alongside the dialogue processes analysed in this report. See chapter 3 (Peace negotiations in America).

Table 1.2. **Armed conflicts and peace processes in 2025**

Armed conflicts with peace negotiation (22)	Armed conflicts without peace negotiation (18)
AFRICA (7)	AFRICA (10)
CAR -2006-	Burundi -2015-
DRC (east) -1998-	Cameroon (Ambazonia/ North West and South West) -2018-
Ethiopia (Amhara) -2023-	DRC (east – ADF) -2014-
Libya -2011-	DRC (west) -2023-
Somalia -1988-	Ethiopia (Oromia) -2022
South Sudan -2009-	Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) -2011-
Sudan -2023-	Mali -2012-
AMERICA (2)	Mozambique (North) -2017-
Colombia -1964-	Somalia (Somaliland-SSC Khatumo) -2023-
Haiti -2024-	Western Sahel Region -2018-
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (5)	ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (7)
Myanmar -1948-	Afghanistan -2001-
Philippines (Mindanao) -1991-	India (CPI-M) -1967-
Philippines (NPA) -1969-	India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989-
Thailand (south) -2004-	India – Pakistan -2025-
Thailand – Cambodia -2025-	Indonesia (West Papua) -2024-
EUROPE (2)	Pakistan -2001-
Russia – Ukraine -2022-	Pakistan (Balochistan) -2005-
Türkiye (PKK) -1984-	MIDDLE EAST (1)
MIDDLE EAST (6)	Iraq -2003-
Israel, EUA – Iran ¹⁹	
Israel – Hezbollah -2023-	
Israel – Palestine -2000-	
Syria -2011-	
Yemen -2004-	
Yemen (Houthis) – Israel, USA, United Kingdom	

different countries or governments and actors from different countries (see Table 1.3). In total, 22 dialogue and peace negotiating processes involved actors from different countries as the main negotiating parties, equivalent to 41.5% (compared to 20 cases in 2024, or 38%). Except in the Americas, where only one of the seven processes was international (Venezuela–Guyana), large proportions of the negotiations were international in all the other regions. The two new peace processes in the Middle East in 2025 were international: Yemen (Houthis)–US, and Israel–Syria, and this type of cases accounted for 62.5% of the processes across the region (five of the eight). In Asia and the Pacific, five of the 12 peace processes were interstate (41.7%) and the remaining seven were internal (58.3%). Seven of the 19 processes in Africa were international (36.8%) and the other 12 were internal (63.2%), although one international case (Sudan–South Sudan) also had an internal dimension relating to inter-community disputes in border areas. In Europe, four of the seven processes had an international dimension (57.1%).

Parallel or complementary negotiating tracks were pursued in some contexts, linked to a global scenario of armed conflicts and sociopolitical crises with highly complex configurations of actors and disputes. The negotiations in the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Sudan–South Sudan, Yemen, Myanmar and Haiti involved highly complex networks of actors (see Table 1.1.). Furthermore, many peace processes encompassed only some of the actors involved in the armed conflicts or sociopolitical crises, but not all. For example, the negotiations over the armed conflict that began in 2025 and pitted the Houthis against the US, Israel and the United Kingdom only involved the Yemeni armed group and the US.

Whilst it is often possible to clearly identify the **third-parties** involved in mediation, facilitation and dialogue support activities, on other occasions these tasks are carried out in a discreet or non-public manner. In 2025 in 48 of the 53 peace processes (90.5%), at least one third party was involved. This was a higher percentage

19. In this report, the negotiations relating to this case are analysed under the heading 'Iran (nuclear programme)'.

than in the last two years (86% in 2024 and 89% in 2023) and was the same as in 2022. All new peace processes that were begun or transformed in 2025 included third parties: Mozambique (national dialogue); peace negotiations in Colombia with the splinter armed groups Comuneros del Sur, EMBF and CNEB, which had resulted from previous processes with the ELN, EMC and Segunda Marquetalia; Thailand–Cambodia; Israel–Syria; and the negotiations between the Houthis and the US. Once again, third-party support was observed in processes with different formats, both as part of internal negotiations and in international negotiations (see Table 1.3.). Only five of the 53 peace processes had no third parties, four of them in Asia and the Pacific: North Korea–South Korea, North Korea–US, India (Nagaland) and India–China. The remaining process without third parties took place in Africa: the national dialogue initiated in 2025 in South Africa.

In the vast majority of cases involving a third party, more than one actor performed mediation or facilitation tasks (40 of the 48 cases with third parties, equivalent to 83.3%). An immense majority of the cases had a set of actors with mediation, facilitation and dialogue support functions, occasionally with collegiate, complementary and coordinated formulas, and at other times, and increasingly, with fragmentation, coordination difficulties or competition. In the other eight of the 48 cases, only one third party was observed or information emerged about it: Chad, Mozambique, the Philippines (MNLF), the Philippines (NDF), Thailand (south), Türkiye (PKK), Palestine, and Yemen (Houthis)–US.

