An Approach to the Kosovo Post-War Rehabilitation Process from a Gender Perspective

Ana Villegas Ariño
Gema Redondo de la Morena

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SUMMARY:

This paper analyses the post-war rehabilitation process in Kosovo from a gender perspective. After a brief historical background to locate events, the paper introduces the work carried out by the international community in Kosovo and the way this was organised highlighting achievements and constraints that can put the sustainability of the process at risk. The paper also analyses the post-war rehabilitation process from a gender perspective, reflecting on the work undertaken by international and local organisations for the promotion of a more egalitarian and less discriminatory society.
The following report looks at the post-war rehabilitation process in Kosovo paying particular attention to its gender dimension. More specifically, the report reflects on the international intervention and analyses the role of women in promoting gender equality in post-war Kosovo and their objective of engendering the status negotiations.

Kosovo has been under international administration for eight years, the last two of them being devoted to negotiations between the Kosovar provisional authorities and the Belgrade Government. In November 2007 the last round of negotiations took place in Vienna and both sides made it clear that they would accept no less than their basic negotiating positions. In the case of Kosovo, they claimed independence from Serbia, while in the case of Serbia, the Belgrade delegation offered autonomy to the Kosovar province with extensive devolved powers. This stalemate left the Security Council with the task of making the final decision about the future of Kosovo. Furthermore, the same month the Kosovars elected Hashim Thaçi, a former political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), and former “Prime Minister” of the “provisional government”\textsuperscript{2}, as the new Prime Minister in the most recent elections held in Kosovo\textsuperscript{3}.

Kosovo is therefore on the brink of an important change in its political status. This situation makes it an interesting case study of whether if the international community has managed “to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo”\textsuperscript{4} as UN resolution 1244 (1999) envisaged it would do in Kosovo.

In order to evaluate the different aspects of the transformations achieved through the post-war rehabilitation process and to assess their sustainability for the future, this research project has concentrated on the gender dynamics within the society and the Government structures and actions taken to try to improve women’s lives.

The study of the gender dimension in the cycle of Kosovo’s conflict (armed conflict, rehabilitation process and status negotiations) is closely linked to an inclusive understanding of peace-building. The traditional exclusion of women from war and post-war decision making areas in Kosovo and the neglecting of the heterogeneity of needs in both war and post-war contexts cannot hide a complex reality in which the different groups of women and men have played a great variety of roles. Among those, peace-building and pro-gender equality roles adopted by various groups of women have been of special importance for their efforts in building an inclusive society. In turn, the joint venture of the international community and local actors in promoting an inclusive peace in post-war Kosovo needed to be engendered in order to be truly inclusive, as the axes of conflict to be resolved in post-war Kosovo go beyond those that led to the armed conflict and include others such as gender-hierarchies. Furthermore, the status of Kosovo as an interim international protectorate created an opportunity to implement the international pro-gender equality commitments, as compiled in UN resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security, whose practical results need to be evaluated. All these elements are addressed in this report with the aim of visualising the gender dimension of Kosovo’s post-war rehabilitation process.

This paper is based on field work carried out in Kosovo along with a review of literature. The field work consisted of interviews carried out in Kosovo by the

\textsuperscript{1} In this report the Serbian version of the name ‘Kosovo’ is used instead of ‘Kosova’, the Albanian version of the name, because it is the more common form used in standard English.
\textsuperscript{2} The Government of Kosovo was established in 1991-2 following the Declaration of Kaçanik (town in the South of Kosovo, close to border with FYROM), when the Republic of Kosovo was proclaimed by the newly elected Assembly. In 1999, after the Rambouillet talks, Hashim Thaçi with the support of the United States occupied the posts of Ibrahim Rugova (President) and Bujar Bukoshi (Prime Minister) in the “parallel” structures existing since 1991-92. The “provisional” label was added to Thaçi’s Government in order not to clash with the interim administration established by the international community.
\textsuperscript{3} On 17 November 2007, three different elections were held in Kosovo: elections for the Kosovo Assembly (legislative part of the Provisional Institutions); for municipal assemblies, and for mayors.
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School for a Culture of Peace researchers Ana Villellas and Gema Redondo with parties from civil society as well as the international community and academia during October 2007. Such interviews were intended to include the widest spectrum of Kosovar civil and political society as well as the international community\(^4\). Despite the extensive input both from people currently involved in Kosovo and from other research papers and studies of the region the responsibility for any omissions or errors in this document lies solely with the authors\(^5\).

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\(^4\) The names of the persons interviewed are not included on the express desire of most of them.

\(^5\) We would like to thank everyone who has contributed to this report, especially Debora García Orrico for her valuable comments of the historical details of the Kosovo process and her insights into the international process.
2. Historical background

Throughout history Kosovo, a territory with a population of mainly Albanian ethnic origin has been subjected to outside interference where people have been pawns in unending strategic manoeuvrings.

In order to try to understand the current situation it is worth recalling briefly the origins of this conflict, starting with when Josip Broz “Tito” was restructuring the institutions of the Federation to prepare for his succession. Instead of appointing a successor he organised that his position be replaced by an eight-member presidency, comprising one representative from each of the six Republics, and one from each of Serbia’s autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. The presidency of this body would rotate annually between its eight members. (Silver and Little, 1995). The aim of the Yugoslav Constitution adopted in 1974 was to counterbalance Serbia’s position of power due to its having the biggest population. By virtue of the 1974 Federal Constitution, Kosovo and Vojvodina acquired a political status practically identical to that of the Republics, save the right to secede and their designation as Serbian Provinces. Although this calmed the smaller regions’ fears of a dominant Serbia, Serb leaders complained about this reduction of the republic’s powers. In 1981 after Tito’s death there was an upsurge in the ethnic Albanian support for independence within Kosovo claiming independence from Serbia and the right to become the seventh republic of Yugoslavia (rather than being just a province). The Yugoslav army and the federal police intervened to break up any protests. Meanwhile, in view of the dissatisfaction of Kosovo Serbs with the increasingly unfavourable position within the province Milosevic saw the opportunity to use this dissatisfaction to further his career towards the Presidency of Serbia. What came next was an orchestrated manipulation of Serbian patriotism by Milosevic who encouraged Serb nationalist feelings towards Kosovo (calling it the “cradle of Serbian civilization”) so as to initiate his assault to power and as a result causing the Yugoslav wars. Kosovo was the last of these wars that put an end to the Yugoslav Federation during the 1990 and left behind millions of displaced people and refugees who sought refuge either in the republics were they were a majority, in their own country, in other European countries or further afield.

Earlier, in 1989, one year after the derogation of the 1974 Constitution, and with it the loss of Kosovo’s status as an autonomous province, the Kosovo Albanians withdrew from the Kosovo Government in protest and under pressure from the Yugoslav army. In 1991 they boycotted the population census, organised a semi-clandestine referendum and with the Declaration of Kaçanik, the Republic of Kosovo was proclaimed, and Ibrahim Rugova, at that time leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), was elected as its president in the 1992 elections. This government built a parallel administration to provide health, education and other public services to the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo that was mainly supported by the revenues coming from the Kosovar diaspora. Indeed, the parallel system was a way of survival for the population of Kosovo. For the following eight years the Kosovar Albanians decided to claim their independence via a non-violent resistance movement, headed by Rugova hoping that they would achieve recognition from the international community.

From 1989 until the intervention of the international community in 1991, there was an increase in police abuses, harassment and human rights violations suffered by the Albanians in Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians were subjected to discriminatory practices that spread not only fear but also corruption, as a mechanism to survive.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) began its activities in 1997 claiming responsibility for various attacks against Serbian authorities, whom they called the “occupiers”. There was a confrontation between the supporters of the armed struggle consisting of attacks against the Serb security apparatus aiming at getting international recognition through diplomatic means. Meanwhile there was a growing tiredness amongst the population, due to the scarce successes of the pacifist movement and the continuation of the daily discrimination and abuse.

In October 1998 the ceasefire agreed between Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic allowed the deployment of 2,000 international observers under the auspices of the OSCE in what was known as the Kosovo Verification Mission. This mission was
created under the auspices of UN Security Council resolution 1203 which mandated the OSCE and NATO to conduct verification in and over Kosovo respectively, and called for the full cooperation of the FRY. Their role was to monitor and verify the compliance of all parties with resolution 1199, which called for an immediate cease fire in Kosovo and withdrawal of security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from the province. In the meantime International mediation by the Contact Group managed to bring the parties to the table in Rambouillet, France, for two rounds of talks. Once Thaçi became the de facto leader of the Kosovo Albanian Delegation to Rambouillet, he agreed to sign what was known as the Rambouillet Accords, the terms of which were not to be accepted by Serbian authorities. The Serb refusal to sign Rambouillet prompted NATO air strikes against Kosovo and Belgrade, which began in March 1999 and lasted for almost eleven weeks. The NATO air intervention ended when Milosevic agreed to sign at Kumanovo a cease-fire and a Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which led to the withdrawal of the Serb forces from Kosovo and the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of resolution 1244, of 10 June, authorising the establishment of an international security presence and an international civilian presence in Kosovo. During the interim period that followed the withdrawal of the Serb forces and the deployment of the international forces under the command of NATO, under the acronym of KFOR (Kosovo Forces), the number of attacks against Kosovo Serbs by Kosovo Albanians increased dramatically. The increasing number of security incidents and violence against Kosovo Serbs perpetrated not only by Kosovo Albanian individuals but also by the “authorities” from the parallel institutions, therefore giving popular legitimacy to the attacks, provoked an exodus of part of the Serb population from Kosovo leaving some of the cities emptied of Kosovo Serbs. This was the case in Peja/ Pec and Prizren, amongst many other, and in cities left divided along ethnic lines as was the case in Mitrovica (North), Kamenica (East) or Orahovac (South), just to give a couple of examples. These can be explained by their proximity to Serbia proper or by the geographical position of the Serbian areas within the cities. This division along ethnic lines is still in force in the case of Mitrovica, where there is a majority Serb population and in the case of Orahovac, there is what is called a Serb enclave in the upper part of the city. The trend of harassment of Kosovo Serbs continued well into 2001 (CD, 2006), and even later as the riots of March 2004 showed.

According to international workers present at that time in the area, the slowness in the deployment of security police forces to take on civil security responsibilities left a lawless and insecure environment where looting, killings and forced expropriation of apartments took place. Furthermore, all remaining Kosovo Serbs were susceptible to being arrested and accused of war crimes. KFOR took over responsibility for providing a safe and secure environment once its deployment was completed, but nevertheless the huge damage caused during the first months of the post-war rehabilitation process could have been avoided if the absence of a legitimate police force either international or local had been tackled earlier.

As for the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, according to UN reports, out of an estimated population of 1.7 million people, almost half (800,000) sought refuge in neighbouring countries (Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro) and up to 500,000 people are considered to be internally displaced. One unique characteristic of the Kosovo humanitarian crisis is that most of the refugees abroad, according to UN figures almost 650,000 mainly Kosovo Albanians, returned to Kosovo either spontaneously or with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) immediately following the end of the confrontations. With regards to infrastructure and public administration, there were problems with power generation, the provision of water and the main public service structures (schools, telephones, public transport, the judiciary, the health system) none of which were fully functional. Furthermore, there was a shortage of skilled labour in these areas. Due to the exclusion that Kosovo Albanians suffered during Milosevic period there were no professionals trained to perform these duties. Most of the Kosovo Serbs that had previously been performing these duties had left their posts, either voluntarily or forced by harassment.
3. The post-war rehabilitation process – International intervention

Security Council resolution 1244 issued on 10th of June 1999 authorised the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was deployed to fulfil the above mentioned tasks that had never before been undertaken by an international organization. Later on there was the case of Timor-Leste, which used the case of Kosovo as a blueprint.13

The international community came to Kosovo with some lessons learnt from the mission deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as demonstrated in the single command structure that has been applied in Kosovo. In Kosovo all different areas of work were distributed amongst leading agencies, which at the same time respond to UNMIK (the UN Mission leader organization). The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) retains the judicial, executive and legislative powers and its aim is to facilitate the political process taking into account the Rambouillet Accords. The structure developed comprises four pillars.

The structure of the mission was organised in four pillars. The organizations taking a leading role were the United Nations, the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the United Nations as the overall leading organization.

This four-pillar structure remains in place to date, although local administrative structures have formally assumed most of the responsibilities, with the exception of certain functions of Pillar I, Police and Justice, which are amongst the reserved powers as defined by the constitutional framework of 2001.

Throughout the eight years of international intervention in Kosovo there have been seven Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG) that have led the political transformation of the region.14 During these years of international administration in Kosovo there was not a single one in which killings, threats, harassment and acts of violence and intimidation were not committed against minorities, especially against Kosovo Serbs. The only exception was a relatively calm period experienced during a few months in 2002. But this calm, as the UNMIK highlighted, was more attributable to the fact that many members from the minority communities had already left or were living in enclaves. At the same time it was in 2002 when the attacks against international actors increased. This trend of unceasing violence demonstrates that the underlying structural hostility, due to the years of oppression under the Milosevic’s regime suffered by the Kosovo Albanians (one of the causes of the confrontation between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians) has not been de-constructed. The only variation in this structural violence schema has been that of the roles, as the power relations have changed.

