US President Barack Obama informed Afghan President Hamid Karzai that he had asked the Pentagon for a plan to fully withdraw all international troops from Afghanistan in late 2014 due to Karzai’s refusal to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that would provide for reducing the amount of US soldiers in the country after 2014. Obama has stated that it is still possible to reach an agreement and he will negotiate with Karzai’s successor after the elections in April. However, the US has also said that the longer it takes to achieve a deal, the weaker it will be and the smaller scope it will have. Obama’s decision came after a secret meeting was held between the Afghan government and the Taliban insurgency in Dubai, which apparently helped to further erode the already deteriorated relations between both governments. Karzai has refused to sign the BSA and has demanded the release of Taliban leaders to conduct negotiations, signalling that his signature depends on US cooperation for the Taliban to join the negotiating table. Sources close to Karzai said that the meeting had still not produced any results and the Taliban insurgency denied that the meeting ever took place. (The New York Times, 03, 25/02/14; Pajhwok, 06/02/14; Reuters, 04/02/14; BBC, 25/02/14)

In late February, at least 20 bodies of people that had been executed were found in the centre of Bangui, bringing the number of fatalities to 1,251 since December. The bodies of the victims, Christians and Muslims executed by gunshot or machete, were recovered by the Red Cross, which said that the real death count was much higher because the figure did not include killings perpetrated elsewhere in the country. Moreover, 19 soldiers of the African mission to the country, MISCA, have been killed since December. The mission, which has been criticised for its inefficiency and the partiality of some of its members, especially the Chadian contingent, came under strong pressure on the ground. The Chadian contingent is the main target of attacks, as 13 of the 19 soldiers killed came from that country. The population links the Chadian contingent to the Muslim civilians and Séléka fighters, some of whom come from Chad, and reports circulated claiming that the Chadian contingent had collaborated with Séléka. Furthermore, France extended its mission in the country. The UN Security Council approved to send a UN mission to replace the African one, but its creation was stopped by the US Congress’ expenditure cap on funding a new United Nation mission. (Jeune Afrique, 12 and 25-27/02/14)

Clashes between the police and what the Chinese government described as a terrorist cell caused the death of 15 people, including 11 assailants, two police officers and two civilians. This episode of violence took place in the prefecture of Aksu (near the border with Kirgizstan), a region where 12 other people were killed in late January. Specifically, three people were killed by three explosive devices, while the other nine were shot to death by state security forces. Some Uyghur organisations said that these last two episodes of violence could have been in response to the central government’s increased militarisation in the province of Xinjiang. These attacks also occurred a few weeks after the Chinese Foreign Ministry travelled to Afghanistan to strengthen bilateral security relations. According to various analysts, Beijing is increasingly concerned about the effects that the planned withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2014 may have on the stability of Xinjiang and China, which is why it is stepping up its involvement in promoting stability and security in Central Asia. (Radio Free Asia, 14/02/14; International Business Times, South China Morning Post, 14/02/14)

Violence continued to escalate in the southern region of DR Congo as it has since October 2013, when various armed groups acting under the umbrella militia group Mai Mai Kata Katanga began to burn down entire villages systematically, forcibly displacing at least 400,000 people. Different separatist groups began fighting with the Congolese Army and executed various local leaders around two years ago, when a regional Mai Mai leader escaped from captivity where he had been held since 2007. The displaced population depends on humanitarian aid, which has great trouble reaching the zone affected by violence, known as the Triangle of Death, framed by the towns of Pweto, Mitwaba and Manono, a region of around 20,000 square kilometres. The MONUSCO has expressed its willingness to boost its presence on the ground to protect the humanitarian convoys. Some of the armed groups’ claims are legitimate, according to various analysts, in this massively underdeveloped region in a province where important mineral resources are mined and where there are hardly any schools or health facilities. The Congolese government has important allies in the region and on occasion regional leaders have used these groups for their own benefit. (IRIN, 4, 18 and 27/02/14)