Most of the peace negotiations in 2025 took place in Africa (36%), followed by Asia and the Pacific (23%), the Middle East (15%) and the Americas and Europe (13% respectively)

In an international context characterised by a multitude of mediating actors, these took various forms, notably **intergovernmental organisations** –such as the UN, the EU, the AU and IGAD, in particular– and states, as well as religious organisations and civil society actors, including specialised centres. Intergovernmental organisations played a predominant role, except in Asia and the Pacific, where their role was smaller. In line with the trend consolidated in recent years, the UN was the main intergovernmental organisation involved in supporting peace processes. In 25 of the 53 processes identified during the year and in 25 of the 48 cases that had at least one third party (47% and 52%), it was present in different formats (primarily special envoys and representatives and missions) and support functions (mediation, co-mediation, verification, ceasefire monitoring, assistance, support or good offices and others). Despite continuing to be the main intergovernmental organisation involved in mediation and facilitation in peace processes, its role as a third party was reduced compared to the previous two years. In 2024 and 2023, the UN had participated as a third party in 58% and 60% of peace processes that involved third parties, respectively; and in 50% and 53% of the

total peace processes in those two years, respectively. Once again, the UN's role in peace processes in Africa stood out, but its participation fell from 11 peace processes there in 2024 to eight in 2025: Libya, Morocco–Western Sahara, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Sudan–South Sudan and South Sudan. In regions such as the Middle East, the UN's role changed or was diminished by the development of events and decisions that affected its initiatives or the mandate of its missions, among other factors.

Other international and regional organisations also played a prominent role, especially regional organisations in their geographical areas of operation. The EU was the only regional organisation that carried out mediation and dialogue support tasks outside its regional area of operation. The EU performed third-party functions, although with varying degrees and types of involvement, in 13 contexts (the same figure as in 2024). The EU provided support in eight peace processes in Africa (Ethiopia, Ethiopia–Egypt–Sudan, Libya, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Sudan and South Sudan), in addition to all peace processes in Europe, with the exception of the Russia–Ukraine negotiations (where the EU provided

support to Ukraine through other ways) and Türkiye (PKK). The AU was a third party in 10 African peace processes, two fewer than in 2024: Ethiopia (Amhara), Ethiopia (Tigray), Ethiopia–Egypt–Sudan, Libya, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan–South Sudan. The IGAD continued to be involved in six dialogue and peace negotiation processes: Ethiopia (Amhara), Ethiopia (Tigray), Somalia, Sudan, Sudan–South Sudan and South Sudan. This is the same number as in 2024, but with the difference that in

2024 it was supporting the dialogue process in Ethiopia (Oromia), which ceased to be active in 2025; and, as a new development compared with the previous year, it became involved in supporting the dialogue in the Amhara region of Ethiopia.

The role of the OAS stood out in 2025, as it was involved in four peace processes in 2025: Colombia (Comuneros del Sur), Colombia (EMBF), Colombia (FARC) and Haiti. Other regional organisations such as the OSCE, the SADC, the Arab League, CARICOM, ECOWAS, ASEAN, the CEEAC, the ICGLRL, the EAC, the OIC, the OIF and CELAC played a smaller role, participating as third parties in between one and two peace processes each, but which together amounted to involvement in 12 different ones: Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), Moldova (Transnistria), Senegal (Casamance), the DRC, Myanmar, Thailand–Cambodia, the CAR, Libya, Sudan, the Philippines (MNLF), Haiti and Venezuela–Guyana. This involvement highlighted the potential of regional organisations in supporting dialogue. However, in some cases, such as the OSCE, geostrategic divisions limited the room

Table 1.3. Internal and international peace processes and negotiations with and without third parties in 2025

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (28)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (2)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (3)	Negotiations with third parties (19)
AFRICA							
CAR		x					
Chad ⁱ	x	x					
DRC							x
Ethiopia				x			
Ethiopia (Amhara)		x					
Ethiopia (Tigray)		x					
Eritrea – Ethiopia							x
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan							x
Ethiopia – Somalia (Somaliland)							x
Libya		x					
Morocco – Western Sahara							x
Mozambique				x			
Senegal (Casamance)		x					
Somalia		x					
Somalia – Somaliland ⁱⁱ							x
South Africa			x				
South Sudan		x					
Sudan ⁱⁱⁱ		x					
Sudan – South Sudan		x ^{iv}					x
AMERICA							
Colombia (Comuneros del Sur)		x					
Colombia (ELN)		x					
Colombia (EMBF)		x					
Colombia (FARC)		x					
Colombia (CNEB)		x					
Haiti		x					
Venezuela – Guyana							x
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC							
Afghanistan – Pakistan							x
India (Nagaland)	x						
India – China						x	
North Korea – South Korea						x	
North Korea – USA						x	
Myanmar		x					
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)		x					
Philippines (MILF)		x					
Philippines (MNLF)		x					

i. Two previous initiatives are being implemented in Chad: the Doha peace agreement between part of the Chadian insurgency and the government and the commitments made in the National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS). There is also a consultation process for the part of the insurgency that did not sign the Doha agreement facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio.

ii. Although the Republic of Somaliland is not officially recognised as an independent state, this peace process is considered international because the region enjoys de facto recognition as an autonomous administration independent of Somalia.

iii. The three peace processes and negotiations that were underway in Sudan in 2018 were consolidated into just one in 2019 due to the end of the national dialogue forum between the government and the opposition following the formation of a transitional government, as well as the merging of the negotiations over Darfur and the “Two Areas” (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) into a single peace process. Since 2023, the negotiations have focused on resolving the national armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

iv. This dialogue track refers to negotiations to resolve inter-community disputes in the Abyei region and border areas.