The aim of the international intervention during the post-war rehabilitation phase was to stop the violence and to (re)habilitate the government structures to make them capable of dealing in a peaceful manner with the problems that gave rise to the armed con-
frontonat in the first place. The reports submitted to the Security Council detailing the evolution of the mission tasks and objectives showed every year how the local structures of governance put in place evolved until they, according with international standards, were able to begin to assume more management and decision making responsibilities. In the meantime while the process is carried out at a management and governmental level factors such as structural violence are not being tackled in an adequate way. Indeed the international community put an emphasis on developing programmes to achieve what they understood was needed: a multi-ethnic society. But looking at the current situation in terms of the existence of a real multi-ethnic society, perhaps the means used to achieve it have not been the best ones.

Perhaps the problem could be that the lay-out of what could be called the "general objective" was wrong in the first place. If the first part of the tasks set out in resolution 1244 is taken "to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self governing institutions..." , the international administration has proved to be a success from a formal perspective, as can be seen through the extracts from the Secretary General’s Reports in annex 1. UNMIK contributed to the establishment of what was called Provisional Self-Government Institutions and to the organisation of several rounds of elections. The last ones took place quite recently using an open list system. It has put in place rule of law mechanisms, a quasi-functional judiciary, a police service with European training standards, advanced legislation and mechanisms for gender mainstreaming as well as media commissions. And, in general terms, all the single mechanisms needed for a functional government structure respectful of the rights of their citizens. Although these were not the only tasks mandated by resolution 1244, as it continues as follows: "to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo". And it is in achieving this objective where not only the international community but the PISG and the inhabitants of Kosovo and the Government in Belgrade have failed if we take into account the lack of freedom of movement, the existence of parallel institutions of Government and the very existence of the enclaves.15

While the projects set in motion by the international community have managed to achieve the first part of the mandate, the inter-ethnic violence which was one of the results of the armed confrontation and subsequent international intervention still remains. In Kosovo there are different notions of inter-ethnic violence: direct physical and psychological violence, indirect psychological violence and intra-ethnic violence designed to prevent or punish inter-ethnic contact and cooperation. This last factor is considered by many as the most important one sustaining polarised hostile relations between groups (Collaborative Learning Projects and Care, 2006). Despite the work done by the international community with community-based projects, conflict building measures, special provisions and regulations to ensure the participation of minority groups, the relations between ethnic groups that currently live in Kosovo remain very polarised and influenced by ethnicity.

The question is whether the work done by the international community should be regarded as a failure or as a success. In this case, while the work done by the international community could be considered a success –public services, education, health and industry are functioning in Kosovo– perhaps from a political perspective, meaning the return of refugees and the internally displaced as much as the achievement of a sustainable multiethnic society, it has not been as successful politically. Perhaps it was never clearly determined what the political goal, or aim was.

As one interviewee pointed out, besides ethnicity there are other factors that should have been borne in mind by the international organizations when they were planning their intervention, amongst them: the transition from a communist regime with a very patriarchal society and hierarchical state, the effect of highly patriarchal family relations, the rural and urban divide, the importance of the clan structure and its role and the ever present culture of silence in Kosovo Albanian society.

All the above shape the structural violence factors as much as the most obvious ones, such as ethnicity. In order to have produced an adequate response the international community would have needed time and resources to carry out proper research before intervening and to identify and enlist the key actors that could have contributed to achieving social change. Unfortunately the international intervention was characterised by deadlines to fulfil irrespective of whether or not projects and measures had been put in place to achieve social transformation.

15 The villages and towns of Kosovo Serb majority are known as enclaves. The people that live in these areas are mainly Kosovo Serbs who try to make their living without leaving the enclave neither for medical nor police assistance, which leaves them enormously vulnerable not only from outside threats but also from other dangers such as domestic violence. Kosovo Serbs live in complete isolation receiving biased information coming from Belgrade. Furthermore, there are collective centers for Serbs in Kosovo, Gracanica being the biggest one. The Serbian commissariat for return supports the Serb refugees to promote the right to return.
4. Engendering Kosovo’s rehabilitation process

Two elements can be highlighted in relation to the study of post-war Kosovo from a gender perspective: the importance of the gender dimension in Kosovo’s armed conflict and post-war rehabilitation process and the special opportunity created in Kosovo as a “gender laboratory” in which international gender-equality commitments could be translated into practice due to the transitional status of Kosovo as an “international protectorate” led by the international community. And both elements are closely related to peacebuilding: peace processes have to adopt a gender perspective and promote societal changes towards gender equality in order to be inclusive and sustainable peace processes; and women’s roles in the promotion of peace in any conflict-context are highly significant for the construction of an inclusive peace. Therefore both elements, the gender dimension in Kosovo’s war and post-war period and the opportunity created for the international community to promote gender-equality in Kosovo, will be addressed in this section.

The understanding of the gender category\(^6\) means the acceptance that armed conflicts and post-war rehabilitation processes are not gender neutral but are embedded in gendered dynamics and relations which, cross-cut by other elements (e.g. age, cultural context, social class, ethnicity) result in differentiated effects for the different groups of women and men. In that sense, women and men (and the various groups of women and men, as heterogeneous categories) can experience violence and opportunities for peace and reconstruction in different ways according to socially constructed roles and expectations and to specific needs that result from those.

In this idea lies the importance of addressing the gender dimension in the cycle of conflicts (conflict-prevention, armed conflicts, peace processes and post-war rehabilitation processes). The denial of that gender perspective, either by actively resisting it or simply by ignoring it, results on one hand in the neglect of the specific needs women and men have in those contexts and on the other hand in the perpetuation of power relations that can become more acute under violence. Engendering the analysis of armed conflicts and post-war processes implies also acknowledging the opportunities which arise in contexts of change to redress previous unequal power relations and to promote the construction of a new more inclusive society.

The adoption of a gender perspective has contributed to create a corpus of knowledge on gender and armed conflict giving visibility to: a) differential impacts of war on women and men, in the sense that men often suffer from direct consequences of war related to their gendered status as combatants or potential combatants (forced enrolment, mortal victims, selective and collective slaughtering, imposed hegemonic masculinity and repression and silencing of alternative masculinities among other elements), while women suffer direct consequences related to their gendered position (e.g. sexual violence and double victimisation, forced displacement, extra burden in caring for dependent victims and, more generally, for the family), and b) differential patterns of participation in armed conflicts (e.g. women relegated from political and military decision-making areas; higher participation levels of men in combat than of women; active role both from women and men in mechanisms resisting and protesting war, such as pacifist feminist activism, pacifist movements, student’s activism, indigenous groups).

The gender dimension in the Kosovo armed conflict was significant in many ways, as has happened in many other contexts. Violence affected in specific ways both men and women, the former being especially affected by deaths resulting directly from armed confrontation in their roles as combatants, and the latter, together with civilian men and children, bearing the burden of displacement, collapse of service provision channels, destruction of property and disruption of means of living and psychosocial harm, amongst others. Threats and impact on human security affected both women and men, although the various groups of women and men experienced them through their different gendered positions, implying for instance that women often played an extra role as carers of the relatives and war casualties; they faced specific and major difficulties as widows; they were stigmatised and traumatised if raped with their bodies forcibly becoming an extension of the armed conflict and of the symbols and frontiers of communities; they were especially affected by the difficulties of access to goods and services as new householders or as caregivers of their households. Besides, their specific needs linked to their reproductive health were also neglected. Moreover, the multiple forms of violence experienced by the population during the armed conflict had a specific gender dimension in the form of sexual violence against women, such as rape, which was a war strategy used both by Serbian Security Forces and paramilitaries against Kosovo Albanian women as well as by Kosovo Albanian parallel security forces (e.g. UCK, parallel police) against Kosovo Serbian

\(^{6}\) Gender refers to “the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context and time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context. In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context. Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age.” (Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues, 2007).
Kosovo Albanian women, along with women from other communities, were not only victims of violence but played a multiplicity of roles, which in the case of Kosovo Albanians ranged from armed combatants to civil society peace activists. In the case of Kosovo, there was an active nonviolent position within Kosovar Albanian civil society during the years previous to the war manifested in the civic resistance to Milosevic’s regime through the creation of alternative public institutions and services. This nonviolent active human capital lasted in some way through the armed conflict in the form of individual mechanisms of resistance to cope with the violence as well as some explicit collective strategies. Nonetheless, the start of the phase of armed conflict showed to many the limitations of the nonviolent means amid a context of international isolation and internal oppression. Despite this, a continuation in the role played by numerous women with regards to the resistance to violence and oppression can be identified throughout the years of pre-war, war and post-war. This active nonviolent role played by women in the pre-war years and during the armed conflict took many forms, such as humanitarian activities, participation in politics and provision of social services. As some Kosovo Albanian women activists from the civil society and from the field of women in politics highlight today, the emphasis and idiosyncrasy of the initiatives led by women in the pre-war period was primordially linked to the “national cause”, that is, to the resistance to Milosevic’s regime of oppression against the Kosovo Albanian population and the demand of an advance status for Kosovo. The perception of a common external threat and the need to resist it diluted internal divisions and power relations, such as gender power relations, for the sake of the survival of the national community. Therefore, the gender dimension was somehow subordinated or downplayed by the national collective project.

Despite this overarching national umbrella subordinating any other agenda or dimension, women involved in what was called “the resistance movement” pushed forward an agenda promoting the advancement of the status of women, their rights and well-being. The women’s branch of the LDK, actively promoted by women within the LDK, grew to 300,000 members in Kosovo in the pre-war years at critical times, according to some of its promoters. For them, this initiative constituted “the most crucial women’s contribution to the liberation of women in Kosovo” and one that simultaneously pursued the promotion of women in politics as well as in other fields by addressing concrete needs. However, this initiative had to confront the lack of experience of women in politics and the resulting lack of sustainability. Other initiatives came from the field of civil society, with NGOs such as the Centre for the Protection of Women and Children and Morat Qiriavi involved in humanitarian and service-provision activities that addressed specific women’s needs (Lytth, 2001). All these initiatives and experiences constituted in themselves a highly relevant process of women’s empowerment which, even if accompanied by a gender-blind national context, managed to engender realities and to offer some alternative, even if subordinated, agendas. Moreover, they sowed the seeds for the strengthening and renewal of the women’s movement in the post-war period.

On the other hand, the post-war rehabilitation process in Kosovo, as in other contexts, has been embedded of the gender dynamics that operate upon unequal power relations. The way gender operates in these types of processes has to do with questions such as: Who draws up the post-war agenda? Whose voices are heard and not heard in the elaboration of that agenda and why? To what extent or how do women participate in the post-war rehabilitation process? Which obstacles hinder the participation of women across fields in the decision-making levels? Which specific needs do the different groups of men, women, girls and boys, have in post-war societies? Are those differential needs taken into account in the design and the implementation of post-war policies? Who has access to resources in the post-war period? How are the various axes of post-war rehabilitation processes (security, government and participation, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation) conceptualised and addressed? What are the implications resulting from those conceptualisations and practices for men and women? Does the post-war rehabilitation process explicitly embrace the goal of gender equity? If so, how is this goal translated into practice, monitored and evaluated? Those are questions of power, requiring the analysis of how gender power relations are sustained or transformed in contexts of change.

Thus, from a gender perspective, post-war rehabilitation processes are complex transformational and gendered processes, in which the axis of conflict together with other conflicts emerging to the surface (e.g. gender power relations and changes in gender roles) need to be addressed in order to (re)build societal bases leading to a new society that enables peaceful, democratic and egalitarian relations. The case of Kosovo has experienced many of the trends that are common to many post-war rehabilitation processes in terms of gender, including phenomena such as changing gender roles coexisting with rises in domestic violence and increased prostitution; ac-

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17 This report covers mainly the experiences of Kosovan Albanian women. Those of women from other ethnic communities (e.g., Serbian and Roma women) are addressed indirectly with regards to the post-war rehabilitation process and are not covered with regards to the war period due to the need to limit the scope of research.
tive role of women’s groups pressing for a major participation of women in decision-making together with gender-blind organisational cultures within institutions and political parties; risks associated with the lack of a wide and comprehensive DDR programme as well as unaddressed psychosocial trauma; widespread day-to-day social problems such as huge unemployment, low wages and precarious heath and educational system—with differential implications and impact on women and men— together with the non-resolution of the axis of the armed conflict, the status of Kosovo.

