

Burundi

(PNDDR, 2004-2008)

Context

Conflict

Since its independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has been witness to a number of outbreaks of violence, particularly in 1965, 1972, and 1988. The armed forces, controlled by the minority Tutsi (13% of the population), put down these outbreaks. In 1993, a Hutu president, Mr. Melchior Ndadaye, was elected for the first time. However, he was assassinated the same year. This led to a new outbreak of violence between, on the one hand, armed Hutu opposition groups, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), and the National Liberation Forces (FNL, in French, Forces Nationales de Libération); and on the other hand, the Tutsi-led government, with some participation as well from Hutus. Since that time, Burundi has experienced one war after another, and more than 300,000 persons have died, half of this number during the first year of the conflict. In 1996, a coup d'état brought Major Pierre Buyoya to power. He had already been the president through another coup in 1987. At the start of 2006, only the FNL, founded in 1979 by Hutu refugees in Tanzania and led since 2001 by Agathon Rwasa, and its 1,500-3,000 combatants continued to fight the government. At this point, the government of Burundi was formed by a coalition of forces who had made peace with each other in recent years.¹

Peace process

The Arusha Peace Agreement, signed in August 2000, established a transition period of 36 months and involved constitutional reforms for Burundi. Two important groups, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for Defence of Democracy (known by its French acronym CNDD-FDD), led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, and the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), led by Alain Mugabarabona, rejected the agreement and continued fighting the government. Both groups later splintered and this strained the negotiation process. In October 2002, nevertheless, the groups signed a ceasefire agreement.

In regards to DDR, demobilization was conducted for state security and defence forces and armed opposition groups. Demobilization was accomplished through the compilation of a list of combatants qualifying for demobilization and by processing the combatants for identification purposes, once they could show they fulfilled set criteria. Both a body for managing socio-vocational reintegration and a technical committee for managing the kinds of demobilization necessary were created. The international community was urged to participate in the DDR process.²

The Arusha Agreement stipulated a number of arrangements for transitional justice. In Protocol I, on the nature of the conflict, problems of genocide and exclusion, and their solutions, the agreement highlighted the need to combat criminal impunity for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity. The agreement also mentioned the need to develop national laws to punish crimes of this magnitude.

The CNDD-FDD and the Transitional Government signed the **Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi in October 2003**. The protocol said CNDD-FDD combatants had to be moved to areas designated by the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), under the supervision of the African Mission in Burundi. The aim was for the CNDD-FDD to create a new Burundi National Defence Force (BNDF). Ex-combatants not integrated into the Armed Forces were to be demobilized progressively according to the needs of society, under the supervision of the Burundian Ministries of State and Defence.³

¹ Extract from School for a Culture of Peace (2006)

² See the Arusha Peace Agreement, <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_08282000_toc.html>.

³ See the Pretoria Protocol, <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/burundi_10082003.html>.

Summary

Type of DDR	Multiple DDR with restructuring of the armed forces in a post-war context.
Groups to demobilize	78,000 ex-combatants, 41,000 of them armed forces, 15,500 armed opposition groups, and 21,400 Gardiens de la Paix.
Implementing bodies	<i>National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion (NPDDR)</i>
Budget	\$84.4 million
Timeline	From December 2004 to December 2008
Status / synopsis	It is calculated that there are 26,279 demobilized ex-combatants, including 3,261 minors. Around 5,400 small arms have been collected. 23,018 adults and all minors have received assistance for reintegration.

Basic facts

Population: 8,900,000

Food emergency: Yes

IDP: 100,000

Refugee population: 375,727

GDP: \$ 973,659,520

Per capita income: \$ 330

IDH: 0,382 (172nd)

Military expenditure: \$ 48,000,000

Military population:

35,000 (armed forces);

31,050 (paramilitaries)

Arms Embargo: No

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The protocol considered temporary immunity for ex-combatants. Article 8 outlined the need to create a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a mandate to encourage mechanisms of reconciliation and pardon, to unearth the truths behind crimes, to classify crimes, to determine responsibility for crimes, and to determine the guilty persons and victims.⁴

The protocol widened amnesty for CNDD-FDD combatants and government security forces, opting to use the term "temporary immunity" rather than amnesty. A commission responsible for implementing the protocol and identifying persons qualifying for amnesty, including CNDD-FDD collaborators, was decreed in 2004.