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (28)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (2)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (3)	Negotiations with third parties (19)
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC							
Philippines (NDF)		x					
Thailand (south)		x					
Thailand – Cambodia							x
EUROPE							
Armenia – Azerbaijan ^v							x
Cyprus		x					
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) ^{vi}							x
Moldova (Transdniestria)		x					
Russia – Ukraine							x
Serbia – Kosovo							x
Türkiye (PKK) ^{viii}		x					
MIDDLE EAST							
Iran (nuclear programme)							x
Israel – Lebanon (Hezbollah)							x
Israel – Palestine							x
Israel – Syria							x
Palestina		x					
Syria		x					
Yemen		x					
Yemen (houtis) – USA							x

v. International negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the normalisation of relations, territorial integrity, border demarcation and transport routes, amongst other issues, took place in 2025 without external mediation in some areas, such as border demarcation, and with external mediation in others.

vi. The nature of the peace processes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Russia's role in those conflicts, is subject to interpretation. Georgia considers Russia an actor in the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

vii. The peace process between Serbia and Kosovo is considered international. Although Kosovo's legal status is still controversial, it has been recognised as a state by over 100 countries. In 2010, the International Court of Justice handed down a non-binding ruling stating that Kosovo's independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

viii. The dialogue process in Türkiye officially has no third parties, but political representatives from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region have played supporting roles in the process.

for manoeuvre in mediation and dialogue support.

Furthermore, alongside intergovernmental organisations, a significant number of **states** became involved as third parties in negotiating processes, often amid the projection of national interests. The growing role of states as third parties was observed in all regions. In Africa, states led or supported dialogue initiatives in most peace processes in 2025, with a particularly active role played by Türkiye, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in different negotiations involving Eritrea, Ethiopia, the DRC, Somalia and Sudan, and in previous years, Chad. Türkiye played a notable role in the peace negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia, whilst Saudi Arabia, the US, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland and other states were prominently active in the negotiating process between the Sudanese Army and the RSF. Saudi Arabia was also a key third party

The UN remained the main intergovernmental organisation involved in mediation and facilitation work in peace processes, but its role as a third party decreased compared to the previous two years

in the negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Most

third parties in Asia and the Pacific were states. The two most active countries in that region were Malaysia and China. In the Middle East, countries from the region stood out, such as Oman, the mediator in the ceasefire between the US and the Houthis. Oman also played a significant third-party role in the indirect negotiations between the US and Iran over the latter's nuclear programme. Qatar was involved jointly with Egypt and the US in the Israel–Palestine negotiations. Egypt supported intra-Palestinian dialogue and Saudi Arabia participated to varying degrees in several cases in the region (Israel–Palestine and Syria). The United Arab Emirates was also

involved in the Israel–Palestine peace process. In all peace processes in the Americas, except for Haiti, other governments from the region participated in facilitation tasks (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile and

Table 1.4. Intergovernmental organisations as third parties in peace processes in 2025

UNITED NATIONS (UN) (25)	
AFRICA (8)	
CAR	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for the Central African Republic. The UN is part of the International Support Group for Central Africa (GIS-RCA)
DRC	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the DRC
Libya	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Libya United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) The UN forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and EU
Morocco – Western Sahara	UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
Somalia	UN Special Representative for Somalia UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTAMS)
South Sudan	United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for South Sudan
Sudan	Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan
Sudan – South Sudan	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa
AMERICA (6)	
Colombia (ELN)	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Colombia
Colombia (EMBF)	UN Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative for Colombia
Colombia (FARC)	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
Colombia (CNEB)	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
Haiti	United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Haiti
Venezuela – Guyana	UN Secretary-General
ASIA AND PACIFIC (1)	
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Peacebuilding Fund Resident Coordinator Office Mediation Support Unit UNDP
EUROPE (4)	
Cyprus	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus and head of UNFICYP Mission of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus Office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus (OSASG) Secretary-General's Personal Representative on Cyprus
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	United Nations Special Representative in the Geneva International Discussions
Russia – Ukraine	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Liaison Office in Kyiv
Serbia – Kosovo	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Kosovo and head of the UNMIK mission
MIDDLE EAST (6)	
Iran	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The UN Secretary-General regularly reports on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which validated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015)
Israel – Lebanon (Hezbollah)	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)
Israel – Palestine	UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
Israel – Syria	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
Syria	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria
Yemen	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Yemen United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA)
EUROPEAN UNION (UE) (13)	
AFRICA (8)	
CAR	The EU is a member of the International Support Group for Central Africa (GIS-RCA)
DRC	The EU delegation in the DRC The EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region
Ethiopia	The EU has given support to the national dialogue process

