

Executive summary

Peace Talks in Focus 2025. Report on Trends and Scenarios is a yearbook that analyses the peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world during 2025. The examination of the development and dynamics of negotiations worldwide allows to provide a comprehensive overview of peace processes, identify trends and comparatively analyse the various scenarios. One of the main objectives of this report is to provide information and analysis to those who participate in peaceful conflict resolution at different levels, including parties to disputes, mediators, civil society activists and others. The yearbook also aims to grant visibility to different formulas of dialogue and negotiation aimed at reversing dynamics of violence and channelling conflicts through political means in many contexts. Thus, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

Methodologically, the report draws mainly on the qualitative analysis of studies and information from many sources (the United Nations, international organisations, research centres, media outlets, NGOs and others), as well as on experience gained during field research. The report also cross-cuttingly incorporates a gender perspective in the study and analysis of peace processes.

The report is divided into six chapters. The first presents a summary and map of the 53 peace processes and negotiations that took place in 2025 and provides an overview of the main global trends. The next five chapters delve into the peace processes and negotiations from a geographic perspective. Each of them addresses the main trends of peace negotiations in Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East, respectively, and describes the development and dynamics of each case in those regions. At the beginning of each of these five chapters, a map is included indicating the countries where peace processes and negotiations have occurred in 2025.

Peace processes and negotiations in 2025

AFRICA (19)	ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (12)	EUROPE (7)
CAR Chad ¹ DRC Eritrea – Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia (Amhara) Ethiopia (Tigray) Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan Ethiopia – Somalia (Somaliland) Libya Morocco – Western Sahara Mozambique Senegal (Casamance) Somalia Somalia – Somaliland South Africa South Sudan ² Sudan Sudan – South Sudan	Afghanistan – Pakistan India (Nagaland) India – China Myanmar North Korea – South Korea North Korea – USA Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) Philippines (MILF) Philippines (MNLF) Philippines (NDF) Thailand (south) Thailand - Cambodia	Armenia – Azerbaijan ³ Cyprus Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) Moldova (Transdnistria) Russia – Ukraine Serbia – Kosovo Türkiye (PKK)
	AMERICA (7)	MIDDLE EAST (8)
	Colombia (Comuneros del Sur) Colombia (ELN) Colombia (EMBF) ⁴ Colombia (FARC) Colombia (CENB) ⁵ Haiti Venezuela – Guyana	Iran (nuclear programme) Israel – Lebanon (Hezbollah) Israel – Palestine Israel – Syria Palestine Syria Yemen Yemen (Houthis) – USA


1. In the case of Chad, there are two processes: firstly, a consultation process involving the faction of the insurgency that did not sign the 2022 Doha Agreement, facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio; and secondly, the negotiations and peace agreement in Miski (Tibesti region) between the Government and the Miski Self-Defence Committee.
2. This peace negotiation process includes two distinct spaces: 1) Negotiations on the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018); and 2) Peace negotiations between the Government and armed groups not signatory to the R-ARCSS in Rome and Nairobi. The actors involved in each of these are specified in the "actors" column.
3. Starting with the 2024 edition, this yearbook stopped using the designation "Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)" to refer to the negotiating process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's military offensive in 2023 resulted in the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan gained full control over the region and the self-proclaimed administration of Nagorno-Karabakh ceased to exist in January 2024. In 2023, Armenia agreed to recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. All this led to the final exclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue from the negotiations between both countries.
4. The negotiations between the Colombian government and the armed group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) shifted to involve the Government and the Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF, which arose from EMC).
5. The negotiations between the Colombian government and the Segunda Marquetalia insurgency evolved in 2025 into negotiations between the government and the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB, a group that originated from Segunda Marquetalia).

Negotiations in 2025: global overview and main trends

An increase was identified in the number of peace processes and negotiations analysed worldwide in 2025. The year saw the highest number of peace processes and negotiations since 2017, when Escola de Cultura de Pau (ECP) began using its current classification of peace processes and negotiations. Following the drop in the number of processes in 2020 and 2021, the years of the COVID-19 pandemic, with 40 and 37 processes respectively, an upward trend ensued, reaching 53 in 2025. In 55% of the armed conflicts active in 2025 there were dialogue and negotiation processes (22 out of 40 conflicts, see table “Armed conflicts and peace processes in 2025”).