Three South Korean citizens and an Egyptian citizen were killed in an explosive attack on a bus in the Sinai Peninsula, the first of its kind against tourists in the country in a decade (or at least in the last three years, according to other sources). Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the radical Islamist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, which considered it part of an “economic war” against current Egyptian authorities. According to press reports, the organisation issued an ultimatum for foreign tourists to leave the country. Various analysts said this meant that the Sinai-based militants had decided to expand their aims after focusing their attacks on Egyptian security forces in recent months. These attacks have intensified since the ouster of Islamist President Mohamed Mursi and have involved bombings and the murder of police officers and soldiers in Sinai and other areas, including Cairo. The group’s most spectacular feats have included a bomb attack against a general police headquarters in Cairo and the downing of an Egyptian Air Force helicopter with a surface-to-air missile in Sinai in late January. The second attack (which triggered an Egyptian Army offensive in early February that killed 13 militia members) was considered evidence of the escalation of the conflict and of the challenge posed by the militant groups operating in the area, which have obtained sophisticated weapons coming from Libya. Analysts have stressed that the Egyptian government is still trying to link episodes of violence in the country to the Muslim Brotherhood as a way to justify its campaign to persecute the organisation, which it declared a “terrorist” group in late 2013. After the change of government in the country following the surprise resignation of the cabinet on 24 February, the new Prime Minister, Ibrahim Mahlab, announced that he would stamp out terrorism in Egypt. At the end of the month, an Egyptian court sentenced 26 people to death in absentia for forming a terrorist group and planning an attack on the Suez Canal. (BBC, 27/01/14 and 01, 17, 18, 26/02/14; New York Times, 16/02/14; Foreign Policy, 24/02/14)

Escalating violence in the province of Anbar that began in late 2013 with armed clashes between security forces and armed groups linked to al-Qaeda forced nearly 50,000 families to leave their homes. According to UNHCR estimates, a total of 300,000 people were forcibly displaced in the first six weeks of 2014, causing a great humanitarian emergency. This is the greatest forced displacement due to violence since the most critical point of the armed conflict in Iraq, the period from 2006 to 2008, and joins the 1.1 million internally displaced people that have still been unable to return to their homes since the war began in 2003. Iraqi security forces attempted to regain control of Ramadi and Fallujah, which had been captured by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Most of the displaced people fled to other parts of the province of Anbar, the largest in Iraq, which borders on Syria, while around 60,000 people sought refuge in more distant provinces. Meanwhile, the armed conflict in Iraq continued to claim the lives of many people. According to a UN body count, 773 (618 civilians and 115 members of the security forces) were killed and another 1,229 people were injured in January alone, not including the fatalities resulting from fighting in Anbar. According to official sources, more than one thousand people were killed, which would make January 2014 the bloodiest month in the last six years. Many acts of violence continued to be reported throughout February in the form of clashes, explosive attacks and suicide attacks. (UN News, 11/02/14; IRIN, 05/02/14; BBC, 12/02/14)

The armed group Boko Haram continued to perpetrate various attacks in northeast Nigeria that killed over 200 people in February. The most prominent acts of violence during the month include the killing of 39 people (including three children) in the town of Kondunga in Borno State, where a mosque and more than a thousand homes were destroyed; the massacre of 106 people in the town of Izghe (Borno) (military forces had withdrawn from the area after an attack that claimed the life of nine soldiers); and the suicide attack and subsequent armed assault by Boko Haram on the border town of Bama, which left another 60 people dead. The attack on Bama took place a day after the President’s spokesman ensured that the Nigerian Army was “winning the war” against Boko Haram. Other serious incidents occurred during the second half of February, such as a new attack in the city of Izghe, the murder of between 29 and 42 adolescents (according to different sources) at a rural school in Yobe State in another attack attributed to Boko Haram and the killing of another 37 people at the end of the month in Adamawa State, in yet another action ascribed to the group. According to local sources, in Borno State alone, 500 people were killed in attacks perpetrated by militia members since the beginning of 2004. In this context, local leaders and segments of the population expressed their indignation that the security forces failed to prevent or act on these attacks. Authorities in the states most affected by the violence (Borne, Yobe and Adamawa, where states of emergency have been in effect since mid-2013) requested extraordinary measures from the government, such as more troops and supplies to deal with Boko Haram. President Goodluck Jonathan responded to the criticism and defended the actions of the security forces, ensuring that the struggle against Boko Haram would improve. In mid-January, the President ordered a total change in the leadership of the Nigerian Armed Forces and suggested in public statements that the fight against Boko Haram had been affected by divisions in the security forces. (BBC, 29/01/14 and 12, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27/02/14; New York Times, 13, 17/02/14)