EUROPEAN UNION (UE) (13)	
AFRICA (8)	
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	The EU has given support to AU facilitation efforts
Libya	The EU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and UN
Mozambique	The EU has supported the national dialogue process
South Sudan	The EU is part of the mediation group
Sudan	The EU is part of the mediating actors
EUROPE (5)	
Armenia – Azerbaijan	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA)
Cyprus	High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia EU Observation Mission in Georgia (EUMM)
Moldova (Transnistria)	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) ²⁰ EU Delegation to Moldova The EU has an observer role in the OSCE-facilitated 1+1 of the peace process
Serbia – Kosovo	President of the European Council High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues EU Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)
AFRICAN UNION (UA) (10)	
CAR	The AU leads the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU with the support of ECCAS, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad)
DRC	The AU leads the Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC Facilitation of negotiations between DRC and Rwanda (Luanda process)
Ethiopia (Amhara)	The AU has facilitated the peace talks
Ethiopia (Tigray)	AU mediation team led by the AU Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM)
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	The AU has made facilitation efforts between the three countries
Libya	The AU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the EU, Arab League and UN
Somalia	AU High Representative for Somalia African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)
South Sudan	The AU is part of “IGAD Plus”
Sudan	AU High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) The AU and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) are part of the mediating group
Sudan – South Sudan	African Union Border Programme (AUBP)
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) (6)	
Ethiopia (Amhara)	The IGAD has facilitated the peace talks
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Participation in the AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM)
Somalia	IGAD delegation
South Sudan	The IGAD forms part of “IGAD Plus” in South Sudan
Sudan	IGAD is part of the mediating actors
Sudan – South Sudan	IGAD delegation
ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) (4)	
Colombia (Comuneros del Sur)	Mission to Support the Peace Process of the Organization of American States
Colombia (EMBF)	Mission to Support the Peace Process of the Organization of American States
Colombia (FARC)	Mission to Support the Peace Process of the Organization of American States
Haiti	Secretary General of the OAS and Group of Friends of Haiti
ARAB LEAGUE (2)	
Libya	The Arab League forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, EU and UN
Sudan	The Arab League is one of the mediating actors
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (2)	
Myanmar	ASEAN envoy
Thailand – Cambodia	Malaysia held the rotating ASEAN chairmanship in 2025

20. The EUBAM mission concluded its mandate in November 2025.

CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM) (2)	
Haiti	CARICOM Eminent Persons Group
Venezuela – Guyana	CARICOM presidency
ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE) (2)	
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the South Caucasus
Moldova (Transnistria)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Transnistrian Settlement Process OSCE Mission in Moldova
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC) (2)	
CAR	OIC delegation in the CAR
Philippines (MNLF)	The OCI facilitated the 1996 peace agreement between the Government and the MNLF and subsequently accompanied negotiations for its full implementation
COMMUNITY OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STATES (CELAC) (1)	
Venezuela – Guyana	Presidency pro-tempore of CELAC
EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY (EAC) (1)	
DRC	Facilitation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Nairobi process)
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES (ECCAS) (1)	
CAR	ECCAS delegation in the CAR
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) (1)	
Senegal (Casamance)	Facilitator and guarantor
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION (ICGLR) (1)	
DRC	Facilitation of negotiations between DRC and Rwanda (Luanda process)
ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE LA FRANCOPHONIE (OIF) (1)	
DRC	OIF delegation in the DRC
SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) (1)	
DRC	SADC representation in the DRC

Uruguay). In Europe, the role played by countries from the region itself was less significant, with a growing role played by countries from outside the region, such as the US and, in the Russia–Ukraine peace process, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and others. Peace processes in all regions had states from other regions participating in third-party functions to varying degrees, alongside the involvement of countries from the immediate neighbourhood. The role of the US revealed contradictions and tensions in 2025. In the Middle East, it presented itself as a mediating actor whilst providing decisive political and military support to one of the parties involved in most of these conflicts at the same time: Israel. US intervention in peace processes in Europe and the Middle East in 2025 conformed to the emerging concept of ‘transactional peacemaking’. Authors define this as prioritising bilateral approaches, based on interests, as opposed to values and inclusion, and with a focus on short-term agreements.²¹

Local, regional and international third parties became involved through diverse formats, including through support structures. These took different forms and

Many states became involved as third parties in negotiations, often amid the projection of national interests

varying degrees of complexity. Some of them included only states grouped in diverse structures. This was the case with the guarantor countries (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile) and the supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain) in the dialogue between the Colombian government and the ELN, as well as the guarantor countries in the peace process between the Colombian government and the EMBF (Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, Venezuela) and between the Colombian government and the CNEB (Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Venezuela and Uruguay). Others included a combination of states and/or intergovernmental organisations and, in some cases, civil society actors. This was the case with the permanent supporters in the Colombia (ELN) and Colombia (EMBF) peace processes, which grouped representatives of the UN and the Catholic Church and, in the negotiating process with the EMBF, representatives of the OAS and the World Council of Churches as well. Another case was the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU and ECCAS, with support from the UN, the ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of Congo and Chad). In Sudan, the structures of the previous dual mediation process were unified: the trilateral mechanism (composed of the

21. Hellmüller, Sara y Salaymeh, Bilal (2025). Transactional peacemaking: Warmakers as peacemakers in the political marketplace of peace processes. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 46(2), 312–342. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2024.2448908>.

UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the AU and the IGAD) and the Quad (US, UK, Saudi Arabia and UAE), which together formed the Aligned for Advancing Life and Peace in Sudan (ALPS) Group.