Together with the importance of the gender dimension as a horizontal issue in Kosovo’s war and post-war periods, this report addresses a second factor in the study of Kosovo’s case. It refers to the unique opportunity opened in Kosovo for the international community to act as a catalytic actor, together with local actors, in the promotion of gender equity, due to the transitional status of Kosovo as a territory ultimately administered by the United Nations. In view of the recurrent gap between formal commitments and practical engagement in the field of gender, Kosovo can be seen as a test or an opportunity for the implementation of the already sophisticated gender discourses and formal adherences. In the Kosovar case this becomes especially relevant taking into account its post-war condition and the advances reached at formal international level regarding the interlinks between gender and peacebuilding. UNSC resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security, resulting from intensive work and lobbying from the international women’s movements and building upon the work of previous decades, calls on the Security Council, the UN Secretary General, all member-states and other actors (e.g. civil society, military) to promote the participation of women in peace and post-war rehabilitation processes. Beyond that resolution other compromises at international level constituting the corpus of international mechanisms regarding gender and peace, also apply in Kosovo’s case, offering additional arguments for the key idea expressed here: that in view of the formal or informal gender mandates resulting from international agreements, the UN has had a unique opportunity to implement its commitments or, in the contrary, to evidence even more explicitly the subordinated role that the gender dimension plays in the field of the so-called realpolitik.

Thus the double condition in Kosovo of post-war context and international protectorate resulted in a favourable scenario of opportunities and challenges for the combined promotion of: a) an inclusive peace that promotes gender equity and addresses specific differential needs resulting from the gendered experience of armed conflict, and b) the active participation and contribution of women to the post-war rehabilitation process. Subsequent sections of this report will analyse whether this opportunity has been addressed in practice.

19 Since the approval of the first International instruments on women’s rights in the 70s, the corpus of international legal instruments has kept increasing, resulting in the extension and improvement of the initial documents, especially the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women (CEDAW, 1979). CEDAW does not specifically deal with peace issues, but has constituted the reference for all documents coming after it. Some of the landmark documents are the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1994), Beijing Platform of Action (1995) and the Windhoek declaration: The Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (2000).
5. Actors promoting gender-equality in post-war Kosovo

The promotion of gender equity and the mainstreaming of gender in the post-war rehabilitation and peace-building context in Kosovo have been and still are complex processes, driven by different groups of actors interlinked by multiple types of relationships. Studying their idiosyncrasies and their relationships allows the drawing of lessons that could be taken into account in subsequent phases of the Kosovo rehabilitation process as well as in other contexts. Thus the starting point of this section is the emphasis on the capacity of action by the actors involved and on the factors at the level of actors that influence in one way or another the way the gender dimension is understood, socialised, institutionalised and translated into pro-gender equality action. The focus on actors is combined here with the conceptualisation of post-war rehabilitation processes as opportunities for positive change and inclusive peace in which a multiplicity of actors can play a variety of roles. Consequently, the analysis of the actors promoting gender equality in Kosovo will put a special emphasis on the peacebuilding role that these actors can play.

In Kosovo, as in other contexts, the promotion of the gender perspective and of the goal of gender equity has been pushed forward by certain groups of women acting as catalytic agents. Even if this active mobilisation is combined with a specific international and local socio-political context of gender-friendly political correctness, it must be highlighted that the leading advocating and action role in terms of gender has been played by gender-aware women. To facilitate the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the promotion of gender in Kosovo’s post-war context and of its peacebuilding dimension, it is useful to attempt to characterize these groups.

Among the variety of actors working in the field of gender in Kosovo, several broad groups or individuals can be identified according to their origin (international/national), their field of work (e.g. politics, research, funding and training, advocating and aware-raising, service-provision, media, economics), their peacebuilding dimension (explicit or implicit), their history (experience going back to pre-war period, post-war history and experience), their ethnic dimension and/or modus operandi in terms of ethnicity (mono-ethnic/multiethnic composition, inclusive/exclusive discourses and practices) and their strategy in relation to other actors and actionlines (individual action, networks, collective action), among other elements.

This report does not aim to go into the detail of every organisation working in the field of gender, but rather to establish patterns of conduct, trends and general characteristics of those actors and to reflect on the consequences for gender and peacebuilding deriving from them. A specific emphasis will be given to the trends related to the international/national divide, due to its importance for assessing Kosovo’s rehabilitation process and the leading role of the UN in it. The peacebuilding dimension of the actors promoting gender equity and their perspective on elements of the conflict, such as the ethnic divide, are also of significant importance for its implications in terms of the inclusiveness and sustainability of the post-war rehabilitation process.

The map of actors promoting gender equity in post-war Kosovo has evolved over the years in a gradual way, progressively incorporating new actors, such as the national gender machinery and more local NGOs and networks, or changing the pattern of relations within the map.

Adapting the pyramid of actors Lederach uses for analysing potential transformative actors in conflict-situations (Lederach, 1998), it is possible to identify local pro-gender equity actors in the three levels of the pyramid, as well as in the regional and international contexts surrounding or permeating the local context. The first level, the one at the level of highest decision-making processes of various fields (politics, military, religion) has mobilised less actors promoting gender equality, in line with the historical exclusion that areas of decision-making and of “traditional” notions of power (political power, military power) have imposed on women. In spite of this, this first level comprises some key women working in the field of politics who are mobilised for the transformation of gender relations in the process of the post-war rehabilitation. Their mobilisation is especially relevant taking into account that for many of them during the war period their main mobilising goal was the nationalist agenda, an agenda subsequently broadened in post-war Kosovo so as to include other issues. These gender-aware women coexist with other women in the field of politics who have not actively positioned themselves in terms of promoting gender mainstreaming and gender equity. There are some horizontal links across political parties, but no horizontal alliances across ethnic divisions, and scarce strategic alliances for joint and effective promotion of gender equality with male counterparts. Their vertical links have been scarce, due to factors which will be addressed later, although they seem to be gradually improving and increasing, even if mainly limited to actors within the community-based level.

The second level of the social pyramid (the level of leading members from well-valued social sectors who can act as mediators in processes of transmis-
sion of ideas or even as promoters of social changes) comprises both individuals and organised groups of women from fields such as the media and economics. These actors in the second level have visibility and a vision of the potential of Kosovan women in many fields as a hard-working, pragmatic and very active population group, which they link to a vision of Kosovars as entrepreneurial, optimistic and co-operative people. Nonetheless, this second level has lost individuals through the years (e.g. intellectuals) who have become disillusioned with the prospects of transformation in Kosovo, with their Kosovan colleagues and the Kosovan political class, resulting in their exit from active public roles. They support women in non-traditional women’s fields and offer an image of the possibility of change and transformation of gender relations in post-war contexts. The actors at this level pertain mainly to the majority ethnic group, and their vertical relations are directed mainly towards the community-based level rather than to the first and highest level.

The third level, that is the community-based level, comprises multiple women’s NGOs, many of them connected through networks. According to both local and international women interviewed for this report, among the multiplicity of NGOs created in the immediate post-war context—not just women’s NGOs but general NGOs—, many were created as personal-profiteering projects amid the high influx of international funds, which caused social distrust, frustration and scepticism among the population towards the NGO sector. Despite this, other women’s organisations were honest initiatives with long-term objectives and sustainable means. This community-based level actually comprises local organisations mainly from the main ethnic Kosovar community, the Albanian, but it has incorporated progressively organisations from minority communities, which have also developed their own networks and some alliances and joint practices across ethnicities. Moreover, some of the local organisations already existed before the war, with relatively strong communal links and legitimacy, which contributed to their respectability. It can be said that this community-based level has strong, dynamic and catalytic women’s groups within the main ethnic Kosovar community, which have developed inclusive discourses with regards to identity and ethnicity, but which generally lack strong male alliances and which have to face the general societal disillusion towards the NGO sector. Women’s groups in minority ethnic communities are scarcer and face specific problems in terms of double pressures, internal and external (internal social control in terms of gender hierarchies within Kosovo Serb communities and, more generally, in terms of peer group pressure against alternative views to the hegemonic Kosovo Serb views; and external pressure with regards to open and/or perceived hostility of Kosovo Albanians against Serb women, resulting in restriction of movement, isolation, limited economic perspectives, and perpetuation of the “image of the enemy”, among other elements).

The adaptation of Lederach’s study of the regional and international contexts that tend to surround the local pyramid of actors, allows us to identify pro-gender equity actors from both regional and global circles that have established relations with the local actors and which play a role in local gender-dynamics. First of all, the international circle, despite being external, plays a major formal local role in the sense that the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General has ultimate power in decision-making in Kosovo. UNMIK’s Office for Gender Affairs (OGA), despite the possibility it had to move across the local pyramid, vertically and horizontally, as well as to move within the UNMIK mission itself, seems to have remained a static external actor in terms of gender, addressing local actors from the outside and with a top-down approach, while at the same time remaining a static actor attached to the core of power of UNMIK but unable to influence or permeate it. Only recently has the OGA started to move differently towards the map of local actors and, despite that, its intermittent position due to the power vacuums within the office seems to have hampered those movements, according to local actors. In contrast to OGA, other actors from the international circle with a gender mandate have managed to position themselves closer to the local map of actors, establishing horizontal relations with the various levels of local actors as well as promoting local vertical and horizontal relations. That is the case of some international agencies and intergovernmental organisations, or specific staff within those organisations, such as OSCE and UNIFEM, and certain international NGOs and donors, such as the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation. Regionally, the actors working in the field of gender in neighbouring countries and establishing links with local actors are mainly located in the community-based level actors, that is, women NGOs and social movements. Thus the relations are horizontal and built upon networks and common experiences of armed conflict and post-war rehabilitation processes viewed from a gender dimension. Regional actors also include some actors at the other two levels, that is, women from the political field as well as women from other professional fields (e.g. media, academia, and businesses).

The OGA was placed within the Office of the Special Representative in 2005. Before that date it was located under Pillar II of UNMIK.
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Based on Lederach’s pyramid of actors (Lederach, 1998)

Figure 1.1. Actors promoting gender equality in post-war Kosovo

5.1. International and local actors: potential and challenges of a complex relation

The analysis of the role played both by national and international actors in the field of gender is of special importance taking into account firstly the already mentioned transitional status of Kosovo as an international protectorate led by the international community, and secondly the international gender commitments of the latter. From a post-war rehabilitation perspective it is important to identify patterns of behaviour, attitudes and relations between international and local participants of post-war contexts in order to identify strengths and weaknesses. Despite the fact that international and local divides are not always evident, as both groups constitute heterogeneous macro-groups, international intervention in post-war processes inevitably draws a line between the external and internal actors. In that sense, interviews held for this report and existing research done in this area allow us to identify an international/local divide that permeates relations between actors from both sides of it, affects narratives regarding the genesis and subsequent phases of the promotion of gender in post-war Kosovo, and ultimately has an influence on results. Nonetheless, this divide has been constructed upon a local identification of “internationals” as an equivalent of “UNMIK”, usually leaving outside other international actors which are locally identified as having worked in a constructive way across the divide. Subsequently, this section will focus on the relations between local actors and the UNMIK Office for Gender Affairs.

In general terms both local and international actors seem to agree to a certain degree that the process of institutionalisation of the goal of gender equity in post-war Kosovo results from: a) a combination
of a strong and active local women’s movement advocating and working for the promotion of women’s rights and for the advancement of women’s status; and b) specific international partners promoting gender equity in post-war Kosovo through funding, training and advocate work, as well as from an international context and community committed in formal terms to address gender within a framework of so-called international standards which include non-discrimination and gender equality. Nonetheless, despite that common acknowledgement of a combination of internal and external action and context, there are also significant differences in terms of perceptions over the degree of engagement and responsibility of international and local actors in that combined process.

Local women’s groups and activists interviewed for this report tend to put the emphasis on the local synergies, especially when referring to the immediate post-war period, depicting the genesis of the promotion and institutionalisation of the gender perspective mainly as a locally-driven process built upon a history of Kosovar women activism and resistance to violence and repression. Local women’s groups and individuals also point to the way in which they have had to confront international top-down approaches, gendered prejudices and gender-blindness within the same international organisations supposedly committed to promote gender equality at local level. These difficulties especially refer to the UN Office of Gender Affairs in Kosovo, whose role and interlinks with local women’s organisations will be analysed in more detail below due to the major role of the UN in the rehabilitation process. On the other hand, international actors, while acknowledging the strength and role of the local women’s movement, tend to highlight the commitment of the international community or of specific international agencies and organisations to principles such as equality, women’s rights and non-discrimination, as well as the translation that this support has had in the development of gender institutional machinery and concrete results at different levels (e.g. legislation, mechanisms, policies).

Of special importance is the analysis of the role of the UN Office for Gender Affairs (OGA) with regards to the local actors. Strategically placed within the Office of the Special Representative since January 2005 it has had a potential to promote gender equality and gender mainstreaming within the whole UNMIK mission, although this strategic location was lacking in the first years due to its position as an advisory unit under Pillar II of UNMIK. Besides, the high expectations and optimism of local women’s organisations with regards to the international mission together with their level of experience and strength constituted an additional factor for the potential of a major positive role to be played by the OGA with an external projection, that is, a role of supporting the upgrading of the gender dimension in Kosovar post-war society. However, drawing on the reflections of local and international organisations over alleged uncooperative patterns of behaviour and top-down approaches in the immediate post-war period, as well as reflections from analysts close to the OGA itself over the difficult relations established between the OGA and local women’s organisations, it seems that OGA’s role has been complex and has failed to fulfilled, at least in its first years, its potential. Local claims of an alleged top-down approach refers to the lack of acknowledgement and recognition of local experiences, knowledge and priorities in terms of gender, and the disregarding of local voices and of the potential of joint synergies. Moreover, locals and internationals point to alleged divisive practices carried on by the OGA that seem to have left behind damage within the women’s movement.