One of the last amnesties was a presidential decree, promulgated in 2006, to give temporary immunity to all individuals identified by the commission. The decree was followed up by a variety of ministerial orders which resulted in the freeing of some 3,000 persons, including some charged with grave offences committed during the war.

Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform (SSR) in Burundi focuses on two principal areas:

- the integration into the BNDF of the old Burundian Armed Forces (known by their French acronym FAB) and Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPM); and
- the reduction of the BNDF to 25,000 soldiers via a demobilization of 5,000 police officers, in order to streamline expenses and divert military spending to social and economic areas.

The defence and security arrangement, according to the Burundian constitution, must include the Armed Forces, the national police, and the intelligence service. The defence forces must include members of the state Armed Forces and ex-combatants by way of a technical committee comprising representatives from all sectors of society. Members of the

Armed Forces accused of genocide, coups d'état, or violations of the constitution or human rights are excluded from security restructuring done on a voluntary, individual, and transparent basis.

Though resolved now, one stumbling block to SSR was harmonizing the various ranks of the military. According to the current composition of the BNDF, 60 percent of officials are drawn from the old Armed Forces and 40 percent from the FDD. The government was given the role of determining the structure of the BNDF, while bearing in mind that command positions were to be split equally by the sides.⁵

Other Disarmament Initiatives

In April 2007, the government said three types of demining activities were going to be administered until 2008. The activities included accelerating demining efforts in affected areas to reduce the number of landmine victims, increasing access to social and economic services, boosting the capacities of the Mine Action Centre, and linking programming to development and poverty reduction plans.

A decree with the aim of strengthening national security by reducing the quantity of weapons in the hands of civilians was approved in May 2005. Other measures put in force included prohibiting off-duty police officers and military personnel from carrying guns and wearing uniforms during election periods.

DDR Process

Background to DDR

With a series of visits by NCDDR members to Eritrea, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, the purpose of which was to understand best practices in those countries, DDR in Burundi prepared to launch in August 2000, immediately after the signing of the Arusha Agreement. The African Mission in Burundi launched a pilot cantonment project in Muyange, in the province of Buzanza, to listen to the experiences and lessons learned there and to use the learning to guide future DDR work. Considerations arising included a need to understand political conditions in order to conduct more effective work; to establish a period for cantonment; to maintain security in cantonments; to provide sufficient funding; to ensure cantonment periods did not last for more than three or four weeks; to situate cantonments in accordance with political, logistical, and security considerations; and to address the problem of child soldiers.⁶

Type of DDR

DDR in Burundi falls under the *National Programme for Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reinsertion* (NPDDR). It involves multiple DDR with restructuring to the Armed Forces in a post-war context.

Implementing bodies

MONUC overlooks the disarming of combatants, ensures their security, and is responsible for transferring them to home countries where they are assisted by World Bank MDRP programmes of national reintegration. The MDRP is responsible for planning in Burundi. Institutionally, the peace process is organized as follows:

- the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) monitors ceasefire agreements, identifies armed groups, and overlooks DDR;
- the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR) manages overall programme coordination;
- 17 NCDRR provincial offices, one per province, and 117 ex-combatants, one per commune, manage local DDR;
- the UN Mine Action Coordination Center, UNMACC, overlooks weapons inspections;

⁴ School for a Culture of Peace, *Burundi*.

⁵ World Bank, *Annexe Technique*, Burundi, p. 5.

⁶ World Bank, op. cit.

- the World Food Programme gives food aid in the early stages of DDR;
- UNICEF runs a national child soldier rehabilitation programme; and
- the UN Integrated Office in Burundi helps in demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants.