After various weeks of meetings between a negotiating delegation representing the government and another intermediary party with the Taliban insurgency, several attacks claimed by different Taliban factions, particularly the killing of 23 soldiers that had been captive since 2010, caused the Pakistani government to cancel the negotiations. On 30 January, the Pakistani Prime Minister had announced the formation of a four-person committee to conduct peace negotiations with the Taliban insurgency and the political shura (committee) of the armed opposition group TTP appointed various intermediaries to negotiate. Both parties had agreed that they would discuss the parameters of the Constitution, that the agreements would only be applicable to tribal areas affected by the armed conflict, that both parties would cease armed activity that could jeopardise the talks, though without reaching a formal ceasefire agreement, and that the negotiations would not last a long time. They also held a direct high-level meeting between the governmental committee and the Taliban leadership. However, the Pakistani government cancelled the process after the attacks and declared that it was preparing a large-scale military operation on North Waziristan. (Dawn, 02, 18, 26/02/14; The Express Tribune, 30/01/14, 03, 06, 12, 13, 20, 26/02/14; Washington Post, 25/02/14; BBC, 20/02/14)

Within weeks of signing an important agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF on sharing power in Mindanao, various episodes of violence raised tensions in the region. The most significant incident was the battle between the Armed Forces and the BIFF (a MILF splinter group opposed to the current negotiating process) in the province of Maguindanao, in which 37 members of the BIFF were reportedly killed. One of the arguments that the government used to justify this offensive in Maguindanao was that the leader of the BIFF, Ameril Umbra Kato, was hiding in MILF strongholds in which state security forces and bodies could not operate due to the cessation of hostilities agreement and the peace process involving both parties. Furthermore, fresh clashes were reported between MILF combatants and joint contingents of community militia and MNLF fighters in late February. Certain MNLF factions also voiced their opposition to the peace process involving Manila and the MILF. However, many of the clashes that have been reported in recent years between the MILF and the MNLF have been more linked to personal and family matters or land issues than to ideological or strategic disagreements between the groups. Another matter that increased tension in Mindanao was the arrest of one of the main MILF leaders and commander of the group’s 118 Base Command in Maguindanao. Upon his release after three days of detention for various murders, the MILF said that some of its members with legal cases pending would enjoy immunity to avoid misunderstandings that could adversely affect the progress of the peace negotiations. (Philippine Star, 20 and 26/02/14; Inquirer.net, 09/02/14; Channel News Asia, 26/02/14)

The internal crisis between the Ukrainian government and the social and political opposition hit a turning point in February, with serious levels of violence and the departure of President Viktor Yanukovich, in a conflict with multiple dimensions, including internal struggles for political and economic power and projection of the rivalry between Euro-Atlantic institutions and Russia. In mid-February, the opposition cleared out government buildings occupied in January, a condition included in the amnesty law passed at the end of the month, and several hundred people detained since December were released. There were new protests and clashes between police and protestors that killed 18 people on 18 February, including seven police officers, while Kiev City Hall was captured by demonstrators. Despite a truce between the parties, 20 February was the most violent day in Ukraine in decades, with new protests and heavy repression of them with firearms that left at least 77 people dead. It was documented that snipers were deployed to shoot protestors. As the situation deteriorated, the government and opposition reached an agreement facilitated by a European delegation (Germany, France and Poland) backed by Russia and ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament that provided for a unity government, restoration of the 2004 Constitution, constitutional reform and early elections at the end of the year. Tension continued in the streets despite the agreement, with opposition demonstrators deeply mistrustful of it, considering it insufficient, and new occupations of buildings. On 22 February, demonstrators captured the presidency building. Yanukovich fled and denounced a coup d’état. He was removed from office by Parliament, which appointed an interim President, an ally of opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko, who was released after languishing in prison since 2011. Parliament also appointed the rest of the interim posts and passed a resolution to hold elections in May. The Ukrainian Army and security forces said that they would not interfere in political matters. Meanwhile, anti-Yanukovich self-defence groups maintained their positions in their areas of influence while in areas with Russian-speaking majorities (east and south), rival militias boosted their numbers and demonstrations increased on both sides. Tensions soared in Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea, a Russian-majority region transferred from the former USSR to Ukraine in 1954 and where Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is based. Crimea witnessed protests by both rival sectors and armed men seized the seat of the regional government and Parliament on 27 February, where they raised the Russian flag on a day when the Crimean MPs dismissed the local government and passed a resolution calling for a referendum to expand its autonomy in May. Meanwhile, Russia put its troops in two military districts on alert and ordered emergency military manoeuvres on Russian soil. Furthermore, the Ukrainian government denounced that Russian troops had deployed to the airport in Sevastopol (Crimea), blocking it. Russia denied the claim. Besides, pro-Russian armed men captured a second large airport in Crimea at Simferopol. (BBC, Reuters, 1-28/2/14)