Overall, even if more evaluation or an internal audit of OGA’s role could throw more light on the local allegations, narratives and results indicate that the potential of a synergy between the OGA and local groups has not been fulfilled, and that the UN has missed the opportunity of acting as a catalytic actor for the promotion of gender both within its structures in Kosovo and towards Kosovar society. The apparent lack of strategy and vision of the OGA, at least during its first years, seems to have resulted in missing an important opportunity for building up strong international and local alliances from the beginning, sharing knowledge on the local gender dimension, designing common and more effective strategies, facilitating the international lobby for the implementation of UNSC resolution 1325 in Kosovo, and pressing for gender mainstreaming within UNMIK, amongst others.

The human factor seems to have been relevant in the failure of the OGA to fulfil its potential, at least with regards to its role as supporter of the promotion of gender equality within Kosovar’s political structures and society, according to the analyses of actors with a gender mandate interviewed for this report. Problems at the human level such as communication and relational problems, misunderstandings, personalization of difficulties or lack of inclusive vision seem to have played a major role. Despite that, structural factors such as subordination of the gender dimension within gender-blind organisational structures and cultures (e.g. the nonstrategic location of the OGA in its first years) may have negatively influence the process of promoting gender-equality, especially with regards to gender mainstreaming within the mission itself. In any case, the change of location of the OGA does not seem to have redressed those internal limitations in a significant way.
On the other hand, among some women activists within the field of women in politics there is the perception that the work of international actors working in the field of gender has targeted almost exclusively women from the community-based level, resulting in a lack of support or insufficient support to women promoting gender equality in the field of politics. Some external analysts have also identified this pattern of international focus on Kosovar women’s NGOs, generating grievances among women in other fields. Nonetheless, those grievances are also the result of other factors, such as the personalization of politics and social action, inter-generational cleavages, and the lack of recognition that women from the fields of politics and from civil society each allege they suffer due to the other. Despite so, there seems to be a gradual increase in the attention played both by internationals and locals towards the importance of engendering decision-making levels, which implies a rapprochement of these groups.

Finally, even if the international/national divide has played a divisive role, reducing the potential of allied work between international and local actors with gender mandates, it must be highlighted that there has been a positive evolution in recent years, with increasing cooperation between international and national actors and better relations between the OGA and local groups. This evolution seems to be a learning process, with the OGA itself acknowledging the limitations and up-and-downs. The future EU leading presence in Kosovo will be a new test to see how this learning process is being internalised by international actors. Up to now, there are signs of positive engagement and cooperative behaviour by the EU planning team (EUPiT) towards international and local actors from the gender field, as manifested in the holding of working sessions organized by the EUPiT in order to share information, goals and perspectives with local actors from the field of gender.

To conclude, as the gender dimension is such a complex process that needs to be addressed in the short, medium and long-term, it is highly relevant that international actors build upon all the work in the gender field carried on by local actors, whom they should recognize as equal partners sharing a common goal and on whom they can count for elaborating strategies and multiplying results.

5.2. Peacebuilding and gender-aware actors in post-war Kosovo

Another interesting element to look at with regards to the actors promoting gender equality in Kosovo is the peacebuilding dimension. Gender equality is a core element of an inclusive and comprehensive understanding of peace. Kosovo’s women’s movement constitutes a key heterogeneous actor in the broad peacebuilding field due to its active role in favour of a more just and egalitarian peace. And even if UNSC resolution 1325 calls for all actors in conflict and postconflict contexts to promote the participation of women in peace and post-war rehabilitation processes, it seems that women’s groups have taken the leadership in the process of raising awareness about the resolution, explaining its implications, implementing it and monitoring its implementation.

Of special importance with regards to this peacebuilding dimension is the constitution of the Women’s Peace Coalition, as a joint platform established in March 2006 by Kosovar and Serbian women peace activists to monitor the status negotiations, to promote the participation of women in them and, more generally, to promote the mainstreaming of gender in the negotiations. It is a partnership promoted by Kosova Women’s Network (KWN) and the Women in Black. Even if this platform has been recently constituted, the cooperation between Kosovar women’s organisations and Women in Black goes back to the 90s.

Its strategy has been to lobby national and international actors to push for the presence of women in the Kosovar negotiation team. Concretely, the platform has proposed to the Kosovar Government the appointment of Edita Tahiri to the negotiation team, as a person over whom women peace activists from Kosovo and Serbia have reached consensus. And even more importantly, all members of the Women Peace Coalition have agreed on a solution for the future status of Kosovo, evidencing how women across divides (such as the national/ethnic divide) can reach agreements and build bridges that put the emphasis on the common need to find solutions to common problems, rather than on divisive issues.

21 The KWN is a network established in 2000 that comprises 85 women’s organisations across Kosovo and across ethnic backgrounds (it includes six Serbian and five Roma organisations). Before 2000 it acted as an informal network. As they themselves affirm, the KWN advocates on behalf of Kosovar women at the local, regional and international level, drawing on the voices and experiences of its 85 member organisations, which work in fields such as education, psychosocial services, economic development, women’s rights, legal services, research on the gender dimension, service and capacity-building for people with special needs, women’s political participation and violence against women.

22 Women in Black from Serbia started in 1991 as a public nonviolent protest against the war in former Yugoslavia, the Serbian regime’s policy, militarism and all forms of violence and discrimination. They are not an organisation but rather a social movement integrated in the international peace network of Women in Black, which started through vigils in Israel in 1988 by women protesting against Israel’s Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and which developed in other countries such as Serbia, Italy, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Spain, etc.

23 Edita Tahiri was Minister of Foreign Affairs within the alternative political institutions from 1991 to 2000, as well as Special Representative and Envoy of Kosovo for the Office of the High Representative for Kosovo (OGA) and the Women in Black.
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Even if the campaign has not achieved its goal of women’s presence in the negotiations, it has contributed to visualize the possibility of agreement across frontiers, the legitimacy of women’s demand to be present at the negotiations and the lack of initiative and will of the Kosovar government to engender the negotiation process. Local institutions had the legal competence to decide on the composition of the negotiation team, but despite the fact that the UN could have influenced or tried to influence the process whether through its Special Envoy or the UN mission, this did not happen. Nonetheless, it seems that there has not been any significant interest on the part of the international community to engender this negotiation process.

This in turn has contributed to make explicit the contradictions from the international community with regards to gender-equality international compromises, such as the compromise on the promotion of women’s participation in peace processes. In that sense, even if the campaign to influence the negotiating process might have come too late, as one interviewed women working in the field of gender issues in Kosovo said, UNSC resolution 1325 has since its approval in 2000 called for governments and the UN Secretary General, among others, to promote the participation of women in peace processes. It seems that Kosovo, having the status of an international protectorate led by the international community, and having a strong women’s movement, could have been an exceptional case for the international community (the UN Security Council, influential governments, and the UE amongst others) to promote the participation of gender-aware women in it, either influencing the Kosovar government to include renown women in the team or by including women in mediating and facilitating roles (e.g. Special Envoy for the resolution of the future status of Kosovo, members of the international troika), or at least to promote a wider national debate on the challenges and implications of women’s participation in the negotiation process.

The process carried on by women peace activists from Serbia and from Kosovo seems to have been highly important for strengthening the women’s peace movement across borders as well as for unifying and reinforcing Albanian Kosovar women’s movement, whose actors seem to have put aside their differences and intra-movement divides to push forward their common goal of engendering the status negotiations as part of their ultimate goal of contributing to build a more inclusive, gender-aware and just post-war Kosovo. Thus the choice of Edita Tahiri as the person the Women Peace Coalition has proposed to be included in the status negotiation has important implications.

It is worth acknowledging that Edita Tahiri’s role during the years of Albanian-Kosovar alternative institutions and her role as negotiator during various international peace conferences, including negotiations at Rambouillet, where she was chairing the Albanian’s meeting, was marked by a gender-neutral position. That is, as she has acknowledged in interviews for this report, the “national agenda” was her priority during those years of resistance to Milosevic’s policies and during the negotiations aiming to put an end to the armed conflict. Her national agenda was above any other dimension, such as the gender perspective. Now reflecting on her evolution, she acknowledges that in the after-war period, facing the (re)emergence of Kosovo’s patriarchal society—according to her, it was partially contended during the years of civic resistance and armed conflict—and the male-dominated international intervention, her position has adopted a more primordial gender-aware profile, committed to the promotion of gender equality. Therefore, she foresees she would adopt a qualitatively different position in terms of the gender perspective if she was to be appointed to the negotiating team. Consequently, her reflection reinforces the views on the need to “build a critical mass of transformational leaders—both men and women—who place the goals of social justice and gender equality at the center of their political motivations” (Anderlini, 2000:56-57). And this links to the view that “women at peace tables are often the sole voices speaking out for women’s rights and concerns. Since the peace and reconstruction process sets the tone for the political, economic and social institutions that follow, women with an understanding of gender issues can make critical contributions to the longer term goal of women’s development and equality” (Anderlini, 2000:36). It seems that Edita Tahiri’s presence in the negotiation team could have contributed to the implementation of resolution 1325 due to her pro gender-equality position together with her experience in the political field and in formal peace negotiations.

On the other hand, the choice of Edita Tahiri also implies a rapprochement of sectors within the local women’s movement which have not always been united or that have experienced difficult relations, such as the sectors of women in politics and women in civil society. These synergies of cooperation are fundamental to build a strong partnership and a united voice than can influence more effectively the negotiating process and, more generally, the post-war rehabilitation process.

Another element of the peacebuilding dimension of local women’s groups is the interethnic composition of some of them. In that sense, taking into account that one element of the conflict has been the interethnic divide, then the focus on building alliances and inclusive agendas that take into account the specific
needs of the various groups of women from the different ethnic communities contributes, even if partially, to the erosion of the strong ethnic barriers that still characterize Kosovo. In that sense, as several women activists interviewed for this report have remarked, women across ethnic communities face common problems, such as domestic violence, psychosocial trauma, enormous problems with regards to health and education services and high levels of unemployment. But they have also pointed to the specific problems women from minority ethnic communities face. The transformation of discourses focused almost exclusively on mono-ethnic perspectives to broader views, acknowledging problems faced by the different groups of women is a positive sign in terms of creating bases for dialogue and rapprochement.

As a way of example, in the case of Serb women, one of the main differential problems they face relates to the freedom of movement. Even if the mobility of Serb women has ameliorated over the years, the majority of them do not feel free to move yet, which, according to some international staff in the field interviewed for this report, is due to both tangible factors related to open hostility from the Albanian population towards Serb citizens moving out of Serb-controlled areas and entering certain Albanian-controlled areas, but also to intangible factors linked to feelings of generalised fear that can not be overestimated if based on the violent incidents that have taken place against Serbs of Kosovo.

Therefore, the strategy of some Serb and Albanian women’s organisations working together with the help of international partners, such as UNIFEM, has been the promotion of joint travelling and the subsequent joint empowerment of Serb and Albanian women. Nonetheless, not all local Albanian women’s organisation’s acknowledge the specific problems face by Serb women within Kosovo, stating instead that there are no longer problems of freedom of movement, which implies neglecting the fear many Serb women still have. On the contrary, other organisations and international partners put the emphasis on the need for Serb women in Kosovo to confront and overcome their fears as a process of empowerment and dismantling imposed barriers.

Apart from the Serb minority, women from other ethnic minorities also face significant problems, such as Roma women, who according to some Albanian women activists, are the community which has received least attention from the Government and the one suffering the worst situation in terms of marginalisation, with additional problems in terms of access to education and health and almost total unemployment.

5.3. Strengths and weaknesses of gender-aware actors in post-war Kosovo

The analysis of Kosovo’s amalgam of actors promoting gender equity within the post-war context can be further completed with a reflection on the factors that have played a positive or negative role in their process of advancing gender equity, their strategies and inputs. The identification of these factors contributes to the debate on lessons learned and good practices that, in turn, might be useful for actors promoting gender equity in other peacebuilding contexts.

In terms of positive factors, the strength of the local women’s movement has played a major role reinforcing the already developed view within the field of gender and peace studies on the need to move beyond the victimisation of women in armed conflict and post-war contexts. Many trends and characteristics have contributed to the building up of strong local actors promoting the construction of an inclusive post-war Kosovo.

One of the strengths has been the networking strategy. That is, the majority of local women’s organisations and individual activists have built bridges through the establishment of networks or alliances of various dimensions. Some have a local profile, such as the Kosova Women’s Network (KWN), the Serbian network Zora, the Kosova Women’s Lobby (KWL) or the Kosovo Business Women’s Network. Others have a regional dimension, such as the Women’s Lobby for Peace, Security and Justice in South East Europe. The external alliances also comprise the well-developed relations established with international partners, such as UNIFEM and Kvinna Till Kvinna. Beyond the geographical dimension, alliances have also been established within professional fields or thematic profiles (e.g. media, economy, and politics). This well-developed practice of networking, which has received the support of some external donors, has contributed to economize on efforts, multiply results and consolidate, visualize and unify the voice of the local women’s movement, despite some internal divisions between groups.