The peace process in Burundi was implemented with the help of a joint operations plan, or a memorandum of understanding on disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants, which was used by the UN Operation in Burundi (succeeded by BINUB), the JCC, MDRP, and NCDDR.⁷

On May 21, 2004, the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter created the UN Operation in Burundi (known by its French acronym ONUB) and declared it active, with the maximum permissible number of peacekeepers, 5,655, in early June 2004. In addition to ensuring compliance with peace agreements, overlooking security, and ensuring satisfactory elections, ONUB was put in charge of DDR, controlling and monitoring state Armed Forces, and restricting the flow of small arms along borders.⁸

The UN Integrated Office in Burundi (known by its French acronym BINUB), established under Security Council Resolution 1719, replaced ONUB in January 2007. BINUB's main goals are to ensure peace and democracy, promote human rights, fight criminal impunity, and coordinate UN agencies and participating donors.

BINUB's role in terms of security is to monitor the overall ceasefire agreement, develop a national SSR plan with a component for training in human rights, implement a national demobilization and reintegration programme for ex-combatants, and strengthen initiatives to counter the use and proliferation of small arms.⁹

Established later in the peace process, the UN Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, a political and strategic response to the conflict and a partnership between the commission and government, works to

- reduce the proliferation of small arms by disarming civilians;
- demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life, paying particular attention to special needs groups; and
- promote SSR by training individuals in human rights and for regular employment.¹⁰

Guiding Principles

The goal of the peace process is to demobilize 80,000 ex-combatants, reinsert and reintegrate them, assist vulnerable groups, and reduce the country's military expenditures by 62 percent.

The government began to design a national DDR plan with support from the World Bank in January 2003. In August 2003, it established the NCDDR, with the following as its guiding principles:¹¹

- that DDR be an integral part of SSR;
- that reintegration be achieved in conjunction with reconstruction and the rehabilitation of war-affected towns;
- that the peace process respect the amnesties granted under the Arusha Agreement, except in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, or coups d'état; and
- that the peace process respect temporary immunities issued by leaders and combatants of armed opposition groups and the Armed Forces.

⁷ CICS, *DDR and Human Security in Burundi*, p. 4.

⁸ UNDDR, *Burundi*.

⁹ BINUB, <http://binub.turretdev.com>.

¹⁰ Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, http://www.peacebuildingcommission.org/files/uploads/Indicators_Burundi_Framework_Draft_FR_Nov2007.pdf.

¹¹ NCDDR, *Rapport Couvrant les Mois de Septembre à Décembre 2004*.

Groups to Demobilize

The number of individuals to demobilize varies, however an accepted number seems to be 78,000. Group demobilization schedules differ according to affiliation. The groups, and their numbers, scheduled for demobilization include:

- 41,000 Armed Forces, 8,000 in a first phase and the rest in a second;
- 15,500 combatants, 6,000 in a first phase, belonging to various opposition armed political parties and movements (APPM), including the CNDD, CNDD-FDD led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, CNDD-FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU), National Liberation Front (FROLINA), and PALIPEHUTU-FNL led by Alain Mugarabona;
- an unspecified quantity of persons operating in the DR Congo, to be demobilized and repatriated by MONUC; and
- 21,400 combatants belonging to the Gardiens de la Paix (11,733 of a total 20,000) and the Combatants Militants (9,668 of a total 10,000), all to be demobilized in a first phase.¹²

UNICEF estimates there are 3,500 child soldiers operating in Burundi. In 2004, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers said the war made use of 8,000 youth.¹³

Eligibility Criteria

A combatant qualifying for demobilization programming must

- surrender a set quota of weapons and ammunition;
- be known to a commanding officer;
- have been a member of a known armed group which participated in military actions prior to the signing of a ceasefire;
- be able to demonstrate knowledge of basic military training; and
- be a Burundian national.

Groups targeted for demobilization include those active in the Armed Forces or opposition groups before signing specific agreements settled from 2000 to 2003. Demobilized

¹² World Bank, op. cit.

¹³ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Global Report 2008*.