The chronic political crisis in the country worsened, triggered by protests in early February against the collapse of several privatised state companies in the town of Tuzla, which were followed by demonstrations in more than thirty cities against corruption and in support of improving the population’s quality of life. The demonstrations went on for weeks and mostly took place in cities in the Muslim-Croat Federation, although there were also some smaller protests in the Bosnian Serb region (Republika Srpska). In any case, the demonstrations were not sectarian in nature, but were linked to political mismanagement of resources and the lack of social welfare. Still, Bosnian Serb politicians claimed that the protests were aimed at destabilising the Republika Srpska and repeated in late February that the way to solve Bosnia’s problems was to dissolve it. Some protests at the start of the month resulted in clashes between demonstrators and police and attacks on canton and state government buildings, leading to several hundred people wounded and dozens arrested. Human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch urged impartial investigations into the use of excessive force by the security forces. The police announced an investigation into the events. The prime ministers of four canton governments resigned after the protests. Segments of the population participating in the demonstrations created public discussion (“plenary”) forums in various cities. The Parliament of the Canton of Sarajevo accepted the demands of the local public forum to form a government of experts and adopt measures to lower rulers’ salaries and limit other economic privileges, in addition to reviewing all privatisation agreements. Furthermore, the police warned that there could be massive protests in March, when the previous ones would be a month old. The tension caused by the protests hit a country affected in recent years by political paralysis due to internal divisions within the main party coalitions, disagreements between sub-state authorities and the state government and troubled relations with the international community overseeing the post-war period. All this came in a context of great public disaffection with politicians, high levels of corruption, unemployment and precarious standards of living. (Balkan Insight, BBC, 1-27/2/14)

A crisis broke out in the government of Burundi due to the removal of the Vice President of the country, Bernard Busokoza, who was in conflict with the Minister of the Interior, Edouard Nduwimana. Previously, Nduwimana had forced out the chairman of the UPRONA party for attempting to place an ally closer to the ruling party, the CNDD-FDD, in the leadership of the organisation. Busokoza overruled his Interior Minister, but the country’s President, Pierre Nkurunziza, supported Nduwimana’s dismissal of Busokoza, who was also in deep disagreement with the head of state over a proposed constitutional reform that would allow him to extend his term. Busokoza had been appointed Vice President in October 2013 to replace another Vice President close to the government. Three other ministers of the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA minority party decided to leave the government to demonstrate their rejection of the pressure and influence that Nkurunziza wields in his party, the CNDD-FDD. Thus, the Tutsi UPRONA party announced it was leaving the government and rejected the new appointments made by Nkurunziza from an UPRONA faction close to the government to maintain ethno-political balances in the government as required by the Constitution that arose from the accords that ended the war in the country. Nkurunziza’s plans to run in the next presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015 have generated widespread opposition to the ruling party, the CNDD-FDD. (Reuters, 17-18/02/14; Jeune Afrique, 02, 05/02/14)

The interim President of Guinea-Bissau, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, signed a decree that postpones the parliamentary and presidential elections once again, from March to April 2014. The elections form part of the transition road map following the military coup in 2012. According to the President, the decision was made after consulting with political stakeholders, the transitional government and the electoral commission. The PAIGC party, which has traditionally ruled and whose candidate won the first round of the 2012 elections, after which the Army carried out a coup d’état, said that it did not object to the new scheduled date. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council expressed its concern about the continuous delays and urged local stakeholders and the international community to redouble their efforts to prepare for the elections. In addition, the UN’s Special Envoy to Guinea-Bissau urged the Security Council to consider imposing sanctions on anyone that tries to jeopardise the upcoming general elections. (UN, Reuters, 23, 26/02/14)