This rising trend in peace processes since the pandemic years has not been accompanied by lower levels of violence and global armed conflict and, on the contrary, it has come amid an increase in armed conflicts and sociopolitical crises worldwide. In fact, 40 armed conflicts were recorded in 2025, three more than in

Regional distribution of peace negotiations



2024 and the most since 2011. And, in parallel, in recent years there has been an upward trend in the number of socio-political crises. The increase in the number of processes analysed takes place in a changing context in the field of ‘peacemaking’, characterized by

Armed conflicts and peace processes in 2025

Armed conflicts with peace negotiation (22)	Armed conflicts without peace negotiation (18)
AFRICA (7)	AFRICA (10)
CAR -2006-	Burundi -2015-
DRC (east) -1998-	Cameroon (Ambazonia/ North West and South West) -2018-
Ethiopia (Amhara) -2023-	DRC (east – ADF) -2014-
Libya -2011-	DRC (west) -2023-
Somalia -1988-	Ethiopia (Oromia) -2022
South Sudan -2009-	Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) -2011-
Sudan -2023-	Mali -2012-
AMERICA (2)	Mozambique (North) -2017-
Colombia -1964-	Somalia (Somaliland-SSC Khatumo) -2023-
Haiti -2024-	Western Sahel Region -2018-
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (5)	ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (7)
Myanmar -1948-	Afghanistan -2001-
Philippines (Mindanao) -1991-	India (CPI-M) -1967-
Philippines (NPA) -1969-	India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989-
Thailand (south) -2004-	India – Pakistan -2025-
Thailand – Cambodia -2025-	Indonesia (West Papua) -2024-
EUROPE (2)	Pakistan -2001-
Russia – Ukraine -2022-	Pakistan (Balochistan) -2005-
Türkiye (PKK) -1984-	MIDDLE EAST (1)
MIDDLE EAST (6)	Iraq -2003-
Israel, EUA – Iran ⁶	
Israel – Hezbollah -2023-	
Israel – Palestine -2000-	
Syria -2011-	
Yemen -2004-	
Yemen (Houthis) – Israel, USA, United Kingdom	

6. In this report, the negotiations relating to this case are analysed under the heading ‘Iran (nuclear programme)’.

more fragmented and non-linear processes, a growing number of ad hoc initiatives rather than formal and structured processes, and a decline in the number of peace agreements formally signed each year. Furthermore, most peace processes faced deadlocks, obstacles, and difficulties.

The total number of peace processes and negotiations in 2025 (53) represented an increase of only one case compared to 2024 (52), but there were changes in the negotiating processes that make up this figure. Among the new cases or those derived from previous processes are the case of Mozambique, where a national dialogue was initiated, and Colombia, where the fragmentation and division of armed groups led to transformations in various processes. Additionally, negotiations started in 2025 between the Colombian government and Comuneros del Sur, a group that emerged from the ELN. Thailand and Cambodia conducted negotiations over the armed conflict that erupted in 2025 over their longstanding border dispute. Furthermore, Israel and Syria initiated contacts in 2025 to address the crisis between them in relation to Israel's attacks on and occupation of territory in southern Syria. The US and the Yemeni armed group al-Houthi also established contacts in 2025 through Oman, which led to a ceasefire. In contrast to these new processes, or those resulting from previous ones, other peace negotiations ceased to be analysed as such in 2025: Mali, Cameroon, the Ethiopian region of Oromia, Mozambique (Renamo), Venezuela, China (Tibet) and India (Assam).

As regards the **geographical distribution** of processes and negotiations in 2025, the majority of the cases analysed were concentrated in Africa, which hosted 19 negotiation processes, accounting for 36% of the total (20 processes and 39% of the total in 2024). Asia and the Pacific was the region with the second-highest number of cases, with a total of 12, representing 23% of the negotiations in 2025 (the same figure and percentage as in 2024). The rest of the negotiations were distributed across the Middle East (eight processes and 15% of the total, compared to six cases and 12% in 2024), and the Americas and Europe, with seven cases each, equivalent to 13%, the same as the previous year. (See table "Peace processes and negotiations in 2025" and graph "Regional distribution of peace negotiations").

In all cases, one of the **actors involved in the peace processes and negotiations** was a state government. The state governments involved in dialogue negotiated or maintained contacts directly or indirectly with various kinds of actors, depending on the characteristics of the context, but which generally included armed groups (directly or through political representatives, and in some cases through coalitions of armed groups); a combination of armed groups and political and social actors; representatives of political and military

organisations with territorial control; other state and sub-state governments; and political and social opposition groups. To a lesser extent, attempts at dialogue and rapprochement with criminal armed groups were also identified. Overall, the upward trend in the diversity of actors involved in negotiations was maintained.