FAB soldier are required to show proof of membership, while opposition group members must own a weapon and be physically identifiable, or be recognized as ex-combatants by a verification team.¹⁴

Budget

The initial cost estimated for the peace process was \$77.9 million, funded mainly by the MDRP. The following table gives the budgetary breakdown.

Table 01. Budget

Donor	Million \$	%
MDTF	41.8	53.6
World Bank (International Development Association)	36.07	46.3
Government of Burundi	0.02	0.1
TOTAL	77.9	100

Source: MDRP, *Burundi Fact Sheet*.

(*) Funds from Germany, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the United States, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the European Union

Germany contributed \$15.9 million to the MDTF for ex-combatant reintegration, internally displaced persons, and refugees.

Schedule

DDR began formally on December 2, 2004, after a delay of one year, with a first group of 216 combatants. It was put on hold from December 23, 2004 to January 4, 2005. The anticipated conclusion date was December 31, 2008.¹⁵ It is important to note that MONUC's programme for repatriating ex-combatants in the DR Congo remains active.

Phases

With a series of visits by NCDDR members to Eritrea, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, the purpose of which was to understand best practices in those countries, DDR in Burundi prepared to launch in August 2000, immediately after the signing of the Arusha Agreement. The African Mission in Burundi launched a pilot cantonment project in Muyange, in the province of Buzanza, to listen to the experiences and lessons learned there and to use the learning to guide future DDR work. Considerations arising included a need to understand political conditions in order to conduct more effective work; to establish a period for cantonment; to maintain security in cantonments; to provide sufficient funding; to ensure cantonment periods did not last for more than three or four weeks; to situate cantonments in accordance with political, logistical, and security considerations; and to address the problem of child soldiers.

DDR in Burundi was divided into two phases: a first phase, lasting one year, for the DDR of the FAB and to create a new National Defence Forces consisting of a maximum 30,000 soldiers; and a second phase, lasting three years, for the DDR of surplus defence forces.

Disarmament

Disarmament, involving the registration, storage, and possible destruction of weapons collected after June 2004, is the responsibility of ONUB. The disarmament process consists of disarming ex-members of the Armed Forces in their barracks and later registering and transporting them to cantonments.

Demobilization

Twelve assembly points were created, five for cantonment and disarmament, two for members of Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD, two for other APPMs, and one for integration into the national police. Three demobilization centres were also created, one in Gitena, another in Bubanza, and a final Muramuya.

¹⁴ CICS, op. cit.

¹⁵ World Bank, op. cit.

The demobilization of 30,000 members of the Armed Forces began in late 2005. 5,000 soldiers of the Armed Forces, demobilized in a first phase, were assembled in one centre, and 9,000 members of armed opposition groups were assembled in two other centres. These transit centres were created in Randa, Gitega, and Muramuya. Individuals remained for 10 days in the transit centres. They were registered and given preliminary counselling. Their identities were verified, they were given a medical examination, they were registered, identified, oriented, and finally transported. Each demobilized person received an allowance for reinsertion within a month of demobilization. Allowances, issued according to rank, were used to reinsert families. It is important to note that conditions in camps were deplorable due to a lack of clean water and sanitation, which could have caused a cholera epidemic.

UNICEF and the Government of Burundi established a protocol to demobilize child soldiers in the Armed Forces, FNL-Palipehutu, CND-FDD, and the National Transitional Government in October 2001.

A World Bank initiative, with a budget of \$3.5 million, aims to demobilize 90 percent of child soldiers in Burundi, reintegrate them into home communities within eight months, and establish mechanisms to impede re-recruitment. \$20 per month is offered to families over a period of 18 months. Activities carried out thus far by the initiative include preparing home communities, supporting families, sustaining educational goals, giving special care to demobilized youth, providing psychosocial support, and sustaining rapid-impact projects to encourage youth participation.