Another strength has been their explicit peacebuilding dimension, which has drawn on existing international mechanisms such as UNSC resolution 1325 to demand a legitimate presence in the negotiating process. This peacebuilding dimension, as explained above, goes beyond the status negotiation and encompasses

44 The Women’s Lobby for Peace, Security and Justice in South East Europe is a network of organisations and activists coming from Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, established in 2006 with the support of UNIFEM and which works through advocacy and political action to promote peace and stability in the Balkans, including the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325.
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a comprehensive vision of the post-war rehabilitation process as a unique opportunity to address not only the causes of the armed conflict but also other intra-group conflicts and problems (e.g. poverty, problems in the health and education systems), some of which especially affect women, with the aim of incorporating them as active parts in the process of building a lasting holistic peace in Kosovo and redefining the concept of security, promoting a human security perspective.

Related to the networking strategies and the peace dimension, an additional strength of the local women’s movement is its dynamism and diversity, that is, their lines of action across different fields (e.g. media, advocacy, research, politics, arts, service provision). To a certain extent this dynamism can be linked to the experience achieved by women’s organisations during the years of nonviolent resistance to Milosevic’s regime, when they had to depend on self-reliance strategies, but also to the process of empowerment experienced by gender-aware women who, despite the gap between expectations and UNMIK’s role, went through a process of assertiveness and defended opportunities for positive change within the post-war context. Consequently, they have already become a visible and tangible socio-political actor within Kosovo’s internal dynamics, one on which governmental actors have to count if official claims of inclusion are to be sustained. This means that their recommendations and advocacy campaign count and do in fact result in inputs in internal policies. Besides, the existence of old and new generations of women activists ensure the continuation and sustainability of their peacebuilding strategies and practices, even if this coexistence of generations has proved to be difficult at times.

Nonetheless, together with those main strengths, there have been negative factors hampering the process of building a gender-sensitive Kosovo society. Among those, according to the different interviews held for this report, the human factor has played a relatively important role in diminishing the potential of the UNMIK Office for Gender Affairs (OGA) to play a catalytic role, which in turn has hampered the potential of the international and local alliance to multiply results. Besides, the human factor seems to have also limited to some extent the potential of the national gender machinery at certain levels, according to the local actors interviewed. Nonetheless, more research needs to be done on the factors hampering the implementation of gender compromises, as human factors can go beyond individuals and reflect organisational cultures or social structures uninterested in pursuing gender equality goals.

The explicit or implicit neglecting of the gender dimension found in international and national institutions towards gender mainstreaming and towards practical compromises with the local women’s movement has proved to be a significant factor hindering the achievement of major inputs in certain fields, such as in the peacebuilding dimension and the status negotiations. It is related to the patriarchal environment and rationale in which international and national institutions are embedded, which in the case of international actors it seems to have been accompanied by external prejudices resulting in a top-down approach which has to certain extent dismissed existent local-knowledge and attempted to start from zero.

Another factor that should be taken into account is the long-term nature of the engendering of post-war rehabilitation processes, including Kosovo’s case, which implies that the deep-rooted nature of patriarchal rationales cannot be easily overturned and that actors working in the field of gender need to take into account the various tempus (long-, medium- and short-term perspectives) and develop strategies and analysis according to those.

On the other hand, the local women’s movement faces several internal weaknesses, which may have negatively influenced their work. Through the interviews held for this report, some internal difficulties within the Kosovar women’s movement have been identified, which are common to other contexts. They refer to grievances and misperceptions between sectors, mainly between women in politics and women from civil society. The feelings of lack of recognition and insufficient support to women in politics from the community-based level and by international partners put forward by some women in politics coexist with the feelings of dissatisfaction expressed by women NGOs for the lack of recognition by women politicians towards the work done by women NGOs and for the perceived excessive claims of ownership by some women in politics. Even if these problems are to a certain extent minor and have not hampered the consolidation of the local women’s movement, they might have slowed down at certain periods the impetus of the movement and created difficulties within certain networks, such as the Kosovo Women’s Lobby, which brings together leading female figures across sectors of Kosovo. This gap between sectors has a certain parallel in another subtle gap between generations, which has created some difficulties or grievances over the sometimes difficult balance between the recognition and promotion of past, present and future experiences and strategies. The identification of these internal weaknesses does not undermine the strength of the local women’s movement but simply points to areas which could be further reinforced in order to reinvigorate the movement, specially taking into account that the emotional dimension—the one dealing with feelings, whether of grievances or of satisfaction—is a fundamental part of a holistic concept of a lasting peace.
6. The challenge of implementing gender equality in post-war Kosovo

One of the common difficulties regarding compromises on gender equality in conflict and post-war rehabilitation contexts—as well as in other contexts—is their implementation. Even when the gender perspective is formally developed and its implementation becomes an instrument aiming at the achievement of equality, the real results are more complex and are often marked by the widespread trend of gender being “everywhere and nowhere”. Kosovo’s case is not an exception. Its condition as a post-war rehabilitation process, that is, as a context of changes and opportunities, makes the implementation of the gender perspective especially relevant. In order to contribute to the building of a more inclusive society and to leave behind not just war hatreds but also gender hierarchies. Therefore the analysis of Kosovo’s post-war rehabilitation process at the implementation level and from a gender perspective contributes to identifying strengths and weaknesses in that process that could in turn be useful for comparative analyses and for the process of Kosovo’s gender mainstreaming itself. In fact, its analysis shows common trends but also context-related characteristics.

The implementation level in Kosovo cannot be understood in isolation to the degree of understanding and internalisation of the gender perspective by the political establishment which, according to women’s organisations interviewed, has been low, both among international and local key actors. To some extent the modus operandi of the international community has reflected a lack of implementation in their own spaces of the standards and goals being promoted in Kosovo. As a way of example, none of the eight Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General appointed to lead the UNMIK mission has been a woman, nor has a woman been head of any of the key international organisations working in Kosovo. Nonetheless, despite the general low level of internalisation of the gender perspective, which does not just amount to a quantitative presence, the gender dimension can be said to have been formally embedded into the political agenda, at least at the formal level, and has also resulted in practical mechanisms and procedures and, to some extent, in practical results. This, as mentioned in previous sections, has been seen as the result of a combination of local demands by women’s groups and commitments of the international community to gender-equality goals.

In order to study the gender perspective at the implementation level, two sub-levels can be identified: the level of mechanisms and instruments put in place through which to facilitate the implementation of the gender perspective, and the level of the actual implementation of these mechanisms in terms of addressing general and specific needs and achieving practical results.

With regards to the first sub-level, that of mechanisms, several achievements should be noted. According to women’s organisations and international organisations with a gender mandate interviewed for this report, a sophisticated gender machinery and gender legal framework has been put in place. It has even been depicted as the most progressive in the whole Balkan region by local and international actors. Its main legal pillar for this gender framework is the Law on Gender Equality, promulgated by UNMIK in June 2004 as Regulation No.2004/18, which aims to “preserve, treat and establish gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of the Kosovo society, providing equal opportunities for both female and male participation in the political, economic, social, cultural and other fields of social life”. It states objectives and procedures, including the establishment of a national gender machinery. The approval of a law on gender was, in turn, a recommendation of the National Action Plan on Gender (NPA), a framework document which was developed during 2002-2003 following a process of comprehensive debate initiated by local women’s groups supported by UNIFEM with the participation of a wide spectrum of stakeholders. This NPA, endorsed by the Government in 2004, served as a roadmap in which key areas of concern were assessed from a gender perspective (education, economy, politics, health and social welfare, human rights and violence against women and children, and culture), and which resulted in recommendations to be implemented. Other legal documents have preceded, complemented or developed the Gender Equality Law, such as UNMIK Regulation 2003/1 on Amending Applicable Law on Crimes related to Sexual Violence, UNMIK regulation 2003/12 on Protection against Domestic Violence, Anti-Discrimination Law (Law No.2004/3). Besides, there are strategic policy plans or guiding documents, such as the Kosovo Program on Gender Equality (2007-2013), which is still a work in progress, or the Strategy on increasing the number and position of women in PISG 2006-2015, approved by the Government in May 2006.

In a context of a post-war rehabilitation process and consequent (re)building of a whole society, giving legal status to gender framework documents implies securing a formal place for the gender perspective in the new entity being built. It also offers a legal basis to be used in the demand for the implementation of the gender perspective. Nonetheless, the...
level of responsiveness to these laws and regulations by law enforcers, the level of public awareness of the rights and commitments upheld by those legal documents, as well as the avenues for judicial remedy, fall short of the original ideas (UNFPA, 2006).

This legal pillar provided by the Gender Law is supported at the institutional level by the gender machinery put in place, following to a large extent the strategy of mainstreaming gender across policies and levels since 2003. At the municipal level, this machinery includes gender officers, which are positions at senior civil servant level which are present in all municipalities and which have propositional, awareness-raising and monitoring tasks. These gender focal points sometimes hold various responsibilities; acting simultaneously as focal points for child rights, equal opportunities and gender equality. According to local focal points, a new instruction from central government calls for the reorganisation of these focal points at municipal level, aiming to establish Offices for Human Rights, which will supposedly comprise the gender dimension, as well as a more general human rights perspective. While these local gender focal points constitute a relevant opportunity to contribute to the implementation of the gender perspective at municipal level, with successful examples such as Istok municipality, the general impact of these figures show mixed results. According to international and local staff working at the level of municipalities, there has been a great disparity of implementation of functions and the subsequent impact. Some gender officers have actively pushed forward initiatives and reviewed regulations successfully, with or without the support or even with the active resistance from the local administration, while other focal points have been largely inactive. Therefore, the following description from 2004 with regards gender focal points remains valid for a still significant number of municipalities: “[…] municipal gender officers have not been able to introduce gender concerns in the municipal agendas and have had limited interaction with decision makers and civil society. Their performance has been reduced to activities at the margins of core policies and programmes […].“(UNSG, 2004).

There are several shortcomings or obstacles hindering the potential of gender officers, such as budget limitations, lack of support from assemblies, lack of initiative by staff holding the posts, lack of coordination or knowledge-sharing with other municipalities, lack of executive power, amongst others. Gender focal points are also members of local Gender Equality Committees, another organ at municipal level, comprising assembly members. As with gender officers, the impact of those committees varies across municipalities, many of them having been largely inactive.

At a central level, the gender machinery put in place comprises a Gender Equality Commission within Kosovo’s Assembly, which functions as a sub-committee of the Committee for Judicial, Legislative Matters and Constitutional Framework, as well as a Women’s Caucus comprising of women from across the political parties represented in the Assembly, although it is an informal organ and, according to some local women’s groups, not a very active platform nowadays.

It is at the governmental level where the bulk of the national gender machinery is located. The Gender Equality Office, elevated in September 2006 to the Gender Equality Agency, the Advisory Office on Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender (located within the Office of the Prime Minister), the Inter-ministerial Council on Gender Equality and the gender officers in six ministries, constitute a comprehensive institutional chart to mainstream gender in post-war Kosovo.

Therefore, in general terms the essential instrumental basis, both legal and institutional, has been put in place. This constitutes in itself an important achievement opening the door for the implementation of the gender perspective and the potential transformation of unequal structures. Nonetheless, even at the level of institutional mechanisms there are limitations, such as the lack of an independent budget line on the side of the Gender Equality Agency or the fact that its responsibilities have not been clearly demarcated, which are two key factors for the proper functioning of this agency that still need to be put in place. Furthermore, there is the need to define proper accountability mechanisms to evaluate the development of measures promoting gender equality. Even if the Gender Equality Agency has adopted the non-mandatory habit of reporting annually on its activities and steps taken, an explicit formal requirement to do so would guarantee systematic monitoring practices irrespective of commitments by certain individuals.

The evaluation of the level of implementation of gender equality in Kosovo is complex, with no definitive conclusion. In that respect, several ideas can be put forward. First of all, there is a general sense of disappointment among local women’s organisations with regards to the implementation level. According to the groups interviewed, mechanisms exist but they are not being used so as to produce results. Their perception is that policies are not being gender-mainstreamed and that they are producing scarce practical results in terms of a positive impact on women’s lives. Therefore women (meaning the different groups of women) continue to experience higher levels of unemployment, to suffer to a larger extent the consequences of a collapsed health system, to drop out of the educational system in larger numbers than their male counterparts. Specific
factors such as poor services, lack of access to services, especially in rural areas, long distances and deficient infrastructure, and family decisions based on the prioritisation of male members’ educational needs intervene in these gender differentials. Furthermore, high levels of unemployment rates among women are accompanied by their major presence in the grey economy, with its consequent vulnerability in terms of rights. Additionally, women from ethnic minorities face even more difficulties or difficulties of a different type, such as limitations on movement that Serbian woman from Kosovo experience or the widespread discrimination in all fields and levels that Roma women experience. Of significant importance are the increasing trends since 1999 of domestic violence and the levels of human trafficking and prostitution, as well as the suicide rates among women. These trends reflect the need to adopt a gender perspective in the design of post-war rehabilitation processes, as post-war periods unleash latent conflict dynamics, such as the paradoxical double process of opening opportunities for positive changes in gender roles as well as reaffirming or strengthening gender hierarchies.