In 2025, the number of international peace processes rose slightly, involving two or more governments from different countries or governments and actors from different countries. In total, 22 dialogue and peace negotiating processes involved actors from different countries as the main negotiating parties, equivalent to 41.5% (compared to 20 cases in 2024, or 38%). Parallel or complementary negotiating tracks were pursued in some contexts, linked to a global scenario of armed conflicts and sociopolitical crises with highly complex configurations of actors and disputes. Furthermore, many peace processes encompassed only some of the actors involved in the armed conflicts or sociopolitical crises, but not all. For example, the negotiations over the armed conflict that began in 2025 and pitted the Houthis against the US, Israel and the United Kingdom only involved the Yemeni armed group and the US.

A total of 53 peace processes were recorded in 2025, in a scenario also characterised by an increase in armed violence around the world

Whilst it is often possible to clearly identify the **third-parties involved in mediation, facilitation and dialogue support** activities, on other occasions these tasks are carried out in a discreet or non-public manner. In 2025 in 48 of the 53 peace processes (90.5%), at least one third party was involved. This was a higher percentage than in the last two years (86% in 2024 and 89% in 2023) and was the same as in 2022. All new peace processes that were begun or transformed in 2025 included third parties. Once again, third-party support was observed in processes with different formats, both as part of internal negotiations and in international negotiations (see Table "Internal and international peace processes and negotiations with and without third parties in 2025"). Only five of the 53 peace processes had no third parties, four of them in Asia and the Pacific and one in Africa.

In the vast majority of cases involving a third party, more than one actor performed mediation or facilitation tasks (40 of the 48 cases with third parties, equivalent to 83.3%). An immense majority of the cases had a set of actors with mediation, facilitation and dialogue support functions, occasionally with collegiate, complementary and coordinated formulas, and at other times, and increasingly, with fragmentation, coordination difficulties or competition. In the other eight of the 48 cases, only one third party was observed or information emerged about it.

In an international context characterised by a multitude of mediating actors, these took various forms, notably **intergovernmental organisations** –such as the UN, the EU, the AU and IGAD, in particular– and states, as

Internal and international peace processes and negotiations with and without third parties in 2025

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (28)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (2)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (3)	Negotiations with third parties (19)
AFRICA							
CAR		x					
Chad ⁱ	x	x					
DRC							x
Ethiopia				x			
Ethiopia (Amhara)		x					
Ethiopia (Tigray)		x					
Eritrea – Ethiopia							x
Ethiopia – Egypt – Sudan							x
Ethiopia – Somalia (Somaliland)							x
Libya		x					
Morocco – Western Sahara							x
Mozambique				x			
Senegal (Casamance)		x					
Somalia		x					
Somalia – Somaliland ⁱⁱ							x
South Africa			x				
South Sudan		x					
Sudan ⁱⁱⁱ		x					
Sudan – South Sudan		x ^{iv}					x
AMERICA							
Colombia (Comuneros del Sur)		x					
Colombia (ELN)		x					
Colombia (EMBF)		x					
Colombia (FARC)		x					
Colombia (CNEB)		x					
Haiti		x					
Venezuela – Guyana							x
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC							
Afghanistan – Pakistan							x
India (Nagaland)	x						
India – China						x	
North Korea – South Korea						x	
North Korea – USA						x	
Myanmar		x					
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)		x					
Philippines (MILF)		x					
Philippines (MNLF)		x					

i. Two previous initiatives are being implemented in Chad: the Doha peace agreement between part of the Chadian insurgency and the government and the commitments made in the National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS). There is also a consultation process for the part of the insurgency that did not sign the Doha agreement facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio.

ii. Although the Republic of Somaliland is not officially recognised as an independent state, this peace process is considered international because the region enjoys de facto recognition as an autonomous administration independent of Somalia.

iii. The three peace processes and negotiations that were underway in Sudan in 2018 were consolidated into just one in 2019 due to the end of the national dialogue forum between the government and the opposition following the formation of a transitional government, as well as the merging of the negotiations over Darfur and the “Two Areas” (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) into a single peace process. Since 2023, the negotiations have focused on resolving the national armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

iv. This dialogue track refers to negotiations to resolve inter-community disputes in the Abyei region and border areas.