Each of the **negotiating agendas** exhibited unique aspects and the details of the issues under discussion did not always become public knowledge. As in previous years, **the pursuit or implementation of truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities** was one of the central issues of discussion in several peace processes. This issue was present in peace processes in Africa, such as in the Ethiopian regions of Amhara and Tigray, in Senegal (Casamance), in Sudan and in the DRC, in relation to the armed groups in the east of the country and especially the M23. In Asia and the Pacific, practically all interstate negotiations during the year pivoted mainly on this issue. Thailand and Cambodia met on repeated occasions to try to reduce violence in the border regions, achieving ceasefire agreements twice during the year. Afghanistan and Pakistan initiated negotiations during the year to address the escalation of violence that has occurred between them since the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021. In Europe, the US, Russia and Ukraine announced ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure and safe navigation in the Black Sea in March, but they were unsuccessful. Subsequent attempts to negotiate a ceasefire failed. Throughout 2025, various ceasefires were announced in the cases analysed in the Middle East, although the vast majority were characterised by their fragility, recurrent violations or partial scope. Thus, for example, the ceasefire between the US and the Houthis involved only those two parties and not Israel, so hostilities between Netanyahu's government and the Yemeni group continued throughout the year. The ceasefires announced for the Israel–Palestine and Israel–Lebanon (Hezbollah) conflicts were continuously violated by Israeli forces. The widespread appearance of negotiations linked to ceasefires is consistent with analyses highlighting that in the last 15 years, particularly in the MENA region, ceasefire agreements have become more important as a mechanism for addressing armed conflicts alongside a decline in broader and more comprehensive peace processes that address the root causes of conflicts amid the multiplication of actors involved both in the conflicts and in mediation initiatives.²²

Other military-security issues also featured prominently on the agendas, such as the **disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants (DDR)** and security sector reform (SSR). The issues of DDR and SSR were present in most cases analysed in Africa, such as Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), the CAR, the DRC,

Senegal (Casamance), South Sudan and Libya. DDR also took place in Asia, in the peace processes in the Philippines with the MILF and MNLF. In the Americas, a central issue on the agendas of the negotiations with different Colombian armed groups during 2025 was demobilisation and the establishment of Temporary Location Zones, where combatants will transition from military to civilian life. The handover of weaponry by insurgent groups as part of demobilisation processes was also negotiated. In Europe, the PKK withdrew its forces still present in Türkiye to northern Iraq and initiated a symbolic disarmament. One of the main issues under discussion was the disarmament and future demobilisation and reintegration of the group's combatants. In the Middle East, the disarmament of armed actors was the subject of negotiations affecting Israel–Palestine, with Hamas indicating its willingness to hand over 'defensive weapons', but not 'offensive' ones. Regarding other notable cases in that region, the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah refused to disarm or possibly integrate into the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) until Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon was guaranteed. In Syria, one of the key points of discussion was the possible integration of Kurdish and Druze forces into the new Syrian Armed Forces.

Issues related to **autonomy, self-determination, independence, territorial integration and the recognition of the identity** of different minorities were also prominent. This was true in the peace processes of Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Tigray), Senegal (Casamance), South Sudan, Morocco-Western Sahara, India (Nagaland), the Philippines (MILF, MNLF), Myanmar, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) and Thailand (South). In Europe, although the issue of self-proclaimed independent disputed territories was crucial, the negotiations tended to postpone it, prioritising other issues first, as in Cyprus, Georgia and Moldova. Meanwhile, some negotiations addressed issues related to **border demarcation, state sovereignty and mutual recognition**. These issues were important in peace processes in Africa between Eritrea and Ethiopia, between Sudan and South Sudan, between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Somalia and Somaliland; in the Americas between Venezuela and Guyana; in Asia between Thailand and Cambodia; and in Europe between Armenia and Azerbaijan, whilst the Serbia-Kosovo case also involved the normalisation of relations. Furthermore, specifically in the Middle East, another issue was **territorial withdrawal**, found on the agendas of Israel–Palestine, Israel–Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Israel–Syria, given Israel's expansion of territorial occupation.

Issues relating to countries' **governance** and political transitions, power-sharing and electoral processes were

22. Poppelreuter, Philip, Qabas al-Musawi and Alexander Bramble, *Gendering Ceasefires in the MENA Region: The Cases of Gaza and Lebanon*, AGDA Insight, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy e Inclusive Peace, November 2025.

also addressed. Governance-related issues were present in ongoing negotiations in various contexts in Africa, such as Chad, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. In the Americas, much of the content of the negotiations in Haiti revolved around the possibilities of political transition there and the governability of this transition amid intense violence and extreme governmental fragility. Other items on negotiating agendas included **prisoner exchanges**, such as in Russia–Ukraine, Israel–Palestine and Yemen, as well as other humanitarian challenges, including access to aid, and procedural issues, especially in Asian peace processes.

In 2025, most dialogue and negotiating processes followed a trend of encountering difficulties, stagnation and even setbacks. In Africa, the cases of Eritrea–Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Tigray), Ethiopia–Egypt–Sudan, Ethiopia–Somalia, Libya, Morocco–Western Sahara, CAR, Somalia, Somalia–Somaliland, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan–South Sudan worsened due to impasse, deadlock and in some cases a situation on the brink of collapse. Among other cases, the peace process in the Ethiopian region of Tigray reached its most fragile moment since the Pretoria Peace Agreement was signed in November 2022, affected by factors such as incomplete implementation of the agreement, growing internal political and military fragmentation in Tigray and a deterioration in relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In Sudan, peace initiatives were once again unsuccessful and failed to contain violence during a year characterised by the de facto division of the country into two areas of influence, one controlled by the Sudanese Army and the other by the paramilitary RSF, with two parallel governments. In Asia, various dialogue processes also suffered deadlock and even setbacks. The negotiations between the Philippines and the MILF regarding the implementation of the 2014 peace agreement entered a situation considered dangerous in 2025, with trust between the parties at its lowest levels since 2014 and the MILF ordering the suspension of the demobilisation of 14,000 combatants until the government complied with several provisions of the peace agreement. The cases of Thailand (south), India (Nagaland), the Philippines (NDF), Papua New Guinea and the Korean peninsula also faced paralysis or significant difficulties. In the Americas, there was a clear setback in the Colombian peace process involving the ELN, as the negotiations were officially suspended in early 2025 and did not resume for the rest of the year. The rest of the peace processes faced stagnation or significant difficulties, such as the divisions of Colombian armed groups, which led to transformations in several processes. In the Middle East, some peace processes remained deadlocked, such as Yemen, affected by the dynamics of regional upheaval and the interrelationship of conflicts. In Europe, the negotiating processes between Serbia–Kosovo, Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia) and Moldova (Transdniestria)

In 2025, most of the dialogue and negotiating processes faced difficulties, impasse and setbacks

remained largely at an impasse, bogged down by internal difficulties and geopolitical divisions.