In the view of the women’s groups interviewed, even if specific policies, campaigns or projects may target women or may consist of capacity-building on gender for both women and men, the neglect of the gender perspective in the overall post-war rehabilitation process and in the overall policies being delivered (economy, trade, property, education, infrastructure, finance, culture, health, etc.) results in a lack of significant advances towards a more egalitarian society. This implies missing the opportunity to build up a society that not only deals with the issues that led to the armed conflict, but also other axes of conflict, such as gender inequality. As long as post-war needs vary across different groups of women and men (in terms of age, ethnic group, war experience, social class, etc.), the implementation of the gender perspective will contribute to a more effective and inclusive post-war rehabilitation process.

This general view of insufficient implementation of the gender perspective in post-war Kosovo is related to several factors. One of them is the perceived lack of sufficiently qualified staff within the national gender machinery, in addition to a more general disinterest in the gender perspective by the political establishment, even if not necessarily an active resistance to it. Another factor highlighted is the general stalemate of Kosovo linked to the non-resolution of its definite status. In this sense, there is the perception that the undefined status of Kosovo during these eight years has acted as a limiting factor hindering the implementation of policies in many fields, but also as an umbrella under which the local government has hidden itself justifying lack of advances due to local inability to function as a normal state while, according to women’s groups interviewed, more steps could have been taken in terms of gender equality despite the impasse in the status process.

Despite the general evaluation by women’s organisations in terms of a general lack of a gender perspective being put into practice, several considerations must be taken into account. First of all, there have been some concrete advances and steps being taken. As a way of example, the Gender Equality Agency has started to do some evaluation of draft laws since February 2006, commenting on draft laws such as those on Labour, Pension and Invalid Insurance, Termination of Pregnancy, Courts, State Aid and Rules of Procedures of the Government. Even if results are still partial and limited, this could be the start of more systematic procedures which may positively impact law-making in Kosovo and their subsequent results. Another concrete implemented measure has been the adoption of the quota system. According to the Law on Gender Equality, “unequal representation” exists “when the participation of a certain gender in a particular social field or in a segment of such fields is lower than 40%”. In practical terms, the quota requirement for central and local assemblies is fixed at 30%, a condition that is currently met in the vast majority of cases. In general terms, women’s groups consider it a partial success, agreeing with the widespread notion of the need to have a minimum critical mass of any specific group, women in this case, in order to make their voices heard.

On the other hand, changes like the transformation of gender relations, roles and expectations, take time. Therefore, while gender inequalities are still present, as shown by statistical figures regarding issues such as the levels of unemployment and salaries, the social structures sustaining them (such as patriarchy) might be gradually evolving, which cannot be isolated or delinked from the fact that women’s groups in Kosovo constitute a strong social forces demanding and promoting changes in society. Formal and instrumental achievements such as the new legal and institutional gender framework also contribute to these long-term societal changes by means of giving more visibility and institutional support to the demands of gender equity. In that sense, experts from the field of social sciences working in Kosovo interviewed for this report identify social changes taking place in the field of gender relations, with young women facing a complex position between past traditional practices and expectations which tended to subordinate women’s position in society, and new patterns of behaviour and values which extend women’s autonomy directly or indirectly. These changes can be viewed within the general social, political and economic changes that have been taking place in Kosovo in the last decades.
To sum up, while from a gender perspective there have been significant steps taken at the institutional and legal level with regards to the construction of a more inclusive society in post-war Kosovo, the implementation of the principles adopted at a formal level remain a challenge. Despite that, changes in gender relations and roles are of a long-term nature. And Kosovo is still in an incipient phase with regards to the transformation of its gender-regime. Some results in terms of social changes have already been identified by local women’s groups, which may imply that local dynamics will progressively lead to more egalitarian social structures and relations. The international community has played an ambivalent and heterogeneous role in this process, with some actors playing a more dynamic and pro-active role, while others remaining mainly at the level of formal support to gender equality. In any case, local actors will bear the main responsibility in the near future to demand and work towards the transformative goal of an inclusive post-war Kosovo. In that respect, and in a future new scenario of potential supervised independence, local institutions will have to face local demands and decide whether to accept the challenges ahead in terms of gender or to conti-
7. Conclusions

As the final decision on the status of Kosovo is about to unfold there are some concerns that should be taken into account, not just for the sake of the possible new state, but also as a set of lessons learnt for any future interventions by the international community (if any similar interventions were to be proposed).

The international intervention in Kosovo can be regarded as two-fold. On the one hand the main structures of a functioning state have indeed been put in place. This could be regarded as a success if it were not for one problem, that they have never been fully functional on their own, due in part to the specific prerogatives of the UN mission (SRSG’s reserve powers). Besides UNMIK’s specific prerogatives, Kosovo leaders blamed most of the last years’ political stalemates on the pending status resolution.

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The final resolution of the status of Kosovo is awaited for with hope by some (the Albanian Kosovars), while others, such as the Kosovo Serbs, wait for it with despair and fear. Outside Kosovo other parties involved or that could be influenced by the final decision, like some EU countries and the ex Yugoslavia Republics, have adopted a wait and see approach. Several analysts have advised against the reshaping of the Balkan borders mentioning the probability of causing instability in places like the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or in Macedonia, where there is a big Albanian majority. The final resolution of the situation will not be seen in the near future, as the European Union has announced an extended process of supervised independence. The irony is that if the situation develops according to international wishes and expectations Kosovo and Serbia will find each other together again, but this time under the flag of the European Union.

In the meantime, and for the sake of future interventions, it would be recommended highly advisable to reflect on how the situation has evolved in Kosovo since the international intervention; which the good practices were and how these could be replicated somewhere else and identifying the main mistakes and how these could be avoided in the future.

From a gender perspective, the post-war rehabilitation process has been complex and offers mixed results. On one hand, the combination of internal and external factors comprising a strong and dynamic local women’s movement and an external international community formally committed to gender-equality standards, has allowed the gender perspective to permeate somehow the post-war agenda. Positive results range from a significant process of empowerment by some sectors of local women to the establishment of a comprehensive national gender machinery which should allow the gender perspective to be reflected in the general agenda. Social changes take time and the patriarchal structures are well entrenched in Kosovo, as much as in any place around the world, but despite this the overall present stage of conflict dynamics (e.g. generational cleavages; entrepreneurial and optimistic society despite social frustration towards the political establishment) opens the door for changes to gradually take place if local actors push for them, as they are doing. In that sense, Kosovo could be said to be in an incipient phase with regards to the engendering of social and political structures and minds. Formal measures such as the gender quota or the gradual presence of women in traditionally male spaces, such as police forces, may contribute to progressively normalise the presence of women in traditional male public spaces and, ultimately, to promote gender equality.

On the other hand, despite the fact that changes regarding gender need a long-term perspective, it seems that during the relatively short period since the start of the international protectorate in Kosovo more things could have been done to promote gender equality, both by international and local actors. UNMIK and, generally, the international community, have lacked the strategic vision and political will to make the most of the opportunity created in Kosovo to implement their international gender commitments, such as the UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security. Even if some positive synergies between certain international and local actors with gender mandates have been identified, an opportunity has been missed for a more dynamic and effective broad international-local coalition to be developed and work for the promotion of gender equality by drawing on international resources and commitments and on local knowledge and legitimacy. The future withdrawal of the UN, the deployment of the EU and the potential start of an internationally supervised independence will offer a new opportunity for a solid international-local pro-gender equality coalition to be developed, although ultimately, it will be local actors who will bear the main responsibility for promoting social changes towards a more inclusive and just society and in rendering their local ruling class accountable for their actions or inactions in terms of gender. In that sense, it has been gender-aware local actors who have been at the forefront of the promotion of gender equality, lacking a proactive and consistent support from the political establishment. Therefore the devolution of power to local structures, as the future status will probably do, will open the door for more local accountability in terms of implementation of the gender commitments formally adopted by the Kosovar political institutions, as implementation of agreements and goals has remained a major challenge up to now.
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Annex I

Main events and political issues under each SRSG summarised from the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council (1999 – 2007)

1999 – SRSG – Sergio Vieira de Mello (Interim) and Bernard Kouchner

* Establishment of UNMIK.
* Demobilisation of the UÇK should have happened on 19 September 1999, as established by the Kumanpovo Military-Technical Agreement (K+90 days), but differences between COMKFOR LTGEN Jackson, SRSG Kouchner and Hashim Thaçi and Agim Çeku, representing the UÇK prevented demobilisation to occur until two days later, on 21 September, after the signature of an agreement and the adoption of Regulation 1999/8, on the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps. It is worth mentioning than while other institutions official name is in both Serbian and Albanian (many of them also English), this new institution is known by Albanian initials, which are the ones that appear on their uniforms and emblems (TMK). Most demobilisation efforts are then addressed at integrating former UÇK members into the Kosovo Police Service (through training at the Kosovo Police School) and at the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
* Establishment of the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC). This local body meets every week under the leadership of the SRSG. The participants of the KTC are representatives from the major political parties and ethnic groups. The KTC has four directorates covering health, housing, education and public services.
* Multi-ethnic governmental structures created: Four Joint Civilian Commissions under leadership or co-leadership of UNMIK operate in the health, education, energy and public utilities and post and telecommunication sectors. Although the Serbs join two, two others remain mono ethnic.
* Signature of the 15 December Agreement establishing the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS), only with Kosovo Albanian representatives (Rugova, Thaçi, Qosja). The agreement is presented thereafter for implementation to the Kosovo Serbian politicians who then refuse to participate in the JIAS.
* Establishment of a Joint interim Administration Structure (JIAS).
* Establishment of an Interim Administrative Council (IAC).
* Harassment, intimidation and attacks against minorities which results in the lack of freedom of movement and minority exodus.
* Big confrontations related to property claims. UNMIK together with the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) establish an Independent Housing and Property Directorate and a Housing and Property Claims Commission, which later on will fall under Pillar 2 responsibility.
* Completion of the Disarmament process of the KLA members and creation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), as a civil emergency unit maintaining its military ranks-structure, discipline and training with the connivance of KFOR and the SRSG.
* Graduation of the first class from the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS).
* Domestic violence and trafficking are identified by international organizations as the main problems affecting women in Kosovo.

2000 – SRSG – Bernard Kouchner

* IAC and UNMIK identify the need to have 20 interim administrative departments to co-administer Kosovo with the international structures. Each department is co-directed by a local and an international head. Three of the local co-heads are local women.
* Kosovo Serbs continue to refuse to participate in the local interim administrative bodies. One of the main reasons for this refusal is that they were not involved in its foundation and were invited to participate once they were created by KA and UNMIK. The Serbian National Council (SNC) from Gracanica (led by Bishop Artemije) joins the JIAS as an observer for an initial period of three months in April. This is done despite opposition from the Mitrovica SNC (led by Oliver Ivanović) and the Serb National Assembly (SNA). Furthermore, one Kosovo Serb is at the IAC and four more serve at the KTC.
* Limited participation of minorities within the municipal structures.
* All parallel Kosovo Albanian structures cease to exist and most of their personnel are integrated into JIAS. JIAS personnel are appointed on a quota-based participation, mainly of the three parties that signed the agreement on 15 December 1999.
* Serious deterioration of the security situation with continued widespread harassment, human rights violations, murders and forcible evictions of minorities.
**An Approach to the Kosovo Post-War Rehabilitation Process from a Gender Perspective**

* The humanitarian affairs component is phased out by mid year. The humanitarian affairs pillar ceases to exist as a formal component within the UNMIK structure at the end of June.
* Kosovo continues to have the highest unemployment rate in Europe due to the destruction of businesses and a previous discriminatory employment policy.
* A Joint Registration Task Force is established to carry out the registration of political parties.
* The registration of political parties increased.
* General elections are held in Serbia and Vojislav Kostunica ousts Slobodan Milosevic from the Belgrade Government.
* First Municipal elections take place on 28th October 2000. 5,500 candidates compete for 920 seats in 30 municipal assemblies. The voter turn out is 79 per cent, although this does not include any Kosovo Serbs and the participation of the other minorities is very low.
* The fate of missing persons and the continued detention of people from Kosovo in prisons in Serbia remain matters of deep concern.
* The Ombudsperson Institution is established by an SRSG regulation.
* Establishment of the Institute for Civil Administration. This is an independent institution established by pillar 2 as the official training body for the public sector.
* Trafficking of women for prostitution emerges as a major regional and human rights concern.
* Domestic violence continues to be a serious issue. A legislative working group initiates the drafting of laws to combat domestic violence and trafficking of women.
* UNMIK works with international and local women’s groups to promote the active participation of women voters in the municipal elections and to encourage female candidates to run for office. 500 women participate in training to run an electoral campaign and strengthen their understanding of municipal governance and electoral campaigning.
* Gender sensitive training is initiated to streamline a gender perspective throughout UNMIK. A series of gender sensitive training sessions are initiated with the help of UNDP and UNIFEM. Furthermore a network of gender focal points is identified in the JIAS departments as well as in regional and municipal offices. These focal points are responsible for initiating and implementing gender policy in their respective areas and for facilitating consultation between UNMIK and women’s organizations.