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (28)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (2)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (3)	Negotiations with third parties (19)
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC							
Philippines (NDF)		x					
Thailand (south)		x					
Thailand – Cambodia							x
EUROPE							
Armenia – Azerbaijan ^v							x
Cyprus		x					
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) ^{vi}							x
Moldova (Transnistria)		x					
Russia – Ukraine							x
Serbia – Kosovo							x
Türkiye (PKK) ^{viii}		x					
MIDDLE EAST							
Iran (nuclear programme)							x
Israel – Lebanon (Hezbollah)							x
Israel – Palestine							x
Israel – Syria							x
Palestina		x					
Syria		x					
Yemen		x					
Yemen (houtis) – USA							x

v. International negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the normalisation of relations, territorial integrity, border demarcation and transport routes, amongst other issues, took place in 2025 without external mediation in some areas, such as border demarcation, and with external mediation in others.

vi. The nature of the peace processes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Russia's role in those conflicts, is subject to interpretation. Georgia considers Russia an actor in the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

vii. The peace process between Serbia and Kosovo is considered international. Although Kosovo's legal status is still controversial, it has been recognised as a state by over 100 countries. In 2010, the International Court of Justice handed down a non-binding ruling stating that Kosovo's independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

viii. The dialogue process in Türkiye officially has no third parties, but political representatives from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region have played supporting roles in the process.

well as religious organisations and civil society actors, including specialised centres. Intergovernmental organisations played a predominant role, except in Asia and the Pacific, where their role was smaller. In line with the trend consolidated in recent years, the UN was the main intergovernmental organisation involved in supporting peace processes. In 25 of the 53 processes identified during the year and in 25 of the 48 cases that had at least one third party (47% and 52%), the UN was present in different formats (primarily special envoys and representatives and missions) and support functions (mediation, co-mediation, verification, ceasefire monitoring, assistance, support or good offices and others). Despite continuing to be the main intergovernmental organisation involved in mediation and facilitation in peace processes, its role as a third party was reduced compared to the previous two years. In 2024 and 2023, the UN participated as a third party in 58% and 60% of peace processes that involved third parties, respectively; and in 50% and 53% of the total peace processes in those two years, respectively. Once again, the UN's role in peace processes in Africa stood out, but its participation fell from 11 peace processes there in

2024 to eight in 2025: Libya, Morocco–Western Sahara, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Sudan–South Sudan and South Sudan. In regions such as the Middle East, the UN's role changed or was diminished by the development of events and decisions that affected its initiatives or the mandate of its missions, among other factors.

Other international and regional organisations also played a prominent role, especially regional organisations in their geographical areas of operation. The EU was the only regional organisation that carried out mediation and dialogue support tasks outside its regional area of operation. The role of the OAS stood out in 2025, as it was involved in four peace processes in 2025: Colombia (Comuneros del Sur), Colombia (EMBF), Colombia (FARC) and Haiti. Furthermore, alongside intergovernmental organisations, a significant number of **states** became involved as third parties in negotiating processes, often amid the projection of national interests. The growing role of states as third parties was observed in all regions. In Africa, states led or supported dialogue initiatives in most peace processes in 2025, with a particularly active role played by Türkiye, Qatar,

the UAE and Saudi Arabia in different negotiations involving Eritrea, Ethiopia, the DRC, Somalia and Sudan. The role of the US revealed contradictions and tensions in 2025. In the Middle East, it presented itself as a mediating actor whilst providing decisive political and military support to one of the parties involved in most of these conflicts at the same time: Israel.

Each of the **negotiating agendas** exhibited unique aspects and the details of the issues under discussion did not always become public knowledge. As in previous years, the pursuit or implementation of **truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities** was one of the central issues of discussion in several peace processes. This issue was present in peace processes in Africa, such as in the Ethiopian regions of Amhara and Tigray, in Senegal (Casamance), in Sudan and in the DRC, in relation to the armed groups in the east of the country and especially the M23. In Asia and the Pacific, practically all interstate negotiations during the year pivoted mainly on this issue, as the cases of Thailand-Cambodia and Afghanistan-Pakistan illustrate.