Many other peace processes trended both ways across all regions, with a combination of difficulties and obstacles and some often limited and fragile progress, as well as the achievement of various agreements (see Tabla 1.5.). This ambivalent evolution occurred in Africa in cases such as Ethiopia (Amhara), in the national dialogue processes in Ethiopia, South Africa and Mozambique and in the DRC, where some diplomatic progress was made when peace agreements were signed between the DRC and Rwanda. However, these agreements did not reduce violence in one of the most critical years in the DRC in the last decade. In various scenarios in Asia and the Pacific, some progress was also made, but it was also relative. In several cases (Afghanistan–Pakistan, Thailand–Cambodia and Myanmar), violence reduction agreements were signed; in some instances these included ceasefires, demilitarisation measures and confidence-building initiatives. Although such agreements led to a reduction in tension, in all three cases high levels of violence were reported in 2025 and the security situation remained volatile and uncertain at the end of the year. In the Americas, several partial agreements stood out, reached during the year between the Colombian government and the armed group Comuneros del Sur. In Europe, a large part of the peace processes trended both ways. The agreement reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan, pending signature, was a historic step towards the normalisation of relations after decades of conflict. Nevertheless, the agreement included problematic aspects from a human rights and transitional justice perspective, such as by withdrawing and discarding proceedings initiated in the judicial sphere, and leaving out issues related to the impacts of the conflict on populations and addressing those consequences. The resumption of political-military negotiations in various formats in the peace process in Russia–Ukraine represented a significant new development compared to previous years, but it advanced with great difficulties, shaped by the antagonistic positions of the warring parties. In the Middle East, the ceasefires reached, notably in the cases of Israel–Palestine and Yemen (Houthi)–US, Syria, or implemented, such as in Israel–Lebanon (Hezbollah), were fragile, partial or subject to continuous violations. These agreements resulted in a partial and relative reduction of violence for civilian populations subjected to extremely severe impacts and, in some cases, limited and insufficient access to humanitarian aid to try to alleviate vast needs.

Finally, with regard to the **gender, peace and security agenda**, as in previous years, the analysis of the different processes in 2025 confirms the obstacles that women face in participating in formal processes and the difficulties in incorporating a gender perspective

Table 1.5. Main agreements of 2025

Peace processes	Agreements
Armenia – Azerbaijan	In March 2025 the two governments separately announced the completion of the final text of an agreement, formally known as the Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. At the end of the year, it was still pending signature and subject to conditions demanded by Azerbaijan. The agreement, comprising 17 points, designates the borders between the former USSR republics as the international borders of the independent states recognised by the international community and enshrines recognition of and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of international borders and the political independence of both countries (Article 1 of the agreement). The text also commits the parties not to make territorial claims against the other party; to refrain from the use or threats of the use of force against each other's territorial integrity or political independence; and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other party (Articles 2, 3 and 4). The agreement also includes a commitment not to deploy third-party forces on their shared border (Article 7) and to withdraw and dismiss or resolve disputes and proceedings brought before the courts (Article 15). Besides, at a trilateral meeting in Washington on 8 August between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and US President Donald Trump, the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders signed a seven-point joint declaration. The first point endorses and 'initiates' the text of the March agreement and notes mutual recognition of the need for further steps towards its final signing and ratification. As part of these trilateral arrangements, the parties agreed to resolve the issue of the connection between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan enclave through a project called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), to be operated and exploited by a US-Armenian consortium.
Chad	In April 2025, the government of Chad and the armed group known as the Miski Self-Defence Committee reached a peace agreement involving local figures such as former minister Adoum Younousmi and the government's official mediator and former opposition figure, Saleh Kebzabo. The agreement included an amnesty for combatants and security forces, the temporary suspension of mining activities and a commitment to review the distribution of gold revenues.
Colombia (Comuneros del Sur)	The government of Colombia and the armed group Comuneros del Sur reached several partial agreements during the year, including Agreement No. 6 on memory, truth and the dignity of victims (for the application of the Non-Judicial Mechanism for Contribution to Truth); Agreement No. 7 on the substitution of illegal crops (the transformation of illegal economies in the department of Nariño); Agreement No. 8 on the creation of a Temporary Zone for the Co-Construction of Territorial Peace in the municipality of Mallama; Agreement No. 9 on the comprehensive reintegration of Comuneros del Sur of Nariño for peace and territorial transformation (for the transition to civilian life of members of the armed group); Agreement No. 10 on the strengthening of democracy in the territory; and Agreement No. 11 on the protection of the rights of children and adolescents as part of the table for the shared construction of territorial peace in Nariño.
DRC	On 27 June, the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the DRC signed a US-facilitated agreement in Washington in the presence of US President Donald Trump. Known as the Washington Agreement, it rested on three main pillars: 1) the gradual withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese soil; 2) a security operation conducted through the creation of a joint security coordination mechanism within 30 days; and 3) the establishment of regional economic integration mechanisms within 90 days, closely linked to the exploitation and marketing of strategic minerals, with the direct involvement of US companies. As part of the agreement, the DRC was supposed to facilitate the dismantlement of the FDLR, whilst Rwanda pledged to withdraw its troops and end its support for the M23. However, the agreement did not directly include the M23 or the FDLR. On 4 December, President Tshisekedi and President Kagame met in Washington with US President Donald Trump to ratify the Washington Agreement.
Ethiopia (Amhara)	On 4 December, the Amhara regional government and a Fano militia faction called the Amhara Fano Popular Organisation (AFPO) reached a peace agreement mediated by the AU and the IGAD. The agreement includes formal commitments to a cessation of hostilities, the reintegration of combatants into official security structures under certain conditions and the opening of channels for political dialogue. However, the agreement did not constitute a definitive solution for all actors or for all Fano militia factions because the latter lack a unified chain of command.
Israel – Palestine	Following mediation by Qatar, Egypt and the US, a ceasefire agreement for Gaza was announced on 15 January. The agreement was structured in three phases. The first phase, lasting 42 days, provided for the release of a first group of Israelis held by Hamas in exchange for the release of Palestinians detained by Israel, an increase in humanitarian aid access to the Gaza Strip and an Israeli withdrawal from the most populated areas of Gaza. The second phase, whose duration was not determined, was to involve the exchange of the remaining prisoners held by Hamas for Palestinians detained by Israel and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. However, this second phase was not implemented, nor was the third, and Israel broke the ceasefire on 18 March, intensifying its military campaign. It was not until October that the US and Israel jointly announced a 20-point plan for Gaza, presented as an ultimatum to Hamas. Trump's proposal included a ceasefire, new prisoner exchanges, the reactivation of humanitarian aid to Gaza, a phased Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international 'stabilisation' force and the establishment of a technocratic government with Palestinian and international figures supervised by a Board of Peace, which would also oversee the reconstruction of Gaza. Despite ambiguities and abundant criticism, Trump's plan for Gaza was endorsed by the UN Security Council through Resolution 2803, adopted in November.