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**2001 – SRSG – Hans Haekkerup**

* Promulgation of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government which provides for a 120-seat Assembly based on proportional representation. A seven member Presidency of the Assembly will guide its work. The Assembly will elect a President who will in turn elect a Prime Minister. The SRSG will maintain full control over the Judiciary and have broad authority to intervene and correct any actions of the provisional institutions of self-government that are inconsistent with Security Council resolution 1244, including the power to veto Assembly legislation, where necessary, using the so-called Reserved powers.
* The holding of general elections with a closed list system. OSCE is in charge of the electorates’ registration process.
* No party wins enough seats to form government and there is a need to form a coalition.
* Completion of the transfer of Municipal public administration responsibilities, as foreseen in the constitutional framework.
* UNMIK launches the new Police and Justice Pillar, or Pillar 1, which realigns the UNMIK police and the Department of Justice into one structure to strengthen the fight against crime.
* Confrontation between LDK, who has the majority in 24 municipalities and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), who has the majority in three municipalities. PDK accuses LDK of monopolising power.
* Widespread violence with an ethnic basis continues to pose a threat to an unstable situation.
* The number of violent incidents against the international community increases.
* Tensions rise further in the South Eastern Serbian Valley of Presevo (known by Kosovo Albanians as Eastern Kosovo) and neighbouring areas resulting in an influx of refugees.
* Forced returns of Kosovo Albanians from Germany and Switzerland.
* Kosovo Serbs continue to refuse to engage politically.
* An outbreak of ethnic violence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia following the assassination of five Macedonian police officers by Albanian groups results in the closure of the border with Kosovo which causes a big reduction in domestic revenues.
An Approach to the Kosovo Post-War Rehabilitation Process from a Gender Perspective

* The UNMIK office of Gender Affairs in cooperation with UNIFEM and UNDP formulates the Kosovo Action Plan for the Advancement of Women for 2001-2003, which identifies the six following priorities areas for Kosovo women: education, science and culture, health care, violence against women, legislation and women’s rights and gender mainstreaming. A process for monitoring of the Plan’s implementation is also formulated.

2002 – SRSG – Michael Steiner

* Establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG).
* After several months of deadlock a coalition Government is formed and Ibrahim Rugova, LDK leader, is elected President of Kosovo, meanwhile Bajram Rexhepi (PDK) is elected Prime Minister.
* The 20 existing administrative departments are consolidated into nine transitional departments that are later transformed into 10 Ministries (although initially there were going to be nine). Each Ministry has an international advisor to advise the Minister on policy development and governance and to coordinate the international staff within the Ministry and to liaise with UNMIK.26
* UNMIK and the Belgrade Government sign a common document to guarantee the Kosovo Serbs participation in the elections. This results in the creation of a High-ranking Working Group as an official forum for dialogue between UNMIK and the PISG and the Yugoslav authorities.
* At the Municipal level UNMIK administrators are progressively handing over their responsibilities to the local authorities.
* The number of active members of the KPC is reduced from 4,300 to 3,000 before the end of the year.27
* Security and freedom of movement for minorities in Kosovo remains a serious concern. During 2002 there is a slight decline in crimes against minorities, arson and looting although the main reason for that is attributable to the fact that many members from the minority communities have already left or are living in enclaves. Despite this, ethnically motivated attacks continue to occur. Also attacks against members of the international community in Kosovo continue to increase.
* The euro becomes the main currency in Kosovo replacing the German Mark which was adopted as official currency in 2000.
* Further progress in the consolidation of the law and order structures.
* The number of Kosovo Police Service officers amounts to 4,521. Out of them 83.06 per cent are male, 16.94 per cent are women, 84.41 per cent Kosovo Albanians, 8.32 per cent Kosovo Serbs 3.54 per cent Kosovo Bosniac and 3.74 per cent from other minority communities.
* By September the Central Election Commission (CEC) registers the candidate list of all political entities. There are 68 political entities, 30 of them Kosovo-Serbian, with 5,500 candidates representing all Kosovo communities, 27 per cent of them being women.
* The President of Former Yugoslavia calls all Kosovo Serbs to participate in the Municipal elections.
* Municipal elections are held in October with a 54 per cent voter turnout. Kosovo Serb participation is only 20 per cent. This low turnout is attributed to the mixed signals receive from the Belgrade authorities and the lack of confidence of the Kosovo Serbs in the beneficial outcome of the process.
* Kosovo Albanians begin to be prosecuted for war related crimes. It will not be until 2002 that they begin to be sentenced for war related crimes.
* The advisory Office on Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunity and Gender oversees and advises the Ministries of the PISG. Its Diversity Task Force works closely with the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women to create equal opportunities and integrate the concept of non-discrimination.
* The first phase of reform of the educational system is introduced with the aim of bringing Kosovo’s educational system up to European standards.
* In some municipalities and certain Ministries, especially the areas of health, education and administrative services, Kosovo Serbs maintain their parallel administrative structures challenging the daily work of the public administration.
* UNMIK establishes an Office on Missing Persons and Forensics (OMPF) within the department of Justice and subsuming into it. The structure of the Missing Persons Unit of UNMIK Police existed since 1999.

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26 It is worth mentioning that Justice and Interior were not included in this group and were not formally integrated until the end of 2005.
27 They should have never been 4,300, because the limitation by regulation was 3,000 active and 2,000 reserve.
* In terms of economic progress imports exceed exports by a factor of 10 and the public investment programme remains heavily dependent on external donations. Unemployment and underemployment continue to be a big concern.
* UNMIK begins to issue driving licences and licence plates to control the movement of the population.
* The Institute for Civil Administration hold training programmes on “Gender and Leadership” for over 100 Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb civil servants.
* Management seminars are held for senior female staff within the public administration service.
* A benchmarks process or what is called “Standards before status” is put in place. UNMIK develops a series of progress indicators to track achievements and highlight where efforts are still needed.\(^{28}\)
* UNMIK introduces its Strategy for Sustainable Returns at the 4th donor coordination meeting for Kosovo that takes place in Brussels in November. Several participants raise the need for Kosovo to have access to loans from international financial institutions in light of declining funds from donors.

### 2003 – SRSG – Michael Steiner / From August onwards Harri Holkeri

* Efforts to establish a multiethnic civil service continue although hampered by security concerns, inter ethnic tensions in the workplace and limitations on the freedom of movement. Another constraining factor is the negative messages put out by certain Serbian Ministries and political parties. At the beginning of the year the level of minority community representation in most of the central bodies averages less than 6 per cent.
* The Government begins to distance itself publicly from some decisions, especially unpopular ones such as the raising of income taxes, even though it had agreed to it in the corresponding Council (in this case in the Economic and Fiscal Council).
* Some Kosovo Albanian cabinet members distance themselves from the benchmarks stating that the standard and status should both be pursued at the same time.
* The Serbian Prime Minister calls for final status negotiations to begin this year.
* Renewed tensions amongst the Kosovo Albanians coalition partners (LDK, PDK, AKK).
* The Serb parallel administration in the North of the city of Mitrovica reduces its parallel activities in accordance with UNMIK.
* Harassment problems in the mixed municipalities result in the walk out of the Kosovo Serbs members of the administration.
* As a result of gender requirements in the electoral legislation and the system of closed lists, 28.5 per cent of the new Municipal Assembly is made up of women representatives. A substantial improvement on the 8 per cent achieved at the 2000 elections.
* Serious crimes incidents decline slightly but grievous assaults, arson and robbery against minorities, especially Kosovo Serbs increase.
* No regular public transport service exists between areas inhabited by the minority and majority ethnic communities, except for buses that transport civil servants.
* The Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) initiates the first wave of privatization in Kosovo and approves the first 25 firms to be sold as “flagship privatizations”.
* Kosovo’s largest publicly owned enterprise, the Kosovo Energic Corporation (KEK), continues to experience significant problems making Kosovo’s inhabitants suffer daily power cuts.
* The process to transfer further responsibilities to the PISG is launched.
* The Council of Europe decentralization mission commences.
* The Senior Public Appointments Committee completes the recruitment of 80 per cent of civil servants through competitive examinations. The first female Permanent Secretary is appointed. There is a general lack of transparency in the appointment of civil servants as Chief Executive Officers and Department Directors in the municipalities. There is a perception amongst civil servants that their careers depend more on political allegiance than on professional skills.
* Employment of minorities in most public and socially owned enterprises remains low.
* Despite mechanisms in place some local press continue to issue inflammatory and sensational reports and present inaccurate or provocative information.

\(^{28}\) See annex 2.
* Ethnic violence and crime increase again after a decrease in December 2002. 2003 is the first year of which no outburst of violence occurs in Mitrovica, Presevo or FYROM during the Spring. *Minority communities are still not able to use their language and alphabet throughout Kosovo. This provision is only fully respected in the Assembly of Kosovo. The personal names of non-Albanians are “albanised” in official documents. * There are problems making the KPC a multi-ethnic body due to the fact that the majority of its members come from the KLA and there are public declarations by Kosovo Albanian leaders and KPC members that this group is on its way to becoming the army of an “independent Kosovo”. 29 * Two Inter-Ministerial working groups on Gender equality and Disabilities are established by the Prime Minister’s Office. The newly established Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Gender considers the employment of gender advisers within each ministry with a view to, inter alia, initiating programmes for the further promotion of female participation within the ministries. * Seven additional Gender Equality Committees have been established in the municipalities since April. These committees consist mainly of Municipal Assembly members and civil society representatives. * There are a total of 359 local judges, 46 local prosecutors and 1,337 local court support staff. In the local judiciary, Kosovo Serbs represent 4.8 per cent of all judges and other minorities, including Turkish, Bosniak and Roma represent 5.4 per cent. There is only one Kosovo Serb prosecutor and three from other minority communities. Women constitute approximately 23.6 per cent of the total judiciary. * At the Kosovo Police Service women constitute 15.29 per cent of the 5,207 police officers. Most of which, mainly men almost 80%—come from KLS ranks. * Trafficking and prostitution continues to be one of the main areas of organised crime activities. * Leaders of Pristina and Belgrade agree that dialogue should begin and the SRSG begin to discuss the possibilities of direct talks with the Serbian Prime Minister. The direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on practical issues is one of the benchmarks required within the “Standards before status” approach. * The “Standards before status” continues to be the guiding principle of the UNMIK during this period. * The representation of women at a professional level in the public sector improves. A position of Municipal Gender Officer is established in each of the 30 municipalities as a senior civil servant, funded under the Kosovo consolidated budget. This position is also included at the executive level in six ministries. * A Gender Equality Commission begins to operate in the Assembly. * A draft law on gender equality is introduced in the Assembly. * The record of hiring women at senior and managerial position continues to be poor. * The dialogue on practical issues between Belgrade and Pristina is officially launched in Vienna on 14 October. The dialogue is organised into working groups of experts to discuss four key areas: energy, the missing, returns and transport and communications.

2004 – SRSG – Harri Holkeri / From August onwards Soren Jessen-Petersen

* The SRSG and the Kosovo Prime Minister launch the document “Standards for Kosovo”. This document clearly set out the standards that Kosovo should meet. There is also a mechanism put in place to review the progress of the PISG towards meeting the benchmarks. * Five working groups will cover the review of the eight benchmarks and will work on the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan. Kosovo Serb political leaders did not work on the document and the Government of Serbia rejected Kosovo Serb participation in it alleging it was a road map for Kosovo independence. * Minorities continue to be excluded from employment, especially in the civil service. * The presence of women in legislative bodies reflects only the minimum legal requirements for gender representation in electoral lists, with 33 out of 120 seats in the Kosovo Assembly and 28 per cent of all municipal assembly seats occupied by women. * In the public sector, there is only 1 woman minister out of 10 ministers, 1 woman permanent secretary out of 9 permanent secretaries, 7 women out of 18 parliamentary committee heads, and only 2 women out of 30 chief executive officers in municipalities. * Preparations for the Kosovo wide Assembly elections. * In 17-18-19 March there are riots orchestrated by Kosovo Albanians against Kosovo Serbs, Ashkali and Roma. The attacks occur throughout Kosovo and involve mainly established communities that have been in Kosovo since 1999. There are attacks on places of worship and cultural heritage sites.

* According to international workers interviewed, Serb members of the KPC were “invited” not to come to work and disciplinary processes against Serb members of unauthorised absence followed (initiated at KFOR and signed by UNMIK’s KPC Coordinator—a UK General).
The attacks are the result of other violent incidents that occurred earlier which were made worse by the inflammatory and biased media that covered the events.