In Europe, the US, Russia and Ukraine announced ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure and safe navigation in the Black Sea in March, but they were unsuccessful. Throughout 2025, various ceasefires were announced in the cases analysed in the Middle East, although the vast majority were characterised by their fragility, recurrent violations or partial scope. Thus, for example, the ceasefire between the US and the Houthis involved only those two parties and not Israel, so hostilities between Netanyahu's government and the Yemeni group continued throughout the year. The ceasefires announced for the Israel-Palestine and Israel-Lebanon (Hezbollah) conflicts were continuously violated by Israeli forces. The widespread appearance of negotiations linked to ceasefires is consistent with analyses highlighting that in the last 15 years, particularly in the MENA region, ceasefire agreements have become more important as a mechanism for addressing armed conflicts alongside a decline in broader and more comprehensive peace processes that address the root causes of conflicts.

Other military-security issues also featured prominently on the agendas, such as the **disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants (DDR)** and security sector reform (SSR). The issues of DDR and SSR were present in most cases analysed in Africa. In Europe, the PKK initiated a symbolic disarmament. In the Middle East, the disarmament of armed actors was the subject of negotiations affecting Israel-Palestine, Israel-Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Syria.

Issues related to **autonomy, self-determination, independence, territorial integration and the recognition of the identity** of different minorities were also prominent. This was true in the peace processes of Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Tigray), Senegal (Casamance), South Sudan, Morocco-Western Sahara, India (Nagaland), the Philippines (MILF, MNLF), Myanmar, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) and Thailand (South).

Meanwhile, some negotiations addressed issues related to **border demarcation, state sovereignty and mutual recognition**. These issues were important in peace processes between Eritrea and Ethiopia, between Sudan and South Sudan, between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Somalia and Somaliland; between Venezuela and Guyana; between Thailand and Cambodia; between Armenia and Azerbaijan, whilst the Serbia-Kosovo case also involved the normalisation of relations. Furthermore, specifically in the Middle East, another issue was **territorial withdrawal**, found on the agendas of Israel-Palestine, Israel-Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Israel-Syria, given Israel's expansion of territorial occupation. Issues relating to countries' **governance** and political transitions, power-sharing and electoral processes were also addressed. Other items on negotiating agendas included **prisoner exchanges**, such as in Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine and Yemen, as well as other humanitarian challenges, including access to aid, and procedural issues, especially in Asian peace processes.

With regards to the **evolution of negotiations and peace processes**, in 2025, most dialogue processes followed a trend of encountering difficulties, stagnation and even setbacks. In Africa, the cases of Eritrea-Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Tigray), Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan, Ethiopia-Somalia, Libya, Morocco-Western Sahara, CAR, Somalia, Somalia-Somaliland, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan worsened due to impasse, deadlock and in some cases a situation on the brink of collapse. In Asia, various dialogue processes also suffered deadlock and even setbacks, among them the cases of Thailand (south), India (Nagaland), the Philippines (NDF), Papua New Guinea and the Korean peninsula. The negotiations between the Philippines and the MILF regarding the implementation of the 2014 peace agreement entered

a situation considered dangerous in 2025, with trust between the parties at its lowest levels since 2014 and the MILF ordering the suspension of the demobilisation of 14,000 combatants until the government complied with several provisions of the peace agreement. In the Americas, there was a clear setback in the Colombian peace process involving the ELN, as the negotiations were officially suspended in early 2025 and did not resume for the rest of the year. The rest of the peace

The UN remained the main intergovernmental organisation involved in mediation and facilitation work in peace processes, but its role as a third party decreased compared to previous years

Many states became involved as third parties in negotiations, often amid the projection of national interests

processes faced stagnation or significant difficulties, such as the divisions of Colombian armed groups, which led to transformations in several processes. In the Middle East, some peace processes remained deadlocked, such as Yemen, affected by the dynamics of regional upheaval and the interrelationship of conflicts. In Europe, the negotiating processes between Serbia–Kosovo, Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia) and Moldova (Transdniestria) remained largely at an impasse, bogged down by internal difficulties and geopolitical divisions.

Many other peace processes trended both ways across all regions, with a combination of difficulties and obstacles and some often limited and fragile progress, as well as the achievement of various agreements (see table “Main agreements in 2025”). This ambivalent evolution occurred in Africa in cases such as Ethiopia (Amhara), in the national dialogue processes in Ethiopia, South Africa and Mozambique and in the DRC, where some diplomatic progress was made when peace agreements were signed between the DRC and Rwanda. However, these agreements did not reduce violence in one of the most critical years in the DRC in the last decade. In various scenarios in Asia and the Pacific, some progress was also made, but it was also relative. In several

cases (Afghanistan–Pakistan, Thailand–Cambodia and Myanmar), violence reduction agreements were signed; in some instances these included ceasefires, demilitarisation measures and confidence-building initiatives. Although such agreements led to a reduction in tension, in all three cases high levels of violence were reported in 2025 and the security situation remained volatile and uncertain at the end of the year.