Peace processes Agreements

Senegal (Casamance)	In February 2025, the government of Senegal and the faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) led by César Atoute Badiate, the Provisional Committee of the Unified Political and Combat Wings of the MFDC, reaffirmed their commitment to peace during a meeting held in Bissau, under the mediation of Guinea-Bissau and with the support of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. The negotiations focused on security, justice and political demands, providing continuity to the disarmament agreement signed in 2022. Though the practical aspects of disarmament remain to be defined, both parties ratified their willingness to move the process forward. The agreement provides for amnesties, pardons and reintegration programmes, making it an important step towards resolving the Casamance conflict for good.
Yemen (Houthis) – USA	On 6 May, US President Donald Trump announced the suspension of the intense aerial offensive that the US had conducted against the Yemeni group in the preceding months. Oman then reported that it had mediated a ceasefire between the parties that committed them not to attack each other. According to reports, the agreement stipulates that Washington halts its military operation and the Houthis cease their attacks on military vessels and vessels linked to US maritime commerce and allow freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Both parties presented the agreement as a victory. The agreement did not include Israel, so hostilities between the Houthis and the Israeli government continued in the following months until the US announced a 'ceasefire' in Gaza in October.

into negotiations. Peace processes continued to be characterised mostly by the limited participation of women in negotiating and mediation teams. For the most part, **no specific participation mechanisms were designed for women in most negotiations, and a gender approach and the recognition of the rights of women and the LGBTIQ+ population were left out of much of the negotiating agendas.**

The Americas was the only region in which women's participation and leadership was observed in many of the active peace negotiations, but without this implying that gender agendas were in any way pre-eminent. In

that region, two government negotiating delegations were headed by women: the delegation participating in the negotiations with the ELN, led by Vera Grabe since her appointment in 2023, and the government delegation in the negotiations with the EMBF, which came to be headed by Gloria Quiceno following her appointment in 2025. In the Americas, women were involved in all negotiating delegations and also as part of some facilitating actors. Despite the limitations and obstacles encountered in other regions, some initiatives stood out in Libya, Mozambique, Somalia and South Africa regarding the participation of women in negotiating teams and consultation and support spaces

Table 1.6. Peace processes and negotiations in which at least one of the negotiating parties has a National Action Plan 1325²³

Peace processes and negotiations	Country with a National Action Plan 1325 and a negotiator in the peace process
AFRICA (14)	
CAR	CAR (2019-2022)
Chad	Chad (2023-2027)
DRC	DRC (2019-2022)
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan	Sudan (2020-2022)
Ethiopia – Somalia (Somaliland)	Somalia (2021-2025)
Morocco – Western Sahara	Morocco (2021-2024) ²⁴
Mozambique	Mozambique (2018-2022)
Senegal (Casamance)	Senegal (2020-2024)
Somalia	Somalia (2021-2025)
Somalia – Somaliland	Somalia (2021-2025)
South Africa	South Africa (2020-2025)
South Sudan	South Sudan (2015-2020)
Sudan	Sudan (2020-2022)
Sudan – South Sudan	Sudan (2020-2022), South Sudan (2015-2020)
AMERICA (5)	
Colombia (CNEB)	Colombia (2024-2034)
Colombia (Comuneros del Sur)	Colombia (2024-2034)

23. Table prepared with data on peace processes collected by Escola de Cultura de Pau, and with data on national action plans from the WPS Focal Points Network and from Security Women. In parentheses, the dates of the period of the last national action plan as of December 2025.