The meeting between the armed opposition groups and the Burmese government to announce the date to sign a nationwide ceasefire agreement was postponed until March. The meeting, which should take place in Hpa-an (capital of Karen State), had been delayed previously on various occasions. The armed groups, which submitted a draft of the ceasefire agreement to the government, said that there were still some differences that had to be worked on more, such as the government’s proposal to integrate the insurgents into the Burmese Armed Forces and its request that they reveal the numbers of troops, weapons and munitions under rebel control. Moreover, disagreements and disputes over power arose among the insurgent groups during the negotiations, 14 of which were grouped into the National Ceasefire Coordination Team. Some groups’ refusal to participate in the negotiations (like the Wa armed group, the Palaung militia and the RCSS, for example), also put the future of the ceasefire agreement in danger, as did the sporadic clashes that took place between the Burmese Army and armed groups with which bilateral agreements had been signed. Government sources said that Aung San Suu Kyi was scheduled to participate in the meeting at Hpa-an. (The Irrawaddy, 29/01/14; 07 and 21/02/14)

The UN’s Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group published a report revealing that the federal government had committed systematic abuses and allowed arms obtained by Somali authorities after the partial lifting of the arms embargo imposed on the country to end up in the hands of the armed Islamist group al-Shabaab. The group said that it was very difficult to quantify the volume of the diverted arms and recommended restoring the full arms embargo on the country, which was active from 1992 to March 2013, and whose lifting caused a major division in the UN Security Council. The whereabouts of arms shipments from Uganda, Djibouti and Ethiopia was unknown. The report identified two sub-clans, one of them close to the President, linked to government structures that were diverting and distributing arms to parallel security forces and clan militias that did not form part of the security forces. Meanwhile, clashes continued in the central and southern parts of the country between the al-Shabaab, the African AMISOM mission and Somali security forces and militias. A car bomb attack caused the death of 12 people at the headquarters of the country’s intelligence services, in addition to the nine assailants, highlighting the fragility of the country’s security forces. The victims also included senior security officials. In another military action, al-Shabaab executed three women separately for forming part of the government or collaborating with foreign troops. (Garowe Online, 21, 25 and 27/02/14; Reuters, 12/02/14)

The political dispute within the government in 2013 that led to the violent conflict that broke out in mid-December between President Salva Kiir and his former Vice President Riek Machar has caused thousands of fatalities, forcibly displaced 863,000 people and sparked a grave humanitarian crisis that has made 3.7 million people dependent on humanitarian aid, according to OCHA. The United Nations asked for 1.3 billion USD to deal with the humanitarian situation. Some sources estimated that the body count could reach 10,000, while other sources gave larger figures. Around 740,000 of the 863,000 displaced people were inside South Sudan and the rest had fled to neighbouring countries. A fragile ceasefire agreement was reached between both factions in late January. The second round of peace talks took place in mid-February and was mediated by the regional organisation IGAD alongside the ceasefire violations. One of the main subjects of discussion was the release of senior political officials arrested by Salva Kiir’s government that have been accused of treason and attempting a coup d’état, including the former Secretary General of the SPLM, Pagan Amun. The Church of South Sudan and other civil movements and organisations complained that they were left out of the peace talks taking place in Addis Ababa between the parties. The non-governmental organisation MSF said that 240 humanitarian employees of the organisation were forced to flee due to the insecurity, especially in Unity state. Even though both leaders have supporters and opponents from different ethnic groups, the dispute between both factions have led to intercommunity clashes in which the government soldiers of President Salva Kiir have attacked members of the Nuer community (to which Riek Machar belongs), while the rebellion led by the supporters of Riek Machar has focused on persecuting the Dinka group (of which Kiir is a member). In the state of Warrap, 42 people were killed and dozens more were wounded to varying degrees as the result of an attack suspected to have been committed by Machar’s faction, known as the SPLM-in-Opposition, although responsibility for it has still not been claimed. (BBC, 01/02/14; Sudan Tribune, 01 and 02/02/14)