In the Americas, several partial agreements stood out, reached during the year between the Colombian government and the armed group Comuneros del Sur. In Europe, a large part of the peace processes trended both ways. The agreement reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan, pending signature, was a historic step towards the normalisation of relations after decades of conflict. Nevertheless, the agreement included problematic aspects from a human rights and transitional justice perspective. The resumption of political-military negotiations in various formats in the peace process in Russia–Ukraine represented a significant new development compared to previous years, but it advanced with great difficulties, shaped by the antagonistic positions of the warring parties. In the Middle East, the ceasefires reached, notably in

Main agreements of 2025

Peace processes Agreements

Armenia – Azerbaijan	In March 2025 the two governments separately announced the completion of the final text of an agreement, formally known as the Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. At the end of the year, it was still pending signature and subject to conditions demanded by Azerbaijan. The agreement, comprising 17 points, designates the borders between the former USSR republics as the international borders of the independent states recognised by the international community and enshrines recognition of and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of international borders and the political independence of both countries (Article 1 of the agreement). The text also commits the parties not to make territorial claims against the other party; to refrain from the use or threats of the use of force against each other's territorial integrity or political independence; and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other party (Articles 2, 3 and 4). The agreement also includes a commitment not to deploy third-party forces on their shared border (Article 7) and to withdraw and dismiss or resolve disputes and proceedings brought before the courts (Article 15). Besides, at a trilateral meeting in Washington on 8 August between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and US President Donald Trump, the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders signed a seven-point joint declaration. The first point endorses and ‘initiates’ the text of the March agreement and notes mutual recognition of the need for further steps towards its final signing and ratification. As part of these trilateral arrangements, the parties agreed to resolve the issue of the connection between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan enclave through a project called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), to be operated and exploited by a US-Armenian consortium.
Chad	In April 2025, the government of Chad and the armed group known as the Miski Self-Defence Committee reached a peace agreement involving local figures such as former minister Adoum Younousmi and the government's official mediator and former opposition figure, Saleh Kebzabo. The agreement included an amnesty for combatants and security forces, the temporary suspension of mining activities and a commitment to review the distribution of gold revenues.
Colombia (Comuneros del Sur)	The government of Colombia and the armed group Comuneros del Sur reached several partial agreements during the year, including Agreement No. 6 on memory, truth and the dignity of victims (for the application of the Non-Judicial Mechanism for Contribution to Truth); Agreement No. 7 on the substitution of illegal crops (the transformation of illegal economies in the department of Nariño); Agreement No. 8 on the creation of a Temporary Zone for the Co-Construction of Territorial Peace in the municipality of Mallama; Agreement No. 9 on the comprehensive reintegration of Comuneros del Sur of Nariño for peace and territorial transformation (for the transition to civilian life of members of the armed group); Agreement No. 10 on the strengthening of democracy in the territory; and Agreement No. 11 on the protection of the rights of children and adolescents as part of the table for the shared construction of territorial peace in Nariño.