Reintegration

The NCDDR designed a support strategy to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian and work life. The strategy focussed on the personal choices of ex-combatants in seeking socioeconomic opportunities and received contributions from a great number of institutions.¹⁶

Ex-combatants were reintegrated three months after they demobilized and the NCDRR was responsible for

¹⁶ CICS, op. cit.

their reintegration. As with other DDR components, reintegration was divided into social activities, especially work in communities, and economic activities. The following principles guide reintegration:

- all ex-combatants must receive the same assistance regardless of rank;
- ex-combatants may choose a location for reintegration (roughly 75 percent elect rural sites) and the activities they wish to partake in;
- special programming must be available for child soldiers, women, and disabled persons;
- ex-combatants must be given opportunities for employment creation;
- programming must benefit the communities in which ex-combatants settle; and
- opportunities must be provided to start micro-projects and access micro-credit.

Reintegration into the various sectors of the economy includes

- activities for employment creation,
- training for self-employment,
- formal education,
- business promotion, and
- employment promotion.¹⁷

The NCDRR supports business promotional activities in the following sectors:

- farming and fishing,
- food production,
- small retail, and
- trades and crafts.

Essential to all of this work is community participation, through

- help in reconciling ex-combatants with host communities,
- help in mitigating perceptions that can cause damage,
- support for rehabilitation, and
- specialized information sharing and sensitization around family, HIV/AIDS, and women's issues.

Demobilized combatants, whether members of the Armed Forces or opposition groups, receive a Temporary Subsistence Allowance based on prior agreement and rank. The minimum allowance is \$515 and the average \$600. The allowance is paid out in 10 cash instalments. The first payment is made upon decamping, the second after three months in a host community of choice, and the rest in quarterly payments. Reintegration also funds a number of related activities or expenses: micro-projects, seeds and tools, health care, education, vocational training, and administrative work.¹⁸

Around 30,000 militia members receive a one-off payment of \$91 after demobilizing. Initially the payment was made via the commercial banking system and not by hand, but later it was announced all payments would be made in goods and not cash. From February 2004 to June 2006, the ILO and USAID ran reconciliation projects in communities using lessons learned from countries such as Sierra Leone. The ILO and USAID aimed to gain the trust of communities in highly militarized regions and promote reconciliation there.

Evolution

In early December 2002, Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD agreed to demobilize, but members did not turn up at designated cantonments for many months. This was because the African Union, supported logistically by the US, whose responsibility it was to safeguard the camps, had not been properly consulted.

The first ex-combatants demobilized in June 2003 and by November, 200 had demobilized. Neither a definition of legal status nor a clear DDR strategy for the ex-combatants upon demobilization existed. MONUC repatriated Burundian combatants eligible for DDR located in the DR Congo. This work lasted many months. Members of demobilized groups belonging to Ndayikengurukiye's CNDD-FDD and Mugarabona's FNL refused to release child soldiers in their ranks. In September 2004, the African Mission in Burundi said its deployment was conditional upon the number of encamped combatants being significant.

In August 2005, opposition leaders surrendered weapons to ONUB in a symbolic renunciation of armed violence and as a good will gesture of the intention to participate in government after elections. As it turned out, former CNDD-FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza was victorious in the elections. Members of the Gardiens de la Paix protested delayed payments of \$100 per person entitled to them in June and August 2005. Government spokespersons said the government has the funds but had difficulties identifying some persons because the number of Gardiens, initially estimated at 20,000, later multiplied. Following an ex-combatant status review conducted by the NCDRR, an unspecified, large number of persons were noted to have been denied payment. Due to the confusion, the government created a new NCDRR team to review the list of ex-combatants.¹⁹

A first phase for demobilizing child soldiers concluded in 2004. UNICEF demobilized 2,260 youth found in the Armed Forces and Gardiens de la Paix. A second phase was concluded in December 2004. Here, 618 youths pertaining to six APPMs were demobilized. Reports by youth in early 2006, criticizing the peace process for not fulfilling their rights to reintegrate, hinted at a lack of funding for

¹⁷ World Bank, op. cit.

¹⁸ World Bank, op. cit.