* The document on the progress of standards is modified on March 31st, after the riots, and the planned reduction of KFOR troops is re-evaluated, although the numbers remain.
* Municipalities fail to respond to the crises and do not take timely measures to contain or prevent the violence.
* Inter-ethnic relations at the local level are severely damaged.
* Operational responsibility for running the Assembly elections in 2004 is for the first time entrusted to the people of Kosovo. A multi-ethnic Central Election Commission is created to conduct the elections.
* A Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo is promulgated in June. It foresees the establishment of an Office for Gender Equality, which will be mandated to coordinate activities with the Advisory Office on Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender Issues of the Prime Minister’s Office. It also contemplates the creation of a dedicated capacity to address issues of gender-based discrimination within the Office of the Ombudsperson.
* Inclusion of the position of Municipal Gender Officer within the Kosovo consolidated budget.
* Domestic violence remains one of the major obstacles for the exercise of women’s human rights and the enhancement of local development.
* Municipal Assembly, Mayors and Parliamentary Elections This is the first time mayors are directly elected through an open list system. Elections to the Kosovo Assembly took place without Kosovo Serb participation. LDK and AAK formed a coalition government.
* UNMIK and the PISG prepare a framework to reform the local government with the aim of safeguarding the vital interests of minority communities.
* Kai Eide is appointed by the Secretary General to conduct a comprehensive review of the policies and practices of all actors in Kosovo.

2005 – SRSG – Soren Jessen-Petersen

* Prime Minister, Ramush Haradinaj, is indicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and has to resign. He is replaced by Bajram Kosumi.
* Confrontations between the coalition parties in Government and the opposition parties grow.
* Kosovo Serb participation at the political level remains low with only one Kosovo Serb minister, the Minister of Returns and Communities.
* The dialogue of practical matters related to cultural and heritage issues advances with the willingness of the Serbian Government to establish a dialogue in this regard.
* There are some improvements on freedom of movement for minorities.
* None of the standards has been fulfilled. Ambassador Kai Eide continues evaluating its progress. He presents his report favourable to the start of talks on status in December 2005.
* The establishment of the Office of Gender Affairs is still pending.
* Specific provisions on gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment are incorporated into new draft codes of conduct for judges, prosecutors and lay judges.
* According to a technical assessment of the standards, the Law on Inheritance needs a gender equality perspective.
* The Security Council launches a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status as foreseen in resolution 1244. Martti Ahtisaari is appointed as the Special Envoy for the status process.
* President Ibrahim Rugova establishes the Kosovo negotiating team, comprising himself, the Prime Minister, the President of the Assembly and the leaders of the two main Kosovo Albanian opposition parties.
* A women’s caucus is established including all parties and minority community members.
* Laws significantly affecting women, such as those on the family and inheritance, continue to be drafted and adopted without consultation with women’s groups.
* Women hold 27 per cent of jobs in central ministries and 26 per cent of municipality jobs, including a high proportion of non-professional grades. Representation of women at senior levels remains negligible.
* The Kosovo Police Service and the Kosovo Correctional Service remain formally multiethnic. Of the total number of police officers, 15.2 per cent are from minority communities, with more than 20 per cent of higher ranking officers coming from minority groups. Women’s participation in rule of law institutions compares favourably with the region: 50 per cent of court liaison officers, 75 per cent
of victims advocates, 45 per cent of the professional staff of the Judicial Inspection Unit, 17 per cent of correctional staff, 30 per cent of judges, 18 per cent of prosecutors and 14 per cent of police.

* Violence against women and children, trafficking and other forms of exploitation continue at high levels in Kosovo.
* Minority recruitment and retention efforts need to continue. Women comprise 2.9 per cent of the active KPC force (3.5 per cent of the reserve). Minority communities and women need encouragement from their own communities to join KPC.
* Civil society continue to participate in the work of the Assembly through public hearings on four draft laws. Women participate in all Assembly Committees.
* The Law on the Family adopted by the Assembly needs revising for compliance with international instruments for the protection of women’s human rights

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<tr>
<th>2006 – SRSG – Soren Jessen-Petersen. From August onwards Joachim Rucker</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Security situation continues to be fragile and unstable.</td>
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<td>* Progress on the implementation of the standards continues to be slow.</td>
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<td>* The status talks process begins.</td>
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<td>* In February 2006 President, Ibrahim Rugova, passed away and is replaced by Fatmir Sejdiu after his election by the General Assembly.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Prime Minister, Bajram Kosumi, resigns and is replaced by Agim Ceku, former Head of the Kosovo Protection Corps with the support of the Alliance for the future of Kosovo (AAK).</td>
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<tr>
<td>* The approach of the new Government leaders is more proactive towards the inclusion of minorities. Despite this, Kosovo Serbs participation in the governance structures of Kosovo remains marginal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* The Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija demands that Kosovo Serb municipal employees choose either to be on the payroll of parallel structures sponsored by Belgrade or to be on the payroll of the Provisional Institutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* UNMIK continues to transfer further competences to the PISG particularly in the areas of rule of law and justice. Competences are not transferred, only the ministries are established, but only the formal aspects of justice, corresponding to the former Department of Judicial Administration, formerly subordinated to the Ministry of public services becomes “autonomous”. Justice and the commanding structures of Police, remain in the hands of UNMIK.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* The Contact Group states that an international civilian and military presence will be required in Kosovo for some time in order to: carry out functions such as supervision of compliance with provisions of a future status settlement; ensure security and protection of minorities; and monitor and support the continued implementation of the standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The overall number of refugees and internally displaced persons returning to Kosovo continues to be very low, especially the return of Kosovo Serbs.</td>
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<td>* An Office of Gender Equality is established within the Office of the Prime Minister.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* According to the Office of Gender Equality data women hold 27 per cent of jobs in central ministries and 26 per cent of municipality jobs, including a high proportion of non-professional grades.</td>
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<td>* The gender affairs units are put under the control of the Kosovo Police Service.</td>
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<td>* A gender equality board and two gender coordinators within each KPC unit are appointed. KPC will be represented in the Inter-Ministerial Working Group for the Achievement of Gender Equality.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* The European Union begins to prepare for a possible leading role in the police and justice sector.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* The political process to determine the future status of Kosovo is the driving force behind all major political and policy developments in Kosovo during most of the year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Kosovo negotiating team produces inter alia detailed proposals for decentralization and a plan for the future governance of Mitrovica. The team’s Communities Council, led by an opposition party leader, pays several visits to Kosovo Serb areas and consults with most ethnic minority community leaders over the past months. There is no direct participation of minority representatives in the work of the negotiating team, however (with the exception of the Bosniak-minority Minister of Health, who has taken part in the future status talks) and the team does not include women members.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* The Belgrade delegation to the future status talks includes some Kosovo Serb representatives.</td>
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<td>* The Government approves on 3 May a long-term strategy to increase the number and improve the position of women in the Provisional Institutions, drafted by the Office of Gender Equality.</td>
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</table>
An Approach to the Kosovo Post-War Rehabilitation Process from a Gender Perspective

* Serbia issues a new Constitution which describes Kosovo as a part of Serbia. This is heavily criticized in a statement put out by the Kosovo Assembly.

* SRSG begins preparations for a potential departure of the mission following an eventual political settlement.

* Implementation of a long-term strategy to increase the number and improve the position of women in the Provisional Institutions, draft by the Office of Gender Equality and approved by the Government on 3 May, begins with training and the gathering of statistics.

* The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and KPS begins gender-awareness training for KPC officer courses on 21 October, continuing a tradition of cooperation between UNIFEM and KPC in that area.

2007 – SRSG – Soren Jessen-Petersen. From August onwards Joachim Rucker

* Martti Ahtisaari submits a draft comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo status settlement (“Settlement Proposal”) to the parties on 2nd of February. He invites the parties to engage in a consultative process on the Settlement Proposal in the first week of February.

* A number of concerns are voiced on its contents such as the proposed disbandment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and decentralization, followed by the establishment of a Kosovo Force, where the members of the disbanded KPC would find a place (according to Ahtisaari’s proposal).

* Kosovo Serbs continue to take very little part in the political institutions in Kosovo.

* There is a relatively small number of potentially destabilizing incidents in comparison with previous years.

* The basic reference document on standards implementation, the 2004 Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, is replaced by the European Partnership Action Plan, approved by the Government in August 2006. The 109 standards goals contain in the original Implementation Plan are all incorporated into the Action Plan, but the actions agreed in 2004 have been updated and revised to reflect current challenges and to respond to both the standards goals and the European partnership priorities. As a result, the Agency for European Integration is now the main coordination mechanism within the Provisional Institutions on standards, and the European Partnership Action Plan is the main guiding tool for Kosovo’s European integration process. It is expected that the European integration process will remain a Kosovo Government priority for the foreseeable future, which will ensure that the principles underlying the standards programme will be preserved and promoted beyond the life of UNMIK.

* Decentralization continues to be a contentious issue in the context of the status process. Although the Kosovo negotiating team has improved its communication with The municipalities to explain their proposals for new municipalities, it has faced criticism from those living in affected areas and others who perceive decentralization as a means of establishing the territorial control of Belgrade over Kosovo Serb-majority areas.

* In addition, the establishment of new municipalities should be synchronized with the holding of new municipal elections, which were postponed because of the status process.
### Annex II

**Goals and benchmarks of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo**

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<tr>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>Functioning democratic institutions*</th>
<th>Rule of law (Police/Judiciary)</th>
<th>Freedom of movement</th>
<th>Returns and reintegration</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Property rights</th>
<th>Dialogue with Belgrade</th>
<th>Kosovo Protection Corps</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td>Democratic governance and efficient delivery of public service</td>
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<td><strong>Benchmarks</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Full compliance with and implementation of Resolution 1244 (1999) and the constitutional framework</strong></td>
<td>Multi-ethnicity, tolerance, security and fairness under normal conditions, without special measures</td>
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*UNMIK = United Nations Mission in Kosovo

**Notes:**
- UNMIK = United Nations Mission in Kosovo
- Rule of law (Police/Judiciary): Sustained and consistent action by UNMIK to promote and enforce the rule of law, ensuring fair and impartial administration of justice.
- Freedom of movement: All Kosovo inhabitants have the right to return and freely choose their place of residence in Kosovo through free and safe movement, including transfer of personal and immovable property.
- Returns and reintegration: All Kosovo refugees and displaced persons, including returnees, have the right to return to their property, including other socially owned assets, with full security of property.
- Economy: Adherence to sound institutional and legal basis for a market economy, budget transparency, and fair treatment of businesses.
- Property rights: Respect for property rights and protection against illegal expropriation.
- Dialogue with Belgrade: Active engagement of Kosovo institutions in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.
- Kosovo Protection Corps: Support to establishment of solid economic framework to secure investment, special economic zone for return and repatriation, adequate allocation of budget resources, support to establishment of solid economic framework to secure investment, special economic zone for return and repatriation, adequate allocation of budget resources, and support to establishment of solid economic framework to secure investment, special economic zone for return and repatriation.
School for a Culture of Peace

The School for a Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau) was founded in 1999 with the objective of organising a variety of academic and research activities related to the culture of peace, the prevention and transformation of conflicts, disarmament and the promotion of human rights.

The School for a Culture of Peace is principally financed by the Generalitat de Catalunya [autonomous government of Catalonia] via the Catalan Development Cooperation Agency, part of the Secretariat for Foreign Cooperation, and the Department for Universities, Research and the Information Society. It also receives support from other departments within the Generalitat and from local councils, foundations and other entities. The School for a Culture of Peace is run by Vicenç Fisas, who holds the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

The main activities run by the School for a Culture of Peace include:

* A Post-graduate Course on Culture of Peace (post-graduate programme consisting of 230 classroom hours and 70 places).
* Elective subjects: “Peace culture and conflict management” and “Educating for peace and in conflicts”.
* Awareness-raising and conflict intervention initiatives to facilitate dialogue amongst the parties involved in a conflict.
* The Human Rights Programme, which monitors the international status of human rights, and especially the thematic fields currently setting the world agenda, such as the influence of terrorism on the enjoyment of individual rights and corporate social responsibility.
* The Programme on Education for Peace, which strives to promote and develop knowledge, values and skills for education for peace.
* The Programme on Music, Arts and Peace, which focuses on research into the contribution made to peacebuilding by the arts.
* The Disarmament Programme, which works on various issues in the area of disarmament, with special emphasis on micro-disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes for combatants, and is also monitoring weapons exports.
* The Conflicts and Peacebuilding Programme, which undertakes daily monitoring of the international situation in the realms of armed conflicts, situations of tension, humanitarian crises, development and gender, in order to issue its annual report “Alert!” plus fortnightly, monthly and quarterly reports.
* The Peace Processes Programme, which monitors and analyses the different countries with peace processes or formalised negotiations underway and also those with negotiations still in the exploratory phase. This programme includes the “Colombia Project”, devoted to giving greater visibility to the peace initiatives in Colombia.
* The Post-war Rehabilitation Programme, which monitors and analyses international aid in terms of peacebuilding in wartime and post-war situations.

School for a Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau)
Facultat Ciències Educació, Edifici G-6
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
08193 Bellaterra (Spain)
Tel.: (+34) 93 581 24 14/93 581 27 52; Fax: (+34) 93 581 32 94
Email: alerta.escolapau@pangea.org
Web: www.escolapau.org