Tension and polarisation rose in Thailand due to the increase in violence against anti-government demonstrations. Five people were killed (four of them children) and more than 50 were injured during various episodes of violence that took place in late February, bringing the toll to 21 fatalities and 720 people wounded since the mass protests began in the final quarter of 2013. Two of the most significant acts of violence against the anti-government protests included the detonation of an explosive device in a shopping centre and a shooting and grenade attack on an opposing concentration. These incidents were condemned by the government, which promised to prosecute those responsible, as well as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who offered his offices to try to resolve the situation. The tension also escalated due to the protest leader’s fresh rejection of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s calls for dialogue, and to his insistence on replacing the current government with an unelected people’s council to enact reforms that the opposition deems necessary. In this regard, the leader of what are called the “red shirts” (traditional groups allied to the current government) warned that the Thai population possessed 10 million arms in a clear threat to the opposition’s actions and aims. Meanwhile, the chief of the Thai Armed Forces rejected any military intervention and said that the current Constitution contains sufficient mechanisms to cope with the current situation, but also warned that the country could become embroiled in a civil war if political and social levels of polarisation persist. (CNN, 25/02/14; ABC News, The Nation, 27/02/14; Reuters, 26/02/14)

The dialogue between the Turkish government and the PKK deteriorated alongside the rise in political and social tensions in Turkey. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, who has been in prison since 1999, held his sixteenth legally authorised meeting in early February with a delegation of Kurdish MPs. Öcalan described the current status of the process as critical and warned of the risks. He also asserted three requirements: the implementation of a legal framework for the negotiations, the formation of observation bodies and a permanent commission to supervise the negotiations. The delegation said that the next meeting, scheduled for early March, would be crucial for the process, as it would coincide with celebrations of the Kurdish New Year (Newroz) and mark a year since Öcalan called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the guerrilla fighters to northern Iraq, a process that was frozen in September. The tension running through the dialogue process comes at the same time as a political crisis rocking Turkey that originated in the exposure of a corruption scandal December that led to a shakeup in the government and purges in the judiciary and the police. Analysts link the political crisis to the struggle between the ruling AKP party and Muslim cleric Fetullah Gülen’s Hizmet movement. According to local media, Hizmet had achieved bases of support in the judiciary and the police. Pressure on the government rose in February, when a recorded telephone call was leaked in which Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recommended that his son get rid of a large amount of money. Erdogan blasted the recording, saying it was a fabrication and a smear. Days before, pro-government media reported that prosecutors had allegedly put illegal wiretaps on thousands of politicians, businessmen, writers and civil society representatives. Furthermore, in February Parliament passed a controversial law that put the supreme body of judges and prosecutors under ministerial control, as well as another law granting the authorities broad powers to control and block access to the Internet. (1-27/02/14, Firat, BBC)

The Public Prosecutor’s office said that 13 people have died and nearly 140 have been injured due to anti-government protests that began on 12 February and continue in various Venezuelan cities such as Caracas, Maracaibo, Táchira, Carabobo and Aragua. However, the government said that 30 people died because they were unable to receive medical attention due to the barricades used by the opposition to block the aforementioned cities. Meanwhile, the opposition said that around 650 people had been detained and that dozens of them had been mistreated. These allegations were confirmed by some human rights organisations, but the government denied having encouraged or allowed human rights violations or any act of torture. President Nicolás Maduro described the protracted protests called by the opposition as an attempted coup d’état and even warned of the arrest of a person who was allegedly orchestrating car bomb attacks. He also convened a Government Federal Council to bring together 23 governors and called for a “national peace conference”. One of the main opposition leaders, Henrique Capriles, refused to participate in either event, claiming that the government solely intended to put an end to the civic protests without making any concessions or enacting any reforms. Another main opposition leader, Leopoldo López, was in a military prison on charges of incitement to violence. During the protests, there were also demonstrations in front of the Cuban Embassy due to protestors’ beliefs that Havana interferes in the internal affairs of Venezuela. Moreover, Maduro called for direct talks with US President Barack Obama to address the support that Caracas has accused the US government of providing to the opposition. (BBC, 25/02/14; El País, 13/02/14; El Universal, 27/02/14)