¹⁹ Reuters, August 12, 2005.

reintegrating demobilized child soldiers. Human Rights Watch claimed the government kept in custody certain youth linked to the FNL, rather than give them aid for rehabilitation. Human Rights Watch requested the youth be released from prison. Around 3,000 were demobilized from 2004 to 2006. Of this number, 600 were placed in schools and 2,300 were given vocational training.

Under-Secretary-General, Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, said in 2007 that advances had been made in protecting children in Burundi, but they were insufficient. She said conditions in camps where 200-300 child soldiers were being detained, needed improving and that greater assistance was required for reintegration. She urged parliament to adopt criminal code legislation to recognize as a war crime the recruitment of youth under the age of 16. She reminded parliament that children continued to be recruited and called on the FNL to abandon its practice of recruiting youth and free the children held in its ranks.²⁰

In early 2006, the NCDRR began demobilizing an initial 103 disabled ex-combatants belonging to the Armed Forces. As part of this collective demobilization, ex-combatants were offered housing, medical support, clothing, and ongoing monitoring.

It is calculated that 26,279 ex-combatants (47 percent of expected), including 3,261 child soldiers, have demobilized so far, and some 5,400 small arms have been collected. Meanwhile, 23,018 ex-combatants (42 percent of expected) and 14,813 (27 percent) have been reinserted and reintegrated into society respectively. 20,144 Gardiens de la Paix have been given reinsertion packages. The challenges that remain include fully disarming and dismantling militias, accelerating economic reintegration, attending to disabled combatants and their medical needs, demobilizing the Armed Forces, and reducing the number of police officers.²¹

Major opportunities for reintegration involve widening trade (56 percent of total economic activity), agriculture (32 percent), and construction. Bururi and Bubanza were the most common provinces selected for reintegration because most ex-combatants came from them. The third most popular city was Bujumbura, suggesting perhaps a desire for anonymous reintegration. Only 8 percent of ex-combatants, however, chose the city, which has experienced heavy armed violence.²²

In April 2008, protesting the demobilization process they were required to submit to as part of troop reductions funded by international financial institutions, more than 900 soldiers refused to show up demobilization sites. The soldiers demanded they be given allowances and back pay promised to them before demobilization. They also questioned whether ethnic quotas were being fulfilled properly.

The armed opposition group Palipehutu-FNL began to encamp after signing a ceasefire agreement with the government. 150 combatants gathered in one of three reception centres after being verified by members of a Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, foreign diplomats, and international institutions.

Disarmament and demobilization of the FNL began in July 2008 with the encamping of 2,500 combatants. The government called attention to the fact that only 40 weapons were surrendered and that the FNL did not provide the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism with a list of 21,000 combatants to participate in DDR programming as promised. After two months of programming, few additional weapons were surrendered, and the question of reintegrating armed opposition groups into state defence and security forces remained unregulated.²³ Spokespersons for the FNL said conditions in camps were poor.²⁴

Integration into the Armed Forces

In January 2004, Hutu President Domitien Ndayizeye and Tutsi Vice-President Alphonse-Marie Kadege formalized the composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

of the Armed Forces. Members of Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD, a former armed opposition group, filled 14 of the 35 positions (40 percent). The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to recommend to the government the size and composition of the Armed Forces, supervise DDR, and promote confidence measures among members of the Armed Forces and ex-combatants who have joined the unified military.

One reason for the armed conflict that erupted in 1993 and was resolved by the reconstituted Armed Forces, was a lack of representation in the military, controlled historically by the Tutsi, of the majority Hutu. Other former armed opposition groups, Ndayikengurukiye's FDD and Mugabarabona's FNL, which both signed ceasefire agreements with the government in 2002, were not offered positions in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The demobilization of 30,000 members of the Armed Forces began in late 2005. 5,000 soldiers of the Armed Forces, demobilized in a first phase, were assembled in one centre, and 9,000 members of armed opposition groups were assembled in two other centres. These transit centres were created in Randa, Gitega, and Muramuya. Individuals remained for 10 days in the transit centres. They were registered and given preliminary counselling. Their identities were verified, they were given a medical examination, they were registered, identified, oriented, and finally transported. Each demobilized person received an allowance for reinsertion within a month of demobilization. Allowances, issued according to rank, were used to reinsert families. It is important to note that conditions in camps were deplorable due to a lack of clean water and sanitation, which could have caused a cholera epidemic. National Defence Force Spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Adolphe Mianikariza opposed disarming officers withdrawn from the defence forces and defended the right to bear a registered, ceremonial arm.