24. The National Action Plan of Morocco (2021-2024) was extended in 2025 for the period 2025-2026.

Peace processes and negotiations	Country with a National Action Plan 1325 and a negotiator in the peace process
AMERICA (5)	
Colombia (ELN)	Colombia (2024-2034)
Colombia (EMBF)	Colombia (2024-2034)
Colombia (FARC)	Colombia (2024-2034)
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (7)	
Afghanistan – Pakistan	Afghanistan (2015-2022)
North Korea – South Korea	South Korea (2024-2027)
North Korea – USA	USA (2023)
Philippines (MILF)	Philippines (2023-2033)
Philippines (MNLF)	Philippines (2023-2033)
Philippines (NDF)	Philippines (2023-2033)
Thailand (south)	Thailand (2024-2027)
EUROPE (6)	
Armenia – Azerbaijan	Armenia (2025-2027)
Cyprus	Republic of Cyprus (2021-2025)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Georgia (2022-2024)
Moldova (Transnistria)	Moldova (2023-2027)
Serbia – Kosovo	Serbia (2025-2027), Kosovo (2013-2015) ²⁵
Russia – Ukraine	Ukraine (2021-2025)
MIDDLE EAST (6)	
Iran (nuclear programme)	USA (2023), France (2021-2025) ²⁶ , United Kingdom (2023-2027) ²⁷ , Germany (2021-2024) ²⁸
Israel – Lebanon (Hezbollah)	Lebanon (2019-2023)
Israel – Palestine	Palestine (2020-2024)
Palestine	Palestine (2020-2024)
Yemen	Yemen (2020-2022)
Yemen (Houthis) – USA	Yemen (2020-2022), USA (2023)

for negotiating processes. In Libya, women achieved 35% representation in the initiatives promoted during the year by the UN: the Advisory Committee and the Structured Dialogue, conceived as advisory and consultation forums to help to unblock the country's peace negotiations. In Asia and the Pacific, one of the few exceptions to the practically non-existent participation of women in formal negotiations was the case of the Philippines, where some women held key positions in the negotiating process between the government and the NDF, such as the facilitator of the dialogue and the chair of the NDF's negotiating panel. In Europe and the Middle East, the country delegations continued to have predominantly male leadership. In contrast, intergovernmental bodies in Europe did include women in mediation positions, unlike most mediating states. In the Middle East, one of the few exceptions was UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jeanine Hennis-Passchaert's involvement in the monitoring mechanism for the Israel–Lebanon (Hezbollah) ceasefire.

In 2025, 38 of the 53 peace negotiations involved at least one negotiating country that had a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, which should promote the participation of women in these processes. Of these 38 processes, 36.8% (14 cases) took in Africa, 18.4% in Asia and the Pacific (seven cases), 15.8% in Europe and the Middle East (six cases each) and 13.2% in the Americas. Twenty-nine countries that were negotiating parties in peace negotiations in 2025 had a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, which should promote the participation of women in such processes. **However, the official implementation period of national action plans had ended in various countries and new generations of plans had not been officially approved.** This was the case in Mozambique, the DRC, the CAR, Senegal (Casamance), Sudan, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Georgia, Kosovo, Germany, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and the US. Despite having this tool at their disposal, most peace negotiations continued to exclude women, and the gender perspective was not incorporated into the dynamics of the peace processes

25. Kosovo is included as a negotiating country because, although Kosovo's international legal status remains unclear, it has been recognised as a state by more than one hundred countries. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion in 2010 establishing that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law. Kosovo's National Action Plan has not been formally renewed, but Kosovo has a Gender Equality Programme (2020-2024), which commits to women's participation in peace negotiation and reconciliation processes.
26. France is a negotiating party in the Iran (nuclear programme) process.
27. The United Kingdom is a negotiating party in the Iran (nuclear programme) process.
28. Germany is a negotiating party in the Iran (nuclear programme) process.

either, calling into question the effectiveness of action plans as tools for inclusive peacebuilding.

Despite the exclusion and obstacles to women's participation, **women's civil society organisations** took action regarding many peace processes, demanding involvement in negotiations, raising demands and recommendations on substantive issues, demanding ceasefires and taking part in multiple initiatives, such as emergency responses to conflicts. Among many other cases, the first Women, Peace and Security Summit was held in Bougainville, during which women's organisations presented a document demanding that Bougainville's future constitution guarantee 50% representation of women at all decision-making levels. Civil society actors

participated in various processes in the Americas, presenting proposals to enrich the negotiating agendas with approaches incorporating a gender and inclusive perspective. At the local level in Africa, networks of women mediators and peacebuilders were consolidated, such as the Somali Women Peace Network, which facilitated community conflict resolution and support for victims of gender-based violence in approximately 17 districts across the country. Kurdish women from Türkiye organised meetings during the year in different parts of the country with various groups of women to share information and expand discussions on the dialogue in the country. Cypriot women's organisations participated in actions aimed at strengthening alliances among themselves and at influencing the peace process.