A presidential committee led by Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi formally approved turning the country into a federal system composed of six regions. The new structure of Yemen will be reflected in the new Constitution, which must be drafted and submitted to a referendum as part of the transition process begun in the country in 2011 after Ali Abdullah Saleh’s departure from power. According to the new federal system, two regions will be created in the south (Aden and Hadramawt) and four in the north (Saba, Janad, Azal and Tahama), with a special status afforded to the capital, Sanaa, and to the port of Aden. Although the measure was raised as an attempt to get around criticism about excessive centralisation and a way to give more autonomy to the southern region, the decision was immediately rejected by southern groups that insist on independence, as well as those that had argued for a two-region federal system with the intention of obtaining a greater share of power and control over areas of the country with oil reserves. At the end of the month, the UN Security Council authorised the imposition of sanctions on individuals or groups that hinder the transition process. Previously, the Security Council had warned of the interference of groups linked to Saleh and to the separatist movement in the south. Meanwhile, during the month Yemen continued to be affected by acts of violence linked to different focal points of the conflict, including the activities of al-Qaeda, the north-south dispute and instability in the north. Thus, International Crisis Group warned that the government needed to adopt urgent measures to prevent a new escalation of violence in the north, where several ceasefire agreements have allowed a temporary and limited halt to clashes between Houthis and Salafists. A new outbreak of violence in this area could further destabilise the country at a time of extreme fragility. Notably, Human Rights Watch called on the United States to investigate a drone attack in December that the organisation claimed killed 12 civilians that were not members of AQAP, as Washington and Yemeni authorities had asserted. (Saba, 10/02/14; BBC, 10/02/14; Reuters, 10 and 26/02/14; al-Jazeera, 27/02/14; ICG, 26/02/14; HRW, 20/02/14; UN News, 26/02/14)

Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu relaunched the negotiating process regarding the conflict on the divided island of Cyprus with a meeting between them under the auspices of the UN on 11 February. The meeting revived the dialogue after an 18-month interruption influenced by Cyprus’ term as rotating presidency of the EU and the financial crisis gripping the island. As an outcome of the meeting, both leaders issued a joint statement that included a seven-point agreement on basic points in line with statements made in previous stages. Thus, Anastasiades and Eroglu’s document described the status quo as unacceptable and warned that it could have negative consequences for both communities of the island if it continued. Second, they pledged to resume the negotiating process with a focus on achieving results, putting all main issues on the table and discussing them interdependently. Furthermore, both leaders set the goal of achieving an agreement as soon as possible, which would be put to separate and simultaneous referendums. Third, they repeated the principles endorsed in the past, that the solution to the conflict was based on a bi-communal, bi-regional federation with political equality. Another point on the agreement repeated that the negotiations were based on the principle that nothing would be agreed until everything was agreed. (UN, Reuters, 11/02/14)

The Libyan government passed a decree that recognised Libyan women raped during the revolt that led to Muammar Gaddafi’s ouster as war victims. During the conflict, the regime’s forces resorted to rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war, according to evidence gathered from various sources, including the International Criminal Court. According to the French newspaper Le Monde, the initiative will also cover women that were forced to offer sexual services to the former dictator and his sons. The legislation, which must still be ratified by Parliament, establishes a series of compensatory measures, including medical and psychological treatment, financial aid, legal assistance in proceedings against their attackers, easier access to education and employment and measures to protect children born of rape. Likewise, it plans to create a special commission that will gather information in a reserved manner on the women affected by sexual violence. The Libyan Minister of Justice saw the decree as a key element for reconciliation in the country and for helping the many women living with the consequences of their abuse. Women’s organisations in Libya welcomed the initiative, which was also praised by international organisations such as the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). During February, new elections were held in Libya to choose the 60 members (20 from each region) of the panel that will draft a new Constitution for the country. The elections were held amidst a climate of frustration and low participation, and in a context of ongoing violence. (Le Monde, BBC and New York Times, 20/02/14)

Sushil Koirala, the President of the Nepali Congress party, was appointed Prime Minister by the recently elected Parliament based on the commitment to enact a new Constitution for Nepal within one year. Other political forces represented in Parliament also insisted that this timeframe of one year be respected. Koirala received the support of the CPN-UML party, with whom he will form a government coalition, although his candidacy was rejected by the Maoist UCPN-M party and other parties with less representation in Parliament. However, the Maoists said they would take a proactive role in drafting the new Constitution to guarantee its federal, democratic and republic nature. Meanwhile, the CPN-UML released the names of the ten party members that will hold ministerial posts in the new coalition government with the Nepalese Congress. The formation of the new should help to put an end to the political crisis and institutional paralysis that the country has undergone in recent years. (Nepalnews, 10, 19, 25, 26/02/14; New York Times, 10/02/14)