Harmonizing military rank continues to be a challenge for reintegration, especially since all groups exaggerated the numbers of high-ranking officers.

²⁰ School for a Culture of Peace, *Alerta 2008!*

²¹ MDRP, *Burundi Fact Sheet*.

²² World Bank, *op. cit.*

²³ ICG, *Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue*.

²⁴ IRIN, July 28, 2008.

Lessons Learned

One of the main errors in the peace process in Burundi was the four-year delay to demobilization after a peace agreement was signed. The reasons for the delay lie, in theory, with the funding mechanism, however some point to the natures of the combatants themselves. Another contributing factor was the inflation of combatant numbers. The CNDD-FDD, for instance, alleged to have an overstated 80,000 combatants in order to profit from DDR. There was also a question of who constituted an ex-combatant.²⁵

Regarding disarmament, it is worth pointing out the number of weapons surrendered is unknown because an MDRP disarmament phase has yet to be established. Another issue revolves around demobilization and integration payments promised to ex-combatants, which were lower than expected. There are indications of an inequality of payments, so that while CNDD combatants received \$600, the Gardiens de la Paix received just \$100, and youth an average \$330. In this conjunction, both the EU and World Bank delayed money earmarked for rural development, further increasing a sense of inequality held between ex-combatants.²⁶

Due to a variety of political and technical strains, there were also difficulties in the transition from demobilization to reintegration. Reintegration experienced the following technical problems: a lack of national scope and financial infrastructure; low numbers of NGOs supporting reintegration in communities; deficiencies in the primary school system; and depleted funds for planning, management, and logistics.²⁷

In late 2007, World ORT published an evaluation of World Bank programme funding, recommending that funds be extended to compensate for the short reintegration period and the 18 months of accumulated delay built up at the beginning of DDR. World ORT also recommended the NPDRR decentralize decision making, put in motion an informational and sensitization process, establish

a project for vocational training, promote awareness of the psychological problems faced by ex-combatants, and improve efforts to accommodate physically disabled individuals in society.²⁸

Regarding the government-FNL ceasefire agreement signed in 2006, and the subsequent cessation of hostilities agreement, the FNL began to encamp, in the third quarter of 2008, 3,500 of a total 15,000 combatants in three camps as a preliminary step towards demobilization and disarmament. After two months, however, few additional weapons were surrendered and the question of reintegrating armed opposition groups in state defence and security forces was left unaddressed.²⁹

²⁵ Alusala, *Disarmament and the Transition in Burundi*.

²⁶ Boshoff and Vera, *A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*.

²⁷ Nkurunziza, *Rapport sur le Processus de DDR des Ex-combatants au Niveau National*.

²⁸ World ORT, October 26, 2007.

²⁹ ICG, *op. cit.*

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Glossary

AMIB: African Mission in Burundi	ONUB: United Nations Mission in Burundi
BINUB: Integrated UN Mission in Burundi	PALIPEHUTU: Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu
BNDF: Burundi National Defence Forces	SNESS: Structure Nationale s'occupant des Enfants Soldats
CNDD-FDD: National Council for the Defence of Democracy -Forces for Defence of Democracy	SOPRAD :Solidarité pour la Promotion de l'Assistance et du Développement
FNL: Front National du Liberation	UN: United Nations
FROLINA: Front de Libération Nationale	UNDP: United Nations Development Program
ILO: International Labour Organistaion	UNICEF: United Nations Children Fund
JCC: Joint Ceasefire Commission	UNMACC: United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center
MDRP: Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program	WB: World Bank
MONUC: United Nations Mission in DR Congo	WFP: World Food Program
NCDDR: National Comission on DDR	
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation	
OAG: Opposition Armed Groups	