DRC	On 27 June, the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the DRC signed a US-facilitated agreement in Washington in the presence of US President Donald Trump. Known as the Washington Agreement, it rested on three main pillars: 1) the gradual withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese soil; 2) a security operation conducted through the creation of a joint security coordination mechanism within 30 days; and 3) the establishment of regional economic integration mechanisms within 90 days, closely linked to the exploitation and marketing of strategic minerals, with the direct involvement of US companies. As part of the agreement, the DRC was supposed to facilitate the dismantlement of the FDLR, whilst Rwanda pledged to withdraw its troops and end its support for the M23. However, the agreement did not directly include the M23 or the FDLR. On 4 December, President Tshisekedi and President Kagame met in Washington with US President Donald Trump to ratify the Washington Agreement.
Ethiopia (Amhara)	On 4 December, the Amhara regional government and a Fano militia faction called the Amhara Fano Popular Organisation (AFPO) reached a peace agreement mediated by the AU and the IGAD. The agreement includes formal commitments to a cessation of hostilities, the reintegration of combatants into official security structures under certain conditions and the opening of channels for political dialogue. However, the agreement did not constitute a definitive solution for all actors or for all Fano militia factions because the latter lack a unified chain of command.
Israel – Palestine	Following mediation by Qatar, Egypt and the US, a ceasefire agreement for Gaza was announced on 15 January. The agreement was structured in three phases. The first phase, lasting 42 days, provided for the release of a first group of Israelis held by Hamas in exchange for the release of Palestinians detained by Israel, an increase in humanitarian aid access to the Gaza Strip and an Israeli withdrawal from the most populated areas of Gaza. The second phase, whose duration was not determined, was to involve the exchange of the remaining prisoners held by Hamas for Palestinians detained by Israel and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. However, this second phase was not implemented, nor was the third, and Israel broke the ceasefire on 18 March, intensifying its military campaign. It was not until October that the US and Israel jointly announced a 20-point plan for Gaza, presented as an ultimatum to Hamas. Trump's proposal included a ceasefire, new prisoner exchanges, the reactivation of humanitarian aid to Gaza, a phased Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international 'stabilisation' force and the establishment of a technocratic government with Palestinian and international figures supervised by a Board of Peace, which would also oversee the reconstruction of Gaza. Despite ambiguities and abundant criticism, Trump's plan for Gaza was endorsed by the UN Security Council through Resolution 2803, adopted in November.
Senegal (Casamance)	In February 2025, the government of Senegal and the faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) led by César Atoute Badiate, the Provisional Committee of the Unified Political and Combat Wings of the MFDC, reaffirmed their commitment to peace during a meeting held in Bissau, under the mediation of Guinea-Bissau and with the support of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. The negotiations focused on security, justice and political demands, providing continuity to the disarmament agreement signed in 2022. Though the practical aspects of disarmament remain to be defined, both parties ratified their willingness to move the process forward. The agreement provides for amnesties, pardons and reintegration programmes, making it an important step towards resolving the Casamance conflict for good.
Yemen (Houthis) – USA	On 6 May, US President Donald Trump announced the suspension of the intense aerial offensive that the US had conducted against the Yemeni group in the preceding months. Oman then reported that it had mediated a ceasefire between the parties that committed them not to attack each other. According to reports, the agreement stipulates that Washington halts its military operation and the Houthis cease their attacks on military vessels and vessels linked to US maritime commerce and allow freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Both parties presented the agreement as a victory. The agreement did not include Israel, so hostilities between the Houthis and the Israeli government continued in the following months until the US announced a 'ceasefire' in Gaza in October.

the cases of Israel–Palestine and Yemen (Houthis)–US, Syria, or implemented, such as in Israel–Lebanon (Hezbollah), were fragile, partial or subject to continuous violations. These agreements resulted in a partial and relative reduction of violence for civilian populations subjected to extremely severe impacts and, in some cases, limited and insufficient access to humanitarian aid to try to alleviate vast needs.

Finally, with regard to the **gender, peace and security agenda**, as in previous years, the analysis of the different processes in 2025 confirms the obstacles that women face in participating in formal processes and the difficulties in incorporating a gender perspective

into negotiations. Peace processes continued to be characterised mostly by the limited participation of women in negotiating and mediation teams. For the most part, **no specific participation mechanisms were designed for women in most negotiations, and a gender approach and the recognition of the rights of women and the LGBTIQ+ population were left out of much of the negotiating agendas.**

The Americas was the only region in which women's participation and leadership was observed in many of the active peace negotiations, but without this implying that gender agendas were in any way pre-eminent. In Colombia, two government negotiating delegations were

headed by women: the delegation participating in the negotiations with the ELN, led by Vera Grabe, and the negotiation with the EMBF, headed by Gloria Quiceno appointed in 2023 and 2025, respectively. Despite the limitations and obstacles encountered in other regions, some initiatives stood out in Libya, Mozambique, Somalia and South Africa regarding the participation of women in negotiating teams and consultation and support spaces for negotiating processes. In Libya, women achieved 35% representation in the initiatives promoted during the year by the UN: the Advisory Committee and the Structured Dialogue, conceived as advisory and consultation forums to help to unblock the country's peace negotiations. In Asia and the Pacific, one of the few exceptions to the practically non-existent participation of women in formal negotiations was the case of the Philippines, where some women held key positions in the negotiating process between the government and the NDF. In Europe and the Middle East, the country delegations continued to have predominantly male leadership.

In 2025, 38 of the 53 peace negotiations involved at least one negotiating country that had a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, which should promote the participation of women in these processes. Of these 38 processes, 36.8% (14 cases) took in Africa, 18.4% in Asia and the Pacific (seven cases), 15.8% in Europe and the Middle East (six cases each) and 13.2% in the Americas (five cases). Twenty-nine countries that were negotiating parties in peace negotiations in 2025 had a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, which should promote the participation of women in such processes. However, the official implementation period of national action plans had ended in various countries and new generations of plans had not been officially approved. Despite having this tool at their disposal, most peace negotiations continued to exclude women, and the gender perspective was not incorporated into the dynamics of the peace processes either, calling into question the effectiveness of action plans as tools for inclusive peacebuilding.

Regional trends

Africa

- Nineteen peace processes and negotiations were identified in Africa in 2025, accounting for nearly 36% of the 53 worldwide. Most of them deteriorated, however.
- National dialogues were launched in both Mozambique and South Africa during the year, seeking to incorporate reforms and ease social and political tensions.
- The resolution of the various internal conflicts and regional crises facing Ethiopia was stalled by multiple endogenous and exogenous factors.

- The government of Senegal and a faction of the MFDC reaffirmed their commitment to peace in Casamance.
- The Qatari-US diplomatic initiative between the DRC and Rwanda failed whilst the M23/Rwanda offensive persisted, along with the progressive involvement of Burundi, which could lead to a regional escalation of the conflict.
- The peace agreement in South Sudan teetered on the brink of collapse following the arrest of former Vice President Riek Machar.

America

- In the Americas, there were seven negotiating processes in 2025, accounting for 13% of the world total.
- In Colombia, the group Comuneros del Sur agreed to hand over war materiel and begin to demobilise.
- Negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government were officially suspended in January as a result of the resurgence of violence in Catatumbo and were not resumed for the rest of the year.
- The Colombian government and the armed group Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano reached more than 10 partial agreements at the negotiating table.
- The main coalition of armed gangs in Haiti, Viv Ansanm, expressed its desire to enter into some form of dialogue with the government regarding the political transition in the country.
- Caracas continued to insist on bilateral negotiations to resolve the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region, whilst Georgetown insisted on arbitration by the International Court of Justice.

Asia and the Pacific

- In Asia and the Pacific there were 12 negotiation processes, 23% of the total cases in the world.
- Different armed groups in Myanmar held negotiations with the military junta due to pressure from China to de-escalate the armed conflict.
- The new South Korean president took some conciliatory measures and offered to resume unconditional dialogue based on 'peaceful coexistence'.
- The US and North Korean governments highlighted the good personal relationship between the leaders of both countries and expressed their willingness to resume dialogue under certain conditions.
- In the Philippines, the body monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement warned that trust between the government and the MILF was at its lowest point since the agreement was signed and that the negotiating process was at a dangerous juncture.

- Faced with the outbreak of the most serious border armed conflict in decades, Cambodia and Thailand signed several truces with the assistance of third parties such as ASEAN, the US and China.
- The governments of Papua New Guinea and Bougainville signed the Melanesian Agreement, a roadmap to complete the peace process begun in the 1990s and determine the political status of Bougainville Island.

Europe

- In 2025, seven of the 53 peace processes in the world (13%) took place in Europe.
- In 2025, negotiations between Russia and Ukraine were resumed in different formats and with US government mediation, though they faced multiple obstacles.
- Armenia and Azerbaijan reached a peace and normalisation of relations agreement, though it had not yet been signed and was subject to conditions demanded by Baku at the end of the year.
- The peace process in Cyprus gained some momentum in 2025 through informal meetings and some confidence-building measures, but formal negotiations were not resumed.
- The peace process in Türkiye yielded some significant military-related results, such as the PKK's decision to dissolve and end its armed struggle.

Middle East

- The Middle East was the scene of eight negotiations in 2025, accounting for 15% of the total number of cases worldwide.
- The negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme experienced ups and downs and were affected by the 'Twelve-Day War' pitting Iran against Israel and the US.
- The negotiations to address the conflict in Yemen remained deadlocked in 2025, in part due to the impact of regional upheaval on the country.
- Following mediation by Oman, the US and the Yemeni armed group the Houthis agreed to a ceasefire that did not include Israel.
- Despite the ceasefire agreement in late 2024, Israel continued to conduct almost daily attacks in Lebanon.
- The agreements announced in 2025 only relatively lowered the extraordinary levels of violence in Gaza.
- Following the expansion of territories occupied by Israel in Syria, Netanyahu's government and the new Syrian government initiated contacts, but talks remained stalled.
- The regime change in Syria activated internal processes of dialogue and conflict management, in parallel with dynamics of tension and violence.